Issues in CONTENTS

1-4 Theoretical note

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Regulation Theory
N° 49
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Juillet 2004

EDITORIAL

No, the French social protection system has not collapsed; it has indeed resisted the forces of managerial neo-
liberalism. Yes, it has modernised itself, succeeded in preserving its unity and reaffirmed the originality of its hybrid trajec-
tory. Such is the thesis defended here by Jean-Claude Barbier and Bruno Théret. Combining theoretical analysis and an
empirical historical investigation, they contest the universalism of functionalist comparisons developed by specialists of the
‘Welfare State’ (a concept which the authors would replace by that of the national social protection system) and the super-
ficial criticism of liberalism. Their argument imposes a reconsideration of the prevailing discourses on the French system.
But their method should also encourage a close look at the analysis of other national systems, as well as the dynamics
(real or potential) introduced by European integration.

THEORETICAL NOTE

France’s new social protection system

JEAN-CLAUDE BARBIER (CEE) [email protected]
BRUNO THERET (IRIS-PARIS DAUPHINE) [email protected]
http://www.theorie-regulation.org
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France is clearly not in the Golden Age of social pro- RMO (regulatory medical practice guidelines), AUD
tection. But we are hardly witnessing the ‘neo-liberal’ (mainstream unemployment insurance benefit), ASS
debacle which some repeatedly predict, any more than (special solidarity allowance for the unemployed), CES
a blanket convergence towards privatisation, the tar- (employment-solidarity contract), PARE (assistance
geting of the poor, workfare and so on. Our analysis of plan for return to employment), APA (allocation for loss
trends in France does not show any significant realisa- of autonomy for the elderly), and so on.
tion of such ‘Anglo-American style’ developments We would maintain that there has even been a revo-
(other than a rhetorical one). The French social protec- lution in power relations, for the State’s political take-
tion system has certainly undergone so many spec- over of the social security system, as represented by
tacular adaptations over the past thirty years that it the Social Security Funding Law introduced by the
would seem to be ‘new’. But these changes in no way 1995 Juppé plan (named after then-Prime Minister
amount to a break-up of the system. New principles Alain Juppé), profoundly modified relations between
have been introduced (e.g., activation policies, individ- the system’s actors, along with the forms of its legiti-
ual incentives) but while certain might correspond to macy. But like every revolution, this one is likely to end
liberal political forms, they are far from being the only in a restoration, given the slight regulatory efficiency
ones and in France, they are given a particular content. and shaky legitimacy of the new institutions created.
The balance of power has hardly been stabilised and
Resistance to the neo-liberal agenda the conflict between the two alternative modes of gov-
The French system has shown a high capacity for erning social protection – Beveridge’s republican ap-
resistance to doctrines inspired by ‘neo-liberalism’ and proach and Bismarck’s corporatist approach involving
managerial neo-liberalism in particular. Certain the social partners along with the State– has exacer-
changes, such as those affecting the areas of health- bated the situation rather than resolving it, as demon-
care or dependency, even reflect a strengthening of strated in recent years by the misadventures of the
the State’s role and influence within the system, to the individual plan for return to employment and the resig-
detriment of the role of private actors, both individual nations of the heads of the national healthcare fund
and collective. There is also no reason to accept the (CNAM). The spending targets, the employment poli-
argument of those, on Left and Right alike, who main- cies, the reforms concerning pensions seem to have
tain that France is incapable of reform. In fact, the achieved little stability at institutional level and remain
French system has demonstrated an amazing internal vulnerable to electoral changes, the evolution of the
capacity for adaptation and institutional innovation, as EU’s political integration and labour conflicts. On the
demonstrated by the plethora of new acronyms tied to other hand, innovations such as the minimum income
significant changes: CSG (generalised social-security benefit, the generalised social security contribution, the
contribution), RMI (minimum income benefit), CMU personal autonomy allowance or universal health cov-
(universal health coverage), CCSS (social security erage may be taken as elements of the possible emer-
audit board), LFSS (social security funding law), gence of a new system where the Beveridgean dimen-
ONDAM (national health insurance spending target), sions would assume greater importance than was

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Issues in Regulation Theory n°49 – Juillet 2004 Page 2

previously the case. relations underlying it. First of all, the social protection
It might be added that the reforms observed obey system does not only protect individuals against the
multiple logics and intertwine in ways which are spe- negative effects of the social division of labour (loss or
cific to each sector. Some are intended to address absence of job-related resources, work injury and
social problems – unemployment, changing forms of health problems); it also protects them against those of
employment, growing inequalities, exclusion – created the division between those who govern and those who
by the neo-liberal policies accompanying the reorienta- are governed (by constituting legitimate rights to the
tion of economic dynamics towards an extraverted State’s fiscal resources which must be honoured by
growth subject to the orders of market finance. Others those in power) and those of the gender division of
may be considered responses to problems resulting domestic tasks (by guaranteeing specific social rights
from the very success of the social policies and institu- for women confined to the domestic sphere). In this
tions of the ‘Ancien Régime’ of social protection – way, it contributes to the legitimisation of the State as
longer life expectancy, greater gender equality, well as the transformation of the forms of family life. At
changes in the forms of the family, reduction of working the same time, social protection draws on three major
hours, differentiation between the market and civil methods of allocating economic resources – personal
society, aspirations for a greater democratisation of insurance, redistribution through taxes and family soli-
private and public life. These successes have in fact darity – which it articulates or combines in mixed
imposed the renegotiation of three major dimensions of forms. In this way, social protection helps to construct
the social contract: inter-generational and inter-gender the social bond at national level: it brings together
relations, as well as those between representatives individual and collective strategies which would other-
and represented. Still other reforms are more purely wise be mutually exclusive. Beyond the differentiation
tied to strategies of power insofar as social policies are of the forms of protection (the variable proportions of
also political resources: who should govern the social social insurance, social assistance and mutual aid from
security system and how? one country or historical period to another), social
protection thus unifies the society by constituting a
Welfare State or national social protection system? system.
To understand the complexity of these factors of In France, although the social protection system is
change and the specifically French dimensions of the fragmented over a base which is mainly occupational
resulting developments, it is necessary to enter into the and is, as a result, often held to be ‘blocked’ by numer-
mysteries of the organisation of the social protection ous ‘corporatisms’, it includes mechanisms which en-
system itself. This system cannot be reduced to a sure its unification. One example of this is the fact that
‘Welfare State’ as is generally the case.1 Confining the social security funds, rather than adhering strictly to
ourselves to the ‘Welfare State’ amounts to ignoring the principle of social insurance, also participate in
the social protection provided by institutions related to national solidarity by handling services related to social
the companies or the spheres of the family and collec- assistance. The same is true of the mutual insurance
tive organisations (such as the mutual insurance com- companies. But the basic mechanism involves a whole
panies); conversely, it also leads to assimilating certain group of financial transfers between its different com-
organisations and institutions to the State when they ponents: the majority of them receive over 13 percent
are in fact independent of it (and certain recent reforms of their resources in this way. Through these transfers,
have been aimed precisely at bringing them under two levels of solidarity going beyond “occupational
State control). The social security system which, para- solidarity” are established: inter-occupational solidarity
doxically for a country which is otherwise held to be within the social insurance schemes and national soli-
extremely State controlled, constitutes the core of the darity when the transfers occur between social insur-
French social protection system is one example of ance schemes and public schemes. This crossed fund-
2
such institutions. Even if it is the central pillar of the ing stabilises the system over the long term, not only
social protection system, however, the social security for reasons of financial equilibrium but also because it
system is in no way identical with it. The French sécu- symbolically generates an overall coherence. Ulti-
rité sociale - unlike social security in the UK (assis- mately, the transfers impose national solidarity, which
tance benefits) and in the US (social insurance pen- is based on a political logic of the universal coverage of
sions) - corresponds to a whole system of social social risks.
insurance funds covering health, industrial accidents, The national social protection systems are not simply
maternity and pensions. This system is funded by disparate groupings of institutions or social policies
payroll contributions and managed by the social part- ensuring in a more or less public way the coverage of
ners under State supervision. (Unemployment insur- social needs in various domains (pensions, healthcare,
ance is not part of French social security for the histori- income support in case of unemployment, handicap,
cal reason that it was only instituted as a special fund work accidents, illness, maternity or exclusion). They
in 1958). are also macro-systems which have a relative coher-
ence and participate as such in the reproduction of
Relative to the notions of ‘Welfare State’ and ‘social wage societies (as in ‘wage citizenship’). The logics of
security’, that of social protection system thus allows their formation and development go back to overall
us to emphasise the complex articulation of social economic, political and ethical determinants: the type
of macro-economic policies, the form of the public
authority’s legitimacy, the state of family structures and
population dynamics, the conception of social justice.
1.
See Théret (1997) and Barbier (2002).
2.
France is thus the country where the share of social contri- International classifications and the French idiosyn-
butions relative to taxes in the funding of the social protection crasy
system is among the highest in the world; this remains true In order to deal with this complexity at international
even today, in spite of the growing recourse to the general- level, the comparatists, notably following G. Esping-
ised social security contribution (CSG), whose purely fiscal
Andersen (1990), have come to reduce it through a
nature remains controversial, moreover.
classification of social protection systems: the liberal
family including the Anglo-American countries, but also
Issues in Regulation Theory n°49 – Juillet 2004 Page 3

Japan and Switzerland; the social-democrat family jurisdiction.

composed of the Scandinavian countries; the ‘corpora- Such is the case with the promotion of gender equal-
tist-conservative’ family of continental Europe (within ity, the analysis of the effects of population ageing on
which a Latin model – Southern Europe – is sometimes the future of pension systems, social exclusion, the
set apart). By default, France is generally included in role of lifelong learning and so on. This situation offers
this last category. Such an extremely reductive classifi- a striking contrast with the 1970s, when the ‘European
cation almost always leads to a deterministic vision of agenda’ touched on a minority of ‘social problems’.
historical changes. We cannot really speak of convergence, however, or
To be sure, a number of the French system’s formal even of institutional harmonisation at European scale.
features – among others, its organisation into multiple The common problems which the national systems are
funds – seemingly justify its classification within the called upon to resolve (demography, increasing labour-
‘continental’ family, the classic example of which is market flexibility, financial globalisation, etc.) cannot be
‘Bismarckian’ Germany. However, there are numerous considered to result in identical adjustments. It seems
reasons, notably related to the hold of the centralising more apt to think that if contemporary societies have
republican State model (which contrasts with the Ger- handled social risks differently so far, things should not
man federal model and is more in tune with the be any different in the future. General procedures or
‘Beveridgean’ model prevailing in the other two fami- overriding principles may seem to converge but spe-
lies) for applying this classification with great caution in cific institutions, political systems, actors, conceptions
the case of France. The issue of the family and the role of justice and performances are stamped with the
of women on the labour market also contribute to this national seals and corresponding habitus (in
reluctance. Prior to the Second World War, the French Bourdieu’s sense of the term).
system historically incorporated a clearly paternalist The French system, like those of its neighbours, is
dimension which was subsequently pro-natalist. But transformed in relation to international political and
this familialism, discredited by its association with the economic developments, but these changes are not
Vichy government in particular, was transformed in the independent of local economic policies and the system
post-war era with the setting up of a more composite also reacts to domestic changes which, for one thing,
social security system which, unlike Germany or Italy, do not correspond exactly to those taking place else-
was compatible with a high rate of female labour- where and, for another, are not conceived in the same
market participation. From this point of view, France is way. Social protection involves the collective imagina-
closer to Sweden. tion, the implementation of meaningful categories
In other respects as well, France shows similarities which are first defined within historically constituted
with the social-democrat model; this is notably the case political communities where a certain conception of
for policies aimed at increasing employment and coun- social justice prevails, even if diverse foreign influ-
tering exclusion, even if a similar orientation in France ences are also absorbed.
yields results which are quantitatively less convincing
than, for example, in Denmark. Indeed, the invention of Differing pressures and issues from one sector or
the notion of insertion – a particular approach to social period to another
integration which has no exact equivalent elsewhere – The French social protection system includes two
in the late 1970s attests to this proximity. Last of all, sub-sectors which have neither the same weight nor
far-reaching reforms have profoundly transformed the the same dynamics: on the one hand, retirement pen-
1970s system by accentuating its Beveridgean fea- sions and healthcare, on the other, unemployment, the
3
tures and thus its composite nature. family and poverty. The actors concerned are not all
When all is said and done, an international compari- the same and are not uniformly subject to the same
son prompts us to pay less attention to the similarities internal and/or external pressures. In the area of pen-
between France and Germany that to a historical fea- sions and healthcare, the social protection system
ture which is proper to the French system: the fact that faces pressures from financial interests (insurance
its ‘heritage’ is composed of an original mixture of the companies, banks, etc.) and above all from financial
marks of the various families, combined and ordered globalisation strategies. Here, it represents a potential
differently depending on the areas of risk and the his- market tied to population ageing and a growing de-
torical context. Thus, we maintain that it is preferable, mand for healthcare. The stakes of the reforms for the
especially in the context of analysing its changes, to dominant actors are less the reduction of spending
view social protection à la française as a hybrid sys- than its privatisation. On the other hand, market fi-
tem. And this feature makes it likely that its future de- nance is not eager to take charge of the other areas
velopment will vary from one domain to another. (employment, family, housing and anti-poverty pro-
grammes). Rather, these domains are confronted by
Will the EU’s increased power in the social domain the large companies’ strategies for greater flexibility
lead to convergence?
In order to evaluate this development, it is also nec-
essary to take into account the European Union’s role
3.
in social protection, a role which, while it is not decisive Pensions and healthcare are not only the two social-
today, remains a factor of change which cannot be protection sectors which have the greatest quantitative impor-
considered exogenous in the same way as transforma- tance (80 % of total spending). They are also the ones which
have shown the largest growth since 1975, as in the other EU
tions of international relations. Indeed, Europe is being countries: 3.5 and 2.1 % of the GDP, respectively. With 2.2 %
constructed by the European States themselves and of the GDP in 2002, unemployment protection has also in-
within each one, social policies and European integra- creased in importance (it even attained 2.6 and 2.7 % during
tion policies necessarily interact with one another. the recessions of 1983 and 1993, respectively). Family bene-
Today, and especially since the introduction of a co- fits and housing allowances, meanwhile, are limited to less
ordination of employment policies (the 1997 Luxem- than 4 % of the GDP. Finally, spending in the name of the
bourg summit) and the social and economic orienta- poverty and ‘social exclusion’ risk hardly merits the media
attention it generates: it represented only 0.4 % of the GDP
tions decided upon at the Lisbon summit in 2000, the
and 1.4 % of total spending in 2002.
EU is asserting its reforming mission in the area of
social issues, even if the latter remain under national
Issues in Regulation Theory n°49 – Juillet 2004 Page 4

and the financial austerity promoted by government clear that the social dimension harbours essential
elites. resources for the legitimisation of the new European
In addition, the reforms, like the crisis, also – and political order. The demand for a Community jurisdic-
primarily – result from national-level economic policies tion in the area of employment led in 1997 to the im-
and an interaction of players which is itself marked by plementation of a co-ordination procedure which has
the national form of the political system. For thirty come to be known as the OMC (open method of co-
years the reforms have thus been paced by the reap- ordination).
pearance and recurrence of a business cycle alternat- The Commission’s positions are often described as
ing recovery and recession, as well as a succession of uniformly ‘neo-liberal’. But far from being unanimous,
different economic policies associated with it: the stag- these are marked by the split between DGs dealing
flation of the 1974-1983 period, the competitive disin- with economic and financial affairs and those dealing
flation of the 1984-1993 period, economic policy gov- with social affairs. And they are also subject to fluctua-
erned by the Maastricht criteria from 1994 to the tions over time, as demonstrated by the European
absorption of the shock created by the changeover to social agenda appended to the Treaty of Nice, where
the euro in 2002 and at present, the prevailing disso- the issues of ‘return to full employment’ and ‘reduction
ciation of the geographic levels of monetary policy and of inequalities’ which were taboo in the liberal Commu-
fiscal policy. nity discourse of the 1990s have reappeared.
Each cycle can in fact be associated with one main In our view, such fluctuations express a contradiction
type of adjustment or reform: the pursuit of social ad- between the neo-liberal agenda which has been privi-
vances along Keynesian lines during the stagflationist leged until now and the need to correct social and
management, parametrical reforms centred on a re- regional inequalities in order to ensure social and terri-
duction of social spending with unchanged institutions torial cohesion within the EU, in a context where the
during the period of competitive disinflation, more question of the federal form of European political inte-
structural reforms once the EU’s single market came gration is raised more and more openly. The future
into being. Thus, significant reforms in the area of evolutions of the French social protection system will
health and pensions, the sectors which are by far the certainly remain consistent with the inheritance of the
most costly for public finances, were above all intro- past, but the integration of the national systems into
duced in the third economic cycle, from 1993 on. But the larger EU is now a highly open process capable of
4
internally, this was also a period where the resistance giving rise to multiple scenarios.
of the weakest collective actors took a more active
form.
These adjustments in economic policy over the past References
thirty years and the distinct reactions they have en-
tailed among the social forces concerned have given Barbier, J.-C. (2002). “Marché du travail et système
rise to forward-looking reforms followed by setbacks or de protection sociale: pour une comparaison interna-
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seemed less appropriate in the following period, to Barbier, J.-C., and B. Théret (2001). “Welfare to
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These internal political variables are not totally Policies. Rutgers, N. J.: Transaction Publishers, pp.
autonomous relative to the external ones but the na- 135-183.
tional political choices have primed. Thus, the fact that
Barbier, J.-C., and B. Théret (2003). “The French
the social reforms of the past thirty years have mainly
Social Protection System: Path Dependencies and
been governed by financial considerations may be
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linked, more or less directly, to the introduction of the
(eds.), Changing Patterns of Social Protection. New
single market and the single currency in the European
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, pp. 119-168.
Union, via the interplay of policies inspired by neo-
liberalism. But as we have already emphasised, the Barbier, J.-C., and B. Théret (2004). Le nouveau sys-
single market and single currency have not been pulled tème français de protection sociale. Paris: La Décou-
out of a magician’s hat; they are political and social verte.
constructions reflecting internal political choices. The Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of
future of the national social protection systems in Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univer-
Europe also depends on such choices and the way sity Press.
they will shape the evolution of European integration. Théret, B. (1997). “Méthodologie des comparaisons
internationales, approches de l’effet sociétal et de la
French social protection and Europe: two interlocked régulation: fondements pour une lecture structuraliste
destinies des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale.”
Marked by a new welfare mix in which Beveridgism L’Année de la régulation 1, pp. 163-228.
has undeniably assumed greater weight, the emerging
Théret, B. (2002). Protection sociale et Fédéralisme.
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sels and Montreal: Presses Interuniversitaires Euro-
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péennes-Peter Lang and Presses de l’Université de
notably constitutional forms which the EU will take and
Montréal.
the role of social policies within it; and last of all, the
ability of the main organised social forces to propose
and negotiate the forms of social protection they would
like to see at the different geographic levels (European,
national, regional or even local). 4.
See Barbier and Théret (2004) and Théret (2002 and 2003).
Since the Maastricht Treaty and the institution of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it has become
Issues in Regulation Theory n°49 – Juillet 2004 Page 5

Théret, B. (ed.) (2002). “Intégration territoriale et

politiques sociales en Europe: la construction de
l’Union européenne” (special section). Sociétés
contemporaines no. 47, pp. 5-78.
Théret, B. (ed.) (2003). “Politiques sociales et cons-
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