THE MIMAMSA PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

In ancient and medieval India there was tremendous development not only
in the fields of Science and Philosophy, but also in the field of law.
However, the advent of British rule denied us the benefits of these
developments as the alien rulers made it a policy to demoralise and
denigrate us by propagating the idea that Indians were a race with no
worthwhile achievement to their credit.

In this article only one aspect of our native Jurisprudence, viz. our
traditional principles of interpretation, has been dealt with, and the aim is
to show that the propaganda of Westerners is false.

As is well known, the principles of interpretation of statutes mainly relied

on in our law courts are those dealt with in the works of Western jurists
like Maxwell and Craies. However, in our country we had developed from
very early times a scientific system of interpretation known as the
Mimansa Principles1 and these were regularly followed by our renowned
jurists like Vijnaneshwara (author of Mitakshara), Jimutvahana (author
of Dayabhag), Nanda Pandit (author of Dattak Mimansa) etc. Whenever
there was any conflict between the Smritis e.g. Manusmriti and
Yagnavalkya Smriti, or ambiguity in a Shruti or Smriti, the Mimansa
Principles were applied. Most of these principles are rational and
scientific, and in some respects superior to the principles obtaining in
Western Law. At present there is no reason why we should not apply them
in appropriate cases.

As a Judge I think it should be my effort to revive the use of these

principles. In a recent case, Tribhuwannath v. D.I.O.S., Writ Petition No.
17544 of 1990 decided on 30-3-19922 one of these principles was applied.
In this case the petitioner, who was the seniormost teacher in an
Intermediate College, had filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court
claiming that he should have been appointed ad hoc Principal on the
retirement of the previous Principal, but the management had superseded
him. In the course of hearing two Division Bench decisions apparently
conflicting with each other, were cited. While the Division Bench ruling
written by Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. had held that the seniormost teacher
should be appointed ad hoc Principal the Division Bench ruling delivered
by Hon'ble V.N. Khare, J. had held that it is the discretion of the
Management as to who is to be appointed. By way of employing
the Samanjasya principle of Mimansa it was easy to reconcile the
conflicting decisions by holding that the former decision should be
interpreted to mean that ordinarily the seniormost teacher should be
appointed Principal, while the latter decision should be interpreted to
mean that in exceptional cases, viz., if there are grave charges against him,
he can be superseded by a reasoned order, though only after giving him a
show-cause notice.
The Mimansa or the Purva Mimansa Rules to be exact, were laid down by
Jaimini in his Sutras written around 600 B.C. That they are very ancient
is proved by the fact that they are referred to in many Smritis which
themselves are very old. Thus, the Apastamba Sutras copiously refer to
Jaimini's principles. Since these Sutras are written in very concise form it
became necessary to explain them. Many commentaries were written on
them, the main ones being of Sabara, who lived around Second Century
A.D., and Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara, who lived around the Eighth
Century A.D.

Before mentioning some of the Mimansa Principles it is necessary to give

a short background. Classical Hindu Philosophy has six schools
(shatdarshan) all of which aim at Moksha (liberation). Purva Mimansa is
one of these schools, and according to it one can achieve Moksha by
performing Yagya (sacrifice) in accordance with the Shastras. The
Shastras consist of Shruti and Smriti, the former being superior to the
latter. Shruti consists of the four Vedas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyaks and
the Upanishads. Brahmanas are treatises written in prose which prescribe
methods of performing various Yagyas. To every Veda one or more
Brahmanas are attached. Thus, the Aitareya Brahmana is attached to the
Rig Veda, the Taitareya Brahmana to the Black Yajur Veda, the
Shatapatha Brahmana to the White Yajur Veda, and the Tandya Brahmana
to the Sama Veda.
After Shankaracharya's renowned victory over Mandan Misra, Purva
Mimansa, as a philosophic system, declined in importance.
Shankaracharya was a proponent of Uttar Mimansa (also known as
Vedanta), according to which Moksha can be achieved by knowledge of
Brahma. Shankaracharya preached that Jnanakanda (the Vedantic Path) is
superior to Karmakanda (the performance of Yagya). He shifted the
emphasis in the Shrutis from the Brahmanas to the Upanishads, and his
view was accepted, and ever since Vedanta became the dominant school
of Hindu philosophy.

However, though Purva Mimansa lost prominence to Vedanta in

Philosophy, its importance remained as paramount as before in the legal
sphere. It must however be clarified that the Mimansaks were not jurists.
Their aim was to perform the Yagya properly, for they sincerely believed
that this was the means to achieve moksha. For the conduct of Yagyas in
accordance with the rules they had to devise a system of interpretation to
resolve the conflicts, ambiguities, etc. in the Shrutis, which were
aggravated by the archaic, pre-Panini Sanskrit employed in the Vedic
texts. No doubt the principles of interpretation were initially evolved to
resolve conflicts that arose in connection with the meaning of rules
governing performance of the Yagya, but gradually these principles came
to be accepted for interpreting legal texts also which were mixed up with
religious rules in the Smritis. It was therefore natural that our great
commentators like Vijnaneshwara, Jimutvahana, etc. had utilised these
Mimansa principles whenever faced with any ambiguity or conflict in the
various Shastras.

Unfortunately, there has not been much effort to explain these principles.
The advent of Anglo-Saxon Law must have been responsible for this lack
of study.

The Mimansa principles are in two respects superior to Maxwell's

principles of interpretation, viz.: (1) They can be utilised not only for
interpreting statutes but also judgments, whereas Maxwell's principles can
only be used for interpreting statutory law, (2) They are more detailed and
systematic.

The Mimansa Principles distinguish between obligatory statements and

non-obligatory statements. The main obligatory rule is called a Vidhi (or
a Pratishedh, if it is in negative form). Vidhis are of 4 types, (1) Utpatti
Vidhi, or a substantive injunction (e.g. 'perform the agnihotra'), (2)
Viniyoga Vidhi, or applicatory rules (e.g. 'with curdled milk perform the
agnihotra'), (3) Prayog Vidhi, or rules of procedure, and (4) Adhikara
Vidhis (rules regarding rights and personal competence). Apart from these
Vidhis proper (mentioned above) there are also certain quasi Vidhis called
niyamas and parishankhyas, but it is not necessary to go into details here.
Vidhis are found in Brahmanas.

The main non-obligatory statement is known as an Arthavada. An

Arthavada is a statement of praise or explanation. Most of the Vedas
proper consist of Arthavadas as much of the Vedic hymns are in praise of
some god, and do not lay down any injunction. Arthavada is like the
preamble or statement of objects in a statute. An Arthavada has no legal
force by itself, but it is not entirely useless since like a statement of objects
or preamble it can help to clarify an ambiguous Vidhi, or give the reason
for it. Sometimes a Vidhi is also seen couched in the form of Arthavada.
This situation has necessitated the need for evolving a system of
interpretation. Six axioms of interpretation have therefore been developed
for the interpretation of shastras3 They are:

(1) The Sarthakyata axiom, which means that every word and sentence
must have some meaning.

(2) The Laghava axiom (Gauravah doshah), which states that that
construction which makes the meaning simpler and shorter is to be
preferred.

(3) The Arthaikatva axiom, which states that a double meaning should not
be attached to a word or sentence occurring at one and the same place.
Such a double meaning is known as a Vakyabheda, and is a fault (dosh).

(4) The Gunapradhan axiom, which states that if a word or sentence

purporting to express a subordinate idea clashes with the principal idea
the former must be adjusted to the latter, or must be disregarded
altogether.
(5) The Samanjasya axiom4 which states that all attempts should be made
at reconciliation of apparently conflicting texts. Jimutvahana has applied
this principle for reconciling conflicting texts of Manu and Yajnavalkya
on the right of succession.

(6) The Vikalpa axiom, which states that if there is a real and
irreconcilable contradiction between two legal rules having equal force,
the rule more in accordance with equity and usage should be adopted at
one's option. Thus where one of the rules is a higher legal norm as
compared to the other, e.g. a Shruti in relation to Smriti, by the Badha
principle5 the former prevails.

It may be mentioned here that the Mimansaks made every effort to

reconcile conflicts, and held that Vikalpa was to be resorted to only if all
other means of reconciliation failed, for Vikalpa had eight faults (dosh).

Apart from the above mentioned axioms of interpretation there are the
four well-known general principles of interpretation in Mimansa, viz.:

(1) the Shruti Principle, or the literal rule. This is illustrated by the well-
known Garhapatya maxim. There is the Vedic verse "Aindra garhapatyam
Upatishthate" (with the Indra verse one should worship Garhapatya). Now
this Vidhi can have several meanings e.g. (1) One should worship
Garhapatya (the household fire) with a verse addressed to Indra, (2) One
should worship both Indra as well as Garhapatya, (3) One should worship
either of the two. The correct interpretation, according to the Shruti
principle, is the first interpretation.

(2) the Linga principle (also called Lakshana artha) or the suggestive
power of words or expressions. This principle can be illustrated by the
decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij
Kishore6, where the words "landless person" were held to refer to landless
peasants only and not to landless businessmen.

(3) the Vakya Principle, or syntactical arrangement, and

(4) Prakarana, which permits construction by referring to some other text

in order to make the meaning clear.

The first principle (Shruti) is to be resorted to if (1) the meaning of the

text is clear, and (2) it accords with the intention. But there are texts whose
meaning seems to be clear, but to give that literal meaning would totally
undermine its intention. For example, if a literal meaning is to be given to
the English law which forbade a layman to 'lay hands' on a priest, the
layman who wounded a priest with a weapon would not be doing anything
illegal. Similarly on a literal construction when the Turkish Sultan
Mohammed II sawed the Venetian Governor's body in two it was no
breach of his promise to spare his head, and Tamarlane's burying alive a
garrison was no violation of his pledge to shed no blood.

We see therefore that the literal rule will sometimes lead to absurdity and
totally efface the intention of the law. In fact, as Lord Denning 7 has
pointed out, the modern method of interpretation is to seek the intention
rather than to follow the literal rule. This is signified in the decision of the
Supreme Court of India in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India8 The
Mimansaks were great intention seekers, and the Linga, Vakya and
Prakarana principles all aim at finding the intention of the law.

Only the broad outlines have been indicated above, but it has to be noted
that the Mimansa Principles go into minute details and systematically
arrange the principles of interpretation into categories and sub-categories
with all their ramifications. For example, the Vakya principle (mentioned
above) include adhayahara and anusanga (supplying of missing words and
expressions), upakarsha and apakarsha (transference of clauses up or
down in the sentence), etc.

To give an illustration of the anusanga principle9 (elliptical extension) it

is interesting to see how Jimutavahana interpreted the text of Manu which
states "Of a woman married according to the Brahma, Daiva, Arsha,
Gandharvaand Prajapatya form, the property shall go to her husband, if
she dies without issue. But her wealth, given to her on her marriage in the
form called Asura, Rakshas and Paisacha, on her death without issue shall
become the property of her parents". Jimutavahana employing the
anusanga principle interpreted this text to the effect that the words "wealth
given to her on her marriage" should also be inserted in the first sentence
after the words "the property".
The difference between the Linga principle and the Vakya principle may
also be noticed. In the former no violence is done to the wording of the
text, but the words or expressions are construed differently from the literal
sense, and hence Linga is really construction by context. In Vakya,
however, some violence is done to the text e.g., by connecting two
separate sentences, or by adding words or expressions, or by transferring
words or expressions up or down a sentence. This violence may
sometimes become necessary to save the text from becoming meaningless
or absurd, just as the surgeon may have to do violence to the body (by
operation) to save the patient's life. For this purpose the Uha principle (use
of reason) is employed.10 In this connection it may be mentioned that
Maxwell also permits doing violence to the statute in exceptional
situations. He says "where the language of a statute, in its ordinary
meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction
of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or
absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction
may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even
the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules
of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering
their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other
words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the
legislature could not possibly have intended what the words signify, and
that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language
and really give the true intention". This approach seems to have been
followed by the Supreme Court in S.S. Kalra v. Union of India11, wherein
it has observed that sometimes courts can supply words which have been
accidentally omitted.

Apart from the above mentioned principles of interpretation there are also
a large number of popular maxims (nyayas) which are in essence
illustrations of the above principles. Thus, in the Tribhuwannath
case 1 (supra) the maxim of the lost horses and burnt chariot
(Nashtashvadagdharatha nyaya) was applied for harmonising two
apparently conflicting decisions of the Allahabad High Court. Similarly,
there is the maxim 'the popular sense prevails over the etymological sense'
which is illustrated by the word 'Pankaj'. This word literally means
anything born in mud and therefore can refer to dozens of things. But by
usage it has come to mean only lotus.

There are various other such maxims (nyayas) e.g., the Aruni maxim,
holika maxim, barhi maxim, shodashi maxim, garhapatya maxim, the
maxim of the wooden sword (sphadi nyaya) the partridge (kapijjala)
maxim, the maxim of the two monsters (sundopsunda nyaya), the maxim
of the larger fish eating the smaller fish (matsya nyaya) etc.12 Nyayas are
extremely useful in understanding the principles of interpretation. In fact
many of these maxims have been used by our commentators.13
Application of Mimansa principles sometimes lead to different results.
For example, there is a text of Vasishta which says "a woman should not
give or take a son in adoption except with the assent of her husband". This
has been interpreted in 4 different ways by our commentators. (1) The
Dattak Mimansa holds that no widow can adopt a son because the assent
required is assent at the time of adoption, and the husband being dead no
assent of his can be had at the time of adoption. Vachaspati, of the Mithila
School of Mitakshara, is of the same opinion, but for a different reason.
According to him, adoption can only be resorted to after performing the
homa, and since a woman cannot perform the homa with Vedic mantras,
she cannot adopt. (2) The Dayabhaga view is that the husband's assent is
not required at the time of actual adoption, and hence if the husband had
given assent in his lifetime his widow can adopt after his death. (3) The
view of the Dravida School of Mitakshara is that the words "except with
the assent of the husband" are only illustrative, and hence assent of her
husband's agnates or father-in-law's agnates is sufficient. (4) The
Vyavaharmayukha and Nirnayasindhu hold that assent is required only
for the woman whose husband is living and hence a widow can freely
adopt unless she had been expressly forbidden by her late husband. To
give another example, both the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga use mimansa
principles in interpreting the Smritis but with different results. For
example, the word 'sapinda' has been interpreted differently in Dayabhaga
and Mitakshara. Both these systems lay down that the nearest Sapinda has
the right to inherit, but according to Dayabhaga 'Sapinda' means the
person who has the right to offer the pinda (rice balls) in the shraddha
ceremony to the deceased, while the Mitakshara interprets the word
'pinda' to mean particles of the body, and not rice balls, and hence sapinda
means one having the same particles as the deceased (i.e. nearer in blood).

The fact that Mimansa principles sometimes lead to different results

however does not diminish their utility. Maxwell's principles also lead to
different results. This only shows that principles of interpretation should
not be applied blindly. Principles of interpretation are good servants but
bad masters, as observed by the Supreme Court in Keshavji Ravji and
Co. v. C.I.14 They are to be utilised for discovering the meaning of the
legal text, but they are not to be applied without having regard to the
context and commonsense and reason. They are, after all, not rules of law
but a methodology for resolving certain difficulties.

It is also pertinent to mention the mimansa principles were originally

evolved for interpreting the religious texts pertaining to the Yagyas, and
hence all of them may not be relevant for interpreting legal texts.

In conclusion I would like to clarify that it is not my opinion that we

should not use the sound and useful ideas of Western jurists like Maxwell.
It would be foolhardy to discard the good ideas of Western jurists. It has
never been the Indian tradition to reject foreign ideas, merely because they
are foreign. There are many good things we have to learn from
Westerners. But at the same time we should not blindly ape the
Westerners and discard our own traditional ideas if they are found still
useful and relevant. After all we too have produced great thinkers, and we
can utilise their sound ideas wherever appropriate after making suitable
adaptations to suit the prevailing conditions.

Utilization of Mimansa Principles

Knowledge of Mimansa Principles enables one to creatively develop the

law. A few examples of utilization of Mimansa Principles in some of my
judgments is given below:

1. In Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan v. State of U.P.15 the controversy

was as to which of two clerks appointed on the same day in an
Intermediate College would be senior, and hence entitled to promotion as
Head Clerk. Now there is no rule to cater to this situation. However,
Chapter 2, Regulation 3 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Regulations
states that where 2 teachers are appointed on the same day, the senior in
age will be senior. Using the atidesh Principle of mimansa it was held that
the same principle which applies to teachers should be also applied to
clerks, and hence the senior in age would be senior. The atidesh principle
originated in the practical difficulty of performing certain yagyas. There
are some yagyas (e.g. agnihotra, darshapurnamani, etc.) whose method of
performance is given in detail in the Brahmanas. These are known as
prakriti yagyas. However, thereare other yagyas whose rules are not given
any where, and these are known as vikriti yagyas. The question arose how
these latter are to be performed? The atidesh principle was created to
resolve this difficulty, and according to this principle the vikriti yagya is
to be performed according to the rules of the prakriti yagya belonging to
the same genus.

2. In Tribhuwan Misra v. D.I.O.S. (supra) the Samanjasya principle was

used to reconcile 2 apparently conflicting Division Bench rulings. This
technique avoided reference to a Full Bench which would have tied up 3
or more Judges for several days in resolving the conflict. No doubt this
decision (as a Single Judge) curtailed the full effect of the 2 Division
Bench decisions, but that was done on the authority of the maxim of the
lost horse; and burnt chariot (Nasrhtashva Dagdharatha Nyaya). This is
based on the story of two men travelling in their respective chariots. One
of them lost his horses and the other's chariot was burnt through the out
break of fire inn the in where they were spending the night. The horses
that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot, and the two men
pursued their journey together. Its teaching is union for mutual advantage,
which has been quoted in the 16th Vartika to Panini, and is explained by
Patanjali. It is referred to in Kumarila Bhatta's 'Tantravartika'.

3. The Anusanga Principle of Mimansa has been used in Mahabir Prasad

Dwivedi v. State16 The principle has been explained in great detail in this
decision, which may be seen in the aforesaid journal. The conclusion
reached in this decision could not have been reacted by any principle of
Western Jurisprudence, and this illustrates the great use which can be
made of Mimansa Principles to make the statute more democratic and
equitable.

The Laghava Principle has been used in Vinay Khare v. State of

U.P.17 The controversy in this case was that if in a competitive
examination two candidates got equal marks whether the candidate who
got more marks in the oral interview should be placed higher in the select
list or the candidate who got more marks in the written test. It was held in
this case that the candidate who got more marks in the written test should
be placed higher because to interpret general suitability on the basis of
marks in the written test is a short and simple interpretation and provides
a clear objective test, whereas the criteria in the oral interview involves
consideration of the candidate's personality, dress, physique, etc. which is
complicated and in which there are more chances of favouritism and
arbitrariness.