Norman Book On Cumputer Virus PDF

Norman Book on
Computer Viruses
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Contributors to The Norman Book on Viruses:
Snorre Fagerland, Sylvia Moon, Kenneth Walls, Carl Bretteville
Edited by Yngve Ness
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Last revised February 2003.
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Contents ! v
Contents
Contents ........................................................................................................v
Introduction .................................................................................................7
What is a virus? ...........................................................................................8
What is a program ................................................................................ 8

What is residency ................................................................................. 9
Malware classes overview.................................................................... 9
Virus ..................................................................................................... 9
Worm.................................................................................................. 10
Trojans, backdoors, security risks ...................................................... 10
Denial-of-service tools, nukers, mail bombers .................................. 10
Hacking tools, virus creation kits....................................................... 11
Bugs, logic bombs, time bombs ......................................................... 12
Hoax ................................................................................................... 12
Virus/worm types overview ....................................................................12
Boot virus ........................................................................................... 14
Multipartite virus................................................................................ 14
Binary file virus ......................................................................................14
Script file viruses ....................................................................................17
Macro virus .............................................................................................19
How it works ...................................................................................... 19
Why it’s such a risk............................................................................ 19
Embedding and linking ...................................................................... 20
MS Word............................................................................................ 21
MS Excel............................................................................................ 21
Office 97, Office 2000, Office XP ..................................................... 22
Boot viruses ............................................................................................22
The booting process ........................................................................... 23
A bootable diskette ........................................................................23

Contents ! vi
How a boot virus infects .................................................................... 24

Special case: The CIH virus (W95/CIH.1003.A)............................... 24
Special case: The Melissa virus (W97M/Melissa.A@mm) ............... 25
Special case: The CodeRed worm (NT/CodeRed.A)......................... 26
Special case: The LoveLetter virus (VBS/LoveLetter.A@mm)........ 27
Special case: Nimda (W32/Nimda.A@mm) ...................................... 27
Special case: Sircam (W32/Sircam.A@mm) ..................................... 28
Special case: Klez (W32/Klez.H@mm)............................................. 29
Special case: Friends Greetings (W32/FriendGreet).......................... 30
Predictions for the future.................................................................... 31
How many viruses are there... .................................................................32
...and does it matter? .......................................................................... 32
In the wild viruses ...................................................................................33
The evolution of the virus problem ..........................................................35
Viruses on different operating systems ....................................................36
MS-DOS .................................................................................................37
Windows .................................................................................................37
OS/2 ........................................................................................................38
Windows 95/98/ME ................................................................................39
Windows NT/2000/XP ............................................................................41
Solutions to the virus problem ..................................................................42
Establish routines ............................................................................... 42

Anti-virus solutions............................................................................ 42
Sandbox ......................................................................................................46
About Sandboxing ..................................................................................46

Sandboxing using emulation .............................................................. 47
Sandboxing using a virtual machine .................................................. 48
Forecasting the sandbox technology .................................................. 48
Industry facts .............................................................................................49
Norman Virus Control ..............................................................................50

Contents ! vii
NVC 5 – a new approach to virus control ...............................................50

Certification ............................................................................................51
Awards ....................................................................................................52
Virus Alert Program ................................................................................52
Index ...........................................................................................................53

Contents ! viii

Introduction ! 7
Introduction
It’s hard to believe that the first IBM personal computer (PC)
was introduced in August, 1981. In the beginning they were used
by a small group of people. Today, however, we can’t imagine
life without them, both at work and at home. Look around your
office when the electricity goes out, and you’ll see people
standing around talking because they feel they can’t get any
work done without their computers.
We have become dependent on these machines and the
information stored within. As the importance of a “thing” rises, it
becomes equally as important, if not more, to secure it. (How
many of you have alarm systems in your cars?)
A large portion of modern computing life is to secure the
information that we are creating and processing. There are many
aspects of information security, ranging from physical access to
ensuring that the information has not been changed in any way.
"The only secure computer is one One of the most high-profile threats to information integrity is
that’s unplugged, locked in a safe, the computer virus. Surprisingly, PC viruses have been around
and buried 20 feet under the for two-thirds of the IBM PC’s lifetime, appearing in 1986. With
ground in a secret location...and
I’m not even too sure about that global computing on the rise, computer viruses have had more
one.” visibility in the past two years. In fact, the entertainment industry
Attributed Dennis Huges, FBI has helped by illustrating the effects of viruses in movies such as
“Independence Day”, “The Net” and “Sneakers”.
Note that computer viruses are also found on Macintoshes and
other platforms, but in this book, we will focus on PC viruses.
The topics we will cover are:
• what a virus is
• the evolution of the virus problem
• viruses on different operating systems
• solutions to the virus problem
• how Norman Virus Control products help

What is a virus? ! 8
What is a virus?
The terms “computer virus” and “virus” are used very loosely in
everyday conversation and have become synonymous with
“trouble”.
A virus is usually not something that creates cool screen effects
and enables you to hack into Pentagon. The “Launching virus”
screen as seen in Hollywood movies bear no resemblance with
real life viruses. In reality, a virus infection is most often
invisible to the user. The machine may slow down a little. Some
programs may be unstable and crash at irregular intervals, but
then again that happens ever so often on clean systems too.
Still, some viruses have some sort of screen effect. The Windows
virus “Marburg” fills the desktop with red circles with a white
“X” inside”. A couple of viruses will make desktop icons escape
the mouse cursor. Such effects are not particularly common,
since they expose the existence of the virus.
In order to explain such vexing programs, we will need to look at
what programs really are.
What is a program
A program is a recipe for a computer’s behavior. Now,
computers do not read these things as we humans do. They
cannot understand free text messages – instead they have to rely
on numbers, because computers are really only glorified
calculators. For example, let’s look at the instruction for “do
nothing” in ordinary Intel processors (yes, there is an instruction
for that) – it’s the number 144. If the number 144 is translated
into binary it can be written as 10010000 – which physically
means voltage on, off, off, on, off, off, off, off in wires going into
the processor.
When a program is run on your computer, what happens is that
the operating system, for example Windows, reads the program

from the disk, examines it and determines what kind of program

it is. From there the processor is fed the numbers in the program.
Modern operating systems are multitasking – that is, they can
juggle around with many programs simultaneously. That is why
you can have several program windows open at the same time.
What is residency
“Residency” is a term you will come across far and wide in this
book. It means “active in memory”. A resident program is a
program that exists in the computer’s memory for an extended
period of time. The term was more relevant in the DOS heyday,
when most programs were non-resident – i.e. they did what they
were supposed to do and died. In the Windows world, however,
it’s fair to say that most programs are resident. They stay active
until you close them.
Malware classes overview

Viruses, Worms, Trojan horses, Logic Bombs etc. are all
examples of what is called malicious software programs, or
malware for short.
Malware is primarily an unwanted, uninvited, potentially
dangerous set of programs, but there are important distinctions
among the different subtypes. The following overview defines a
few of the most important categories:
Virus
Viruses require a host, and their goal is to infect other files so
that the virus can “live” longer. Some viruses perform
destructive actions although this is not necessarily the case.
Many viruses attempt to hide from being discovered.
Remember: Viruses are simply software programs.
Replicates?
Yes. All viruses make copies of themselves, infecting boot
sectors, programs, or “data files” as the opportunity arises.

Worm
A host is not required, although one in some cases may argue
that a worm’s host is the machine it has infected. As such, some
researchers define worms as a subtype of viruses. In the
beginning worms were considered to be mainly a mainframe
problem. This changed after Internet became widespread; worms
quickly got accustomed to the Windows operating system and
started to send themselves via e-mail, IRC, and other network
functions. In addition we have lately seen a re-emergence of the
UNIX-based worms, which exploit security holes in the different
flavours of UNIX.
Replicates?
Yes. A worm makes copies of itself as it finds the opportunity.
Trojans, backdoors, security risks

Do not require a host. The word Trojan is derived from the term
“Trojan horse”, and although it sometimes refers to the
destructive code contained in the program, the term is more often
used to refer to the entire program file. Trojans are programs that
perform some unwanted action while pretending to be useful.
Most trojans activate when they are run and sometimes destroy
the structure of the current drive (FATs, directories, etc.),
obliterating themselves in the process.
A special type is the backdoor trojan, which often does not do
anything overtly destructive, but sets your computer open for
remote control and unauthorized access. Unfortunately, some of
the commercially available remote administration tools can be
used as trojans in certain settings. Tools that do not have enough
precautions against being used for malicious purposes may be
detected by Norman Virus Control as a “security risk”.
Replicates?
No.
Denial-of-service tools, nukers, mail bombers

These categories are software weapons. They do not pose any
direct threat to the computer where they are installed, but are
designed to disrupt the operation of other networked computers.

Sometimes these weapons can be installed silently to be used

from unsuspecting users’ computers, and in this respect such
tools also fit the description trojans.
Denial-of-service (DOS) tools are used to bombard other
computers with connection attempts to such a degree that the
computer that is under attack cannot handle the traffic load, and
legitimate requests are neglected. A special case of denial-of-
service is the so-called “Distributed Denial-of-Service”, or
DDOS. DDOS occurs when several machines start a coordinated
attack against the same target.
Nukers send malformed network requests to try to confuse the
attacked machine and cause a crash.
Mail bombers are pretty self-explanatory – they are used to
annoy people by filling up their mailbox.
Replicates?
No. None of these replicate by themselves, but it is possible to
combine viruses and some of these attack methods.
Hacking tools, virus creation kits

There are quite a few people who engage in shady activities, and
there are plenty of tools available to help them.
Hacking, which unfortunately has come to mean gaining
unauthorized access to remote computers, has been a problem
since long before the first computer viruses emerged. There are a
number of obtainable tools that can be used to gain knowledge
about and break into other computers.
There are also quite a few programs that in turn can create
computer viruses. These programs are made as help for would-be
virus authors, and is one of the main reasons for the current virus
situation. These tools are so easy to use that persons with no
programming skills can make new viruses. Such programs are
called virus generators, virus creation kits, or just kits.
Replicates?
No. A virus creation kit creates new viruses, but does not
replicate by itself.

Bugs, logic bombs, time bombs

These are program malfunctions. You can say that they require a
host — programmers cannot write a bug without at the same time
writing other code — although it's fair to say that most
programmers do not intentionally write bugs. Logic bombs and
time bombs are malfunctions intentionally inserted in otherwise
“good” code.
Replicates?
No. This code generally has better things to do than making
copies of itself. Logic bombs and time bombs wish to remain
hidden, with only their effects being visible. Bugs do just about
everything except make more bugs.
Hoax
A hoax is a chain letter, typically sent over e-mail, which carries
false warnings about viruses or trojans. This causes well-
meaning users to send the warning on in the belief that they are
doing other users a favor. Often such warnings apparently stem
from well-known companies and organizations, but this is not the
case. Hoaxes may also contain other messages that are supposed
to trick people to send the message on, for example they will
offer money or a cell phone as a reward for forwarding the
message to friends.
If you receive a warning about a virus, do not pass the warning
on to other users! This rule applies even if the virus actually does
exist, and applies doubly if the warning asks to be sent on. It
whips up anxiety and increases the workload.
Replicates?
No, not by itself. They trick the user into making copies instead.
Virus/worm types overview

When speaking about viruses and worms, we normally speak
about these main categories:

Binary file virus and worms

File viruses infect executables (program files). They are able to
infect over networks. Normally these executables and viruses
consist of instructions that are created for easy machine
interpretation, so-called machine code. To the untrained eye,
machine code is incomprehensible, as it is basically a row of
numbers to be queued into the processor. File worms are also
written in machine code, but instead of infecting other files,
worms focus on spreading to other machines. See page 24 for
details.
Binary stream worms

CodeRed is a binary stream Stream worms is a group of network spreading worms that never
worm that employs the manifest themselves as files. Instead, they travel from computer
network.
to computer just as pieces of code that exist only in memory. The
most renowned of this group is the CodeRed series of worms that
spread between IIS systems. See page 26 for details.
Script file virus and worms

A script virus is technically a file virus, but script viruses are
written as pure text and thus easily readable for everybody. Since
computers cannot understand text instructions directly, the text
first has to be translated from text to machine code. This
procedure is called “interpretation”, and is performed by separate
programs on the computer. For example, Visual Basic Script
(VBS) is interpreted by the program WSCRIPT.EXE, and old
DOS batch language (BAT) is interpreted by
COMMAND.COM. Script viruses infect other script files, but
even more common are the script worms that travel from
machine to machine, preferably over e-mail. See page 27 for
details.
Macro virus
Macro viruses infect data files, or files that normally are
perceived as data files, like documents and spreadsheets. Many
“data file types” have the possibility to include instructions along
with the normal content – f.ex. Microsoft Word files can contain
instructions that tells Word how to show a particular document,

or instructions that tells Windows to do certain actions. Just

about anything that you can do with ordinary programs on a
computer can be done through such so-called macro instructions.
Macro viruses are among the most common viruses today. These
are able to infect over networks. See page 25 for details.
Boot virus
Boot viruses infect boot sectors of hard drives and floppy disks.
These are not able to infect over networks.
Multipartite virus
Multipartite viruses infect both executable files and boot sectors,
or executable files and data files. These are able to infect over
networks.
You may also have come across terms like “polymorphic”,
“stealth”, and “encrypted”. These are not types of viruses per se,
but rather methods that viruses use to disguise themselves from
anti-virus products.
The next sections describe binary, script, macro, and boot viruses
more thoroughly.
Binary file virus

A file virus attaches itself to a program file (the host) and uses
different techniques in order to infect other program files.
There are several basic techniques for infecting an executable
file: companion, link, overwrite, insert, prepend, append, and
others.
A companion virus does not modify its host directly. Instead it

maneuvers the operating system to execute itself instead of the
host file. Sometimes this is done by renaming the host file into
some other name, and then grant the virus file the name of the

original program. Or the virus infects an .EXE file by creating a

.COM file with the same name in the same directory. DOS will
always execute a .COM file first if only the program name is
given, so if you type “EDIT” on a DOS prompt, and there is an
EDIT.COM and EDIT.EXE in the same directory, the
EDIT.COM is executed.
A link virus makes changes in the low-level workings of the file

system, so that program names do no longer point to the original
program, but to a copy of the virus. It makes it possible to have
only one instance of the virus, which all program names point to.
An overwriting virus places itself at the beginning of the

program, directly over the original program code, so the program
is now damaged. When you try to run this program, nothing
happens except for the virus infecting another file.

Such viruses are easily apprehended and destroyed by users and

user support staff, so they actually spread very poorly in the wild.
You have almost no chance of ever getting an overwriting virus
in your machine.
An inserting virus copies itself into the host program. Programs

sometimes contain areas that are not used, and viruses can find
and insert themselves into such areas. The virus can also be
designed to move a large chunk of the host file somewhere else
and simply occupy the vacant space.
The pure prepending virus may simply place all of its code at the
top of your original program. When you run a program infected
by a prepending file virus, the virus code runs first, and then your
original program runs.

An appending virus places a “jump” at the beginning of the

program file, moves the original beginning of the file to the end
of the file, and places itself between what was originally the end
of the file and what was originally at the beginning of the file.
When you try to run this program, the “jump” calls the virus, and
the virus runs. The virus then moves the original beginning of the
file back to its normal position and then lets your program run.
This was a brief overview of how a virus attaches itself to a
program file. It uses different techniques in order to infect. Many
file viruses go memory-resident so that they can monitor all
actions and infect other program files as they are run or
otherwise accessed. Other file viruses infect by “direct action”,
which means that they infect other program files right away,
without going memory resident. Under Windows this distinction
becomes blurred, as many viruses are resident and “direct
action”.
Several other methods exist.
Script file viruses

Script file viruses are a not really a new class of viruses, but has
only quite recently evolved into a major threat. As mentioned,
scripts are pure text instructions that are interpreted by some
program. There are quite a few scripting languages:
Visual Basic Script: These scripts are normally found as separate
*.VBS files or inserted into web pages. VB scripts have a

functionality that is a subset of the Microsoft Visual Basic

language, and it’s expandable by importing functions from other
programs. For example, many of Microsoft Words’ functions can
be used through VB script.
JavaScript: The scripting language that was introduced by Sun
Microsystems alongside the development of the HTML standard.
Standard JavaScript is usually quite safe, as it does not affect the
file system. You’ll normally find JavaScript on web pages.
JScript: The Microsoft version of JavaScript. It is about as
flexible and expandable (and unsafe) as Visual Basic Script.
JScript is found in *.JS files or on web pages.
DOS BAT language: When you wanted venerable old DOS to
do something, you used to type the command on the command
line. E.g. displaying files in a directory was performed by typing
DIR <Enter>.
However, sometimes you instructed DOS to perform certain
tasks when you weren’t around to type in the commands. The
BAT (batch) language was developed for this purpose: enter the
commands into a text file and then type the filename on the
command line to give DOS a set of commands to process. Such
files are always called batch files and have the extension *.BAT.
UNIX shell script: This is similar to DOS batch language only it
was developed for the different varieties of UNIX. UNIX has
very wide set of commands available from the command line, so
shell scripts are quite powerful and can do a lot of different
things.
IRC scripts: Internet Relay Chat is a chat system for the Internet.
Chat systems can be scripted to perform certain tasks
automatically, like sending a greeting to someone who just
joined the chat room. However, the scripts also support sending
of files, and many worms and viruses spread over IRC. Known
IRC programs that have been exploited are the popular mIRC,
pIRCH and VIRC clients.
Other scripting languages: Many other scripting languages
exist. Corel Draw, Visual Foxpro, SuperLogo, InstallShield etc.
can be scripted and have been used for malicious purposes.

Macro virus
Since the introduction of the first macro virus in August 1995
and until quite recently, this virus type has been the fastest
growing category. The first time we discussed this phenomenon
in this publication, in January 1997, the number of known macro
viruses was 100. Some four years later, Norman had identified
more than 8,000 macro viruses, and the number is still growing.
Even though bigger threats have emerged since the heyday of the
macro virus, the problem still exists and cannot be ignored.
How it works
Traditional file viruses do not attempt to infect data files, for data
files are not an ideal ground for replication. That is, one does not
“run” a data file  one “reads” and “edits” a data file. However,
in the past few years, organizations have been building upon
open systems, in which data is shared more readily. This in turn
means that there is little security. Macro viruses take advantage
of the fact that many applications now contain macro
programming languages. These languages allow users (and
virus authors) more flexibility and power within the application
than ever before, and in fact convert what used to be data files
into programs. Often macro viruses are not detected early
enough because many users are not familiar with the nuances of
macros. As a result, macro viruses have an infection rate much
higher than traditional file and boot viruses.
In the beginning, the most targeted macro programming
language was WordBasic, the language within early versions of
Microsoft Word. Later, the predominant macro programming
language used in viruses became Visual Basic for Applications,
or VBA. This programming language is shared by a lot of
applications – Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint, Project, Visio
and many others.
Why it’s such a risk

Since data files, and in particular documents, are shared more
frequently than executable (program) files, the security threat
posed by macro viruses is very real. VBA is also a very powerful

programming language which can be used to control almost

anything on the computer.
Some macro viruses contain destructive code and some even
create and execute traditional file and boot viruses. While
traditional file and boot viruses affect the operation of a machine,
macro viruses affect the quality and reliability of information
contained within data files.
Embedding and linking

The open systems in many of Microsoft’s applications utilize
OLE in order to combine different data types. You can embed an
object such as a bitmap or an executable within a Word
document. Embedding an object means that any edits to the
object will not be reflected in any other copies of the object. You
can also link an object such as an Excel spreadsheet to a Word
document. Linking an object means that you may edit the object
in either its source application or from within the application to
which it is linked, and all copies of the object will be updated.

Microsoft Office products have the ability to embed and link

objects. In addition, they have the ability to be embedded and
linked in other applications. Thus there is a risk that you can run
a Word macro virus from within another application, or an
infected executable file from within Microsoft Office.
MS Word
By far the most common macro viruses have been written for
Microsoft Word. This is partly because Word was the first
application to be riddled with macro viruses, but also because
Word documents are exchanged more frequently than any other
file type. The first Word macro virus, WM/Concept.A was
created in the middle of 1995 and was quickly one of the most
widespread viruses in the world - in spite of the fact that it
contained no mail-spreading functionality that became popular
towards the turn of the century.
MS Excel
It did not take long after the first Word Macro virus before the
first Excel virus appeared: XM/Laroux.A. This was an event that
was expected, as the techniques necessary to create such a virus
are the same as for Word macro viruses.
The difference between the first viruses for Word and Excel is
that viruses for Word were written in WordBasic, whereas
viruses for Excel were written in VBA3 (Visual Basic for
Applications version 3). The format was different, and the
macros were not stored inside the spreadsheet (viruses for Word
6/7 are stored in the Word document), but in separate streams.
This technique complicated detection, identification, and
removal.
Macro viruses for Excel can sometimes pose a bigger threat than
Word viruses, because of the possible practical implications.
Imagine that a macro virus for Excel multiplies a certain cell by a
factor 10 and that this particular cell specifies your salary.
Definitely not the end of the world, but what if this cell was
divided by 10?
These are minor inconveniences compared to similar changes to
calculation formulas for estimating the strength of concrete for a

skyscraper. Spreadsheets are often large, and anomalies are not

easily recognized.
Office 97, Office 2000, Office XP

The introduction of Office 97 also included changed formats for
almost all programs in the suite, but at least the changes were
consistent. Both Excel and Word are using VBA5, based on
VBA3 with many extensions.
VBA5 is not compatible with WordBasic, which should indicate
that macro viruses written for previous versions of Word would
not affect Word 8.0 in Office 97.
However, Microsoft initiated a WordBasic to VBA5, and a
VBA3 to VBA5 conversion to upgrade existing macros to the
new formats.
The same thing happened with document conversion from VBA5
to VBA6, which is the VBA version used by the newer Office
formats Office 2000 and Office XP.
Consequently, macro viruses for previous versions of Word and
Excel can also be ‘upgraded’. Not every virus will work after the
conversion, but we know that quite a few do.
Boot viruses
Boot viruses infect System Boot Sectors (SBS) and Master Boot
Sectors (MBS).
The MBS is located on all physical hard drives. It contains,
among other data, information about the partition table
(information about how a physical disk is divided into logical
disks), and a short program that can interpret the partition
information to find out where the SBS is located. The MBS is
operating system independent. The SBS contains, among other
data, a program whose purpose is to find and run an operating
system.
Because floppy diskettes are exchanged more frequently than
program files boot viruses are able to propagate more effectively
than file viruses.

Refer to “Viruses on different operating systems” on page 36 for

more information.
The booting process

To understand boot viruses, it is necessary to understand the
booting process.
The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System), which controls the
booting process, is initiated as soon as the power is switched on.
The next process that runs is called POST (Power On Self Test).
It ensures that the computer is in working order. One POST
function that all users will recognize is the display that counts the
amount of RAM (Random Access Memory) in the machine.
POST’s final act is to kick off the booting process. The first task
is to determine whether or not there is a diskette in the floppy
drive. If there is, the System Boot Sector on the floppy is read,
and the machine attempts to boot from it.
If the diskette is not bootable (see below for more details), then
you will see the following message on the screen:
Non system-disk or disk error.
Replace and strike any key when ready.
This text is written to screen by a small program that exists on
the SBS of the diskette if it is non-bootable.
Normally, however, no diskette is present, and the Master Boot
Sector on the hard drive is read. Then the System Boot Sector on
the boot partition of the hard drive is read, and it will start the
operating system.
This process remains the same on machines running DOS,
Windows, Windows 9x/ME, Windows NT/2000, Linux and
OS/2. The differences appear when the operating systems
themselves are loaded.
A bootable diskette
When a floppy disk is formatted, a System Boot Sector is
created. The diskette can have two functions: contain program
files and data files and/or be a bootable diskette.

A bootable diskette is one that can be used to bypass the booting

process on the hard drive. Instead, the boot process runs from the
diskette.
To create a bootable diskette, you must either format the diskette
with the “system” option (/S) or you must use DOS’ SYS
command on the diskette.
A formatted diskette always has a System Boot Sector regardless
of whether or not the diskette is bootable. The SBS happens to be
the place that a boot virus calls home, so any formatted diskette
that you have can potentially be infected with a boot virus.
How a boot virus infects

If a diskette is left in the drive, and the machine is set up to boot
from floppy, then the SBS of the diskette will be read. If the SBS
contains a boot virus, the boot virus will become active, go
memory resident, infect the system areas of the hard drive, and
attempt to infect other write-enabled diskettes that are accessed.
Users tend to leave floppies in the drive when they turn their
machines off in the afternoon and then forget about them when
they turn their machine on in the morning. Thus, many people
boot from their floppies without even realizing it. As a result,
boot viruses were the most common viruses for a long period.
Special case: The CIH virus (W95/CIH.1003.A)
Type: Binary file virus

Infects: Windows 32-bit executable programs
Until 26 April 1998 it was true that viruses could inflict serious
damages on software, but not on hardware. On this particular
day, the virus W95/CIH.1003.A struck for the first time. The
victims had to replace the flash BIOS chip, and even (especially
on laptops) the PC’s motherboard. In the months to follow, the
CIH virus was reported in the wild from most parts of the world.
It now exists in a heap of different variants, some triggering on
the 26th of the month.

The CIH virus infects executable files under Windows 95/98 in a

very covert manner. For example, infected files do not increase
their length. Often, an unexpected change of file length for a
binary file is a sign of virus activity.
The technical description of what actions the virus take when it
triggers is beyond the scope of this book. Simply put, when the
flash BIOS is reprogrammed by the CIH virus, the PC is
lobotomized and forgets its internal language. When this
happens, there is no cure but replace this piece of hardware. The
virus can also partially overwrite the hard disk and render it
useless.
The CIH virus is a reminder that virus writers sometimes have
detailed information on undocumented internal procedures deep
down inside the operating systems. When they use this
knowledge to write almost bug-free viruses as nasty as CIH, the
need for adequate virus protection is a must.
It’s common knowledge that many CIH victims were infected
after downloading files from Internet gaming sites. Therefore,
we think it’s appropriate to remind all surfers on the web about
the everyday perils out there.
However, we do recommend that you use antivirus software with
a qualified updating mechanism. The days when you could get
away with quarterly updates of your virus protection software are
definitely over.
Special case: The Melissa virus (W97M/Melissa.A@mm)
Type: Macro virus

Infects: Word 97 and Word 2000 documents
Late March ‘99, we received reports that a document called

password.doc seemed to be sending itself via e-mail. The
number of mails sent was so oversized that several e-mail servers
were unable to handle the traffic load and crashed. We were
looking at the first massmailing e-mail virus. The document
contained a macro virus called W97M/Melissa.A, which not only
spread itself to the users documents, but also sent copies of itself

to the fifty first entries in the user’s address book. A delicate side
effect was the involuntary distribution of documents to others.
Word documents quite often contain sensitive or semi-sensitive
information, so the damage because of this spread pattern may
have been substantial.
Special case: The CodeRed worm (NT/CodeRed.A)
Type: Binary stream worm

Infects: Windows 2000 machines running IIS
Until August 2001, the presence of malicious software was

generally in files. Programs are indeed present in memory when
they run, but since they normally have to be started from file,
antivirus tools have traditionally focused on detecting malware
in files.
This perception changed with CodeRed. CodeRed is a program,
almost like any other program. However, there’s a striking
difference: it never manifests itself on the hard disk. This makes
it difficult for many antivirus tools to see the worm at all. It
moves into the computer from the network as a kind of data
stream. The receiving machine perceives the event as a program
and executes it from its place in memory. Clearly, this is not
something that should be allowed to happen, but CodeRed
exploits a known bug or malfunction in the Internet Information
Server in order to accomplish this.
Once running on the local machine, it will again attempt to
contact other machines in order to disseminate. The worm is
easily stopped by patching the IIS server to eliminate the bug that
the worm employs, but other worms may exploit other security
holes in the future.

Special case: The LoveLetter virus (VBS/LoveLetter.A@mm)
Type: Script file virus

Infects: VBScript files
In the beginning of May 2000 the phones started to ring at

antivirus vendors’ offices everywhere. “Do you provide
detection for the I love you virus?” The question was followed
by a roaring silence before the hesitant answer: “What I love you
virus?”
This virus epidemic demonstrated a very nasty feature of modern
e-mail viruses and worms: they are fast. Before the antivirus
industry had seen the virus, users all over the world had received
copies in their mail boxes. LoveLetter is a textbook example for
the importance of frequent antivirus updates and the importance
of using good heuristics (“unknown virus detection”).
Sidenote: VBS/LoveLetter.A is a real virus, as it overwrites VB
Script files with itself. However, the wormish functionality is
what you see. The distinguishing feature of fast propagation is
why LoveLetter, not surprisingly, sometimes is referred to as a
worm.
Special case: Nimda (W32/Nimda.A@mm)
Type: Binary executable virus

Infects: Windows 9x/Me/NT/2000/XP machines
This is a very interesting case. This virus employs a

conglomerate of techniques to spread. However, the most
intriguing part is the Internet spreading technique.
Before Nimda appeared, a few virus authors had experimented
with infecting users from web servers. The problem from the
virus writer’s point of view, was that this created a single point of
attack. As soon as the offending web page was identified, it
would be shut down, thus effectively killing the virus. Other

worms, like CodeRed, have tried to break into or infect web

servers. Nimda was the first to combine these effects.
When Nimda is started on a machine (remeber, it’s an
executable), it will start to look for web servers. This is done by
generating random Internet addresses and attempting to connect
to these. When a connection is established, Nimda hacks the web
server effectively, and copy itself over. When it runs on the web
server, it modifies web pages in ways that infect surfers on these
pages. This two-way infection creates a two-sided problem:
users are not used to consider a web page as a possible source for
infections, and there is no longer any single web server that can
be shut down to stop the virus. The web spreading mechanism is
more mischievous considering that the user does not necessarily
need to click on any attachment to be infected - Nimda exploits a
programming error in certain versions of Internet Explorer to be
executed automatically as the web page (or mail body) is viewed.
Nimda possesses other spreading mechanisms that are more
commonplace—it infects binary executable files, it spreads over
the local network shares, and it e-mails itself around.
Special case: Sircam (W32/Sircam.A@mm)
Type: Binary executable worm

This middling worm was not expected to be much of a threat at

the face of it. It spreads by ordinary e-mail, and it has a semi-
fixed mail body text, so it’s easy to recognize. However, this
worm has proved to be very persistent and hard to uproot. Why is
that?
The most distinguishing feature with Sircam is the trick it does
when it sends itself via e-mail. It finds a random document,
spreadsheet, or zip file on the hard disk, and simply append it to
itself. The resulting file has the name of the original document,
but adds an extension. For example, mydocument.doc
becomes mydocument.doc.exe. If you are not paying close

attention when you read the mail, the file may easily be mistaken
for an original uninfected file.
A grim consequence of this trick is that personal and/or
confidential information may be sent out unintentionally. The
worm doesn’t care whether it sends an innocent memo or
business-sensitive financial information. We have experienced
that very personal letters from infected users have arrived in our
mailbox. This demonstrates the hazard of today’s computing—
even your own hard disk can be exposed for everyone to see.
Sensitive information should always be encrypted and preferably
stored on a removable media such as floppies or CDs.
Special case: Klez (W32/Klez.H@mm)
Type: Binary executable virus

The Klez family consists of about ten different variants with

slightly different properties. Only two of these have become
really widespread—the E and H variants. Of these, the H variant
is totally dominant and is at the time of this writing (December,
2002) by far the most widespread e-mail capable virus
worldwide.
It arrives in mails of very unpredictable appearances—different
subjects, body texts and attachment file names. The texts used
for these fields are randomly picked from files on the user’s hard
disk and from word lists inside the virus itself. The most
insidious feature, however, is that the “FROM:” address is faked.
Klez collects e-mail addresses from various places on the
infected machine and use them randomly for both “TO:” and
“FROM:” addresses. So, the next time you receive a Klez-
infected e-mail, remember that the (seemingly) sender is most
likely not infected.
Klez also spreads through a number of other mechanisms. It
copies itself over network shares, both as a standalone
executable file and as a RAR archive with itself inside. It also

sometimes acts as a virus— it stores legitimate programs in

compressed files and takes their place.
It doesn’t stop there; it also plants another unrelated virus on
machines which it infects. This virus, called W32/Elkern.C, is
not capable of spreading over mail by itself. Elkern can be very
difficult to remove because of its ability to attach to already
running processes in memory. You may clean up the entire hard
disk, but the viral process may lurk inside legitimate running
processes and continue to infect.
Special case: Friends Greetings (W32/FriendGreet)
Type: Binary executable, commercial

This is not a virus or worm, even though it has “worm-like”

capabilities.
It arrives as an e-mail that looks like this:
Bill, Bob has sent you a greeting card -- a postcard from Friend-
Greetings.com. You can pick up your greeting card at Friend-
Greetings.com by clicking on the link below.
http://www.friend-greeting.com/pickup.html?code= <removed>
&id=<removed>
Message:
------------------------------------------------------------
Bill,
I just sent you a greeting card - please pick it up.
Bob
-----------------------------------------------------------
Now, this looks innocent enough. However, if you click on the
link, you will be prompted to download and install software to
view the “postcard”. During the installation of this software, you
will be informed via license information screens that the
software will mail such cards to everyone in your address

book. Many users accept this, either because they don’t read the
license information, or because they don’t care. In this manner
the software spreadsfar because it has permission by the user to
do so.
It is advisable to read all license agreements carefully so that you
do not get inadvertently caught in such schemes.
Predictions for the future

Norman expects that macro viruses still will represent a serious
threat to data security, even though there is reason to believe that
the growth rate will flatten.
Some scripting languages have made it abundantly clear that
they have the potential to cause a lot of issues security wise, and
new scripting languages show up quite often. Script viruses will
remain a problem for the foreseeable future.
The last couple of years have also indicated a reemergence of the
binary file virus and worm. This group of malware was actually
losing terrain in the early and mid-nineties, because the exchange
of executable files became less and less common with the
introduction of Windows, while e-mail systems at the time were
not sophisticated enough to facilitate for e-mail worms. Internet
and modern Windows software development tools have changed
all that. Now there is an active exchange of files over e-mail and
via other network functions, and with them, viruses. Binary file
viruses will be around as long as programs are exchanged freely.
Other areas of computer usage are changing. The Internet as
“environment” becomes more complex and interconnected, and
this will create new opportunities for malicious software. Exactly
how the terrorists of the Internet will exploit the new reality is
hard, if not impossible to predict. It’s not unlikely that next really
serious virus epidemic will emerge along one of these
unpredictable new trails. We have already seen from the
CodeRed incident that part of the Internet infrastructure is
vulnerable and will play a role in future outbreaks.
Norman will continue to keep abreast of the virus issue. We have
some of the world’s most prominent experts working to monitor
the evolution of computer security, and we seek to be prepared to
intercept new threats before the damage is done.

How many viruses are there...

Anti-virus vendors are asked this question all the time. The
answer is difficult for several reasons:
1. There is no central organization that counts the number
of viruses.
2. New viruses appear every day. Some experts say that
the growth of new viruses is exponential and others say
that it’s quadratic. If we were able to count them all,
then the count would be valid only for a short period of
time such as a day.
3. Often we find that many variants are made based upon
one virus, and often there is disagreement among the
virus research community on the definition of
“variant”.
4. There is no standard naming convention for viruses,
and as a result it is possible to have several different
names for the same virus.
This brings up the question of how viruses get their
names. Sometimes the virus author puts text into the
virus that indicates a name for the virus or for him/
herself (e.g., The xxx virus is here; Greetings from
yyy). But most of the time, names are given by people
who discover them. Different methods are used, such
as: estimates of place of origin or place of detection
(e.g., the Lehigh virus), number of bytes that the virus
adds to files, what the virus does, and so on.
With those caveats in mind, Norman Virus Control products
detect over 56,000 virus variants as of this writing (December,
2002).
...and does it matter?

To the ordinary user, it’s immaterial if the number of viruses is
this or that, as long as your anti-virus software keeps your
machine virus free. The number of known viruses does not really
reflect what is going on in the virus makers’ world. Statistics are

sometimes useful as a visible manifestation of the evolution of

computer viruses, for example.
The computer virus problem is best evaluated by analyzing the
nature of the individual virus and looking at what they do, rather
than keeping track of how many there are. This may have been
the message from the virus maker(s) who sent some 14,000
brand new viruses to anti-virus vendors all over the world (fall of
1998). All of these viruses had been generated automatically, and
they were therefore not technically sublime. In fact, most of
these viruses could be detected by heuristic methods.
Nevertheless the number of viruses detected by our virus
definition files almost doubled overnight, while the overall virus
threat remained unchanged.
In the wild viruses

Although virus researchers know of thousands of viruses, you
need not worry about all of them. Of those thousands, most of
them exist only in research labs, and the remaining handful are
actually seen in homes and organizations around the world.
As a result, virus researchers group viruses into two categories:
“in the wild” and “in the zoo”, sometimes referred to as “ITW”
and “ITZ” respectively.
Viruses that are “in the wild” have been seen outside the research
labs. In the wild viruses comprise about 10% of the viruses that
we know about, and it is these viruses that you and your
organization should concern yourselves with.
If you are interested in more details, contact your nearest dealer
or Norman directly.
Corporations and single users need to protect themselves by
frequent updates of their virus control tools. This in turn involves
the antivirus industry to constantly update and distribute
definition files. A definition file holds the virus signatures
(fingerprints of known viruses) and is used by the scanning
engine to detect and remove computer viruses.
Any virus scanner is only as effective as its most recent update,
so obtaining frequent virus signature updates is critical to
maintaining a secure computing environment.

Norman Virus Control version 5 or higher makes this easy for

you by downloading and installing updates from Norman
automatically.

The evolution of the virus problem ! 35
The evolution of the virus

problem
In the beginning, computers were not connected together very

well, and computer viruses spread extremely slowly. Files were
transmitted via BBSs (bulletin board systems) or on diskette. As
a result, the transmission of infected files and boot sectors was
geographically limited.
However, as soon as connectivity increased, mostly by the use of
computers in the workplace, the boundaries of computer viruses
widened. First there was the local area network (LAN), then
there was the wide area network (WAN), and now there is the
Internet. The extensive use of e-mail has also contributed to the
meteoric rise in the number of macro virus incidents.
We are now living in a society in which global technology has
taken the forefront, and global commerce is driven by
communication pathways. Computers are an integral part of this
technology and so the information they contain (as well as the
malicious code they unwittingly contain) also becomes global.
Consequently, it is much easier to get a virus today than it was a
few years ago. However, the types of viruses that are common
today are different than those that were common two years ago.
Steve White, Jeff Kephart, and David Chess of the IBM Thomas
J. Watson Research Center have been following the evolution of
viruses, and (among other things) they have concluded that the
prevalence of certain types of viruses have been in part
determined by changes in operating systems.1
In the following sections, we will discuss how viruses operate in
different operating systems.
1. Steve R White, Jeffrey O Kephart and David M Chess, ‘The Changing Ecology of Computer
Viruses’ Proceedings of the Fifth International Virus Bulletin Conference, Brighton, UK, 1996.

Viruses on different operating systems ! 36
Viruses on different operating

systems
Computer viruses were first created as early as around 1981,

when a program called “Elk Cloner” was created for the
Apple IIe computer. It appeared on some bulletin board systems,
but never really spread much and was never referred to as a
“virus”. Dr. Fred Cohen coined that term in 1983 when he
discussed concepts and experiments with replicating programs
(http://all.net/books/virus/index.html). These experiments were
conducted in controlled mainframe environments.
Although the first viruses that appeared were made for operating
systems such as Apple II and VAX, they did not become a real
problem before they were created for MS-DOS. MS-DOS was
the first operating system to become a household item, and as
such the viruses for this OS had a much larger potential for
spreading than viruses for other platforms. It took some years for
Windows to stabilize and become popular, so viruses flourished
in MS-DOS. In fact, almost all file viruses were DOS based for
years after the introduction of Windows, and the first Windows
generations (up to Windows 3.11 for workgroups) were actually
not bothered much with viruses at all. However, the appearance
of Microsoft Word on this platform and the macro viruses that
came with it gave us a taste of what was to come later.
OS/2 came on the scene shortly after viruses, but OS/2 never
became such a mainstream operating system as DOS. Therefore,
virus writers were less likely to be running OS/2 themselves.
Even if OS/2 viruses had been written frequently, they would not
be as widespread as MS-DOS viruses were. As a result, there is
only a handful known OS/2 viruses today.

Today, DOS is outmoded even though a DOS-like functionality

still exists on Windows machines. However, in a virus setting,
DOS is for all intents and purposes dead as disco.
The current operating systems nowadays are the 32-bit Windows
variants (Win 95/98/ME, Win NT/2000/XP) and the different
UNIX variants. Let’s take a look at how viruses behave on MS-
DOS, Windows, OS/2, Windows 95/98, Windows NT/2000, and
UNIX.
MS-DOS
Since the macro viruses that we have seen to date infect data files
generated from and read by Windows applications, macro
viruses are not a problem on MS-DOS-only machines.
Traditional file viruses and boot viruses prosper in MS-DOS
machines because MS-DOS has no inherent security features.
Viruses, therefore, have free rein to infect memory, and program
files as described in “Binary file virus” on page 14.
Windows
When Windows was introduced, users had to change the way
they interacted with their computers. The images on the screen
were more colorful, navigating around in a program was more
intuitive, and the prospect of being able to switch tasks without
exiting an application was very enticing.
Since DOS ran “underneath” Windows 3.x, file viruses were able
to infect machines that ran Windows, but their lifespans were cut
short. In general, file viruses are able to infect Windows
executables, but the executables then do not generally work
properly. Impatient users would either replace the executables, or
if they were frustrated enough, reinstall Windows. This was
enough to cause the demise of the traditional file virus. In
addition, the structure of the executables in Windows 3.x is more
complicated than DOS and even Windows 9x/NT executables,
and memory has in some respects better protection. Viruses
under Windows 3.x therefore never became the nuisance as they
have proved to be under newer Windows versions.

Macro viruses and boot viruses, however, have not suffered the
same fate. To date, macro viruses have been written to target
Windows applications, and therefore the presence of Windows is
required. Combining the wide acceptance of Windows with the
fact that macro viruses infect data files rather than program files
(see “Macro virus” on page 19) has led to six macro viruses
being amongst the ten most common viruses overall.
The actual booting process on a Windows machine is no different
than on a DOS-only machine. Therefore, boot viruses have not
been hindered by Windows, and they continue to propagate by
infecting hard drives, going memory resident, and then infecting
floppy disks.
OS/2
As mentioned above, OS/2 is not as widely used as Windows and
other Microsoft operating systems. Because of the way that OS/2
was designed, however, it is still susceptible to non-OS/2-
specific viruses.
Unlike Windows, MS-DOS does not run “underneath” OS /2.
OS/2 is a powerful 32-bit operating system that supports DOS
applications, Windows applications, and native OS/2
applications. In order to run DOS applications, OS/2 furnishes
VDMs (virtual DOS machines). As the name suggests, VDMs
“look” like DOS to DOS programs. Therefore, an infected DOS
program can infect other DOS program files within that VDM,
but not DOS programs in other VDMs. The newly infected DOS
program file can then continue infecting other program files
which might be started in VDMs in the future. So the infection
path continues.
If Windows applications which include macro programming
languages are run on an OS/2 machine, then the OS/2 machine is
equally as susceptible to macro viruses as a Windows machine.
Again, since the booting process is the same on IBM-compatible
machines prior to the operating system being loaded, boot
viruses can infect OS/2 machines. OS/2 handles diskettes
differently than DOS and Windows so the likelihood that the
boot virus will propagate after it has infected the hard drive is
lower on an OS/2 machine than on a Windows or DOS-only

machine. The risk involved is rather one of the boot virus’s

action on the hard drive. If the boot virus was designed to have a
payload, then we can expect it to be delivered, regardless of
whether it was able to infect any floppies.
OS/2 supports two file systems: FAT (file allocation table) and
HPFS (high performance file system), and you may use just one
or both. HPFS is more advanced and stores information in
different places, so you can expect serious effects on an HPFS
system from a boot virus that expected to only see FAT.
Windows 95/98/ME
Windows 95 was launched at a time when the Internet became
public property. Today the world wide web is available for
everybody, not just for the seasoned user. Even though the
majority of PC users welcome the Internet, e-mail, and chat
programs, the flip side is a huge playground for virus makers,
sometimes referred to as the Internet terrorists. The widespread
use of these facilities has contributed to manifold the propagation
of viruses under Windows 9x/ME.
Unlike Windows and DOS, Windows 95/98 is marketed as
having built-in security features. Unfortunately, such features are
not robust enough to safeguard Windows 95/98 against viruses.
In fact, the first virus written especially to target Windows 95
(the Boza virus) emerged late in 1995. Furthermore, Windows
95’s workgroup networking environment has no file-level
protection and therefore can potentially lead to increases in virus
spreading.
After the rather primitive Boza virus, the Windows 95/98 and
Windows NT/2000 viruses have increased in numbers and
complexity. Like in the DOS environment, the first viruses were
amateurish. Then they have become more technically complex as
the virus writers have gained experience. Some of the viruses
under Windows 95/98 and Windows NT/2000 spread by active
use of the network protocol. A temporary "climax" of complexity
and destructive capacity was reached with the CIH virus in 1998
(see page 24). Later viruses have become increasingly sly.
Windows 95/98 shares many characteristics with OS/2 with
respect to system architecture and interaction with viruses:

Like OS/2, Windows 95/98 is a 32-bit operating system that

supports DOS applications, Windows applications, and native
Windows 95/98 applications.
Similar to OS/2’s VDMs, Windows 95/98 has VMs (virtual
machines)— a System Virtual Machine with separate address
spaces for Win32 applications and a shared address space for all
Win16 applications; and separate virtual machines for individual
DOS applications.
DOS file viruses can easily spread on a Windows 95/98 machine
because DOS program files’ only limitation under
Windows 95/98 is that they cannot write directly to the hard
drive.
Each DOS VM takes on the characteristics of the system from
the point at which the machine was started. Since
Windows 95/98 first starts up by running the same programs as a
DOS-only machine does, it is possible that an infected program
running during the startup process could go on to infect other
program files within that VM. In addition, if that infected
program originated from the startup process, it would become
active in all VMs that were started in the future. Although
program files from one VM cannot infect program files in
another VM, it is possible for an infected program file to be
loaded into a separate VM in the future, thereby continuing the
infection path.
The macro viruses that have been written to date target data files
generated from and read by Win16 and Win32 applications that
are frequently run on Windows 95/98. As a result, macro virus
infections abound on Windows 95/98.
Since the Windows 95/98 boot process is the same as a DOS-
only or Windows machine (up to a certain point), boot viruses
are able to infect hard drives of Windows 95/98 machines. When
Windows 95/98 loads, however, boot viruses are often disabled
and not allowed to propagate. On the other hand, if the boot virus
has a payload, it may deliver it without requiring the virus to
replicate beforehand.

Windows NT/2000/XP
As discussed in the sections on OS/2 and Windows 95/98/ME,
Windows NT supports DOS applications, Windows applications,
and native Windows NT applications. Like Windows 95/98,
Windows NT is backwards compatible, and to some extent with
DOS and Windows. Despite the fact that NT’s security features
are more robust than Windows 95/98’s, file viruses can still
infect and propagate within Windows NT. DOS applications run
in separate VDMs (virtual DOS machines), and file viruses can
function within the VDM. Some DOS file viruses might not
work in the intended fashion under NT, but there is little about
NT’s security that prevents file viruses from infecting. NT has a
feature called System File Checker (SFC), but that can be
bypassed.
As with Windows 95/98, Windows NT supports applications that
contain macro programming languages, making NT as
vulnerable to macro viruses as old Windows machines.
Because Windows NT machines boot the same way that DOS
machines do (up to the point at which NT takes over), boot
viruses are able to infect NT hard drives. However, when these
boot viruses attempt to go memory resident, they will be stopped
by NT and therefore be unable to infect floppies. In effect, this
stops the infection path, but the user must still deal with any side
effects that the boot virus may have on the system — destructive
payloads or manhandling NT’s boot area in such a way that NT
refuses to load.
Some viruses target Windows NT directly. The W32/Funlove
and W32/Bolzano viruses undermine the NT security handling,
and the recently discovered NT/CodeRed series of viruses
exploit security holes found in software that runs exclusively on
NT.

Solutions to the virus problem ! 42
Solutions to the virus

problem
Establish routines
Unless organizations and single-users have established internal
routines for data handling, the chance for running a virus-free
computing environment is not likely to succeed. We have seen
that when strategies and routines for data handling are initiated at
management level, the organization is less exposed to virus
infections. And when they occur, routines make it easier to root
out the infected files before they spread.
Anti-virus solutions
When people think of anti-virus solutions, they normally think of
scanners. Scanners are the most readily available type of anti-
virus solution, but they are not the only type.
It’s perhaps best to think of anti-virus solutions in terms of:
• what is required to detect the virus
- generic methods
- specific methods
and
• when the virus is detected
- prior to the attempted infection
- after the infection
A virus can be detected using either generic methods or specific
methods. Generic methods look for virus-like behavior rather
than specific viruses. As a result, even new viruses can be
detected, and there is little need for frequent updates to the tool
that is being used. Because generic methods look for behavior
rather than specific viruses, the name of the virus is normally not
given. Instead users are simply warned that a virus is likely to be

present. Some shy away from this method because it can give
false alarms.
Examples of generic detection methods are:
• checksumming and integrity checking
• heuristics
• decoys
• behavior blocking
Specific methods, on the other hand, rely on having prior
knowledge of the virus. In this case the tool is able to both detect
that the virus is present as well as identify it. As a result, frequent
updates to the tool are necessary. Most users like to know what
they’re “up against” if a virus is found, and the best way to do
that is to determine the exact nature of the beast. For this reason,
many users prefer this method, but they do not ultimately
appreciate how often the tool must be updated.
Examples of specific detection methods are:
• on-demand and scheduled scanning
• on-access (real-time) scanning
Note that the methods above are not always specific – heuristic
methods are usually implemented as parts of on-demand and on-
access scanning.
An equally important consideration is when the virus is detected.
All users would probably agree that the ideal situation would be
to prevent viruses from continuing to infect, and the next most
ideal would be to identify those areas that have already been
infected.

Let’s examine where the above-mentioned methods fall:
Method Detection discussion

Check- Both methods store information about
summing (hopefully) uninfected files in a certain place.
and integrity Checks against the current status of the files and
checking the stored information are performed
periodically. If any change is detected, then a
warning is issued. This method provides after-
the-fact detection.
Heuristics This is a method of analyzing files and boot
areas in a general sense to determine if the code
appears virus-like. Heuristics perform after-the-
fact detection.
Decoys This is a method of lying in wait for viruses,
allowing certain files to become infected if a
virus is present. Decoys detect viruses as they
are infecting and are helpful in raising the
warning flag.
Behavior This is a method of analyzing the behavior of all
blocking computing actions to determine if the sum of the
parts adds up to a virus-like action. If so, then
the action is stopped before infection can occur.
Behavior blocking performs before-the-fact
detection.
On-demand This is a method of scanning for specific viruses
and at certain times. This is always an after-the-fact
scheduled detection.
scanning
On-access This method also uses scanning, but the
scanning detection process occurs while other computer
processes occur, such as copying a file. As a
result, users are notified of existing viruses
before they can be triggered.
The subject of removal of viruses and other malware is complex.

Some people have a narrow definition of virus removal - if you
delete the file or format the hard drive, the virus is no longer
there. Please note, however, that such drastic measures are rarely
necessary, and that it is much healthier to define removal as

removing the malicious code entirely and leaving behind a

usable and clean system state.
Some of the detection methods listed above can also perform
removal (as defined the “healthy” way):
Method Removal discussion

Checksumming and Can remove viruses.
integrity checking
Heuristics Sometimes can remove boot and
macro viruses.
Decoys Cannot remove viruses.
Behavior blocking Can remove viruses from memory and
boot viruses from floppies.
On-demand and Can remove viruses.
scheduled scanning
On-access scanning Can remove viruses.

Sandbox ! 46
Sandbox
Automatic detection, immediate cure and distribution of updated

virus definition files have been a lifelong dream amongAV
vendors all over the world. Throughout the years, theAV
business has invested significant resources to come up with a
solution that could fulfil this ambitious goal.
Norman has developed a solution that achieves this objective.
It’s called Sandbox; a term that best describes the technique that
is used to check if a file is infected by an unknown virus. The
method allows untrusted, possible viral code to play around on
the computer. Not in the real computer, but in a simulated
computer. Simply put, this is how a sandbox works: a file that
NVC finds suspicious is tossed into the sandbox. When the file is
executed, every “viral” move it makes is meticulously monitored
and recorded. Remember that any piece of code – hostile or not –
that is subjected to the sandbox’s scrutiny believes that it is
working on a real computer. If it’s malware, it’s caught in the act
and immediate antidote can be prepared. At any rate, no harm is
done to real files. But the exposure of a possible viral program is
very real.
At the Virus Bulletin Conference in 2001, Norman produced a
fully functional prototype of a scanning engine with Sandbox
functionality. Note that this prototype also had eliminated a
major obstacle associated with this technology, namely false
alarms. In other words, the Sandbox’s analysis was very
accurate.
About Sandboxing
In the paragraphs below we’ll take a closer look at the sandbox
concept, and how it’s implemented. A major challenge is to
integrate the new technology in the product without slowing
down scanning speed, for example.

Sandbox ! 47
Sandboxing using emulation

A computer virus is a computer program, defined through its
behavior. It will transfer code/data to other computer files. When
these other computer file in turn is given control, the virus code
is somehow activated, trying to infect other computer files. This
process is called replication. For a computer program to be called
“viral”, it must be able to perform this task recursively.
Norman’s sandbox is a virtual world where everything is
simulated. It is powered by an emulator, and together they let
possible virus infected binary executables “run” just as they
would do on a real system. When execution stops, the sandbox is
analyzed for changes.
However, viruses can detect that they run inside a simulated
world. Even though we try to cover most aspects, there will
always be an API or service that is not provided which viruses
can test. It’s only a subset of DOS/Windows which is
implemented – just enough to run viruses and their hosts. Many
viruses are not stable programs. They contain bugs, and often
cause your real CPU to hang. This is also a problem for
simulation. When does it hang and when is it just a really slow
huge virus?
Since nothing runs on your system, except an emulator—it is
safe. Everything else is virtualized. Nothing is stored on your
hard disk, even if the sample you are testing, wants to. Since
sandboxing with the purpose of detecting viruses include
“booting” the “computer”, having a full-blown installation of
e.g. Windows 98 SE would be too slow and inefficient. Norman’s
environment is simulated and tailor-made—i.e. it is written by
us. It’s painstaking and meticulous work to develop and test the
operating systems so that they match the real ones at a
satisfactory level. You can “apply” any tailor-made operating
system to inspect viral/malicious behavior of a sample. So we
have virtualized the entire computer. A new BIOS, CPU feature,
OS fix, and so on can be virtually applied, and several worlds can
be simulated in turns. Everything is controlled from our
definition file.

Sandbox ! 48
It runs inside the scanner engine on any computer/OS we’re

already supporting, and will detect the same viruses on the
different platforms, even on access if you like.
Sandboxing using a virtual machine

It is also possible to build a sandbox by creating a VM (Virtual
Machine). The idea is to block all exits, so the executable you are
examining cannot escape. However, we don’t consider this
solution as safe enough. There will always be “another” exploit
of the PC’s processor, some weird interrupt/exception/fault etc.
that will allow malicious code to escape a VM, and spread to
your real system.
We’ve seen it before with other attempts to “fence” malware (for
example INT 1 tracing). A VM is too specific to the environment
you are running, and cannot be a part of a generic scanner
engine. A VM doesn’t virtualize the computer your running on.
The hardware, CPU and BIOS are equal to the one already
running on the system. Using a VM, you cannot test suspicious
files for other platforms, like Linux. Your system is not
necessarily clean - you use what you have. However, executing
inside a VM is faster. Everything happens in real-time. The
environment is already there; you don’t have to “create” it. You
use a copy of the machine as it is, which saves development.
Forecasting the sandbox technology

After the break through with the sandbox, we foresee refining the
current version, as well as using the experience from research as
a stepping-stone to related functionality within AV technology.
Futhermore, configuration options in NVC for sandbox related
tasks will be implemented, and other automated procedures may
very well follow in the wake of the new innovation. They virus
makers are definitely getting more sophisticated, but their
opponents in the AV industry are making significant progress,
too.

Industry facts ! 49
Industry facts
Virus statistics
“99,67% of companies surveyed experienced at least one virus
encounter during the survey period. 51% claimed they had at
least one “virus disaster” during the 12-month period before they
were surveyed.”
! Source: 2000 Computer Virus Prevalence Survey,
IICSA.net, October 23, 2000
General Statistics
“Today, 45% of all corporate information and ideas are stored in
an organization’s email system.” denote
! Source: SC Magazine, August 2001
Financial Statistics
“Including hard and soft dollar figures, the true cost of virus
disasters is between $100,000 and $ 1 Millon per company.”
! Source: Computer Crime & Security Survey, Computer
Security Institute, March 12, 2001
The Security Threat

• Reuters reported that over $12 billion in damage was
caused by computer viruses in the first 6 months of the
year 2000 alone.
• According to “Tippet’s Law of Malicious Code”, the
virus problem doubles about every 14 months.

Norman Virus Control ! 50
Norman Virus Control

NVC 5 – a new approach to virus control
Since 1989 Norman ASA has developed one of the world’s
leading virus control software packages. The current version,
NVC 5, is the result of a development cycle that started in 1999
and was finalized a year later.
Virus control has traditionally involved user interaction like
‘scanning’ of files and boot sectors to detect and remove malign
code. Only for the last three or four years have we seen a change
towards on-access detection, internet-based updating, and
centralized management in virus control. NVC5 takes advantage
of the operating systems’ potential for full integration. For
example, a file system filter driver is installed on Windows NT/
2000/XP and OS/2, while a VxD offers the same functionality on
Win95/98/Me.

NVC version 5
The product was designed from scratch, emphasizing
transparency, reliability and ease of use. Some key objectives
were defined, including:
• Invisibility
• Scalability
• Accountability
• Automatic support and maintenance
The final design is the result of a philosophy that in many ways is
very different from the mainstream virus control products.
Certification
Norman Virus Control 5 is certified by West Coast Labs with the
Check Mark level 1 certification, and ICSA labs certified for on-
access and on–demand antivirus product.

Awards
Norman Virus Control is one of the most award-winning

products in the history of Virus Bulletin Magazine, with a total of
21 Virus Bulletin 100% Awards of 25 possible awards since the
start-up January 1998. The 100% award signifies that the product
detects 100% of viruses that is reported “in the wild” at the time
of testing.
Virus Alert Program

In the wake of the Melissa virus incident (Easter 1999), Norman
introduced a virus alert program to assist customers in similar
situations in the future.
Norman’s Virus Alert Program offers subscribers a special
service in situations when a virus alert situation occurs. To learn
more about the program and how to subscribe, see
www.norman.no.

Index ! 53
Index Decoys 44
—D—
Diskette, bootable 23
DOS 23
DOS BAT language 18
—E—
Embed 20
—Symbols—
Evolution of the virus problem 35
/S 24 Excel virus 21
—Numerics— —F—
32-bit 38 FAT 39
File allocation table 39
—A— File virus 14
Appending virus 17
—H—
—B— Heuristics 44
Basic Input/Output System 23 High performance file system 39
BBS 35 hoax 12
Behavior blocking 44 How many viruses 32
BIOS 23 HPFS 39
Bomb
logic 12 —I—
time 12 In the wild viruses 33
Boot virus 19 In the zoo viruses 33
Boot virus, how it infects 24 Information security 7
Bootable diskette 23 inserting virus 16
Booting process 23 Integrity checking 44
Boza 39 Internet 35
Bug 12 Introduction 7
Bulletin board system 35 IRC scripts 18
ITW 33
—C— ITZ 33
chat programs 39
Check-summing 44 —J—
Chess, David 35 JavaScript 18
CIH 24, 25 JScript 18
CodeRed 26, 31 Jump 17
companion 14
Concept.A 21

Index ! 54
—K— Prepending virus 14, 16

Kephart, Jeff 35
—R—
—L— RAM 23
Random Access Memory 23
LAN 35
Lehigh virus 32
Link 20 —S—
link 14 Sandbox 46
link virus 15 SBS 22, 24
Linux 23, 48 Scripting language
Local area network 35 Corel Draw 18
Logic bomb 12 DOS BAT language 18
LoveLetter 27 InstallShield 18
IRC script 18
—M— JavaScript 18
JScript 18
Macro programming languages 19
SuperLogo 18
WordBasic 19
UNIX shell script 18
Macro virus 19
Visual Basic 17
Master Boot Sector 22, 23
Visual Foxpro 18
MBS 22
Security, information 7
Melissa 25
simulated computer 46
MS-DOS 37
Sircam 28
Solutions to the virus problem 42
—N— SYS command 24
Nimda 27, 28 System Boot Sector 22, 23, 24
Non system-disk or disk error 23 System option 24
—O— —T—
Office 2000 22 Time bomb 12
Office XP 22 Trojan 12
OLE 20 Trojan horse 10
On-access scanning 44
On-demand scanning 44 —U—
Operating systems, viruses on 36
UNIX shell script 18
OS/2 23, 38
Overwriting virus 14, 15
—V—
—P— Variant 32
VBA 19
PC 7
VBA3 21
POST 23
VBA5 22
Power On Self Test 23
VBA6 22

Index ! 55
VDM 38 CodeRed 26
viral 47 Sircam 28
Virtual DOS machine 38
Virtual Machine 48
Virus
appending 17
boot 19
boot, how it infects 24
Boza 39
CIH 24
Concept.A 21
evolution 35
file 14
Friends Greetings 30
how many 32
in the wild 33
in the zoo 33
Klez 29
Laroux.A 21
Lehigh 32
LoveLetter 27
macro 19
Melissa 25
most common 38
Nimda 27
on different operating systems 36
overwriting 14, 15
prepending 14, 16
solution 42
Virus Bulletin 46
Virus, what it is 8
Visual Basic Script 17
—W—
W32/Elkern.C 30
WAN 35
White, Steve 35
Wide area network 35
Windows 23, 37
Windows 95 39
Windows 9x/ME 23
Windows NT/2000 23
WordBasic 19, 21
Worm 10

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Norman offices
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
! Norway ! Finland ! Switzerland

Norman ASA Norman Ibas Oy Norman Data Defense Systems AG
Strandveien 37, Lysaker Läkkisepäntie 11 Postfach
P.O. Box 43 FI-00620 Helsinki CH-4015 Basel
N-1324 Lysaker Tel: +358 9 2727 210 Tel: +41 61 487 2500
Tel: +47 67 10 97 00 Fax: +358 92727 2121 Fax: +41 61 487 2501
Fax: +47 67 58 99 40 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]
E-mail: [email protected] www.norman-ibas.fi www.norman.ch
www.norman.com/no
! United Kingdom ! The Netherlands
! Denmark Norman Data Defense Systems (UK) Ltd Norman/SHARK B.V.
Norman Data Defense Systems AS PO Box 5517 Postbus 159
Blangstedgårdsvej 1 Milton Keynes NL-2130 AD Hoofddorp
DK-5220 Odense SØ MK5 6XJ, UK Tel: +31 23 789 0222
Tel. +45 6311 0508 Tel: +44 (0) 8707 448 044 Fax: +31 23 561 3165
Fax: +45 6313 3901 Fax: +44 (0) 8717 176 999 E-mail: [email protected]
E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] www.norman.nl
www.norman.com/dk www.normanuk.com
! USA
! Sweden ! Germany Norman Data Defense Systems Inc.
Norman Data Defense Systems AB Norman Data Defense Systems GmbH 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 950A
Birger Jarlsgt. 27 Kieler Str. 15 Fairfax, VA 22031, USA
P.O. Box 5044 D-42697 Solingen Tel: +1 703 267 6109
SE-194 05 Uppland Väsby Tel: +49 212 267 180 Fax: +1 703 934 6367
Tel. +46 8 988 660 Fax: +49 212 267 1815 E-mail: [email protected]
E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] www.norman.com
www.norman.com/se www.norman.de
Unread Compact Log Con- Quaran- Read

Diskette
email disk statistics figure tine email
Norman solutions for clients/workstations

Norman Virus Control for Microsoft Windows 95, 98, Me, NT4.0, 2000, XP, OS/2, Linux (On-Demand scanning) |
Norman Internet Control for Microsoft Windows 95, 98, Me, NT4.0, 2000, XP | Norman Personal Firewall | Norman
Privacy
Norman solutions for servers

Norman Virus Control for Microsoft Windows XP, 2000, NT40 | Norman Virus Control Firebreak for Novell Netware 4.11
and later | Norman Virus Control for Linux | Norman Virus Control for Lotus Domino (Win32, OS/2) | Norman Virus
Control for Firewall-1 (and next generation version)
Norman solutions for web, gateways and mailservers

Norman Spam Control | Norman Email Control | Norman Download Control | Norman Virus Control Net | Norman
Virus Control for Microsoft Internet Information Server | Norman Virus Control for MIMEsweeper | Norman Virus
Control for Microsoft Exchange
w w w. n o r m a n . c o m

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In particular, and without the limitations imposed by the licensing

The information in this document as well as the functionality of the

Names of products mentioned in this documentation are either

Last revised February 2003.

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

What is a virus? ...........................................................................................8

What is a program ................................................................................ 8

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

How a boot virus infects .................................................................... 24

The evolution of the virus problem ..........................................................35

Viruses on different operating systems ....................................................36

Solutions to the virus problem ..................................................................42

Establish routines ............................................................................... 42

About Sandboxing ..................................................................................46

Industry facts .............................................................................................49

Norman Virus Control ..............................................................................50

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

NVC 5 – a new approach to virus control ...............................................50

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

from the disk, examines it and determines what kind of program

Malware classes overview

Remember: Viruses are simply software programs.

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Trojans, backdoors, security risks

Denial-of-service tools, nukers, mail bombers

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Sometimes these weapons can be installed silently to be used

Hacking tools, virus creation kits

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Bugs, logic bombs, time bombs

Virus/worm types overview

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Binary file virus and worms

Binary stream worms

Script file virus and worms

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

or instructions that tells Windows to do certain actions. Just

Binary file virus

A companion virus does not modify its host directly. Instead it

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

original program. Or the virus infects an .EXE file by creating a

A link virus makes changes in the low-level workings of the file

An overwriting virus places itself at the beginning of the

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Such viruses are easily apprehended and destroyed by users and

An inserting virus copies itself into the host program. Programs

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

An appending virus places a “jump” at the beginning of the

Script file viruses

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

functionality that is a subset of the Microsoft Visual Basic

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman

Why it’s such a risk

Copyright © 1990-2003 Norman