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 Write an essay on what Anthony Giddens means by the term ‘‘practical consciousness’’ and how it

relates to ‘‘discursive consciousness’’?

Introduction

The main focus of this essay will be the nature of practical and discursive consciousness and their

relationship to each other within a social action theoretical framework. An overview of Giddens' defining

thoughts on both concepts will be followed by an examination of the views of Lukács regarding his

theories of false and class consciousness and how Mark Haugaard developed these ideas to incorporate

the concepts of practical and discursive consciousness. The often dichotomous nature of the relationship

between practical and discursive consciousness will then be examined through the work of Beverly

Skeggs. This section will consider difficulties that may be encountered when attempting to apply these

concepts to the realities of peoples' lives and their own self-perceptions. To conclude, the recent

calamitous boom-bust events in the Irish economy and its possible effect on society with regard to the

practical and discursive consciousness of the general population will be discussed.

Practical or Discursive?

Anthony Giddens elucidates the term practical consciousness during the introduction of The

constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration

“Practical consciousness consists of all things which actors know tacitly about how to 'go on' in the contexts of
social life with out being able to give them discursive expression.” (Giddens, 1986:xxiii)

O'Connor and Kay (2010:4-4) further elaborate upon this in descriptions of certain everyday activities,

such as visiting the cinema or eating in a restaurant. Embedded within these situations are protocols

which are observed by customers without questioning the origin of that knowledge, e.g. that payment is

made when entering a cinema, but when leaving a restaurant. As Giddens (1986:xxiii) explains, these

generally accepted modes of behaviour are not documented in literature, yet knowledge of them exists

tacitly in people. Furthermore, the nature and content of practical consciousness is sensitive to the effects

of the cultural environment, position within social strata and adherence to particular belief systems by the

agent (Giddens, 1986:7). The nature of these sensitivities will be discussed with reference to the work of

Beverly Skeggs in more detail later.

Discursive consciousness on the other hand is that which can be verbalised or considered

intellectually (Giddens, 1986:49) and, as Giddens (1991:35) notes, it provides a platform for the

interpretive mechanisms by which humans monitor and internally annotate their behaviour. This concept
is clarified by Lars Bo Kaspersen,

“A discursive explanation means that we explicitly express an activity; for example, how and why we ride a
bicycle. Such an explanation may operate at different levels. Asked about my bike riding, I can respond that I
am on my way to work, I can provide an anatomical/physiological explanation, or I can declare that I bike
because I am opposed to automobile pollution” (Kaspersen, 1995:35).

We can describe levels for another everyday occurrence: men holding doors open for women. This could

be discursively explained, on various levels, as occurring because the man is in a positive mood, feels he

is physically stronger than the woman or because his upbringing conditioned him to do so.

Practical consciousness describes behaviour which resides in the “non-concsiousness” (Giddens,

1986:35), while discursive consciousness can manifest in purposeful and intentional behaviour. The

knowledge held at a practical level becomes explicit through the discursive process. The evolution of

practical into discursive knowledge enables implicit behaviour and beliefs to be explicitly articulated. In

our door-holding example above, the man may tacitly believe that his behaviour is expected within the

social context, but may only come to realise this when questioned. When applied to social stratification

and placement, discursive knowledge becomes a tool with which to examine and reflect upon position

within newly recognised social strata. An agent may choose to act, or not, depending on their social

status and the level of societal entrenchment they perceive. (Haugaard, in Clegg et al, 2006:216). This is

strongly related to Georg Lukács' ideas of class and false consciousness.

Awakening the Collective Consciousness

Lukács published History and Class Consciousness in 1922 which highlighted the importance of

“...the subjective side of Marxist theory” (Ritzer, 2008:278). Lukács work concentrates on the subjective

collective consciousness of groups “...who occupy the same class position within society” (Ritzer,

2008:279). False consciousness to which Lukács refers is a state of collective psychological reality. The

members of one group are unaware of and unable to fully comprehend their socio-economic position in

relation to other groups. Due to a lack of awareness, a false consciousness, they are unable to effect any

change. Lukács posited that two groups engaged in this idealogical struggle were the proletariat and the

bourgeoisie. For societal change to occur the proletariat had to achieve class consciousness, to “...fully

realise the nature and extent of their exploitation in capitalism” (Ritzer, 2008:279). Lukács (1922) wrote,

“The superior strength of true, practical class consciousness, lies in the ability to look beyond the divisive
symptoms of the economic process to the unity of the total social system underlying it” (Lukács,
1922/1968:74).

He believed in the ability of the proletariat to achieve a state of class consciousness and so become active

in determining their own social position (Ritzer, 2008:280). A shift in consciousness would “...[move the
proletariat] from being a “class in itself”, that is a structurally created entity, to being a “class for itself”, a

class conscious of its position and mission (Ritzer, in Bottero, 2007:539). For this to occur, the proletariat

would need to be equipped with a true understanding of their subordinate position within the structures

of society.

Haugaard (1997) argues that the transition from a “class in itself” to a “class for itself” involves a

conversion or interchange of information between discursive and practical consciousness. This transition

involves translating the structural reality from practical to discursive consciousness (Haugaard,

1997:155). Furthermore, Haugaard, like Lukács, posits that practical consciousness regarding class

structures within capitalism must shift into discursive consciousness before a class consciousness can be

achieved, and a struggle begun (Lukács, 1922/1968:76; Haugaard, 1997:155). Lukács and Haugaard

both assume that the agents of the respective classes are not only aware of, but also comply with, the

stratification of their social groups. This requires a recognition of the concept of identity and its myriad

meanings, within both practical and discursive consciousness. For some, however, their perception of

self-identity and their potential for agency within the structural elements of society does not concur with

that of sociological hypotheses, as Beverly Skeggs (1977) discovered.

Square Pegs and Round Holes

The relationship between practical and discursive consciousness is a bidirectional one. Our tacit

knowledge augments the discourse regarding different subjects and spoken knowledge, and this in turn

updates particular taken-for-granted realities (O'Connor and Kay, 2010:4-5). This process can lead to

conflicts between what people “feel” about their situations and what people “think” about their situations.

Beverly Skeggs (1997) demonstrated that at times the experience and interpretation of the personal

realities of people in society can be contradictory to that of the discursive consciousness or discourse

around a subject. During an ethnographic study into the attitudes of working class women towards

feminism Skeggs found that some women expressed and exemplified subjective representations of what

could be termed feminist ideology. However, because of their perception of what “being” a feminist meant

and required from them, they associated feminism with women in a more affluent social position who did

not have the difficult everyday realities and hardships that characterised their practical consciousness:

“...the logical conclusion to the marketing of popular individualistic feminism: feminism is seen to be selfish,
prerogative of the privileged, something that benefits those in different economic, social and cultural
circumstances (Skeggs, 1997:153).

In this instance the dichotomous relationship between practical and discursive consciousness created

conflicts for these women. They clearly did not view themselves as affected by, or effecting, feminism yet
their daily existence was full of what could be referred to as common problems of gender inequality

(Skeggs, 1997:155)

It's a Trust Thing

From a sociological perspective the last ten years has provided an unprecedented opportunity for

discourse due to the level and intensity of economic turmoil in Ireland. One focus of this discourse has

been social trust, and its role in maintaining stable societies. The relationship between trust and practical

consciousness is clearly elucidated by Newton (2007:350) who states “Trust is not a mindset that people

have inside themselves, but a collective property of social systems”. A growing feeling of apathy towards

political processes has been shown to be associated with negative feelings of trust in general (Giddens,

2006:676). In recent times Ireland has seen large scale demonstrations by citizens as a reaction to the

gross mishandling of the country's finances. The public has not been coy in voicing this feeling of

mistrust. One survey found that Ireland had the lowest rate of trust in Government out of 22 European

countries as well as the lowest rate of trust in businesses, with banks being the least trusted sector

(Finfacts Team, 2010). It could be argued that there has been a shift from the level of practical to

discursive consciousness with regard to certain structural elements within the Irish State, such as the

financial organisations, and this shift has impacted directly on the level of trust.

Irish banks have historically been regarded as monolithic and permanent institutions within the

Irish state.

“If the party consists merely of a hierarchy of officials isolated from the mass of ordinary workers who are
normally given the role of passive onlookers, if the party only occasionally acts as a whole then this will produce
in the members a certain indifference composed equally of blind trust and apathy with regard to the day-to-day
actions of the leadership” (Lukács, 1922/1968:336).

The surge of wealth created for the economy by the banks during the Celtic Tiger years served to

copper-fasten their position within customers' practical consciousness as immoveable, solid and

trustworthy – these assumptions were rarely challenged or even articulated. In the past four years the

level of discussion in numerous public forums regarding bad practices within the Irish banking sector has

been unprecedented. Detailed analysis of lending processes, risk assessment and other banking practices

has been moved from the boardroom into the everyday dialogue of the public.

One could argue that the public nature of this exposure has served to raise this subject from the

previously practical to the discursive. In doing so it has very much altered the consciousness of the Irish

people with regard to the banks and trust in the government via its perceived relationship with the

banks, and certain bankers in particular. As the results of the aforementioned survey illustrate, attitudes
regarding issues of trust in the government have altered and this could further alter future discursive

subjects. If Lukács was correct, this discursive change will now influence the constitution of our practical

consciousness with regard to our financial institutions. This influence could, as Lukács predicted, provide

us with agency to articulate and challenge how financial institutions influence our lives. In fact, this newly

found discursive consciousness echoes Skeggs findings regarding perceived self-identity within practical

consciousness. While many Irish citizens previously considered the day-to-day running of the banking

sector, and its regulators, to be none of their concern, they have recently discovered that these “other”

realities very much affect their own day-to-day lives. The bank guarantee scheme and the repercussions

it has had for subsequent budgets, has had a large impact on the household budgets of almost all citizens

– suddenly banking and finance have become national concerns within the discursive consciousness of an

entire generation.
References:

Literature:

Bottero, Wendy (2007) Class Consciousness. In: George Ritzer ed. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of

Sociology. Oxford:Blackwell: 539-542.

Clegg, Stewart R, Courpasson, D, Phillips, Nelson (2006) Power and organizations. London:Sage

Publications.

Giddens, Anthony (1986) The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration.

Berkeley:University of California Press.

Giddens, Anthony (1991) Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age.

Cambridge:Polity Press.

Giddens, Anthony (2006) Sociology. Cambridge:Polity Press.

Haugaard, Mark (1997) The Constitution of Power: A theoretical analysis of power, knowledge and

structure. Manchester:Manchester University Press.

Kaspersen, Lars Bo (1995) Anthony Giddens: an introduction to a social theorist.

Oxford:Blackwell Publishers.

Kay, Martin. O'Connor, Pat. (2010) Sociology 3A Oscail Course Notes. Dublin:Oscail

Lukács, Georg (1968) History and class consciousness: studies in Marxist dialectics, trans. by R.

Livingstone. Berlin:The Merlin Press (originally published in 1922).

Newton, Kenneth (2007) Social and Political Trust. In:Dalton, Russel J., Klingemann, Hans D. ed. Oxford

Handbook of Political Behaviour New York:Oxford University Press 342-361.

Ritzer, George (2008) Sociological Theory. New York:McGraw Hill.

Skeggs, Beverly (1997) Formations of Class and Gender. London: Sage Publications.

Electronic:

Finfacts Team, 2010, Trust in government and business in Ireland is the lowest in Europe according to

pan-European survey. [Online] Available at:

<http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1018896.shtml> [Accessed 13 October 2010].