TOMASA VDA.

DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased

Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
"Balalong," respondents.

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant (Petitioner) claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob
and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.

Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of
his claim, he presented an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur,
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
1âw phi 1.nêt

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo defendant-appellee
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted
son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant
Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfred on the ground of there was neither a marriage license nor a
marriage ceremony.

Petitioner Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with
damages questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.

Petitioner claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio
C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original
copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as
secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.

During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of the
reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:

1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the marriage
contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;

2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his
"thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and
Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting
that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo
[af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the "thumbmark"
was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;

3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss
of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly
"gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration".
And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as
padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he was then in Australia.
In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin
Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera. This belies
 the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr.
Jose Centenera;

4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in
the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order in issued by then Presiding Judge
Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein
Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the
Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
residence on 01 October 1990.

In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial
proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since
he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented
the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief
Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner
Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of
unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between the
standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya
appearing in the Order granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.

Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui
declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his
claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of
the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each
other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well
as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
 And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be

established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction
be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that
would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove
the contents of such document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the
marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the
circumstances of the loss of the original document.

With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine,
suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the
presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties.

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court.
Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court
below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons
that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted
testimony and documentary evidence.

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.

Issues:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
 b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.7

Held:

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not been
sufficiently established.

First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may
be assailed only in a direct proceeding. Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil
contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. This argument is misplaced,
because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then,
the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the
assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?

"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses."13 Upon
a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the
part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the
testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following:
(a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner,
informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages,
and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization
issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino —
ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry
in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the
loss of the marriage certificate.

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence they have disregarded.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself,
provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction.
Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage
contract.

Proof of Marriage

As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage,
has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at
the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)

In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to

present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)

Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the
Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics
Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering
their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place,
failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the
marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.

Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate
courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale
signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the
present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the
testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an exception to the
general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its context.
Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity.

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly,
when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without
any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert
witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44

In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child.
Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the
alleged adoption of respondent.

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.50 This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of
Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT.