Primicias v. Fugoso

10/28/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 080
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of

Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner, vs. VALERIANO E.
FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT TO FREEDOM OF

SPEECH AND TO PEACEFULLY ASSEMBLE AND
PETITION GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES, NOT ABSOLUTE; REGULATION
UNDER POLICE POWER; POLICE POWER, BY WHOM
EXERCISED.—The right to freedom of speech, and to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of
the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies
that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may
be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is
exercised by the government through its legislative branch
by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to
political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and
cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called
municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the
purpose.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POLICE POWER

DELEGATED TO MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA.—
The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of
the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, which according to section 2439 of the
Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City.
Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal
Board, among others, the following legislative powers, to
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e0f6f1ed7fbf9947a003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/57
wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of

riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u)
to regulate the use of streets. avenues, * * * parks,
cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement
of nuisances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances
it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MEETING AND ASSEMBLY IN

STREET OR PUBLIC PLACE IN MANILA,
REGULATION OF.—As there is no express and
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72 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Primicias vs. Fugoso
separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City of

Manila regulating the holding of public meeting or
assembly at any streets or public places, the provision of
section 1119 of said Ordinance to the effect, among others,
"that the holding of any parade or procession in any
streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit
therefor is first secured from the Mayor, who shall, on
every such occasion, determine or specify the streets or
public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of
such parade or procession," may be applied by analogy to
meeting and assembly in any street or public places.
4. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; POWER OF MAYOR TO

GRANT PERMIT FOR HOLDING ASSEMBLY OR
MEETING, PARADE OR PROCESSION, SCOPE OF.—
Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of
Manila is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the
Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated
discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the
City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the
right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor,
subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used
for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and
public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. This court

has adopted the second construction, namely, that said
provision does not confer upon the Mayor the power to
refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or
public places where the parade or procession may pass or
the meeting may be held. The ordinance cannot be
construed as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or
refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to
authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and
other public places for holding of meetings, parades or
processions, because such a construction would make the
ordinance invalid and void or violative of the
constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Board is
empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks and
other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in
section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means
and includes the power to control, to govern and to
restrain, but can not be construed as synonymous with
"suppress" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41
Phil., 103), the Municipal Board cannot grant the Mayor a
power which it does not have. Besides, as the powers and
duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are
executive,
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VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 73
and one of them is "to comply with and enforce and give
the necessary orders for the faithful performance and
execution of the laws and ordinances (section 2434 [b] of
the Revised Administrative Code), the legislative police
power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances
regulating reasonably the exercise 01 the fundamental
personal right of the citizens in the streets and other
public places, cannot be delegated to the Mayor or any
other officer by conferring upon him. unregulated
discretion or without laying down rules to guide and
control his action by which its impartial execution can be
secured or partiality and oppression prevented.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 2434 OF

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE GRANTING MAYOR POWER
TO GRANT OR REFUSE MUNICIPAL LICENSES OR
PERMITS OF ALL CLASSES, NOT APPLICABLE.—
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the

Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the
Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal
licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an
authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the
petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is
predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal
Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the
Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a
specific or substantive power independent from the
corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as
Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under
the same section 2434. Moreover "one of the settled
maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred
upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by
that department to any other body or authority," except
certain powers of local government, specially of police
regulations which are conferred upon the legislative body
of a municipal corporation. Taking this into consideration,
and that the police power to regulate the use of streets
and other public places has been delegated or rather
conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of
the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code), it is
to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same
breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the
same power, specially 'in view of the fact that its exercise
may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by
the Municipal Board.
6. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; NULLITY OF

UNLIMITED POWER OF MAYOR TO GRANT OR
REFUSE PERMIT FOR USE OF STREET AND PUBLIC
PLACE FOR PROCESSIONS, PARADES OR
MEETINGS.—Assuming arguendo that the Legislature
has the power to confer, and
74
in fact has conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant

or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent
from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the
matter, and the provisions of section 2444 (u) of the same
Code and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the
contrary notwithstanding, such grant of unregulated and

unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of
streets and other public places for processions, parades, or
meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons
stated in the decisions in the cases cited in the opinion,
specially in Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire (312 U.
S., 569), wherein the question involved was also the
validity of a similar statute of New Hampshire. Because
the same constitutional limitations applicable to
ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a
municipal ordinance which grants unrestrained discretion
upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that
confers unlimited power to any officer either of the
municipal or state governments. Under the democratic
system of government in the Philippines, no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of
the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency. As stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering
(84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104) "The discretion with which
the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised
within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to
transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary
authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for
refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground
to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the
fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing
groups, remain bitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the
duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As
the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a
peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that
fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage,
the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be
given any consideration. It does not make comfort and
convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of
official action. It enables the Mayor to refuse the permit
on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the
record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary
suppression of free expression of views
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VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 75
on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will

U' doubtedly prevent such eventualities. (Hague vs.
Committee on Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496; 83
Law. ed., 1423.)
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Ramon Diokno for petitioner.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal
Julio Villamor for respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitioner

Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties against Valeriano Fugoso, as Mayor of the
City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday
afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the
ground that the respondent refused to grant such permit.
Due to the urgency of the case, this Court, after mature
deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in
the petition on November 15, 1947, without prejudice to
writing later an extended and reasoned decision.
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacef ully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of
democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights
is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power
to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people.
76

This sovereign police power is exercised by the government

through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws
regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights,
and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their
legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to
enact ordinances for the purpose.
The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of
the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, which according to section 2439 of the
Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City.
Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board,
among others, the following legislative powers, to wit: "(p)
to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots,
affrays, disturbances and disorderly assemblies, (u) to
regulate the use of streets, avenues, * * * parks, cemeteries
and other public places" and "for the abatement of
nuisances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it
may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."
Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and 1119.
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as
an offense against public peace, and section 1262 of the
same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any
act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:
"SEC. 1119. Free for use of public.—The streets and public places
of the city shall be kept f ree and clear f or the use of the public,
and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same
shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by
ordinance or regulation: Provided, That the holding of athletic
games, sports, or exercises during the celebration of national
holidays in any streets
77
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 77

or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any
district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued
by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places, or
portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises
may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of any
parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited
unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor, who
shall, on every such occasion, determine or specify the streets or
public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such
parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications
to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not
less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or
procession."
As there is no express and separate provision in the

Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the holding of
public meeting or assembly at any street or public places,
the provisions of said section 1119 regarding the holding of
any parade or procession in any street or public places may
be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any
street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is
that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit
for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City
of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right
to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject
only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used for the
purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by over-' lapping,
to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the
conclusion that we must adopt the second construction,
that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to
mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to
refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or
public places where the parade or procession may pass or
the meeting may be held.
78

Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of

Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569. In
that case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L. chap, 145,
section 2, providing that "no parade or procession upon any
ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a
special license therefor shall first be obtained from the
selectmen of the town or from licensing committee," was
construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not
conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to
ref use to grant the license, and held valid. And the
Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941)
penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of
the State Supreme Court, held that "a statute requiring
persons using the public streets for a parade or procession
to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the
rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press,
where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner
of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *."
We cannot adopt the other alternative construction or
construe the ordinance under consideration as conferring
upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the
permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to
prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a
construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or
violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal
Board is empowered only to regulate the use of streets,
parks, and other public places, and the word "regulate," as
used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code,
means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to
restrain, but can not be construed as syno-
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VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 79

Primicias vs. Fugoo
nymous with "suppress" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City

of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal Board can not
grant the Mayor a power which it does not have. Besides,
as the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief
Executive of the City are executive, and one of them is "to
comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for
the faithful performance and execution of the laws and
ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative
Code), the legislative police power of the Municipal Board
to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the exercise of
the fundamental personal right of the citizens in the
streets and other public places, can not be delegated to the
Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him
unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to
guide and control his action by which its impartial
execution can be secured or partiality and oppression
prevented.
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 111., 430, it was held
by the Supreme Court of Illinois that, under Rev. St. 111. c.
24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to
regulate the use of the public streets, the council has no
power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon
the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the
superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such
permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on the
council cannot be delegated by them.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State ex rel.
Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104, held the
f ollowing:
"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke,

49 Md., 217, were also, in substance, the same, for the ordinance
in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained will of a
single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or
control his action, and it was held void because 'it lays down no
rules by which its impartial execution can be secured, or
partiality and oppression prevented,' and that 'when we
remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or
prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and
other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and
difficult to be de-
80

tected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to

comment upon the injustice capable of being wrought under cover
of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who gives
to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance
which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls
within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it

inoperative and void.' * * * In the exercise of the police power, the
common council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of
such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them,
directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing
so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the
council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the
limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer
upon any city officer an arbitrary authority, making him in its
exercise a petty tyrant."
In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N. W., 72,' a city

ordinance providing that "no person or persons, or
associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride, or
drive, in or upon or through the public streets of the City of
Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners, flags, * *
* without having first obtained the consent of the mayor or
common council of said city;" was held by the Supreme
Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said
Supreme Court in the course of its decision held:
"* * * We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it

assumes to grant, so far as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as
only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will
enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in
accordance with the limitations and conditions required by the
rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of
law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under a
constitution than under the common law.
"It is quite possible that some things have a greater -tendency
to produce danger and disorder in the cities than in smaller towns
or in rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary
measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend
beyond the fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and
no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action
altogether can be granted at all. * * *
"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free
countries, and in most civilized countries, for people who are
assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or
reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia,
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VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 81

Primicias vs, Fugoso
and with music of various kinds. These processions for political,

religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for the
express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and
frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the

spectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural product and
exponent of common aims, and valuable factors in furthering
them. * * * When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for
purposes opposed to private or public security, they become
unlawf ul, and their members and abettors become punishable. *
**
"It is only when political, religious, social, or other
demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate as
nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or
private or private mischief, that the law interferes.
"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in
general perfectly lawful, and because it leaves the power of
permitting or restraining processions, and their courses, to an
unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if
regulated at all, must be by permanent, legal provisions,
operating generally and impartially."
In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 111., App. 222, the question was

raised as to the validity of the city ordinance which made it
unlawful f or any person, society or club, or association of
any kind, to parade any of the streets, with flags, banners,
or transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical
instruments, without the permission of the city council first
had and obtained. The appellants were members of the
Salvation Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the
ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance invalid
said, "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they
must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial;
they must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement to
rest in official discretion * * * Ever since the landing of the
Pilgrims from the Mayflower the right to assemble and
worship according to the dictates of one's conscience, and
the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful
purpose, have been fostered and regarded as among the f
undamental rights of a f ree people. The spirit of our free
institutions allows great latitude in public parades and
demonstrations whether religious or political * * * If this
ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off
the parades of those whose nations
82

do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and

permit like parades of those whose notions do. When men
in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise

power so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of
our free institutions violated. * * * Where the granting of
the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small
body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The
law abhors partiality and discrimination. * * *" (19 L. R. A.,
p. 861.)
In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col.,
427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in
construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273
of the City of Walsenburg, which provides: "That it shall be
unlawful for any person or persons or association to use the
street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado, for any parade,
procession or assemblage without first obtaining a permit
from the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do,"
held the following:
"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate

the use of public streets is conceded. '35 C.S.A., chapter 163,
section 10, subparagraph 7. 'The privilege of a citizen of the
United States to use the streets * * * may be regulated in the
interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.'
Hague, Mayor, vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U.S., 496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423.
[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to
impose regulations in the use of public streets is found in the
recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569; 61 S. Ct.,
762, 765; 85 Law. ed., 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the
following appears: 'The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.
The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar
illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction
of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest
83
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 83

of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some

civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red
traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the
municipal command or sought by that means to direct public
attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the
use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional
exercise of control by local government, the question in a
particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny
or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the
opportunities for the communication of thought and the
discussion of public questions immemorially associated with
resort to public places. Lovell -vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451; 58 S.
Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949 [953]; Hague vs. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954,
963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of
New Jersey [Town of Irvington]; 308 U. S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct.,
146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310
U.S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219,
1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352.'
[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an
ordinance which leaves to the uncontrolled official discretion of
the thief of police of a municipal corporation to say who shall, and
who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public
streets. No standard of regulation is even remotely suggested.
Moreover, under the ordinance as drawn, the chief of police may
for any reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this
privilege to any group. This is authorization of the exercise of
arbitrary power by a governmental agency which violates the
Fourteenth Amendment. People vs. Harris, 104 Colo., 386, 394; 91
P. [2d], 989; 122 A.L.R. 1034. Such an ordinance is unreasonable
and void on its face. City of Chicago vs. Troter, 136 111., 430; 26
N. E., 359. See, also, Anderson vs. City of Wellington, 40 Kan.
173; 19 P., 719; 2 L.R.A., 110; 10 Am. St. Rep., 175; State ex rel.
vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104:19 L. R. A., 858, 36 Am.
St. Rep., 948; Anderson vs. Tedford, 80 Fla., 376; 85 So., 673; 10
A. L. R., 1481; State vs. Coleman, 96 Conn., 190; 113 A. 385, 387;
43 C. J., p. 419, section 549; 44 C. J., p, 1036, section 3885. * * *
"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the
privilege of using the public streets in a lawful manner clearly is
apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and we
therefore hold it null and void."
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs.

Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515,
516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal
84

ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public

assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public
parks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the
director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots,
disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a
permit when after investigation of all the facts and
circumstances pertinent to the application he believes it to
be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise
of the police power. Said Court in the course of its opinion
in support of the conclusion said:
"* * * Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with
peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation,
be abridged or denied.
"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance
quoted in Note 1 void upon its face. It does not make comfort or
convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official
action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his
mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or
disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be
made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of
views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will
undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official
suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the
duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the
right."
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the,

Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the
Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal
licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an
authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the
petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is
85
VOL. 80, J ANUARY 27, 1948 85

predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal

Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the
Mayor, such as those found in. Chapters 40 to 87 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a
specific or substantive power independent from the
corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as
Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the
same section 2484. Moreover "one of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make 'laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority," except certain
powers of local government, specially of police regulation
which are conferred upon the legislative body of a
municipal corporation. Taking this into consideration, and
that the police power to regulate the use of streets and
other public places has been delegated or rather conferred
by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City
(section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be
presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath,
conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same
power, specially if we take into account that its exercise
may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by
the Municipal Board.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has
the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the
Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of
all classes, independent from ordinances enacted by the
Municipal Board on the matter, and the provisions of.
section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section 1119 of the
Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, such
grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or
refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public
places for processions, parades, or meetings, would be null
and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in
the cases above quoted, specially in Willis Cox vs. New
Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved was also
the validity of a similar statute of New Hamsphire.
Because the same constitutional limitations applicable to
86

ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a

municipal ordinance which grants unrestrained discretion
upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that
confers unlimited power to any officer either of the
municipal or state governments. Under our democratic
system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except
perhaps in cases of national emergency. As stated in State
ex rel Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The discretion with
which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be
exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion
to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an
arbitrary authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."
It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of
article 2434 (m) of the Administrative Code apparently in
support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs.
Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255-261, but evidently the quotation of
said provision was made by the writer of the decision under
a mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter
dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision rendered.
The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held
therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines was
clearly an unlawf ul one, and theref ore the Mayor of the
City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied
for. On the contrary, had the meeting been held, it was his
duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation
of section 844, which is punishable as misdemeanor by
section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and
principles advocated and urged in the Constitution and by-
laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and
the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members
in the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are
highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious
conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful
authorities in their duty."
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for
refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground
87
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 87

to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the

fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing
groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in their government, and in the duly

constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of
the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request
of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public
meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt
that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for
the refusal of the permit can not be given any
consideration. As stated in the portion of the decision in
Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It
does not make comfort and convenience in the use of
streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables
the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere
opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or
disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses,
be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free
expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition
of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we
make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his
concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S.
(Law. ed.), 1105-1107:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free

speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must
be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one * * *.
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty. * * *
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to
prohibition of these functions essential effective democracy,
unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of
free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would
be inappropriate
88

as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. * *

* The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent
crimes are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly." Whitney
vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is

granted and, there appearing no reasonable objection to the
use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied
for, the respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding
permit, as requested. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, and Briones,

JJ., concur.
PARÁS, J., concurring:
The subject-matter of the petition is not new in this

jurisdiction. Under Act No. 2774, section 4, amending
section 2434, paragraph (m) of the Revised Administrative
Code, the Mayor has discretion to grant or deny the
petition to hold the meeting. (See Evangelista vs.
Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255.) And, in the case of U. S. vs.
Apurado, 7 Phil., 422, 426, this Court said:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark

the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a
rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to
seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual
members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as
a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then
the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances
would become a delusion and share and the attempt to exercise it
on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner
would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to
attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities. If
89
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 89

instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty

individuals should be sought out and punished therefor."
The petitioner is a distinguished member of the bar and

Floor Leader of the Nacionalista Party in the House of
Representatives; he was the chief campaigner of the said
party in the last elections. As the petition comes from a
responsible party, in contrast to Evangelista's Communist
Party which was considered subversive, I believe that the
fear which caused the Mayor to deny it was not well
founded and his action was accordingly far from being a
sound exercise of his discretion.
BRIONES, M., conforme:
En nombre del Partido Nacionalista y de los grupos

oposicionistas aliados, Cipriano P. Primicias, director
general de campaña de las minorías coaligadas en las
últimas elecciones y "Floor Leader" de dichas minorías en
la Cámara de Representantes, solicitó del Alcalde de
Manila en comunicación de fecha 14 de Noviembre, 1947,
permiso "para celebrar un mitin público en la Plaza
Miranda el Domingo, 16 de Noviembre, 1947, desde las
5:00 p.m. hasta la 1:00 a.m., a fin de pedir al gobierno el
remedio de ciertos agravios." También se pedía en la
comunicación licencia para usar la plataforma ya levantada
en dicha Plaza.
El Vice-Alcalde César Miraflor actuó sobre la solicitud
en aquel mismo día dando permiso tanto para la
celebración del mitin como para el uso de la plataforma, "en
la inteligencia de que no se pronunciarán discursos
subversivos, y además, de que usted (el solicitante) será
responsable del mantenimiento de la paz y orden durante
la celebración del mitin."
Sin embargo, al día siguiente, 15 de Noviembre, el
Alcalde Valeriano E. Fugoso revocó el permiso concedido,
expresándose los motivos de la revocación en su carta de tal
fecha dirigida al Rep. Primicias.
"Sírvase dar por informado—dice el Alcalde Fugoso en su carta—

que después de haber leido los periódicos metropolitanos de esta
90

mañana en que aparece que vuestro mitin va a ser un 'rally' de

indignación en donde se denunciarán ante el pueblo los supuestos
fraudes electorales perpetrados en varias partes de Filipinas para

anular la voluntad popular, por la presente se revoca dicho
permiso.
"Se cree—añade el Alcalde—que la paz y el orden en Manila
sufrirán daño en dicho 'rally' considerando que las pasiones
todavía no se han calmado y la tension sigue alta como resultado
de la última contienda política.
"Según los mismos periódicos, delegados venidos de provincias
y estudiantes de las universidades locales participarán en el
'rally,' lo cual, a mi juicio, no haría más que causar disturbios,
pues no se puede asegurar que concurrirán allí solamente
elementos de la oposición. Desde el momento en que se mezclen
entre la multitud gentes de diferentes matices políticos, que es lo
que probablemente va a ocurrir, el orden queda en peligro una vez
que al público se le excite, como creo que será excitado, teniendo
en cuenta los fines del mitin tal como han sido anunciados en los
periódicos mencionados.
"Se dice que los resultados de las últimas elecciones serán
protestados. No hay base para este proceder toda vez que los
resultados todavía no han sido oficialmente anunciados.
"Por tanto—termina el Alcalde su orden revocatoria—la acción
de esta oficina se toma en interés del orden público y para
prevenir la perturbación de la paz en Manila."
De ahí el presente recurso de mandamus para que se

ordene al Alcalde recurrido a que expida inmediatamente el
permiso solicitado Se pide también que ordenemos al
Procurador General para que investigue la fase criminal
del caso y formule la acción que justifiquen las
circunstancias.
Dada la premura del asunto, se llamó inmediatamente a
vista arguyendo extensamente los abogados 1
de ambas
partes ante esta Corte en sus informes orales.
El recurso se funda, respecto de su aspecto civil, en el
artículo III, sección 1, inciso 8 de la Constitución de
Filipinas, el cual preceptúa "que no se aprobará ninguna
ley que cuarte la libertad de la palabra, o de la prensa, o el
derecho del pueblo de reunirse pacíficamente y dirigir
petiticiones al
_______________
1 El letrado Sr. D. Ramón Diokno, en representación del recurrente, y el

Fiscal Auxiliar de Manila D. Julio Villamor, en representación del
recurrido.
91
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 91

gobierno para remedio de sus agravios." Con respecto al

posible aspecto criminal del caso se invoca el artículo 131
del Código Penal Revisado, el cual dispone que "la pena de
prisión correccional en su período mínimo, se impondrá al
funcionario público o empleado que, sin fundamento legal,
prohibiere o interrumpiere una reunion pacífica, o
disolviere la misma."
La defensa del recurrido invoca a su favor los llamados
poderes de policía que le asisten como guardian legal de las
plazas, calles y demás lugares públicos. Se alega que como
Alcalde de la Ciudad de Manila tiene plena discreción para
conceder o denegar el uso de la Plaza Miranda, que es una
plaza pública, para la celebración de un mitin o reunión, de
conformidad con las exigencias del interés general tal como
el las interpreta. Específicamente se citan dos
disposiciones, a saber: el artículo 2434 (b), inciso (m) del
Código Administrativo Revisado, y el artículo 1119,
capítulo 118 de la Compilación de las Ordenanzas
Revisadas de la Ciudad de Manila, edición de 1927. El
artículo aludido del Código Administrativo Revisado se lee
como sigue:
* * * * * * *
"(m) To grant and refuse municipal license or permits of all

classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon
which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal
ordinance are being committed under the protection of such
licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the
same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason
of .general interest."
La ordenanza municipal indicada reza lo siguiente:
"SEC. 1119. Free for use of public.—The streets and public places
of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public,
and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same
shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by
the ordinance or regulation: Provided, That the holding of athletic
games, sports, or exercises during the celebration of national
holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the
patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by
means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the
streets or public places, or portions thereof, where such athletic
games, sports, or
92

exercises may be held; And provided, further, That the holding of

any parade or procession in. any streets or public places is
prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the
Mayor, who shall, on every occasion, determine or specify the
streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of
such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all
applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to
the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of
such parade or procession."
Parece conveniente poner en claro ciertos hechos. El mitin

o "rally" de indignación de que habla el Alcalde recurrido
en su carta revocando el permiso ya concedido no consta en
la petición del recurrente ni en ningún documenmento o
manifestación verbal atribuída al mismo, sino solamente en
las columnas informativas de la prensa metropolitana. El
recurrente admite, sin embargo, que el objeto del mitin era
comunicar al pueblo la infinidad de telegramas y
comunicaciones que como jefe de campaña de las
oposiciones había recibido de varias partes del archipiélago
denunciando tremendas anomalías, escandalosos fraudes,
actos vandálicos de terrorismo político, etc., etc., ocurridos
en las elecciones de 11 de Noviembre; llamar la atención
del Gobierno hacia tales anomalías y abusos; y pedir su
pronta, eficaz y honrada intervención para evitar lo que
todavía se podía evitar, y con relación a los hechos
consumados urgir la pronta persecución y castigo
inmediato de los culpables y malhechores. De esto resulta
evidente que el objeto del mitin era completamente pacífico,
absolutamente legal. No hay ni la menor insinuación de
que el recurrente y los partidos oposicionistas coaligados
que representa tuvieran el propósito de utilizar el mitin
para derribar violentamente al presente gobierno, o
provocar una rebelión o siquiera un motín. En realidad,
teniendo en cuenta las serias responsabilidades del
recurrente como jefe de campaña electoral de las minorías
aliadas y como "Floor Leader" en el Congreso de dichas
minorías, parecía que esta consideración debía pesar
decisivamente en favor de la presunción de que el mitin
sería una asamblea pací-
93
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 93

fica, de ciudadanos2
conscientes, responsables y amantes de
la ley y del orden.
Se ha llamado nuestra atención a que en el artículo
arriba citado y transcrito de las Ordenanzas Revisadas de
Manila no figura el mitin entre las materias
reglamentadas, sino sólo la procesión o parada por las
calles. Esto demuestra, se sostiene, que cuando se trata de
un mitin en una plaza o lugar público, la concesión del
permiso es ineludible y el Alcalde no tiene ninguna facultad
discrecional. Paréceme, sin embargo, que no es necesario
llegar a este extremo. Creo no debe haber inconveniente en
admitir que el mitin está incluído en la reglamentación, por
razones de conveniencia pública. Verbigracia, es
perfectamente lícito denegar el permiso para celebrar un
mitin en una plaza pública en un día y una hora
determinados cuando ya previamente se ha concedido de
buena fe el uso del mismo lugar a otro a la misma hora. La
prevención de esta clase de conflictos es precisamente uno
de los ingredientes que entran en la motivación de la
facultad reguladora del Estado o del municipio con relación
al uso de calles, plazas y demás lugares públicos. Por
ejemplo, es también perfectamente lícito condicionar el
permiso atendiendo a su relación con el movimiento
general del tráfico tanto de peatones como de vehículos.
Estas consideraciones de comfort y conveniencia pública
son por lo regular la base, el leit-motif de toda ley u
ordenanza encaminada a reglamentar el uso de parques,
plazas y calles. Desde luego que la regla no excluye la
consideración a veces de la
_____________
2 Los hechos confirmaron plenamente esta presunción: el mitin

monstruo que se celebró en la noche del 22 de Noviembre en virtud de
nuestra resolución concediendo el presente recurso de mandamus—el más
grande que se haya celebrado jamás en Manila, según la prensa, y al cual
se calcula que asistieron unas 80,000 personas—fué completamente
pacífico y ordenado, no registrándose el menor incidente desagradable.
Según los períodicos, el mitin fué un magnífico acto de ciudadanía
militante y responsable, vindicatoria de la fe de todos aquellos que jamás
habian dudado de la sensatez y cultura del pueblo de Manila.
94

paz y del buen orden, pero más adelante veremos que este
último, para que sea atendible, requiere que exista una
situación de peligro verdadero, positivo, real, claro,
inminente y substancial. La simple conjetura, la mera
aprensión, el temor más o menos exagerado de que el mitin,
asamblea o reunion pueda ser motivo de desorden o
perturbación de la paz no es motivo bastante para denegar
el permiso, pues el derecho constitucional de reunirse
pacíficamente, ya para que los ciudadanos discutan los
asuntos públicos o se comuniquen entre sí su pensamiento
sobre ellos, ya para ejecer el derecho de petición recabando
del gobierno el remedio a ciertos agravios, es infinitamente
superior a toda facultad reguladora en relación con el uso
de los parques, plazas y calles.
La cuestión, por tanto, que tenemos que resolver en el
presente recurso es bien sencilla. ¿Tenía razón el Alcalde
recurrido para denegar el permiso solicitado por el
recurrente, ora bajo los términos de la ordenanza
pertinente, ora bajo la carta orgánica de Manila, y sobre
todo, bajo el precepto categórico, terminante, expresado en
el inciso 8, sección 1, del Artículo III de la Constitución?
¿No constituye la denegación del permiso una seria
conculcación de ciertos privilegios fundamentales
garantizados por la Constitución al ciudadano y al pueblo?
Resulta evidente, de autos, que el recurrido denegó el
permiso bajo lo que el mismo llama "all-pervading power of
the state to regulate," temiendo que el mitin solicitado iba a
poner en peligro la paz y el orden público en Manila, No se
fundó la denegación en razones de "comfort" o conveniencia
pública, vgr., para no estorbar el tráfico, o para prevenir un
conflicto con otro mitin ya previamente solicitado y
concedido, sino en una simple conjetura, en un mero temor
o aprensión—la aprensión de que, dado el tremendo hervor
de los ánimos resultante de una lucha electoral harto
reñida y apasionada, un discurso violento, una arenga
incendiaria podría amotinar a la gente y provocar serios
desórdenes. La cuestión en orden es la siguiente: ¿se
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VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1048 95

puede anular o siquiera poner en suspenso el derecho

fundamentalísimo de reunión o asamblea pacífica,
garantizado por la Constitución, por razón de esta clase de
conjetura, temor o aprensión? Es obvio que la contestación
tiene que ser decididamente negativa. Elevar tales motivos
a la categoría de razón legal equivaldría prácticamente a

sancionar o legitimar cualquier pretexto, a colocar los
privilegios y garantías constitucionales a merced del
capricho y de la arbitrariedad. Si la vigencia de tales
privilegios y garantías hubiera de depender de las
suspicacias, temores, aprensiones, o hasta humor del
gobernante, uno podría fácilmente imaginar los resultados
desastrosos de semejante proposición; un partido
mayoritario dirigido por caudillos y liders sin escrúpulos y
sin conciencia podría fácilmente anular todas las
libertades, atropellar todos los derechos incluso los más
sagrados, ahogar todo movimiento legítimo de protesta o
petición, estrangular, en una palabra, a las minorías, las
cuales—como sabe todo estudiante de ciencia política—en
el juego y equilibrio de fuerzas que integran el sistema
democrático son tan indispensables como las mayorías.
¿Qué es lo que todavía podría detener a un partido o a un
hombre que estuviera en el poder y que no quisiera oír
nada desagradable de sus adversarios si se le dejara
abiertas las puertas para que, invocando probables peligros
o amagos de peligro, pudiera de una sola plumada o de un
solo gesto de repulsa anular o poner en suspenso los
privilegios y garantías constitucionales? ¿No sería esto
retornar a los días de aquel famoso Rey que dijo: "El Estado
soy yo," o de aquel notorio cabecilla político de uno de los
Estados del Sur de America que asombró al resto de su país
con este nefasto pronunciamiento: "I am the only
Constitution around here"? Es inconcebible que la facultad
de reglamentar o el llamado poder de policía deba
interpretarse en el sentido de justificar y autorizar la
anulación de un derecho, privilegio o garantía
constitucional. Sin embargo, tal sería el resultado si en
nombre de un concepto tan vago y tan elástico como es el
"interés general" se permitiera in-
96

terdecir la libertad de la palabra, de la cual los derechos de

reunion y de petición son nada más que complemento
3
lógico
y necesario. Una mujer famosa de Francia3 en la época
del terror, momentos antes de subir al cadalso y colocar su
hermoso cuello bajo la cuchilla de la guillotina, hizo
histórica esta exclamación: "¡Libertad, cuántos crímenes se
cometen en tu nombre!" Si se denegara el presente recurso
legitimando la acción del recurrido y consiguientemente
autorizando la supresión de los mitínes so pretexto de que

la paz y el orden público corren peligro con ellos, un
desengañado de la democracia en nuestro país acaso
exprese entonces su suprema desilusión parafraseando la
histórica exclamación de la siguiente manera: "lnterés
general, paz, orden público, cuántos atentados se cometen
en vuestro nombre contra la libertad!"
El consenso general de las autoridades en los países
constitucionalmente regidos como Filipinas,
particularmente en Estados Unidos, es que el privilegio del
ciudadano de usar los parques, plazas y calles para el
intercambio de impresiones y puntos de vista sobre
cuestiones nacionales si bien es absoluto es también
relativo en el sentido de que se puede regular, pero jamás
se puede denegar o coartar so pretexto o a, guisa de
regulación (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S., 515-517). Este asunto, planteado y
decidido en 1938, ha venido a ser clásico en la
jurisprudencia americana sobre casos del mismo tipo que el
que nos ocupa. La formidable asociación obrera Committee
for Industrial Organization conocida más popularmente por
la famosa abreviatura CIO, planteó una queja ante los
tribunales de New Jersey contra las autoridades de Jersey
City, (a) atacando, por fundamentos constitucionales, la
validez de una ordenanza municipal que regulaba y
restringía el derecho de reunion; y (b) tachando de
inconstitucionales los métodos y medios en virtud de los
cuales ponían en vigor la ordenanza las referidas
autoridades.
_____________
3 Madame Roland.
97
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 97

Los hechos del caso, brevemente expuestos, son, a saber: La

CIO trataba de celebrar mitines y asambleas públicas en
Jersey City a fin de comunicar a los ciudadanos sus puntos
de vista sobre la "National Labor Relations Act." Las
autoridades de la ciudad, comenzando por el Alcalde Hague
el famoso cabecilla de la muy notoria máquina política de
New Jersey, rehusaron consistentemente conceder licencia
para dichos mitines bajo la especiosa alegación de que los
miembros de la organización obrera solicitante eran
comunistas y del orden público corría peligro de grave

perturbación; es decir, casi, casi la misma alegación que en
el presente caso. La denegación de la licencia se fundaba en
una ordenanza municipal que trataba de reglamentar el
derecho constitucional de reunion y asamblea pacífica.
Los tribunales de New Jersey, declarando
inconstitucionales la ordenanza en cuestión y los métodos
por los cuales se trataba de poner en vigor, sentenciaron a
favor de la CIO permitiéndole celebrar los mitines
solicitados. Elevado el asunto en casación a la Corte
Suprema Federal, ésta confirmó la sentencia con sólo una
ligera modificación. Entre otros pronunciamientos se dijo
que: (a) donde quiera esté alojado el título sobre las calles,
parques y plazas, desde tiempo inmemorial los mismos
siempre se han considerado como un fideicomiso para uso
del público, y desde tiempos remotos que la memoria no
alcanza se han usado siempre para fines de reunion y de
intercambio de impresiones y puntos de vista entre los
ciudadanos, así como para la libre discusión de los asuntos
públicos; (b) que el uso de las calles y plazas públicas para
tales fines ha sido siempre, desde la antigüedad, una parte
importante y esencial de los privilegios, inmunidades,
derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos; (c) que el privilegio
del ciudadano de los Estados Unidos de usar las calles,
plazas y parques para la comunicación de impresiones y
puntos de vista sobre cuestiones nacionales puede ser
regulado en interés de todos; es en tal sentido absoluto pero
relativo, y debe ser ejercitado con sujeción al "comfort" y
conveniencia generales y
98

en consonancia con la paz y el buen orden; pero no puede

ser coartado o denegado so pretexto y forma de regulación;
(d) que el tribunal inferior estuvo acertado al declarar
inválida la ordenanza en su faz, pues no hace del "comfort"
o conveniencia en el uso de calles y plazas la norma y
patron de la acción oficial; por el contrario, faculta al
Director de Seguridad a rehusar el permiso en virtud de su
simple opinion de que la denegación es para prevenir
motines, trus-tornos o reuniones turbulentas y
desordenadas; (e) que, de esta manera, y conforme lo
demuestra el record, la denegación puede ser utilizada
como instrumento para la supresión arbitraria de la libre
expression de opiniones sobre asuntos nacionales, pues la
prohibición de hablar producirá indudablemente tal efecto:

(/) y, por último, que no puede echarse mano de la
supresión oficial del privilegio para ahorrarse el trabajo y el
deber de mantener el orden en relación con el ejercicio del
derecho. En otras palabras, traduciendo literalmente la
fraseología de la sentencia, aun a riesgo de incurrir en un
anglicismo, "no puede hacerse de la supresión oficial
incontrolada del privilegio un sustituto del deber de
mantener el orden en relación con el ejercicio del derecho."
He aquí ad verbatim la doctrina:
"5. Regulation of parks and streets.—"Wherever the title of streets

and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of the citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not in the guise of regulation be abridged or denied. We
think the court below was right in holding the ordinance * * * void
upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use
of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the
Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such
refusal will prevent
99
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 99

riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the

record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression
of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition
of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But
uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a
substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the
exercise of the right." (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516.)
Durante la audiencia del presente asunto se hizo mención

del caso de Evangelista contra Earnshaw, 57 Jur. Fil., 255,
como un precedente en apoyo de la acción del Alcalde
recurrido. Pero la similitud es sólo en el hecho de que el
entonces Alcalde D. Tomás Earnshaw también revocó el
permiso previamente concedido al partido comunista que

representaba Crisanto Evangelista para celebrar mitines
en Manila, pero las circunstancias en ambos casos son
enteramente diferentes. El Alcalde Earnshaw revocó el
permiso después de una minuciosa investigación en que se
habían encontrado pruebas indubitables no sólo de que en
los estatutos y documentos del partido comunista se
preconizaba como uno de sus primordiales objetivos el
derribar al gobierno americano en Filipinas—gobierno que
ellos calificaban de imperialista y capitalístico—sino que de
hecho en mitines celebrados con anterioridad los
comunistas habían pronunciado discursos clara y
positivamente sediciosos predicando una abierta rebelión e
incitando un alzamiento para liberar, según ellos, al
proletariado filipino de las garras del imperialismo
capitalista. La acción por tanto, del Alcalde Earnshaw se
fundó no en una simple conjetura, en un mero temor o
aprensión, sino en la existencia de un peligro inminente,
claro, real, sustantivo—ingrediente único y
excepcionalísimo que permite una salvedad suspensiva
singularísima en el ejercicio de los privilegios
constitucionales de que se trata.
¿Existe ese ingrediente en el caso que nos ocupa?
Indudablemente que no. Ni siquiera se ha hecho la más
pequeña insinuación de que las minorías coaligadas en
cuyo nombre se ha pedido la celebración del mitin en
cuestión
100

tuvieran el propósito de derribar al gobierno por métodos y

procedimientos violentos. El mismo Fiscal Villamor, en su
informe oral, admitió francamente la legalidad de la
coalición y de sus fines. Podemos tomar conocimiento
judicial de que esas minorías coaligadas lucharon en todas
las provincias y municipios de Filipinas presentando
candidatos para todos los cargos—nacionales, provinciales
y locales, y de que su candidatura senatorial triunfó en 21
provincias de las 50 que componen el mapa electoral, y en 5
ciudades con carta especial de las 8 que existen,
incluyéndose entre dichas 5 la de Manila, capital del
archipiélago.
Que la coalición minoritaria no es una organización
subversiva como la que fué proscripta en el caso de
Evangelista contra Earnshaw, sino que por el contrario
propugna la balota, no la bala, como el instrumento normal

y democrático para cambiar los gobiernos y las
administraciones, lo demuestra, además del hecho ya
apuntado de que luchó en las últimas elecciones
prevaliéndose de las armas proveídas por la legalidad y
sacando partido de los medios de que disponía frente a la
natural superioridad del partido gobernante, lo demuestra,
repito, la circunstancia de que después de hechas las
votaciones y mientras se estaban contando los votos y
cuando vió que, según ella, se había escamoteado o se
estaba escamoteando la voluntad popular en varias partes
mediante engaños, abusos y anomalías de diferentes clases,
no buscó la violencia ni recurrió a la acción directa para
hallar remedio a sus agravios o vengarlos, sino que trató de
cobijarse bajo la Constitución reuniendo al pueblo en
asamblea magna al aire libre para comunicar y discutir sus
quejas y recabar del gobierno el correspondiente remedio. Y
esto lo hizo la coalición oficialmente, con todas las rúbricas
del protocolo, formulando la petición del mitin el hombre
que mejor podía representarla y ofrecer garantías de
legalidad y orden ante los poderes constituídos—el
recurrente en este caso, cuya solvencia moral y política está
doblemente garantida por su condiciór de líder de las
minorías en el Congreso y jefe de campaña
101
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 101

de las mismas en las pasadas elecciones. ¿Qué mejor

prueba de legalidad y de propósitos pacíficos y ordenados?
Por tanto, las circunstancias han venido a situar al
gobierno en una encrucijada: por un lado, el camino
angosto de la represión, de una política de fuerza y de
cordón férreo policíaco; por otro lado, la amplia avenida de
la libertad, una política que consista en abrir espitas y
válvulas por donde pueda extravasarse no ya la protesta
sino inclusive la indignación del pueblo, previniendo de
esta manera que los vapores mal reprimidos hagan estallar
la caldera, o que la desesperación lo arrastre a conspirar en
la sombra o a confiar su suerte a los azares de una cruenta
discordia civil. Creo que entre ambas políticas la elección
no es dudosa.
Se alega que antes del 11 de Noviembre, día de las
elecciones, el Alcalde recurrido había concedido a las
minorías coaligadas permisos para celebrar varios mitines
políticos en diferentes sitios de Manila; que en dichos
mitines se habían pronunciado discursos altamente

inflamatorios y calumniosos llamándose ladrones y
chanchulleros a varios funcionarios del gobierno nacional y
de la Ciudad de Manila, entre ellos el Presidente de
Filipinas, el Presidente del Senado y el mismo recurrido,
suscitándose contra ellos la animadversión y el desprecio
del pueblo mediante la acusación de que han estado
malversando propiedades y fondos públicos con grave
detrimento del bienestar e interés generales; que, dado este
antecedente, había motivo razonable para creer que
semejantes discursos se pronunciarían de nuevo,
minándose de tal manera la fe y la confianza del pueblo en
su gobierno y exponiéndose consiguientemente la paz y el
orden a serias perturbaciones, teniendo en cuenta la
temperatura elevadísíma de las pasiones, sobre todo de
parte de los grupos perdidosos y derrotados.
Estas alegaciones son evidentemente insostenibles.
Darles valor equivaldría a instituir aquí un régimen de
previa censura, el cual no sólo es extraño sino que es
enteramente repulsivo e incompatible con nuestro sistema
de gobierno.
102

Nuestro sistema, más que de prevención, es de represión y

castigo sobre la base de los hechos consumados. En otras
palabras, es un sistema que permite el amplio juego de la
libertad, exigiendo, sin embargo, estricta cuenta al que
abusase de ella. Este es el espíritu que informa nuestras
leyes que castigan criminalmente la calumnia, la
difamación oral y escrita, y otros delitos semejantes. Y
parafraseando lo dicho en el citado asunto de Hague vs.
Committee for Industrial Organization, la supresión
incontrolada del privilegio constitucional no puede
utilizarse como sustituto de la operación de dichas leyes.
Se temía—dice el recurrido en su contestación—que la
probable virulencia de los discursos y la fuerte tension de
los ánimos pudiesen alterar seriamente la paz y el orden
público. Pero—cabe preguntar—¿de cuando acá la libertad,
la democracia no ha sido un peligro, y un peligro perpetuo?
En realidad, de todas las formas de gobierno la democracia
no sólo es la más difícil y compleja, sino que es la más
peligrosa. Rizal tiene en uno de sus libros inmortales una
hermosa imagen que es perfectamente aplicable a la
democracia. Puede decirse que ésta es como la mar: serena,
inmóvil, sin siquiera ningún rizo que arrugue su superficie,

cuando no lo agita ningún viento. Pero cuando sopla el
huracán—léase, Vientos de la Libertad—sus aguas se
alborotan, sus olas se encrespan, y entonces resulta
horrible, espantosa, con la espantabilidad de las fuerzas
elementales que se desencadenan libérrimamente.
¿Ha dejado, sin embargo, el hombre de cruzar los mares
tan sólo porque pueden encresparse y enfurecerse a veces?
Pues bien; lo mismo puede decirse de la democracia: hay
que tomarla con todos sus inconvenientes, con todos sus
peligros. Los que temen la libertad no merecen vivirla. La
democracia no es para pusilánimes. Menos cuando de la
pusilanimidad se hace pretexto para imponer un régimen
de fuerza f undado en el miedo. Porque entonces el
absolutismo se disfraza bajo la careta odiosa de la
hipocresía. Ejemplo: los Zares de Rusia. Y ya se sabe como
terminaron.
103
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 103

El Magistrado Sr. Carson describió con mano maestra los

peligros de la libertad y democracia y previno el temor a
ellos con las luminosas observaciones que se transcriben a
continuación, expuestas en la causa de Estados Unidos
contra Apurado, 7 Jur. Fil., 440 (1907), a saber:
"Es de esperar que haya más o menos desorden en una reunion

pública del pueblo para protestar contra agravios ya sean reales o
imaginarios porque en esos casos los ánimos siempre están
excesivamente exaltados, y mientras mayor sea el agravio y más
intenso el resentimiento, tanto menos perfecto será por regla
general el control disciplinario de los directores sobre sus secuaces
irresponsables. Pero si se permitiese al ministerio fiscal agarrarse
de cada acto aislado de desorden cometido por individuos o
miembros de una multitud como pretexto para caracterizar la
reunion como un levantamiento sedicioso y tumultuoso contra las
autoridades, entonces el derecho de asociación, y de pedir
reparación de agravios sería completamente ilusorio, y el ejercicio
de ese derecho en la ocasión más propia y en la forma más pacífica
expondría a todos los que tomaron parte en ella, al más severo e
inmerecido castigo si los fines que perseguían no fueron del
agrado de los representantes del ministerio fiscal. Si en tales
asociaciones ocurren casos de desorden debe averiguarse quiénes
son los culpables y castigárseles por este motivo, pero debe
procederse con la mayor discreción al trazar la línea divisoria
entre el desorden y la sedición, y entre la reunion esencialmente

pacífica y un levantamiento tumultuoso."
En el curso de los informes se preguntó al Fiscal, defensor

del recurrido, si con motivo de los discursos que se dicen
calumniosos y difamatorios pronunciados en los mitines de
la oposición antes de las elecciones ocurrió algún serio
desorden: la contestación fué negativa. Como se dice más
arriba, en el mitin monstruo que después se celebró en
virtud de nuestra decision en el presente asunto tampoco
ocurrió nada. ¿Qué demuestra esto? Que los temores eran
exagerados, por no llamarlos fantásticos; que el pueblo de
Manila, con su cordura, tolerancia y amplitud de criterio,
probó ser superior a las aprensiones, temores y suspicacias
de sus gobernantes.
La democracia filipina no puede ni debe sufrir un
retroceso en la celosa observancia de las garantías
constitucionales sobre la libertad de la palabra y los
derechos concomi-
104

tantes—el de reunion y petición. Se trata de derechos

demasiado sagrados, harto metidos en el corazón y alma de
nuestro pueblo para ser tratados negligentemente, con un
simple encogimiento de hombros. Fueron esas libertades
las que inspiraron a nuestros antepasados en sus luchas
contra la opresión y el despotismo. Fueron esas libertades
la base del programa político de los laborantes precursores
del '96. Fueron esas libertades las que cristalizaron en la
carta organizacional de Bonifacio, generando luego el
famoso Grito de Balintawák. Fueron esas libertades las que
después informaron los documentos políticos de Mabini y la
célebre Constitución de Malolos. Y luego, durante cerca de
medio siglo de colaboración filipino-americana, fueron esas
mismas libertades la esencia de nuestras instituciones, la
espina dorsal del régimen constitucional y prácticamente
republicano aquí establecido. Nada mejor, creo yo, para
historiar el proceso de esas libertades que los atinados y
elocuentes pronunciamientos del Magistrado Sr. Malcolm
en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Bustos, 37 Jur. Fil.,
764 (1918). Es difícil mejorarlos; así que opto por
transcribirlos ad verbatim a continuación:
"Hojeando las páginas de la historia, no decimos nada nuevo al

afirmar que la libertad de la palabra, tal y como la han defendido
siempre todos los países democráticos, era desconocida en las Islas
Filipinas antes de 1900. Por tanto, existía latente la principal
causa de la revolución. José Rizal en su obra 'Filipinas Dentro de
Cien Años' (páginas 62 y siguientes) describiendo 'las reformas
sine quibus non' en que insistían los filipinos, dijo:
"El ministro, * * * que quiera que sus reformas sean reformas,
debe principiar por declarar la prensa libre en Filipinas, y por
crear diputados filipinos.
"Los patriotas filipinos que estaban en España, por medio de
las columnas de La Solidaridad y por otros medios, al exponer los
deseos del Pueblo Filipino, pidieron invariablemente la 'libertad
de prensa, de cultos y de asociación.' (Véase Mabini, 'La
Revolución Filipina.') La Constitución de Malolos, obra del
Congreso Revolucionario, en su Bill de Derechos, garantizaba
celosamente la libertad de la palabra y de la prensa y los derechos
de reunion y de petición.
"Tan sólo se mencionan los datos que anteceden para deducir la
afirmación de que una reforma tan sagrada para el pueblo de
estas
105
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 105

Islas y a tan alto precio conseguida, debe ampararse ahora y

llevarse adelante en la misma forma en que se protegería y
defendería el derecho a la libertad.
"Después sigue el período de la mutua colaboración
americanofilipina. La Constitución de los Estados Unidos y las de
los diversos Estados de la Union garantizan el derecho de la
libertad y de la palabra y de la prensa y los derechos de reunion y
de petición. Por lo tanto, no nos sorprende encontrar consignadas
en la Carta Magna de la Libertad Filipina del Presidente
McKinley, sus Instrucciones a la Segunda Comisión de Filipinas,
de 7 de abril de 1900, que sientan el siguiente inviolable principio:
"Que no se aprobará ninguna ley que coarte la, libertad de la
palabra o de la prensa o de los derechos del pueblo para reunirse
pacíficamente y dirigir peticiones al Gobierno para remedio de sus
agravios"
"El Bill de Filipinas, o sea la Ley del Congreso de 1.° de Julio
de 1902, y la Ley Jones, o sea la Ley del Congreso de 29 de Agosto
de 1916, que por su naturaleza son leyes orgánicas de las Islas
Filipinas, siguen otorgando esta garantía. Las palabras entre
comillas no son extrañas para los estudiantes de derecho
constitucional, porque estan calcadas de la Primera Enmienda a
la Constitución de los Estados Unidos que el pueblo americano

pidió antes de otorgar su aprobación a la Constitución.
"Mencionamos los hechos expuestos tan sólo para deducir la
afirmación, que no debe olvidarse por un solo instante, de que las
mencionadas garantías constituyen parte integrante de la Ley
Orgánica—La Constitución—de las Islas Filipinas.
"Estos párrafos que figuran insertos en el Bill de Derechos de
Filipinas no son una huera palabrería. Las palabras que allí se
emplean llevan consigo toda la jurisprudencia que es de aplicación
a los grandes casos constitucionales de Inglaterra y America.
(Kepner us. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1917],
214 U. S., 470.) Y ¿cuáles son estos principios? Volumen tras
volumen no bastaría a dar una contestación adecuada. Pero entre
aquéllos están los siguientes:
"Los intereses de la sociedad y la conservación de un buen
gobierno requieren una discusión plena de los asuntos públicos.
Completa libertad de comentar los actos de los funcionarios
públicos viene a ser un escalpelo cuando se trata de la libertad de
la palabra. La penetrante incision de la tinta libra a la burocracia
del absceso. Los hombres que se dedican a la vida pública podrán
ser víctimas de una acusación injusta y hostil; pero podrá
calmarse la herida con el bálsamo que proporciona una conciencia
tranquila. El funcionario público no debe ser demasiado
quisquilloso con respecto a los
106

exaltarse la mente y la dignidad de los individuos. Desde luego

que la crítica no debe autorizar la difamación. Con todo, como el
individuo es menos que el Estado, debe esperarse que sobrelleve
la crítica en beneficio de la comunidad. Elevándose a mayor altura
que todos los funcionarios o clases de funcionarios, que el Jefe
Ejecutivo, que la Legislatura, que el Poder Judicial—que
cualesquiera o sobre todas las dependencias del Gobierno—la
opinion pública debe ser el constante manantial de la libertad y de
la democracia. (Véanse los casos perfectamente estudiados de
Wason vs. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B., 73, Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F.
& F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
Ahora que ya somos independientes es obvio que la

república no sólo no ha de ser menos celosa que la antigua
colonia en la tenencia y conservación de esas libertades,
sino que, por el contrario, tiene que ser muchísimo más
activa y militante. Obrar de otra manera sería como borrar
de una plumada nuestras más preciosas conquistas en las
jornadas más brillantes de nuestra historia. Sería como

renegar de lo mejor de nuestro pasado: Rizal, Marcelo H.
del Pilar, Bonifacio, Mabini, Quezon, y otros padres
inmortales de la patria. Sería, en una palabra, como si de
un golpe catastrófico se echara abajo la recia fábrica de la
democracia filipina que tanta sangre y tantos sacrificios ha
costado a nuestro pueblo, y en su lugar se erigiera el
tinglado de una dictadura de ópera bufa, al amparo de
caciquillos y despotillas que pondrían en rídiculo el país
ante el mundo * * * Es evidente que no hemos llegado a
estas alturas, en la trabajosa ascension hacia la cumbre de
nuestros destinos, para permitir que ocurra esa tragedia.
No nos compete determinar el grado de certeza de los
fraudes e irregularidades electorales que la coalición
minoritaria trataba de airear en el mitin en cuestión con
vistas a recabar del gobierno y del pueblo el propio y
correspondiente remedio. Pudieran ser reales o pudieran
ser imaginarios, en todo o en parte. Pero de una cosa
estamos absolutamente seguros y es que la democracia no
puede sobrevivir a menos que esté fundada sobre la base de
un sufragio efectivo, sincero, libre, limpio y ordenado. El
colegio electoral es el castillo, mejor todavía, el baluarte de
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
107
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 107

la democracia. Suprimid eso, y la democracia resulta una

farsa.
Así que
4
todo lo que tienda a establecer un sufragio
efectivo no sólo no debe ser reprimido, sino que debe ser
alentado. Y para esto, en general para la salud de la
república, no hay mejor profilaxis, no hay mejor higiene
que la crítica libre, la censura desembarazada. Solamente
se pueden corregir los abusos permitiendo 5
que se
denuncien públicamente, sin trabas y sin miedo. Esta es la
mejor manera de asegurar el imperio de la ley por encima
de la violencia.
HILADO, J., dissenting:
Because the constitutional right of assembly and petition

for redress of grievances has been here invoked on behalf of
petitioner, it has been considered doubly necessary to
expound at length the grounds of my dissent. We are
____________
4 En Méjico el lema, la consigna political es: "Sufragio efectivo, sin

reelección." Los que conocen Méjico aseguran que, merced a esta consigna,
la era de las convulsiones y guerras civiles en aquella república ha pasado
definitivamente a la historia.
5"No puedo pasar por alto una magistratura que contribuyó mucho a
sostener el Gobierno de Roma; fué la de los censores. Hacían el censo del
pueblo, y, además, como la fuerza de la república consistía en la disciplina,
la austeridad de las costumbres y la observación constante de ciertos ritos,
los censores corregían los abusos que la ley no había previsto o que el
magistrado ordinario no podía castigar. * * *
"El Gobierno de Roma fué admirable, porque desde su nacimiento, sea
por el espíritu del pueblo, la fuerza del Senado o la autoridad de ciertos
magistrados, estaba constituído de tal modo, que todo abuso de poder pudo
ser siempre corregido.
"El Gobierno de Inglaterra es más sabio, porque hay un cuerpo
encargado de examinarlo continuamente y de examinarse a sí mismo; sus
errores son de suerte que nunca se prolongan, y por el espíritu de atención
que despiertan en el país, son a menudo útiles.
"En una palabra: un Gobierno libre, siempre agitado, no podría
mantenerse, si no es por sus propias leyes capaz de corregirse."
("Grandeza y decadencia de los romanos," por Montesquieu, págs. 74, 76 y
77.)
108

all ardent advocates of this right, whenever and wherever

properly exercisable. But, in considering the legal problem
here presented serenely and dispassionately, as I had to, I
arrived at a different conclusion from that of the majority,
(a) Right not absolute but subject to regulation.—It
should be recognized that this right is not absolute and is
subject to reasonable regulations. (Philippine Constitu-
tional Law by Malcolm and Laurel, 3d ed., p. 407;
Commonwealth vs. Abrahams, 156 Mass., 57, 30 N.E. 79.)
Messers. Malcolm and Laurel say: "The right of peaceful
assemblage is not an absolute one. Assemblies are subject
to reasonable regulations."
In the above cited case of Commonwealth vs. Abrahams,
which is cited in support of the text on page 407 of the
above cited work on Philippine Constitutional Law by
Malcolm and Laurel, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts considered and decided a case involving a
regulation by the Board of Park Commissioners forbidding
all persons "to make orations, harangues, or loud outcries"

in a certain park, under penalty of $20, except upon prior
consent of the board. The defendant requested permission
to deliver an oration in the park, which was refused by the
board, and thereafter entered the park, and delivered an
"oration or harangue" about ten or fifteen minutes in
length. In a criminal trial of said defendant for violating
the rules promulgated by the Board of Park
Commissioners, said rules were held valid and reasonable,
and not inconsistent with article 19 of the Bill of Rights (of
the Massachusetts Constitution), providing that "the
people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to
assemble to consult upon the common good, give
instructions to their representatives, and to request of the
legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or
remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the
grievances they suffer." In that case the defendant
admitted that the people would not have the right to
assemble for the purposes specified in the public streets,
and might
109
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 109

not have such right in the public gardens or on the

common, because such an assembly would or might be
inconsistent with the public use for which these places are
held. And the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said:
"* * * The same reasons apply to any particular park. The parks
of Boston are designed for the use of the public generally; and
whether the use of any park or a part of any park can be
temporarily set aside for the use of any portion of the public, is for
the park commissioners to decide, in the exercise of a wise
discretion."
In the above-quoted case it appears from the statement of

facts preceding the opinion that within the limits of
Franklin Park, there involved, were large areas not
devoted to any special purpose and not having any
shrubbery that would be injured by the gathering thereon
of a large concourse of people; that defendant's speech
contained nothing inflammatory or seditious, and was
delivered in an ordinary oratorical tone; that at the close of
the oration the audience quietly dispersed; and that no
injury of any kind was done to the park. Still, it was held
that the regulation under which the Board of Park

Commissioners denied the permission to deliver said
oration requested by the defendant was valid and was not
inconsistent with that provision of the Massachusetts Bill
of Rights guarantecing to the people the "right, in an
orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon
the common good, give instructions to their
representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by
the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress
of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they
suffer."
In the case at bar, the Mayor of Manila had the duty and
the power, inter alia, "to grant and refuse municipal * * *
permits of all classes * * * for any (other) good reason of
general interest" (Rev. Ad. Code, section 2434 [b]-[m] ;
italics ours); and "to comply with and enforce and give the
necessary orders for the faithful enforcement and execution
of the laws and ordinances in effect within the jurisdiction
of the city." [lbid.,
110

section 2434 (b)-(a)]; and among the general powers and

duties of the Municipal Board, whose ordinances the said
Mayor was at once bound and empowered to comply with
and enforce, were such as "regulate the use of streets, * * *
parks, * * * and other public places." [Ibid., section 2444 (u)
; italics ours.]
Another legal doctrine which should not be lost sight of
is that, without abridging the right of assembly and
petition, the government may regulate the use of places—
public places—wholly within its control, and that the state
or municipality may require a permit for public gatherings
in public parks and that, while people have the right to
assemble peaceably on the highways and to parade on
streets, nevertheless the state may regulate the use of the
streets by requiring a permit (16 C. J. S., p. 642). In our
government the state, through the Charter of Manila, has
conferred certain powers pertinent to the subject under
consideration upon the City Mayor, and upon the
Municipal Board. Among these is the duty and power of
said Mayor "to grant and refuse municipal * * * permits of
all classes * * * for any good reason of general interest"
(italics ours), and the power and duty of the Municipal
Board "to regulate the use * * * of street, * * * parks, * * *
and other public p l a c e s e s * * *" (italics ours), already

above discussed.
Plaza Miranda in a way is a public square or plaza, and
in another sense, in view of its more frequent public use, is
a public place devoted to traffic between several streets
which empty into it within the district of Quiapo. It is a
fact of common knowledge and within the judicial notice of
this Court that said plaza is one of the public places
constantly used by an usually great number of people
during all hours of the day and up to late hours of the
night, both for vehicular and for pedestrian traffic. It is one
of the centers of the city where a heavy volume of traffic
during those hours converges and from which it again
proceeds in all directions; and the holding during those
111
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 111

hours of a meeting, assembly or rally of the size and nature

of that contemplated by petitioner and those belonging to
the Coalesced Minority Parties when the permit in
question was requested from the City Mayor, must have
been expected to greatly inconvenience and interfere with
the right of the public in general to devote said plaza to the
public uses for which it has been destined since time
immemorial.
The rule may perhaps be more aptly stated by saying
that the right of peaceful assembly and petition is not
absolute but subject to regulation as regards the time,
place, and manner of its exercise. As to time, it seems
evident, for example, that the State, directly or through the
local government of the city or municipality, by way of
regulation of the right of free speech, may validly prohibit
the delivery of speeches on public streets near private
residences between midnight and dawn. As to place, we
have the example of the instant case involving Plaza
Miranda or any other public place. And as to manner, it is
a familiar rule that the freedom of speech does not
authorize the speaker to commit slander or defamation,
and that laws and ordinances aimed at preventing such
abuses are valid regulations of the right. Among other
cases which may be cited on the same point, we have that
of Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, 307 U.
S., 496, 83 Law. ed., 1423, cited in the majority opinion and
from which the following passage is copied from the
quotation therefrom in the said opinion:
"* * * The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the

streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute,
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace
and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied." (Italics ours.)
I construe this declaration of principles by the United

States Supreme Court to imply that where the regulatory
action is predicated upon the "general comfort and conven-
112

ience," and is "in consonance with peace and good order," as

in the instant case, such action is regulation and not "guise
of regulation," and therefore does not abridge or deny the
right.
(b) No constitutional right to use public places under
government control, for exercise of right of assembly and
petition, etc.—
Indeed, carefully analyzed, the action taken by the City
Mayor was not even a regulation of the constitutional right
of assembly and petition, or free speech, claimed by
petitioner, but rather of the use of a public place under the
exclusive control of the city government for the exercise of
that right. This, I submit, is a distinction which must be
clearly maintained throughout this discussion. No political
party or section of our people has any constitutional right
to freely and without government control make use of such
a public place as Plaza Miranda, particularly if such use is
a deviation from those for which said public places have
been by their nature and purpose immemorially dedicated.
In other words, the City Mayor did not attempt to have
anything to do with the holding of the "indignation rally" or
the delivery of speeches thereat on the date desired, at any
place over which said mayor had no control—his action was
exclusively confined to the regulation of the use of Plaza
Miranda for such a purpose and at such a time. Chief
Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous court in Cox vs.
New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed., 1049, 1054,
said:
"If a municipality has authority to control the uses of its public

streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it can
not be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair

discrimination, to time, place, and manner in relation to the other
proper uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the
limited authority conferred by the licensing provisions of the
statute in question as thus construed by the state court
contravened any constitutional right." (Italics ours.)
That case was concerned with a prosecution of sixtyeight

"Jehovah's Witnesses" in a municipal court in the State of
New Hamsphire for violation of a state statute
113
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 113

prohibiting a "parade or procession" upon a public street

without a special license. The appellants invoked the
constitutional right of free speech and press, as well as that
of assembly. The judgment of the municipal court was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hamsphire and
that of the latter was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court. Among other things, the United States
Supreme Court said that the appellants were not
prosecuted for distributing leaflets, or for conveying
information by placards or otherwise, or for issuing
invitations to a public meeting, or for holding a public
meeting, or for maintaining or expressing religious beliefs.
Their right to do any of these things apart from engaging in
a "parade or procession," upon a public street was not
involved in the case. The question of the validity of a
statute addressed to any other sort of conduct than that
complained of was declared not to be before the court (85
Law. ed., 1052). By analogy, I may say that in the instant
case the constitutional rights of free speech, assembly and
petition are not before the court but merely the privilege of
petitioner and of the Coalesced Minorities to exercise any
or all of said rights by using Plaza Miranda, a public place
under the complete control of the city government. In the
same case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, Chief Justice
Hughes, in his opinion, used the following eloquent
language:
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the

existence of an organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as

inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.
The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar
illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction
of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it can not be disregarded
by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be
justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he
thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal
114

command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an

announcement of his opinion. * * *" (85 Law. ed., 1052-1053.)
In other words, when the use of public streets or places is

involved, public convenience, public safety and public order
take precedence over even particular civil rights. For if the
citizen asserting the civil right were to override the right of
the general public to the use of such streets or places, just
because it is guaranteed by the constitution, it would be
hard to conceive how upon the same principle that citizen
be prevented from using the private property of his
neighbor for the exercise of the asserted right. The
constitution, in guaranteeing the right of peacef ul
assembly and petition, the right of free speech, etc., does
not guarantee their exercise upon public places, any more
than upon private premises, without government
regulation in both cases, or the owner's consent in the
second.
In Davis vs. Commonwealth, 167 U. S. 43, 42 Law. ed.,
71, 72, the United States Supreme Court, in affirming the
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of the
latter tribunal, quoted from said decision as follows:
"* * * As representative of the public it (legislature) may and does

exercise control over the use which the public may make of such
places (public parks and streets), and it may and does delegate
more or less of such control to the city or town immediately
concerned. For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid
public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the
owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no
proprietary right interferes the legislature may end the right of

the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the
dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting
the public use to certain purposes, See Dill. Mun. Corp. secs. 393,
407, 651, 656, 666; Brooklyn Park Comrs. vs. Armstrong, 45 N. Y.
234, 243, 244 (6 Am. Rep. 70) * * *."
(c) Authorities cited.—.

I have examined the citations of authorities in the
majority opinion. Most of the cases therein cited are, I
think, inapplicable to the one under consideration, and
115
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 115

those which may have some application, I believe reinforce

this dissent. None of them was for mandamus to compel
the granting of a permit for holding a meeting, assembly, or
the like, upon a public place within the control of the
general or local government.
The fact that a law or municipal ordinance under which
a person had been prosecuted for delivering a speech
without the required permit, for example, was declared
unconstitutional or otherwise void for delegating an
unfettered or arbitrary discretion upon the licensing
authority, thus completely failing to confer the discretion,
does not mean that such person has the right by
mandamus to force said authority to grant him the permit.
If, in such a case, the law or ordinance, conferring the
discretion, is unconstitutional or void, the mandamus suit
becomes entirely idle. Such a suit would involve a self-
contradictory proposition, for the very idea of a permit is
something which may be granted or withheld. He who has
the power to grant permission for the doing of an act
necessarily has the correlative power to deny the
permission. A "permit" which under no conditions or
circumstances and at no time can be refused needs a
different name.
Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569,
was concerned with a statute of the State of New
Hampshire which was construed by the Supreme Court of
the same State as not conferring upon the licensing board
unfettered discretion to refuse the license, and was held
valid both by said Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
of the United States.
In our case, section 2434 (b)-(m) of the Revised

Administrative Code does not confer upon the Mayor of
Manila an unfettered discretion to grant or to refuse the
permit—his power to grant or to refuse the permit is
controlled and limited by the all-important requirement of
the same section that whatever his determination, it
should be "for any good reason of general interest."
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 111., 430, the
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that the power
of city councils under the state laws to regulate the use of
116

the public streets could not be delegated by them, and

therefore could not be delegated to the superintendent of
police. But in our case the power of the City Mayor under
the Revised Administrative Code has not been delegated by
the Municipal Board of Manila but has been directly
conferred by the State through its legislature.
In State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585, what
was involved was a city ordinance committing to the
unrestrained will of a public officer the power to determine
the rights of parties under the ordinance without anything
"to guide or control his action." In our case, as already
stated, the City Mayor received his power from the State
through the Legislature which enacted the Revised
Administrative Code, and moreover, his action was therein
provided to be guided and controlled by the already
memtioned requirement that whether he grants or refuses
a municipal permit of any class, it shall be for some "good
reason of general interest," and not as his unfettered will
may dictate.
The case of In re. Fradzee, 63 Mich., 399, involved a city
ordinance declared unreasonable and void by the Supreme
Court of Michigan, the ordinance prohibiting certain uses
of the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids "without
having first obtained the consent of the mayor or common
council of said city." The ordinance did not prescribe any
guide, control or limitation for, of, and to, the exercise of
the power thus conferred upon the mayor or common
council. The following passage from the quotation from the
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan made in the
majority opinion would seem to reinforce the stand taken
in this dissent.
"* * * We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it

assumes to grant, so far as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as
only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will
enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in
accordance with the limitations and conditions required by the
rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of
law, which can not be less careful of private rights under a
constitution than under the common law.
117
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 117

"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to

produce danger and disorder in the cities than in smaller towns or
in rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary
measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend
beyond the fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and
no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action altogether
can be granted at all * * *." (Italics ours.)
The instant case is concerned with an "indignation rally" to

be held at one of the busiest and most frequented public
places in this big cosmopolitan city, with a present
population estimated to be 150 per cent larger than its
prewar population, and the public officer who was being
called upon to act on the petition for permit was the chief
executive of the city who was by reason of his office the
officer most directly responsible for the keeping and
maintenance of peace and public order for the common
good. And as stated elsewhere in this dissent, his power in
the premises was not without control, limitation or guide
and, lastly, the action taken by him was not an absolute
suppression of the right claimed but was merely a
postponement of the use of a public place for the exercise of
that right when popular passions should have calmed down
and public excitement cooled off sufficiently to better
insure the avoidance of public peace and order being
undermined.
Rich vs. Mapervill, 42 111. Ap., 222, had to do with
another city ordinance. The court there held that when
men in authority are permitted in their discretion to
exercise "power so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the
spirit of our free institution violated." (Italics ours.) This is
not our case, as the power of the Manila Mayor now under
consideration is not at all arbitrary. It was further held in
that case that where the granting of the permit is left to
the unregulated discretion of a small body of city alderman,

the ordinance can not be other than partial and
discriminating in its practical operation. The case at bar is
radically different for, as already shown, the discretion of
the City Mayor here is not unregulated, for the phrase "any
good reason of general interest" is cer-
118

tainly an effective regulatory condition precedent to the

exercise of the power one way or the other. And just as
certainly the reasons alleged by the respondent Mayor for
his action stated in his letters dated November 15 and 17,
1947, addressed to petitioner and in his affidavit Annex 1,
seem entirely well founded and well taken, consideration
being had of his grave responsibilities as the immediate
keeper of peace and public order in the city. Elsewhere in
this dissent we quote from said documents textually.
On page 13 of the majority opinion there is a quotation
of another passage from the case of Cox vs. New
Hampshire, supra, which says:
"As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and

processions is a traditional exercise of control by local
government, the question in a particular case is whether that
control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the
right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
associated with resort to public places."
The above rule means that if the control exerted does not
deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly, such
control is legally valid. This is precisely our case, since the
respondent Mayor neither denied nor unwarrantedly
abridged the right asserted by petitioner and his
companions. If the postponement of the granting of the
permit should be taken as a denial of the right, then we
would be practically denying the discretion of the proper
official for it would be tantamount to compelling him to
grant the permit outright, which would necessarily mean
that he can never refuse the permit, for one who cannot
even postpone the granting of such permit much less can
altogether refuse it.
Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U. S. 496, 83 Law. ed., 1423, apart from being clearly
distinguishable from the instant case as later

demonstrated, contains the passage quoted on page 7 of
this dissent, which decidedly supports it. The distinction
between that case and this is that there "the ordinance
deals only with the
119
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 119

exercise of the right of assembly for the purpose of

communicating views entertained by speakers, and is not a
general measure to promote the public convenience in the
use of the streets or parks" (83 Law. ed., 1436); while in the
instant case section 2434 (b)-(m) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not solely aimed at prohibition of
any particular act for it likewise provides for permission,
and in both cases is expressly aimed at promoting the
"general interest."
Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 95 Law,
ed., 1049, is equally in solid support of this dissent as
appears from No. 2 of the syllabus therein:
"A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade
or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute
is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are
strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration -of
the time, place, and manner, of the parade or procession, with a
view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an
opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse licenses, but are required to
exercise their discretion free from improper or inappropriate
considerations and from unfair discrimination." (Italics ours).
In empowering and directing the City Mayor to grant or

refuse permits "for any * * * good reason of general
interest," the Revised Administrative Code plainly has in
view only the common good and excludes all "improper or
inappropriate considerations" and "unfair discrimination"
in the exercise of the granted discretion.
Lastly, as between Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, supra, and Cox vs. State of New Hampshire
supra, the choice is obvious with regard to their
authoritative force, when it is considered that in the former
out of the nine Justices of the United States Supreme
Court two did not take part and of the seven who did only
two, Justices Roberts and Black, subscribed the opinion
from which the majority here quote, while in the latter
(Cox vs. State of New Hampshire) the decision was
unanimous.
120

(d) Mandamus unavailable.—

McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Revised,
Volume 6, p. 848, section 2714, expresses the rule obtaining
in the United States that the immunity from judicial
control appertaining to the Office of the Governor of the
State, or to the Presidency of the United States, does not
attach to the mayorality of a city. But on page 878, section
2728, he has the following to say on the unavailability of
mandamus to compel the granting of licenses and permits
by municipal officers:
"SEC. 2728. To compel the granting of licenses and permits.—If

the issuance of the license or permit is discretionary with the
officer or municipal board, it is clear that it cannot be compelled
by mandamus. The cases rarely, if ever, depart from this well
established rule, and in consequence in doubtful cases the judicial
decisions uniformly disclose a denial of the remedy. As already
stated, the fundamental condition is that the petition must show
a clear legal right to the writ and a plain neglect of duty on the
part of the public officer to perform the act sought to be enforced.
For example, one who seeks to compel a city to issue to him a
permit for the erection of a building must show compliance with
all the valid requirements of the building ordinances and
regulations.
"The granting of licenses or permits by municipal or other
public authorities, as mentioned, is usually regarded as a
discretionary duty, and hence, ordinarily, mandamus will not lie
to compel them to grant a license or issue a permit to one claiming
to be entitled thereto, especially where it is not alleged and shown
that the exercise of such discretion was arbitrary. All the court
can do is to see that the licensing authorities have proceeded
according to law. Their decision will not be reviewed on its merits.
Where, however, refusal to grant a license or to issue a permit, as
said above, is arbitrary or capricious mandamus will lie to compel
the appropriate official action. * * *"
To my mind, the following reasons, alleged by the

respondent Mayor, negative all element 01 arbitrariness in
his official action:
"* * * please be advised that upon reading the metropolitan

newspapers this morning wherein it appears that your meeting
will be an indignation rally at which all the supposed election
frauds allegedly perpetrated in many parts of the Philippines for
the pur-
121
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 121

pose of overriding the popular will, will be bared before the

people, this office hereby revokes the said permit.
"It is believed that public peace and order in Manila will be
undermined at the proposed rally considering that passions have
not as yet subsided and tension remains high as an aftermath of
the last political contest.
"According to the same newspapers, delegates from the
provinces and students from local universities will participate in
the said rally which, in my opinion, would only precipitate trouble
since no guarantee can be given that only the opposition elements
will be there. The moment the crowd becomes mixed with people
of different political colors which is most likely to happen, public
order is exposed to danger once the people are incited, as they will
be incited, considering the purposes for which the meeting will be
held as reported in the newspapers above mentioned.
"* * *." (Mayor's letter dated November 15, 1947.)
"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of
November 7, 1947, requesting for a permit to hold a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, on Saturday, November 22,
1947, for the purpose of denouncing the alleged fraudulent
manner in which the last elections have been conducted and the
alleged nationwide flagrant violation of the Election Law, and of
seeking redress therefor. It is regretted that for the same reasons
stated in my letter of November 15, 1947, your request can not be
granted for the present. This Office has adopted the policy of not
permitting meetings of this nature which are likely to incite the
people and disrupt the peace until the results of the elections
shall have been officially announced. After this announcement,
requests similar to yours will be granted.
"* * *." (Mayor's letter dated November 17, 1947.)
"That according to Congressman Primicias, the meeting will be
an indignation rally for the purpose of denouncing the alleged
fraudulent manner the said elections were conducted and the

nationwide flagrant violations of the Election Law:
"2. That it is a fact that the returns of the last elections are still
being recounted in the City of Manila in the Commission on
Elections, and pending the final announcement of the results
thereof, passions, especially on the part of the losing groups,
remain bitter and high;
"3. That allusions have been made in the metropolitan
newspapers that in case of defeat, there will be minority
resignations in Congress, rebellion and even revolution in the
country;
"4. That I am sure that the crowd that will attend the said
meeting will be a multitude of people of different and varied
political sentiments;
"5. * * * * * * *
"6. That judging from the tenor of the request for permit and
taking into consideration the circumstances under which said
meet-
122

ing will be held, it is safe to state that once the people gathered
thereat are incited, there will surely be trouble between the
opposing elements, commotion will follow, and then peace and
order in Manila will be disrupted; and
"7. That the denial of said request for permit has been made for
no other reasons except to perform my duty as Mayor of Manila to
maintain and preserve peace and order in this City.
"8. That I have assured Congressman Primicias that
immediately after the election returns shall have been officially
announced, the Nacionalista Party or any party will be granted
permit to hold meetings of indignation and to denounce alleged
frauds," (Annex 1, Answer.)
For these and other reasons which could be advanced in

corroboration, I am of the considered opinion that the
respondent Mayor had under the law the requisite
discretion to grant or to refuse the permit requested, and
therefore to revoke that which had previously been
granted, and that the reasons for such revocation alleged in
his letters dated November 15 and 17, 1947, to petitioner
and in his affidavit Annex 1 were amply sufficient to justify
his last action. And be it distinctly observed that this last
action was not an absolute denial of the permit, but a mere
postponement of the time for holding the "rally" for good
reasons "of general interest" in the words of section 2434

(b)(m) of the Revised Administrative Code.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I join in Mr. Justice Hilado's dissent and wish to add a few

remarks.
As Mr. Justice Hilado says, freedom of speech, of the
press, and of peaceable assemblage, is only an incidental
issue in this case. No one will contest the proposition that
the mayor or the Congress itself may not stop the
petitioner and his men from meeting peaceably and venting
their grievances in a private place. The main issue rather
is the extent of the right of any group of people to use a
public street or a public plaza for a purpose other than that
for which it is dedicated.
The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not
prevent the government from regulating the use of places
123
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 123

within its control. A law or ordinance may forbid the

delivery of addresses on the public parks, or on the streets
as a valid exercise of the police power. (12 C. J., 954.)
Rights of assembly and of petition are not absolute rights
and are to be construed with regard to the general law. (16
C. J. S., 640.) Indeed, "the privileges of a citizen of the
United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions * * * must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience." (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 83 Law. ed., 1433.) And so
long as the municipal authorities act within the legitimate
scope of their police power their discretion is not subject to
outside interference or judicial revision or reversal. (44 C.
J., 1101.) Of necessity a municipality must be allowed
reasonable latitude in this regard. (14 C. J., 931.)
The mayor did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in
withholding or postponing the permit applied for by the
petitioner. His reasons were real, based on contemporary
events of public knowledge, and his temporary refusal was
reasonably calculated to avoid possible disturbances as well
as to advance and protect the public in the proper use of
the most congested streets and public plaza in an
overcrowded city. There was reason to fear disturbances,
not from the petitioner and his men but from elements who
had no connection with the holding of the meeting but who,
having gripes, might be easily excited to violence by
inflammatory harangues when nerves were on edge.
The fact that no untoward incident occurred does not
prove the judiciousness of this Court's resolution. The court
is not dealing with an isolated case; it is laying down a rule
of transcendental importance and far-reaching
consequences, in the administration of cities and towns. If
nothing happened, it is well to remember that, according to
newspapers, 500 policemen were detailed to prevent
possible disorder at the gathering. It should also be borne
in mind that vehicular traffic in the vicinity of Plaza Mi-
124

randa had to be suspended and vehicles had to be rerouted

before, during and after the meeting. All of which entailed
enormous expense by the city and discomforts to the
general public.
No individual citizen or group of citizens certainly has a
right to claim the use of a public plaza or public streets at
such great expense and sacrifice on the part of the city and
of the rest of the community. Yet, by virtue of this Court's
resolution any person or group of persons invoking
political, civil or religious freedom under the constitution is
at liberty to stage a rally or parade or a religious
procession, with the mayor powerless to do anything
beyond seeing to it that no two meetings or parades were
held in the same place or close to each other. No precedent
in the United States, after whose institutions ours are
modelled, approaches this Court's resolution in its
disregard of the government's authority to control public
streets and to maintain peace and order. In an infant
republic where the state of peace and order is still far from
normal, where the forces of law are far from adequate to
cope with lawlessness; in a city where conditions of traffic
are among the worst if not the worst on earth, this Court
sets down a principle that outstrips its prototype in
"liberality," forgetting that personal rights can only exist in
a properly regulated society. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
said in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 61 S. Ct, 762, "Civil
liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses. The authority of the municipality to

impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties, but
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order
upon which they ultimately depend." To be logical, peddlers
and merchants should be given, as a matter of right, the
freedom to use public streets and public squares
125
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 125

to ply their trade, for the freedom of expression and of

assemblage is no more sacred than the f reedom to make a
living. Yet no one has dared make such claim.
The cases cited in the resolution are not applicable. It
will be seen that each of those cases involved the legality of
a law or municipal ordinance. And if in some of said cases a
law or an ordinance was declared void, the grounds of
invalidation were either discrimination or lack of authority
of the Legislature or the municipal council under the state
constitution or under the law to adopt the contested
measure.
As applied to Manila, there are both a law and an
ordinance regulating the use of public places and the
holding of meetings and parades in such places. As long as
this law and this ordinance are in force the mayor does not
only have the power but it is his sworn duty to grant or
refuse a permit according to what he believes is in
consonance with peace and order or is proper to promote
the general comfort and convenience of the inhabitants.
The Court says that section 2434 (m) of the Revised
Administrative Code "is not a specific of substantive power
independent from the corresponding municipal ordinance
which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is
required to enforce under the same section 2434." The
Court advances the opinion that because section 2444
confers upon the municipal board "the police power to
regulate the use of streets and other public places," "it is to
be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same
breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m), the
same power, specially if we take into account that its
exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same
power by the municipal board."
Section 2434 (m) is written in the plainest language for
any casual reader to understand, and it is presumed that it
means what it says. This provision certainly was not

inserted in the city charter, which must have been drawn
with painstaking care, for nothing. And I am aware of
126

no constitutional provision or constitutional maxim which

prohibits the delegation by the Legislature of part of its
police power affecting local matters, directly upon the
mayor instead of through the municipal board. Nor is there
incompatibility between section 2434 (m) and section 2444
or the ordinance enacted under the latter. At any rate,
section 2434 (m) is of special character while section 2444
is general, so that, if there is any conflict between section
2434 (m) and the ordinance passed under section 2444, the
former is to prevail.
This Court has already set at rest the validity, meaning
and scope of section 2434 (m) in a unanimous decision with
all the nine members voting, when it sustained the mayor's
refusal to grant a permit for a public meeting on a public
plaza to be followed by a parade on public streets.
(Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255.) The reference to
section 2434 (m) in that decision was not an obiter dictum
as the majority say. The sole question presented there, as
we gather from the facts disclosed, was the legality of the
mayor's action, and the court pointed to section 2434 (m) as
the mayor's authority for his refusal. The fact that the
mayor could have denied the petitioner's application under
the general power to prohibit a meeting for unlawful
purposes did not make the disposition of the case on the
strength of section 2434 (m) obiter dictum. An adjudication
on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all
pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved,
which are presented and decided in the regular course of
the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a
matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a
point expressly decided does not lose its value as a
precedent because the disposition of the case is or might
have been made on some other ground, or even though, by
reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on
127
VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 127

Co Tiac vs. Natividad
the particular point, otherwise than it did. (1 C. J. S. 314-

315.)
But the Court asserts that if the meaning of section
2434 (m) is what this Court said in the Evengelista-
Earnshaw case, then that section is void. I do not think
that that provision is void—at least not yet. Until it is
invalidated in the proper case and in the proper manner,
the mayor's authority in respect of the issuance of permits
is to be measured by section 2434 (m) and by the municipal
.ordinance in so far as the ordinance does not conflict with
the law. The validity of that provision is not challenged and
is nowhere in issue. It is highly improper, contrary to the
elementary rules of practice and procedure for this Court to
say or declare that that provision is void. Moreover, Article
VIII, section 10, of the Constitution provides that "all cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court in banc, and no
treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Court."
Only seven members voted in favor of the resolution.
Petition granted.
____________
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10/28/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 080

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT TO FREEDOM OF

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POLICE POWER

wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MEETING AND ASSEMBLY IN

72 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Primicias vs. Fugoso

separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City of

4. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; POWER OF MAYOR TO

proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. This court

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 73

Primicias vs. Fugoso

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 2434 OF

Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the

6. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; NULLITY OF

74 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Primicias vs. Fugoso

in fact has conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant

contrary notwithstanding, such grant of unregulated and

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 75

Primicias vs. Fugoso

on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitioner

76 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

This sovereign police power is exercised by the government

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 77

As there is no express and separate provision in the

78 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 79

nymous with "suppress" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City

"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke,

80 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

tected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to

within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it

In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N. W., 72,' a city

"* * * We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 81

and with music of various kinds. These processions for political,

frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the

In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 111., App. 222, the question was

82 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and

in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise

"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 83

of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some

The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs.

84 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public

Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the,

VOL. 80, J ANUARY 27, 1948 85

predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal

86 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 87

to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the