Case Study of Nuclear Disaster: Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant

Abstract
This case study is carried out in as a part of Human Values and Professional Ethics-II course, which is also
partially responsible for completion of Bachelor of Technology degree. The aim of this case study is to make
students understand the various concepts of human errors and the impact of disasters on human life. The
motivation for this provided to them by their subject mentor and the students were guided time to time for
the same.

Introduction
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant also known as Fukushima Dai-ichi is located on a 3.5-square-kilometre
(860-acre) between the towns of Futaba and Okuma of Fukushima Prefecture, Japan. The plant consists of
six boiling water reactors (BWR). These light water reactors drove electrical generators with a combined
power of 4.7 GW, making Fukushima Daiichi one of the 15 largest nuclear power stations in the world. First
nuclear power plant was designed, built, and was run in conjunction with General Electric, Boise, and Tokyo
Electric Power Company (TEPCO).
March 11, 2011, the 9.0 earthquake and followed by a not expected tsunami to hit at the power plant factory
in Japan cause a major damage to the plant. It triggered the evacuation zone of 30 km around the plant
which would lead to nuclear radiation leak. The earthquake and tsunami had disabled the cooling system of
the nuclear reactor. As of April 2012, Units 1-4 are no longer in operation. In Unit 1 to shut down on April
20, unit 2-4, closed on April 19, 2012 while was the last of these four units. It was the most powerful
disaster that have been hit the country so far. It has resulted in a massive tsunami that destroyed many towns
and villages, nearly have led to 20 000 people death.

Inside the Fukushima Daiichi reactors

The Fukushima Daiichi reactors are GE boiling water reactors (BWR) of an early (1960s) design supplied
by GE, Toshiba and Hitachi, with what is known as a Mark I containment. Reactors 1-3 came into
commercial operation 1971-75. Reactor capacity is 460 MWe for unit 1, 784 MWe for units 2-5, and 1100
MWe for unit 6.
The Disaster
When the power failed at 3.42 pm, about one hour after shutdown of the fission reactions, the reactor cores
would still be producing about 1.5% of their nominal thermal power, from fission product decay – about 22
MW in unit 1 and 33 MW in units 2&3. Without heat removal by circulation to an outside heat exchanger,
this produced a lot of steam in the reactor pressure vessels housing the cores, and this was released into the
dry primary containment (PCV) through safety valves. Later this was accompanied by hydrogen, produced
by the interaction of the fuel's very hot zirconium cladding with steam after the water level dropped.
As pressure started to rise here, the steam was directed into the suppression chamber/ wetwell under the
reactor, within the containment, but the internal temperature and pressure nevertheless rose quite rapidly.
Water injection commenced, using the various systems provide for this and finally the Emergency Core
Cooling System (ECCS). These systems progressively failed over three days, so from early Saturday water
injection to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) was with fire pumps, but this required the internal pressures to
be relieved initially by venting into the suppression chamber/ wetwell. Seawater injection into unit 1 began
at 7pm on Saturday 12th, into unit 3 on 13th and unit 2 on 14th. Tepco management ignored an instruction
from the prime minister to cease the seawater injection into unit 1, and this instruction was withdrawn
shortly afterwards.
Inside unit 1, it is understood that the water level dropped to the top of the fuel about three hours after the
scram (about 6 pm) and the bottom of the fuel 1.5 hours later (7.30 pm). The temperature of the exposed fuel
rose to some 2800°C so that the central part started to melt after a few hours and by 16 hours after the scram
(7 am Saturday) most of it had fallen into the water at the bottom of the RPV. After that, RPV temperatures
decreased steadily.
As pressure rose, attempts were made to vent the containment, and when external power and compressed air
sources were harnessed this was successful, by about 2.30 pm Saturday, though some manual venting was
apparently achieved at about 10.17 am. The venting was designed to be through an external stack, but in the
absence of power much of it apparently back-flowed to the service floor at the top of the reactor building,
representing a serious failure of this system (though another possibility is leakage from the drywell). The
vented steam, noble gases and aerosols were accompanied by hydrogen. At 3.36 pm on Saturday 12th, there
was a hydrogen explosion on the service floor of the building above unit 1 reactor containment, blowing off
the roof and cladding on the top part of the building, after the hydrogen mixed with air and ignited.
(Oxidation of the zirconium cladding at high temperatures in the presence of steam produces hydrogen
exothermically, with this exacerbating the fuel decay heat problem.)
In unit 1 most of the core – as corium comprised of melted fuel and control rods – was assumed to be in the
bottom of the RPV, but later it appeared that it had mostly gone through the bottom of the RPV and eroded
about 65 cm into the drywell concrete below (which is 2.6 m thick). This reduced the intensity of the heat
and enabled the mass to solidify.
Much of the fuel in units 2&3 also apparently melted to some degree, but to a lesser extent than in unit 1,
and a day or two later. In mid-May 2011 the unit 1 core would still be producing 1.8 MW of heat, and units
2&3 would be producing about 3.0 MW each.
In mid-2013 the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) confirmed that the earthquake itself had caused no
damage to unit 1.
In unit 2, water injection using the steam-driven back-up water injection system failed on Monday 14th, and
it was about six hours before a fire pump started injecting seawater into the RPV. Before the fire pump could
be used RPV pressure had to be relieved via the wetwell, which required power and nitrogen, hence the
delay. Meanwhile the reactor water level dropped rapidly after back-up cooling was lost, so that core
damage started about 8 pm, and it is now provisionally understood that much of the fuel then melted and
probably fell into the water at the bottom of the RPV about 100 hours after the scram. Pressure was vented
on 13th and again on 15th, and meanwhile the blowout panel near the top of the building was opened to
avoid a repetition of unit 1 hydrogen explosion. Early on Tuesday 15th, the pressure suppression chamber
under the actual reactor seemed to rupture, possibly due to a hydrogen explosion there, and the drywell
containment pressure inside dropped. However, subsequent inspection of the suppression chamber did not
support the rupture interpretation. Later analysis suggested that a leak of the primary containment developed
on Tuesday 15th. Most of the radioactive releases from the site appeared to come from unit 2.
In Unit 3, the main back-up water injection system failed at about 11 am on Saturday 12th and early on
Sunday 13th, water injection using the high pressure system failed also and water levels dropped
dramatically. RPV pressure was reduced by venting steam into the wetwell, allowing injection of seawater
using a fire pump from just before noon. Early on Sunday venting the suppression chamber and containment
was successfully undertaken. It is now understood that core damage started about 5:30 am and much or all
of the fuel melted on the morning of Sunday 13th and fell into the bottom of the RPV, with some probably
going through the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel and onto the concrete below.
Early on Monday 14th PCV venting was repeated, and this evidently backflowed to the service floor of the
building, so that at 11 am a very large hydrogen explosion here above unit 3 reactor containment blew off
much of the roof and walls and demolished the top part of the building. This explosion created a lot of
debris, and some of that on the ground near unit 3 was very radioactive.
In defuelled unit 4, at about 6 am on Tuesday 15 March, there was an explosion which destroyed the top of
the building and damaged unit 3's superstructure further. This was apparently from hydrogen arising in unit
3 and reaching unit 4 by backflow in shared ducts when vented from unit 3.
Units 1-3: Water has been injected into each of the three reactor units more or less continuously, and in the
absence of normal heat removal via external heat exchanger this water was boiling off for some months. In
the government report to IAEA in June it was estimated that to the end of May about 40% of the injected
water boiled off, and 60% leaked out the bottom. In June 2011 this was adding to the contaminated water on
site by about 500 m3 per day. In January 2013 4.5 to 5.5 m3/hr was being added to each RPV via core spray
and feed water systems, hence 370 m3 per day, and temperatures at the bottom of RPVs were 19°C in unit 1
and 32°C in units 2&3, at little above atmospheric pressure.
There was a peak of radioactive release on 15th, apparently mostly from unit 2, but the precise source
remains uncertain. Due to volatile and easily-airborne fission products being carried with the hydrogen and
steam, the venting and hydrogen explosions discharged a lot of radioactive material into the atmosphere,
notably iodine and caesium. NISA said in June that it estimated that 800-1000 kg of hydrogen had been
produced in each of the units.
Nitrogen is being injected into the containment vessels (PCVs) of all three reactors to remove concerns
about further hydrogen explosions, and in December this was started also for the pressure vessels. Gas
control systems which extract and clean the gas from the PCV to avoid leakage of caesium have been
commissioned for all three units.
Throughout 2011 injection into the RPVs of water circulated through the new water treatment plant
achieved relatively effective cooling, and temperatures at the bottom of the RPVs were stable in the range
60-76°C at the end of October, and 27-54°C in mid-January 2012. RPV pressures ranged from atmospheric
to slightly above (102-109 kPa) in January, due to water and nitrogen injection. However, since they are
leaking, the normal definition of "cold shutdown" does not apply, and Tepco waited to bring radioactive
releases under control before declaring "cold shutdown condition" in mid-December, with NISA's approval.
This, with the prime minister's announcement of it, formally brought to a close the 'accident' phase of events.
The AC electricity supply from external source was connected to all units by 22 March. Power was restored
to instrumentation in all units except unit 3 by 25 March. However, radiation levels inside the plant were so
high that normal access was impossible until June.

Event sequence following earthquake

EVENT UNIT 1 UNIT 2 UNIT 3
Loss of AC power + 51 min + 54 min + 52 min
Loss of cooling + 1 hour + 70 hours + 36 hours
Water level down to top of fuel* + 3 hours + 74 hours + 42 hours
Core damage starts* + 4 hours + 77 hours + 44 hours
Reactor pressure vessel damage* +11 hours uncertain uncertain
Fire pumps with fresh water + 15 hours + 43 hours
+ 25 hours + 87 hours + 68 hours
Hydrogen explosion (not confirmed for
service suppression service
unit 2)
floor chamber floor
Fire pumps with seawater + 28 hours + 77 hours + 46 hours
Off-site electrical supply + 11-15 days
Fresh water cooling + 14-15 days
* according to 2012 MAAP analysis.
Tepco has written off the four reactors damaged by the accident, and is decommissioning them.
By March 2016 total decay heat in units 1-3 had dropped to 1 MW for all three, about 1% of the original
level, meaning that cooling water injection – then 100 m3/d – could be interrupted for up to two days.
Results of muon measurements in unit 2 in 2016 indicate that most of the fuel debris in unit 2 is in the
bottom of the reactor vessel.

Radiation exposure on the plant site

By the end of 2011, Tepco had checked the radiation exposure of 19,594 people who had worked on the site
since 11 March. For many of these both external dose and internal doses (measured with whole-body
counters) were considered. It reported that 167 workers had received doses over 100 mSv. Of these 135 had
received 100 to 150 mSv, 23 150-200 mSv, three more 200-250 mSv, and six had received over 250 mSv
(309 to 678 mSv) apparently due to inhaling iodine-131 fume early on. The latter included the two unit 3-4
control room operators in the first two days who had not been wearing breathing apparatus. There were up to
200 workers on site each day. Recovery workers are wearing personal monitors, with breathing apparatus
and protective clothing which protect against alpha and beta radiation. So far over 3500 of some 3700
workers at the damaged Daiichi plant have received internal check-ups for radiation exposure, giving whole
body count estimates. The level of 250 mSv was the allowable maximum short-term dose for Fukushima
Daiichi accident clean-up workers through to December 2011, 500 mSv is the international allowable short-
term dose "for emergency workers taking life-saving actions". Since January 2012 the allowable maximum
has reverted to 50 mSv/yr.
Six workers received radiation doses apparently over the 250 mSv level set by NISA, but at levels below
those which would cause radiation sickness.

Public health and return of evacuees

Permanent return remains a high priority, and the evacuation zone is being decontaminated where required
and possible, so that evacuees (81,000 from this accident according to METI) can return without undue
delay. There are many cases of evacuation stress including transfer trauma among evacuees, and once the
situation had stabilised at the plant these outweighed the radiological hazards of returning, with over 1000
deaths reported (see below). There were also 267,000 tsunami survivor refugees remaining displaced in
February 2014.
In December 2011 the government said that where annual radiation dose would be below 20 mSv/yr, the
government would help residents return home as soon as possible and assist local municipalities with
decontamination and repair of infrastructure. In areas where radiation levels are over 20 mSv/yr evacuees
will be asked to continue living elsewhere for “a few years” until the government completes
decontamination and recovery work. The government said it would consider purchasing land and houses
from residents of these areas if the evacuees wish to sell them.
In November 2013 the NRA decided to change the way radiation exposure was estimated. Instead of
airborne surveys being the basis, personal dosimeters would be used, giving very much more accurate
figures, often much less than airborne estimates. The same criteria would be used, as above, with 20 mSv/yr
being the threshold of concern to authorities.
Many evacuated people remain unable to fully return home due to government-mandated restrictions based
on conservative radiation exposure criteria. However, over 1000 premature deaths have been caused by
maintaining the evacuation beyond a prudent week or so. Decontamination work is proceeding while
radiation levels decline naturally. The October 2013 IAEA report makes it clear that many evacuees should
be allowed to return home.
IRID and NDF involvement
The International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID) was set up in August 2013 Japan
by JAEA, Japanese utilities and reactor vendors, with a focus on Fukushima 1-4.
In September 2013 IRID called for submissions on the management of contaminated water at Fukushima. In
particular, proposals were sought for dealing with: the accumulation of contaminated water (in storage tanks,
etc); the treatment of contaminated water including tritium removal; the removal of radioactive materials
from the seawater in the plant's 30 ha harbour; the management of contaminated water inside the buildings;
measures to block groundwater from flowing into the site; and, understanding the flow of
groundwater. Responses were submitted to the government in November.
In December 2013 IRID called for innovative proposals for removing fuel debris from units 1-3 about 2020.
In August 2014 the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF)
was set up by government as a planning body with management support for R&D projects, taking over
IRID’s planning role. It will work closely with IRID, whose focus now is on developing mid- and long-term
decommissioning technologies. NDF will also work closely with Tepco Fukushima Daiichi D&D
Engineering Co. which has responsibility for operating the actual decommissioning work there. The NDF
will be the main body interacting with government (METI) to implement policy.

Summary
Fukushima accident, also called Fukushima nuclear accident or Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident,
accident in 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi (“Number One”) plant in northern Japan, the second worst
nuclear accident in the history of nuclear power generation. The site is on Japan’s Pacific coast, in
northeastern Fukushima prefecture about 100 km (60 miles) south of Sendai. The facility, operated by the
Tokyo Electric and Power Company (TEPCO), was made up of six boiling-water reactors constructed
between 1971 and 1979. At the time of the accident, only reactors 1–3 were operational, and reactor 4
served as temporary storage for spent fuel rods.
TEPCO officials reported that tsunami waves generated by the main shock of the Japan earthquake on
March 11, 2011, damaged the backup generators at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Although all three of the
reactors that were operating were successfully shut down, the loss of power caused cooling systems to fail in
each of them within the first few days of the disaster. Rising residual heat within each reactor’s core caused
the fuel rods in reactors 1, 2, and 3 to overheat and partially melt down, leading at times to the release of
radiation. Melted material fell to the bottom of the containment vessels in reactors 1 and 2 and bored sizable
holes in the floor of each vessel—a fact that emerged in late May. Those holes partially exposed the nuclear
material in the cores. Explosions resulting from the buildup of pressurized hydrogen gas occurred in the
outer containment buildings enclosing reactors 1 and 3 on March 12 and March 14, respectively. Workers
sought to cool and stabilize the three cores by pumping seawater and boric acid into them. Because of
concerns over possible radiation exposure, government officials established a 30-km (18-mile) no-fly zone
around the facility, and a land area of 20-km (12.5-mile) radius around the plant—which covered nearly 600
square km (approximately 232 square miles)—was evacuated.
On April 12 nuclear regulators elevated the severity level of the nuclear emergency from 5 to 7—the highest
level on the scale created by the International Atomic Energy Agency—placing it in the same category as
the Chernobyl accident, which had occurred in the Soviet Union in 1986. It was not until the middle of
December 2011 that Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko declared the facility stable, after the cold
shutdown of the reactors was completed.
A second, but smaller, nuclear accident took place in August 2013 when approximately 300 tonnes of
irradiated water used in ongoing cooling operations in reactors 1, 2, and 3 was discharged into the landscape
surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi facility. TEPCO officials reported that the leak was the result of an open
valve in the short barrier wall that surrounded several of the tanks used in radioactive water storage. The
leak was severe enough to prompt Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority to classify it as a level-3 nuclear
incident.