316 Lopez v. Constantino, 74 Phil 160

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316 Lopez v.

Constantino, 74 Phil 160


FACTS:
In January, 1936, appellant sold to her daughter, the appellee, a parcel of land with all the
buildings and improvements thereon situated at Nos. 1215, 1217, 1219, and 1221 Juan
Luna, Tondo, Manila, in consideration of the sum of P4,000. In civil case No. 49536 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which was instituted by the present appellant against the
present appellee in order that the sale be either rescinded or declared subject to the
condition presently to be mentioned, final judgment was rendered in which the court found
that the purchase price of the house was far below its assessed or market value and that the
sale was subject to the condition that the vendor shall receive from the vendee by way of life
pension one half of the rents from Nos. 1215, 1217 and the ground floor of Nos. 1219 and
1221 Juan Luna. By virtue of that judgment said condition was annotated on the back of the
certificate of title.
On May 3, 1941, without appellee’s fault, the building or buildings above mentioned were
totally destroyed by fire. Appellee and appellant, however, collected P5,000 and P1,000,
respectively, on the insurance of their respective interests.
After the destruction of the building appellee sought by motion in the land registration case to
cancel the annotation on the certificate of title of the condition of the sale above mentioned,
on the theory that her obligation to pay appellant a life pension had terminated upon the
destruction of the building out of the rents from which said pension was payable. The Fourth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion over the opposition of the
appellant and ordered the cancellation of the annotation and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in favor of the appellee without such annotation.
Appellant contends (a) that her right to receive a life pension as a condition of the sale
affected not only the building but also the lot on which it was erected and, hence, such right
was not extinguished upon the loss of the building; and (b) that the proceeds of the fire
insurance policy which appellee collected should be ordered invested in the construction of
another building.
The trial court believed that the life pension was an incumbrance on the building alone, and
held that said building having been destroyed without appellee’s fault, and there remaining
nothing but the lot, "which in Manila constitutes a liability when it has no building," the life
pension could no longer subsist.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is a co-usufructuary of the said building.


RULING: YES.
RIGHT OF PENSIONER AS CO-USUFRUCTUARY OF BUILDING. — But even granting
that the obligation of the appellee to pay to the appellant during the latter’s lifetime one half
of the rents of the building in question or of certain portions thereof is an incumbrance on the
building alone, such obligation may properly be considered as constituting the appellant a
co-usufructuary of said building. Article 469 of the Civil Code provides that usufruct may be
created on the whole or a part of the fruits of a thing, in favor of one or more persons,
simultaneously or successively, and in any case from or to a certain day, conditionally or
unconditionally. And article 517 of the same Code pertinently provides that if the usufruct be
created upon the building only and the latter should be destroyed, the usufructuary shall be
entitled to enjoy the use of the land and materials. It is clear, therefore, that from whatever
aspect the case is viewed, the conclusion is inescapable that appellee’s obligation towards
appellant under the contract above mentioned has not been extinguished.

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