India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms: India and Global Governance

DECEMBER 2017
India and Global Governance
India’s Pursuit of United Nations

Security Council Reforms
MANISH S. DABHADE
India and Global Governance

MANISH S. DABHADE
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Manish S. Dabhade is an Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament
in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group. His teaching
and research interests include diplomacy history, theory and practice, with a
special reference to India.
ISBN : 978-93-87407-34-3
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ABSTRACT
The United Nations Security Council has emerged as the key arena and
barometer for evaluating the promise and progress of accommodating
new, rising powers in the international system. The case of India
provides one of the best examples of a rising power coming to terms with
its increased power, role and expectations of itself and of other powers,
great and small, in negotiating its place in the reformed Council as a
permanent member. This paper begins by mapping its historical
association and varied interests vis-à-vis the Security Council, and its
perspectives on various strands to reform the Council and finally, Indian
strategies over the years to gain a permanent seat in the reformed
Council. This paper concludes that only a pragmatic, real politik
approach that involves hard power bargaining would lead India to
achieve its decades old aspiration to sit at the global high table.
INTRODUCTION
In a truly “historic” move to reforming global governance in the arena of

international peace and security, the 193 member-United Nations
adopted a consensus resolution in its 69th General Assembly on
September 14, 2015 to move from Inter-Governmental Negotiations
ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 1

INDIA’S PURSUIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS
(IGN) to Text-Based Negotiations (TBN) process for reforming the

United Nations Security Council. Welcoming this General Assembly
Decision 80/560 and calling it a “significant development,” India’s
Ministry of External Affairs (2015) struck a very optimistic note:
“We look forward to early commencement of text-based

negotiations with a view to securing concrete outcomes during the 70th
Session of the United Nations General Assembly. We call upon all
Member States to constructively engage in this process so that the long
pending reform of the UN Security Council can be achieved so as to equip
the Council to more effectively address the global challenges.”
In the Indian eyes, “no reform of the United Nations (UN) is

complete without the composition of the Security Council changing to
reflect contemporary realities of the twenty-first century. This requires
expansion in the membership of the Security Council in both the
permanent and non - permanent categories.” This Indian quest for
permanent membership to the Security Council, what India’s Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh once rightly described as “an essay in
persuasion” lies at the heart of repeated Indian pleas for reforming the
UN, the only existing universal organisation of global governance.
(Nafey 2005, p.1) This paper posits some fundamental questions: what
have been the Indian experiences vis-à-vis the Council; what drives the
Indian interests in pursuing the permanent seat in the Council; what
perspectives and positions has India articulated on the proposed
reforms; what bilateral and multilateral strategies has India put in place
in pursuance of its Council objectives; and lastly, what roadblocks does
India need to surmount before it achieves its objective of a permanent
Council seat. Reflecting what Teresita C. Schaffer (2010, p.219) calls
India’s multilateral “personality,” this paper seeks to locate current
Indian perspectives and positions on the entire issue of reforming the
Security Council. It begins with first delineating the nature and role of
2 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017

the Security Council itself and the Indian experiences therein of serving
two-year seven terms as a non-permanent member of the Security
Council. It then examines the multi-layered calculus in pursuing a
permanent seat in the reformed Council by looking at its historic role in
the UN system, its intrinsic value and its great power ambitions.
Further, Indian perspectives on the five sets of issues marked by the
General Assembly and Indian strategies, viz., its diplomacy, are
discussed. This paper ends by identifying serious roadblocks to India’s
ambitions and concludes that India has to display more pragmatism,
more real politik to realise its aspiration to be a permanent member of
the Security Council – the global high-power table.
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: INDIAN

EXPERIENCES
Before examining the Indian ideas, aspirations and strategies, an

understanding of the very special nature of the UN Security Council
becomes necessary. The founders of the UN were clear about a “security
specialist” Council whose pre-eminent purpose was the maintenance of
international peace and security. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that in
pursuance of its security-specific mandate and promised efficiency, it
has an extremely rigid representation system matched with an
extraordinary decision-making power/procedures (Goodrich 1969).
The Council was created as a strictly limited membership body to
"ensure prompt and effective action". This membership, which is a
privilege and not a right, was structured in two categories of
membership, viz., permanent and non-permanent. Although Article 23
of the Charter names the five member states as permanent members of
the Council, the criteria for conferring this privileged permanent
membership remained conspicuous by its absence. Thus, a self-
conferred status formalised the formidable stature of some states that
were on the victorious side that “froze their superior status and built

near-insurmountable hurdles to any future alteration attempt.”

(Murthy 1995, p.18-20) Regarding the non-permanent members of the
Council (that increased from six to eleven in a 1963 Charter amendment
that became effective from 1 January 1966), it was seen by the UN’s
founding fathers as facilitating the legitimacy of the Security Council
decisions. Thus, an addition of non-permanent members was seen as
providing a much needed representational character to the Council and
making it a “microcosm of world opinion.” (Nicholas 1975) Although the
Charter has not put any criteria for permanent members, it has provided
for a two-part criteria for the election on non-permanent members: the
contribution to maintenance of international peace and security and
other purposes of the Organization, and equitable geographical
distribution. Further, to ensure restricted access to membership of the
Council, it was required to elect the non-permanent members with the
support of two-thirds of members voting in the General Assembly and it
would be only for a two-year term. Also, Article 23 explicitly disallowing
immediate re-election of a retiring member ensures that the non-
permanent members shall not be accorded “even a pretense of
permanence.” (Murthy 1995, p. 20) Most significantly, the permanent
members were provided with a veto power on substantive matters of
peace and security.
The Indian approach to the UN, in India’s first Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru’s words, is characterised by “whole-hearted
cooperation” through full participation “in its councils to which her
geographical position, and contribution towards peaceful progress
entitle her.” (Murthy 2010)
The UN Security Council, with its exceptional role in the UN in

preserving international peace and security, has always been of
significance for India right since its founding years. During the 1945 San
Francisco conference, India displayed a keen and active interest in the
Security Council’s composition, especially the basis of election of non-

permanent members. Here, India strongly advocated weightage for

factors such as population, industrial potential, willingness and ability
to contribute to international peace and security, and past performance,
and the need for representation for various regions for states to be
selected for the Security Council. Significantly, India did not have to
press for a vote on its amendment, as the Sponsoring Powers accepted
this suggestion and modified their original proposals. (Murthy 2011,
p.2)
India has been elected for seven terms for a two-year non-permanent
member seat, the last being 2011-12, only behind Japan, Brazil and
Argentina. Except for the first time, when India held the seat earmarked
for the Commonwealth group, it has held the seat on every other
occasion on behalf of the Asian group. India has been a member of the
Council during 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-
92, and lastly, 2011-12 which was seen as a “rehearsal for permanent
membership” (Srinivasan 2013) During the last term, India won the
non-permanent seat with the highest number of votes in the General
Assembly showing its impressive electoral popularity. It needs to be
recalled that in 1996, India had lost the elections to Japan by a wide
margin for a non-permanent seat.
The typical Indian preference in the UNSC has always been to be a

part of the democratic majority contributing to the adoption of broadly
acceptable resolutions and decisions. Analysing all terms of India in the
SC barring the last one, Murthy (2011, p.3) points out that India joined
59 percent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a
vote. With regard to aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent)
that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89
percent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India
stand aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted
against any resolution, and resorted to abstentions only to express its
reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it

always had the company of other Council members on many occasions.

The Indian behaviour herein clearly points to a systematic effort to
display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority
building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council.
INDIA’S SECURITY COUNCIL CALCULUS
The origins of the Indian interests in the Security Council can be traced
as back to the founding of the UN itself when Mahatma Gandhi felt that
India, then including Pakistan and Bangladesh, should become a veto-
wielding member of the Security Council. But the leadership precedence
for independence and managing the difficult, bloody partition followed
by the India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir moved their attention and
interests away from the possible opportunity of a seat. (Cohen 2001, p.
33)Later, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shied away from
the highly debatable offer to join the Security Council by both the
superpowers, the US and the then Soviet Union in 1950 and in 1955
respectively, keeping in mind the emerging Cold war calculus and
steadfastly refused to join at the expense of China (Harder 2015).
Specifically acknowledging India’s rightful claim to a permanent seat,
Nehru wrote:
It would do us little good and it would bring a great deal of

trouble in its train….India, because of many factors is certainly
entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are
not going in at the cost of China.
The Indian calculus on permanent membership of Security Council

flow broadly from a mix of, not necessarily hierarchical, three streams,
viz., India’s historic association with the UN system itself since its
independence, India’s intrinsic value and place in contemporary
international politics, and its ambitions as a traditional great power in
Asia and beyond.

a. India in the UN system
In pursuance of its claims to the Council seat, India points out its rich
history of consistent international, multilateral posture of cooperation
and fraternity, especially when it comes to the UN. The origins of Indian
multilateral engagement dates back to 28 June 1919 when India signed
the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War and created the
League of Nations, the precursor of the UN, wherein India, too, was a
member. India, also the original member of the UN that signed the
Declaration by the UN at Washington on 1 January 1942, participated
in the historic UN Conference of International Organization at San
Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. (Permanent Mission of India
to the UN, New York, no date given)
India, since its independence and even before that, has been an
active participant in all initiatives undertaken by the UN and the various
UN organs including the various discussions on the Agenda for Peace
and the Agenda for Development, the Millennium Development Goals,
and various UN summits, including most importantly, on climate
change. India also contributed by being instrumental in establishing the
G77 of developing states at the UN, other than supporting the
establishment of various bodies, such as the UNICEF on a permanent
basis, the UNDP, the UNEP, and the restructuring of the economic and
social fields of the UN and the UN Development Fund.
India also makes a strong case by highlighting its regular, significant

contributions to the UN. In the arena of peacekeeping, India has
remained the largest cumulative contributor of UN peacekeeping troops
with around 180,000 troops since the 1950s. Currently, around 7,700
Indian peacekeepers have been deployed in 13 missions (out of the total
of 16) in 11 countries. (Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York
2016)

Today, most significantly, India has almost twice the number of

peacekeepers deployed in the ground as do China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States combined – also known as the
P5, the five countries that wield veto power at the Council. In terms of
financial contributions to the UN, India with US$ 20.46 million ranks
23rd in the list of contributors. India had emphasised on this back in
1993: “…not just the financial contribution in absolute terms, but also
in relative terms. For a country with low per capita income, assessed
contribution as per the United Nations scale may entail proportionately
higher sacrifice. The record of timely payment also should be taken into
account.” Adding further, India asserted: “the financial contribution
does not remain static forever, and the crucial issue is the readiness to
fulfil the obligations and not the quantum of payment at a particular
point in time. The point is India could emerge before long, if its economy
performs well, as a sizeable contributor to UN budget.” (Menon 1995,
p.15)
Indian strategic interest in the Council seat has also been shaped by
its history of interacting with the Security Council. In the early years of
its independence during its armed conflict with Pakistan on Kashmir,
India paid the price for being “idealistic”. India took the Kashmir issue to
the UN, wherein it had to battle the hard realpolitik of the Cold War
years that led the UN interventions over the Kashmir dispute. To
prevent this negative outcome again, it is hoped that an Indian presence
at the Security Council will ensure the nation's interests are not
sacrificed at the altar of great power politics. Most importantly, it will
stall any possible intervention by China, a permanent member at the
behest of its ally Pakistan.
Indian interests in the Security Council also flow from the many
larger foreign policy debates in India on whether it will be a status quo
power that accepts liberal norms and positions itself as a “responsible
stakeholder’ in the international system or a revisionist power that

seeks to redefine the norms of international engagement. Many pundits

agree that India would be moderately revisionist, in that it will seek to
adjust international norms and frameworks that suits its global vision,
without seeking to overthrow the current international system.
In addition, India has always seen itself as a champion, a ‘moralistic

force’ of the so called Third World, the developing states. Former
Secretary General Kofi Annan has been quoted as saying that India has
been one of the most significant votaries of shaping the UN agenda on
behalf of the developing world. At his speech in New Delhi, Annan stated:
“Indians have better understood than many other peoples that the goals
of the ‘larger freedom’ that which include development, security and
human rights are not alternatives. They have been single-mindedly
pursuing larger freedom through pluralist democracy.” (Annan 2005)
b. India’s intrinsic value
India’s Ministry of External Affairs has clearly articulated India’s

“legitimate” candidature to be a permanent member of the UN Security
Council. It declares:
By any objective criteria, such as population, territorial size, GDP,

economic potential, civilizational legacy, cultural diversity, political
system and past and ongoing contributions to the activities of the UN —
especially to UN peacekeeping operations — India is eminently qualified
for permanent membership.” Going further, it says, most importantly,
“India has affirmed its willingness and capacity to shoulder the
responsibilities of permanent membership.
At the outset itself, demography remains the primary reason why

India should be in the Council. India, with its population at 1.25 billion
now, is the second most populous country in the world comprising
almost one-fifth of humanity. This basic fact itself warrants Indian

inclusion and representation in the Security Council. For India,

moreover “population represents both an expression of the principle of
democracy and an element of power. With increasing emphasis on the
principle of democracy at the national level, there is a need for extending
the principle to the international level also.” (GA/48/264, 20 July 1993,
p. 48)
India’s rising economic stature globally has added to Indian claims as

well. India is now the fastest-growing major economy in the world, and
Asia’s third largest. India’s real GDP growth, as its 2017 Economic
Survey predicts, will remain between 6.75 percent and 7.5 percent
despite international upheavals like growing oil prices, Brexit, growing
protectionism and trade-related tensions between major economies.
India’s leading position in software and its IT-enabled services making it
a global technology giant add to its increasing economic and trade
footprint across the world. India is now counted amongst the most
influential players in economic organisations like the WTO, BRICS and
the G20.
India’s newly acquired status as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) in

May 1998 also makes it a natural claimant as a permanent member
similar to the existing permanent members who are all NWS. Though
India has not been accorded a de jure recognition of this by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, India now stands recognised as
a de facto NWS due to the nuclear deal signed by India and the United
States in 2005 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver in 2008 to
nuclear transfers for India despite not being a NPT signatory. On the
negative side, it is argued by critics that India has still not signed the
NPT, had rejected the CTBT in 1996 and in fact, was the target of
unanimous Security Council Resolution 1172 after it conducted nuclear
tests in 1998. But India’s nuclear diplomacy after the May 1998 tests
successfully turned India from a pariah state to being increasingly a part
of the non-proliferation regime.

c. India’s great power ambitions
Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the

institutionalised big power status the permanent seat in the Security
Council would confer on India right away. Being a “pen holder” as the
permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly
assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making.
India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential,
which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on
the high table, at the UN’s premier, powerful body would provide it the
much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geo-
economic clout. It would serve as an equalizer to China, its rival and an
emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security
concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. India has always
seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China. India’s
millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of
the international hierarchy of states.
As India’s international profile and capabilities rise due to its ever

expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas such as,
politics, development, economics, and culture and science and
technology, India wishes to shift its international position from a rule
taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role). The
Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the
ongoing, high-pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that
India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower
of various international norms and rules, and now wants to shape and
align them to suit Indian ideas and interests.
In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest

on an acknowledgement by the UN itself of the need to expand the
UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or

risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council,

we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged
by some of the new emerging countries.”
INDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON COUNCIL REFORMS
The UN Security Council reforms became an international agenda with

the UN General Assembly adopting in 1992 the Resolution 47/62 titled,
“The Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council.” In 1993, the Assembly set up an
open ended Working Group that would facilitate a full and frank
exchange of views. In its report to the 1994 General Assembly, the
Group stated:
“…..the debate was substantive and constructive, clarifying the

positions of member states, (but) no conclusions were drawn.
While there was convergence of views that the membership of
the Security Council should be enlarged, there was also
agreement that the scope and nature of such enlargement
require further discussion.” (Murthy 1995, p. 22)
The arguments put forward by the Member States centered on four

aspects for making the Council more representative: the future size of
the Council, the categories of membership, the criteria of membership,
and the veto power. It needs to be recalled that the Security Council
reformed as back as 1965 when it increased its non-permanent
members from 11 to 15, and increased the necessary votes for the
adoption of resolutions from seven to nine.
Indian attempts at reforming the Council date as far back as 1979,

when India’s ambassador to the UN, Brajesh Mishra, along with other
NAM countries submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly
calling for an increase in the non-permanent membership from 10 to 14,

arguing an increase in the UN membership as the principal reason. The

1990s also saw India’s attempts at pressing for UN reforms. India joined
a number of countries in adopting General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/47/62, inscribing this item on our agenda for the first time in
September 1992.
Calling the 69th UN General Assembly decision of September 2014

“truly historic and path-breaking on several counts,” Asoke Mukerji,
India’s then Permanent Representative to the UN, clearly put forward
Indian thinking on the matter. Three issues were highlighted
specifically. First, the consensus decision was not a technical, but a
substantive decision, since it was now adopted through an official
formal L document of the UNGA, the A/69/L.92, and the first in the
history of the Inter-Governmental Negotiation process. This was “a
most positive and unique development” for India as these moved
beyond mere statements, compiled texts or summaries. Second, the UN
General Assembly decision has formally changed the IGN process to a
text-based negotiation. And last, quoting the UN General Assembly
President’s 31st July 2015 letter that reflected a true mandate, India
highlighted that the text attached to the letter “represents a sound basis
upon which Member States can engage in text-based negotiations
through the next phase of the IGN.” India had, in April 2013, called for a
conclusion of the IGN process on UNSC reforms by the 70th anniversary
of the UN. Hoping that the UN now moves purposefully to conclude the
negotiations during the 70th session, India reminded that the World
Summit of 2005 had given a unanimous mandate for “early reform” of
the Security Council to make it “more broadly representative, efficient
and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the
legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.”
In order to move the TBN process forward, India has frequently and
seriously articulated its positions on diverse aspects of the Security

Council reforms. Two organising principles stand out: first, purposeful,

result-oriented negotiations and second, parity for the unrepresented
and the under-represented.
Five sets of issues have been identified by the General Assembly

62/557 decision on “question of equitable representation on and
increase in the membership of the Security Council and related
matters”: categories of membership; question of veto; regional
representation; size of an enlarged council and working methods of the
Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General
Assembly.
a. Categories of membership
On the issue of categories of membership, India has argued that an

overwhelming majority of Member-States have already supported
expansion in both categories. Two largest groups, including Africa with
54 members and L-69 with 42 members and CARICOM, G4 and another
233-Member States including the two permanent members, France and
UK have supported expansion in both categories. India claims that
around 85 percent of total submissions that are part of the text and the
annex have supported expansion in both categories.
India supports increase in both permanent and non-permanent

membership of UN Security Council. Making a case that there is an
imbalance of influence between the permanent and non-permanent
members of the Council, India has called for a “balanced enlargement in
both categories.” Herein, India has highlighted the need of Africa to be
represented in both categories. This directly challenges the proposed “so
called” intermediate models wherein a longer term and immediate re-
election are seen as compensations for a permanent membership. India,
citing the deliberations held in 1945, pointed out that these models were
rejected by an overwhelming majority. India identified a number of

reasons for its opposition to an increase in non-permanent category

only. First, the issues raised by the current imbalance between
permanent and non-permanent members are not addressed due to lack
of checks or balances. Second, the African continent and other
developing countries would still not be represented fully in the Council.
Importantly, it would mean a new category of members and the addition
of new members that fails to make the Council more effective and
accountable. According to India, only the addition of elected, new
permanent members, which are subject to “stringent review” could
provide such an accountability. Siding with the small states, India
supported their contention that the chances of the small states to serve
at the Council would be reduced as the proposed intermediate models
surely enhanced the chances of more resourceful middle powers to
contest in both the traditional non-permanent category seat and the “so
called long-term seats.”
b. Question of veto
On the most important question of veto, India’s position is fully aligned

with the G4, L.69 and Africa who have called for the abolition of veto
and till it exists, it needs to be provided for all members of the
permanent category of the Security Council, which should have all
prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the
permanent category, including the right of veto. (March 2016) The
Indian position is not one of quantity, viz. extending it immediately to
new permanent members, but talks about quality, viz., of introducing
restrictions. India, showing a marked flexibility, has argued that it
supports new members with the same responsibilities and obligations
as current permanent members as a matter of principle. It is open to not
exercising the veto by new permanent members until a decision is taken
during a review process.

c. Regional representation
On the question of regional representation, India has forcefully argued

for an equitable geographical representation and the urgent need for
mitigating the non-representation and under-representation of some
regions in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories.
Making the case, India has pointed to the increase in the number of
states to the current 193 from 51 when the UN was founded, and the un-
tenability of whole continents not being represented at all in the
permanent category. The Council in its existence of 70 years also does
not represent the geo-political and economic realities. The Security
Council, for India, needs to reflect contemporary realities and provide
adequate representation to all regions of the world. India sees the
growing clamor for regional representation as “a cry of frustration and
dissatisfaction with the state of affairs.” The demand for regional
representation has been made on multiple grounds including historical
injustice, entire regions not equitably represented or even
unrepresented in a key category, and hope of moving beyond the nation
state as the primary actor on international affairs. In Indian eyes, it is an
“anachronistic” situation that the UN has three of the five permanent
members from one region alone while the regions of Africa, Latin
America, three-fourths of Asia including the Arab states, the entire
Central and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean states and the Small Island
developing states remain excluded from the functioning of the Security
Council. On the role of regional groupings in the selection of new
members, India favored the current practice, viz., each regional
grouping would endorse its candidate, to be followed by the need to
contest an election on the floor of the General Assembly for occupying a
seat at the Security Council.
Acknowledging the various existing perspectives on the issue of

regional representation that vary from one region to another, India has

welcomed the approach of regions like Africa that have asked as a

collective to be treated as a unique case. But these should be seen as
supplemental in nature and do not replace the Charter requirements of
all Member States voting to elect a permanent member for an equitable
regional representation. While India accepts the inter-linkage drawn by
the African states between the issue of categories and regional
representation, India opposes such linkages. (Joint G4 Statement by
Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, April 2017) Realising that such a
unanimity in the Asian region does not and will not come about, India
has stated that though it respects the unanimous desires of a region like
Africa, it cannot be replicated elsewhere where such desires do not exist.
d. Size of Council and its working methods
On the question of the size of an enlarged Council and its working

methods, India has stated that ‘we the peoples’ in whose name the
Charter was agreed to have more than trebled since 1945, from about
2.35 billion worldwide to more than 7.3 billion estimated today. Also, at
the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, the Security Council had 11
members, including five permanent members and six non-permanent
members and a total of 51 member states. Thus, there was one Council
member for every five Member-States and one permanent member for
every 10 of the General Assembly. The UN membership now has also
trebled. (Feb 2016) India, realising the need to be realistic, has not called
for a three-fold expansion in the membership of the Council.
e. Relationship between the Security Council and the General

Assembly
On the equally significant issue of the relationship between the Security

Council and the General Assembly, India opines that it should not be
competitive or adversarial, but “one of synergy and complementarity”

that benefits the UN objectives of the promotion of international peace

and security. A relationship with the General Assembly based on
transparency, mutual trust and frequent interaction with all Member
States will increase the credibility of the Council, which includes
increase in dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. India thus
has called for a greater transparency and consistency to improve the
relationship between the two. (G4 Joint Statement 2014)
Additionally, and crucially, as it assumes implications for Indian

success in getting the permanent seat in the Council, on the issue of
election process of new permanent members, India has argued for a
process of elections by a secret ballot, in consonance with the UN
Charter and General Assembly rules. Article 108 of the Charter
stipulates that the any amendment to the Charter could be done with a
vote of two-thirds of members of the General Assembly. On the other
hand, Rule 83 of the GA Rules of Procedure says that two-thirds of the
majority of the members present and voting can take decisions of the
General Assembly on important questions. Such decisions include
recommendations regarding maintenance of international peace and
security and the election of the non-permanent members of the Security
Council. India has also cited that the General Assembly’s Resolution
A/RES/53/30 of 23 November 1998, which was unanimously adopted,
decided on a 2/3rd majority of the membership, as the threshold for
arriving at substantive decisions on Security Council Reforms.
INDIAN STRATEGIES: DIPLOMACY IN ACTION
India has adopted a multi-layered strategy to assume the highly coveted

permanent seat in the Security Council. According to Stuenkel, the
Indian strategy of “revisionist integration” into the Security Council
consists of two components: Maximising support in the UN General
Assembly and Minimising resistance in the UN Security Council. India

hopes that its continued leadership of various Global South forums

such as G 77 and NAM would garner much needed numbers in the
UNGA. This is reflected in India’s strong defence of the principle of
sovereignty and the constant voluble criticism of the “Responsibility to
Protect.” On the other hand, India’s growing strategic partnerships with
the P5, including the historic nuclear deal with the US in 2005,
reiteration of historic ties with Russia, and most importantly, seeking a
rapprochement with China, in Indian eyes, paint a favorable picture for
Indian hopes in the Security Council by the existing permanent
members. (Stuenkel 2010, p. 59) Explicit public declarations supporting
India’s candidature as a permanent member in the Council are now also
embodied in bilateral Joint Statements/Declarations since last few
years by most of the P5, including China.
Parallel to courting big and small powers in a bilateral framework,

India has also formed the G4 comprising Brazil, Germany, Japan and
itself, its “coalition of the willing”, and a “collaborative strategy” to
negotiate reforms of the Council. After initial euphoria on its creation in
2004 when its first summit-level meeting was held, Indian interest
ebbed as its campaign to secure a seat did not fructify in 2004-05. After
2004, G4 has been revived by the current Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. PM Modi, speaking at the G4 Summit held in New York
in September 2015 clearly identified the rationale for coming together,
viz., “our shared commitment to global peace and prosperity, our faith in
multilateralism and our willingness to assume our global responsibilities
that the world expects from us.” (“Modi pitches for permanent seat”
2016). He further reiterated that the UNSC “must include the world’s
largest democracies, major locomotives of the global economy, and
voices from all major continents” to carry “greater credibility and
legitimacy.” Making a much stronger case for the G4 in its entirety, he
said that “more Member States have the capacity and willingness to take
on major responsibilities with regard to maintenance of international

peace and security.” In a move to garner substantive support, the G4

Joint Statement pledged to support “Africa’s representation in both the
permanent and non-permanent membership in the Security Council,”
and highlighted the significance of “adequate and continuing
representation of small and medium sized Member States, including the
Small Island Developing States, in an expanded and reformed Council.”
(Full Text of G4 Joint Statement 2016)
India has also joined the L-69, the 42-member grouping of

developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. India also, in
late 2016, joined as a member the newly founded group of Friends on
UN Security Council Reform, created to accelerate the negotiating
process of Council reforms. India had hoped that in next UN General
Assembly session, the 70th one, and entering the 10th IGN process and
25th year of the consideration of the issue of the reforming the Security
Council by the UN, the General Assembly would bring out the desired
outcomes expressed by a large majority of Member States, but it remains
unrealised.
However, Mukherjee and Malone (2013) highlight at least three

challenges to India’s aspirations at the UNSC: lack of enough Indian
government resources for multilateral diplomacy, insufficient
engagement with the normative aspects of many UN Security Council
issues, and an over-reliance on entitlement as the bedrock of India’s
claims to permanent membership, at the cost of more hard-nosed real
politik bargaining in the UN. Further, with India as part of G4, it seems
to have limited its options to negotiate a seat for itself as great power
and regional politics would circumscribe the G4 attempts to win
permanent seats for all as a group (Baru 2015).
More significantly, the status quo bias amongst the existing P5,
despite the General Assembly consensus, remains the overriding
obstacle to adding permanent seats. This has been amply demonstrated

by the lack of any progress since 2015 as the US, China and Russia have
not yet submitted their country positions for TBNs and no agreement at
all on the criteria for deciding permanent membership of the Council.
CONCLUSION
India has emerged as a foremost, singularly acknowledged rising power

seen by most states, great and small, as making a legitimate claim to a
place in the changing architecture of global governance, including the
UN Security Council.
The Indian interests in joining the reformed UN Security Council

stem from its long, civilisational history, an exceptional, globally
impacting geography and demography, its rapidly increasing traditional
great power ambitions, and assuming its rightful place in the comity of
nations in addition to its truly rich, varied and significant historic
contributions to the UN system. Successive Indian leaderships have
therefore, emphasised time and again, the pressing need to democratise
the international relations embodied in the UN and its all-powerful
Security Council. Reiterating this, the Indian PM Modi said in
September 2014:
We must reform the United Nations, including the Security Council,

and make it more democratic and participative. Institutions that reflect
the imperatives of 20th century won’t be effective in the 21st. It would
face the risk of irrelevance; and we will face the risk of continuing
turbulence with no one capable of addressing it… Let us fulfill our
promise to reform the United Nations Security Council by 2015.
Though these Indian desires repeatedly articulated at the highest

levels of government remain unfulfilled and seemingly intractable, its
ideas and diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral, over the last few decades
on the UN Security Council and its reforms including its quest for a

permanent seat, highlight a growing, powerful consciousness in India.

The Indian decision makers realise that it is now historically placed to
become an international rule maker and shaper, as opposed to a meek
rule follower in the policy relevant future. It truly marks a rising India’s
dramatic desire to move to the centre from the periphery of global
politics.
(A version of this paper was published in the Rising Powers Quarterly, Vol. 2,
Issue 3, 2017.)

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DECEMBER 2017

India and Global Governance

India’s Pursuit of United Nations

India’s Pursuit of United Nations

In a truly “historic” move to reforming global governance in the arena of

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 1

(IGN) to Text-Based Negotiations (TBN) process for reforming the

“We look forward to early commencement of text-based

In the Indian eyes, “no reform of the United Nations (UN) is

2 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017

UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: INDIAN

Before examining the Indian ideas, aspirations and strategies, an

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 3

near-insurmountable hurdles to any future alteration attempt.”

The Indian approach to the UN, in India’s first Prime Minister

The UN Security Council, with its exceptional role in the UN in

4 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017

permanent members. Here, India strongly advocated weightage for

The typical Indian preference in the UNSC has always been to be a

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 5

always had the company of other Council members on many occasions.

INDIA’S SECURITY COUNCIL CALCULUS

It would do us little good and it would bring a great deal of

The Indian calculus on permanent membership of Security Council

6 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017

a. India in the UN system

India also makes a strong case by highlighting its regular, significant

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 7

Today, most significantly, India has almost twice the number of

8 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017

seeks to redefine the norms of international engagement. Many pundits

In addition, India has always seen itself as a champion, a ‘moralistic

b. India’s intrinsic value

India’s Ministry of External Affairs has clearly articulated India’s

By any objective criteria, such as population, territorial size, GDP,

At the outset itself, demography remains the primary reason why

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 9

inclusion and representation in the Security Council. For India,

India’s rising economic stature globally has added to Indian claims as

India’s newly acquired status as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) in

10 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017

c. India’s great power ambitions

Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the

As India’s international profile and capabilities rise due to its ever

In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 11

risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council,

INDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON COUNCIL REFORMS

The UN Security Council reforms became an international agenda with

“…..the debate was substantive and constructive, clarifying the

The arguments put forward by the Member States centered on four

Indian attempts at reforming the Council date as far back as 1979,

12 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017

arguing an increase in the UN membership as the principal reason. The

Calling the 69th UN General Assembly decision of September 2014

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 13

Council reforms. Two organising principles stand out: first, purposeful,