G. R. No. 100633.

August 28, 2001

G. R. No. 101550. August 28, 2001

(Joint decision of the Court on two cases)

Facts:

In 1988, Deogracias R. Reyes and Rosalina N. Reyes filed with the Regional Trial Court, Naga City
a complaint against Socorro Abella-Soriano for declaration and recognition of real right under an implied
contract of services, reformation of instrument and damages.

The complaint has two causes of action.

1.) Deogracias and Rosalina pleaded that they were employed by Socorro as manager and administrative
assistant of her property and real estate in 1968. As payment for their services, in 1973, Socorro gave
Deogracias and Rosalina one apartment unit to use as their dwelling for the duration of their lifetime. A
token monthly rental of one hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) was imposed on them to enable them to
supposedly keep their self-respect. In the same building, there existed a unit which Deogracias and Rosalina
improved and converted into a pub and restaurantat a cost of four hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P450,000.00). They were able to sell some residential lots of Socorro. They were able to find tenants and
even collected rents in behalf of Socorro.

Despite all these efforts, on October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina notice to
vacate the two units at No. 67 Elias Angeles St., Naga City.Deogracias and Rosalina averred that Socorro
agreed to allow them to use the two units for the duration of their lifetime as compensation for their services.
By now ejecting them from the premises, Socorro reneged on her obligation.

2.) Deogracias and Rosalina were the owners of two commercial lots with improvements. In 1986,
Deogracias and Rosalina became indebted to Socorro in the amount of P638,635.36. The parties agreed that
to pay for the debt, Deogracias and Rosalina were to sell the two commercial lots P2.5M and deliver part of
the proceeds of the sale to Socorro. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed the
property to Socorro by way of first mortgage. Instead of a real estate mortgage, Socorro prepared two
documents, a deed of absolute sale covering Deogracias and Rosalinas property and a memorandum of
agreement. Due to the ascendancy of Soccorro over them and also because of Socorros repeated assurance
that the documents had the same effect as a real estate mortgage, Deogracias and Rosalina signed the same.
Socorro presented the deed of absolute sale to the register of deeds of Naga City and as a consequence TCT
Nos. 9388 and 9424 were released in her favor. It was only in September 1988, that Deogracias and
Rosalina discovered that they were deprived of the ownership of their property.

Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the first cause of action was
barred by the pendency of an ejectment case between the same parties over the same premises and that the
second cause of action was premature.

The Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress, Socorro, filed with the trial court an urgent ex-
parte motion for restraining order.The Carmelite Sisters talked to respondent Judge Naval in his chambers
and requested him to immediately act on Socorros urgent ex-parte motion for a restraining order. Judge
Naval told the Carmelite Sisters that he could not issue the ex-parte restraining order because a Supreme
Court administrative circular required a hearing with notice to the adverse party. To this statement, Sister
Margaret Mary retorted, Why would Atty. Padilla (Socorros counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.) ask for an ex-
parte restraining order when according to you that is prohibited by an order or circular of the Supreme
Court? Do you mean Atty. Padilla does not even know that there is such an order or circular, when he has
a brother in the Supreme Court (Associate Justice Teodoro Padilla).-

(DI AKO AGREE SA MAGIGING DECISION REGARDING CONTEMPT.. -FEELING KO

In 1989, the trial court granted Socorros motion to dismiss with respect to Deogracias and Rosalinas
first cause of action but denied the same insofar as the second cause of action was concerned.
On the same day, Socorro, through counsel, Atty. Padilla, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Naval
praying that the ends of justice would best be served if the case was re-raffled to another judge. The grounds
cited were: A.) while still a law practitioner and politician, Judge Naval was a frequent customer of the
restaurant owned by Deogracias and was a good friend of his. B.) Judge Naval was also a close friend of
Rosalina and Deogracias attorney, Atty. Dennis B. Recon.The trial Court denied the motion to inhibit.
According to the Court, Judge Naval is competent to hear this case and to render judgment which is
fair and just to both parties.

On March 12, 1990, Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with temporary restraining order. Socorro assailed the following orders of Judge Naval:

1.) His insistence on exercising jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding Deogracias and Rosalinas failure
to pay the correct filing fee on their amended complaint.

2.)His admission of Deogracias and Rosalinas amended complaint which they termed as a supplemental
complaint, despite the fact that it pleaded a cause of action directly contrary to that stated in the original
complaint.

3.) His refusal to issue an ex-parte restraining order to restrain Deogracias and Rosalina from seizing
possession of the property subject of the case on the ground that he was prohibited from doing so by a
certain Supreme Court Circular;

4.) His refusal to inhibit himself from hearing the case.

5.) His unreasonable and violent reaction towards a motion for reconsideration filed by Socorro and Atty.
Padilla.

CA dismissed the petition.

Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the Supreme Court a petition assailing the decision.

GUYS, MAHABA YUNG DISCUSSION SA DECISIONS, ETO LANG YUNG PERTINENT SA

Charge of Direct Contempt of Court

The Court of Appeals erred when it stated that a certiorari proceeding assailing the judgment of
direct contempt was not proper as Atty. Padilla may have appealed therefrom. Rule 71, Section 2, Revised
Rules of Court provides: A person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but
may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. This is exactly what petitioners did.

The Court of Appeals also erred when it affirmed the trial courts finding of direct contempt of court
against Atty. Padilla. Rule 71, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so
near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the
court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment on direct contempt on two grounds.

 Pursuing relentlessly his design to embarrass this Presiding Judge by claiming in his Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration dated August 26, 1989 that this Presiding Judge could not correctly
understand the clearly worded Administrative Circular No. 1 of the Supreme Court.

 Alleging in disrespectful and insulting manner in his Omnibus Motion for Recommendation dated
August 26, 1989 the following:

a. It is respectfully submitted that even a first-year law student will readily see that the last sentence of the
par. 2-3 above quoted - Restraining orders or preliminary injunction should not be issued without prior
notice and hearing and showing of a clear right thereto - must be read and understood in the light of the
heading and subject being discussed, namely, Prompt Action on Dilatory Petitions, to Delay Enforcement of
Executory Judgments. By no stretch of the imagination can it be interpreted in isolation to mean that Courts
had lost their inherent power to issue ex-parte restraining orders.

And this Court certainly can read and understand just what par. 3-2 of Administrative Circular No. 1 means.
(par. 9);

b. One had a right to assume that this Court was sufficiently acquainted with the principle in Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that.

c. Given the foregoing conduct of this Court, undersigned counsel felt that for reasons known only to the
Court it could not really act freely on this Case as it ordinarily would, and therefore a motion to inhibit was
probably the best way out of this situation. (par. 14 (b), sub-par. 4);

d. But the Court obviously took the motion to inhibit in a different light. Not only did it deny the motion; in
so doing, it vented its anger at undersigned counsel and the Carmalite Sisters;

e. They were Carmelite (sic) Sisters, or if their official name is to be used, they were Sisters belonging to the
order of Discalced Carmilites. The Sisters or Daughters of Charity, are an entirely different religious
congregation. It seems that the Court could not get correctly even this very elementary fact;

f. Fourthly, even the Courts version is not at all flattering to it. For if that version were to be believed, the
Court even went to the extent of allowing the sisters to make representations with it, and improper
representations at that, instead of firmly telling the sisters that they were out of bounds and should leave. It
is bad enough that a Presiding Judge should allow a lawyer to discuss the merits of a case out of court and
without the presence of opposing counsel; that he should allow non-lawyers and non-parties, who have
nothing to do with a case, to even discuss them with him is the height of impropriety;

g. All the foregoing circumstances naturally cast serious doubts on the accuracy and truthfulness of the
Courts statements above quoted;
h. What version then is to be believed? With all due respect, it is submitted that the foregoing version of the
Carmelite Sisters is to be believed;

i. When defendant pointed this out in her motion to dismiss and other pleadings, this Court instead of
dismissing both the original and the supplemental complaint sought to remedy the irremediable. It refrained
from passing on it in ruling on the motion to dismiss; but in a separate order of July 12, 1989, it required the
plaintiffs to pay the difference between what they had paid on the original complaint and what they should
pay on the supplemental complaint. In other words, instead of dismissing the supplemental complaint for
non-payment of the filing fee, which is all that it could do, the Court went out of its way to save the day for
the plaintiffs by giving them an opportunity to pay the correct filing fee and thus retain jurisdiction over the
same.
But that is not all. It even gave plaintiffs credit for the inadequate filing fee they paid under their original
complaint;

j. Hence, if plaintiffs insist on their change of theory, the obvious remedy is not by way of supplemental or
even amended complaint, but by dismissing the original complaint and filing an entirely new one. But of
course, that would mean a raffle and plaintiffs apparently do not want to risk having their case fall into
another branch or sala.
It is respectfully submitted, however, that plaintiffs obvious desire to keep their case in this particular
branch of the court is no excuse for violating the rules.

After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we find that Atty. Padillas
innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be considered contumacious.A lawyer’s
remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of
contempt that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt.Courts must be slow to punish for direct
contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie
curiae.
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle,and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.The courts must exercise
the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
Snide remarks or even sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely
actionable under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judges generally and wisely pass unnoticed any
mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. In the natural
order of things, when a case is decided, one party wins and another loses, and oftentimes, both sides are
equally confident and sanguine. Thus, disappointment is great for the party whose action or view fails. It is
human nature that there be bitter feelings which often reach to the judge as the source of the supposed
wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears as but a momentary
outbreak of disappointment.

Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous
language.While judges must exercise patience, lawyers must also observe temperate language as well.
At this juncture, we admonish all lawyers to observe the following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:

Canon 8. Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

A lawyer is an officer of the Court,bound by the law. It is a lawyer’s sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. It is
peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor.
It may happen that counsel possesses a greater knowledge of the law than the judge who presides
over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their
decision. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are
necessary for the orderly administration of justice. Malicious attacks on courts have in some cases been
treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sufficient ground for disbarment.However,
mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of
the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated.
This is not to say that courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer
may criticize the court. He must do so in a bona fide manner, uberrima fides. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism on the one hand, and abuse and slander of the courts and of the judges thereof on the other.
Unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration is proscribed.