Property Cases No 7 1

[No. 31163. November 6, 1929] 1. "1.

The court erred in holding that it has been proved that in the cavans of palay
attached by the herein defendant Pablo Tiongson from the defendant Jose C.
URBANO SANTOS, plaintiff and appellee, vs, JOSE C. BERNABE ET AL., Bernabe were included those claimed by the plaintiff in this cause.
defendants. PABLO TIONGSON and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BULACAN, 2. "2.
appellants. The court erred in ordering the defendant Pablo Tiongson to pay the plaintiff the
1. 1. value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay, the refund of which is claimed by said
MANUAL DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF plaintiff.
PROVISIONS OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO SECTION 2 3. "3.
THEREOF.—Plaintiff S and defendant T deposited some palay with defendant B. T The court erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial."
sues B to recover his portion, and succeeds in obtaining a preliminary attachment
and subsequent sale of B's property, despite S's third-party claim. The sacks of The following facts were conclusively proved at the trial:
palay bore no marks or signs to distinguish T's from S's. S now contends that T
cannot claim the palay attached and sold because in soliciting the attachment, he On March 20, 1928, there were deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse by the plaintiff
impliedly admitted that the palay belonged to B. But, giving section 262 of the Urbano Santos 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and by Pablo Tiongson 1,026 cavans
Code of Civil Procedure a liberal construction, in pursuance of section 2 thereof, and 9 kilos of the same grain.
the application for a preliminary attachment of B's property filed by T, was a claim On said date, March 20, 1928, Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of
for the delivery of personal property deposited by him with the former. Bulacan a complaint against Jose C. Bernabe, to recover from the latter the 1,026 cavans
2. 2. and 9 kilos of palay deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At the same time, the
MIXTURE OF TWO SlMILAR THINGS; PROPORTIONAL RlGHT OF EACH OWNER.— application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted, and the attachable
There being no means, in the instant case, to separate out of the palay attached property of Jose C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay found by the
and sold, the portion corresponding to plaintiff S and that corresponding to sheriff in his warehouse, were attached, sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof
defendant T, the rule prescribed in article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this delivered to said defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case. The
nature must be applied. Said rule is as follows: "If, by the will of their owners, two herein plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the palay, but upon Pablo
things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs Tiongson's filing the proper bond, the sheriff proceeded with the attachment, giving rise
accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, to the present complaint.
each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging It does not appear that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos and those of Pablo Tiongson,
to him, according to the value of the things mixed or commingled." deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, bore any marks or signs, nor were they
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Teodoro, J. separated one from the other.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The plaintiff-appellee Urbano Santos contends that Pablo Tiongson cannot claim the 924
cavans and 31½ kilos of palay attached by the defendant sheriff as part of those
Arcadio Ejercito and Guevara, Francisco & Recto for appellants. deposited by him in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, because, in asking for the attachment
thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Jose C. Bernabe and not
Eusebio Orense and Nicolas Belmonte for appellee. to him.
VlLLA-REAL, J.: In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe, civil case No. 3665 of
This appeal was taken by the defendants Pablo Tiongson and the Provincial Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, it is alleged that said plaintiff deposited. in the
Bulacan from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of said province, wherein defendant's warehouse 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay, the return of which, or the
said defendant Pablo Tiongson was ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos the value thereof, at the rate of P3 per cavan was claimed therein. - Upon filing said
value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay, at the rate of P3 per cavan, without complaint, the plaintiff applied for a preliminary writ of attachment of the defendant's
special pronouncement as to costs. property, which was accordingly issued, and the defendant's property, including the 924
cavans and 31½ kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors committed
by the lower court in its judgment, to wit: It will be seen that the action brought by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe is that
provided in section ,262 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the delivery of personal
property. Although it is true that the plaintiff and his attorney did not follow strictly the
 Property Cases No 7 2

procedure provided in said section for claiming the delivery of said personal property,
nevertheless, the procedure followed by him may be construed as equivalent thereto,
considering the provisions of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that
"the provisions of this Code, and the proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed,
in order to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice."
Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provi sions of section 262 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the writ of attachment applied for by Pablo Tiongson against the property
of Jose C. Bernabe may be construed as a claim for the delivery of the sacks of palay
deposited by the for mer with the latter.
The 778 cavans and 38 kilos 01 palay belonging to the plaintiff Urbano Santos, having
been mixed with the 1,02( cavans and 9 kilos of palay belonging to the defendant Pablo
Tiongson in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse; the sheriff having found only 924 cavans and
31½ kilos of palay in said warehouse at the time of the attachment thereof; and there
being no means of separating from said 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay belonging to
Urbano Santos and those be longing to Pablo Tiongson, the following rule prescribed ii
article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is applicable:
"ART. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are
mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be
separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate
to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or com mingled."
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been deter mined, we will take the proportion
only of the 924 ca vans of palay which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano
Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited
1,026 cavans, 525.51 or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and Pablo Tiongson is
hereby ordered to pay the plain tiff Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay
a the rate of P3 a cavan, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Johns, J., dissents.
Judgment modified.
_________________
 Property Cases No 7 3

[No. 45425. April 29, 1939] 2. "2.

That prior to December 15, 1934 plaintiffs, in order to enable them to purchase
JOSE GATCHALIAN ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. THE COLLECTOR OF one sweepstakes ticket valued at two pesos (P2), subscribed and paid therefor
INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant and appellee. the amounts as follows:
1. 1. 1 Jose Gatchalian .............................................................................. P0.18
PARTNERSHIP OF A CIVIL NATURE; COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY;
SWEEPSTAKES; INCOME TAX.—According to the stipulated facts the plaintiffs 2 Gregoria Cristobal ............................................................................ 0.18
organized a partnership of a civil nature because each of them put up money to
buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which 3 Saturnina Silva ................................................................................. 0.08
they may win, as they did in fact in the amount of P50,000 (article 1665, Civil
Code). The partnership was not only formed, but upon the organization thereof 4 Guillermo Tapia ................................................................................ 0.13
and the winning of the prize, J. G. personally appeared in the office of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collected 5 Jesus Legaspi .................................................................................. 0.15
the prize, the office issued the check for ?50,000 in favor of J. G. and company,
6 Jose Silva ........................................................................................ 0.07
and the said partner, in the same capacity, collected the check. All these
circumstances repel the idea that the plaintiffs organized and formed a 7 Tomasa Mercado .............................................................................. 0.08
community of property only.
8 Julio Gatchalian ................................................................................ 0.13
2. 2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil
9 Emiliana Santiago ............................................................................ 0.18
nature, the said entity is the one bound to pay the income tax which the
defendant collected under the aforesaid section 10 (a) of Act No. 2833, as 10 Maria C. Legaspi ............................................................................... 0.16
amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761. There is no merit in plaintiffs' contention
that the tax should be prorated among them and paid individually, resulting in 11 Francisco Cabral ............................................................................. 0.13
their exemption from the tax.
12 Gonzalo Javier ................................................................................... 0.14
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Sison, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. 13 Maria Santiago ................................................................................. 0.17

Guillermo B. Reyes for appellants. 14 Buenaventura Guzman .................................................................... 0.13

Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee. 15 Mariano Santos ................................................................................ 0.14

IMPERIAL, J.: Total .................................................................................................... 2.00

The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue the sum of P1,863.44, with legal interest thereon, which they paid under 1.
protest by way of income tax. They appealed from the decision rendered in the case on 2. "3.
October 23, 1936 by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, which dismissed That immediately thereafter but prior to December 15, 1934, plaintiffs
the action with the costs against them. purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one of the duly authorized
The case was submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of facts: agents of the National Charity Sweepstakes Office one ticket bearing No. 178637
for the sum of two pesos (P2) and that the said ticket was registered in the
"Come now the parties to the above-mentioned case, through their respective name of Jose Gatchalian and Company;
undersigned attorneys, and hereby agree to respectfully submit to this Honorable Court
the case upon the following statement of facts: 3. "4.
That as a result of the drawing of the sweepstakes on December 15, 1934, the
1. "1. above-mentioned ticket bearing No. 178637 won one of the third prizes in the
That plaintiffs are all residents of the municipality of Pulilan, Bulacan, and that amount of P50,000 and that the corresponding check covering the above-
defendant is the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippines; mentioned prize of P50,000 was drawn by the National Charity Sweepstakes
 Property Cases No 7 4

Office in favor of Jose Gatchalian & Company against the Philippine National plaintiffs, the said plaintiffs on June 15, 1935, through Gregoria Cristobal, Maria
Bank, which check was cashed during the latter part of December, 1934 by Jose C. Legaspi and Jesus Legaspi, paid under protest the sum of P601.51 as part of
Gatchalian & Company; the tax and penalties to the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan, as evidenced
by official receipt No. 7454879 which is attached and marked Exhibit J and made
4. "5. a part hereof, and requested defendant that plaintiffs be allowed to pay under
That on December 29, 1934, Jose Gatchalian was required by income tax protest the balance of the tax and penalties by monthly installments;
examiner Alfredo David to file the corresponding income tax return covering the
prize won by Jose Gatchalian & Company and that on December 29, 1934, the 10. "11.
said return was signed by Jose Gatchalian, a copy of which return is enclosed as That plaintiffs' request to pay the balance of the tax and penalties was granted
Exhibit A and made a part hereof; by defendant subject to the condition that plaintiffs file the usual bond secured
by two solvent persons to guarantee prompt payment of each installments as it
5. "6. becomes due;
That on January 8, 1935, the defendant made an assessment against Jose
Gatchalian & Company requesting the payment of the sum of P1,499.94 to the 11. "12.
deputy provincial treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan, giving to said Jose Gatchalian & That on July 16, 1935, plaintiff filed a bond, a copy of which marked Exhibit K is
Company until January 20, 1935 within which to pay the said amount of inclosed and made a part hereof, to guarantee the payment of the balance of
P1,499.94, a copy of which letter marked Exhibit B is inclosed and made a part the alleged tax liability by monthly installments at the rate of P118.70 a month,
hereof; the first payment under protest to be effected on or before July 31, 1935;
6. "7. 12. "13.
That on January 20, 1935, the plaintiffs, through their attorney, sent to That on July 16, 1935 the said plaintiffs formally protested against the payment
defendant a reply, a copy of which marked Exhibit C is attached and made a of the sum of P602.51, a copy of which protest is attached and marked Exhibit
part hereof, requesting- exemption from the payment of the income tax to which L, but that defendant in his letter dated August 1, 1935 overruled the protest
reply there were enclosed fifteen (15) separate individual income tax returns and denied the request for refund of the plaintiffs;
filed separately by each one of the plaintiffs, copies of which returns are attached
and marked Exhibits D-1 to D-15, respectively, in order of their names listed in 13. "14.
the caption of this case and made parts hereof; a statement of sale signed by That, in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the monthly installments in
Jose Gatchalian showing the amounts put up by each of the plaintiffs to cover accordance with the terms and conditions of the bond filed by them, the
up the cost price of P2 of said ticket, copy of which statement is attached and defendant in his letter dated July 23, 1935, copy of which is attached and marked
marked as Exhibit E and made a part hereof; and a copy of the affidavit signed Exhibit M, ordered the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan to execute within
by Jose Gatchalian dated December 29, 1934 is attached and marked Exhibit F five days the warrant of distraint and levy issued against the plaintiffs on May
and made part hereof; 13,1935;

7. "8. 14. "15.

That the defendant in his letter dated January 28, 1935, a copy of which marked That in order to avoid annoyance and embarrassment arising from the levy of
Exhibit G is enclosed, de nied plaintiffs' request of January 20, 1935, for their property, the plaintiffs on August 28, 1936, through Jose Gatchalian,
exemption from the payment of tax and reiterated his demand for the payment Guillermo Tapia, Maria Santiago and Emiliano Santiago, paid under protest to
of the sum of P1,499.94 as income tax and gave plaintiffs until February 10, the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan the sum of P1,260.93 representing
1935 within which to pay the said tax; the unpaid balance of the income tax and penalties demanded by defendant as
evidenced by income tax receipt No. 35811 which is attached and marked Exhibit
8. "9. N and made a part hereof; and that on September 3, 1936, the plaintiffs formally
That in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the amount of tax demanded protested to the defendant against the payment of said amount and requested
by the defendant, notwithstanding subsequent demand made by defendant the refund thereof, copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit O. and made
upon the plaintiffs through their attorney on March 23, 1935, a copy of which part hereof; but that on September 4, 1936, the defendant overruled the protest
marked Exhibit H is enclosed, defendant on May 13, 1935 issued a warrant of and denied the refund thereof; copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit P
distraint and levy against the property of the plaintiffs, a copy of which warrant and made a part hereof; and
marked Exhibit I is enclosed and made a part hereof;
15. "16.
9. "10. That plaintiffs demanded upon defendant the refund .of the total sum of one
That to avoid embarrassment arising from the embargo of the property of the thousand eight hundred and sixtythree pesos and forty-four centavos
 Property Cases No 7 5

(P1,863.44) paid under protest by them but that defendant refused and still
refuses to refund the said amount notwithstanding the plaintiffs' demands.
"Pulilan, Bulacan, P, I.
16. "17.
The parties hereto reserve the right to present other and additional evidence if (Sgd.) "JOSE GATCHALIAN"
necessary." And a summary of Exhibits D-1 to D-15 is inserted in the bill of exceptions as follows:
Exhibit E referred to in the stipulation is of the following tenor: "RECAPITULATIONS OF 15 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR 1934 ALL DATED
"To whom it may concern: JANUARY 19, 1935 SUBMITTED f O THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
Name Exhibit Purchase Price Expenses Net
"I, Jose Gatchalian, a resident of Pulilan, Bulacan, married, of age, hereby certify, that No. Price Won prize
on the 11th day of August,1934, I sold parts of my share on ticket No. 178637
1. Jose to ..............................
Gatchalian D-1 P0.18 P4,425 P480 3,945
thepersons and for the amount indicated below and the partof my share remaining is
also shown to wit: 2. Gregoria Cristobal .......................... D-2 0.18 4,575 2,000 2,575
Purchaser Amount Address
3. Saturnina Silva ............................... D-3 0.08 1,875 360 1,515
1 Mariano Santos ........................................................... P0.14 Pulilan, Bulacan.
4. Guillermo Tapia ............................ D-4 0.13 3,325 360 2,965

2 Buenaventura Guzman ................................................. 0.13 Do.

5. Jesus Legaspi by Maria D-5 0.16 3,825 720 3,105
Cristobal ..................................
3 Maria Santiago ............................................................ 0.17 Do.
6. Jose Silva ...................................... D-6 0.08 1,875 360 1,515
4 Gonzalo Javier ............................................................ 0.14 Do.

5 Francisco Cabral .......................................................... 0.13 Do.

7. Tomasa Mercado .......................... D-7 0.07 1,875

6 Maria C. Legaspi ......................................................... 0.16 Do.

8. Julio Gatchalian by Bea- D-8 0.13 3,150
triz Guzman .............................
7 Emiliana Santiago ....................................................... 0.13 Do.
9. Emiliana Santiago ......................... D-9 0.13 3,325

8 Julio Gatchalian .......................................................... 0.13 Do.

10. Maria C. Legaspi ......................... D-10 0.16 4,100

9 Jose Silva ..................................................................... 0.07 Do.

11. Francisco Cabral ......................... D-11 0.13 3,325

10 Tomasa Mercado ......................................................... 0.08 Do.

12. Gonzalo Javier ............................ D-12 0.14 3,325

11 Jesus Legaspi ............................................................... 0.15 Do.

13. Maria Santiago ............................ D-13 0.17 4,350

12 Guillermo Tapia ........................................................... 0.13 Do.

14. Buenaventura Guzman ................ D-14 0.13 3,325

13 Saturnina Silva ............................................................. 0.08 Do.

15. Mariano Santos .......................... D-15 0.14 3,325

14 Gregoria Cristobal ........................................................ 0.18 Do.

2.00 50,000"

15 Jose Gatchalian ............................................................ 0.18 Do.

2.00 Total cost of

The legal questions raised in plaintiffs-appellants' five assigned errors may properly be
reduced to the two following: (1) Whether the plaintiffs formed a partnership, or merely
said ticket; and that, therefore, the persons named above are entitled to the parts of whatever
prize that might be won by said ticket. a community of property without a personality of its own; in the first case it is admitted
that the partnership thus formed is liable for the payment of income tax, whereas if there
 Property Cases No 7 6

was merely a community of property, they are exempt from such payment; and (2) merit in plaintiffs' contention that the tax should be prorated among them and paid
whether they should pay the tax collectively or whether the latter should be prorated individually, resulting in their exemption from the tax.
among them and paid individually.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs of this
The Collector of Internal Revenue collected the tax under section 10 of Act No. 2833, as instance to the plaintiffs-appellants. So ordered.
last amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761, reading as follows:
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur
"SEC. 10. (a) There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total
net income received in the preceding calendar year from all sources by every corporation, Judgment affirmed.
joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en participación), association or _____________
insurance company, organized in the Philippine Islands, no matter how created or
organized, but not including duly registered general copartnerships (compañias
colectivas), a tax of three per centum upon such income; and a like tax shall be levied,
assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the
preceding calendar year from all sources within the Philippine Islands by every
corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en participación),
association, or insurance company organized, authorized, or existing under the laws of
any foreign country, including interest on bonds, notes, or other interest-bearing
obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise: Provided, however, That nothing in this
section shall be construed as permitting the taxation of the income derived from
dividends or net profits on which the normal tax has been paid.
"The gain derived or loss sustained from the sale or other disposition by a corporation,
joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en participación), association, or
insurance company, or property, real, personal, or mixed, shall be ascertained in
accordance with subsections (c) and (d) of section two of Act Numbered Two thousand
eight hundred and thirty-three, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and
twenty-six.
"The foregoing tax rate shall apply to the net income received by every taxable
corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en participación),
association, or insurance company in the calendar year nineteen hundred and twenty
and in each year thereafter."
There is no doubt that if the plaintiffs merely formed a community of property the latter
is exempt from the payment of income tax under the law. But according to the stipulated
facts the plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because each of them put up
money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize
which they may win, as they did in fact in the amount of P50,000 (article 1665, Civil
Code). The partnership was not only formed, but upon the organization thereof and the
winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian personally appeared in the office of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collected the prize, the office
issued the check for P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said
partner, in the same capacity, collected the said check. All these circumstances repel the
idea that the plaintiffs organized and formed a community of property only.
Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil nature, the 'said entity is the
one bound to pay the income tax which the defendant collected under the aforesaid
section 10 (a) of Act No. 2833, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761. There is no
 Property Cases No 7 7

No. L-27933. December 24, 1968. Cadastre, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27083 in the name of
plaintiff. After answer, claiming that the lot was defendants' conjugal property, the
DIVERSIFIED CREDIT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE ROSADO Municipal Court ordered defendants to surrender and vacate the land in litigation; to
and Luz JAYME ROSADO, defendantsappellants. pay P100.00 a month from the filing of the complaint up to the actual vacating of the
Civil law; Co-ownership; Where a co-owner has no right to sell a divided part of the real premises; to pay P500.00 attorneys' fees and costs. Upon appeal to the Court of First
estate owned in common, or convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds.—It is Instance, the case was submitted on the following stipulation of facts (Rec. on App.,
a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to pp. 59-60) :
any def inite portion of the land or thing owned in common until the partition thereof. 1. 1.
Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate That Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre belong to the thirteen co-owners,
share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. The principle is including the wife of the defendant herein, who owns 1/13th part pro-indiviso;
emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez v. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, it was held that
while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, he has 2. 2.
no right to sell a divided part of the real estate owned in common. "If he is the owner of That on May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme Rosado, wife of the defendant Felipe Rosado,
an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the right to sell and convey an undivided half, signed a Deed of Sale together with the co-owners of the property to the plaintiff
but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by as shown by Exh. "A" for the plaintiff;
metes and bounds." The doctrine was reiterated in Mercado v. Liwanag, L-14429, June
20, 1962, holding that a co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land owned 3. 3.
in common. And in Santos v. Buenconsejo, L-20136, June 23, 1965, it was ruled that a That on the lot in question the defendant Felipe Rosado had built a house
coowner may not even adjudicate to himself any determinate portion of land owned in sometime in 1957 without the whole property having been previously partitioned
common. among the thirteen (13) co-owners;

Same; Where claim of conversion of wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in 4. 4.

character as a result of a building construction was rejected; Article 158, Civil Code, held That the title of the property has already been transferred to the plaintiff upon
inapplicable; Case at bar.—The key question in the case at bar is whether by the registration of the Deed of Sale in June, 1964, with the Office of the Register of
construction of a house on the lot owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold by them Deeds;
to the appellant corporation, the land in question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal 5. 5.
property. Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, That demand was made by the plaintiff upon the defendant Felipe Rosado and
it can not be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land his wife Luz Jayme Rosado on October 19, 1964, but until now the defendant
belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on her 1/13th Felipe Rosado has refused to vacate the premises or to remove his house thereon
ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of as shown by Exh. "B" for the plaintiff, on the grounds as he alleged in his answer
conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of that he had built on the lot in question a conjugal house worth P8,000.00 which
the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis. necessarily makes the lot on which it stands subject to Article 158 of the Civil
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City. Fernandez, J. Code and on the point of view of equity that the wife of the defendant Felipe
Rosado received an aliquot share of P2,400.00 only from the share and if the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. house were demolished the defendant would suffer damage in the amount of
P8,000.00;
Montalvo & Bernabe for plaintiff-appellee.
6. 6.
Pedro D. Delfin for defendants-appellants. That the portion of the lot on which the house stands, would earn a monthly
REYES, J.B.L., J.: rental of P50.00;

This appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City, Negros 7. 7.
Occidental (Civ. Case No. 7516 of that Court) was certified to us by the Court of That Felipe Rosado, husband of Luz Jayme, did not give his conformity to the
Appeals (Second Division) because the same involves no questions of fact. Deed of Sale, Exh. "A".

The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Diversified 8. 8.
Credit Corporation filed an action to compel the spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme That on October 31, 1964, the defendant Felipe Rosado requested the plaintiff
Rosado to vacate and restore possession of a parcel of land in the City of Bacolod (Lot in the letter, Exh. "C" for the plaintiff, for a period of six (6) months within which
62-B of Subdivision plan LRC-Psd-33823) that forms part of Lot No. 62 of the Bacolod to vacate the premises.
 Property Cases No 7 8

9. 9. Rosado f urther contends that as the building of the house at the expense of the conjugal
That the letter was not answered by the plaintiff and they did not accept the partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share on his wife in Lot 62-B into property of
offer, and on November 25, 1964, they filed a complaint before the Municipal the community, the deed of sale of May 11, 1964 in favor of the appellee corporation
Court which proves that plaintiff neglected the offer; was void in so far as said 1/13 share is concerned, because his wife, Luz Jayme, had
ceased to own such share from and after the building of the house; and Rosado, as
The Court of First Instance in its decision rejected the claim of ownership advanced by manager of the conjugal partnership, had not participated in the sale, nor subsequently
Rosado, based upon the construction of a house on the disputed lot by the conjugal ratified the same.
partnership of the Rosado spouses, which allegedly converted the land into conjugal
property under Article 158, paragraph 2 of the present Civil Code of the Philippines; We find appellant's thesis legally untenable. For it is a basic principle in the law of co-
further held that defendants were in estoppel to claim title in view of the letter Exhibit C ownership, both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889, that no individual
requesting for six (6) months within which to vacate the premises, and affirmed the co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common
decision of the Inferior Court. Defendant Felipe Rosado resorted to the Court of Appeals, until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or
and his appeal (CA-G.R. No. 37398-R) is the one now before us. He assigns four alleged abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the
errors: co-owners. The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez vs. Ilustre,
5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of
a) The lower court erred in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void, since upon the his undivided interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the real estate owned in
construction of the conjugal dwelling thereon, the conjugal partnership of the defendant- common. "If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the right to
appellant Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme became the owner of the share of Luz Jayme in sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts,
Lot No. 62-B, Bacolod Cadastre; and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds." The doctrine was reiterated in
10. (b) Mercado vs. Liwanag, L-14429, June 20, 1962, holding that a co-owner may not convey
The trial court -erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to vacate Lot No. 62-B a physical portion of the land owned in common. And in Santos vs. Buenconsejo, L20136,
and in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void because as the legal June 23, 1965, it was ruled that a co-owner may not even adjudicate to himself any
usufructuary of the share of Luz Jayme Rosado in Lot 62-B, Bacolod Cadastre, determinate portion of land owned in common.
the conjugal partnership, managed and administered by the defendant-appellant Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it cannot
Felipe Rosado can not be deprived of its usufructuary rights by any contract be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land belonging
between Luz Jayme and the plaintiffappellee; to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on her 1/13 ideal or
11. (c) abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of conversion
The trial court erred in not holding that the defendantappellant should be of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of the
reimbursed the value of the conjugal house constructed on Lot 62-B; and construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.

12. (d) It is the logical consequence of the foregoing ruling that the lower court did not err in
The lower court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay attorneys' fees holding that the appellant was bound to vacate the land without reimbursement, since
in the amount of five hundred (P500.00) pesos. he knew that the land occupied by the house did not belong exclusively to his wife, but
to the other owners as well, and there is no proof on record that the house occupied
It can be seen that the key question is whether by the construction of a house on the lot only 1/13 of the total area. The construction was not done in good faith.
owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold by them to the appellant corporation, the
land in question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal property. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Costs against
appellant Felipe Rosado.
Appellant, husband of vendor Luz Jayme, claims the affirmative invoking the second
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing that: Concepcion, CJ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
"ART. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate
property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the Judgment affirmed.
industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership. ________________
"Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the
land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same."
 Property Cases No 7 9

No. L-44426. February 25, 1982.* before partition shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the
dissolution of the communal estate. What a co-heir can validly dispose of is only his
SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** hereditary rights.
and EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS, respondents.
Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had instituted a complaint before the
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer; Property; An ejectment case for recovery of Court of First Instance for ejectment and recovery of possession against herein
possession by a vendee is premature where instituted prior to the actual partition of the petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1163, alleging that they are the owners in fee
property among the heirs where from, the contending parties claims it appears that they simple of a parcel of commercial land, proindiviso, consisting of 150.8 sq. meters, more
bought the same portion of the lot from different heirs.—The action for ejectment and or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan, having bought the same from
recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in the lower court is premature, Evaristo G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on April 15, 1964.
for what must be settled first is the action for partition. Unless a project of partition is They also demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the property at
effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. the rate of P40.00 until the property is surrendered to them.
Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a
co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. meter land originally owned by
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common Hermogenes Espique and his wife, both dead. After their death, their five children,
by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided namely: Maria, Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be ownership of the whole lot.
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners
of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided. Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the
Espique children. Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern one-half portion of
Same, Same; A co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself a definite portion of a land owned the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique
in common before it is partitioned by covenant or judicial decree.—An individual co- and that the southern one-half portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique. The land
owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or subject of the controversy is the most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the
thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior Espique children which petitioner claims he had bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967
to that time all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share and which respondents claim they had bought from Evaristo on April 15, 1964. Both sales
in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. What a co-owner may dispose were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending
of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed therein as Civil Case No. T-
allotted to him upon partition. Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional 966.
rights.
The Court finds merit in the petition for setting aside respondent appellate court’s
Same; Same; Same.—Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand decision finding for respondents-plaintiffs, for the following considerations:
payment of rentals for the use of the property in dispute. Until the partition of the estate
is ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending partition The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in
proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither the lower court is premature, for what must be settled first is the action for partition.
petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite
dispute. portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or
by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For
PETITION to review the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.1 Upon the death of a person, each of his
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or
TEEHANKEE, J.: portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed
among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
The Court reverses the appellate court’s decision affirming in toto the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs-respondents the lawful While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full
owners of the land in question and ordering defendant (herein petitioner) to pay ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may
P30.00 monthly rentals until possession of the property is surrendered to respondents, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the
for unless there is partition of the estate of the deceased, either extrajudicially or by effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited,
court order, a co-heir cannot validly claim title to a specific portion of the estate and by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
sell the same. Title to any specific part of the estate does not automatically pass to the upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
heirs by the mere death of the decedent and the effect of any disposition by a co-heir specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-
 Property Cases No 7 10

owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion No individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of land or thing owned
without any physical adjudication.3 An individual co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself in common until the partition thereof. (Diversified Credit Corporation vs. Rosado, 26
or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual SCRA 470).
partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is
an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common There can be no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and
by all the co-owners.4 What a co-owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot identifiable, though not technically described. (De la Cruz vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307).
share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition.5 Co-owner may validly lease his half-interest to third party independently of other co-
Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.6 owner. (Vda. de Castro vs. Atienza, 53 SCRA 264).
In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of Where the allegations of a complaint for unlawful detainer contain no allegation that
respondents and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made a demand had made to vacate the premises, but only an allegation that a demand was
before the partition of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the made for payment of the rentals agreed upon, such allegation is insufficient to confer
deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the interests thereby acquired by jurisdiction upon the court. (Casilan vs. Tomassi, 10 SCRA 261).
petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned
to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate7 subject to The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or
provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in
provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code.8Respondent court’s ruling that the sale by unlawful detainer cases. (Vda. de Murga vs. Chan, 25 SCRA 441).
Estefanio in favor of petitioner is not valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs is
Any of the co-owners may bring the action in a forcible entry and detainer case.
erroneous. Such notice in writing is not a requisite for the validity of the sale. Its purpose
(Vencilao vs. Camarenta, 29 SCRA 473). A complaint for forcible entry should be
is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate, for them to exercise
dismissed where it appears that the lot, the possession of which was allegedly entered
their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code, that is,
into illegally is different from that made the basis of the complaint. (Capacio vs. Rivera,
the right to redeem the property sold within one month from the time they were notified
34 SCRA 153).
in writing of the sale by a co-heir. (There is nothing in the record to indicate that such
right of subrogation was in effect sought to be exercised upon the co-heirs’ having Re-entry by the judgment debtor in the property sold in an ordinary execution sale
learned of the sale, which is not in issue here.) does not constitute contempt of court but would give the purchaser or his heirs a cause
of action for forcible entry against said debtor. (Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling, 2 SCRA
Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for
793).
the use of the property in dispute. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of ——o0o——
each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor respondents can
rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in dispute.
Accordingly, respondent court’s judgment is set aside and judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing the complaint of respondents-plaintiffs in the court below. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., took no part.
Judgment set aside.
Notes.—A co-owner cannot adjudicate a portion of the property without conformity
of other co-owners or by judicial decree. (Santos vs. Buenconsejo, 14 SCRA 407).
A co-owner may not acquire exclusive ownership of common property through
prescription. (Castrillo vs. Court of Appeals, 10 SCRA 549).
A co-owner is a trustee for the other co-owner. (Castrillo vs. Court of Appeals, 10
SCRA 549).