Roper V Simmons PDF

(Bench Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ROPER, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORREC-

TIONAL CENTER v. SIMMONS
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
No. 03–633. Argued October 13, 2004—Decided March 1, 2005

At age 17, respondent Simmons planned and committed a capital mur-
der. After he had turned 18, he was sentenced to death. His direct
appeal and subsequent petitions for state and federal postconviction
relief were rejected. This Court then held, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U. S. 304, that the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the execution of a
mentally retarded person. Simmons filed a new petition for state
postconviction relief, arguing that Atkins’ reasoning established that
the Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under
18 when he committed his crime. The Missouri Supreme Court
agreed and set aside Simmons’ death sentence in favor of life impris-
onment without eligibility for release. It held that, although Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, rejected the proposition that the Con-
stitution bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders younger than
18, a national consensus has developed against the execution of those
offenders since Stanford.
Held: The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their
crimes were committed. Pp. 6–25.
(a) The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and un-
usual punishments” must be interpreted according to its text, by con-
sidering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its
purpose and function in the constitutional design. To implement this
framework this Court has established the propriety and affirmed the
necessity of referring to “the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society” to determine which punishments
are so disproportionate as to be “cruel and unusual.” Trop v. Dulles,
356 U. S. 86, 100–101. In 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S.
2 ROPER v. SIMMONS
Syllabus
815, 818–838, a plurality determined that national standards of de-

cency did not permit the execution of any offender under age 16 at
the time of the crime. The next year, in Stanford, a 5-to-4 Court re-
ferred to contemporary standards of decency, but concluded the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution
of offenders over 15 but under 18 because 22 of 37 death penalty
States permitted that penalty for 16-year-old offenders, and 25 per-
mitted it for 17-year-olds, thereby indicating there was no national
consensus. 492 U. S., at 370–371. A plurality also “emphatically re-
ject[ed]” the suggestion that the Court should bring its own judgment
to bear on the acceptability of the juvenile death penalty. Id., at 377–
378. That same day the Court held, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S.
302, 334, that the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical
exemption from the death penalty for mentally retarded persons be-
cause only two States had enacted laws banning such executions.
Three Terms ago in Atkins, however, the Court held that standards of
decency had evolved since Penry and now demonstrated that the exe-
cution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment.
The Atkins Court noted that objective indicia of society’s standards,
as expressed in pertinent legislative enactments and state practice,
demonstrated that such executions had become so truly unusual that
it was fair to say that a national consensus has developed against
them. 536 U. S., at 314–315. The Court also returned to the rule, es-
tablished in decisions predating Stanford, that the Constitution con-
templates that the Court’s own judgment be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty. Id., at 312. After
observing that mental retardation diminishes personal culpability
even if the offender can distinguish right from wrong, id., at 318, and
that mentally retarded offenders’ impairments make it less defensi-
ble to impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes or as a
real deterrent to future crimes, id., at 319–320, the Court ruled that
the death penalty constitutes an excessive sanction for the entire
category of mentally retarded offenders, and that the Eighth
Amendment places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to
take such an offender’s life, id., at 321. Just as the Atkins Court re-
considered the issue decided in Penry, the Court now reconsiders the
issue decided in Stanford. Pp. 6–10.
(b) Both objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular
by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question,
and the Court’s own determination in the exercise of its independent
judgment, demonstrate that the death penalty is a disproportionate
punishment for juveniles. Pp. 10–21.
(1) As in Atkins, the objective indicia of national consensus
here—the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of
Cite as: 543 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
Syllabus
States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books;
and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—
provide sufficient evidence that today society views juveniles, in the
words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as “categorically
less culpable than the average criminal,” 536 U. S., at 316. The evi-
dence of such consensus is similar, and in some respects parallel, to
the evidence in Atkins: 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty,
including 12 that have rejected it altogether and 18 that maintain it
but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles
from its reach. Moreover, even in the 20 States without a formal
prohibition, the execution of juveniles is infrequent. Although, by
contrast to Atkins, the rate of change in reducing the incidence of the
juvenile death penalty, or in taking specific steps to abolish it, has
been less dramatic, the difference between this case and Atkins in
that respect is counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the
change toward abolition. Indeed, the slower pace here may be ex-
plained by the simple fact that the impropriety of executing juveniles
between 16 and 18 years old gained wide recognition earlier than the
impropriety of executing the mentally retarded. Pp. 10–13.
(2) Rejection of the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile of-
fenders under 18 is required by the Eighth Amendment. Capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit “a narrow
category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability
makes them “the most deserving of execution.” Atkins, 536 U. S. at
319. Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders. Juveniles’ susceptibility to im-
mature and irresponsible behavior means “their irresponsible con-
duct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815, 835. Their own vulnerability and com-
parative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean ju-
veniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole environment. See Stanford,
supra, at 395. The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous
crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved
character. The Thompson plurality recognized the import of these
characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16. 487 U. S., at 833–
838. The same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under 18.
Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident that
neither of the two penological justifications for the death penalty—
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders,
e.g., Atkins, 536 U. S., at 319—provides adequate justification for im-
posing that penalty on juveniles. Although the Court cannot deny or
4 ROPER v. SIMMONS
Syllabus
overlook the brutal crimes too many juvenile offenders have commit-
ted, it disagrees with petitioner’s contention that, given the Court’s
own insistence on individualized consideration in capital sentencing,
it is arbitrary and unnecessary to adopt a categorical rule barring
imposition of the death penalty on an offender under 18. An unac-
ceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of
any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s ob-
jective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should
require a sentence less severe than death. When a juvenile commits
a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most
basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his poten-
tial to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity. While
drawing the line at 18 is subject to the objections always raised
against categorical rules, that is the point where society draws the
line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood and the age
at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest. Stanford should
be deemed no longer controlling on this issue. Pp. 14–21.
(c) The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected
and significant confirmation for the Court’s determination that the
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18. See,
e.g., Thompson, supra, at 830–831, and n. 31. The United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction
to the juvenile penalty. It does not lessen fidelity to the Constitution
or pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples underscores
the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of free-
dom. Pp. 21–25.
112 S. W. 3d 397, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and Breyer, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concur-
ring opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined.

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(Bench Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ROPER, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORREC-

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

No. 03–633. Argued October 13, 2004—Decided March 1, 2005

815, 818–838, a plurality determined that national standards of de-

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,

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