De Guzman v.

Court of Appeals general community or population, and one who offers

services or solicits business only from a narrow
Respondent Ernesto Cendaña, a junk dealer, was segment of the general population. We think that
engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal. n. Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such
Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap distinctions
material, respondent would bring such material to
Manila for resale. e. He utilized two (2) sixwheeler So understood, the concept of "common carrier"
trucks which he owned for hauling the material to under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly
Manila. n. For that service, respondent charged with the notion of "public service" under the Public
freight rates which were commonly lower than Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as
regular commercial rates. amended) which at least partially supplements the
law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service
authorized dealer of General Milk Company Act, "public service" includes: "x x x every person
(Philippines), , contracted with respondent for the that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or
hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation,
warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,
petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 occasional or accidental, and done for general
December 1970. Accordingly, on 1 December 1970, business purposes, any common carrier, railroad,
respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to street railway, traction railway, subway motor
his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with
by respondent himself; while 600 cartons were placed or without fixed route and whatever may be its
on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel classification, freight or carrier service of any class,
Estrada, respondent's driver and employee. Only 150 express service, steamboat, or steamship line,
boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the
petitioner while the 600 ever reach the petiotner due transportation of passengers or freight or both,
to it was hijacked. So the petitioner filed an action shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice
against the petioner. plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system,
gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and
Issue : Whether or not cendana is a common carrier
power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless
HELD communications systems, wire or wireless
broadcasting stations and other similar public
The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the services.
following terms: "Article 1732. Common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or
or goods or both, by land, water, or air for deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless
compensation, offering their services to the public." the same is due to any of the following causes only;
The above article makes no distinction between one (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
whose principalbusiness activity is the carrying of natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public
persons or goods or both, and one who does such enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act
carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4)
as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids The character of the goods or defects in the packing
making any distinction between a person or or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular public authority."
or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither
for reasons of public policy,"[2] are held to a very
does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
high degree of care and diligence ("extraordinary
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the
diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of 2. He must undertake to carry goods of the
passengers. The specific import of extraordinary kind to which his business is confined;
diligence in the care of goods transported by a 3. He must undertake to carry by the method
common carrier is, according to Article 1733, by which his business is conducted and over
"further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, his established roads; and
numbers 5, 6 and 7" of the Civil Code.
4. The transportation must be for hire.
there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier.
It is engaged in the business of transporting or
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a
CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 125948, 1998-12- public employment. It undertakes to carry for all
29 persons... indifferently, that is, to all persons who
Facts: choose to employ its services, and transports the
goods by land and for compensation. The fact that
Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it
Republic Act No. 387, as amended, to contract, from the definition of a common carrier.
install and operate oil pipelines. The original pipeline
concession was granted in 1967[1] and renewed by SPOUSES TEODORO and NANETTE PERENA,
the Energy Regulatory Board in 1992. Petitioners, v. SPOUSES NICOLAS and
TERESITA L. ZARATE, PHILIPPINE
petitioner applied for a mayor's permit with the NATIONAL RAILWAYS, and the COURT OF
Office of the Mayor of Batangas City. APPEALS, Respondents.

However, before the mayor's permit could be issued, BERSAMIN, J.:

the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to
pay a local tax... pursuant to the Local Government FACTS:
Code.
Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Peres (Peres) were
The respondent City Treasurer assessed a business
engaged in the business of transporting students from
tax on the petitioner... based on the gross receipts for
their respective residences in Paraque City to Don
products pumped... petitioner paid the tax under
Bosco in Pasong Tamo, Makati City, and back. They
protest... respondent City Treasurer denied the protest
employed Clemente Alfaro (Alfaro) as driver of the
contending that petitioner cannot be considered
van. Spouses Nicolas and Teresita Zarate (Zarates)
engaged in transportation business, thus it cannot
contracted the Peres to transport their son Aaron to
claim exemption
and from Don Bosco.
Issues:
Considering that the students were due at Don Bosco
Court of Appeals erred in holding that (1) the by 7:15 a.m., and that they were already running late
petitioner is not a common carrier or a transportation because of the heavy vehicular traffic on the South
contractor, and (2) the exemption sought for by Superhighway, Alfaro took the van to an alternate
petitioner is not clear under the law. route at about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the narrow path
underneath the Magallanes Interchange. The railroad
Ruling:
crossing in the narrow path had no railroad warning
There is merit in the petition. signs, or watchmen, or other responsible persons
manning the crossing. In fact, the bamboo barandilla
The test for determining whether a party is a common was up, leaving the railroad crossing open to
carrier of goods is: traversing motorists.
1. He must be engaged in the business of At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad
carrying goods for others as a public crossing, PNR Commuter No. 302 (train), was in the
employment, and must hold himself out as vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange travelling
ready to engage in the transportation of northbound. As the train neared the railroad crossing,
goods for person generally as a business and Alfaro drove the van eastward across the railroad
not as a casual occupation; tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus. His view
of the oncoming train was blocked because he
overtook the passenger bus on its left side. The train common carrier should "carry the passengers safely
blew its horn to warn motorists of its approach. The as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
passenger bus successfully crossed the railroad the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
tracks, but the van driven by Alfaro did not. The due regard for all the circumstances." To successfully
impact threw nine of the 12 students in the rear, fend off liability in an action upon the death or injury
including Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the to a passenger, the common carrier must prove his or
path of the train, which dragged his body and severed its observance of that extraordinary diligence;
his head, instantaneously killing him. otherwise, the legal presumption that he or it was at
fault or acted negligently would stand.
Thus, the Zarates sued the Peres for breach of
contract of carriage and the PNR for quasi-delict. The According to Article 1759 of the Civil Code, their
RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates. On appeal, the CA liability as a common carrier did not cease upon
affirmed the findings of the RTC. proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of
ISSUE: Whether or not the Peres are liable for breach their employee. The Peres were liable for the death of
of contract of carriage? Aaron despite the fact that their driver might have
acted beyond the scope of his authority or even in
HELD: The petition has no merit. violation of the orders of the common
carrier. DENIED.
CIVIL LAW: common carrier; extraordinary
diligence

A common carrier is a person, corporation, firm or

association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering such services
to the public. Contracts of common carriage are
governed by the provisions on common carriers of
the Civil Code, the Public Service Act, and other
special laws relating to transportation. A common
carrier is required to observe extraordinary diligence,
and is presumed to be at fault or to have acted
negligently in case of the loss of the effects of
passengers, or the death or injuries to passengers. The
true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or
extent of the business actually transacted, or the
number and character of the conveyances used in the
activity, but whether the undertaking is a part of the
activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out
to the general public as his business or occupation.

Applying these considerations to the case before us,

there is no question that the Peres as the operators of
a school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting
passengers generally as a business, not just as a
casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry
passengers over established roads by the method by
which the business was conducted; and (c)
transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a
limited clientele, the Peres operated as a common
carrier because they held themselves out as a ready
transportation indiscriminately to the students of a
particular school living within or near where they
operated the service and for a fee.

Article 1755 of the Civil Code specifies that the