FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137621. February 6, 2002.]

HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION , petitioner, vs .

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN , respondent.

Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.

Joselito H.J. Reyes for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan enacted Ordinance

No. 28 increasing the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Members of
petitioner association participated in several public hearings conducted by the Sanggunian
Bayan. The ordinance was approved by the Acting Mayor on October 7, 1996. Copies of
the ordinance were given to the Municipal Treasurer and posted in three public places in
lieu of publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality. On
December 8, 1997, petitioner's president appealed to the Secretary of Justice. The appeal
was dismissed for being led out of time. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appeal was dismissed for failure to attach certi ed true copies of the assailed resolutions
of the Secretary of Justice. On motion for reconsideration, petitioner explained that it
exerted due diligence to get copies of the resolutions but failed to do so on account of
typhoon "Loleng." The motion was denied. Hence, the present recourse.
The appellate court should have tempered its strict application of procedural rules
in view of the fortuitous event and considering that litigation is not a game of
technicalities.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code, an
appeal questioning the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance must be led within
thirty (30) days from its effectivity to the Secretary of Justice. In the case at bar, the ling
of the appeal more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance is barred for being led
late and was rightly dismissed by the Justice Secretary. Petition dismissed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; CERTIFIED COPIES OF ASSAILED RESOLUTION

MUST BE ATTACHED TO PETITION; FAILURE TO ATTACH RESOLUTION ON GROUND OF
FORTUITOUS EVENT IN CASE AT BAR. — We nd that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing petitioner's appeal on the ground that it was formally de cient. It is clear from
the records that the petitioner exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed
Resolutions certi ed by the Department of Justice, but failed to do so on account of
typhoon "Loleng." Under the circumstances, respondent appellate court should have
tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event
considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; TAX ORDINANCE; 30-
DAY PERIOD OF APPEAL TIME-BARRED IN CASE AT BAR. — We hold that the petition
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 should be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already
time-barred. The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. The
aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be
made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance
and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be
suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October 1996.
Petitioner led its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of
the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being
time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to state that the time frame xed by law for parties
to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a "mere technicality" that
can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government
Code are mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality
of Hagonoy to x and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of
revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of
its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its
revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not
left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an
aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances. cCHITA

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC HEARING PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner's bold
assertion that there was no public hearing conducted prior to the passage of Kautusan
Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. In petitioner's two (2) communications with the
Secretary of Justice, it enumerated the various objections raised by its members before
the passage of the ordinance in several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the
purpose. These show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the proposed increase
and in fact participated in the public hearings therefor. The respondent municipality
likewise submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings conducted by the
Sangguniang Bayan's Committee on Appropriations and Market on February 6, July 15 and
August 19, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall rentals. Petitioner cannot gripe
that there was practically no public hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed
measure were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. To be sure, public hearings are
conducted by legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a
proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on the legislative body
and it is not compelled by law to adopt the same. Sanggunian members are elected by the
people to make laws that will promote the general interest of their constituents. They are
mandated to use their discretion and best judgment in serving the people. Parties who
participate in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not
expect that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
4. ID.; ID:, ID.; PUBLICATION OR POSTING; COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. —
On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the Local Government Code
provides that . . . municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the
same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places." The
records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner's negative allegation that the subject
ordinance was not posted as required by law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows
that the procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with.
Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was enacted by the Sanggunian Bayan of Hagonoy on October
1, 1996. Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on
October 7, 1996. After its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given to the Municipal
Treasurer on the same day. On November 9, 1996, the Ordinance was approved by the
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 Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the period from November
4-25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz: in front of the municipal building, at the bulletin
board of the Sta. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of the O ce of the Market
Master in the public market. Posting was validly made in lieu of publication as there was
no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy. This fact was known to
and admitted by petitioner. Thus, petitioner's ambiguous and unsupported claim that it
was only "sometime in November 1997" that the Provincial Board approved Municipal
Ordinance No. 28 and so the posting could not have been made in November 1996 was
su ciently disproved by the positive evidence of respondent municipality. Given the
foregoing circumstances, petitioner cannot validly claim lack of knowledge of the
approved ordinance. The ling of its appeal a year after the effectivity of the subject
ordinance is fatal to its cause.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO LIMIT OF PERCENTAGE INCREASE TO TAX RATES. — Finally,
even on the substantive points raised, the petition must fail. Section 6 c.04 of the 1993
Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limiting the
percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it
be said that the rates were not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in
the Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classi ed. To be sure, the Ordinance
covered the three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke, the burnt
but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke with wet
market. However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was excluded from the
increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift, dilapidated place, with no doors or protection
for security, intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their goods along the
sidewalk.

DECISION

PUNO , J : p

Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural. Substantive laws, insofar as
their provisions are unambiguous, are rigorously applied to resolve legal issues on the
merits. In contrast, courts generally frown upon an uncompromising application of
procedural laws so as not to subvert substantial justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally
uncommon for courts to decide cases based on a rigid application of the so-called
technical rules of procedure as these rules exist for the orderly administration of justice.
Interestingly, the case at bar singularly illustrates both instances, i.e., when procedural
rules are unbendingly applied and when their rigid application may be relaxed.
This is a petition for review of the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 15, 1999, dismissing the appeal of petitioner Hagonoy Market Vendor
Association from the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice for being formally deficient.
The facts: On October 1 , 1996 , the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, 2 which increased the stall rentals of the market
vendors in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject
ordinance was posted from November 4-25, 1996. 3
In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioner's members were personally given
copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January,
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 1998. On December 8 , 1997 , the petitioner's President led an appeal with the Secretary of
Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was
unaware of the posting of the ordinance.
Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the ordinance took effect on
October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law.
Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner's appeal, made over a year later, was already time-
barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was led out of
time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996,
as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. Citing the case of
Tañada vs. Tuvera, 4 the Secretary of Justice held that the date of effectivity of the subject
ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in October 1996, after the required
publication or posting has been complied with, pursuant to Section 3 of said ordinance. 5
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner did not assail the nding of the Secretary of Justice that their appeal
was led beyond the reglementary period . Instead, it urged that the Secretary of Justice
should have overlooked this "mere technicality" and ruled on its petition on the merits.
Unfortunately, its petition for review was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for being
formally de cient as it was not accompanied by certi ed true copies of the assailed
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. 6
Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 7
Hence, this appeal, where petitioner contends that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN ITS
STRICT, RIGID AND TECHNICAL ADHERENCE TO SECTION 6, RULE 43 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF COURT AND THIS, IN EFFECT, FRUSTRATED THE VALID
LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER THAT ORDINANCE
(KAUTUSAN) NO. 28 WAS NOT VALIDLY ENACTED, IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, TANTAMOUNT TO AN ILLEGAL EXACTION IF
ENFORCED RETROACTIVELY FROM THE DATE OF ITS APPROVAL ON
OCTOBER 1, 1996.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION NOTWITHSTANDING
PETITIONER'S EXPLANATION THAT ITS FAILURE TO SECURE THE
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE WAS DUE TO THE INTERVENTION OF AN ACT OF GOD —
TYPHOON "LOLENG," AND THAT THE ACTUAL COPIES RECEIVED BY THE
PETITIONER MAY BE CONSIDERED AS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
THE RULES.
III
PETITIONER WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IF
ORDINANCE/KAUTUSAN NO. 28 BE NOT DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND
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 IS ALLOWED TO BE ENFORCED RETROACTIVELY FROM OCTOBER 1, 1996,
CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL RULE, ARTICLE 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THAT
NO LAW SHALL HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
The rst and second assigned errors impugn the dismissal by the Court of Appeals
of its petition for review for petitioner's failure to attach certi ed true copies of the
assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner insists that it had good
reasons for its failure to comply with the rule and the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to
accept its explanation.
We agree.
In its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, 8 the petitioner
satisfactorily explained the circumstances relative to its failure to attach to its appeal
certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, thus:
". . . (D)uring the preparation of the petition on October 21, 1998, it was
raining very hard due to (t)yphoon "Loleng." When the petition was completed,
copy was served on the Department of Justice at about (sic) past 4:00 p.m. of
October 21, 1998, with (the) instruction to have the Resolutions of the Department
of Justice be stamped as "certi ed true copies. However, due to bad weather, the
person in charge (at the Department of Justice) was no longer available to certify
to (sic) the Resolutions.
"The following day, October 22, 1998, was declared a non-working holiday
because of (t)yphoon "Loleng." Thus, petitioner was again unable to have the
Resolutions of the Department of Justice stamped "certi ed true copies." In the
morning of October 23, 1998, due to time constraint(s), herein counsel served a
copy by personal service on (r)espondent's lawyer at ( sic) Malolos, Bulacan,
despite the ooded roads and heavy rains. However, as the herein counsel went
back to Manila, (o cial business in) government o ces were suspended in the
afternoon and the personnel of the Department of Justice tasked with issuing or
stamping, "certified true copies" of their Resolutions were no longer available.

"To avoid being time-barred in the ling of the (p)etition, the same was
filed with the Court of Appeals "as is."

We nd that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal on the

ground that it was formally deficient. It is clear from the records that the petitioner exerted
due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolutions certi ed by the Department of
Justice, but failed to do so on account of typhoon "Loleng." Under the circumstances,
respondent appellate court should have tempered its strict application of procedural rules
in view of the fortuitous event considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities. 9
Nonetheless, we hold that the petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the
petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is
Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which provides:
"SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances
and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for the
approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance
with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof. Provided, further, That
any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
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 thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall
not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and
payment of the tax, fee or charge levied therein: Provided, nally , That within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period
without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may
file appropriate proceedings.
The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure
should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the
ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not
be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October 1996.
Petitioner led its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of
the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being
time barred. At this point, it is apropos to state that the timeframe xed by law for parties
to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a "mere technicality" that
can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government
Code are mandatory. 1 0 Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the
municipality of Hagonoy to x and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood,
collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the
operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely
derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue
measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. 1 1 Hence, the law provided
a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax
ordinances.
In a last ditch effort to justify its failure to le a timely appeal with the Secretary of
Justice, the petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be counted not from the
time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its members were personally
given copies of the approved ordinance in November 1997. It insists that it was unaware
of the approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first,
no public hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the
approved ordinance was not posted.
We do not agree.
Petitioner's bold assertion that there was no public hearing conducted prior to the
passage of Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. In petitioner's two (2)
communications with the Secretary of Justice, 1 2 it enumerated the various objections
raised by its members before the passage of the ordinance in several meetings called by
the Sanggunian for the purpose. These show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of
the proposed increase and in fact participated in the public hearings therefor. The
respondent municipality likewise submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings
conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan's Committee on Appropriations and Market on
February 6, July 15 and August 19, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall rentals.
13

Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing conducted as its
objections to the proposed measure were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. To
be sure, public hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow interested parties to
ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding
on the legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the same. Sanggunian
members are elected by the people to make laws that will promote the general interest of
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 their constituents. They are mandated to use their discretion and best judgment in serving
the people. Parties who participate in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed
ordinance should not expect that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
On the issue of publication or posting , Section 188 of the Local Government Code
provides:
"Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures . —
Within ten (10) days after their approval, certi ed true copies of all provincial, city,
and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for
three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however,
That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of
local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and
publicly accessible places." (italics supplied)
The records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner's negative allegation that
the subject ordinance was not posted as required by law. In contrast, the respondent
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which
clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was
complied with. Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Hagonoy on October 1, 1996. Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved
the Ordinance on October 7, 1996. After its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given
to the Municipal Treasurer on the same day. On November 9, 1996, the Ordinance was
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the period
from November 4-25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz: in front of the municipal building,
at the bulletin board of the Sta. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of the Office of the
Market Master in the public market. 1 4 Posting was validly made in lieu of publication as
there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy. This fact was
known to and admitted by petitioner. Thus, petitioner's ambiguous and unsupported claim
that it was only "sometime in November 1997 " that the Provincial Board approved
Municipal Ordinance No. 28 and so the posting could not have been made in November
1996 1 5 was su ciently disproved by the positive evidence of respondent municipality.
Given the foregoing circumstances, petitioner cannot validly claim lack of knowledge of
the approved ordinance. The ling of its appeal a year after the effectivity of the subject
ordinance is fatal to its cause.
Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the petition must fail. Section 6c.04 of
the 1993 Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limiting
the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can
it be said that the rates were not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in
the Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classi ed. To be sure, the Ordinance
covered the three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke, the burnt
but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke with wet
market. However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was excluded from the
increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift, dilapidated place, with no doors or protection
for security, intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their goods along the
sidewalk. 1 6
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs. AaEcDS

SO ORDERED.

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 Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Per Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
Teodoro P. Regino; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

2. Annex "E," Petition; Rollo, pp. 35-36; The ordinance was signed by Councilor Felix V. Ople,
Tagapangulo ng Sanggunian and Dr. Maria Garcia Santos as Pangulo Punong Bayan.
3. Per Certification of Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos; Rollo, at p. 49.
4. 146 SCRA 448, 452-454 (1986).
5. Resolution, dated February 25, 1998; Rollo, pp. 27-29.
6. Resolution, dated December 17, 1998; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
7. Resolution, dated February 15, 1999; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

8. Rollo, pp. 11-12.

9. Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187(1997).
10. Reyes, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 320 SCRA 486 (1999), citing Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1995 edition, p. 266.
11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1998).
12. Pagtutol sa Kautusan Blg. 28, C.A. Rollo, p. 18; Paghahabol, CA Rollo, pp. 29-30.
13. Rollo, pp. 82-95.
14. Certification of Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos; Rollo, p. 49; Affidavits of
municipal employee Ruperto dela Cruz and Municipal Councilor Cruz; Rollo, pp. 99-100.

15. See Reply; Rollo, at p. 54.

16. As shown in pictures attached to respondent's Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 117-118.

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