People vs. Maceren

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No. L-32166. October 18, 1977.

* extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
MACEREN, CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO Same; Same; In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it must
REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, clearly appear that the order falls within the scope of the authority conferred by law.—
accused-appellees. A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to
make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power
Filling; Jurisdiction; Appeals; An offense punishable with a fine up to P500.00 should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative
falls under the concurrent jurisdiction of a provincial capital town court and the Court agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary
of First Instance. The order of the former is directly appealable to the Supreme implication conferred upon it. x x x In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative
Court.—It is obvious that the crime of electro fishing, which is punishable with a fine order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the
up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized
Court of First Instance. And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of with special care.
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of dismissal rendered by that
municipal court was directly appealable to this Court, not the Court of First Instance of APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Maceren, J.
Laguna. It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court’s order of dismissal is The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
void for lack of jurisdiction. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.
municipal court to this Court. Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.
Fishing; Administrative law; Fishery Adm. Order No. 84 penalizing electro
fishing is null and void because the Fishery Laws under which it was issued (Act 4003 AQUINO, J.:
and R.A. 3512) did not expressly prohibit electro fishing.—We are of the opinion that
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Law, Act No. Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the
4003, and under the law creating the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit law creating the Fisheries Commission.
electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator
to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1,
Same; Same; Lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by
power to declare what act constitute a criminal offense.—The law making body “using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green
cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device
constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the locally known as ‘senso’ with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo
Same; Same; Electro fishing is now punishable by virtue of P.D. 704.— direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its currect reach, to the detriment
the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive regulation and prejudice of the populace” (Criminal Case No. 5429).
because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of
1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the
areas. prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.
Same; Same; An administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric
not amend an act of the legislature.—Administrative regulations adopted under current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section 11 of
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted
of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not
provision. By such relations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider
Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. x it unlawful.
x x The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be prohibits “the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance” in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or Thus, the phrase “in any portion of the Philippine waters”, found in section 2, was
poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: “in fresh water fisheries in the
more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies
than five years. of fresh water.”
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish “electro fishing.” The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that
Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section
Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law “or of any rules and
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more
Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: than two hundred pesos (P200), or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
“SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS OF THE both, in the discretion of the court.”
PHILIPPINES. That assumption is incorrect because section 3 of the aforequoted Administrative
Order No. 84 imposes a fine of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro
“Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4(h) of R.A. No. fishing, which amount exceeds the maximum fine of P200 fixed in section 83. It
3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in seems that the Department Secretary and the Commissioner of Fisheries prescribed
all waters of the Philippines are hereby promulgated for the information and guidance their own penalty for electro fishing, which penalty is less than the severe penalty
of all concerned. imposed in section 76 and which is not identical to the light penalty imposed in
“SECTION 1.—Definition.—Words and terms used in this Order shall be section 83.
construed as follows: Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the lighter penalty prescribed in section
83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original
jurisdictionof the inferior court (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663,
1. “(a)‘Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines’ includes all
September 22, 1976, 73 SCRA 23).
waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the treaties between the
We have discussed this preliminary point, not raised in the briefs, because it is
United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December,
obvious that the crime of electro fishing, which is punishable with a fine up to P500,
eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen
falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of
hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of
First Instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the
fresh waters are included.
cases cited therein).
2. “(b)Electro fishing.—Electro Fishing is the catching of fish with the use of
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a
electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which
provincial capital, the order of dismissal rendered by that municipal court was directly
may be battery or generator-operated and from any available source of
appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last
electric current.
par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20
3. “(c)‘Persons’ includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
SCRA 596).
4. “(d)‘Fish’ includes other aquatic products.
It results that the Court of First Intance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction
over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court’s order of dismissal is void for
“SEC. 2.—Prohibition.—It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro lack of jurisdiction. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal
fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-
covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources 1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above,
which shall be carried at all times. punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention
“SEC. 3.—Penalty.—Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order is not well-taken because, as already stated, the penal provision of Administrative
shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court. an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro
“SEC. 4.—Repealing Provisions.—All administrative orders or parts thereof fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary
inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked. under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of
“SEC. 5.—Effectivity.—This Administrative Order shall take effect sixty (60) days Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations
after its publication in the Official Gazette.” promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the
purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order encourage, promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No.
No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that “any other violation
against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). of” the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder “shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49,
for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.” P. D. No. 704).
As already pointed out above, the prosecution’s reference to section 83 is out of The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is
place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative Order No. 84 is not a dear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It
the same as the penalty fixed in section 83. We are of the opinion that the Secretary is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded electro fishing.
their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1(c) of
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for in the old
3512. Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. penalizes electro fishing by “imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years”, a
As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a fine of not exceeding P500 or
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries
other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are Administrative Order No. 84.
devoid of any legal basis. An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive he exceeded his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative
in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine order.
mollusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the Administrative agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law.
No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
within the category of “other violations” because, as already shown, the penalty for purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of prescribes (People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, L-
obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the 24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706,
penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the 712).
Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs.
what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 1132). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of
waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water legislative powers. Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to
fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not promote the public interest are necessary because of “the growing complexity of
condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing. increased difficulty of administering the law” (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, 68 Phil. 328).
under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
regulation because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An
salt water areas. administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109
That decree provides: Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June
“SEC. 33.—Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products.— 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
taken or gathered fish or fishery/ aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: x x x.” extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
The decree repealed Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J.
and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all Decrees, Acts, 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69
Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs. Phil. Veterans
Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). There is no question This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra,promulgated on July 26, 1960,
that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. called the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules
Section 4 of the Fisheries Law provides that the Secretary “shall from time to time and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal
issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent” with that law, “as may be provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible
necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof.” That power is now misunderstanding or confusion.
vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by section 7 of the Revised Fisheries The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of
Law, Presidential Decree No. 704. the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Commissioner of Fisheries regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in
“to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
Resources, forms, instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose” of In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can
that enactment “and for the development of fisheries.” constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “the Department the latter (People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, It has been held that “to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be
regulations, orders, circulars, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated
law, necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient to any other body or agency” (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs.
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in
the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because
penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law.” the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case
have the force of law (Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 117 involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the
Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L-20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned
316). section 4 of the Fisheries Law.
As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the
a requisite that he should not transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three
exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is
in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that “administrative or receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A
to the laws or the Constitution.” violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal
As noted by Justice Fernando, “except for constitutional officials who can trace Penal Code.
their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First
the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it.” “department zeal Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor
may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.” (Radio without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 Corrigidor Island.
SCRA 493, 496-8). This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to
“Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and
authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned.
expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the taw are oftentimes left to administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary “is equivalent
the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to
said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or him, it being expressly reserved” to the lawmaking body. “Such an act constitutes not
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.” The rule or regulation should only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an
be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore” the said
administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias provision “is null and void and without effect”. Hence, the charge against Santos was
Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). dismissed.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative
agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 SE 2d 534; See 2 board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was
Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130). quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and WHEREFORE, the lower court’s decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of
boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of
rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of SO ORDERED.
the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Santosand Guerrero, JJ., concur.
(State vs. Miles, 5 Wash. 2nd 322; 105 Pac. 2nd 51). Fernando and Antonio, JJ., did not take part.
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the
administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Decision set aside and order affirmed.
Miles, supra). Notes.—The Supreme Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in all
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries of the Department of Agriculture
“to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and and Natural Resources, there is the condition that such permit does not authorize the
regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game.” permittee to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or occupancy within the areas
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that “it shall be granted to him until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had and obtained or
unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, until such claim shall have been legally extinguished. (Republic vs. De los
pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or Angeles, 44 SCRA 255).
any part thereof.” The existence of the impediment in the grant of a fishpond permit must be
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-dollar reckoned at the time of the grant thereof, not at the time the application was filed.
cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open (Nera vs. Titong, Jr., 56 SCRA 40).
season for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation Governmental compromise with violations of the Fisheries Act cannot be had after
of the rule promulgated by the State Game Commission. the criminal action had already been instituted. (Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336).
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the
statute penalized was the takingof game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the ——o0o——
display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative

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