Miranda VS Aguirre
Miranda VS Aguirre
Miranda VS Aguirre
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela
into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago
ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among
others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city, viz.:
Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words
"an independent" thereon so that said Section will read as follows:
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire
section and in its stead substitute the following:
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend
that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The
Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it
is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of
the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the
provincial board of Isabela. 4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not
require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules
implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They
defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a
result of its reclassification.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule
that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. 5Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in
his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city council of Santiago. It
is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to a mere component
city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of
R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City.
Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of
Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the
COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional. 1âw phi 1.nêt
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its
appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial
power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue
has been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Tañada
v. Cuenco, 6 we held:
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers "to those questions which under the Constitution are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by
law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No.
8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not
petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws
passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that
this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide
that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires
a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government
units belongs to Congress. 8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in
Congress. 9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the
issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city
requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not
the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal
that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve
a common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement.
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for
it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable
practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit
directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing,
abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their
sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru
people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting
more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For
one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be
placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of
Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province.
Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of
Santiago, viz.: 10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had
"merely re-classified" Santiago City from an independent component city into a
component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be,
actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial changes in
the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the
Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to
the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically, and administratively. Thus, the
territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the
province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial
Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the
internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A.
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area
and population of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government,
and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined
(Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes
on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160),
professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140,
R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City.
Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the
City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the
schedule set forth by Section 285 of R.A. No. 7160. The City Government's share in
the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted
since certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A.
No. 7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial
officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial
Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every component city and municipality
within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review
(Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section
455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the
local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No.
7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial
Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of
the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No.
7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an
independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X),
1987 Constitution).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a
plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite
should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No.
8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the
people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with
the Constitution when it provides that:
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they
result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a
change in the political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No.
8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This
power of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite
clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused
a transition in the status of Santiago as a city. Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was
created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly
affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere
transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its
physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if
the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government
unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that
the Constitution imposes two conditions — first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the
Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be
approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said
criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements,
however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit
concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people.
Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its
requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section
10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority
of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law
or ordinance fixes another
date. 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite
is absolute and mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different
purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area
are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators,
hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall
be attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the
people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose — to use the people's voice as a
check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against
this excess committed by the political representatives of the people themselves than the exercise
of direct people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are ". . . basic to local government, it is also
imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants
of the locality concerned. . . . By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will
also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the
benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government units." 13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the debates in
Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent
component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes.
Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no
significant change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the
people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is
the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of
officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to
be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to
submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be
voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of the
amendment "after a very enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz.: 14
Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the
Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in
the Record the whole text thereof.
The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled:
Insert
The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified
to run for any elective positions in the Province of Isabela.
The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and
authority of general supervision over the city and its officials, which power and
authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very far away
from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is
affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the said province, and is
benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the
City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I
want some explanation on what happened between then and now that has made us
decided that the City of Santiago should cease to be independent and should now
become a component city.
In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that
they want to participate in the provincial elections.
Thank you.
This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is
the reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that
a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.
The question I would like to raise — and I would like to recall the statement of our
Minority Leader — is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular
politician.
In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the
additional territory be added to the election of the provincial officials of the province
of Isabela.
Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago
who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children
will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime
reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who
signed the resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by
the congressman of that district who represents a constituency, the voice of the
district.
I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must
be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law which has
been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given account, as we do
give account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.
In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite
in order to approve the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that
the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this
issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be
proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those
enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this
constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city.
That is how the members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an
amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no
provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the
other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the
province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it.
To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political
leaders of Isabela deciding for them.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute
suspension of the session.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela — I am no great fan of
the Senator from Isabela — but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only
his province but his own city where he is a resident and registered voter.
So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance,
senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the
request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the district
of other senators. I need not remind them.
May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of
Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised
the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the province. The town
is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?
But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the
Committee.
In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros
Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the
law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its
enactment, viz:
The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation of the new
Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The
transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials
shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the
election for President and Vice-President." Thus, the petitioners reported after the
event: "With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up
and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government
officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the
elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to
deliver the "solid North" to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened
in Negros del Norte during the elections — the unashamed use of naked power and
resources — contributed in no small way to arousing "people's power" and steel the
ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to
be a Filipino today.
The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the
implementing acts complained of, viz., the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new
province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void.
The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province
(as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining
areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of
Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela,
Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid,
San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly
contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then
prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its
boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected." It is plain that all the cities and municipalities
of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new
province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and
entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in
the plebiscite, because the whole is affected by its proposed division and substantial
alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be
partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only
the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes
of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent
component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite
the City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan 17 whose charters were
amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which their city
belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are
not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the
city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not highly
urbanized cities which alone were considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was
under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained: 18
. . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers
the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no
intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and there is
no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the
powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City
of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city.
Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power
to vote in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being
a component city. It is for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing qualified voters of the city of
Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he
explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a
component city. 20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy
the anomalous situation then obtaining". . . where voters of one component city cannot vote simply because their
charters so provide." 21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities prohibiting their people from
voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional
and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from
implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
I share the opinion of the majority of my colleagues that, for the reasons expressed in
the ponencia, a plebiscite is essential in order to render effective the conversion of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, from an independent to a component city. I would not go to the extent,
however, of declaring Republic Act No. 7720 unconstitutional; instead, with due respect, I take
the view that a plebiscite can be held conformably with the provisions of the Local Government
Code. I do not see, in this instance, a serious incompatibility in having Republic Act No. 7720
stand along with the Local Government Code.
The issue in this case is whether the conversion of the City of Santiago in Isabela province from
an independent component city to a component city constitutes the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a city within the contemplation of Art. X, §10
of the Constitution so as to require the approval of the people in a plebiscite. The Court, in
declaring R.A. No. 8528 unconstitutional for lack of provision for a plebiscite, does not say that
the reclassification of Santiago City as an ordinary component city constitutes creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundary. Nonetheless, the Court today holds that
because the reclassification of the city would result in a "material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein," the
approval of the law in a plebiscite is required. 1âw phi 1.nêt
With all due respect I submit that not every change — however "material" and far-reaching — in
the classification of a local government unit requires popular approval. Only if the reclassification
involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a
need for such changes to be approved by the people, for then there would be a creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government unit, as the case
may be, within the meaning of Art. X, §10 of the Constitution. Thus, the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 7160), in implementing the constitutional provision in question, states:
(a) Income. — It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate
with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Sec. 8. Division and Merger. — Division and merger of existing local government
units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their
creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the
income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below
its current income classification prior to such division.
The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6)
months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial
position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province,
city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be
abolished will be incorporated or merged.
The conversion from an independent component city to a component city involves no such
changes in income, population, or land area. There may be changes in the voting rights of the
residents of the city, the supervision of the city's administration, and the city's share in the local
taxes, as petitioners point out, but such changes do not amount to the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government unit so as to require a
plebiscite for their approval. An independent component city and an ordinary component city are
both component cities, as distinguished from highly urbanized cities.1 The only difference between
them is that the charters of the independent component cities prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials and such cities are independent of the provinces in which they are
located. 2 Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit
their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities
shall be independent of the province.
Sec. 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. — (a) Cities with a minimum population of two
hundred thousand (200,000.00) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer;
shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet the above requirements shall be considered component
cities of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is
located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city shall be
considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality.
(c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for
elective provincial officials.
Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials
prior to the classification of said cities as highly urbanized after the ratification of the
Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such
right.
The Court says that the changes resulting from the reclassification of Santiago City as an
ordinary component city "cannot be considered insubstantial." For one, it is said, its
independence will be diminished because the city mayor will be placed under the administrative
supervision of the provincial governor. For another, the resolutions and ordinances of the city
council will have to be approved by the provincial board of Isabela.
The fact is that whether the City of Santiago is an independent component city or an ordinary
component city, it is subject to administrative supervision, with the only difference that, as an
independent component city, it is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines,
whereas, as an ordinary component city, it will be subject to the supervision of the President
through the province.3 That is hardly a distinction. For the fact is that under the Constitution, the
President of the Philippines exercises general supervision over all local governments. 4
Nor does it matter that ordinances passed by the city councils of component cities are subject to review (not approval as
the Court says) by the provincial boards for the purpose of determining whether the ordinances are within the powers of
the city councils to enact. 5 For that matter, ordinances passed by the city councils of independent component cities are
likewise subject to review, although by the Office of the President. 6 The reason for this is to be found in Art. X, §4 of the
Constitution which provides:
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the
acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
In any case, these are not important differences which determine whether the law effecting them
should be approved in a plebiscite. The defining characteristics of a local government unit are its
income, population, and local area, as §§450 and 452 of the LGC provide. These are referred to
in §7 of the LGC and its Implementing Rules as the "verifiable indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services." Tested by these standards, there is no change in the City of
Santiago requiring the approval of the people in a plebiscite.
The majority states: "It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago
City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its People
thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite
should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No.
8525 downgrades the status of their city." The conversion of the then Municipality of Santiago in
Isabela Province by R.A. No. 7720 was an act of creation. It was based on the municipality's
satisfying the requisites for the creation of a city as provided in the LGC, to wit:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office;
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income.
As thus indicated these requisites are based on the "verifiable indicators" of income, population,
and land area and, therefore, the conversion of what was once a municipality into a city needed
approval in a plebiscite. But the conversion of Santiago City from an independent component city
into a component city involves no more than a change in the right of the people (i.e., the
registered voters of the city) to vote for provincial elective officials.
If an analogy is needed, it is to the reversion of a component city — whether independent or
ordinary — to the status of a municipality. For then the city is actually abolished and abolition, as
stated in the Art. X, §10 of the Constitution, must be approved by the majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite. Stated otherwise, when a municipality is converted into a city, a city is created, and
when the city is reverted into a municipality, the city is abolished. Both acts
of creation and abolition require the approval of the people in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
But when an independent component city is converted into a component city, it is not created into
another form, it is not divided, it is not merged with another unit of local government, it is not
abolished, much less is its boundary substantially altered.
Indeed, this is not the first time that an independent component city is converted into a
component city without a plebiscite. The City of Oroquieta, created as an independent component
city in 1969 by R.A. No. 5518, was converted into a component city in 1989 by R.A. No. 6726,
while the City of San Carlos, created as an independent component city in 1965 by R.A. No.
4187, was converted into a component city by R.A. No. 6843 in 1990. In both cases, the
conversion was made without submitting the matter to a plebiscite.
There is, therefore, no reason for requiring that the reclassification of Santiago City as a
component city must be approved by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite and for holding
that, because R.A. No. 8528 contains no provision for such plebiscite, it is unconstitutional.
It is easy to sympathize with calls for plebiscites as an exercise of direct democracy by the
people. But, although the Constitution declares that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them," it also provides that we are a "republican State." 7 It is
thus a representative form of government that we have. With few exceptions, we have vested the legislative power in the
Congress of the Philippines. 8 This means that when an act of the people's representatives assembled in Congress is duly
passed and approved by the President in the manner prescribed in the Constitution, the act becomes a law 9 without the
need of approval or ratification by the people in order to be effective.10
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, whose well-
written ponenciaexpresses his opinion with clarity, I regret that I am unable to agree that Republic
Act No. 8528 should be declared as unconstitutional for the following reasons:
Sec. 10 Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:
In short, conversion does not appear in the 1987 Constitution nor in the Section 10, Chapter 2 of
the Local Government Code. Surprisingly, Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing
Rules of the Local Government Code included conversion in the enumeration of the modes of
changing the status of local government units, thus:
Other than that, the Local Government Code uses the term "conversion" only in the following
instances: (1) Section 7, which provides that "[a]s a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators
of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: . . . . . .;" (2) Section 450, which
provides for the requisites for the "conversion" of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a
component city; and (3) Section 462, which involves the "conversion" of existing sub-provinces
into regular provinces.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. defines 1 — "conversion," as "the elevation of an LGU from one level to another,
like converting a municipality to a city or a component city to a highly urbanized one or the raising of the classification of
one municipality, city or province from a fourth class category to third, second or first." It is my humble opinion therefore
that the requirement of a plebiscite does not apply to the case at bar which does not involve the upgrading or elevation of
Santiago City but a downgrading thereof.
2. I am not convinced that a mere Rule and Regulation intended to implement the Local
Government Code can expand the terms and provisions clearly expressed in the basic law to be
implemented. As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in his Comment on the petition viz.:
As a matter of fact, Mr. Justice Puno, in his ponencia in the above cited case of Iglesia ni Kristo, opined that "(T)his rule is
void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and
spirit of the law they seek to enforce. 3
3. The proceedings in the Senate show that the Committee on Local Government, to which H.B. No. 8729 was referred,
reported back to the Senate with the recommendation that it be approved with the following amendment:
Sec. 3. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the
entire section and in its stead substitute the following:
However, after the deliberations in the Senate, the Committee on Local Government decided to
withdraw the foregoing proposed amendment. Hence, on February 6, 1998, the Republic Act No.
8528, the constitutionality of which is challenged by the petitioners, was approved.
Be that as it may, may this Court properly require a plebiscite for the validity of said law when
Congress itself, which had been given the opportunity to include such a requirement, decided
against it? Are we not supplanting our judgment over that of Congress, a co-equal branch of
government entrusted by the Constitution to enact laws? I respectfully submit that we may not do
so without disturbing the balance of power as apportioned and delineated by the Constitution.
5. Finally, in a situation where the supposed breach of the constitution is doubtful, equivocal and,
at best, based on argumentative implications, I believe that, as we have ruled in a plethora of
cases 4, every law has in its favor, the presumption of constitutionality and in case of doubt, the Court must exert every
effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it and the
executive that approved it. 1âw phi 1.nêt