PURIFICACION V. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANGELO PEREZ, respondent-appellee.

Facts

 The position of Senior Clerk in the Fiscal Management and Budget Division of the Court of Appeals with
an authorized s of P4,800 per annum, became vacant. The petitioner, Purificacion V. Garcia, who
was then occupying another position of Senior Clerk in the same division but with compensation
at the rate of P3,400 per annum, filed with the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals a written
application for the vacant position stating therein her qualifications.
 upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court of Appeals, the Presiding Justice of said Court,
appointed respondent Angelo Perez to the vacant position, with compensation at the rate of P4,200
per annum, effective on September 14, 1964. At that time, the respondent was holding the position of
Cash and Payroll Clerk in the same division, with compensation at the rate of P3,960 per annum.
 the petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission, a protest against the appointment of the
respondent on the ground that she was next in rank, better qualified and entitled to
preferential appointment to the position. The Commissioner of Civil Service indorsed the
petitioner's protest to the Court of Appeals for comment. In a second endorsement, the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals, recommended approval of the appointment of the respondent

 In a separate communication to the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Chief of the Fiscal Management
and Budget Division of the Court of Appeal stated that the recommendation for the approval of the
appointment of the respondent was made "after carefully studying the records and efficiency
ratings of the ranking employees in said division where the vacancy exists" and that while the
herein petitioner occupies an item in his division, she never worked therein and "has no knowledge
or experience about the nature or kind of work being performed" in said division.
 The first Deputy Clerk of Court and Administrative Officer of the Court of Appeals also informed the
Commissioner of Civil Service that the position of Cash and Payroll Clerk, was considered next in
rank to the position of Senior Clerk to which the respondent was appointed and this ranking
was based in the "hierarchical organization of the Fiscal Department and Budget Division to
which the two above-mentioned positions belong, the degree of relationship between these two
positions and the similarity in the nature of the duties inherent in them."
 the Commissioner of Civil Service approved the appointment of the respondent as Senior Clerk
with compensation at the rate of P4,200 per annum
 the position of Cash and Payroll Clerk vacated by the respondent, the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals appointed Virginia Soriano thereto. On November 23, 1966, the petitioner sent to
the Commissioner of Civil Service her protest against said appointment on the ground that it
violated the Civil Service Rules on Promotion,
 On November 25, 1966, the petitioner commenced the present action but three days later, or on
November 28, 1966, she went her formal protest against the appointment of Mrs. Soriano, with
a prayer that it be disapproved and to cause the appointment of the petitioner to said position.

 The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that: "A careful reading of the plaintiff's
complaint and the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties disclose that the petitioner does not
claim to be entitled to the position but she merely asserted a preferential right' to be appointed
thereto. Considering that she has not been appointed to the position in question, she cannot,
therefore, be placed and made to occupy it. Under the situation, the petitioner has no cause of action
against the respondent." 3 The court a quo further noted that: "Another circumstance which militates
against the present action is that it was commenced beyond the period of one year from the time the
alleged right of the petitioner to hold the office in question arose.
Issue: is whether the petitioner-appellant has the right to bring a quo warranto proceeding questioning
the legality of the appointment of the respondent.

Ruling:

1. Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner, in a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public
office, must be able to show that he is entitled to said office. Absent such an element, the petition
must be dismissed. This is a principle that goes back to Acosta v. Flor, 6 a 1905 decision. There, the
doctrine has been laid down that: "No individual can bring a civil action relating to usurpation of
a public office without averring that he has a right to the same; and at any stage of the
proceedings, if it be shown that such individual has no right, the action may be dismissed
because there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of
such action is destroyed” .

This has been the exacting rule, since then, 7 followed with stricter firmness in Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, 8

In other words, one whose claim is predicated solely upon a more or less remoted possibility, that
he may be the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of action against the office holder. This is
precisely the situation in the case at hand, and there is no cogent reason to change the rule. Perforce, the
instant appeal may be dismissed, even on this ground alone.

2. The observation just made finds relevance to the issue raised in appellant's second assignment of
error, relative to the fatal consequence of her failure to institute the present quo warranto
proceedings within the reglementary period of one year from the accrual of the cause of action
(Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court). In said assignment of error, 9 petitioner-appellant maintains that
the lower court erred in holding that this action should have been commenced within one (1) year
from the appointment of appellee and argues that her cause of action arose only after notice of the
denial of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service
on her protest against the appointment of respondent-appellee. Moreover,' she insists that the
pendency of the protest in the Civil Service Commission suspended the running of the one-yea

The authorities relied upon by appellant are, however, not in point and do not apply in this case. The first case
is one of mandamus - and the case at bar cannot be considered as one, as already shown - asking for the
reinstatement of an employee who was ordered dismissed for cause by the Commission on Civil Service. The
second is a dissenting opinion which is not binding, as it is a mere expression of the individual view of the
dissenting justice from the conclusion held by the majority of the court. The last was expressly abandoned
in Torres v. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436, 439 (195 1),

As applied to the instant case, the admitted facts show that the appointment in controversy was made
on 12 September 1964, effective 14 September 1964; respondent-appellee assumed office on the
strength thereof, and received the salary corresponding to said position. The petition herein was filed
only on 25 November 1966, clearly more than one year after the pretended right of petitioner-appellant
to hold the office in question arose. This circumstance has close the door for any judicial remedy in her favor.

This makes it unnecessary to take up in detail the other assignment of errors advanced by petitioner-appellant.
Suffice it to state that petitioner-appellant has not overcome the presumption of regularity and legality in
official actions anent the extension of the appointment in question by the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and the approval thereof, by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Even if viewed only as a matter of
equity, we cannot disregard, as if they were totally irrelevant, the facts that appellee was at the time of the
issuance of the disputed appointment, receiving a higher salary than appellant; and that he, as cash and payroll
clerk, had always worked in the division to which the contested position pertains, while appellant has never
worked therein, although her item is that of a senior clerk of the same division, thereby giving appellee
higher potentiality for, if not actually greater, competence for the duties and responsibilities of the
position in question.

Likewise, three days after filing the instant petition, appellant protested with the Commissioner of Civil Service
the appointment of one Mrs. Virginia Soriano to the position of cash and payroll clerk, the position vacated by
appellee, praying that she (appellant) be appointed to said position. This theory of abandonment, as
advanced by appellee 14 and raised in appellee's Motion to Dismiss, 15 was not refuted by appellant, as
she could have done by filing a reply brief which she did not. Undeniably, there is obvious validity in
this contention, at least insofar as it tends to show appellant's own conviction in the weakness of her
claim to be entitled to the position in dispute, which constitutes the real and actual foundation of the
action of quo warranto which she has instituted.