01FE16BME085
01FE16BME085
01FE16BME085
Assignment – 1
Branch: Mechanical
USN: 01FE16BME085
Case Study – 1
On September 05, 2003, Samsung India Electronics Limited (SIEL), the Indian
subsidiary of the South Korean electronics major – Samsung Electronics
Company Limited, (Samsung) inaugurated its refrigerator manufacturing
facility in Noida in the state of UP in India. The $25 mn, 5,00,000 unit capacity
plant was only the fifth refrigerator facility of Samsung, the other four being
located in South Korea, China, Thailand and Mexico. Since 2001, SIEL has also
established plants for manufacturing air conditioners and washing machines in
India. These moves have helped the company significantly in gaining market
share in the home appliances industry in India. Like Samsung, several global
companies operating in diverse industries have shown growing interest in
setting up world-class manufacturing facilities in India to cater to the domestic
market as well as for the export market. Market Research Firm IDC estimates
that by 2007, the total market potential for the hardware manufacturing sector in
India will be worth more than $150 bn. The hardware products considered
include PCs, servers, hand-held devices, work stations, storage devices,
peripherals and data communications equipment. Since IDC has not taken
account of hardware for consumer electronics and automotives, the figure
inclusive of these is likely to be much higher. The demand for hardware,
telecom and consumer electronics products in India has been rising fast. For
instance, in 2003, there were 28.6 mn mobile telephony subscribers in India, a
244% growth from the 2002 figure of 11.1 mn. It is expected that in 2004, the
figure will reach 36 mn. With vast untapped potential, the Indian market offers
a huge market for global manufacturers such as Nokia, Samsung (mobile
phones); and HCL Info systems, LG, and IBM (PCs). Major global companies
have established manufacturing facilities in India in order to reduce their
manufacturing costs and cater to the expanding Indian market. Expressing his
optimism over the market potential in India, Gopal Srinivasan, CEO, and TVS
Electronics said, “It isn't a question of opportunity here. It is a question of being
able to execute; companies in this space should grow at least two to three
times.”
Automotive components:
Jewellery:
India has been one of the leading exporters of gems and jewellery next only to
countries like Belgium (Antwerp) and Israel (Tel Aviv). In terms of value,
Indian exports constitute about 55% of the world's polished diamond market.
Rough diamonds sourced from abroad are cut and polished by skilled craftsmen,
after which they are exported. According to the Gems and Jewellery Export
Council, the export of diamonds, coupled with other gems and jewelleries,
contribute to around 20% of India's foreign exchange earnings annually.
IT and Hardware:
It is widely believed that India's IT hardware industry has not performed well as
compared to its renowned software industry. However, over the past couple of
years this trend has been changing. India is slowly emerging as a manufacturing
hub for IT hardware as well. India has already acquired a good reputation in the
hardware and IT appliances segments.
Looking Ahead:
3] Conclusion:
In May 2000, (much to your chagrin!) the ambitious and dynamic, Mr.
Nakamura (Chairman, NLC) received two offers from American companies
wishing to sell lacquer ware in America.
The first offer was from the National China Company. It was the largest
manufacturer of good quality dinnerware in the U.S., with their “Rose and
Crown” brand accounting for almost 30% of total sales. They were willing to
give a firm order for three years for annual purchases of 400,000 sets of lacquer
dinnerware, delivered in Japan and at 5% more than what the Japanese jobbers
paid. However, Nakamura would have to forego the Chrysanthemum trademark
to “Rose and Crown” and also undertake not to sell lacquer ware to anyone else
in the U.S.
Solution
The Nakamura Lacquer Company: The Nakamura Lacquer Company
based in Kyoto, Japan was one of the many small handicraft shops
making lacquerware for the daily table use of the Japanese people.
Mr. Nakamura- the personality: In 1948, a young Mr. Nakamura took
over his family business. He saw an opportunity to cater to a new market
of America, i.e. GI's of the Occupation Army who had begun to buy
lacquer ware as souvenirs. However, he realized that the traditional
handicraft methods were inadequate. He was an innovator and introduced
simple methods of processing and inspection using machines. Four years
later, when the Occupation Army left in 1952, Nakamura employed
several thousand men, and produced 500,000 pieces of lacquers tableware
each year for the Japanese mass consumer market. The profit from
operations was $250,000.
The Brand: Nakamura named his brand “Chrysanthemum” after the
national flower of Japan, which showed his patriotic fervor. The brand
became Japan's best known and best selling brand, being synonymous
with good quality, middle class and dependability.
The Market: The market for lacquerware in Japan seems to have matured,
with the production steady at 500,000 pieces a year. Nakamura did
practically no business outside of Japan. However, early in 1960, when
the American interest in Japanese products began to grow, Nakamura
received two offers
The Rose and Crown offer: The first offer was from Mr. Phil Rose, V.P
Marketing at the National China Company. They were the largest
manufacturer of good quality dinnerware in the U.S., with their “Rose
and Crown” brand accounting for almost 30% of total sales. They were
willing to give a firm order for three eyes for annual purchases of 400,000
sets of lacquer dinnerware, delivered in Japan and at 5% more than what
the Japanese jobbers paid. However, Nakamura would have to forego the
Chrysanthemum trademark to “Rose and Crown” and also undertaken to
sell lacquer ware to anyone else the U.S. The offer promised returns of
$720,000 over three years (with net returns of $83,000), but with little
potential for the U.S. market on the Chrysanthemum brand beyond that
period.
The Semmelback offer: The second offer was from Mr. Walter
Sammelback of Sammelback, Sammelback and Whittacker, Chicago, the
largest supplier of hotel and restaurant supplies in the U.S. They
perceived a U.S. market of 600,000 sets a year, expecting it to go up to 2
million in around 5 years. Since the Japanese government did not allow
overseas investment, Sammelback was willing to budget $1.5 million.
Although the offer implied negative returns of $467,000 over the first five
years, the offer had the potential to give a $1 million profit if sales picked
up as anticipated.
Meeting the order: To meet the numbers requirement of the orders,
Nakamura would either have to expand capacity or cut down on the
domestic market. If he chose to expand capacity, the danger was of idle
capacity in case the U.S. market did not respond. If he cut down on the
domestic market, the danger was of losing out on a well-established
market. Nakamura could also source part of the supply from other
vendors. However, this option would not find favor with either of the
American buyers since they had approached only Nakamura, realizing
that he was the best person to meet the order.
Decision problem: Whether to accept any of the two offers and if yes,
which one of the two and under what terms of conditions?
Objectives:
Short Term:
To expand into the U.S. market.
To maintain and build upon their reputation of the “Chrysanthemum”
brand
Long term:
To increase profit volumes by tapping the U.S. market and as a result,
increasing scale of operations.
To increase its share in the U.S. lacquerware market.
Criteria: (In descending order of priority):
Profit Maximization criterion: The most important criterion in the long
run is profit maximization.
Risk criterion: Since the demand in the U.S. market is not as much as in
Japan.
Brand identity criterion: Nakamura has painstakingly built up a brand
name in Japan. It is desirable for him to compete in the U.S. market under
the same brand name
Flexibility criterion: The chosen option should offer Nakamura flexibility
in manoeuvring the terms and conditions to his advantage. Additionally,
Nakamura should have bargaining power at the time of renewal of the
contract.
Short term returns: Nakamura should receive some returns on the
investment he makes on the new offers.However, this criterion may be
compromised in favor of profit maximization in the long run.?
Options:
Reject both: React both the offers and concentrate on the domestic market
Accept RC offer: Accept the Rose and Crown offer and supply the offer
by cutting down on supplies to the domestic market or through capacity
expansion or both
Accept SSW: offer; accept the SSW offer and meet it through cutting
down on supply to the domestic market or through capacity expansion or
both. Negotiate term of supply.M
Evaluation of Options:
Reject both: This option would not meet the primary criterion of profit
maximization. Further, the objective of growth would also not be met.
Hence, this option is rejected.
Accept RC offer: The RC offer would assure net returns of $283,000 over
the next three yeas. It also assures regular returns of $240,000 per year.
However, Nakamura would have no presence in the U.S. with its
Chrysanthemum brand name The RC offer would entail capacity
expansion, as it would not be possible to siphon of 275,000 pieces from
the domestic market over three years without adversely affecting
operations there. At the end of three years, Nakamura would have little
bargaining power with RC as it would have an excess capacity of 275,000
pieces and excess labor which it would want to utilize. In this sense the
offer is risky. Further, the offer is not flexible. Long-term profit
maximization is uncertain in this case a condition that can be controlled
in the SSW offer. Hence, this offer is rejected.
Accept SSW offer: The SSW offer does not assure a firm order or any
returns for the period of contract. Although, in its present form the offer
is risky if the market in the U.S. does not pick up as expected, the offer is
flexible. If Nakamura were to exhibit caution initially by supplying only
300,000 instead of the anticipated 600,000 pieces, it could siphon off the
175,000 required from the domestic market. If demand exists in the U.S.,
the capacity can be expanded. With this offer, risk is minimized. Further,
it would be competing on its own brand name. Distribution would be
taken care of and long-term profit maximization criterion would be
satisfied as this option has the potential of $1 million in profits per year.
At the time of renewal of the contract, Nakamura would have immense
bargaining power.