LGBT V Comelec
LGBT V Comelec
LGBT V Comelec
FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit
the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.”
Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any
local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.