Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8018 October 26, 1955

GIL ATUN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

Doroteo L. Serrano for appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing the complaint for recovery of a parcel of registered land upon a motion to dismiss
filed by defendants after plaintiffs had closed their evidence. The land in question is located in Legaspi City and registered in the name of Estefania Atun,
deceased aunt of plaintiffs, under Original Certificate of Title No. 11696 of the Registry of Property of Albay. The complaint was filed on August 7, 1950.

The evidence for the plaintiffs-appellants shows that they inherited the land in question from their widowed aunt Estefania Atun (sister of their deceased
father Nicolas Atun), who died without any issue; that they had possessed the land from 1927 to 1930, when plaintiff Gil Atun delivered the same to
Silvestra Nuñez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuñez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental; that in
1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuñez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the
produce; and that defendant Eusebio Nuñez in turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it
belonged, not to Nuñez, but to plaintiffs.

Upon a demurrer to the evidence, filed by defendants after plaintiffs had rested their case, the lower Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the period of ten years within which plaintiffs could have filed an action for recovery thereof under section 40 of Act 190 (computed from the time
plaintiffs lost possession of the land in 1940), had already elapsed, hence their action had prescribed; and that furthermore, plaintiffs failed to prove their
alleged ownership of the land in question, so that the presumption that defendants, being possessors, are the lawful owners thereof, had not been
overcome. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the complaint having been denied, they appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which forwarded the case to us because the appeal raises question of law.

The sole issue herein is whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint on the ground of prescription of action.

The dismissal is erroneous. The land in question is admittedly covered by a Torrens title in the name of Estefania Atun, deceased aunt of plaintiffs.
Section 40 of Act 496 expressly provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. And this Court has repeatedly held that the right of the registered owner to recover possession of the registered property is equally
imprescriptible, since possession is a mere consequence of ownership. (Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil., 298, 308; Eugenio vs. Perdido, supra, p. 41; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil., 106.)

We are aware, of course, that title by adverse possession (acquisitive prescription) is distinct from the statute of limitations (extinctive
prescription) and the operation and effects of such distinction has been explored during the discussions of this petition for review.

But we have finally agreed that, as to the lands registered under the Torrens system, ten years' adverse possession may not be permitted to
defeat the owners' right to possession—which is the necessary incident of ownership. Otherwise loss of the land by prescription would be
indirectly approved, in violation of sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act. This statute, being a later enactment, may be said to have partially
amended the Statute of Limitations established in Act No. 190 in so far as the registered lands are concerned. (Juan Eugenio, et al. vs. Silvina
Perdido, et al., L-7083, May 19, 1955.)

And if prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they
merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (new Civil Code, Art. 777; Art. 657, old), the title or right undergoing no change by its
transmission mortis causa.

The lower Court also erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show a better title than that of defendants who are presumed to possess with
just title. As the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal
heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas,
plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a
separate judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate
(Mendoza Vda. de Bonnevie vs. Cecilia Vda. de Pardo, 59 Phil., 486; Gov't. of P.I. vs. Serafica, 61 Phil., 93; Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 45 Phil., 430).

Pursuant to the rule that reversal on appeal of a ruling upholding a defendant's demurrer to the evidence imports in civil cases loss of his right to submit
evidence in his behalf, in order to discourage prolonged litigations (Arroyo vs. Azur, 76 Phil., 493, and cases therein cited), judgment must be rendered
according to plaintiffs' evidence, which supports their claim of ownership of the land in question, and for damages in the amount of P500 (t. s. n., p. 21).

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed; plaintiffs-appellants Gil Atun, Camila Atun, and Dorotea Atun are declared the lawful owners in common
of the lot in question; and defendants-appellees Eusebio Nuñez and Diego Belga are ordered to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs, and to
indemnify the latter in the amount of P500 by way of damages. Costs against defendants-appellees in both instances. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,

Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and
Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:

For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in this case declaring Ana Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of
the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that the said Ana
Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the properties left by the deceased Eusebio Quitco.

As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only the sum
of one thousand five hundred pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is
made as to the costs. So ordered.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court in its aforesaid decision:

1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of the note Exhibit
C has not yet prescribed.

2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by the right of
representation is subject to the debts and obligations of their deceased father who died without any property whatsoever.lawphi1.net

3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500.

The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions raised in this appeal are those set out in the appealed decision, which have
been established at the trial, namely:

In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting
until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro
Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed (Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma
as his natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note (Exhibit C), of the
following tenor:

P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000). Philippine currency under the
following terms: Two hundred and fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on the first day of March 1922; another two hundred and fifty pesos (P250)to
be paid on the first day of November 1922; the remaining one thousand and five hundred (P1,500) to be paid two years from the date
of the execution of this note. San Enrique, Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan. 21, 1922.

Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children, who are the other defendants.
On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died (Exhibit 5), and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and
as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death, administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court, the
said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court.

Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of the committee on claims and appraisal, the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935, filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for payment, and the
commissioners, upon receipt of said promissory note, instead of passing upon it, elevated the same to this court en consulta (Exhibit F), and
as the Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, presiding over the First Branch, returned said consulta and refrained from giving his opinion thereon
(Exhibit C), the aforesaid commissioners on claims and appraisal, alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim, denied he same (Exhibit
H).

On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco,
and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the
reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From the order denying the said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu
thereof there was filed the complaint which gives rise to this case.

The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first assignment of alleged error, is whether or not the action to recover the sum of P1,500,
representing the last installment for the payment of the promissory note Exhibit C, has prescribed.

According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be
paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was filed on June
26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after he expiration of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26,
1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of the prescriptive period
of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should no have been
presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco,
which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to
institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the
expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.

As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial court erred in holding that the properties inherited by the defendants from their
deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any
property, while it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who died before him in
the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by
his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the
inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein
defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father
from whom they did not inherit anything.

The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.

Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third assignment of error is also well-founded.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing of a claim before the committee on claims and appraisal,
appointed in the intestate of the father, for a monetary obligation contracted by a son who died before him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of
the judicial action for the recovery of said indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot
be filed for its collection before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and the propertiesinherited from the latter
by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are absolved from the complaint, with the costs to the appellees. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed
Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other
heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land
by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).

After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the
ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino
Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at
the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).

But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil
Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and
because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice
any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be
effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided
said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right
of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the
imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The
new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in
question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage
somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be
valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code).
Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18285. October 31, 1962.]

IN THE MATTER OF ESTATE OF DON PABLO TECSON OCAMPO, deceased. TOMASA V. BULOS, petitioner and administratrix-appellee, v.
VICENTE TECSON, Oppositor-Appellee. JOSE TECSON TANTOCO, Movant-Appellant.

Arcadio Ejercito for Movant-Appellant.

Ignacio Lugtu for Oppositor-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. SUCCESSION; RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; ARTICLE 2264 APPLICABLE ONLY IF ILLEGITIMATE FATHER DIES AFTER
EFFECTIVITY OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. — Although the status and rights of illegitimate children under Article 278 of the new Civil Code are, also,
extended, by Article 2264 thereof, to children born before the effectivity of said Code, said Article 2264, in so far as relevant to cases of succession,
applies only when the illegitimate father dies after said Code has become effective, for Article 2263 thereof explicitly provides that "rights to the
inheritance of a person who died, with or without will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous
laws and by the Rules of Court" Uson v. Del Rosario 92 Phil., 530; Montilla v. Montilla, 112 Phil., 598).
\

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija denying a motion of Jose Tecson Tantoco, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant.

It appears that Pablo Tecson died in Manila on April 30, 1940. Soon thereafter, or on May 15, 1940, Tomasa V. Bulos, his widow by second marriage,
initiated this proceeding with a petition for the probate of a document said to be the last Will of the deceased. In due course, said court issued, on
October 16, 1940, an order allowing said instrument to probate. Subsequently, or on November 28, 1953, appellant filed a motion praying that, after due
hearing, he be declared an illegitimate child of the deceased, with the right to succeed him and have in his estate a share equivalent to four-fifths (4/5) of
the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. Vicente Tecson, a legitimate child of the deceased, objected to said motion and, when the same was
heard, the parties stipulated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that Jose Tecson Tantoco was born on April 10, 1904; that the movant Jose Tecson Tantoco is the son of the deceased Pablo Tecson with Felisa
Tantoco y Clemente; that the movant Jose Tecson Tantoco was conceived and born when the deceased Pablo Tecson was legally married to Juana
Mendoza; that the marriage was then subsisting; that consequently the movant Jose Tecson Tantoco is an illegitimate, not natural, son of said deceased
Pablo Tecson; that this Court has not made any declaration as to the heirs of the deceased Pablo Tecson; that the document marked as Exhibit ‘A’ is an
exact copy of the portions of the record of Criminal Case No. 734 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, filed against the deceased Pablo Tecson, for
seduction."cralaw virtua1aw library

On December 2, 1960, the lower court issued an order holding that appellant’s rights, as an adulterous son of the deceased, should be determined
pursuant to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code, the same being the law in force when Pablo Tecson died in 1940; that an illegitimate child, other
than a natural child, is entitled, under said Code, not to a legitime, but, only, to support, which may not be availed of by appellant, he being already of
age; and that, since the rights of the heirs of Pablo Tecson under said Code vested immediately upon his death in 1940 and the legitime of four-fifths
(4/5) of the share of an acknowledged natural child under the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be given to appellant herein without affecting the rights
thus vested in said heirs under the Civil Code of Spain, appellant can not avail himself of the benefits of the Civil Code of the Philippines and his
aforementioned motion should be and was denied.

Appellant maintains that the lower court erred in not granting said motion for the estate of the deceased is still undistributed and the Civil Code of the
Philippines, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 287. Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support
and such successional rights as are granted in this Code."cralaw virtua1aw library

ART. 2264. The status and rights of . . . illegitimate children mentioned in article 278, shall also be acquired by children born before the effectivity of this
Code."cralaw virtua1aw library

ART. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"(3) Articles 283, 284 and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is no merit in this appeal. Although the status and rights of illegitimate children under Article 278 of our new Civil Code are, also, extended, by
Article 2264, thereof, to children born before the effectivity of said Code, said Article 2264, in so far as relevant to cases of succession, applies only
where the illegitimate father dies after said Code has become effective, for Article 2263 thereof explicitly provides that "rights to the inheritance of a
person who died, with or without will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws and by the
Rules of Court" (Uson v. Del Rosario, L-4962, January 29, 1953; Montilla v. Montilla, L-14462, June 30, 1961).

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant Jose Tecson Tantoco. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.