FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN G.R. No.

158407 January 17, 2005 (CASE DIGEST)

Petitioner FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC alleging
that the respondent by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a
portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon depriving the petitioner of a 68-square meter portion of her
property along the boundary line.

The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country.
The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno (respondent's brother), who received the same.

The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of
execution was issued.

The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC for the annulment of the decision of the MTC
on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway,
the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Respondent claimed she was a resident of Oslo, Norway and although
she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo
Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in
her behalf.

In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and
complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent was proper since her
brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint
and summons for and in her behalf.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The trial court declared that there was no
valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent considering that she left the Philippines for Oslo, Norway,
and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that
the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant
therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial
service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court.
Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was
followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the
respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the respondent. Whether or not the action of
the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in rem.

RULING:

The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against the respondent is an action
quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam because the
plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the
latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages
by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in
personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam
is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of
this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on
him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from
a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are
concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights
and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons
to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal
with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as
between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and complaint by the Sheriff:

In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served
with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he
is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth
in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court;
or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.

In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987,
remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway,
having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly
served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :

… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or
Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and
hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was
made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service
ineffective.

In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of
service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the
case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the
summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house
of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
process as of jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s
residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the
residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo
Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a
person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he
has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and OrlandoMacasalda cannot prevail over the
Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and
occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that
Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house.

In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999,
by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision
of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

Javier vs Veridiano
FACTS:

Petitioner bought a land on a subdivision by filing a Miscellaneous Sales Application. Pending the
approval of the sale, Ben Babol entered a portion adjacent to the land being bought by Petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the occupied land by Babol is part of his land so he filed a forcible entry case.
However, the trial court found Petitioner wrong and so sustained the possession of Babol. Later on,
Babol would sell this portion to private Respondent. In the meantime, the application was approved
and a TCT was delivered to Petitioner. This motivated the Petitioner to demand the land again, this
time from Respondent, and this time on the basis of ownership. He filed a complaint for quieting of
title and recovery of possession. Respondent countered that the first case on forcible entry
constituted res judicata against the second complaint.
ISSUE:

W/N the first case on forcible entry was res judicata against the second case on quieting of title

RULING:

No! Once again, for res judicata to arise, four requisites must concur: Final judgment, Court with
competent jurisdiction, judgment based on merits, identity of parties and cause of action.
The Court said that in the two cases, there were identity of parties because Respondent, having
acquired the contested land by sale and tradition, is a successor in interest.

However, there was no identity of the causes of action. In forcible entry, the only issue is prior
possession and not ownership. In accion reivindicatoria, the issue is the ownership. The Court held
that the second case was actually an accion reivindicatoria as Petitioner set up title for herself, prayed
that Respondent to be ejected and that she be declared the owner. Thus a final judgment on forcible
entry or detainer is NOT a bar against to an action for determination of ownership.

HEIRS OF SORIANO V. CA and SPOUSES ABALOS

A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in this case. Said land was
originally owned by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a period of 15 years to the
Spouses David and Consuelo with RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting
as caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration of the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot
he owned was divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots inherited was sold to the
Spouses ABALOS, here. The other lot was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not
completely (only ¾ of the lot). The lots in question were subsequently registered in the name of the
Spouses Abalos. The courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners thereof. Soriano
questions their ownership of the land and so filed cases against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still
in possession of the land claiming rights of “Security of Tenure” as a tenant of the land.

ISSUE:

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof?
RULING/RATIO:

No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary
incident. Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically include
possession. This is especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is occupying the land
allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. The court says “allegedly” due to the fact that there
is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board) on the
issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest by final judgment; however the
right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy Act, which protects the rights of agricultural
tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of ownership
yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since the rights of Soriano to possess the
land are still pending litigation in the DARAB he is protected from dispossession of the land until final
judgment of said court unless Soriano’s occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.