Filing # 101056286 E-Filed 01/02/2020 08:52:57 PM

No. 4D19-1499
IN THE
Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
________________________________________
RECEIVED, 01/02/2020 08:53:30 PM, Clerk, Fourth District Court of Appeal

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,

v.

ROBERT KRAFT,
Appellee.
_______________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court of the Fifteenth

Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County
L.T. No. 2019MM002346AXXX
_______________________________________

AMENDED REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

________________________________________

Ashley Moody
Attorney General

Amit Agarwal (FBN 125637)

Solicitor General

Jeffrey Paul DeSousa (FBN 110951)

Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
(850) 414-3300
[email protected]
[email protected]

Counsel for State of Florida

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities .................................................................................................. ii

Argument....................................................................................................................1

I. The County Court Erroneously Suppressed Video Evidence of Kraft’s

Prostitution Offenses .......................................................................................1

A. The warrant was valid ........................................................................... 1

B. Law-enforcement officers properly executed the warrant .................... 4

C. In any event, videos of Kraft should not have been

suppressed .............................................................................................8

1. The good-faith exception applies in the event of a Warrant

Clause Violation.......................................................................... 8

2. Should the Court find a violation of the Reasonableness

Clause, suppression is limited at most to those videos seized
outside the scope of the warrant ................................................. 9

II. Kraft’s Remaining Arguments Lack Merit....................................................12

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................15

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................17

Certificate of Font ....................................................................................................18

i
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Berger v. New York,

388 U.S. 41 (1967) .............................................................................................1, 2

Bettez v. City of Miami,

510 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) ................................................................4, 5

Bueno v. Workman,
20 So. 3d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) .....................................................................13

Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) ........................................................................................... 5-6

Dalia v. United States,

441 U.S. 238 (1979) ...............................................................................................1

Johnson v. State,
660 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1995)............................................................................ 13, 15

Murphy v. State,
32 So. 3d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ........................................................................4

Pazos v. State,
654 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ...................................................................9

Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978) ...............................................................................................9

Rodriguez v. State,
297 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1974).....................................................................................11

State v. Dwyer,
332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976).....................................................................................3

State v. Irvine,
558 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) .................................................................8, 9

ii
State v. Morris,
540 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) .................................................................5, 7

State v. Powers,
555 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ......................................................................6

State v. Sabourin,
39 So. 3d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) .......................................................................9

United States v. Batiste,

No. 06-20373-CR, 2007 WL 2412837 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007) ........................3

United States v. Dorfman,

542 F.Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ...........................................................................3

United States v. Heldt,

668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ...........................................................................11

United States v. Koyomejian,

970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................................................... 3, 6, 7, 8

United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897 (1984) ...............................................................................................9

United States v. Liu,

239 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2000).................................................................................11

United States v. Sparks,

806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) ...........................................................................10

United States v. Vento,

533 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976)...............................................................................2, 8

United States v. Webster,

809 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) ...........................................................................11

United States v. Williams,

124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997).................................................................................13

iii
United States v. Young,
877 F.2d 1099 (1st Cir. 1989) ..............................................................................11

Waller v. Georgia,
467 U.S. 39 (1984) ...............................................................................................11

Statutes

42 U.S.C § 1983 .......................................................................................................10

§ 796.05(1), Fla. Stat..................................................................................................5

§ 796.05(2), Fla. Stat................................................................................................12

§ 796.07(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. .......................................................................................13

iv
 ARGUMENT

I. THE COUNTY COURT ERRONEOUSLY SUPPRESSED VIDEO EVIDENCE OF

KRAFT’S PROSTITUTION OFFENSES.

A. The warrant was valid.

1. Kraft argues that the search warrant was facially defective because it did

not instruct police to minimize. Ans. Br. 22-25. Normal rules governing warrants do

not apply, in his view, because “electronic surveillance” requires special standards

so as to not leave individuals “at the mercy of advancing technology.” Id. at 21.

Applicable caselaw does not support that contention. In Dalia v. United

States, the Court rejected the claim that “warrants for electronic surveillance are

unique,” such that wiretap orders “must include a specification of the precise manner

in which they are to be executed.” 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979). It instead held that,

even in the intrusive context of Title III wiretaps, the Warrant Clause “require[s]

only three things”: a magistrate, probable cause, and particularity. Id. at 255.

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), does not hold that a warrant

authorizing non-audio video surveillance must include minimization procedures.

There, the Court invalidated a state law authorizing wiretap orders without requiring

“particularity in the warrant as to” three areas “specifically required by the Fourth

Amendment,” including “[1] what specific crime has been or is being committed,

[2] ‘the place to be searched,’ or [3] ‘the persons or things to be seized.’” Id. at 56.

In contrast, the warrant here (1) found probable cause for the crime of Deriving
1
Support from the Proceeds of Prostitution; (2) named certain locations within the

Orchids of Asia Day Spa as the place to be searched; and (3) described the objects

of the search as “Evidence of Prostitution . . . specifically the Non-audio, video

recordings of individuals engaged in acts related to these violations.” R. 2116.

To be sure, the Supreme Court also found the New York law invalid because

it authorized “continuous” and “indiscriminate[]” recording “of any and all persons

coming into the area.” Ans. Br. 20. That ruling, however, was based not on any

alleged lack of minimization, but on a violation of the probable cause requirement.

Berger, 388 U.S. at 59. “[A]uthorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period,”

the Court wrote, “is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures

pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.” Id. (emphasis added). When a

lengthy surveillance operation is based on one probable cause finding, whatever

suspicion existed when the warrant issued may be stale by the search’s end. This

warrant, on the other hand, approved searches for only five days. R. 2116.

Kraft is also incorrect that the “uniform, persuasive precedent” of federal

courts requires that video surveillance warrants include minimization protocols.

Ans. Br. 17-18 (citing cases). Those decisions are hardly “uniform,” as numerous

federal authorities have rejected the view that minimization instructions are required

by the Warrant Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 861 (3d Cir.

1976) (affirming “[d]espite the absence of the minimization provision” because that

2
omission is a “mere ‘technical defect’”); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.Supp. 345,

388 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Batiste, 2007 WL 2412837, at *8 n.9 (S.D. Fla.

Aug. 21, 2007). Nor are Kraft’s preferred cases persuasive. Init. Br. 14-20; see, e.g.,

United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542-51 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J.,

concurring in judgment). Regardless, those federal decisions are “not binding on

state courts,” State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1976), and none reversed

based on a lack of minimization, casting into doubt their precedential status even in

the federal courts that decided them. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 544 & n.2.

2. Nor are the State’s Warrant Clause arguments “procedurally barred.” Ans.

Br. 18-19. In the proceeding below, the State contended that this was “not a Title III

case” and that “Title III” was merely “guidance,” adding that “there is no case in the

State of Florida on video recording.” R. 3233. Statutory minimization requirements

governing audio surveillance, in other words, need not be imported into the

constitutional requirements governing non-audio video surveillance.

Moreover, typical preservation rules are unsuited to the unique facts here.

Currently pending before the Court is the State’s appeal in Zhang, where it is

undisputed that prosecutors preserved the argument that the Warrant Clause does not

require minimization instructions. E.g., Zhang R. 577. That is relevant because this

is an interlocutory appeal. When the “state of the law regarding the reasonableness

of a search [] has changed since the suppression hearing,” that new law governs the

3
remainder of the proceedings. Murphy v. State, 32 So. 3d 122, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA

2009). So if the Court rules that the Warrant Clause was satisfied in the related cases,

the county court “has inherent authority” to reconsider its non-final suppression

order. Bettez v. City of Miami, 510 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

B. Law-enforcement officers properly executed the warrant.

1. None of the minimization procedures Kraft proposes was required by the

Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.

First, the Constitution did not require police to stop filming whenever (1) a

Spa patron left on his underwear at the start of a massage or (2) the lights were not

instantly dimmed at the start of a massage. Ans. Br. 26. Underwear may be removed,

and lights may be dimmed, after a massage starts, just as prostitution may take place

whether the lights are on, dimmed, or off entirely. In this very case, for instance, the

county court noted that at least one man who received an illicit massage “started

with underwear on but had his underwear later removed.” R. 2100.

Second, the Fourth Amendment did not bar surveillance outside ordinary

“business hours” Ans. Br. 29-30. Police were investigating a criminal enterprise

involving prostitution, and they possessed evidence that some or all of the masseuses

may have been living in the massage parlor. R. 2108. In that circumstance, the

Constitution did not require investigators to presume that prostitution would occur

only during ordinary business hours.

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 Third, police did not have to minimize by placing cameras to cover only “the

register” in the lobby, rather than the massage rooms where suspected prostitution

was occurring. Ans. Br. 29. Kraft’s argument to the contrary observes that detectives

already possessed “smoking-gun proof” of prostitution, and therefore assumes that

they were permitted to film only money “transactions” constituting “discrete

evidence of proceeds.” Id. But that misunderstands the elements of Deriving Support

from the Proceeds of Prostitution. To establish that crime, the State must show that

the defendant derived support “from what is believed to be the earnings or proceeds

of such person’s prostitution.” § 796.05(1), Fla. Stat. Put differently, prosecutors

must link specific “prostitution earnings” with the act of deriving support. State v.

Morris, 540 So. 2d 226, 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). To do so here, police had to trace

the money from the johns to the sex workers and from the sex workers to Spa

management and ownership. On top of that, video evidence of the manager’s

presence in the massage rooms during a sex act would establish her knowledge that

the money was an illicit “proceed” of prostitution.

Fourth, police did not have to cease recording any time a “female client[]”

entered a massage room and film only “massages of men.” Ans. Br. 25, 29; FACDL

Br. 18. The Fourth Amendment did not require the magistrate judge to employ sex-

based classifications in the warrant; indeed, doing so might well have raised rather

than dispelled constitutional concerns. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-204

5
(1976). At a minimum, law-enforcement officers did not need to presume that only

male clients procure illicit prostitution services during the “early stages” of their

surveillance operation—before the video evidence established an evidentiary basis

for surveilling men and women differently. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,

141 (1978).

Finally, one amicus argues that police should have engaged in “short, periodic

spot-checking.” DPI Br. 10-11. But law-enforcement officers reasonably recorded

the entirety of each massage that was subject to surveillance: The start of an illegal

massage, no less than the proverbial “happy ending,” supplies evidence critical to a

fair assessment of the crime charged. Absent a full recording, defendants might

complain that the State failed to document contextual evidence that was either

exculpatory or germane to an assessment of potential defenses. See, e.g., State v.

Powers, 555 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).1

2. The State did not concede, in this or any other case, that Kraft’s Fourth

1
Kraft and his amici fail to show (Ans. Br. 17; DPI Amicus Br. 12-13) that
non-audio video recording is categorically more invasive of individual privacy than
audio surveillance, or that the proper remedy for any such problem is to import the
statutory standards governing audio surveillance into the Fourth Amendment
requirements governing non-audio video surveillance. A key difference is that non-
audio video surveillance does not reveal the contents of a person’s mind as evidenced
by private communications—the covert monitoring and recording of which might
reasonably be thought to be more invasive than mere visual observation—in the way
that wiretaps have the capacity to do. Silent video surveillance will never unveil, for
instance, the substance of confidential communications between attorney and client,
priest and penitent, or husband and wife.
6
Amendment rights were violated. See Ans. Br. 2, 3, 4, 15, 22, 38. In Zhang, ASA

Greg Kridos contended that detectives reasonably executed the warrant; highlighted

their minimization techniques; and argued that the evidence against each defendant

was admissible. Zhang R. 568, 583-84, 592-93, 601, 625, 626. Mr. Kridos regretted

that four other people were filmed receiving apparently non-criminal massages, and

he opined that, as to “those four individuals,” id. at 589 (emphasis added), detectives

had not made a “good faith effort” to minimize. Id. at 595. The “best practice,” he

thought, would have been to stop recording if the conduct on screen was innocent.

Id. at 579. He did not concede that police failed to minimize as to the defendants in

Zhang. To the contrary, he maintained that “evidence that was gathered against

Ms. Wang and Ms. Zhang and the twenty-five other individuals was obtained

lawfully.” Id. at 590; see id. at 603 (“Neither Ms. Wang or [] Ms. Zhang were part

of any improperly recorded video.”). Still less did he concede that incriminating

videos of Kraft were improperly recorded.

At any rate, ASA Judith Arco later clarified that because “[l]ots of these guys

got massages for forty minutes and the last five minutes was where the criminal

conduct happened,” there was “no … way that the officer could immediately tell”

which massages would be criminal. Id. at 626-28. That tracks the State’s position

here: Requiring police to predict whether a massage would end in prostitution was a

“very difficult burden” not imposed by the Constitution. Id. at 628; Init. Br. 24-25.

7
 At a minimum, this Court is not bound by an alleged concession that a lone

prosecutor offered as to non-parties in a different case.

C. In any event, videos of Kraft should not have been suppressed.

1. The good-faith exception applies in the event of a Warrant

Clause Violation.

Suppression would not be the remedy even if some constitutional violation

occurred. At the outset, Kraft is incorrect that the good-faith exception is “properly

reserved” for cases where the warrant is invalid due to a “technical defect.” Ans.

Br. 37. The good-faith exception exists to temper the deleterious effects of exclusion

when exclusion will not result in appreciable deterrence, and therefore applies any

time police reasonably rely on an invalid warrant. See, e.g., State v. Irvine, 558 So.

2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (applying good-faith exception to warrant

lacking probable cause). In any event, the omission of minimization instructions

from a warrant is a “mere technical defect” under Title III, Vento, 533 F.2d at 861,

and there is no cause for concluding that it would be otherwise if that statutory

minimization requirement were imported into the Fourth Amendment.

None of the courts below found that law-enforcement officers lacked good

faith. If anything, the county court acknowledged that there is a “dearth of Florida

cases offering guidance on this issue,” R. 2095, while the circuit court in Zhang

stressed that the Fourth Amendment requirements for non-audio video surveillance

warrants are “unchartered territory.” Zhang R. 576. Accordingly, the circuit court
8
assured officers attending the hearing that “no matter what I do here, don’t take it

personally” because “executing these types of things” “is difficult.” Id.

That Detective Sharp’s affidavit cited several cases on which Kraft now relies,

Ans. Br. 38, supports the State’s reliance on the good-faith exception. By apprising

the magistrate of those non-binding authorities, police were entitled to later rely on

that warrant in good faith, knowing they had discharged their duty of candor to the

court. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984).

In addition, the State Attorney’s Office aided in drafting, and in fact reviewed,

the warrant. R. 2342-43, 2883-84. The good-faith exception applies when an “officer

t[akes] the proposed affidavit to an assistant state attorney for approval as to form

before executing it before the magistrate.” Pazos v. State, 654 So. 2d 1000, 1001

(Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also State v. Sabourin, 39 So. 3d 376, 384 (Fla. 1st DCA

2010) (“an Assistant State Attorney [] reviewed the affidavit and informed her it was

sufficient to present to the county judge”).

2. Should the Court find a violation of the Reasonableness

Clause, suppression is limited at most to those videos seized
outside the scope of the warrant.

A. Kraft does not and cannot show that the videos incriminating him would

not have been obtained with the minimization requirements he posits. See Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (suppression requires the challenged search to

have “violated the Fourth Amendment rights of that particular defendant”); cf.

9
United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1340 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that Fourth

Amendment standing requires an “injury in fact”). He argues that police should not

have recorded women; but he is a man. He claims that massage rooms should not

have been recorded after ordinary business hours; but he obtained illegal prostitution

services during ordinary business hours. He urges that only the end of massages

should have been recorded; but his first offense came at the end of a massage. 2 And

he insists that police should not have recorded men who left on their underwear; but

he removed his own underwear immediately.

Kraft is also wrong that if he lacks Fourth Amendment standing then “virtually

no one can be expected to enforce minimization in practice.” Ans. Br. 4, 33-34;

FACDL 13-19. In this very case, third parties have filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C §

1983, alleging that the same video surveillance of which Kraft complains violated

their Fourth Amendment rights. See Doe v. Town of Jupiter, No. 19-cv-80513 (S.D.

Fla.). Likewise, if police film a person committing a crime which otherwise would

have been shielded from recording under a proper minimization regime, that person

might obtain suppression. If, for instance, Kraft were a woman—and if the

2
Kraft committed the first of his two acts of solicitation of prostitution at the
end of a massage on January 19, 2019. Thus, had police viewed only the end of that
massage, they would have captured his conduct. His second crime occurred at or
near the beginning of the massage on January 20. By then, police already knew that
Kraft was likely to commit a crime; under any reasonable standard, they would have
been justified in recording the entirety of his second massage. See supra at 6.
10
Constitution forbade filming women—Kraft would have standing.

B. Asking the Court to expand the usual scope of suppression, Kraft alleges

that police “blatantly ignored” the terms of the warrant, thereby justifying “total

suppression.” Ans. Br. 34-35. The Supreme Court has already rejected that theory.

See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 43 n.3 (1984); Init. Br. 36-38.

Rodriguez v. State—a case that predated Waller and therefore did not have the

benefit of that decision; addressed Florida’s statutory wiretap scheme, not the

constitutional question; and, like several other decisions cited by Kraft, Ans. Br. 27,

35 n.19, involved wiretaps implicating the unique context of the attorney-client

privilege—does not change that. See 297 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1974).

In the “exceedingly rare” case where a federal court has applied the flagrant

disregard exception, United States v. Webster, 809 F.3d 1158, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016),

evidence will be suppressed in its totality only where the police “in bad faith” “effect

a widespread seizure of items that were not within the scope of the warrant,” United

States v. Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000), or where “the lawful part [of a search]

seems to have been a kind of pretext for the unlawful part.” United States v. Young,

877 F.2d 1099, 1105-06 (1st Cir. 1989). There must be “persuasive evidence that the

search was merely a subterfuge to examine or seize other evidence not specified in

the warrant.” United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But no

widespread seizure or pretext exists here.

11
II. KRAFT’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT.

A. Along with his minimization arguments, Kraft contends that video

surveillance, at least in the massage rooms themselves, was unnecessary. Ans.

Br. 38-44. But necessity is not an independent Fourth Amendment requirement. See

Init. Br. 43. Even if it were, Kraft’s claim assumes that to prove the crime of Deriving

Support from the Proceeds of Prostitution, police needed only to film money

exchanging hands at “the register.” Ans. Br. 42. More is clearly needed, however,

supra at 5, and neither “tax and bank records” nor “videos at the register” sufficed

for that task. Ans. Br. 41-42.

For purposes of assessing the validity of the magistrate’s warrant, or the

manner in which that warrant was executed, it is inaccurate to assert that police were

only investigating a “routine misdemeanor” for which video surveillance was per se

illegal or presumptively disproportionate. Ans. Br. 1; see also id. (citing “the State’s

disproportionate effort to win a misdemeanor conviction”); Prof’s Amicus Br. 8-10.

By its terms, the warrant at issue here authorized law-enforcement to investigate

Deriving Support from the Proceeds of Prostitution—a felony offense. See R. 2116;

§ 796.05(2), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[a]nyone violating this section,” which

prohibits deriving support from the proceeds of prostitution, commits a felony

offense). This investigation has already culminated in felony charges against the

owner, manager, and employees of the Spa. In addition, the Legislature has

12
determined that Solicitation of Prostitution may itself constitute a felony in some

circumstances. See § 796.07(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (providing that “[a] person who

violates paragraph (2)(f),” which makes it unlawful “[t]o solicit . . . prostitution,”

“commits . . . [a] felony of the third degree for a second violation” and “[a] felony

of the second degree for a third or subsequent violation”). Finally, this Court need

not turn a blind eye to the fact that investigations into illicit prostitution schemes

often yield evidence of more serious crimes, including the modern-day slavery that

underlies the felony offense of sex trafficking.

In all events, the necessity for a search cannot turn on a reviewing judge’s

“personal opinion regarding the need for or the importance of the criminal provisions

that appear to have been violated.” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 417 (3d

Cir. 1997) (Alito, J.).

B. Last, Kraft claims that “[t]hree categories of misstatements materially

infected the warrant.” Ans. Br. 45. But the county court declined to reach the Franks

v. Delaware issue, meaning this record lacks the fact-finding necessary to affirm

under the “Tipsy Coachman” doctrine. See R. 2101 n.4; Bueno v. Workman, 20 So.

3d 993, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (doctrine inapplicable “where a lower court has

not made factual findings on an issue”).

Either way, Kraft has not shown a “deliberate falsehood or a statement in

reckless disregard of the truth.” Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 655 (Fla. 1995).

13
His allegation that Health Department Inspector Karen Herzog “cook[ed] up” her

testimony that she observed indicators of “primary domicile,” Ans. Br. 7, is easily

disproved by photographic evidence of the bedding, clothing, medications, and other

signs that the Spa’s employees may have been living there. R. 3369-76.

So too, the suggestion that Detective Sharp improperly referred—on one

occasion in his affidavit—to the “middle-aged therapists as ‘girls,’” Ans. Br. 47, is

belied by Sharp’s inclusion of the birthdates of each of the women Inspector Herzog

found working there, R. 2108, and by his use of the term “women” multiple times in

the same paragraph where he referenced “girls.” R. 2112. A lone, offhand reference

to “girls” could not possibly have misled the magistrate into believing the Spa’s sex

workers were underage.

It is similarly untrue that Detective Sharp “falsely implied that he had

observed only men patronizing the Spa.” Ans. Br. 45. While Detective Sharp wrote

in his affidavit that the Spa had “overwhelmingly (if not exclusively) male customer

clientele,” R. 2111, he explained at the suppression hearing that he believed the few

women who entered the Spa during the pre-surveillance period “did not obtain

services for which the business was advertised for” because they “exited the business

a short amount of time” after entering. R. 2424; see also R. 2427-31.

Finally, Kraft assails Detective Sharp’s statement that he had “strongly

considered” the Mesa-Rincon case, and that he possessed “specialized training and

14
experience in the investigation of prostitution organizations.” Ans. Br. 45. Yet Sharp

testified that while he had not personally read that opinion, members of the State

Attorney’s Office “advised [him] of the case law” and gave him the opportunity to

ask “What does this case involve?” R. 2457-58. Regarding Detective Sharp’s

training and experience in the field of prostitution investigations, he had taken

multiple classes discussing the topic, attended “several meetings,” and “participated

in prostitution stings.” R. 2442-44, 2445.

Even assuming a misstatement, none of the alleged inaccuracies was material.

“The materiality prong of Franks requires the moving party to establish that the

affidavit, with the misstatements deleted, would itself fail to establish probable

cause.” Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 654. Yet Kraft acknowledges that police had “already

proved”—via untainted statements—that prostitution “was occurring” in the Spa.

Ans. Br. 40. The magistrate undoubtedly would have found probable cause based on

undisputed facts properly set forth in the affidavit, including admissions by Subjects

A-D that they paid for sex acts in the Spa, R. 2109-11; adult website reviews,

R. 2105-07; trash pulls revealing napkins covered in seminal fluid, R. 2109; and Lei

Wang’s contacts with another illicit massage parlor. R. 2111.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the suppression order.

15
Respectfully submitted,

Ashley Moody
ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ Jeffrey Paul DeSousa

Amit Agarwal (FBN 125637)
SOLICITOR GENERAL
[email protected]
Jeffrey Paul DeSousa (FBN 110951)
DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL
[email protected]
Office of the Attorney General
PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Tel. (850) 414-3300
Fax (850) 410-2672

Counsel for State of Florida

16
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served via the e-filing portal to the

following on this second day of January 2020:

William A. Burck Donnie Murrell

Derek L. Shaffer 400 Executive Center Drive
Sandra Moser Suite 201—Executive Center Plaza
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Sullivan LLP [email protected]
1300 I Street NW, Suite 900 (561) 686-2700
Washington, D.C. 20005 Counsel for Amicus Curiae
(202) 538-8000 Due Process Institute
[email protected]
[email protected] Harvey J. Sepler
[email protected] Rimon, P.C.
Counsel for Robert Kraft 3389 Sheridan Street #450
Hollywood, Florida 33021
Alex Spiro [email protected]
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & (305) 501-2898
Sullivan LLP Counsel for Amicus Curiae
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor Independence Institute
New York, NY 10010
(212) 849-7000 Leonard Feuer
[email protected] Leonard Feuer, P.A.
Counsel for Robert Kraft 240 10th Street
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Frank A. Shepherd [email protected]
GrayRobinson, P.A. (561) 659-1360
333 SE Second Avenue, Suite 3200 Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Miami, Florida 33131 Professors Stephen Saltzburg and
[email protected] Ronald Goldstock
(305) 416-6880
Counsel for Robert Kraft

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Justin F. Karpf
Assistant Public Defender
Leon County Courthouse
301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 401
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
[email protected]
(850) 606-8500
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
FACDL and NACDL

David Oscar Markus

National Co-Chair, Amicus Committee
National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers
40 NW 3rd Street, PH1
Miami, FL 33128
[email protected]
(305) 379-6667
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
FACDL and NACDL

/s/ Jeffrey Paul DeSousa

Jeffrey Paul DeSousa
DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL

CERTIFICATE OF FONT

I certify that the font used in this brief is 14-point Times New Roman.

/s/ Jeffrey Paul DeSousa

Jeffrey Paul DeSousa
DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL

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