1st 3 Cases For Legal Research

G.R. No. 171535. June 5, 2009.
*
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES EDITO and
MERIAN TIROL and SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MIRANDA NGO, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Sales; Double Sales; Requisites that must Concur for Article 1544 to Apply.—
Reliance on Article 1544 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. In Cheng v. Genato, et al., 300 SCRA 722
(1998) we enumerated the requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply, viz.: (a) The two (or more)
sales transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over
the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 1544 has no application in cases where the sales involved were
initiated not by just one vendor but by several successive vendors.—Article 1544 of the New Civil Code
has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated not by just one vendor but by several
successive vendors. In the instant case, respondents and petitioner had acquired the subject property
from different transferors.
Land Titles; Land Registration; Registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to
effect and bind the land; If a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered
under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not considered registered and
the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.—Well-settled is
the rule that registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to effect and bind the
land. Prior to the Property Registration Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land Registration Act)
governed the recording of transactions involving registered land, i.e., land with a Torrens title. On the
other hand, Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for the system of recording of transactions over
unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a better right. Accordingly, if a parcel of
land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act No. 3344 and
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol
not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not considered registered and the registration of the deed
does not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.
Same; Same; Same; A sale that is not correctly registered is binding only between the seller and the
buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.—Respondents may not be characterized as buyers in
bad faith for having bought the property notwithstanding the registration of the first Deed of Absolute Sale
under Act No. 3344. An improper registration is no registration at all. Likewise, a sale that is not correctly
registered is binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not convert it
into unregistered land.—Petitioner, however, is of the impression that registration under Act No. 3344 is
permissible because the duplicate copy of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 4763-D had been lost or
destroyed. This argument does not persuade. Our pronouncement in Amodia Vda. de Melencion, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 534 SCRA 62 (2007), is apropos: x x x The fact that the certificate of title over the
registered land is lost does not convert it into unregistered land. After all, a certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. This Court agrees with the
petitioners that AZNAR should have availed itself of the legal remedy of reconstitution of the lost
certificate of title, instead of registration under Act 3344.
Same; Same; Innocent Purchasers for Value; A person dealing with registered land may generally rely on
the correctness of a certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine
the legal status of the property, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry; Respondents
considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.—Under the established principles of land
registration, a person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of
title and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal status of the property,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we rule
that respondents exercised the required diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the
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subject property as to be considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
RGR Law Office for respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to reverse, annul and set aside (i) the May 27, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA–
G.R. CV No. 72867 entitled “Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol, et al. v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority,” and (ii) its February 17, 2006 Resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The instant case finds its genesis in a complaint for quieting of title filed on August 8, 1996 by
respondents, Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol and Spouses Alejandro and Miranda Ngo, against petitioner
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). The facts were aptly summarized by the Court of
Appeals as follows:
“The instant appeal revolves around a certain parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D, over which the parties to the
above-entitled case assert ownership and possession.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs-appellees and business partners, Edito P. Tirol and Alejandro Y. Ngo, along with their respective
spouses, claim to have purchased a 2,000 square meter parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D, from a certain
Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins, a Filipino citizen married to a certain Mr. Scott
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1 Rollo, pp. 7-16.
2 Id., at p. 18.
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Edward Jenkins, an American citizen, per Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-
appellees bought the said property on the strength of the apparent clean title of vendor Jenkins as
evidenced by the Tax Declaration and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18216, all under Mrs. Elma Jenkins’
name, which bear no annotation of liens, encumbrances, lis pendens or any adverse claim whatsoever.
After the sale wherein plaintiffs-appellees were purportedly purchasers for value and in good faith, they
succeeded in titling the said lot under their names per Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044 on
September 20, 1993, and further proceeded to pay realty taxes thereon. It was only in January 1996 that
plaintiffs-appellees discovered a cloud on their title when their request for a Height Clearance with the
Department of Transportation and Communications was referred to the defendant-appellant Mactan[-
]Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on account of the latter’s ownership of the said
lot by way of purchase thereof dating far back to 1958.
At this point, it becomes imperative to trace the chain of ownership over Lot No. 4763-D. It is undisputed
that the original owners of said property were the spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, who owned
the entire Lot No. 4763, of which Lot No. 4763-D is a portion of (sic). Unfortunately for herein parties, this
is where the similarity of facts end (sic), and the instant controversy begins.
According to plaintiffs-appellees: Originally, the entire Lot No. 4763 was decreed in the names of spouses
Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef under the provisions of the Land Registration Act on June 1, 1934. [In]
January 1974, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to Spouses Moises Cuizon
and Beatriz Patalinghug. The latter spouses thereafter succeeded to secure the reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title of Lot No. 4763, Opon Cadastre as evidenced by Court Order dated July 3, 1986. Said
Court Order subsequently became final and executory, thus a reconstituted title, OCT No. RO-2754, was
issued in the name of the original owners-spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef. On September 12,
1986, the Deed of Absolute Sale between spouses Julian Cuison/Marcosa Cosef and spouses Moises
Cuizon/Beatriz Patalinghug was registered and annotated on OCT No. RO-2754, which was cancelled to
give way to the issuance of TCT No. 16735 in the name of spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz
Patalinghug. Thereafter, the latter sold a portion, denominated as Lot No. 4763-D, to Mrs. Elma Jenkins
on December 15, 1987, who[,] as earlier discussed, sold the same lot to herein plaintiffs-appellees on
September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees contend that all throughout the chain of ownership, the titles—
albeit from a reconstituted one—of the previous owners were absolutely devoid of any annotations of
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liens, encumbrances, lis pendens, adverse claim, or anything that may cause a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence and diligence to suspect the contrary. Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellees have been in
actual, uninterrupted and peaceful possession of the property since 1993, and if the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest be tacked, plaintiffs-appellees would be in constructive, uninterrupted and
peaceful possession for sixty-two (62) long years as of the date of filing their Complaint for Quieting of
Title in the court a quo.
According to the defendant-appellant: On March 23, 19863, the original owners, spouses Julian Cuison
and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to the government, through the [then] Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA, for brevity). In a Certificate dated March 19, 1959, vendor Julian Cuison confirmed
that he was the possessor and actual owner of Lot No. 4763 which was located within the “Mactan
Alternate International Airport” and that the duplicate copy of the certificate of title was lost or destroyed
during the last war without him or his predecessor(s)-in-interest having received a copy thereof. Since
then, the government, through defendant-appellant MCIAA, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
adverse possession of the property in the concept of owner. Said lot allegedly became part of the Clear
Zone of Runway 22 for purposes of required clearance for take-off and landing. Moreover, defendant-
appellant asserts that plaintiffs-appellees are nothing more than trustees of Lot No. 4763-D in favor of
defendant-appellant MCIAA, being merely successors-in-interest of the original owners, spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, who undertook in paragraph 4 of the Deed of Absolute Sale, to assist in the
reconstitution of title so that the land may be registered in the name of vendee government, through
defendant-appellant MCIAA. In paragraph 5 of the same Deed of Absolute Sale, the parties also agreed
that the property be registered under Act 3344 pending the reconstitution and issuance of title.
Purportedly, in gross and evident bad faith and in open violation of their Deed of Absolute Sale, the
spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef again sold the same property to spouses Moises Cuizon and
Beatriz Patalinghug, who in turn sold the lot to Mrs. Elma Jenkins, who eventually sold the same to herein
plaintiffs-appellees. Defendant-appellant MCIAA further imputes bad faith to plaintiffs-appellees under the
rationale that because their title came from a reconstituted one and that Lot No. 4763 was within the
Clear Zone of Runway 22 of the airport, plaintiffs-appellees should have exerted effort in researching the
history of owner-
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3 This should be March 23, 1958.
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ship and cannot possibly claim to be innocent of MCIAA’s ownership and possession thereof.”4
In its December 4, 2000 Decision,5 the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner MCIAA in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court rules in favor of defendant and thus DISMISSES the
complaint of plaintiffs for want of merit.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the defendant MCIAA, is adjudged as (sic) the lawful
owner of the entire Lot 4763, Opon Cadastre.
The Deed of Absolute Sale involving Lot 4763-D in favor of plaintiffs is hereby declared null and void.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044 for Lot 4763-D under the names of plaintiffs is likewise deemed null
and void.
The Register of Deeds is directed to issue to the defendant MCIAA a transfer certificate of title covering
the whole Lot 4763.
The counterclaim of defendant, however, is denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”
The trial court held that there was a valid transfer of title from Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef
to the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), and accordingly, the respondents did not buy Lot No. 4763-
D from a person who could validly dispose of it. It likewise ruled that the government (through the CAA,
and now respondent MCIAA) has been in possession of the disputed land since it bought the same in
1958, when a public deed of absolute sale was executed in its favor. Lastly, respondents were considered
as having bought Lot No. 4763-D in bad faith since they ignored circumstances that should have made
them curious enough to investigate beyond the four corners of the Transfer Certificate of Title. In the trial
court’s view, the facts that Lot No. 4763-D (i) is only about 320 meters from the center of the runway and
therefore
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4 Rollo, pp. 7-10.
5 Records, pp. 222-230.
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part of the clear zone and (ii) has been vacant for several decades should have alerted the respondents
to the possibility that the lot could be part of the airport complex and therefore owned by petitioner.
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration6 on January 23, 2001, and a Supplemental (sic) to
Motion for Reconsideration7 on May 17, 2001. Petitioner duly filed its Opposition8 to the said Motions on
April 10, 2001 and June 13, 2001, respectively.
In an Order9 dated August 9, 2001, the trial court did a complete volte face and reversed its Decision.
Holding that Article 154410 of the New Civil Code—which set forth the rule on double sales—finds
application to the instant case, the trial court ratiocinated:
“In the words of the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Cabana, this Court finds that in the case of [a] double sale
of real property[,] Article 1544 of the New Civil Code applies. Defendant was certainly the first buyer and
the plaintiffs [were] the subsequent buyers, to be exact fourth (sic).
But who among the parties herein has a better right to Lot No. 4763-D? To answer this question, it is
necessary to determine first the issue [of] whether or not the plaintiffs were buyers in good faith.
xxx xxx xxx
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6 Id., at pp. 232-234.
7 Id., at pp. 245-252.
8 Id., at pp. 238-241, 258-274.
9 Id., at pp. 282-287.
10 This provision provides:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
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The Court is not convinced that indeed the plaintiffs were buyers in bad faith. xxx The registration of the
deed of absolute sale by the defendant at the Registry of Deeds under Act No. 3344 sometime in 1959 is
not the registration being contemplated under the law. “Registration under Act No. 3344 differs materially
from registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and under the Land Registration Act. In the Spanish
Mortgage Law[,] there is [an] express provision (Article 17) to the effect that titles recorded thereunder
cannot be annulled or invalidated by prior unrecorded rights, while the Land Registration Act (No. 496)
contains a special disposition that only transactions noted on the certificate of title and entered in the
registry books can bind the land. On the other hand, transactions registered under Act No. 3344 cannot
defeat a third person with a better right. Of course[,] the law does not define exactly what may be
considered a better right, leaving the matter of its construction to the courts. The main reason for the
difference in the operation of Act No. 3344 compared with the other systems of registration lies obviously
in the fact that recordings under said Act No. 3344 are not preceded by any investigation, judicial or
administrative, as to the validity or efficacy of the title sought to be recorded.” It is undisputed that Lot No.
4763 was a registered land, only that at the time of registering defendant’s document of sale there was no
copy of the certificate of title because the same was not available due to the after effect of the last global
war.
Hence, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs when they contended that “even at the time when OCT No.
RO-2754 was issued[,] there was no document allegedly proving its (defendant) ownership being
annotated on the certificate of title.” At the time when Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16735, 18216 and
27044 were issued to the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest, there were no annotations of the
alleged claim of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs have all the good reasons to rely on the validity of the
titles. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
x x x The fact that Lot No. 4763-D was within 320 meters from the center of the runway and within airport
premises, was part of the clear zone, and had long been vacant are not enough warning to third persons
dealing [with] such land. It was undisputed that the lot in controversy is outside the perimeter fence of the
defendant. The fact that the said lot was part of the clear zone is not sufficient justification to warn the
plaintiffs in
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(sic) buying it. Such fact was merely for the purpose of construction of buildings, not for realty
ownership.11 (italics in the original)
Aggrieved, petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Decision12 on May 27,
2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Order
dated August 9, 2001 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”
On June 21, 2005, petitioner seasonably moved for its reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
the same in its February 17, 2006 Resolution.13
Hence this appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, where petitioner argues that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AUGUST 9, 2001 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT EVEN IF THE SAME IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.14
Simply stated, the issue may be synthesized as follows: Between respondents Spouses Tirol and
Spouses Ngo, on the one hand, and petitioner MCIAA, on the other, who has the superior right to the
subject property?
We rule in favor of the respondents, but on grounds different than those relied upon by the Court of
Appeals and the trial court.
Preliminarily, reliance on Article 1544 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. In Cheng v. Genato, et al.,15
we enumerated the requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply, viz.:
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11 Records, pp. 284-286.
12 Supra note 1 at p. 16.
13 Rollo, p. 18.
14 Id., at p. 10.
15 360 Phil. 891, 909; 300 SCRA 722, 739-740 (1998).
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(a) The two (or more) sales transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
represent conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have
bought from the very same seller.
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated not by just
one vendor but by several successive vendors.16 In the instant case, respondents and petitioner had
acquired the subject property from different transferors. Petitioner, through its predecessor-in-interest
(CAA), acquired the entire Lot No. 4763 from its original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef, on March 23, 1958. On the other hand, respondents acquired the subject parcel of land, a portion
of Lot No. 4763, from Mrs. Elma Jenkins, another transferee, some thirty-five years later. The immediate
transferors of Elma Jenkins were the Spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug who, in turn,
obtained the subject property from Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef. Therefore, the instant
controversy cannot be governed by Article 1544 since petitioner and respondents do not have the same
immediate seller.
This notwithstanding, we find that respondents have a better right to Lot No. 4763-D.
Petitioner does not contest that Lot No. 4763, of which the property subject of this case is a part, was
registered under Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act) even before the Second World War. Paragraph
4 of the Deed of Absolute Sale17 between petitioner and
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16 See also Spouses Ong, et al. v. Spouses Olasiman, G.R. No. 162045, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA
464.
17 Records, pp. 162-165.
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Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef stipulates, in relevant part:
“That since the Original/Transfer Certificate of Title of the aforementioned property has been lost and/or
destroyed, or since the said lot is covered by Cadastral Case No. 20 and a decree issued on July 29,
1930, xxx the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute said title at its own expense and that the
VENDOR, his heirs, successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that
the said lot may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law.” (italics supplied)
Additionally, in his Certification18 dated March 19, 1959, Julian Cuison stated that “the duplicate copy of
the certificate of title for [Lot No. 4763] was lost or destroyed during the last war without having been
received by [him] or [his] predecessor-in-interest.”
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in
order to effect and bind the land.19 Prior to the Property Registration Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the
Land Registration Act) governed the recording of transactions involving registered land, i.e., land with a
Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for the system of recording of
transactions over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a better right.20
Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act No.
3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not considered registered21
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18 Id., at p. 166.
19 Soriano, et al. v. The Heirs of Domingo Magali, G.R. No. L-15133, July 31, 1953, 8 SCRA 489, 494-
495; Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, G.R. No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 544, 552; Aznar Brothers
Realty Company v. Aying, et al., G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 496, 511.
20 Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, G.R. No. 83432, May 20, 1991, 197 SCRA 245, 249.
21 Amodia Vda. de Melencion, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 148846, September 25, 2007,
534 SCRA 62, 79 citing Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, supra note 19.
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and the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.22
Consequently, the fact that petitioner MCIAA was able to register its Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No.
3344 is of no moment, as the property subject of the sale is indisputably registered land. Section 50 of Act
No. 496 in fact categorically states that it is the act of registration that shall operate to convey and affect
the land; absent any such registration, the instrument executed by the parties remains only as a contract
between them and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration, viz.:
“SECTION 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal
with the same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of deeds, mortgages, leases, or
other voluntary instruments like those now in use and sufficient in law for the purpose intended. But no
deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this
Act the registration shall be made in the office of register of deeds for the province or provinces or city
where the land lies.” (italics supplied)
Hence, respondents may not be characterized as buyers in bad faith for having bought the property
notwithstanding the registration of the first Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344. An improper
registration is no registration at all. Likewise, a sale that is not correctly registered is binding only between
the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.23
Petitioner, however, is of the impression that registration under Act No. 3344 is permissible because the
duplicate copy of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 4763-D had been lost or destroyed. This
argument does not persuade. Our pronouncement in Amodia
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22 Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Francisca Dignos-Sorono, G.R. No. 171571, March 24, 2008,
549 SCRA 58, 63, 67.
23 Revilla, et al. v. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480, 484 (1960).
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Vda. de Melencion, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.24 is apropos:
“In the case at bench, it is uncontroverted that the subject property was under the operation of the
Torrens System even before the respective conveyances to AZNAR and Go Kim Chuan were made.
AZNAR knew of this, and admits this as fact. Yet, despite this knowledge, AZNAR registered the sale in
its favor under Act 3344 on the contention that at the time of sale, there was no title on file. We are not
persuaded by such a lame excuse.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, since the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of AZNAR
was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, the said document is deemed not
registered. Rather, it was the sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan which was registered under Act No. 496.
AZNAR insists that since there was no Torrens title on file in 1964, insofar as the vendors, AZNAR, and
the Register of Deeds are concerned, the subject property was unregistered at the time. The contention is
untenable. The fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not convert it into
unregistered land. After all, a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein. This Court agrees with the petitioners that AZNAR should have
availed itself of the legal remedy of reconstitution of the lost certificate of title, instead of registration under
Act 3344. We note that in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying, AZNAR, beset with the similar
problem of a lost certificate of title over a registered land, sought the reconstitution thereof. It is
unfortunate that, in the instant case, despite the sale of the subject property way back in 1964 and the
existence of the remedy of reconstitution at that time, AZNAR opted to register the same under the
improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed such status to lie undisturbed.”25 (italics supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner MCIAA did not bother to have the lost title covering Lot No. 4763-D
reconstituted at any time, notwithstanding the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
_______________
24 Supra note 21.
25 Id., at pp. 79-80.
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in 1958, or more than fifty years ago. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come to
the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy.26 As a matter of fact, this entire controversy may very
well have been avoided had it not been for petitioner’s negligence.
Furthermore, under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing with registered land
may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond it to determine the legal status of the property,27 except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry.28 Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we rule that respondents exercised the required
diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the subject property as to be considered
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. We quote with favor the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals in this respect:
“Defendant-appellant MCIAA also asseverates that the close proximity of the property to the runway of
the airport (320 meters from the center line of the runway) and the fact that it has been vacant for a
considerable period should have caused [plaintiffs-appellees] to be dubious of the title of the previous
owners thereof. This was, in Our opinion, satisfactorily explained by plaintiffs-appellees when witness Mr.
Edito Tirol testified in open court that he never thought it strange that the land had always been vacant,
and that besides, there were private houses beside the vacant lot, suggesting that the property must be of
private ownership and not that of the airport. Furthermore, he testified that he undertook great care in
verifying the clean title of the said land, [e.g.,] deputizing an employee to do the necessary research,
personally copying pertinent documents registered in the Registry of Property and even consulting legal
advice on the matter. These, for Us, are badges of good faith. Besides,
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26 Claverias v. Quingco, G.R. No. 77744, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 66, 84.
27 Naawan Community Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 443 Phil. 56, 59; 395 SCRA 43, 49
(2003).
28 Id., at pp. 65-66.
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority vs. Tirol, 588 SCRA 635, G.R. No. 171535 June 5, 2009
******************END*************************
G.R. No. 185202. February 18, 2009.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO TARUC @ TARUC,
accused-appellant.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees
to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.—In allowing the
dismissal of the appeal of the accused-appellant under the circumstances identified by the foregoing rule,
the Court, in People v. Mapalao, 260 SCRA 539 (1996), explained that: [O]nce an accused escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless
he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.
Same; Same; Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been
extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.—
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the
Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SECTION 1. Uniform procedure.—Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the procedure
in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Death Penalty; The escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals
from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital punishment—
automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty
cases.—It is indisputable that accused-appellant herein, by escaping from jail, was not present at the
promulgation by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in Criminal Case No. 8010, finding him guilty
of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant failed to surrender and file
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
683
VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 18, 2009

683
People vs. Taruc
the required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already
deprived him of any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, including the right to appeal the same. The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of
the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction,
considering that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not
only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases. In this case, considering that the
penalty imposed by the trial court was death, the Court of Appeals rightly took cognizance of the case.
Upon review by the appellate court, however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Same; Same; By escaping prison, an accused impliedly waives his right to appeal.—By escaping prison,
accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc, 73 Phil. 366 (1941), the
Court enunciated that: There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication.
When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to
have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x. The accused cannot be
accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise
arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief
from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
684
684

People vs. Taruc
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 February 2008 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01638
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Francisco Taruc @ Taruc, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated 29 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No.
8010 for murder.
Accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged in Criminal Case No. 8010 before the RTC of Bataan,
Branch 3, with the crime of murder in connection with the death of Emelito Sualog.
The Information reads:
“That on or about November 8, 1998 at Brgy. Puting Buhangin, Orion, Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack , assault and use
personal violence upon Emelito Sualog @ Elmer, by then and there shooting him with a Celiber (sic) 45
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.”2
Upon arraignment on 25 April 2005, accused, duly assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO),3 pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo
and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; Rollo, pp. 2-20.
2 Records, p. 1.
3 Id., at p. 16.
685
685
People vs. Taruc
After trial on the merits, the RTC on 29 June 2005 rendered a Decision4 convicting the accused, the
decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, accused FRANCISCO TARUC is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal
by direct participation of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, and with the attending aggravating circumstance of treachery, is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of DEATH.
Accused Francisco Taruc is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Emelito Saulog the amounts of
P49,225.00 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in civil indemnity and P30,000.00 in moral damages.
Issue warrant of arrest against accused Francisco Taruc that he may serve the sentence imposed against
him.”5
The case was brought to the Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC6
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 01638.
On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellant’s
_______________
4 CA Rollo, pp. 11-14.

5 Id., at p. 14.
6 Sec. 3. How appeal taken. x x x
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty.
The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of this Rule.
xxxx
Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty.—In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review
and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment
or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded
within ten days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
686
686
People vs. Taruc
Brief.7
Considering that the Notice to File Brief addressed to accused-appellant was returned to the appellate
court with postal notation “moved out,” the Court of Appeals directed accused-appellant’s counsel to
furnish it with the present and complete address of his client within five days from notice.
In compliance, the PAO lawyer concerned informed8 the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant
escaped from prison on 23 August 2002. Said PAO lawyer claimed that he had no means of knowing the
current whereabouts of the accused-appellant. Thereupon, the PAO lawyer asked the Court of Appeals to
direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in Balanga, Bataan, to file a certification as to the accused-
appellant’s escape.
On 20 February 2006, the Court of Appeals required9 the Warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail to
comment on the afore-stated information relayed by the PAO lawyer.
On 6 March 2006, Ropadolfo Fabros Torcuato, Sr., Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Warden of the Bataan
Provincial Jail, conveyed10 to the appellate court that accused-appellant was indeed committed to said
jail on 10 November 2000 but escaped at about 11:00 p.m. on 23 August 2002.
On 23 March 2006, notwithstanding the escape of accused-appellant from prison, the Court of Appeals
granted PAO’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief, in view of the ruling of the Supreme
Court in People v. Flores,11 making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The period of
extension granted had lapsed without the accused-appellant filing his brief; thus, the Court of Appeals
required
_______________
7 CA Rollo, p. 18.
8 Id., at p. 21.
9 Id., at p. 26.
10 Id., at p. 27.
11 G.R. No. 170565, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 451, 454.
687
687
People vs. Taruc

the PAO to show cause why the latter should not be held in contempt for failing to file the same.12
The Court of Appeals found the explanation valid, and accepted the briefs of both the appellant and the
appellee, and considered the case submitted for decision.
On 27 February 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming with modification the Decision
of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, City of Balanga, Bataan in Criminal
Case No. 8010 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant Francisco Taruc, is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the modification of the
penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua is ordered.
The accused-appellant Francisco Taruc is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Emelito Sualog,
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity ex delicto; Forty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Five (P49,255.00) as actual damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages. Costs against the accused-
appellant.”
On 13 March 2008, accused-appellant, still represented by the PAO, filed a Notice of Appeal13 stating
that he was appealing the Decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law and
fact. And on 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-appellant’s appeal and
directed its Records Division to forward the rollo and records of the case to the Supreme Court.14
Hence, this Petition.
_______________
12 CA Rollo, pp. 41-42.
13 Rollo, p. 107.
14 Id., at p. 110.
688
688
People vs. Taruc
As may be gleaned from the records, before the prosecution witness Randy Espina could be cross-
examined,15 accused-appellant escaped from the Bataan Provincial Jail on 23 August 2002. Thus, the
RTC considered the act of the accused as a waiver to cross-examine said witness. Thereafter, the trial
court promulgated a judgment of conviction while accused-appellant was at large. He remains at large
even while his counsel continues to file various pleadings on his behalf before the RTC, the Court of
Appeals, and this Court.
Given that the accused-appellant escaped from jail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of
whether he has lost his right to appeal his conviction inexorably ensues.
An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a
criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made
in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
“In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy
thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.” (Emphasis supplied.)
_______________
15 CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 7.
689
689
People vs. Taruc
Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the
jurisdiction of the courts over his person, viz.:
“SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.—The Court of Appeals may,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In allowing the dismissal of the appeal of the accused-appellant under the circumstances identified by the
foregoing rule, the Court, in People v. Mapalao,16 explained that:
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he
loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the
Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
“SECTION 1. Uniform procedure.—Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the

procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of
Appeals.”
_______________
16 274 Phil. 354, 363; 197 SCRA 79, 87-88 (1991).
690
690
People vs. Taruc
It is indisputable that accused-appellant herein, by escaping from jail, was not present at the promulgation
by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in Criminal Case No. 8010, finding him guilty of the crime
of murder. Accused-appellant failed to surrender and file the required motion within 15 days from the
promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already deprived him of any remedy against said judgment
of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, including the right to appeal the
same.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of
Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital
punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all
death penalty cases.17
In this case, considering that the penalty imposed by the trial court was death, the Court of Appeals rightly
took cognizance of the case. Upon review by the appellate court, however, it modified the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua.
We now come to the resolution of the case.
By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc,18 the
Court enunciated that:
“There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right
of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it
or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after
the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.”
_______________
17 People v. Esparas, 329 Phil. 339, 345-346; 260 SCRA 539, 549 (1996).
18 73 Phil 366, 369 (1941).
691
691
People vs. Taruc
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him.19 While at large, he
cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal.20 Thus, having escaped
from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its
jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, accused-appellant
revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his
chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the
judgment nugatory at his option.21 Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of
the appellate court.22
Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC,
as well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now
when his appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this
Court would succeed. He only hopes in vain.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for the
issuance of the mittimus.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
19 Id.
20 Id., citing People v. Mapalao, supra note 16.
21 Francisco, Criminal Procedure (1996, 3rd ed.), p. 520.
22 Id.
692
692
People vs. Taruc
Quisumbing,** Carpio,*** Austria-Martinez (Actg. Chairperson) and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed.
Notes.—By escaping, the accused waives his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until his
custody is regained. (People vs. Deduyo, 414 SCRA 146 [2003])
The rule authorizing the promulgation of judgment in absentia is intended to obviate the situation in the
past where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the
promulgation of judgment. (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 520 SCRA 729 [2007])
——o0o——
_______________
** Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 11 February 2009.
*** Per Special Order No. 575, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio was designated as an additional
member in place of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago who is on official leave under the
Court’s Wellness Program.
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. People vs. Taruc , 579 SCRA 682, G.R.
No. 185202 February 18, 2009
*******************************************END*****************************************
G.R. No. 143538. February 13, 2009.*
VICENTE A. MIEL, petitioner, vs. JESUS A. MALINDOG, respondent.
Appeals; Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisprudence instructs that when a party is represented by
counsel, notice of the judgment, final order or resolution should be made upon the counsel of record—
thus, the fifteen-day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court commenced to run from receipt
of the judgment, final order or resolution by the party’s counsel on record.—Under the provisions of Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, the appeal from the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the CSC shall be
taken by filing a verified petition for review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment, final order or resolution. Jurisprudence instructs that when a party is represented by
counsel, notice of the judgment, final order or resolution should be made upon the counsel of record.
Thus, the fifteen-day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court commenced to run from receipt
of the judgment, final order or resolution by the party’s counsel on record.
Same; Same; Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned decision/resolution final and executory,
and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the decision/resolution, much less to entertain the
appeal; Filing of an appeal beyond the reglementary period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if
the barring of the appeal would be inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances therein—Courts
may suspend its own rules, or except a particular case from its operations, whenever the purposes of
justice require it.—The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the reglementary period will
make the judgment final and executory by operation of law. Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned
decision/resolution final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the
decision/resolution, much less to
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
120
120
Miel vs. Malindog
entertain the appeal. Nonetheless, we have held that a delay in the filing of an appeal under exceptional
circumstances may be excused on grounds of substantial justice and equity. Filing of an appeal beyond
the reglementary period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the barring of the appeal would be
inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances therein. Courts may suspend its own rules, or
except a particular case from its operations, whenever the purposes of justice require it. In Baylon v. Fact-
Finding Intelligence Bureau, we laid down the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court
to resist strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property; (2) counsel’s
negligence without the participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Same; Same; Public Officers; Dismissal; Penalties; The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment
because it blemishes a person’s record in government service, an injury to one’s reputation and honor
which produces irreversible effects on one’s career and private life—worse, it implies loss of livelihood to
the employee and his family; Generally, a client is bound by the negligence of his counsel, but since, in
the instant case, he had nothing to do with the negligence of his counsel, his case should be an exception
to the rule, as the application of such rule would result in serious injustice to him.—In the case at bar, the
CSC-HO found respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from the
service. The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment because it blemishes a person’s record in
government service. It is an injury to one’s reputation and honor which produces irreversible effects on
one’s career and private life. Worse, it implies loss of livelihood to the employee and his family.
Respondent would certainly suffer grave injustice if the penalty of dismissal imposed on him turned out to
be erroneous or disproportionate and such was not duly rectified because of mere technicality. Further, it
appears that respondent was not able to file his appeal on time because Atty. Bulauitan failed to
immediately inform respondent of the notice of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648. Atty. Bulauitan was so
busy then as campaign manager of a senatorial aspirant that
121

121
Miel vs. Malindog
he forgot to notify respondent of the notice of said resolution. Generally, respondent is bound by the
negligence of Atty. Bulauitan. However, since respondent had nothing to do with the negligence of Atty.
Bulauitan, respondent’s case should be an exception to the rule on the effects of the counsel’s
negligence, as the application of such rule would result in serious injustice to respondent.
Public Officers; Dishonesty; Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline—a public
servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity; The act of making untruthful
statements, or concealment of any information in personal data sheets (PDS), constitutes dishonesty and
is punishable under the Civil Service rules.—Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. No
less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public
officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees additionally provides that
every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest. A PDS is an
official document required of a government employee and official by the Civil Service Commission. It is
the repository of all information about any government employee or official regarding his personal
background, qualification, and eligibility. Government employees are tasked under the Civil Service rules
to properly and completely accomplish their PDS. The act of making untruthful statements, or
concealment of any information in the PDS, constitutes dishonesty and is punishable under the Civil
Service rules. Dishonesty is a “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness.”
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the discipline and morale of the service.
Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances; Where the respondent public employee had been in the government
service for more or less 20 years, during which he made a steady ascent from a lowly laborer to a Civil
Engineer II, has no previous derogatory record as a government employee, and returned the loyalty cash
award, the same may be considered as mitigating circumstances to lower the imposable penalty.—
Section 52, A(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
122
122
Miel vs. Malindog
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules), classifies dishonesty as a grave offense
with a corresponding penalty of dismissal even if committed for the first time. Be that as it may, we
observed that respondent had been in the government service for more or less 20 years, during which he
made a steady ascent from a lowly laborer at the National Irrigation Administration, Catbalogan, Samar,
to a Civil Engineer II at the SED-DPWH. Respondent also had no previous derogatory record as a
government employee. Moreover, he returned the loyalty cash award of P1,500.00. We can consider the
foregoing as mitigating circumstances to lower the penalty imposable on respondent pursuant to Section
53 of the Civil Service Rules, viz.: Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative
Circumstances.—In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Wilfredo M. Bolito for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the Decision2 dated 29 July 1999 and Resolution3 dated 26 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 48045.
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-22.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna with Associate Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a
member of this Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-29.
3 Rollo, pp. 30-31.
123
123
Miel vs. Malindog
On 19 July 1994, petitioner Vicente A. Miel, then employed as Engineer II of the Samar Engineering
District, Department of Public Works and Highways, Catbalogan, Samar (SED-DPWH), filed with the Civil
Service Commission, Region Office No. 8, Tacloban City (CSC-RO No. 8), a Complaint for falsification of
official documents, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and grave
misconduct, against respondent Jesus A. Malindog, then employed also as Engineer II of SED-DPWH,
Samar.
Petitioner alleged in his Complaint that respondent submitted three separate Personal Data Sheets
(PDS), or Civil Service Form No. 212, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
According to the first PDS:4
PERSONAL DATA SHEET

(20 DECEMBER 1988)
xxxx
SERVICE RECORD (Include experience outside government

service)
INCLUSIVE DATES POSITION DEPARTMENT/
From To AGENCY
xxxx
July 1, 1984 - October 9, 1986 C.E. Supervisor PHILPOS
BAGACAY MINES
The second PDS5 stated:
PERSONAL DATA SHEET

(2 MARCH 1992)
xxxx
_______________
4 Records, p. 137.
5 Id., at p. 138.
124
124
Miel vs. Malindog

service)
From To AGENCY
xxxx
June 1, 1984 – Dec. 31, 1986 Civil Engineer PJHL, DPWH
Jan. 1, 1984 – June 30, 1986 Civil Engineer -do-
July 1, 1986 – Oct. 9, 1986 Civil Engineer -do-
And the third PDS6 declared:
PERSONAL DATA SHEET

(Year 1994)
xxxx
SERVICE RECORD (Include experience outside government service)

From To AGENCY
xxxx
Jan. 1, 1984 - October 9, 1986 on leave
Petitioner compared respondent’s three PDSs and pointed out the following contradictory and apparently
deceitful information therein: respondent stated under the service record section of his first PDS that he
worked for PHILPOS BAGACAY MINES, a private company in Hinabangan, Samar, as C.E. Supervisor
from 1 July 1984 up to 9 October 1986; then respondent indicated under the service record section of his
second PDS that he worked at the Philippine-Japan Highway Loan Division (PJHLD) of the DPWH
Region 8 from 1 May 1984 until 9 October 1986; and, finally, respondent wrote under the service record
section of his third PDS that he was “on leave” from his job as civil engineer in DPWH Region 8 from 1
January 1984 up to 9 October 1986. By
_______________
6 Id., at p. 139.
125
125
Miel vs. Malindog
reason of these false statements made by respondent in his PDS, he was granted an amount of
P1,500.00 as loyalty cash award by SED-DPWH. Respondent was also recommended for promotion to
the vacant position of Engineer III in SED-DPWH, but petitioner contended that respondent should be
disqualified from the said promotion by reason of the falsification he made on his three PDSs. Petitioner,
thus, prayed in his Complaint7 that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent based on the
foregoing allegations.
On 5 September 1994, respondent filed before CSC-RO No. 8 an Answer8 to petitioner’s Complaint. In
his Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and averred that they were malicious and pure
harassment. Respondent claimed that petitioner held a grudge against respondent because they were in
“bitter contest” for the vacant position of Engineer III in SED-DPWH. Petitioner scanned respondent’s
personal records just to make a case against him. Respondent explained that he indeed worked for
PHILPOS BAGACAY MINES and at the PJHLD of DPWH Region 8, but he could no longer recall the
exact dates of said employments, considering the length of time that had lapsed since then. Also due to
the frailty of human memory, respondent could not exactly remember his whereabouts during the period
he was supposedly on leave from his job as civil engineer in DPWH Region 8 for the period of 1 January
1984 to 9 October 1986. Respondent asserted that he did not commit any wrong when he accepted the
loyalty cash award. He did not bribe or use unlawful schemes in order to be recommended for the vacant
Engineer III position. Respondent pleaded that petitioner’s Complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
After conducting a preliminary investigation of petitioner’s Complaint, Lorenzo S. Danipog (Danipog),

Director III of
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 133-136.
8 Id., at pp. 67-71.
126
126
Miel vs. Malindog
CSC-RO No. 8, issued a Resolution9 formally charging respondent with dishonesty. Director Danipog
found that respondent had willfully and maliciously written false information on his three PDSs. He opined
that respondent purposely fabricated his second and third PDSs so he could be entitled to the loyalty
cash award of P1,500.00. Director Danipog did not give much credence to respondent’s defense of “frailty
of memory,” because respondent’s false statements on his PDSs were carefully written and complete as
to days, months and years, which could only be done by a conscious mind. The falsification of statements
in the PDS constituted dishonesty, and Danipog concluded that there was prima facie case to charge
respondent with the same.
On 7 July 1997, the Civil Service Commission Head Office (CSC-HO) issued Resolution No. 97330110
finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
The CSC-HO believed that respondent falsified his second and third PDSs so he could be entitled to the
loyalty cash award of P1,500.00 from SED-DPWH; under Section 7(e), Rule X of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code of the Philippines and CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 42 dated 15 October 1992, the loyalty award shall be given only to a government employee who has
completed at least ten (10) years of continuous and satisfactory service to the particular office granting
the award. The CSC-HO held that respondent’s actuation constituted dishonesty under the Civil Service
Rules. The dispositive portion of the CSC-HO Resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, Jesus A. Malindog is hereby found guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, he is meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties including perpetual
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 128-130.
10 Rollo, pp. 36-40.
127
127
Miel vs. Malindog
disqualification from holding public office and from taking future government examinations.”11
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC-HO Resolution No. 973301 dated 7 July 1997, but
it was denied by the CSC-HO in its Resolution No. 98064812 dated 25 March 1998. Thus, respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Respondent’s appeal was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 48045.
The Court of Appeals promulgated on 29 July 1999 its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48045, affirming with
modification CSC-HO Resolution No. 973301 dated 7 July 1997. The appellate court sustained the finding
of the CSC-HO that respondent was guilty of dishonesty for making false statements in his second and
third PDSs. Nevertheless, it held that the penalty of dismissal imposed on respondent should be reduced
to one-year suspension from work without pay considering that: (1) respondent had been in the
government service for almost 20 years; (2) this was his first offense; (3) he rose from the ranks as a
mere laborer until he was promoted to Engineer II at the SED-DPWH; and (3) he returned the loyalty cash
award of P1,500.00. Hence, the Court of Appeals decreed:
“WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is penalized to suffer one year suspension without pay, with the warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.”13
In its Resolution dated 26 May 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the aforementioned Decision.
_______________
11 Id., at p. 40.
12 Records, pp. 32-34.
13 Rollo, p. 28.
128
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Miel vs. Malindog
Consequently, petitioner lodged the instant Petition before us assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY SECTION 4, RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE THAT THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME BY IGNORING OUR
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ISSUED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION THAT RESPONDENT’S
FORMER COUNSEL OR THROUGH RESPONSIBLE PERSON IN HIS OFFICE ADDRESS RECEIVED
CSC RESOLUTION DENYING HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FIFTY ONE (51) DAYS
BEFORE FILING HIS PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY IMPOSING THE

PENALTY OF ONE YEAR SUSPENSION INSTEAD OF AFFIRMING THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION’S PENALTY OF DISMISSAL AGAINST THE LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT, SINCE IT COULD NOT FAULT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR
HAVING COMMITTED ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Apropos the first issue, petitioner asserts that respondent’s appeal of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648
before the Court of Appeals was filed beyond the period allowed for appeal and should have been
therefore dismissed.14
Under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appeal from the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the CSC shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review to the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution. Jurisprudence instructs that when a
party is represented by counsel, notice of
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 13-17.
129
129
Miel vs. Malindog
the judgment, final order or resolution should be made upon the counsel of record.15 Thus, the fifteen-
day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court commenced to run from receipt of the judgment,
final order or resolution by the party’s counsel on record.16
Records show that in the filing of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of CSC-HO Resolution No.
973301, respondent was represented by Atty. Alexander L. Bulauitan.17 The CSC-HO issued Resolution
No. 980648 denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration on 25 March 1998. Atty. Bulauitan received
a copy of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648 on 29 April 1998.18 Respondent then had fifteen (15) days
from such date of receipt, or until 14 May 1998, to appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of the Court. Respondent, however, filed his appeal of CSC-HO Resolutions No. 973301 and No.
980648 with the Court of Appeals only on 19 June 1998, which was obviously beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for doing so.19
The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the reglementary period will make the judgment
final and executory by operation of law.20 Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary
period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned
decision/resolution final and executory, and deprives the ap-
_______________
15 Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA
302, 325 citing Spouses Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil 655, 664; 310 SCRA 393, 400 (1999);
Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-58781, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 555, 558; Cubar v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. L-55035, 23 February 1983, 120 SCRA 768, 772.
16 Rules of Court, Rule 13, Section 2.
17 Records, p. 38.
18 Rollo, p. 75.
20 Sapitan v. JB Line Bicol Express, Inc., G.R. No. 163775, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 230, 242-243.
130
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Miel vs. Malindog
pellate court of jurisdiction to alter the decision/resolution, much less to entertain the appeal.21
Nonetheless, we have held that a delay in the filing of an appeal under exceptional circumstances may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice and equity.22 Filing of an appeal beyond the reglementary
period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the barring of the appeal would be inequitable and
unjust in light of certain circumstances therein.23 Courts may suspend its own rules, or except a particular
case from its operations, whenever the purposes of justice require it.24 In Baylon v. Fact-Finding
Intelligence Bureau,25 we laid down the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to
resist strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property; (2) counsel’s
In the case at bar, the CSC-HO found respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposed upon him the penalty
of dismissal from the service. The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment because it blemishes a
person’s record in government service. It is an injury to one’s reputation and honor which produces
irreversible effects on one’s career and private life. Worse, it implies loss of livelihood to the employee
and his
_______________
21 Sehwani Incorporated v. In-N-Out Burger, Inc., G.R. No. 171053, 15 October 2007, 536 SCRA 225,
233.
22 Legasto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76854-60, 25 April 1989, 172 SCRA 722, 727.
23 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 371, 384; 246 SCRA 304, 316-317 (1995).
24 C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275, 278 (1936).
25 442 Phil. 217, 231; 394 SCRA 21, 31 (2002).
131
131
Miel vs. Malindog
family. Respondent would certainly suffer grave injustice if the penalty of dismissal imposed on him
turned out to be erroneous or disproportionate and such was not duly rectified because of mere
technicality. Further, it appears that respondent was not able to file his appeal on time because Atty.
Bulauitan failed to immediately inform respondent of the notice of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648. Atty.
Bulauitan was so busy then as campaign manager of a senatorial aspirant that he forgot to notify
respondent of the notice of said resolution. Generally, respondent is bound by the negligence of Atty.
Bulauitan. However, since respondent had nothing to do with the negligence of Atty. Bulauitan,
respondent’s case should be an exception to the rule on the effects of the counsel’s negligence, as the
application of such rule would result in serious injustice to respondent.26
Hence, it is in the greater interest of justice that the penalty of dismissal meted out to respondent be
meticulously reviewed by the Court of Appeals despite procedural lapses in respondent’s appeal. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in giving due course to respondent’s appeal.
With regard to his second assigned error, petitioner argues that respondent was guilty of dishonesty in
making false statements in his PDS and, thus, respondent should be dismissed from the service.27
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at
all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle
that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.28 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees additionally provides that
_______________
26 Id.
27 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
28 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1.
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Miel vs. Malindog
every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest.29
A PDS is an official document required of a government employee and official by the Civil Service
Commission. It is the repository of all information about any government employee or official regarding his
personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Government employees are tasked under the Civil
Service rules to properly and completely accomplish their PDS.30 The act of making untruthful
statements, or concealment of any information in the PDS, constitutes dishonesty and is punishable
under the Civil Service rules.31 Dishonesty is a “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.”32 Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the discipline and morale of the service.33
It appears that respondent prepared and submitted three PDSs dated 20 December 1988 (first), 2 March
1992 (second)
_______________
29 Republic Act No. 6713, Section 2.
30 Advincula v. Dicen, G.R. No. 162403, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 696, 708; Bautista v. Navarro, 200
Phil. 278, 283; 114 SCRA 794, 798 (1982); Inting v. Tanodbayan, 186 Phil. 343, 348; 97 SCRA 494, 499
(1980).
31 Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro, A.M. No. P-04-1844, 23 July 2004, 435 SCRA 11, 20-21; Civil Service
Commission v. Sta. Ana, 435 Phil. 1, 11; 386 SCRA 1, 11 (2002); Biteng v. Department of Interior and
Local Government (Cordillera Administrative Region), G.R. No. 153894, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA
520, 528; De Guzman v. De los Santos, 442 Phil. 428, 436; 394 SCRA 210, 215 (2002).
32 Gillamac-Ortiz v. Almeida, Jr., A.M. No. P-07-2401, 28 November 2007, 539 SCRA 20, 25; Re:
Administrative Case for Dishonesty against Elizabeth Ting, Court Sec. I and Angelita Esmerio, Clerk III,
Office of the Clerk of Court, A.M No. 2001-7-SC & No. 2001-8-SC, 22 July 2005, 464 SCRA 1, 15.
33 Alabastro v. Moncada, Sr., A.M. No. P-04-1887, 16 December 2004, 447 SCRA 42, 59.
133
133
Miel vs. Malindog
and 1994 (third).34 Respondent filed these PDSs on three separate occasions, and these were verified
by the records officer of the SED-DPWH.35 It is already incontrovertible that respondent’s three PDSs
contained different and conflicting pieces of information as to his employment for the period 1984-1986.
There is no reason for us to disturb the consistent finding of CSC-RO No. 8, CSC-HO, and the Court of
Appeals that respondent made untruthful statements when he stated in his second PDS that he worked at
the PHJLD of DPWH Region 8 from 1 May 1984 until 9 October 1986; and when he indicated in his third
PDS that he was “on leave” from his job as civil engineer at DPWH Region 8 from 1 January 1984 up to 9
October 1986, when, in fact, he was working at PHILPOS BAGACAY MINES during the same period
according to his first PDS. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as
the CSC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. This is particularly true where the Court of
Appeals affirms such findings of fact.36
Respondent’s act of making false statements in his second and third PDSs clearly displayed dishonesty
on his part. Respondent’s dishonesty became more apparent when he received the unwarranted loyalty
cash award of P1,500.0037 for supposedly rendering 10 years of unbroken service. Evidently, the
erroneous computation of respondent’s years of service was caused by his varying and irreconcilable
statements in his three PDSs.
_______________
34 Records, pp. 137-139.
35 Id., at pp. 41 & 48.
36 Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 782, 788; 356 SCRA 651, 657 (2001).
37 Records, p. 145.
134
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Miel vs. Malindog
Respondent’s contention that the false statements in his second and third PDSs were caused by his frail
memory deserves scant consideration. It should be noted that the gaps among the dates he
accomplished his three PDSs, i.e., 20 December 1988, 2 March 1992 and 1994, were not that long as to
make him forget the vital information stated in each of them. And respondent accomplished all three
PDSs within a decade from the time of his employment in 1984 to 1986, making it unlikely for him not to
remember clearly the details thereof. Also, respondent was not that old or sickly, being only 38 and 40
years old at the time he signed his second and third PDSs, respectively, for him to have such poor
memory.38 Finally, respondent is a civil engineer and government employee. As such, he is expected to
be knowledgeable of and responsible for documents pertaining to his employment.
Section 52, A(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service
Rules), classifies dishonesty as a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of dismissal even if
committed for the first time.
Be that as it may, we observed that respondent had been in the government service for more or less 20
years, during which he made a steady ascent from a lowly laborer at the National Irrigation
Administration, Catbalogan, Samar, to a Civil Engineer II at the SED-DPWH.39 Respondent also had no
previous derogatory record as a government employee. Moreover, he returned the loyalty cash award of
P1,500.00.40 We can consider the foregoing as mitigating circumstances41 to lower the penalty
imposable on respondent pursuant to Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules, viz.:
_______________
38 Respondent was 38 years old in March 1992 and 40 years old in 1994.
39 Records, pp. 41 and 48.
40 Id., at pp. 25-27.
41 Civil Service Commission v. Manzano, G.R. No. 160195, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 113, 132; Civil
Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 578, 601.
135
135
Miel vs. Malindog
“Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances.—In the determination

of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxxx
g. habituality
xxxx
j. length of service in the government
xxxx
l. other analogous circumstances.”
In Apuyan, Jr. v. Sta. Isabel,42 a government employee was charged with and found guilty of dishonesty.
Nonetheless, instead of dismissing respondent, we imposed the penalty of one-year suspension without
pay considering that his dishonesty was his first offense. In Civil Service Commission v. Belagan,43 a
government employee was found guilty of grave misconduct, the penalty for which was dismissal from the
service. However, we did not impose the penalty of dismissal upon respondent, considering the presence
of the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his long years of service in the government; and (2) his
unblemished record in the past. We likewise ruled therein that the appropriate penalty for respondent was
one-year suspension from service without pay.
Pursuant to the aforementioned jurisprudence, we hold that instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal
upon respondent in the instant case, we are penalizing him for his dishonesty with one-year suspension
from service without pay and with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
_______________
42 Adm. Matter No. P-01-1497, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 1.
43 Supra note 41.
136
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Miel vs. Malindog
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 July 1999 and Resolution dated 26 May 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48045 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Respondent is hereby WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Carpio,** Austria-Marti-nez and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution affirmed in toto. Respondent warned against repetition of similar acts.
Notes.—As a general rule, counsel’s ineptitude is not a ground to annul judgment, for the latter’s
management of the case binds his client. (People vs. Bitanga, 525 SCRA 623 [2007])
An employee who falsifies an official document to gain unwarranted advantage over other more qualified
applicants to the same position and secure the sought-after promotion cannot be said to have measured
up to the standards required of a public servant. (Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty and Falsification
of Official Document, Benjamin R. Katly, Information Technology Officer I, 426 SCRA 236 [2004])
——o0o——
_______________
** Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 11 February 2009.
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Miel vs. Malindog, 579 SCRA 119, G.R.
No. 143538 February 13, 2009
Appeals; Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisprudence instructs that when a party is represented by
counsel, notice of the judgment, final order or resolution should be made upon the counsel of record—
thus, the fifteen-day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court commenced to run from receipt
of the judgment, final order or resolution by the party’s counsel on record.—Under the provisions of Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, the appeal from the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the CSC shall be
taken by filing a verified petition for review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment, final order or resolution. Jurisprudence instructs that when a party is represented by
counsel, notice of the judgment, final order or resolution should be made upon the counsel of record.
Thus, the fifteen-day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court commenced to run from receipt
of the judgment, final order or resolution by the party’s counsel on record.
Same; Same; Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned decision/resolution final and executory,
and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the decision/resolution, much less to entertain the
appeal; Filing of an appeal beyond the reglementary period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if
the barring of the appeal would be inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances therein—Courts
may suspend its own rules, or except a particular case from its operations, whenever the purposes of
justice require it.—The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the reglementary period will
make the judgment final and executory by operation of law. Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned
decision/resolution final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the
decision/resolution, much less to
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
120
120
Miel vs. Malindog

entertain the appeal. Nonetheless, we have held that a delay in the filing of an appeal under exceptional
circumstances may be excused on grounds of substantial justice and equity. Filing of an appeal beyond
the reglementary period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the barring of the appeal would be
inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances therein. Courts may suspend its own rules, or
except a particular case from its operations, whenever the purposes of justice require it. In Baylon v. Fact-
Finding Intelligence Bureau, we laid down the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court
to resist strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property; (2) counsel’s
Same; Same; Public Officers; Dismissal; Penalties; The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment
because it blemishes a person’s record in government service, an injury to one’s reputation and honor
which produces irreversible effects on one’s career and private life—worse, it implies loss of livelihood to
the employee and his family; Generally, a client is bound by the negligence of his counsel, but since, in
the instant case, he had nothing to do with the negligence of his counsel, his case should be an exception
to the rule, as the application of such rule would result in serious injustice to him.—In the case at bar, the
CSC-HO found respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from the
service. The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment because it blemishes a person’s record in
government service. It is an injury to one’s reputation and honor which produces irreversible effects on
one’s career and private life. Worse, it implies loss of livelihood to the employee and his family.
Respondent would certainly suffer grave injustice if the penalty of dismissal imposed on him turned out to
be erroneous or disproportionate and such was not duly rectified because of mere technicality. Further, it
appears that respondent was not able to file his appeal on time because Atty. Bulauitan failed to
immediately inform respondent of the notice of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648. Atty. Bulauitan was so
busy then as campaign manager of a senatorial aspirant that
121
121
Miel vs. Malindog
he forgot to notify respondent of the notice of said resolution. Generally, respondent is bound by the
negligence of Atty. Bulauitan. However, since respondent had nothing to do with the negligence of Atty.
Bulauitan, respondent’s case should be an exception to the rule on the effects of the counsel’s
negligence, as the application of such rule would result in serious injustice to respondent.
Public Officers; Dishonesty; Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline—a public
servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity; The act of making untruthful
statements, or concealment of any information in personal data sheets (PDS), constitutes dishonesty and
is punishable under the Civil Service rules.—Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. No
less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public
officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees additionally provides that
every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest. A PDS is an
official document required of a government employee and official by the Civil Service Commission. It is
the repository of all information about any government employee or official regarding his personal
background, qualification, and eligibility. Government employees are tasked under the Civil Service rules
to properly and completely accomplish their PDS. The act of making untruthful statements, or
concealment of any information in the PDS, constitutes dishonesty and is punishable under the Civil
Service rules. Dishonesty is a “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness.”
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the discipline and morale of the service.
Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances; Where the respondent public employee had been in the government
service for more or less 20 years, during which he made a steady ascent from a lowly laborer to a Civil
Engineer II, has no previous derogatory record as a government employee, and returned the loyalty cash
award, the same may be considered as mitigating circumstances to lower the imposable penalty.—
Section 52, A(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
122
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Miel vs. Malindog
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules), classifies dishonesty as a grave offense
with a corresponding penalty of dismissal even if committed for the first time. Be that as it may, we
observed that respondent had been in the government service for more or less 20 years, during which he
made a steady ascent from a lowly laborer at the National Irrigation Administration, Catbalogan, Samar,
to a Civil Engineer II at the SED-DPWH. Respondent also had no previous derogatory record as a
government employee. Moreover, he returned the loyalty cash award of P1,500.00. We can consider the
foregoing as mitigating circumstances to lower the penalty imposable on respondent pursuant to Section
53 of the Civil Service Rules, viz.: Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative
Circumstances.—In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Wilfredo M. Bolito for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the Decision2 dated 29 July 1999 and Resolution3 dated 26 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 48045.
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-22.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna with Associate Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a
member of this Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-29.
3 Rollo, pp. 30-31.
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Miel vs. Malindog
On 19 July 1994, petitioner Vicente A. Miel, then employed as Engineer II of the Samar Engineering
District, Department of Public Works and Highways, Catbalogan, Samar (SED-DPWH), filed with the Civil
Service Commission, Region Office No. 8, Tacloban City (CSC-RO No. 8), a Complaint for falsification of
official documents, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and grave
misconduct, against respondent Jesus A. Malindog, then employed also as Engineer II of SED-DPWH,
Samar.
Petitioner alleged in his Complaint that respondent submitted three separate Personal Data Sheets
(PDS), or Civil Service Form No. 212, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
According to the first PDS:4
PERSONAL DATA SHEET

(20 DECEMBER 1988)
xxxx

service)
From To AGENCY
xxxx
July 1, 1984 - October 9, 1986 C.E. Supervisor PHILPOS
BAGACAY MINES
The second PDS5 stated:
PERSONAL DATA SHEET

(2 MARCH 1992)
xxxx
_______________
4 Records, p. 137.
5 Id., at p. 138.
124
124
Miel vs. Malindog

service)
From To AGENCY
xxxx
June 1, 1984 – Dec. 31, 1986 Civil Engineer PJHL, DPWH
Jan. 1, 1984 – June 30, 1986 Civil Engineer -do-
July 1, 1986 – Oct. 9, 1986 Civil Engineer -do-
And the third PDS6 declared:
PERSONAL DATA SHEET

(Year 1994)
xxxx
SERVICE RECORD (Include experience outside government service)

From To AGENCY
xxxx
Jan. 1, 1984 - October 9, 1986 on leave
Petitioner compared respondent’s three PDSs and pointed out the following contradictory and apparently
deceitful information therein: respondent stated under the service record section of his first PDS that he
worked for PHILPOS BAGACAY MINES, a private company in Hinabangan, Samar, as C.E. Supervisor
from 1 July 1984 up to 9 October 1986; then respondent indicated under the service record section of his
second PDS that he worked at the Philippine-Japan Highway Loan Division (PJHLD) of the DPWH
Region 8 from 1 May 1984 until 9 October 1986; and, finally, respondent wrote under the service record
section of his third PDS that he was “on leave” from his job as civil engineer in DPWH Region 8 from 1
January 1984 up to 9 October 1986. By
_______________
6 Id., at p. 139.
125
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Miel vs. Malindog

reason of these false statements made by respondent in his PDS, he was granted an amount of
P1,500.00 as loyalty cash award by SED-DPWH. Respondent was also recommended for promotion to
the vacant position of Engineer III in SED-DPWH, but petitioner contended that respondent should be
disqualified from the said promotion by reason of the falsification he made on his three PDSs. Petitioner,
thus, prayed in his Complaint7 that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent based on the
foregoing allegations.
On 5 September 1994, respondent filed before CSC-RO No. 8 an Answer8 to petitioner’s Complaint. In
his Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and averred that they were malicious and pure
harassment. Respondent claimed that petitioner held a grudge against respondent because they were in
“bitter contest” for the vacant position of Engineer III in SED-DPWH. Petitioner scanned respondent’s
personal records just to make a case against him. Respondent explained that he indeed worked for
PHILPOS BAGACAY MINES and at the PJHLD of DPWH Region 8, but he could no longer recall the
exact dates of said employments, considering the length of time that had lapsed since then. Also due to
the frailty of human memory, respondent could not exactly remember his whereabouts during the period
he was supposedly on leave from his job as civil engineer in DPWH Region 8 for the period of 1 January
1984 to 9 October 1986. Respondent asserted that he did not commit any wrong when he accepted the
loyalty cash award. He did not bribe or use unlawful schemes in order to be recommended for the vacant
Engineer III position. Respondent pleaded that petitioner’s Complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
After conducting a preliminary investigation of petitioner’s Complaint, Lorenzo S. Danipog (Danipog),

Director III of
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 133-136.
8 Id., at pp. 67-71.
126
126
Miel vs. Malindog
CSC-RO No. 8, issued a Resolution9 formally charging respondent with dishonesty. Director Danipog
found that respondent had willfully and maliciously written false information on his three PDSs. He opined
that respondent purposely fabricated his second and third PDSs so he could be entitled to the loyalty
cash award of P1,500.00. Director Danipog did not give much credence to respondent’s defense of “frailty
of memory,” because respondent’s false statements on his PDSs were carefully written and complete as
to days, months and years, which could only be done by a conscious mind. The falsification of statements
in the PDS constituted dishonesty, and Danipog concluded that there was prima facie case to charge
respondent with the same.
On 7 July 1997, the Civil Service Commission Head Office (CSC-HO) issued Resolution No. 97330110
finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
The CSC-HO believed that respondent falsified his second and third PDSs so he could be entitled to the
loyalty cash award of P1,500.00 from SED-DPWH; under Section 7(e), Rule X of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code of the Philippines and CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 42 dated 15 October 1992, the loyalty award shall be given only to a government employee who has
completed at least ten (10) years of continuous and satisfactory service to the particular office granting
the award. The CSC-HO held that respondent’s actuation constituted dishonesty under the Civil Service
Rules. The dispositive portion of the CSC-HO Resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, Jesus A. Malindog is hereby found guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, he is meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties including perpetual
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 128-130.
10 Rollo, pp. 36-40.
127

127
Miel vs. Malindog
disqualification from holding public office and from taking future government examinations.”11
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC-HO Resolution No. 973301 dated 7 July 1997, but
it was denied by the CSC-HO in its Resolution No. 98064812 dated 25 March 1998. Thus, respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Respondent’s appeal was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 48045.
The Court of Appeals promulgated on 29 July 1999 its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48045, affirming with
modification CSC-HO Resolution No. 973301 dated 7 July 1997. The appellate court sustained the finding
of the CSC-HO that respondent was guilty of dishonesty for making false statements in his second and
third PDSs. Nevertheless, it held that the penalty of dismissal imposed on respondent should be reduced
to one-year suspension from work without pay considering that: (1) respondent had been in the
government service for almost 20 years; (2) this was his first offense; (3) he rose from the ranks as a
mere laborer until he was promoted to Engineer II at the SED-DPWH; and (3) he returned the loyalty cash
award of P1,500.00. Hence, the Court of Appeals decreed:
“WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is penalized to suffer one year suspension without pay, with the warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.”13
In its Resolution dated 26 May 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the aforementioned Decision.
_______________
11 Id., at p. 40.
12 Records, pp. 32-34.
13 Rollo, p. 28.
128
128
Miel vs. Malindog
Consequently, petitioner lodged the instant Petition before us assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY SECTION 4, RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE THAT THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME BY IGNORING OUR
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ISSUED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION THAT RESPONDENT’S
FORMER COUNSEL OR THROUGH RESPONSIBLE PERSON IN HIS OFFICE ADDRESS RECEIVED
CSC RESOLUTION DENYING HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FIFTY ONE (51) DAYS
BEFORE FILING HIS PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY IMPOSING THE

PENALTY OF ONE YEAR SUSPENSION INSTEAD OF AFFIRMING THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION’S PENALTY OF DISMISSAL AGAINST THE LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT, SINCE IT COULD NOT FAULT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR
HAVING COMMITTED ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Apropos the first issue, petitioner asserts that respondent’s appeal of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648
before the Court of Appeals was filed beyond the period allowed for appeal and should have been
therefore dismissed.14
Under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appeal from the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the CSC shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review to the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution. Jurisprudence instructs that when a
party is represented by counsel, notice of
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 13-17.
129
129
Miel vs. Malindog
the judgment, final order or resolution should be made upon the counsel of record.15 Thus, the fifteen-
day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court commenced to run from receipt of the judgment,
final order or resolution by the party’s counsel on record.16
Records show that in the filing of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of CSC-HO Resolution No.
973301, respondent was represented by Atty. Alexander L. Bulauitan.17 The CSC-HO issued Resolution
No. 980648 denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration on 25 March 1998. Atty. Bulauitan received
a copy of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648 on 29 April 1998.18 Respondent then had fifteen (15) days
from such date of receipt, or until 14 May 1998, to appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of the Court. Respondent, however, filed his appeal of CSC-HO Resolutions No. 973301 and No.
980648 with the Court of Appeals only on 19 June 1998, which was obviously beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for doing so.19
The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the reglementary period will make the judgment
final and executory by operation of law.20 Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary
period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned
decision/resolution final and executory, and deprives the ap-
_______________
15 Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA
302, 325 citing Spouses Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil 655, 664; 310 SCRA 393, 400 (1999);
Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-58781, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 555, 558; Cubar v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. L-55035, 23 February 1983, 120 SCRA 768, 772.
16 Rules of Court, Rule 13, Section 2.
17 Records, p. 38.
18 Rollo, p. 75.
20 Sapitan v. JB Line Bicol Express, Inc., G.R. No. 163775, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 230, 242-243.
130
130
Miel vs. Malindog
pellate court of jurisdiction to alter the decision/resolution, much less to entertain the appeal.21
Nonetheless, we have held that a delay in the filing of an appeal under exceptional circumstances may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice and equity.22 Filing of an appeal beyond the reglementary
period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the barring of the appeal would be inequitable and
unjust in light of certain circumstances therein.23 Courts may suspend its own rules, or except a particular
case from its operations, whenever the purposes of justice require it.24 In Baylon v. Fact-Finding
Intelligence Bureau,25 we laid down the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to
resist strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property; (2) counsel’s
In the case at bar, the CSC-HO found respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposed upon him the penalty
of dismissal from the service. The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment because it blemishes a
person’s record in government service. It is an injury to one’s reputation and honor which produces
irreversible effects on one’s career and private life. Worse, it implies loss of livelihood to the employee
and his
_______________
21 Sehwani Incorporated v. In-N-Out Burger, Inc., G.R. No. 171053, 15 October 2007, 536 SCRA 225,
233.
22 Legasto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76854-60, 25 April 1989, 172 SCRA 722, 727.
23 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 371, 384; 246 SCRA 304, 316-317 (1995).
24 C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275, 278 (1936).
25 442 Phil. 217, 231; 394 SCRA 21, 31 (2002).
131
131
Miel vs. Malindog
family. Respondent would certainly suffer grave injustice if the penalty of dismissal imposed on him
turned out to be erroneous or disproportionate and such was not duly rectified because of mere
technicality. Further, it appears that respondent was not able to file his appeal on time because Atty.
Bulauitan failed to immediately inform respondent of the notice of CSC-HO Resolution No. 980648. Atty.
Bulauitan was so busy then as campaign manager of a senatorial aspirant that he forgot to notify
respondent of the notice of said resolution. Generally, respondent is bound by the negligence of Atty.
Bulauitan. However, since respondent had nothing to do with the negligence of Atty. Bulauitan,
respondent’s case should be an exception to the rule on the effects of the counsel’s negligence, as the
application of such rule would result in serious injustice to respondent.26
Hence, it is in the greater interest of justice that the penalty of dismissal meted out to respondent be
meticulously reviewed by the Court of Appeals despite procedural lapses in respondent’s appeal. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in giving due course to respondent’s appeal.
With regard to his second assigned error, petitioner argues that respondent was guilty of dishonesty in
making false statements in his PDS and, thus, respondent should be dismissed from the service.27
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at
all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle
that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.28 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees additionally provides that
_______________
26 Id.
27 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
28 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1.
132
132
Miel vs. Malindog
every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest.29
A PDS is an official document required of a government employee and official by the Civil Service
Commission. It is the repository of all information about any government employee or official regarding his
personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Government employees are tasked under the Civil
Service rules to properly and completely accomplish their PDS.30 The act of making untruthful
statements, or concealment of any information in the PDS, constitutes dishonesty and is punishable
under the Civil Service rules.31 Dishonesty is a “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.”32 Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the discipline and morale of the service.33
It appears that respondent prepared and submitted three PDSs dated 20 December 1988 (first), 2 March
1992 (second)
_______________
29 Republic Act No. 6713, Section 2.
30 Advincula v. Dicen, G.R. No. 162403, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 696, 708; Bautista v. Navarro, 200
Phil. 278, 283; 114 SCRA 794, 798 (1982); Inting v. Tanodbayan, 186 Phil. 343, 348; 97 SCRA 494, 499
(1980).
31 Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro, A.M. No. P-04-1844, 23 July 2004, 435 SCRA 11, 20-21; Civil Service
Commission v. Sta. Ana, 435 Phil. 1, 11; 386 SCRA 1, 11 (2002); Biteng v. Department of Interior and
Local Government (Cordillera Administrative Region), G.R. No. 153894, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA
520, 528; De Guzman v. De los Santos, 442 Phil. 428, 436; 394 SCRA 210, 215 (2002).
32 Gillamac-Ortiz v. Almeida, Jr., A.M. No. P-07-2401, 28 November 2007, 539 SCRA 20, 25; Re:
Administrative Case for Dishonesty against Elizabeth Ting, Court Sec. I and Angelita Esmerio, Clerk III,
Office of the Clerk of Court, A.M No. 2001-7-SC & No. 2001-8-SC, 22 July 2005, 464 SCRA 1, 15.
33 Alabastro v. Moncada, Sr., A.M. No. P-04-1887, 16 December 2004, 447 SCRA 42, 59.
133
133
Miel vs. Malindog
and 1994 (third).34 Respondent filed these PDSs on three separate occasions, and these were verified
by the records officer of the SED-DPWH.35 It is already incontrovertible that respondent’s three PDSs
contained different and conflicting pieces of information as to his employment for the period 1984-1986.
There is no reason for us to disturb the consistent finding of CSC-RO No. 8, CSC-HO, and the Court of
Appeals that respondent made untruthful statements when he stated in his second PDS that he worked at
the PHJLD of DPWH Region 8 from 1 May 1984 until 9 October 1986; and when he indicated in his third
PDS that he was “on leave” from his job as civil engineer at DPWH Region 8 from 1 January 1984 up to 9
October 1986, when, in fact, he was working at PHILPOS BAGACAY MINES during the same period
according to his first PDS. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as
the CSC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. This is particularly true where the Court of
Appeals affirms such findings of fact.36
Respondent’s act of making false statements in his second and third PDSs clearly displayed dishonesty
on his part. Respondent’s dishonesty became more apparent when he received the unwarranted loyalty
cash award of P1,500.0037 for supposedly rendering 10 years of unbroken service. Evidently, the
erroneous computation of respondent’s years of service was caused by his varying and irreconcilable
statements in his three PDSs.
_______________
34 Records, pp. 137-139.
35 Id., at pp. 41 & 48.
36 Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 782, 788; 356 SCRA 651, 657 (2001).
37 Records, p. 145.
134
134
Miel vs. Malindog
Respondent’s contention that the false statements in his second and third PDSs were caused by his frail
memory deserves scant consideration. It should be noted that the gaps among the dates he
accomplished his three PDSs, i.e., 20 December 1988, 2 March 1992 and 1994, were not that long as to
make him forget the vital information stated in each of them. And respondent accomplished all three
PDSs within a decade from the time of his employment in 1984 to 1986, making it unlikely for him not to
remember clearly the details thereof. Also, respondent was not that old or sickly, being only 38 and 40
years old at the time he signed his second and third PDSs, respectively, for him to have such poor
memory.38 Finally, respondent is a civil engineer and government employee. As such, he is expected to
be knowledgeable of and responsible for documents pertaining to his employment.
Section 52, A(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service
Rules), classifies dishonesty as a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of dismissal even if
committed for the first time.
Be that as it may, we observed that respondent had been in the government service for more or less 20
years, during which he made a steady ascent from a lowly laborer at the National Irrigation
Administration, Catbalogan, Samar, to a Civil Engineer II at the SED-DPWH.39 Respondent also had no
previous derogatory record as a government employee. Moreover, he returned the loyalty cash award of
P1,500.00.40 We can consider the foregoing as mitigating circumstances41 to lower the penalty
imposable on respondent pursuant to Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules, viz.:
_______________
38 Respondent was 38 years old in March 1992 and 40 years old in 1994.
39 Records, pp. 41 and 48.
40 Id., at pp. 25-27.
41 Civil Service Commission v. Manzano, G.R. No. 160195, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 113, 132; Civil
Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 578, 601.
135
135
Miel vs. Malindog
“Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances.—In the determination

of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxxx
g. habituality
xxxx
j. length of service in the government
xxxx
l. other analogous circumstances.”
In Apuyan, Jr. v. Sta. Isabel,42 a government employee was charged with and found guilty of dishonesty.
Nonetheless, instead of dismissing respondent, we imposed the penalty of one-year suspension without
pay considering that his dishonesty was his first offense. In Civil Service Commission v. Belagan,43 a
government employee was found guilty of grave misconduct, the penalty for which was dismissal from the
service. However, we did not impose the penalty of dismissal upon respondent, considering the presence
of the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his long years of service in the government; and (2) his
unblemished record in the past. We likewise ruled therein that the appropriate penalty for respondent was
one-year suspension from service without pay.
Pursuant to the aforementioned jurisprudence, we hold that instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal
upon respondent in the instant case, we are penalizing him for his dishonesty with one-year suspension
from service without pay and with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
_______________
42 Adm. Matter No. P-01-1497, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 1.
43 Supra note 41.
136
136
Miel vs. Malindog
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 July 1999 and Resolution dated 26 May 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48045 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Respondent is hereby WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Carpio,** Austria-Marti-nez and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution affirmed in toto. Respondent warned against repetition of similar acts.
Notes.—As a general rule, counsel’s ineptitude is not a ground to annul judgment, for the latter’s
management of the case binds his client. (People vs. Bitanga, 525 SCRA 623 [2007])
An employee who falsifies an official document to gain unwarranted advantage over other more qualified
applicants to the same position and secure the sought-after promotion cannot be said to have measured
up to the standards required of a public servant. (Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty and Falsification
of Official Document, Benjamin R. Katly, Information Technology Officer I, 426 SCRA 236 [2004])
——o0o——
_______________
** Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 11 February 2009.
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Miel vs. Malindog, 579 SCRA 119, G.R.
No. 143538 February 13, 2009
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G.R. No. 171535. June 5, 2009.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

RGR Law Office for respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

1 Rollo, pp. 7-16.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

3 This should be March 23, 1958.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The counterclaim of defendant, however, is denied for lack of merit.

4 Rollo, pp. 7-10.

5 Records, pp. 222-230.

VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

6 Id., at pp. 232-234.

7 Id., at pp. 245-252.

8 Id., at pp. 238-241, 258-274.

9 Id., at pp. 282-287.

10 This provision provides:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

xxx xxx xxx

VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

11 Records, pp. 284-286.

12 Supra note 1 at p. 16.

15 360 Phil. 891, 909; 300 SCRA 722, 739-740 (1998).

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

17 Records, pp. 162-165.

VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef stipulates, in relevant part:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

23 Revilla, et al. v. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480, 484 (1960).

VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

Vda. de Melencion, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.24 is apropos:

xxx xxx xxx

24 Supra note 21.

25 Id., at pp. 79-80.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol

28 Id., at pp. 65-66.

VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 18, 2009

People vs. Taruc

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

Quisumbing, Carpio,* Austria-Martinez (Actg. Chairperson) and Peralta, JJ., concur.