Asian Financial Crisis
Asian Financial Crisis
Asian Financial Crisis
Financial
Crisis:
1997
First, the board macroeconomic framework. The program was designed to avoid a decline in
output, while containing inflation to 20% that year, with the aim of bringing it back to single-
digit level next year, despite the sharp depreciation of the rupiah. At the same time, the external
current account balance was expected to move from a deficit into a sizeable surplus, thereby
generating additional foreign exchange to help the country to repay its external debt.
Second, the budget. The 1998-99 budgets would be revised, to accord with the newly agreed
macroeconomic framework, while still adhering to Indonesia's long-standing balanced-budget
principle. To achieve the objective, serious measures would be required. In particular, action
would need to be taken to curb energy subsidies, which have grown to unsustainable proportions
as the rupiah's depreciation has pushed domestic prices far below world levels. Accordingly, the
government would phase out subsidies gradually by raising both fuel and electricity prices in
steps,
Third, fiscal transparency. In order to ensure that the public is kept fully informed of all
government activities, the accounts of the reforestation and investment funds would be brought
onto the budget in 1998-99.
Public spending must be limited only to those items that are of vital importance to the country.
For this reason, the program envisages that development spending would be curtailed, including
by cancelling immediately the 12 infrastructure projects that were recently postponed or paced
under review.
Monetary policy will need to be kept firm for a sustained period, until confidence in the currency
is restored. As the program measures take hold and confidence returns, market interest rates
should gradually begin to fall, while capital that has moved overseas should return to the
country, providing the banks with sufficient liquidity to resume their lending activity.
Structural reforms. The program envisages that virtually all of the restrictions that have been put
in place will soon be swept away.
Actually, such big help from the IMF did work. For example, in Thailand and Korea, after
implementing the IMF-supported program, the market confidence in both economies returned
after January 1998. The currency had strengthened and the stock markets had been up, new
foreign investment and portfolio investment flowed back. Furthermore, market participants
began to differentiate among countries---and cautiously return to the countries where economic
problems had been forcefully addressed.
The recovery from the crisis was prenominal in case of Malaysia among all the Asian countries
there were certain reasons behind it. First of all instead of instantly going towards aid from IMF
Malaysian government use their own policies to recover from the crisis rather than panicking and
instantly using the funds from foreign to maintain their liquidity. Secondly their delayed
response to crisis was also an efficient measure. at that time when Western countries are using all
types of measures such as QE, LTROs, TARP, Target2 and etc. to inject funds into their
economies in an attempt to reflate their economies. By the time when Malaysia imposed the
capital control (1st September 1998), the crisis had already devastated other countries by more
than a year. Much of the foreign capital that had already left is coming back to ‘bottom fish’ so
as to say, since much of the equities and asset prices are offering at rock bottom prices. Further
to that those IMF-3 economies that embrace IMF aid are on their way to recovery.
Another main reason for the delayed response is the internal bickering between Mahathir and his
deputy (Anwar Ibrahim – Finance Minister then). The imposition of the capital control is
‘purposely timed on 1st September 1998’ because they know that Anwar is going to be sacked
the next day.
The measure that Malaysia took mainly includes the movement of the ringgit from a free float
to a fixed exchange rate regime. Bank Negara fixed the ringgit at 3.8 to the dollar. Capital
controls were imposed while aid offered from the IMF was refused. Various task force agencies
were formed. The Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee dealt with corporate loans.
Danaharta discounted and bought bad loans from banks to facilitate orderly asset
realization. Dana modal recapitalized banks.