SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.

Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of
law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against
the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court
both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme
of our Republic. This case is an illustration.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of
their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein
petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia
Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de
Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to
two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-
concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.4

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the
spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen .5
On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right
of redemption claimed by her brother. 6

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs,
including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the
portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same
house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the
private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they
alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and
Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area
occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant
was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent
law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article
1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article was
written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De
Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was
required.

Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a
copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written
notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "

In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist,
emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a
similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors,
as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof
to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular
method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws"
as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by
the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion,
to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less
expired in 1977.

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature.
While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out
of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter
but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of
the lawmakers. 14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-
day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary,
as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any
problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but
years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977,
thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the
petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be
necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be
any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in
1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure
that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters
were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we
do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed,
the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running
and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when
none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for
its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged
right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his
claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means
of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to
make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among
them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act
of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire,
to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose
to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which
the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted
properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and
Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between
the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of
the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990

MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV,
SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO,
and ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO, respondents.

Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.

Leonardo M. Zaballero for private respondents.

CORTÉS, J.:

On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private respondents Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero,
Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party their pro-indiviso shares as co-
owners in eight parcels of registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to A-1322) located in the
province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96 hectares. Petitioner claimed that under Article
1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these shares from
private respondents for a reasonable price.

On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, on the ground that petitioners' registered notice of lis pendens was ample protection of their
rights.

On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons and copies of the complaint. Private
respondents then filed their answer with counterclaim, praying for the partition of the subject properties.
Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a motion for intervention dated April 29, 1980, adopting
therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim.

At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor are the pro-indiviso co-owners of
the properties cited and described in the complaint;

2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land covered by TCT No. T-1319;
approximately twelve (12) hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320; and the entire
parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject of expropriation proceedings instituted
by the National Housing Authority (NHA) now pending before this Court in Civil Case
Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;

3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein parties in the aforecited
expropriation cases, the current valuation of the land and the improvements thereon is at
P95,132.00 per hectare;
 4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written notice from the defendants and
the intervenor that the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION had offered to buy the latter's share in the properties listed in the
complaint subject to the following terms:

1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS
per square meter, or a total price of NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00)
PESOS for a total area of SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;

2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%) PERCENT of the selling

price, or a minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,700,000.00) PESOS;

3. The balance of the purchase price to be payable within THREE (3)

YEARS from the date of downpayment in THREE (3) EQUAL, ANNUAL
PAYMENTS with interest at the legal rate prevailing at the time of
payment;

4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK GUARANTEE of payments

and shall not be governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code.

(Cf. Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)

5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the plaintiffs were requested:

a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase defendants' and

intervenor's shares under the above-quoted terms; or

b) To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or

c) To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the intervenor, to
the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION at the price and under the terms aforequoted.

6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION

is ready, willing and able to purchase not only the aliquot shares of the defendants and
the intervenor, but also that of the plaintiffs, in and to all the properties subject of this
case, for and in consideration of the net amount of TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50)
PESOS per square meter and under the afore-quoted terms;

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]

The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows:

PLAINTIFFS

1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition;

2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive;

 3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right for an amount of not more that
P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said properties;

4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive right was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint;

DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR

1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50 per square meter;

2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon their failure to exercise the
same within the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the price of P12.50 per square
meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs to sell their
shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond question, as the
same was admitted by the parties herein;

4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95 hectares may be physically

partitioned without difficulty in the manner suggested by them to plaintiffs, and as
graphically represented in the subdivision plan, which will be furnished in due course to
plaintiffs' counsel.

[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]

Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-trial order dated July 9, 1980 granting
petitioners a period of ten days from receipt of the subdivision plan to be prepared by a competent
geodetic engineer within which to express their approval or disapproval of the said plan, or to submit
within the same period, if they so desire, an alternative subdivision plan.

On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the counsel for petitioners a letter enclosed with
a subdivision plan.

On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to the pre-trial order, contending that the question of
reasonable value of the subject properties remains a contentious issue of fact ascertainable only after a
full trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre- emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares in
the co-ownership after due determination of the reasonable price thereof.

Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for petitioners another subdivision plan
prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite communication was sent by petitioners signifying their
approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans.

In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, private respondents filed a motion
dated December 16, 1980 requesting that petitioners be required to formally specify which of the two
options under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that petitioners' shares in the
subject properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter; or that the
subject properties be sold to a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. (claimed to have been
erroneously referred to in the pre-trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof distributed among the parties.

Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the purpose of determining the applicability of
Article 498 of the New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued an order dated February 4, 1981 which
directed the parties to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme of allotting the subject properties to
one of the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or whether or not they know of a third party
who is able and willing to buy the subject properties at terms and conditions more favorable than that
offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order contained a series of questions addressed
to all the parties, who were thereupon required to submit their answers thereto.

Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing to allot their shares in the
subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that
they did not know of any other party who was willing and able to purchase the subject properties under
more favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.

However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by respondent trial judge, petitioners
filed a motion for clarification as to the true identity of the third party allegedly willing to purchase the
subject properties.

On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners' motion on the ground that it was
irrelevant.

Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading captioned "Compliance and Motion", (1)
reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the true identity of the third party buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC., (2)
expressing their view that there is actually no bona fide and financially able third party willing to purchase
the subject properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-
emptive right to purchase the shares of private respondents in the co-ownership at a "reasonable price",
which is less than that computed excessively by the latter at the rate of P12.50 per square meter.
Petitioners therein prayed that further proceedings be conducted in order to settle the factual issue
regarding the reasonable value of the subject properties.

On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion. The judge ruled
that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares in the co-
ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge
ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil
Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date of public bidding for the subject properties on April 13,
1981.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order. Respondent trial judge reset the
hearing on petitioners' motion for reconsideration to April 6, 1981, and moved the scheduled public sale to
April 14, 1981.

Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial judge acted without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order dated March 16, 1981 which denied
petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares and which,
peremptorily ordered the public sale of the subject properties. On April 8, 1981, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of the subject properties at public auction.

With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.

The Court finds no merit in the present petition.

The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated March 16, 1981 is ultimately premised on
petitioners' claim that they had a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-owners,
private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is this same claim which forms the basis of their
complaint for injunction and damages filed against private respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant
to any of the owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares
of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. Article 1620
provides:

A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only
do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common [Emphasis supplied].

Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a
stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked only
after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-ownership [See
Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for
injunction and damages against private respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third
party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to the case at bar.

There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private respondents had acknowledged the pre-
emptive right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a "reasonable price". Although it appears that
private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the offer was made at a
fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July 9, 1980, Annex "C" of the Petition;
Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private respondents had agreed, without qualification, to sell their
shares to petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase the shares at a price lower
than the selling price of private respondents.

Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from alienating their pro-indiviso
shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the
New Civil Code, thus:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property
held in common. The law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the
portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado
v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884,
September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as earlier discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the
right to redeem, within a specified period, the shares which may have been sold to the third party. [Articles
1620 and 1623 of the New Civil Code.]

Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-
indiviso shares.

Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's order for the holding of a public sale
of the subject properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code. After a careful
examination of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the Court finds that respondent trial judge's
order was issued in accordance with the laws pertaining to the legal or juridical dissolution of co-
ownerships.

It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the
partition of the subject properties in the event that the petitioners refused to purchase their pro-indiviso
shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase
the other co-owners' pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject
properties is recognized by law, specifically Article 494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general
rule that no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads as follows:

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand
at any time partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty
years.

Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar. Private respondents'
counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties was therefore entirely proper. However, during the
pre-trial proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the subject properties were incapable of
physical partition. Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But after petitioners inexplicably
refused to abide by the pretrial order issued by respondent trial judge, and stubbornly insisted on
exercising an alleged pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares at a "reasonable price",
private respondents relented and adopted petitioner's position that the partition of the subject properties
was not economically feasible, and, consequently, invoked the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code [Private respondents' "Motion To Allot Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the Same Pursuant To
Article 498 Of The Civil Code", Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-49].

Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the subject properties should not be
partitioned, and private respondents continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership
arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within his jurisdiction
when he issued his order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the
purpose of determining whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of the New
Civil Code were present in the case.

Art. 498 provides that:

Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
alloted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
distributed.

The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is resorted to when (1) the right to
partition the property among the co-owners is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the
property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil Code] would prejudice
the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-
owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon
reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners.

Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries posed by respondent trial judge
and to insist that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which they could
purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and Motion" dated February
27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].

Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent trial judge that the parties
could not agree on who among them would be allotted the subject properties, the Court finds that
respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding of a public sale for
the subject properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square meter), and the distribution of
the proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided under Article 498 of the New Civil Code.

Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further hearings in the case because it is
apparent from the various allegations and admissions of the parties made during the pre-trial
proceedings, and in their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for the application of Article 498 of
the New Civil Code were present in the case. No factual issues remained to be litigated upon.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying
reconsideration2 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 323 and declaring void the
special proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of
the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose
of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the ostensible
purpose of "financial need in the personal, business and medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’
husband."

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand, against his
mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza
(herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr.’s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental
faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband
of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be
sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo
City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental
incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties, and in
order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need for
a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein that Letters of
Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the
improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.

"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as
Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties,
and authorization to sell the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the
physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and
treatment at the Iloilo Doctor’s Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and
hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already.
For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its
improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.

"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex "C")
finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing
thereof for June 20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner
Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy,
and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s attending physicians.

"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex "D"),
finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon
was necessary to defray the mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also
made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the
Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings
sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.

"The said court then disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby
renders judgment as follows:

"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioner’s husband, to be incapacitated and unable to participate in
the administration of conjugal properties;

"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal
properties; and

"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo
City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza
and the buildings standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.

"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the proceedings before
Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision
has already been rendered on the case by public respondent.

"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment in
Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the
argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of administration, and
authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules governing
special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process, particularly the
need for notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardeleza’s petition can be
prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic requirements
thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective one. He further alleged that under the
New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these
rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the
conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc.
No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before
Branch 25.

"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements
thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s
hospitalization. He alleged that the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million
Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also pointed out that the
building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s industry,
labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family.
Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all
financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo
Doctors’ Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on installment basis.
Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge
anything for their professional services.

"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement to his motion for
reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly
applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family
Code comes under the heading on "Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife" which contemplates
of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is
"comatose without motor and mental faculties," the said provisions cannot be made to apply.

"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No.
4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p.
111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of
the deed of absolute sale.

"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale
on the grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final
resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3)
the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would have given his
consent to the sale.

"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had penned the
decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this
case (Annex "I"). The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.

"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying herein petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration and approving respondent Jardeleza’s motion for approval of the deed of absolute
sale. The said court ruled that:

"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by "oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel,
and the opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner,
through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-
Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly observed the procedure embodied
under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20,
1991.

"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor" Teodor L. Jardeleza does not
have the personality to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or properties, subject of
the petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are
both still alive.

"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for
lack of merit.

"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among others, authorized Gilda L.
Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing
thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by
petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on
July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is
hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the sale and issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.

"SO ORDERED."4

On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed decision
and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was
also declared void.5

On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,6 however, on March 29, 1993, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the decision.7

Hence, this appeal.8

The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who
suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental
faculties, and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of
land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in a
summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight
million pesos.

The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on
summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr.
Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that
had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person
or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed,
petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.

"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (165a)."

In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is
absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and
mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.9 In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the
wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.10

Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property
must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95,
1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of
Court.1âwphi1 Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the
incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered
by the trial court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that
a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the
impress of nullity.11 A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked
directly or collaterally.12 "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard."13 "A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or
collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding
where it is invoked."14

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in
toto.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150060 August 19, 2003

PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. represented herein by its President ENGR. WILLIAM C. LIU,
Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. ANTHONY S. VALENCIA and SUSAN T. VALENCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

On appeal is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59960, promulgated on 13 February
2001, which has affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City dismissing the
complaint of petitioners for legal redemption over certain rural lots sold to respondents.

Petitioner is a private corporation based in Cebu City and the registered owner of Lot 4523 situated in
Liloan, Cebu, with an area of 22,214 square meters. Adjacent to the lot of petitioner are parcels of land,
identified to be Lot 4527, Lot 4528, and Lot 4529 with a total combined area of 3,751 square meters. The
three lots, aforenumbered, have been sold by Hermogenes Mendoza to respondent spouses sometime in
December 1994. Petitioner learned of the sale of the lots only in January, 1996, when Hermogenes
Mendoza sold to petitioner Lot No. 4820, a parcel also adjacent to Lot 4523 belonging to the latter.
Forthwith, it sent a letter to respondents, on 30 January 1996, signifying its intention to redeem the three
lots. On 30 May 1996, petitioner sent another letter to respondents tendering payment of the price paid to
Mendoza by respondents for the lots. Respondents, in response, informed petitioner that they had no
intention of selling the parcels. Thereupon, invoking the provisions of Articles 1621 and 1623, petitioner
filed an action against respondents to compel the latter to allow the legal redemption. Petitioner claimed
that neither Mendoza, the previous owner, nor respondents gave formal or even just a verbal notice of the
sale of the lots as so required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu dismissed petitioner’s complaint and respondents'
counterclaim; both parties appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the assailed decision.
Basically, the issues posed for resolution by the Court in the instant petition focus on the application of
Article 1621 and Article 1623 of the Civil Code, which read:

"ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural
land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated unless the grantee does not own any
rural land.

"This right is not applicable to adjacent lands which are separated by brooks, drains, ravines, roads and
other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other estates.

"If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of redemption at the same time, the owner of
the adjoining land of smaller area shall be preferred; and should both lands have the same area, the one
who first requested the redemption."

"ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."

Whenever a piece of rural land not exceeding one hectare is alienated, the law grants to the adjoining
owners a right of redemption except when the grantee or buyer does not own any other rural land.1 In
order that the right may arise, the land sought to be redeemed and the adjacent property belonging to the
person exercising the right of redemption must both be rural lands. If one or both are urban lands, the
right cannot be invoked.2

The trial court found the lots involved to be rural lands. Unlike the case of Fabia vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court3 (which ruled, on the issue of whether a piece of land was rural or not, that the use of the
property for agricultural purpose would be essential in order that the land might be characterized as rural
land for purposes of legal redemption), respondents in the instant case, however, did not dispute before
the Court of Appeals the holding of the trial court that the lots in question are rural lands. In failing to
assail this factual finding on appeal, respondents would be hardput to now belatedly question such finding
and to ask the Court to still entertain that issue.

Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it grants to an adjoining owner of the
property conveyed may be defeated if it can be shown that the buyer or grantee does not own any other
rural land. The appellate court, sustaining the trial court, has said that there has been no evidence
proffered to show that respondents are not themselves owners of rural lands for the exclusionary clause
of the law to apply.

With respect to the second issue, Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides that the right of legal pre-
emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. In stressing the mandatory character of the
requirement, the law states that the deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property unless
the same is accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.

The Court of Appeals has equated the statement in the deed of sale to the effect that the vendors have
complied with the provisions of Article 1623 of the Civil Code, as being the written affirmation under oath,
as well as the evidence, that the required written notice to petitioner under Article 1623 has been met.
Respondents, like the appellate court, overlook the fact that petitioner is not a party to the deed of sale
between respondents and Mendoza and has had no hand in the preparation and execution of the deed of
sale.1âwphi1 It could not thus be considered a binding equivalent of the obligatory written notice
prescribed by the Code.

In Verdad vs. Court of Appeals4 this court ruled:

"We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents. Concededly, no written
notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623
of the Civil Code -

"x x x xxx xxx

Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales
sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the
Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the
trial court.

"The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in
order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and
status.

"Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA 259), relied upon by petitioner in contending
that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a written notice of sale, the Court made it clear that it
was not reversing the prevailing jurisprudence; said the Court:

"’We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which
the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted
properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and
Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.’

"In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not just days or months, after the
consummation of the contracts of sale. The complaint for legal redemption itself was there filed more than
thirteen years after the sales were concluded."5

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside. Petitioner is hereby given a period of thirty days from finality of this decision
within which to exercise its right of legal redemption. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104114 December 4, 1995

LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARC REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Is a judicial action to redeem coupled with consignation of the price within the redemption period
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem under Art. 1623 in relation to Art. 1620 of the Civil Code?
Corollarily, is a formal offer to redeem accompanied with tender of payment a condition precedent to the
filing of an action for the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption? Plainly stated, is the filing of the
action with consignation equivalent to a formal offer to redeem?

A valuable piece of land in Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 24,576 square meters and
covered by OCT No. 0-5290 is disputed by petitioner Lee Chuy Realty Corporation (LEE CHUY REALTY)
and private respondent Marc Realty and Development Corporation (MARC REALTY). Originally the
property was co-owned by Ruben Jacinto to the extent of one-sixth and Dominador, Arsenio, Liwayway,
all surnamed Bascara, and Ernesto Jacinto who collectively owned the remaining five-sixths.

On 4 February 1981 Ruben Jacinto sold his one-sixth pro-indiviso share to LEE CHUY REALTY. The sale
was registered on 30 April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto Jacinto also sold their share
to MARC REALTY. The sale was registered on 16 October 1989.

LEE CHUY REALTY claims that it was never informed of the existence of the sale between MARC
REALTY on one hand and the Bascaras and Jacinto on the other, and that on the contrary it was only
upon inquiry from the Register of Deeds of Bulacan that the sale was brought to its attention. MARC
REALTY contends otherwise. It insists that LEE CHUY REALTY was verbally notified of the sale and was
in fact given a copy of the deed of sale.

On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint for legal redemption against MARC
REALTY1 and consigned in court a manager's check for 614,400. In its Amended Answer with
Counterclaim with Motion to Dismiss, MARC REALTY insisted that the complaint be dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action there being no allegation of prior valid tender of payment nor a prior valid notice
of consignation.

On 26 December 1990 the trial court2 ruled in favor of LEE CHUY REALTY holding that there was a prior
valid tender of payment and consignation. It further decreed that "(n)either a separate offer to redeem nor
a formal notice of consignation are (sic) necessary for the reason that the filing of the action itself, within
the period of redemption, is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem."3

On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with this Court. The petition however was referred to the Court
of Appeals pursuant to Sec. 9, B.P. Blg. 129.

On 22 November 1991 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing that of the lower court and
ruling that "a prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of an action
for legal redemption." It further ruled that "there must be tender of the redemption price within the required
period . . . because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the
established 30-day period." LEE CHUY REALTY filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
hence the present petition.

MARC REALTY contends that prior tender of payment is a condition precedent to the filing of an action in
court in order to validly exercise the right of legal redemption. LEE CHUY REALTY however argues that
the filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, which is a condition precedent to the
valid exercise of the right of legal redemption.

We sustain LEE CHUY REALTY. Arts. 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code on legal redemption provide:

Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares
of all the other co-owners or of any of them are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as
the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof
to all possible redemptioners.

MARC REALTY would apply the ruling in Cabrera v. Villanueva4 and De la Merced v. De Guzman5 where
an offer to redeem was required for the exercise of the right of redemption. On the other hand, LEE
CHUY REALTY anchors its claim on Tioseco v. Court of Appeals,6 Tolentino v. Court of Appeals,7 and
Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court.8 Specifically, in Cabrera v. Villanueva9 we held that for the legal
and effective exercise of the right of legal redemption one must make the offer within the period set in Art.
1623. In other words, if no claim or offer is made within thirty (30) days from written notice, no action may
be allowed to enforce the right of redemption. But in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals,10 Tioseco v. Court of
Appeals11 and Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 we adopted the view that a formal offer to
redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, is not essential where the right to
redeem is exercised through a judicial action within the redemption period and simultaneously depositing
the redemption price. The formal offer to redeem accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption
price prescribed by law is only essential to preserve the right of redemption for future enforcement even
beyond the period of redemption. The filing of the action itself within the period of redemption is
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.

A judicious scrutiny of the cases herein cited impugns the impression of MARC REALTY that they
enunciate conflicting doctrines. On the contrary, we view them as complementing one another. The Court
of Appeals erroneously concluded that a prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or
precondition to the filing of the action for legal redemption, notwithstanding prevailing jurisprudence
holding that to avail of the right of redemption what is essential is to make an offer to redeem within the
prescribed period. There is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to be properly effected.
Hence, it can either be through a formal tender with consignation, or by filing a complaint in court coupled
with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. What is condition precedent to a
valid exercise of the right of legal redemption is either the formal tender with consignation or the filing of a
complaint in court. What is paramount is the availment of the fixed and definite period within which to
exercise the right of legal redemption.13

In Hulganza v. Court of Appeals14 the Court, citing previous decisions, declared that the formal offer to
redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, within the prescribed period is only
essential to preserve the right of redemption for future enforcement beyond such period of redemption
and within the period prescribed for the action by the statute of limitations. Where, as in the instant case,
the right to redeem is exercised through judicial action within the reglementary period the formal offer to
redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, while proper, may be unessential.
The filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.

In sum, the formal offer to redeem is not a distinct step or condition sine qua non to the filing of the action
in Court for the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption. What constitutes a condition precedent is
either a formal offer to redeem or the filing of an action in court together with the consignation of the
redemption price within the reglementary period.

The doctrine in Tolentino, Tioseco and Belisario cases was jettisoned by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that they do not involve legal redemption by a co-owner but by a mortgagor. It concluded that the
application of the rules on legal redemption by a co-owner differs from the legal redemption by a
mortgagor. But the law does not distinguish; neither should we. For sure, the principle in the aforecited
cases is applicable regardless of whether the redemptioner is a co-owner or a mortgagor. Public policy
favors redemption regardless of whether the redemptioner is a co-owner or mortgagor, although perhaps
with unequal force and effect since each is given a fixed but different period. A co-owner desirous of
exercising his right of legal redemption is given a period of thirty (30) days from notice of the sale within
which to avail of the right to redeem.15 Under the free patent or homestead provisions of the Public Land
Act a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance is provided,16 the five-year period to be
reckoned from the date of the sale and not from the date of registration in the office of the Register of
Deeds.17 The redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed properties, on the other hand, is exercisable within
one (1) year from the date of the auction sale as provided for in Act No. 3135.18

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 24220 dated 22 November 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 7, in Civil Case No. 661-M-89 dated 26 December 1990
holding that the filing of the action for legal redemption coupled with the consignation of the redemption
price is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem as a condition precedent to the valid exercise of the right of
legal redemption, is REINSTATED.

Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings in the light of this
pronouncement.

SO ORDERED.