LTD CASES

I. Land Administration ................................................................................................................................. 1

II. History of the Torrens Systems and Land Registration Laws in the Philippines ...................................... 1
1. [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000.] Cruz v NCIP ............................................................................ 1
III. Modes of Acquiring Title to Land ......................................................................................................... 67
1. [G.R. No. L-17652. June 30, 1962] Grande v CA ................................................................................ 67
2. [G.R. No. 73465. September 7, 1989.] Cureg v IAC ........................................................................... 71
3. [G.R. Nos. 66075-76. July 5, 1990.] Agustin v IAC.............................................................................. 76
4. [G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012.] Republic v Santos .............................................................. 79
5. [G.R. No. 161030: September 14, 2011.] Fernando v Acuna ............................................................. 88
6. [G.R. NO. 178906 : February 18, 2009] Arangote v Sps. Maglunon ................................................... 96
7. [G.R. NO. 160132 : April 17, 2009] Naranja v CA ............................................................................. 105
8. [G.R. No. 85240. July 12, 1991.] Claudel v CA ................................................................................. 110
9. [G.R. No. 175763. April 11, 2012.] Bienvenido v Gabriel ................................................................. 116
10. [G.R. No. 169898. October 27, 2006.] Sps Aguirre v Villanueva .................................................... 124
11. [G.R. NO. 171068. September 5, 2007.] Heirs of Arzanon-Crisologo v Ranon ............................... 128

I. Land Administration

II. History of the Torrens Systems and Land Registration Laws in the Philippines

1. [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000.] Cruz v NCIP

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, Petitioners, v. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Respondents.

HON. JUAN M. FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI

MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MALOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA
SAWAY, BAI INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES
D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,
RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANGCAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D.
EMBA, NORMA MAPANSA GONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON,
JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN,
DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID,
MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother
LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B’LAAN TRIBAL
FARMER’S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE’S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.

IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF

NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional
on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, Et. Al.), filed a Motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, Et. Al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on
the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State‟s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in
turn, defines ancestral lands; chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

"(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with non-indigenous peoples for the development
and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than
25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2

Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners. 3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP
and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. 4

These provisions are: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains
and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of
land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples." 5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President
is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination."
They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President‟s power of control over executive departments
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6
Petitioners pray for the following: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[i], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid; chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease
and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and
desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
to comply with his duty of carrying out the State‟s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A.
8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as
dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition
solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon Jr., join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and
Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche‟s essay, Judge Richard Posner 1 wrote: 2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most „past-dependent,‟
of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient
texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a
method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, „paradigm shifts,‟ and the energy
and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a
more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with
history." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the
Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state
ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret
IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress
not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities‟ right to their
ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The-rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their development and
exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the
law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized with
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state‟s power of dominium. 3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of
the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal
crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys,
audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those
places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and
their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said
lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such time
as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms,
plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose,
their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by
virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at
our will." 4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of
distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian. 5
Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes
of land grant from the Crown. 6

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893. 7 The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The
law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the
"Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already
amended by previous orders and decrees. 8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall
revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the United
States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the
United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public
Land Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano

In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano. 9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or
paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant‟s
predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in
1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by
not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year
adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given
them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land,
could not validly transmit it.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which from
earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." 10 The question posed by
the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these
lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?" chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the
Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony,
the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that
until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow
strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754. 11

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court
interpreted it as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the
Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This
statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It
excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person
had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the
public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them,
their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their
holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time
should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part of the
authorities." 12

The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the
kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown. 13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree
provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land
should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown. 14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown‟s principal
subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown‟s instructions: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation
and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not . . . cultivated or tenanted,
may . . . appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are
occupied. . . . . Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their
failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they
will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others." 15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by
private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs‟ case
fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones.
Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute
owner." 16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands
by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the
State." 17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the
other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In
effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.

As a fitting observation, the Court added that" [t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from
earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been
continued by the American Government in Act No. 926." 18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for
the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment
of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; 19 and that the
government‟s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. 20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title
still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, 21 and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. 22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed
under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands
to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. 23 After
the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874.
The main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens
and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations. 24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the Land
Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands
in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachusetts Land Registration Act of 1898, 25 which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the
Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant
Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein,
subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. 26 The certificate
of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of
said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation. 27 cralaw : red

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of
the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country. 28 There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. 29 State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state‟s power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. 30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very
well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the
Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To
remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine. 31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all-forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National Economy
and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." cralaw virtua1aw library

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy and
Patrimony," to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

x x x."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on
public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is
being violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT .

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply
known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership
given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

— the right to develop lands and natural resources;

— the right to stay in the territories;
— the right in case of displacement;
— the right to safe and clean air and water;
— the right to claim parts of reservations;
— the right to resolve conflict; 32
— the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws
and traditions of the community concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a
non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration. 33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and
empowerment, 34 social justice and human rights, 35 the right to preserve and protect their culture,
traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and
technologies. 36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7)
Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas — Region I and the Cordilleras;
Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the
Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. 37 The
NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern
Cultural Communities created by former President (Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized
structure. 38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still unresolved,
the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. 39 The NCIPs decisions may
be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or
unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or
imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay
damages. 40

A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)
or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the
contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 41 and
the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 42

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples. — refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of
ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds
of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the
time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the
establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory.
These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of
ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization,
non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs
also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been
displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro,
Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region — Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga,
Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan;
Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of
Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III — Aetas.

3. In Region IV — Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan,
Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental
Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao‟t bato of Palawan.

4. In Region V — Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of
Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur, Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of
Masbate and Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI — Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental; the
Corolano and Sulod.

6. In Region VII — Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

7. In Region IX — the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of
Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X — Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog,
Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del
Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and Misamis
Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI — There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of
Davao del Norte; B‟laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T‟boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao
del Sur, Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the
Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo,
Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del Sur and South Cotabato.

10. In Region XII — Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon. 43

How these indigenous peoples came to be in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos,
Indonesians and Malays. 44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features
which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the
Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millennium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains.
Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian
influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society. 45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became supplementary
activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil. 46 From the hinterland,
coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically
common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely
uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences. 47 Life was essentially subsistence but not
harsh. 48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages that
traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily
communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods. 49 They fashioned concepts
and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives. 50 They
had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death.
Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of
other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon,
the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be respected.
They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the
relationship between man and the object of nature. 51

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word
"balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. 52 The barangay was basically a
family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and
ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain‟s duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote
their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He
was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war. 53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to
generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants
and in the memory of the elder persons in the community. 54 The written laws were those that the chieftain
and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose. 55 The oldest known written body of
laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1750 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of
Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu. 56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various
subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights,
family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court
composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects
of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral
barangays acted as arbiters. 57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs merely
administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with
chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the
community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay. 58 This
ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so that
no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or
unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of lands. 59 Marine resources
and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on
the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land communities. 60 Recognized leaders, such as the
chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and
benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the
communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival." 61

Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate of
Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu,
Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan
and Subanon. 62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now
Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but was
private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the
lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land."
64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most
production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were
not economies geared to exchange and profit. 65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as
well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small
and separate communities. 66

When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in
barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the
missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion. 67 As early
as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives. 68 The
Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living
in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life
and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." 69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be
constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the church and
the unbaptized were invited to do the same. 70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the
reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal
point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of
the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization. 71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not assigned to
them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It
was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos. 72

The abrogation of the Filipinos‟ ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public domain
were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. 73 The concept that the
Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and
the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land. 74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the Filipinos
according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types. First were the Indios,
the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the
Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities. 75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and was
allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest
classes. 76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the
Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep
interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the
cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
security. 77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to
preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the
newly evolved Christian community. 78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept
constantly alive and vibrant. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of suspicion,
fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism
tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system
that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos. 79

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the existence
of the infieles:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed
by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs." 80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the
American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the
national conscience." 81

The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos. The
term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities." 82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253
creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCTs
primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim
Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with American
Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a
wealth of valuable materials about them. 83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then was the
conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and complete
manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national
cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural
minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said
functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream
and for this purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI). 84 The CNI was given, more or
less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration
was like the colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship. 85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and Americans,
government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian
settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in
Mindanao. 86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the
titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers‟ names. With government initiative and participation, this
titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by
projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national development. 87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in
the formulation and implementation of State policies." 88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were addressed
by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly
this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies.
President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National
Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration
into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their
original lifeways beside the larger community." 89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the
decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands Decree. The
decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural
communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims. 91 In 1979, the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the
expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos. 92

Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980‟s, some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks
of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation
(NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company
(BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take
approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur.
Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. 93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations,
mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the
indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.
94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation. Invoking
her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for
Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the
President." 95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve
their way of life. 96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the
rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their
ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their
own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-
Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-
government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines.
They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population.
97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their
advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The
"infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural
perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the
patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were governed
by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division
of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life
portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. 98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples‟ existence. There is no traditional concept of
permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the
tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the
land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts
to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship,"
the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well. 99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and spirits,
and that those who work the land are its mere stewards. 100 Customary law has a strong preference for
communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related
by blood or by marriage, 101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by
blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the
subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are
engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural
that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned. 102
For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and
obligations to the land are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual ownership.
The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is
limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not
possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code. 103 Under Kalinga
customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and
succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.
104 Moreover, land to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member can
purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili. 105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples‟ economic and social system. The concept of individual
land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon
as inferior, if not inexistent. 106

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of
the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills — Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier, 107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of
Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide. 108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress,
Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the
Philippines, to wit:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the dominance
and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their
homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting
the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural
resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has
been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive
during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first
introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the
government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of
lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs." 109

Senator Flavier further declared: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long
before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled
themselves and related with other tribes. These territories — the land — include people, their dwelling, the
mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their
existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-cultural
and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on it.
Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples." 110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two
postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

According to Senator Flavier," [w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State
have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular
Government where: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural communities
as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been
overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases. 111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529,
R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or
implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of
ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the
policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during
the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government
organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land. The
bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and
deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious
disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction
with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and none
against, with no abstention." 112

House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural Communities. It
was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of
North Cotabato. 113

Rep. Andolana‟s sponsorship speech reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would promote,
recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government‟s obligation to assure and ascertain that
these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained
long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to
look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the
aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the
mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the
Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular
Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish
and American regimes. 115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was approved on
Second Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not
Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the
Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3 a) Ancestral Domains. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with
government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators." 116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that
these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized
by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." 117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala. 118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of
ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims
(CALC‟s) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC‟s) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA on
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 119 The guiding principle in identification and
delineation is self-delineation. 120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto. 121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of
the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the
NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
in the name of the community concerned. 122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any
individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in
accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain,
the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). 124

CADTs and CALTs issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the
place where the property is situated. 125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1)
by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3 [1]. Native Title. — refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public
lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."
126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs‟ preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be
recognized and respected. 127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied
in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs
over the territories identified and delineated. 128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a
right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA
categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public
lands and are private. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government 129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular Government. 130
Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the
State.

In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of
land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied
by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property for the
holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in
accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no
document issued from the Spanish Crown. 131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under
the Spanish Mortgage Law. 132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory
title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land
registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation 133 was proclaimed over his
land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle
and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land. 134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño‟s application for absolute ownership to the land. Both the
Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which
reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño‟s application. The Philippine Supreme Court 135
affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. 136 On
one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to
comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims
within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land
jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as
entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also,
that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may
assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side,
sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are
matters for it to decide." 137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new
colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.

The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist‟s concept of "due process" as well
as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives." 138 It was based on the strong mandate extended to
the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws." The court declared: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the
whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the
Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32
Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be
administered „for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.‟ It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus
assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding
what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that „no law shall be
enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.‟ In the light of the declaration that we have
quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath
that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which
had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and
that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association, — of the
profoundest factors in human thought, — regarded as their own." 139

The Court went further: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like
this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the
doubt." 140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory
went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been
public land." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904 decision
of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor
native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives
owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the
Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond
the powers of the Crown, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If the applicant‟s case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was bad
by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited
by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as
owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the
native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title
12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true
that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or
his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed
nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied). 141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over unconquered
territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that
failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration
requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of
it."
cralaw virtua1aw library

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough,
however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law
because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may
be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
Constitution, the court validated this kind of title. 142 This title was sufficient, even without government
administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without
difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible
effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to
be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and
belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost
forgotten law of Spain." 143

Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio
Municipality in his name. 144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as "native
title." It simply said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument, characterized
as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It
seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province
the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have
made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not
follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the
present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles
through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards
would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce." 145

This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of the Cariño
decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen
James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale
University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native
Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law. 146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty
tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land laws.
147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño‟s title as discussed
and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by
Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians. 148 This is not
surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government policy
towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans. 149 This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro. 150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to remove
the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan.
Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who
was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of
liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It upheld
government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for
educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting
the public forests in which they roamed. 151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Reference was made in the President‟s instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United
States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its
dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that
followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is
insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship
shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States. 152

x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But
even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States,
that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without
any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to
remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be
drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the
legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts
should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful
reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the
different Indian tribes in the United States." 153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is a
part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of
Indians. 154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be
established by custom and prescription. 155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal right
of possession or occupancy." 156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the
lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home; in the sense that such lands constitute
definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation. 157 It is a right which exists apart
from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous instances treaties have been
negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights
or settling and adjusting their boundaries. 158

American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians‟ or native Americans‟ rights to land they have held and
occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the
U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham „s Lessee v.
M‟Intosh. 159

In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2)
Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private
persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the
European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the
old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by
bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in
order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives
title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession. 160 The exclusion of all other
Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and
establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely
disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to
their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied
by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate
dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been
understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy." 161

Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian land
and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer — whether to England, France, Spain or Holland — did
this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless
did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its
right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the
Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the
discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer
gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title paramount
to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never
been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of
possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right." 162

It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal
recognition of this principle. 163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without having to
invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens. 164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia. 165 In this case, the State of Georgia enacted a
law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the
Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who
were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established
between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse
with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States government and the Indians as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the
supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their
country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of
Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of
that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they
were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the
United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.

This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of
individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." 166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial boundaries
and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse
with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford
that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force,
manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is
not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States. cralaw : red

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a
restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very
term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others.." . . . 167

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of
Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States." 168

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all other
European governments. Designated as the naked fee, 169 this title was to be consummated by possession
and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians‟ legal and just
claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer
nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians‟ land — either by purchase, "defensive"
conquest, or cession, — and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish
Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe
respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in
themselves. 170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied by
the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign — first the discovering European
nation and later the original 13 States and the United States — a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was
nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of
occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete ownership. 171 But
this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and
means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. 172 It is clear that this right
of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. 173 It is vulnerable to affirmative
action by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will. 174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual,
exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time. 175 It entails that land owned by Indian title
must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign
government nor to any citizen. 176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and
not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends
upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership. 177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate such
lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. 178 Indian land which has been
abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain. 179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part
of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians. 180 Once set apart by proper
authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but
Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation‟s power to dispose of, them. 181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous
Americans. 182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property
systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of
Philippine IPs to native Americans. 183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title,
however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited
authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land;
title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S; as successor of the discoverer. The
aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress.
184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government. 185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans‟
ownership of these lands, 186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly
entrenched. 187

Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred from asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. 188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application
in the Philippines vis-a-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of
each case.

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private
and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The
long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains
and lands. Cariño was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under
the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be
registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public
Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a grant of the land. 189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain, 190 ipso jure, 191 and is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands 192 that the court declared that the rule that all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has
an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property
even before the Spanish conquest. 193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public
Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the applicant‟s claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens 194 and members of the
national cultural minorities 195 that converts the land from public into private and entitles the registrant to
a torrens certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the
option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration
under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into
public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral
land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration
purposes. To wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496 — Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned
ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous;
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not
less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members
of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually
used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of this
Act." 196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned ancestral
lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not
communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of
owner since time immemorial 197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by
the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral
lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are
agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming
purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope
of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of
the public domain. 198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession." . .
"which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor
in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by
this Act or any other valid law . . . or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."
199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands.
Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and
Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen
per cent (18%) or over, 200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a
limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of
approval of the IPRA.

Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private
and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987
Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber,
(c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and
ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as
public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA
lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem
of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the
ICCs/IPs. 201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws . . . in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain." 202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of
ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under
the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section
44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and
Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to
disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any
person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such
tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4,
1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the
time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under
the provision of the Public Land Law. 203

x x x.

"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] . . . .

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof . 204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land but
because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial
confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient,
provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or
administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of
ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and
429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the
Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily
includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose
of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, 205 the right to consume the thing
by its use, 206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned, 207 and the
right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has not
transmitted such thing. 208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of
ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. — Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights." cralaw virtua1aw library

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its
private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one
particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or
not, are presumed to be communally held. 209 These communal rights, however; are not exactly the same
as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code. 210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand
partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that" [n]o co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in
common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself. 212

Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less corporate
condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension
of another fifty years in any single instance. 213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from
the corporation. 214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily. 215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all
generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral
domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed
to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal. These
lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the
same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption
of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.

Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domains," 216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept
of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary law. 217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of law.
218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal
provision is applicable. 219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code,
custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities. 220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and
coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration. 221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely a
"formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. — The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the-title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated." cralaw virtua1aw library
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being
people of the land — by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful
nurture of the land by the sweat of one‟s brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land — the
possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man
and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man. 222

C. Sections 7(a), 7(b), and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7
provides for the rights over ancestral domains: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. — The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

a) Right of Ownership. — The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share
the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the
terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary
laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to
effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon
these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories. — The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No
ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than
eminent domain. . . .;

d) Right in Case of Displacement. — In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the
State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life
support systems: . . .;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants. — Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. — For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated
systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. — The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have been
reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and
service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict. — Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area
where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable
settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. — The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property. — Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights
to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.

b) Right to Redemption. — In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of
any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of
the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have
the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a)
lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d)
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural
resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement, (d)
the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to
claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with
customary laws.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8
gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or
non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the
ancestral lands, but not to domains. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not
Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation‟s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution." 223

All lands of the public domain and all natural resources — waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources — are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development
and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may
undertake the same in four (4) modes: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production. joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or qualified corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation
and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production, 224
joint venture, 225 or production-sharing agreements. 226 These agreements may be for a period of 25
years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into technical and
financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People‟s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A.
7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to
both large-scale 227 and small-scale mining. 228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely
heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining
equipment." 229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes
ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 7.a) Right of ownership. — The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"

The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of
water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting
grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other
natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a)
does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the
Regalian doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the
IPRA And is Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA 230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Rights of Ownership. — ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/lands. These rights
shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to
consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural
resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or
vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and natural
resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law.
Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not
necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land. 231
The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of
ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak
of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of
ownership over these resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing
Rules in general. 232 Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary
to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules
goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3,
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the
ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and
conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to
benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right
to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive
just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right
to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment
upon these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the following
rights:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities
for future generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights." 233

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are
merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the
profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for
the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be
noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their
exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and
conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of
natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs‟ rights over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship.
For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms
for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within
their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources
must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws. 234

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale
utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources
is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the
plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our
natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." 235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the
ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection
within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1
and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. — The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A
non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of
the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than
twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to allow such
operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to
safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources within
ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs „priority rights‟ therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-
scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that
require technology other than manual labor. 236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural resources and
thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and
members of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural resources.
Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority
means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean
ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these
resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself
chooses. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that
all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication
the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution 237 in relation to Section 57
of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the development and
exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the
ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said
agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to
participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-
ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the
ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as
owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the
ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may
enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or
(4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development
and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The
State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is
nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the
natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State
supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources
even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as
actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for
their subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following provision: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 59. Certification Precondition. — All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-
based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no
certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the
ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or -
controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while
there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or
suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation
process."cralaw virtua1aw library

Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources shall
not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies without prior certification
from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP
certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and
prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement
gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or government
agency.

As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license
or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the
agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over
the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or
agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the
agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to
agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that
are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

V . THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL

MOVEMENT .

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960‟s from two sources. First, the
decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own
destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.
238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American
Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights
and freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the 1980‟s,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first
Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People‟s Alliance that
carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have
since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world. 240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result
of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the
destruction of the indigenous peoples‟ environment, together with the national governments‟ inability to deal
with the situation. 241 Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental
protection, and have become a part of today‟s priorities for the international agenda. 242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and specific
rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result
of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America. 243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current
policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of
the Asian Development Bank. 244

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy
the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development. 245 The IPRA
amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs, 246 and is heavily
influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries" 248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination. 249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No.
107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new
international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of the
earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own
institutions, ways of life and economic development. 250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the
imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. 251 Largely unpopulist, the
present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous
peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and
are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was
made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common
experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to
truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing
democratization, 253 it is this Court‟s duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws
in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997.

VITUG, J.:

An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when it shows itself in
a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the propriety of the specific remedy
invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not
be so perceived as good and inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism, by the
Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Court‟s adjudication must have a
personal and substantial interest in the dispute; 1 indeed, the developing trend would require a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the
proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. 2 The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as
to warrant his invocation of the Court‟s jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise of the Court‟s
remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can easily become too
unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its
intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality.

Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exists, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance and paramount interest to the nation, 3 the Court must take the liberal approach that recognizes
the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues
that affect them. 4 This Court thus did so in a case 5 that involves the conservation of our forests for
ecological needs. Until an exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free
itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be
considered to be of overriding concern.

The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation and its people
now and in the generations yet to come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"), enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is
apparently intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity and development" 6 and commands
the State, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,"
to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being. 7

Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral domains" to embrace "all
areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources"
including "ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and control.

IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally millions
of hectares. The notion of community properly would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest
but also some forms of self-governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7
of the law which states that the "rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
shall be recognized and protected," subsumed under which would encompass the right of ownership
(paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands and natural resources, including "the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned
lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim
parts of ancestral domains previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance
primarily with customary law (par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority
rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the
ancestral domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the
fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State
authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony.

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural
lands, shall not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." 8

These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates in the
1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources",
were derived largely from the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and
other Natural Resources. 9 According to the Committee report, among the principles upon which these
provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute the
exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be presented for those under the sovereign
authority of the Nation and for their posterity." 10 The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention were
of the unanimous view that the "policy on natural resources, being fundamental to the nation‟s survival
should not be left to the changing mood of the lawmaking body." 11

The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, thus expresses this
regalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all lands and natural resources
belong to the state other than those which it recognizes to be of private ownership. Except for agricultural
lands of the public domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all
other natural resources, of the country must remain with the state, the exploration, development and
utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-
production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization. 12

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño v. Insular Government, 13 holding that a parcel
of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed never to
have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override the
collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and from
them that all government authority emanates. 14 It is not then for a court ruling or any piece of legislation
to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the
sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.

The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that
would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution
could have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice
Davide Jr., has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Convention, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Mr. Davide. . . . Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is respectfully submitted that
the particular matter must be submitted to Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for
the possibility of the codification of these customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now
mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We leave it to Congress to determine the extent of
the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to whatever may have been codified earlier. So,
in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the horse." 15

The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with
specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due
process clause," as I so understand it in Tañada v. Tuvera 16 would require an apt publication of a
legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when
specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them
correspondingly binding and effective as such.

Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the law.
Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of Indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands, a task that would entail a balancing of interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of
national interest.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

KAPUNAN, J.:

You ask if we own the land . . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race own the land
because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of every man. The lowly animals
claim their place; how much more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and
placed us in the world to live human lives. And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land)
is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is a grace that must be
nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu Kabunian to all his children. Land
is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs . . . life.
Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos" in
Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World Bank Discussion Papers, No.
188, pp. 71-72.)

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than
in violation of, the Constitution. 1 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible
and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of
the law. 2

The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed in view of such
presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these provisions should take into account the
purpose of the law, which is to give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous
peoples be recognized and protected.

The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and therefore, their
heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned "Indians" of the United States, with
the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the
nations in which these indigenous peoples live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an
oppressive past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community realized the
injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This sentiment among the family of
nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and most comprehensive of which is the
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26,
1994. Among the rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the
resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which
have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous
peoples.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples

The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In the sense the term
has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means "native." 3
"Indigenous" refers to that which originated or has been produced naturally in a particular land, and has not
been introduced from the outside. 4 In international law, the definition of what constitutes "indigenous
peoples" attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term "indigenous peoples" has been
adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by a working definition in the
1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo: 5

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from
other sections of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present
non-dominant sections of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.

This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the present,
of one or more of the following factors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;

(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;

(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system,
membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc.);

(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of
communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language);

(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;

(f) Other relevant facts. 6

In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of Filipinos who have
retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture. 7 Philippine legal history, however, has not
been kind to the indigenous peoples, characterized them as "uncivilized," 8 "backward people," 9 with
"barbarous practices" 10 and "a low order of intelligence." 11

Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the politically-
correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities" as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. — refer to a group of people or homogenous

societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since
time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language,
customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social
and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated
from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country at the time of
conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the
establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains . . ..

Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already plowing our soil
and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original inhabitants of our
archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the
early part of the American regime, 12 these native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting
for their lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao, the
indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands, the lands of their forefathers.

Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national culture
exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial domination
have created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the group of cultural minorities. 13
The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by
foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant. 14 While the culture of the
majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has retained its essentially
native character.

One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around twelve million Filipinos
are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural communities, 15 accounting for more
than seventeen per centum of the estimated seventy million Filipinos 16 in our country. Sadly, the
indigenous peoples are one of the poorest sectors of Philippine society. The incidence of poverty and
malnutrition among them is significantly higher than the national average. The indigenous peoples are also
among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of law and power, they
have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any, voice in national politics and enjoy the
least protection from economic exploitation.

The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples

The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate brothers,
fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social justice, and to
reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the indigenous peoples. They
incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of
the indigenous peoples, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of
national unity and development. 17

SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. 18

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its
increments. 19

SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the
public domain under lease or concession, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. 20

SECTION 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies. 21

SECTION 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities.
22

IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It provides, among others,
that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national
unity and development, protect their rights over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize
the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domains. 23 Moreover, IPRA enumerates the civil and political rights of the
indigenous peoples; 24 spells out their social and cultural rights; 25 acknowledges a general concept of
indigenous property right and recognizes title thereto; 26 and creates the NCIP as an independent agency
under the Office of the President. 27

Preliminary
Issues

A. The petition presents an actual controversy.

The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an appropriate case;
(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case. 28

Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. 29 The threshold issue,
therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and
susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, 30 or that which
seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. 31 A petition raising a constitutional
question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must
show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the presence of opposing views
or contentions. 32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because
they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary
arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding
interests. 33 The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial
determination. 34

In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted,
and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government
agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that
we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe
for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an
unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources.
Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute,
this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the
constitutional process.

B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional questions
herein.

In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 35 Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and
taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only in a "generalized
grievance." 36 Yet, in a sense, all citizen‟s and taxpayer‟s suits are efforts to air generalized grievances
about the conduct of government and the allocation of power. 37

In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing. 38 The proper party
requirement is considered as merely procedural, 39 and the Court has ample discretion with regard thereto.
40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino v. Governor General 41 held: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . [W]hen the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some
personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest and his
right must clearly appear. Upon the other hand, when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws. 42

This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, may also be the
subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may enforce a "public
right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined therein that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . [T]he right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any other qualified
elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in case he fails to
obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to
enforce a public right as distinguished from a private right. The real party in interest is the public, or the
qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and would suffer the same injury.
Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to maintaining a petition whether or not the relief
sought by the relator should be granted. 43

In Tañada v. Tuvera, 44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be informed of matters
of public concern.

In Garcia v. Board of Investments, 45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or consulted on
matters of national concern.

In Oposa v. Factoran, 46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation‟s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law." 47 Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the
Court, stated that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners — the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. 48

Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and
diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national patrimony,
holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient
interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and
inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen‟s suit.

In addition, Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to
enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of an unconstitutional statute,
49 and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute appropriating public funds. 50 The taxpayer has
paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the
proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose of administering
an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 51

The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In
the same manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing that "the amount
necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the current year‟s appropriation for
the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the "ONCC") and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities
(the "OSCC")," 52 which were merged as organic offices of the NCIP. 53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of
a taxpayer‟s suit.

C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi- judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity‟s or person‟s
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 54 Mandamus, on the other hand, is an
extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said entity or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station,
or when said entity or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. 55

In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the challenged
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and
that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the said law and
rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to control and
supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.

Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the questioned provisions of
the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional.
Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country‟s natural resources.
Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy for the relief sought.

D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court assumes
jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.

Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon the
issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the
important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate
court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, 56 such concurrence does not give a
party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this Court‟s primary jurisdiction to issue
said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation. 57 We held in People v. Cuaresma
58 that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court‟s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court‟s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court‟s docket . . .. 59
(Emphasis supplied.)

IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact upon the lives not
only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The resolution of this
case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This
reason is compelling enough to allow petitioners‟ invocation of this Court‟s jurisdiction in the first instance.

Substantive
Issues

Primary Issue

The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around the
constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59.
These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which states: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation‟s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and
lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.

Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership 60 over ancestral
lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title. 61 The term "ancestral lands" under the statute refers
to lands occupied by individuals, families and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities
including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands
are required to have been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or through their ancestors "since time
immemorial, continuously to the present. 62 On the other hand, "ancestral domains" is defined as areas
generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively
by indigenous cultural communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of
indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also include
inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein. 63 Again, the same are required to have been
"held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present." 64 Under
Section 56, property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of
said law "shall be recognized and respected." cralaw virtua1aw libr ary

Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands, ancestral
domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who, between the State
and the indigenous peoples, are the rightful owners of these properties?

It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the
fundamental law. 65 The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted
within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume that it
was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further
than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 66

A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.

In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain and,
thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor
General advance the following arguments: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion over
the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of
jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all
the lands in the archipelago.

Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned
by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership of all lands
and makes the State the original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as
successor to Spain and the United States, is the source of any asserted right of ownership in land.

Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However, petitioners
maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be acquired by
prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of
the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks.

Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon the ratification of
the 1935 Constitution.

Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to protect
that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However, they contend that
the mandate is subject to Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to
petitioners, the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands
and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of Congress.

Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners posit
that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-
agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural resources.

I am not persuaded by these contentions.

Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is understandable. Not
only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded, almost with reverence, as the
immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been
recognized by the Court. 67

Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or
implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the
Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has
persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere. 68

In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights, 69 or those rights which the King has by
virtue of his prerogatives. 70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in
which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. 71 These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by
the king as the sovereign.

The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use
of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions; the King
theoretically retained the title. 72 By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all
lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. 73 The theory of jura regalia
was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. 74

The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government 75 the United States Supreme Court,
reversing the decision 76 of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. . . .. 77 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land
by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of
any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his name of an ancestral land
located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors had lived on the land, had cultivated
it, and had used it as far they could remember. He also proved that they had all been recognized as owners,
the land having been passed on by inheritance according to native custom. However, neither he nor his
ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The government opposed the application for
registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the
applicant was entitled to the registration of his native title to their ancestral land.

Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were
binding as precedent in our jurisdiction. 78 We applied the Cariño doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho v.
Director of Lands, 79 where we stated that" [a]ll lands that were not acquired from the Government either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest." 80

Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court‟s ruling in Cariño was premised on the fact that the
applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription, having established that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners
suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for by Cariño was transferred from the State, as original
owner, to Cariño by virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the basis for decreeing
"by mere legislative fiat . . . that ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to [indigenous peoples] without
judicial confirmation." 81

The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the
public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

There is no merit in these contentions.

A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands which have
always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A
distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive
prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held
by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The
land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the United States and the
Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as
private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription
against the State involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native title assumes
that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have been part of the public domain,
the Solicitor General‟s thesis that native title under Cariño applies only to lands of the public domain is
erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution 82 is irrelevant to the application of the Cariño
doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public domain
does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.

Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.

When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation thereof in the
16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with Portugal, 83 the continents of
Asia, the Americas and Africa were considered as terra nullius although already populated by other peoples.
84 The discovery and occupation by the European States, who were then considered as the only members of
the international community of civilized nations, of lands in the said continents were deemed sufficient to
create title under international law. 85

Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean that it
acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the Spanish Crown was
considered to have acquired dominion only over the unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands. 86

In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their
property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the natives
and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the early Spanish colonial period in the Philippines
wrote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging opportunity to
avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for the
Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification of the
archipelago. This extraordinary document could have been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures of the
Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca. The King instructed
Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their persons or to their
property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship and "to explain to them the
law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved." Although the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if
attacked, the royal instructions admonished the commander to commit no aggressive act which might
arouse native hostility. 87

Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land occupancy. 88
Thus, the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands already held by the
natives. 89 The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The
earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, provided that all those in "unlawful possession of royal lands"
must legalize their possession by means of adjustment proceedings, 90 and within the period specified. The
later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law, declared that titles that
were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for which adjustment was not sought, were
forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law, it was held in the case of Cariño that the royal decree
of 1894 should not be construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of
registering such title. 91

Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States, contrary to
petitioners‟ assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the latter‟s rights over
lands of the public domain. 92 Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of the
Philippines did not impair any right to property existing at the time. 93 During the American colonial regime,
native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that property and
rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be administered for the benefit of the
Filipinos. 94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley‟s instructions, as well as the Philippine
Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these rights,
which served as an inviolable rule upon every division and branch of the American colonial government in
the Philippines, 95 was that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." 96 These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn expressly protected by
the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples over
their ancestral lands and ancestral domains were firmly established in law.

Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the
1935 Constitution." 97 He advances the following arguments: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to restructure the
consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State Through the mandate of the Constitutions that
have been adopted, the State has wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it deems
absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It has been held that the State may impair vested
rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.

Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but determinative of
social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the established social system. . . .

Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural resources that have been
found from generation to generation to be critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its agent, the State.
98

Stated simply, the Solicitor General‟s argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to land, had the
power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that such a theory would necessarily impair vested
rights, he reasons out that even vested rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.

I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor General, while
embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares that "all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State." 99 Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and
existence," including those which are not part of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State.
If there is any room for constitutional construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor of the
preservation, rather than impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1,
Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had existed then
were extinguished and that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing]
control of those portions of the natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social
welfare and existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule against the diminution
of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other natural
resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concessions." The "existing rights"
that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of ownership by indigenous peoples
over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law should be given their ordinary or usual
meaning, 100 and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.

Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution 101 to
protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they
contend that the recognition and protection under IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate
of the Congress, 102 since such recognition and protection amount to the alienation of lands of the public
domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense, the term "right" refers to any legally
enforceable claim. 103 It is a power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person and incident upon
another. 104 When used in relation to property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an object, or any
just and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it. 105 Said provision in the Constitution cannot, by any
reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of ownership over such
ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its constitutional mandate and
power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of
ownership of the indigenous peoples over ancestral lands. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision, does Congress have the power to decide whether
ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the public domain? Also, does Congress have the
power to determine whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the natural resources found
therein?

It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did not intend
Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private property. Rather, they
acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private property, and that customary laws shall
merely determine whether such private ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural community, or by
individuals, families, or clans within the community. The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado and
Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, Jr., then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is
instructive:
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MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either Commissioner
Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase "CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE
APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domain," because ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the extent
thereof which determine the property rights or relations arising therefrom. On the other hand, in this
proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the property rights or relations which shall be used as the
basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain. I assume there must be a certain
difference in the customary laws and our regular civil laws on property.

MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to Congress to make the
necessary exception to the general law on property relations.

MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of such a customary
law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the ownership and the extent of that
ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is the ownership and the extent of ownership which
determine the property rights and relations arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these
customary laws may have a different provision or thrust so that we could make the corresponding
suggestions also by way of an amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.

MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.

There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be ownership based
on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the thinking expressed in the consultation is that
this should be codified and should be recognized in relation to existing national laws. That is essentially the
concept. 106 (Emphasis supplied.)

The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the following exchange
between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of the tribal ownership or
community ownership or of private ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?

MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as ownership by private individuals,
clans and even communities.

MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will set aside the
ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept more
specific ownership in terms of individuals within the ancestral lands.

MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly mentioned
Cariño in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land, or that they
were unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. 108 The framers of the
Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial
doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take these doctrines into
consideration in construing the Constitution. 109

Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as private property of
indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its various provisions,
merely abides by the constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality.

Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean "as subject to the provision of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which vests in the State ownership of all lands of the public
domain, mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this interpretation, petitioners maintain that
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are the property of the State.

This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and nationalization of lands of the public domain and
natural resources, and is of paramount importance to our national economy and patrimony. A close perusal
of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that the framers of the Constitution inserted
the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" mainly to prevent the impairment of Torrens titles
and other prior rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral domains, to
wit:
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MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands. How does this
affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?

MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did say that in cases
where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these two have to be respected.

MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of Baguio City are
considered as ancestral lands?

MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one of the publications
that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as ancestral domain in relation to the
whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to certain individuals or certain groups.

MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as ancestral land?

MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that Filipinos can
speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the right of a particular person or
particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.

MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.

MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110

Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the framers of the
Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law.

There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of the indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same Article ascribing
ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that
when construction is proper, the whole Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any
provision. That construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument. 111

Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other natural
resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize the rights of the
indigenous peoples. These, as set forth hereinbefore, 112 include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the
State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and
development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being, and for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article XIII, directing the removal or reduction of social, economic,
political and cultural inequities and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, subject to prior rights, homestead
rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article
XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article XVI,
authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth. 113 Equity is given prominence as the first objective of
national economic development. 114 The framers of the Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs," intend to establish a
hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or to create absolute
limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the balancing of interests:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide‟s formulation of the first sentence, he says: "The State, SUBJECT
TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall
guarantee the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social
and cultural well-being." There are at least two concepts here which receive different weights very often.
They are the concepts of national development policies and programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal
communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to ask: When the Commissioner proposed this
amendment, which was the controlling concept? I ask this because sometimes the rights of cultural
minorities are precisely transgressed in the interest of national development policies and programs. Hence, I
would like to know which is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands or is it national development policies and programs.

MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more paramount. The concept
introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We have to balance the
interests taking into account the specific needs and the specific interests also of these cultural communities
in like manner that we did so in the autonomous regions. 115 (Emphasis supplied.)

B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State‟s ownership over the natural resources within
the ancestral domains.

Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and
other natural resources, 116 as well as the State‟s full control and supervision over the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources. 117 Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail
Sections 3 (a), 118 5, 119 and 7 120 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which
states, in part, that" [a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State." 121 They would have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a)
of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results
in the abdication of State ownership over these resources.

I am not convinced.

Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and
composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a
particular area is to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a)
serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not
confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose
is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.

The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure that no
unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the
delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural
resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private
property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a
source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply because it recognizes
ancestral domains as their "private but community property." cralaw virtua1aw library

The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples‟ concept of
ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership" is the
"independent and general power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the
limits established thereby." 122 The civil law concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or
the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by
its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that which is owned
and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing owned. 123 In
contrast, the indigenous peoples‟ concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group
ownership. By virtue of the communal character of ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed" 124 because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not
merely the individual member. 125

That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear
from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of
indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8 126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we transferred the
other provision but here itself —

HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr.
Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that belongs
to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where
it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or
either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging
done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our people especially in the
Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just propose a provision for
incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be compensated when there are
damages within their ancestral lands.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are already considered in
subsequent sections which we are now looking for.

HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous people where they
are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior consultation of source which is here
already. So, anyway it is on the record that you want to make sure that the secretariat takes note of those
two issues and my assurance is that it is already there and I will make sure that they cross check.

HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate version you do not
have and if you agree we will adopt that. 127 (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." Neither does Section 7(b),
which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within their
ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural resources.

What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples‟ rights and welfare in relation to the natural
resources found within their ancestral domains, 128 including the preservation of the ecological balance
therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-
approved activities involving the natural resources located therein are undertaken.

Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been recognized in
the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, Et. Al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza 129 in support of their thesis
that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction. 130 They insist that "it is possible
for rights over natural resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior
to the 1935 Constitution." 131 However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the
position of NCIP and Flavier, Et Al., the Court did not recognize native title to natural resources. Rather, it
merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of
1902.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue of time
immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during the
Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural
resources. The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying
reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the Spanish
regime up to the present. 132 Natural resources, especially minerals, were considered by Spain as an
abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars against other nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting
its ownership over minerals wherever these may be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the
separability of title over lands and that over minerals which may be found therein. 133

On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals. As the
owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter‟s cession from Spain, the United States saw it
fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant
patents to private mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land
pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals
within his property. 134 Although the United States made a distinction between minerals found in public
lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases sourced from the State. The
framers of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to maintain the State‟s ownership over natural
resources to insure their conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the
country through economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would become a
source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security and independence. 135

The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources in the 1935
Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973 136 and 1987 Constitutions. 137

Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found the ancestral domains belong to the State, the
Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under
Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the lands and not to the natural resources therein.

Section 52[i] provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. — The Chairperson of
the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Interior and Local
Government, and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and
any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification
shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed.

Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the administration of
other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to agricultural
lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral
lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in Sections
51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part
thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within the
ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because said agencies are mandated under
existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe
Section 52[i] as divesting the State, through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the
natural resources within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all
natural resources are owned by the State.

C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.

The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural
resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and
utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such natural
resources. 138 The statute also grants them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. 139 Before the NCIP can issue a
certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the perfection of any
production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous peoples concerned must
be obtained. 140 In return, the indigenous peoples are given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains or portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation.
141

The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant role in the
utilization of our country‟s natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the
Constitution the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may only be undertaken by
the State, either directly or indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements. 142 To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise submit that
by vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily
gives them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of the State. 143

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of the State, which may
directly undertake such activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements. This provision, however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that
any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution
must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout. 144 No constitutional provision is to be separated
from all the others, or to be considered alone, all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the fundamental law. 145

In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country‟s natural resources
stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the
same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens.
146 Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition and utilization of natural resources,
to apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. 147 Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates the
State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources.
148 Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our
fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered
pronouncement, 149 cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural
resources without the State‟s direct participation.

Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources under existing laws, 150 the State retains full control over such activities,
whether done on small-scale basis 151 or otherwise.

The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under Sections
7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as the Small Scale
Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly
provides that should an ancestral land be declared as a people‟s small-scale mining area, the members of
the indigenous peoples living within said area shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining
contracts. 152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without the
prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned 153 and in the event that the members of
such indigenous cultural community give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land,
royalties shall be paid to them by the parties to the mining to the contract. 154

In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the indigenous peoples
are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: "to manage and conserve natural
resources within territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from
allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that
will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights." cralaw virtua1aw libra ry

It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains only
to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to the search or prospecting of
mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence and the feasibility of
mining them for profit. 155 The exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with
the entire process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources which under the
Constitution belong to the State.

Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of natural
resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights. What is
granted is merely the right of preference or first consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing
laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.

There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant of
concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities. Several
factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent and nature of utilization and the consequent
impact on the environment and on the indigenous peoples‟ way of life are important considerations.
Moreover, the indigenous peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in the best position
to undertake the required utilization.

It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority
to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is always subject to
compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not
they but the State, which owns these resources.

It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from undertaking
activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with private
entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located within the ancestral domains. There is no
intention, as between the State and the indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the
object is to balance the interests of the State for national development and those of the indigenous
peoples.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous peoples from
undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper
governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership rights of the State over the natural
resources.

To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the utilization of natural
resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the
protection by the State of "the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources within
the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the traditional activities of the
indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples before
any search for or utilization of the natural resources within their ancestral domains is undertaken.

In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities, IPRA requires that
the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter of policy and
law, consult the indigenous peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that
national development policies and programs should involve a systematic consultation to balance local needs
as well as national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution on this
point, the national plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the region after thorough
consultation. 156 To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, and the right not
to be removed therefrom without their free and prior informed consent. 157 As to non-members, the prior
informed consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the indigenous peoples and
non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to
IPRA. Existing laws and regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy, 158 the Environmental
Impact System, 159 the Local Government Code 160 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 161 already
require increased consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning
of activities with significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must be
procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession,
license or lease, or to the perfection of any production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a
grant of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but merely
the imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The clear intent of the law is
to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely affected by the
operation of such entities or licensees.

Corollary
Issues

A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.

The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of the laws." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section 3(a)
and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands
and ancestral domains violates the due process clause. 162 Petitioners‟ contention is erroneous.

Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
"subject to Section 56," which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. — Property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected.

Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous peoples,
but not those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section
56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to
the vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such
interpretation is obviously incorrect.

The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous
or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of
these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they
pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. 163 What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its
effectivity.

Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas
claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the
proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation
of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all
proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to
represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. 164 With regard to ancestral domains, the following
procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP;
second, investigation and census by the Ancestral Domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary
report by the ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of
the final report of the ADO. 165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral
domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting and
publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the
NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO. 166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the
petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.

Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP 167
and the application of customary law, 168 violate the due process clause of the Constitution. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of
indigenous peoples, 169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
indigenous peoples, 170 including even disputes between a member of such communities and one who is
not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains. 171 Petitioners clarify that
they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They
merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a member of an
indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who is] before judges who are all
members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge." 172

In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first in disputes
involving property, succession and land, 173 and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes involving
indigenous peoples. 174 They assert that" [w]hen the dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural
community and another who is not], a resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would
clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not know what
these customary laws are." 175

Petitioners‟ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous
peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice
to the non-indigenous peoples. A person‟s possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has
nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering
justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice.

In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi judicial powers.
Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for
review. The regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by
the decision of the NCIP.

Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to
say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision
states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary
laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. 176 The IPRA prescribes the
application of such customary laws where these present a workable solution acceptable to the parties, who
are members of the same indigenous group. This interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the
Implementing Rules which states: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

SECTION 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving.
ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the
concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral
domain or land is located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the
dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)

The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, 177 where all the parties involved are members of
indigenous peoples, 178 specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the
parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved
belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required.

Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes concerning
ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of
customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through
legislation passed by Congress.

Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil
Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence,
179 and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. 180 Moreover, the Local Government Code of
1991 calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving
members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the settling of disputes
if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous
peoples. 181

B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President‟s
power of control over the Executive Department.

The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.

The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

x x x

Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President

Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and well-being of indigenous
peoples. It shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President. As such, the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous
relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall be carried out through a
system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal
operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission, as the Chief Executive
Officer.

Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President over the
NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as "lateral but autonomous
. . . for purposes of policy and program coordination." cralaw virtua1aw library

Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules characterize
the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President, such characterization does not remove
said body from the President‟s control and supervision.

The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well
being of the indigenous peoples and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto.
182 It has been granted administrative, 183 quasi-legislative 184 and quasi-judicial powers 185 to carry out
its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP‟s functions renders it impossible to place said agency entirely
under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason for its
characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent agency" is defined as an
administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of
department, as distinguished from a "subordinate agency" or an administrative body whose action is subject
to administrative review or revision. 186

That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is evident
in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, 187 like those of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent
to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the President" and, as such, is still subject
to the Presidents power of control and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
188 with respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must
secure the President‟s approval in obtaining loans to finance its projects; 189 (2) it must obtain the
President‟s approval for any negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in
whatever from and from whatever source; 190 (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations
and achievements to the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples;
191 and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be directed by the President. 192 The President is
also given the power to appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP 193 as well as to remove them from office
for cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous community. 194
To recapitulate: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8) affirming the
ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title do not
diminish the State‟s ownership of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are
considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid
down in Cariño v. Insular Government; 195

(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other natural resources
in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to
the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from
and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same, as well as priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full control over the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the
indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural
resources under existing laws, such as the Small- Scale Mining Act of 1991 196 and the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995. 197 Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous peoples for the utilization of natural resources
within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid
laws;

(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral lands and
domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who
may have acquired rights of ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the
ancestral lands and domains; 198

(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63,
65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the
application of customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is composed
wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of
customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and

(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent agency under the
Office of the President does not infringe upon the President‟s power of control under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under
the Office of the President, and therefore under the President‟s control and supervision with respect to its
administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the
SEC.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

MENDOZA, J.:

This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury as a result of the
application of the statute to them. They assert a right to seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as
citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of "transcendental importance." cralaw virtua1aw library

The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and controversies for the
determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or
the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. 1 In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a
property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand compensation for
injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to
be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case will thus not
conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court the question of the
constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an
expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in question. 2

I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII §1 of the Constitution to determine in the
abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is
confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in enumerating the
matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all cases. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse
of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any
wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the
decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.

The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia, 3 in which this Court, adopting the
submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its jurisdiction in such cases: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court
not that the President‟s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and
justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.

That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author
of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia. chanrob1es virtua1 law library

Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies
without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it
were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to
invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case
were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the
established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is
unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.

The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom
of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a
statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before
the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than
"as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of expression. But in
other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial
invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of
partial invalidity is not possible.

For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act without
jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will
be based on speculation rather than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the
law, the Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to
intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated, cannot
take place in a vacuum.

Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be a
"galling cop out" 4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism." 5 To decline the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison 6 to hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his commission as justice of the
peace of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie, because §13
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the United States Supreme Court to
issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the court‟s jurisdiction is mainly appellate.

Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review, and so that
there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII,
§1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in
upholding it. Hence, the checking and legitimating functions of judicial review so well mentioned in the
decisions 7 of this Court.

To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show
timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless shown to
be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional
adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that "this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota, presented. 8 For the
exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. 9 Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test the
constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be
accorded to it.

Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor General, 10 reiterated in
Tañada v. Tuvera, 11 that "when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in
the result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws." On
the basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to bring these proceedings. 12

In Severino v. Governor General, 13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor
General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he did not
have such a duty. On the other hand, although mandamus was issued in Tañada v. Tuvera, it was clear that
petitioners had standing to bring the suit, because the public has a right to know and the failure of
respondents to publish all decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed petitioners
in danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what public right is there for petitioners
to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens?

For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of the
procedural or preliminary Issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an actual case or
controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of transcendental importance, 1 which deserve
judicious disposition on the merits directly by the highest court of the land. 2 Further, I am satisfied that the
various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued by the parties.
Moreover, prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies 3 to address the problems raised by
petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral arguments and required
the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling cop-out for us to dismiss it on mere
technical or procedural grounds.

Protection of Indigenous Peoples‟ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia‟s resolution of the two main substantive issues,
which constitute the core of this case. -Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples‟ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of
the Philippines insofar as —

1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain, waters, . . . and
other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State"
and "shall not be alienated." I respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are not public lands and have never been owned by the State." Such sweeping statement places substantial
portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective
reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the entire
Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation‟s natural wealth.

2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources," which the Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and
supervision of the State."cralaw virtua1aw library

True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities‟ right to their
ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution." 4 I concede that
indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to
the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in
its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the
irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to
the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of
nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the nation „s wealth or
to stamp the Court‟s imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of the very authority of
this Court — the constitution of the Philippines.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Constitution Is a Compact

My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws must
conform. 5 It is the people‟s quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which the
State and the government are founded. 6 Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it
speaks for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at intermittent times.
Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain
manner. 7 Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to govern
themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its compass.

RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly
professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our
Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework
of national unity and development." 8 Though laudable and well meaning, this statute, however, has
provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority. More
specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian
Doctrine — the basic foundation of the State‟s property regime.

Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated or Ceded

Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the "conquest" of our country
in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the Philippine Islands was
acquired and held by the Crown of Spain. The King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or
exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and other natural resources. By royal decrees,
though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed; or (2)
ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be obtained by prescription. 9
Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws meant the abandonment or waiver of ownership
claims.

By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The latter
assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish Crown. But
under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens
for the "free and open . . . exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in which they are
found." 10 To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own, exploit and dispose of mineral
resources and other rights arising from mining patents.

This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted add ratified
our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively
declared as belonging to the State all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural
resources. 11 Although respecting mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the further
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who might be entitled to undertake
such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." cralaw virtua1aw library

The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9, Article XIV
of the 1973 Constitution, state: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With
the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain, natural resources shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant;

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national
interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial,
technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service
contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as
such."cralaw virtua1aw library

Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.

"The State shall protect the nation‟s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays and
lagoons.

"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution." cralaw virtua1aw library

The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the desire to
preserve the nation‟s wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time,
and our constitutional framers decided to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State
with the conservation of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments
in support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows:" [T]he natural resources, particularly the
mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged not only to the generation then but
also to the succeeding generation and consequently should be conserved for them." 12

Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of energy and
other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the
alienation of these natural resources. Their disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were
further restricted only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The present
Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and expressly states that only
agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We quote below the relevant provision: 13

"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. . . .." cralaw virtua1aw library

Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral domains
and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that these properties — including forests, bodies
of water, minerals and parks found therein — are private and have never been part of the public domain,
because they have belonged to the indigenous people‟s ancestors since time immemorial.

I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no
one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to "any
existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms.
Because of the State‟s implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those
concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land, the
State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The
land is converted into mineral land and may not be used by any private person, including the registered
owner, for any other purpose that would impede the mining operations. Such owner would be entitled to
just compensation for the loss sustained. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC, 15 the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and
patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights are not
absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws
was deemed an abandonment or a waiver of the claim.

Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be set
aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of understanding of the
cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the nation‟s resources to their exclusive advantage.
They cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen
not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of
lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It would be plain injustice to the
majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the
country‟s resources.

Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant ownership of
public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it recognizes and mandates respect for the rights
of indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains that had never been lands of the public
domain." 16 I say, however, that such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a
provision that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares that all
lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the State" ; and "with the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated." cralaw virtua1aw library

As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 17 the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all lands
not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or decrees
promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).

On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier Et. Al. 18 differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs from
that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that" [t]here are variations
among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair synthesis of these refers to „. . . the tribal right to
use the land or to territorial control . . ., a collective right to freely use the particular territory . . . [in] the
concept of trusteeship.‟"
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the property
for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without the attributes of
alienation or disposition. This concept, however, still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of
the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of
private respondents‟ claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness and equality.

Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and lands to the pre-
Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was limited to the
surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-based. This must be the continuing scope of the
indigenous groups‟ ownership claims: limited to land, excluding the natural resources found within.

In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use — not ownership — of ancestral domains,
then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA‟s Section 57 19 — without the
too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) — insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting,
extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources within ancestral domains.

The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our
Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people.
As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution
— not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to them.

Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution

In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government 20 has been modified or superseded by our
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means by which
public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cariño
refers to land ownership only, not to the natural resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space
above.

Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals, 21 a Decision handed down after our
three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member‟s registration of land
under CA 141, Section 48 (c). 22 The reason was that the property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the solicitor general‟s following statements: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved, as to
include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such
provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable.
Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that „with the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated.‟ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that „with the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated‟."cralaw virtua1aw library

Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court also stated that "forest land is incapable of
registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of
the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent
covering forest land being void ab initio."cralaw virtua1aw library

RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains

The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources found
within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very wording of the law belies this statement.

Section 3 (a) 24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement . . .. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds . . . bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources . . .." (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the natural
resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rights of ownership
and possession over such domains.

The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that ancestral domains
are the ICC‟s/IP‟s private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law declares that ancestral domains, including the natural
resources found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. Not only does it
vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual exclusivity. This means that while
ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos who are not indigenous can never own
any part thereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On the other hand, Section 3 (b) 25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial . . ., under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership, . . . including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and protects "the
right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such ownership need not be by
virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.

I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more
specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural
resources — none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court has
consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government. 26 Mere possession or
utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties. 27 The
presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Hence, . . . all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant
succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or
any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not
rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title."
28

Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely
definitions and should not be construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But, precisely, a
definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or word group." 29 It determines or settles the nature of
the thing or person defined. 30 Thus, after defining a term as encompassing several items, one cannot
thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one or more of the enumerated items
in its definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be bound by the law. In other words,
since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources found therein and further states
that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.

In fact, Intervenors Flavier Et. Al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains, with no
specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the Constitution.
Such outlandish contention further disregards international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been
adopted as part of the law of the land. 31

No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371

Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of
alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500
hectares, they may hold by lease only.

RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere
definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation‟s territory. The properties under the assailed law cover
everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied
by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators." cralaw virtua1aw library
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have used up
the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to occupy. From
year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had
"traditional access." If nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging ancestral domain or
land, several thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their private property.

Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people‟s claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or
consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for them
when they first set foot on our country." 32 They trace their right to occupy what they deem to be their
ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands that have
become part of Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral lands.
33

Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral
domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands. 34 Based on ethnographic surveys, the
solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8
and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country. 35 This means that four fifths of its natural
resources and one third of the country‟s land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting
110 ICCs, 36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share
the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of a "more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among Filipinos.

RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that" [t]he exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The State may
(1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. 37 Such
agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.

But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as
natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and
possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from
the allocation and the utilization thereof. 38 And they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike
non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period. 39
Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must
also be limited to such period.

In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources, 40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has in
effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State‟s power of ownership and full control over a
substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most fundamental law.

I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of natural
resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings are certainly
allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 — (1) ownership of
ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs‟ control of the
exploration, development and utilization of such resources — I believe I should no longer tackle the
following collateral issues petitioners have brought up:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts to undue
deprivation of private property

2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants

3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other forms of
exaction

4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the settlements of disputes
over their rights and claims

5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
violate the due process and equal protection clauses

6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least, no
longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the two major IPRA propositions are
based on unconstitutional premises. On the other hand, I think that in the case of the last three, it is best to
await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by specific provisions of RA 8371.

Epilogue

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well being.

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." cralaw virtua1aw library

Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs: (1) the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.

Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not,
however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest of
the Filipino people. I would concede giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of
their ancestral lands and domains. 41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation‟s
substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live and abide by
our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of the rule of law.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating "reverse
discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the majority of the
Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the
long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.

Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few,
however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by maiming the
healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the
exclusive benefit of favored minorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges
that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence
of social justice — empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally
enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.

WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a)
and (b), 5, 6 7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA 8371.
III. Modes of Acquiring Title to Land

1. [G.R. No. L-17652. June 30, 1962] Grande v CA

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and
ESTEBAN CALALUNG, Respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil
Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to
quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners'
consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with
an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini),
province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her
parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-
83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was
the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a
gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so
much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original
site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to
the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in
their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered
upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of
the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958),
respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and
undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and
deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said
decision, in part, reads:

It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that
the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern
boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is
indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro
Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs,
the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore,
the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the
land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants'
witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4
hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land.
We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee.
No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But,
the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they
become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the
plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has
been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require
any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of
appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they
occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25,
1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired
the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by
law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within
the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession by another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they
have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a
quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question
pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion,
consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession";
and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less
than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a
natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond
the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would
virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of
conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in
a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of
the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate
Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by
Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are
declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not
preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as
much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17,
1959.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time
that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in
question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1).
This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality
wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two
witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of
Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or
1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified
to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934.
The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.ch

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the
plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was
his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action
until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor,
Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the
survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants
who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458
square meters.

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession - from 1933 to 1958 - is not
only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who
declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really
been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to
recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo
Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to
do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in
their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which,
as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of
the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958.
By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in
question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because
the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the
registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership
of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter
protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties.
But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein
certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became
registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a
question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such
possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the
Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and
can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not
in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance
with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So
ordered.
2. [G.R. No. 73465. September 7, 1989.] Cureg v IAC

LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL
SURNAMED CARNIYAN), Petitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES
DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO,
FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD, Respondents.

Josefin De Alban Law Office, for Petitioners.

Silvestre Br. Bello for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS ARE NOT CONCUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE INDICATES TRUE AND LEGAL OWNERSHIP. — In the
case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393, 401-402, We ruled
that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive
evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true and
legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises. Petitioners‟ OCT No. P-19093 should
be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A", dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1" undated
and Exhibit "A-2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private respondents in support of their
claim, which declarations are all in the name of private respondents‟ predecessor-in-interest, Francisco
Gerardo, and appear to have been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established during the
trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF LATER DATE NOT DEFEATED BY TAX DECLARATION
OF EARLIER DATE. — We hold that tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original
certificate of title which is of a later date. Since petitioner‟s original certificate of title clearly stated that
subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, private respondents‟ claim over their
"motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners‟ land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and
nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of title.

3. ID.; ID.; A DECREE OF REGISTRATION BARS ALL CLAIMS AND RIGHTS EXISTING PRIOR TO THE
DECREE. — It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may
have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the
decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496
(now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan subsequent to
the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its northern boundary is
Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused
the accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT No. P-19093, of the
existence of Francisco Gerardo‟s land.

4. ID.; OWNERSHIP; ACCESSION; ACCRETION BELONGS TO OWNERS OF ADJOINING LAND. — The "subject
land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457
of the New Civil Code: "To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." cralaw virtua1aw libra ry

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE INCREASE IN THE AREA IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY REGISTERED EVEN IF THE LOT
RECEIVING THE ACCRETION IS REGISTERED. — The increase in the area of petitioners‟ land, being an
accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed
under the operation of the Torrens System.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 03852 entitled "Domingo
Apostol, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Leonida Cureg, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants", which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent Domingo Apostol
the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more
particularly described as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . ., containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north, by Cagayan River; on the east, by
Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola, with an assessed
value of P3,520." (par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; Emphasis ours)

On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves
Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and
Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and docketed as Civil Case No. Br.
111-373. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on November 12, 1982.

The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced
heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter being the only issue of the late
Francisco Gerardo, who died before the outbreak of the second world war; that since time immemorial
and/or before July 26, 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse
to all other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their "motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel,
Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:chanrobles virtual lawl ibrary

". . . containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on the North, by Cagayan River; on
the East, by Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg); on the south by Antonio Carniyan; and on the West
by Sabina Mola, . . ." (p. 2, Record)

that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-3023 in the name of
Francisco Gerardo, which cancels Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in the name of Francisco Gerardo; that
upon the death of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the "motherland" was succeeded by
his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with three (3) legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad Gerardo,
one of private respondents herein, Primo Gerardo and Salud Gerardo, both deceased, have also been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same; that Primo Gerardo is survived by herein
respondents, Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza, all surnamed Gerardo and Salud Gerardo is survived by
respondent Lilia Maquinad; that in 1979, respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo,
Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the "motherland" to co-respondent Domingo Apostol;
that on September 10, 1982, the verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who
executed an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p. 206, Rollo); that about
the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland" already showed/manifested signs
of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan
River; that Domingo Apostol declared the motherland and its accretion for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.

The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and or the first week of October
1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland" together with its accretion, they
were prevented and threatened by defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing to do so. Named
defendants in said case are herein petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio
and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan, surviving spouse and children, respectively, of Antonio Carniyan.
Further, the complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land situated in Casibarag-
Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela and more particularly described as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on the north by Domingo Gerardo; on the
East, by Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos Cureg, declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed value of P70.00." (p. 5, Record)

that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax Declaration No. 13131 dated July
24, 1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093
issued on November 25, 1968; that the area under the new Tax Declaration No. 15663 was increased from
2,790 square meters to 4,584 square meters and the boundary on the north became Cagayan River,
purposely eliminating completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.

Petitioners‟ answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-existent; that
Antonio Carniyan, petitioners‟ predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the
north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that
the "subject land" is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have been in possession and
cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrob les.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on July 28, 1983 (pp. 244-
250, Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to
September 1982.

In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent Domingo Apostol, thru his
predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and accordingly,
rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that the writ be made permanent; and 4.
ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondents a reasonable attorney‟s fee of P5,000.00, litigation
expenses of P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-145, Rollo).

On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision
of the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners‟ Motion for Reconsideration was denied on January 8,
1986. Hence, this petition for review on the following assigned errors: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded on the north by the Cagayan
River) belongs to the private respondents and not to the petitioners when the petitioners‟ Original Certificate
of Title No. 19093 states clearly that the petitioners‟ land is bounded on its north by the Cagayan River.

"B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the herein petitioners who are only the
heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan since the late Francisco (supposed predecessor of the respondents) could
not have executed the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-2") as he died long before
World War II and since the late Antonio Carniyan could no longer stand up to explain his side.

"C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it wrongly ruled that petitioners
have never been in possession of the land (p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).

"D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private respondents who incredibly claimed that
the accretion occurred only in 1982 and is a "gift from the Lord." (pp. 24-25, Rollo)

This petition is impressed with merit.

The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private respondents together with
the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is referred to in this decision as the "subject land."
virtua1aw lib rary
cralaw

In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject land" which is an
accretion to the registered land while private respondents claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares
accretion attached to their "motherland." cralaw virtua1aw library

It should be noted that the herein private respondents‟ claim of ownership of their alleged two and a half (2
& 1/2) hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four (4) tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and
"B", pp. 191, 192, 193, 194, Rollo). This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for
purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.
(Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa
Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444). For their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of
their Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p. 189, Rollo) issued in
the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners‟ predecessor-in-interest) pursuant to Free Patent No. 399431
dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing that the boundary of petitioners‟ land on the north is Cagayan River
and not the "motherland" claimed by respondents. The said registered land was bought by the late Antonio
Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos Cureg, on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of
Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo) which states that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan River.

In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393, 401-402,
We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not
conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title
indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises. Petitioners‟ OCT
No. P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A", dated 1979;
Exhibit "A-1" undated and Exhibit "A-2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private
respondents in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of private respondents‟
predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have been subscribed by him after the last war,
when it was established during the trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.

Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p. 203, Rollo), which the
appellate court considered as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the land of
Domingo Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said tax
declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later date.
Since petitioner‟s original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the
Cagayan River, private respondents‟ claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners‟
land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of
title.

It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have
existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the
decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496
(now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan subsequent to
the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its northern boundary is
Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused
the accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT No. P-19093, of the
existence of Francisco Gerardo‟s land. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of the "subject land" but the
evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court on page 11 of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated
the reason for denying private respondents‟ petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, that is,." . .
the defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September,
1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents, Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the
east of the land in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-
examination, revealed that when his property was only more than one (1) hectare in 1958, (now more than
4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan (T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20).
Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on direct examination stated that in 1974, the late
Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to it, but
he did not pursue the same because he learned from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that
the same accretion is the subject of an application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila, (T.S.N.,
May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial court and the appellate court that Albano
"made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to survey because persons other than
defendants were in possession of the land," which statement appears only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo).
Fourth, We note Exhibit "20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the Director of Lands dated
August 14, 1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of an accretion situated
in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila‟s application was disapproved because in an investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was found to be
occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to his land. It is
worthy to note that none of the private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of
those found occupying and cultivating said accretion.

On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the "motherland"
through their predecessors-in-interest had not been proved by substantial evidence. The assailed decision of
the respondent court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, stated that since the "motherland"
exists, it is also presumed that private respondents were in possession of the "subject land" through their
predecessors-in-interest since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied on the testimony of Soledad
Gerardo, one of the private respondents in this case, an interested and biased witness, regarding their
possession of the "motherland." From her testimony on pedigree, the trial court presumed that the source of
the property, the late Francisco Gerardo, was in possession of the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp.
137-140, Rollo).

The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland" claimed by private respondents
is non-existent. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan
River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code: chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters."
cralaw virtua1aw library

However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four thousand five hundred
eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said land is approximately five and a half (5.5)
hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners‟ land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the
northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the
lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652,
June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
3. [G.R. Nos. 66075-76. July 5, 1990.] Agustin v IAC

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN

LANGCAY, Petitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD,
PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, Respondents.

Antonio N. Laggui for Petitioners.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for Private Respondents.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of
Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands,
in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of
Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin
(Exh. 2-Agustin).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank.
The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands
covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been
in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892,
and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession
in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were overgrown
with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug‟s Homestead Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved
in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug‟s possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh.
F-Binayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-
interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of
Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among
which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin‟s Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as
accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.

However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in
the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and
Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate
those lots they had to cross the river.

In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on
the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of
Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the
premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No.
343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970,
private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and
their accretions.

On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud,
or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together
with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these
defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested
heirs of Macario Melad.

"In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente
Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong
Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay,
or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881,
7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs
Pablo Binayug and Geronimo Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven
and to costs.

"SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.)" (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)

Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T,
only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi
and Juan Langcay appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the
execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay
on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial (Order dated
August 15, 1975). chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment
of the trial court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.

In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents‟ estate as a result of
accretion;

2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents‟ estate which used to pertain to petitioners‟ estate
cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and

3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by the sudden
and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed.

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who
did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the
sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is
supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)"

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514).

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this period,
the alluviun (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands of the
plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but
can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases that said
Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio
Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo
Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that
when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in
1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of
the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo
Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone. . . ." (p. 27, Rollo.)

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going
on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No.
3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in
June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No.
3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of
18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the
east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas
v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands v. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if
lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the
waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only
just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by
the right of accretion (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The private respondents‟ ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt
change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and
separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and
463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.

"Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years." cralaw virtua1aw library

"Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof
isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from
the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in
1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the
current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by
avulsion to the other side of the river.
chanrobles lawlibrary : redna d

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
4. [G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012.] Republic v Santos

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the
water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the
river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not
to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III
(Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less,
was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079
belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1ςrνll

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his
co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.2ςrνll

The City of Paraque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the
property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from
the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the
property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard
that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3ςrνll

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4ςrνll the RTC granted the application for land registration,
disposing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied
for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Paraque with an area of one thousand forty five
(1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot
4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their
names with the following technical description, to wit:

xxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the
Decree be issued.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5ςrνll to wit:
 I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION
TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C.
SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF
SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEES
FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR
CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6ςrνll

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7ςrνll

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that: 8ςrνll

RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT
WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED
BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAQUE
RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY
AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not
respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

 I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of
the Paraque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins
the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through
inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil
Code, it is provided that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9ςrνll

The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in
this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously
part of the Paraque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins
the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p.
3; p. 38 Rollo).10ςrνll

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was
erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the
drying up of the Paraque River.

The Republics submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of
their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight,
or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it.11ςrνll They would be held entitled to claim the
property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that,
indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12ςrνll The deposit of soil,
to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13ςrνll

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant
of their application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B.
Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Paraque River, leading
both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the
Paraque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4
was issued in their mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land
formed between Lot 4 and the Paraque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and
sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraque River, resulting in the
formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the
current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several
other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the
uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the
increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the
current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the
dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by
the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of time intervening between 1920,
when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in
existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he
knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was
that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s
own testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Paraque River that had dried up
and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed
the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the
Paraque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan
Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River
Bed."14ςrνll

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was
described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio
Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15ςrνll

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river
banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to
claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil
Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical
language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical,
there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application.16ςrνll The first and fundamental
duty of courts is then to apply the law.17ςrνll

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the
Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18ςrνll It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person.19ςrνll

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had
taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based
on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It
rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20ςrνll

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years
because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-
00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr.
Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
property is not a portion of the Paraque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the
Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing
reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the
requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of
a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled
thereto, not having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree),
which pertinently states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely:
(a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21ςrνll

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years."22ςrνll

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings
being binding and conclusive on the Court,23ςrνll the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this
rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.24ςrνll

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that
the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the
Court should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for
more than 30 years, the RTC declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years
because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan
Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that
Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the
subject property is not a portion of the Paraque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000,
thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years"
from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet,
its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the
property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only
that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not
enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively
prove the payors ownership of the land the taxes were paid for, 25ςrνll the tax declarations and payments
being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26ςrνll and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property
involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make
an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the
law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit
created by the current of the water becomes manifest27ςrνll has no applicability herein. This is simply
because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the
river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would
ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-
B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they
declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from
199928ςrνll signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of
their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty
years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means
without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the
Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely:
(a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural
beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the
Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29ςrνll a case involving the registration of
land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title
in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including
its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has
dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the
subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when
"river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted,
however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject
land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration.
Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a
natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering
our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public
domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river,
not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek
changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains
property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State.30ςrνll No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a
title from the State.31ςrνll Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32ςrνll

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of
the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire
only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural
change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public
dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government
to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be
alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through
prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the
Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found
on the survey plan, to wit:33ςrνll

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by
the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the propertys
nature as alienable and disposable public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
Yap34ςrνllthat:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject
of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land
is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,35ςrνll which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36ςrνll we specifically

resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the
alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land
Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,"
appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the
survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37ςrνll we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the
Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a
piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do
so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The
government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts
stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no
probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

xxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls
within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications
may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to
the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt"
did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents
could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.ςηαοblενιrυαllαωlιbrαr

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S.
Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to
the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.
5. [G.R. No. 161030: September 14, 2011.] Fernando v Acuna

JOSE FERNANDO, JR., ZOILO FERNANDO, NORMA FERNANDO BANARES, ROSARIO

FERNANDO TANGKENCGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS FERNANDO, REPRESENTED BY ALFREDO V.
FERNANDO, HEIRS OF GUILLERMO FERNANDO, REPRESENTED BY RONNIE H. FERNANDO,
HEIRS OF ILUMINADA FERNANDO, REPRESENTED BY BENJAMIN ESTRELLA AND HEIRS OF
GERMOGENA FERNANDO, PETITIONERS, VS. LEON ACUNA, HERMOGENES FERNANDO, HEIRS
OF SPOUSES ANTONIO FERNANDO AND FELISA CAMACHO, REPRESENTED BY HERMOGENES
FERNANDO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75773, entitled "Jose Fernando, Jr., et al. v. Heirs of Germogena Fernando, et al.," which reversed
and set aside the Decision2 dated May 16, 2002 of Branch 84, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan in Civil Case No. 256-M-97.

At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
RO-487 (997)3 registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A.
Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When they died
intestate, the property remained undivided. Petitioners herein - namely, Jose Fernando, Jr., Zoilo
Fernando, Norma Fernando Banares, Rosario Fernando Tangkencgo, the heirs of Tomas Fernando, the
heirs of Guillermo Fernando, the heirs of Iluminada Fernando and the heirs of Germogena Fernando -
are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased registered owners. However, petitioners
failed to agree on the division of the subject property amongst themselves, even after compulsory
conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.

Thus, petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint4 for partition on April
17, 1997 against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. In the Complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among
others, that they and defendants are common descendants and compulsory heirs of the late spouses
Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio, and the late spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez. They
further claimed that their predecessors-in-interest died intestate and without instructions as to the
disposition of the property left by them covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). There being no
settlement, the heirs are asking for their rightful and lawful share because they wish to build up their
homes or set up their business in the respective portions that will be allotted to them. In sum, they
prayed that the subject property be partitioned into eight equal parts, corresponding to the hereditary
interest of each group of heirs.

In their Answer5 filed on May 20, 1997, defendants essentially admitted all of the allegations in the
complaint. They alleged further that they are not opposing the partition and even offered to share in
the expenses that will be incurred in the course of the proceedings.

In his Complaint in Intervention6 filed on January 12, 1998, respondent Leon Acuna (Acuna) averred
that in the Decision7 dated November 29, 1929 of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, the portion
of the property identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated to: (a) Antonio Fernando, married to
Felisa Camacho; (b) spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; (c) spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and
Salud Wisco; and (d) Jose Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, the petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest. He likewise claimed that in a 1930 Decision of the Cadastral Court, the portion identified as
Lot 1302 was also already adjudicated to other people as well.

Respondent Acuna further alleged that Salud Wisco, through her authorized attorney-in-fact, Amador
W. Cruz, sold her lawful share denominated as Lot 1303-D with an area of 3,818 square meters to
Simeon P. Cunanan,8 who in turn sold the same piece of land to him as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale.9 He also belied petitioners' assertion that the subject property has not been settled by the
parties after the death of the original owners in view of the Decision 10 dated July 30, 1980 of the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Baliuag, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 80-389 which ordered the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan to issue the corresponding certificates of title to the claimants of the portion of the
subject property designated as Lot 1302.11 Norma Fernando, one of the petitioners in the instant case,
even testified in LRC Case No. 80-389. According to respondent Acuna, this circumstance betrayed
bad faith on the part of petitioners in filing the present case for partition.

Respondent Acuna likewise averred that the action for partition cannot prosper since the heirs of the
original owners of the subject property, namely Rosario, Jose Jr., Norma, Tomas, Guillermo, Leopoldo,
Hermogena, Illuminada and Zoilo, all surnamed Fernando, and Lucila Tinio, purportedly had already
sold their respective one-tenth (1/10) share each in the subject property to Ruperta Sto. Domingo
Villasenor for the amount of P35,000.00 on January 25, 1978 as evidenced by a "Kasulatan sa Bilihang
Patuluyan."12 He added that he was in possession of the original copy of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and
that he had not commenced the issuance of new titles to the subdivided lots because he was waiting
for the owners of the other portions of the subject property to bear their respective shares in the cost
of titling.

Subsequently, a Motion for Intervention13 was filed on June 23, 1998 by respondent Hermogenes
Fernando (Hermogenes), for himself and on behalf of the heirs of the late spouses, Antonio A.
Fernando and Felisa Camacho. According to him, in the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Bulacan,
their predecessors-in-interest had already been adjudged owners of Lots 1302-A, 1302-F, 1302-
G,14 1302-H and 1302-J of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and any adverse distribution of the properties would
cause respondents damage and prejudice. He would also later claim, in his Answer-in-
Intervention,15 that the instant case is already barred by res judicata and, should be dismissed.

In the interest of substantial justice, the trial court allowed the respondents to intervene in the case.

The plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved to have the case submitted for judgment on the pleadings
on May 7, 1999.16 However, the trial court denied said motion in a Resolution17dated August 23, 1999
primarily due to the question regarding the ownership of the property to be partitioned, in light of the
intervention of respondents Acuna and Hermogenes who were claiming legal right thereto.

In their Manifestation18 filed on April 12, 2000, petitioners affirmed their execution of a Deed of Sale in
favor of Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor in 1978, wherein they sold to her 1,000 square meters from
Lot 1303 for the sum of ?35,000.00.

After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. On September 19, 2000, petitioner Elizabeth Alarcon
testified that they (plaintiffs) are not claiming the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997)
but only the area referred to as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan. She also admitted that Lot 1302 had
already been divided into ten (10) sublots and allocated to various owners pursuant to the July 30,
1980 Decision of the CFI of Baliuag, Bulacan and these owners already have their own titles. She
likewise claimed that the entire area consisting of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan is based on the
subdivision plan of Lot 1303. She admitted that plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest was only allocated a
portion of Lot 1303 based on the said plan. However, she claimed that the November 29, 1929
Decision subdividing Lot 1303 was never implemented nor executed by the parties. 19

Petitioner Norma Fernando testified on October 3, 2000 that she is one of the children of Jose A.
Fernando and Lucila Tinio. She affirmed that plaintiffs were only claiming Lot 1303 and Sapang
Bayan. She also testified that Sapang Bayan was supposedly included in Lot 1302 and was previously
a river until it dried up. Unlike Lot 1302, the rest of the property was purportedly not
distributed. She likewise averred that she is aware of a November 29, 1929 Decision concerning the
distribution of Lot 1303 issued by the cadastral court but insisted that the basis of the claims of the
petitioners over Lot 1303 is the title in the name of her ascendants and not said Decision. 20

On November 16, 2000, as previously directed by the trial court and agreed to by the parties, counsel
for respondent Hermogenes prepared and submitted an English translation of the November 29, 1929
Decision. The same was admitted and marked in evidence as Exhibit "X" 21 as a common exhibit of the
parties. The petitioners also presented Alfredo Borja, the Geodetic Engineer who conducted a
relocation survey of the subject property.
After plaintiffs rested their case, respondent Hermogenes testified on December 7, 2000. In his
testimony, he claimed to know the plaintiffs and defendants as they were allegedly his relatives and
neighbors. He confirmed that according to the November 29, 1929 Decision, portions of Lot 1303 was
designated as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C and 1303-D which were adjudicated to certain persons,
including Jose Fernando, while the rest of Lot 1303 was adjudicated to his parents, Antonio A.
Fernando married to Felisa Camacho. According to respondent Hermogenes, his family's tenant and
the latter's children occupied the portion of Lot 1303 allotted to his (Hermogenes) parents while the
rest of Lot 1303 was occupied by the persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision. He
admitted, however, that nobody among the purported possessors of Lot 1303 registered the lots
assigned to them in the Decision.22

On January 18, 2001, respondent Hermogenes presented a witness, Engineer Camilo Vergara who
testified that the subject land is divided into Lots 1302 and 1303 with a creek dividing the two lots
known as Sapang Bayan. He also identified a Sketch Plan numbered as PSD-45657 and approved on
November 11, 1955.23 During the hearing on January 30, 2001, respondent Hermogenes made an oral
offer of his evidence and rested his case. On the same date, respondent Acuna, in lieu of his
testimony, offered for the parties to simply stipulate on the due execution and authenticity of the
Deeds of Sale dated April 6, 1979 and December 28, 1980, showing the transfer of Lot 1303-D from
Salud Wisco to Simeon Cunanan and subsequently to respondent Acuna. When counsel for plaintiffs
and defendants agreed to the stipulation, albeit objecting to the purpose for which the deeds of sale
were offered, the trial court admitted Acuna's exhibits and Acuna rested his case. 24

On February 15, 2001, plaintiffs recalled Norma Fernando as a rebuttal witness. In her rebuttal
testimony, she identified the tax declaration25 over the said property in the name of Jose A. Fernando;
an official receipt26 dated October 3, 1997 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of
Baliuag, Bulacan for payment of real property taxes from 1991 to 1997; and a real property tax
clearance27 dated October 6, 1997, to show that plaintiffs have allegedly been paying the real property
taxes on the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). However, she further testified that
they were now willing to pay taxes only over the portion with an area of 44,234 square meters, which
is included in their claim.28

In a Decision dated May 16, 2002, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs and defendants (petitioners
herein) were indeed the descendants and successors-in-interest of the registered owners, Jose A.
Fernando (married to Lucila Tinio) and Antonia Fernando (married to Felipe Galvez), of the property
covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). After finding that the parties admitted that Lot 1302 was already
distributed and titled in the names of third persons per the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of
Baliuag, Bulacan the trial court proceeded to rule on the allocation of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan.

With respect to Lot 1303, the trial court found that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral
Court, adjudicating said lot to different persons and limiting Jose Fernando's share to Lot 1303-C, was
never implemented nor executed despite the lapse of more than thirty years. Thus, the said decision
has already prescribed and can no longer be executed. The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot
1303 to the ownership of spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio and spouses Antonia A. Fernando
and Felipe Galvez under OCT No. RO-487 (997) and allowed the partition of Lot 1303 among
petitioners as successors-in-interest of said registered owners. Excluded from the partition, however,
were the portions of the property which petitioners admitted had been sold or transferred to Ruperta
Sto. Domingo Villasenor and respondent Acuna.

As for the ownership of Sapang Bayan, the trial court found that the same had not been alleged in the
pleadings nor raised as an issue during the pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court, the
parties failed to clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot 1302 or
Lot 1303. Neither was there any proof that Sapang Bayanwas a river that just dried up or that it was
an accretion which the adjoining lots gradually received from the effects of the current of water. It
was likewise not established who were the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan. The trial court
concluded that none of the parties had clearly and sufficiently established their claims over Sapang
Bayan.

The dispositive portion of the May 16, 2002 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the reversion of Lot
1303, except the portions allotted to Acuna and Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor, to the ownership of
Jose Fernando and Lucia Tinio and Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT No. 997 and
thereafter allowing the partition of said Lot 1303 among the plaintiffs and the defendants as
successors-in-interest of Jose and Lucia as well as Antonia and Felipe after the settlement of any
inheritance tax, fees, dues and/or obligation chargeable against their estate. 29

All the parties, with the exception of respondent Acuna, elevated this case to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed November 24, 2003 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated May 16, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. 256-M-97, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the complaint dated April 17, 1997 filed by plaintiffs-appellants is dismissed. Costs
against plaintiffs-appellants.30

Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in the court a quo elevated the matter for our review through the
instant petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether or not the ownership of Lot 1303 and the Sapang Bayan portion of the piece of land
covered by O.C.T. No. RO-487 (997) or Plan Psu-39080 should revert to the descendants and
heirs of the late spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and Antonia Fernando, married to Felipe
Galvez;

2. Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original certificate of
title is the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.31

The petition is without merit.

Petitioners based their claims to the disputed areas designated as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan on
their ascendants' title, OCT No. RO-487 (997), which was issued on February 26, 1927 in the name of
Jose A. Fernando married to Lucila Tinio and Antonia A. Fernando married to Felipe Galvez. The Court
now rules on these claims in seriatim.

Petitioners' claim with respect to Lot 1303

As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan (in
Cadastral Record No. 14, GLRO Cad. Record No. 781) which was written in Spanish, Lot 1303 had
already been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio; spouses Antonia
A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez; spouses Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa Camacho; spouses Jose
Martinez and Gregoria Sison; and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco from whom respondent
Acuna derived his title. The English translation of the said November 29, 1929 Decision was provided
by respondent Hermogenes and was adopted by all the parties as a common exhibit designated as
Exhibit "X." The agreed English translation of said Decision reads:

Lot No. 1303 - This lot is decreed in record No. 448, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25414 and actually with
Original Certificate No. 997 (exhibited today) in the name of Jose A. Fernando and Antonia A.
Fernando, who now pray that said lot be subdivided in accordance with the answers recorded in the
instant cadastral record, and the sketch, Exh. "A", which is attached to the records.

A part or portion of the lot has been claimed by Antonio A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felisa
Camacho; another portion by the spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; another portion by
Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felipe Galvez; another portion by Jose A. Fernando, of
legal age, married to Lucila Tinio; and another portion by the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud
Wisco, both of legal age. The part claimed by the spouses Jose A. Martinez and Gregoria Sison is Lot
1303-A of Exh. A; the part claimed by Antonia A. Fernando is Lot 1303-B of said exhibit; the part
claimed by Jose A. Fernando is Lot 1303-C of said exhibit, and the part claimed by the spouses
Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco is Lot 1303-D of the aforementioned Exhibit.

The subdivision of said lot is hereby ordered, separating from the same the portions that correspond
to each of the claimants, which portions are known as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C, and 1303-D in
the sketch, Exh. "A", and once subdivided, are adjudicated in favor of the spouses, Jose Martinez and
Gregoria Sison, of legal age, Lot No. 1303-A, in favor of Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age, married to
Felipe Galvez, Lot No. 1303-B; in favor of Jose A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Lucila Tinio, Lot
1303-C; in favor of the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco, of legal age, Lot 1303-D; and the
rest of Lot 1303 is adjudged in favor of Antonio A. Fernando married to Felisa Camacho. It is likewise
ordered that once the subdivision plan is approved, the same be forwarded by the Director of Lands to
this Court for its final decision.

It is ordered that the expense for mentioned subdivision, shall be for the account of the spouses Jose
Martinez and Gregoria Sison, Antonia A. Fernando, Jose A. Fernando, the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz
and Salud Wisco, and Antonio A. Fernando.32

From the foregoing, it would appear that petitioners' ascendants themselves petitioned for the
cadastral court to divide Lot 1303 among the parties to the 1929 case and they were only allocated
Lots 1303-B and 1303-C. Still, as the trial court noted, the November 29, 1929 Decision was never
fully implemented in the sense that the persons named therein merely proceeded to occupy the lots
assigned to them without having complied with the other directives of the cadastral court which would
have led to the titling of the properties in their names. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the persons
named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision and, subsequently, their heirs and assigns have since
been in peaceful and uncontested possession of their respective lots for more than seventy (70) years
until the filing of the suit for partition on April 17, 1997 by petitioners which is the subject matter of
this case. Respondent Hermogenes, who testified that petitioners were his relatives and neighbors,
further affirmed before the trial court that the persons named in the November 29, 1929 Decision took
possession of their respective lots:

ATTY. VENERACION:

Q - This Jose A. Fernando married to Lucila Tinio, you testified earlier are the parents of the plaintiffs.
Did they take possession of lot 1303-C?

A - Yes, sir. They took possession.

Q - Did they take possession of the other lots?

A - No. Yes, the portion...

Q - The other lots in the name of the other persons. Did they take possession of that?

A - Yes, they took took possession of the other... No, sir.

Q - I am asking you whether they took possession, the children...

ATTY. SANTIAGO:

The questions are already answered, your Honor.

ATTY. VENERACION:

What is the answer?

ATTY. SANTIAGO:
It's in the record.

COURT:

The persons named in the Decision already took possession of the lots allotted to them as per that
Decision. So that was already answered. Anything else?

ATTY. VENERACION;

No more question, Your Honor.33

It is noteworthy that petitioners do not dispute that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the cadastral
court already adjudicated the ownership of Lot 1303 to persons other than the registered owners
thereof. Petitioners would, nonetheless, claim that respondents' purported failure to execute the
November 29, 1929 Decision over Lot 1303 (i.e., their failure to secure their own titles) meant that
the entire Lot 1303 being still registered in the name of their ascendants rightfully belongs to
them. This is on the theory that respondents' right to have the said property titled in their names
have long prescribed.

On this point, we agree with the appellate court.

Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
states that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession." Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover
possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.34

However, in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan,35 the Court had
recognized the jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is
true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right
to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

Thus, in Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan,36 the Court had held that while a person may not
acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the
title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back
the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.

In the more recent case of Bartola M. Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion,37 we similarly held that while
jurisprudence is settled on the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally
an abundance of cases where we unequivocally ruled that registered owners may lose their right to
recover possession of property through the equitable principle of laches.

Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in
equity.38 The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's
rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack
of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the
complainant.39

In view of respondents' decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by virtue of
a court judgment and the erstwhile registered owners' inaction and neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right to
recover the same, it is clear that respondents' possession may no longer be disturbed. The right of
the registered owners as well as their successors-in-interest to recover possession of the property is
already a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.
In the same vein, we uphold the finding of the Court of Appeals that the title of petitioners' ascendants
wrongfully included lots belonging to third persons.40 Indeed, petitioners' ascendants appeared to have
acknowledged this fact as they were even the ones that prayed for the cadastral court to subdivide Lot
1303 as evident in the November 29, 1929 Decision. We concur with the Court of Appeals that
petitioners' ascendants held the property erroneously titled in their names under an implied trust for
the benefit of the true owners. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

As aptly observed by the appellate court, the party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their
title over the property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value.41 As we held in Medizabel v. Apao,42 the essence of an action for reconveyance is
that the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the
property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. It is settled in jurisprudence that mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title.43

We cannot subscribe to petitioners' argument that whatever rights or claims respondents may have
under the November 29, 1929 Decision has prescribed for their purported failure to fully execute the
same. We again concur with the Court of Appeals in this regard. An action for reconveyance of
registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the
date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. However, this Court has ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period applies only when the
person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is
in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title
to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land
claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right.44

Petitioners' claim with respect to Sapang Bayan

As for the issue of the ownership of Sapang Bayan, we sustain the appellate court insofar as it ruled
that petitioners failed to substantiate their ownership over said area. However, we find that the Court
of Appeals erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable. The said principle is embodied in
Article 457 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." We
have held that for Article 457 to apply the following requisites must concur: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.45 The character of
the Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the nature that is being referred to in the
provision which is an accretion known as alluvion as no evidence had been presented to support this
assertion.

In fact from the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not agree how Sapang Bayan came
about. Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or a dried-up creek bed
connected to the main river could not be ascertained.

Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420, paragraph 1 46 and
Article 502, paragraph 147 of the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public
dominion. In the absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some
other person, it must continue to belong to the State.

We ruled on this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals,48 to wit:

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified
as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is
null and void.49

Furthermore, in Celestial v. Cachopero,50 we similarly ruled that a dried-up creek bed is property of
public dominion:

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.51

Therefore, on the basis of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, Sapang Bayan cannot be adjudged
to any of the parties in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75773 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
6. [G.R. NO. 178906 : February 18, 2009] Arangote v Sps. Maglunon

ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE, Petitioner, v. SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and LOURDES S. MAGLUNOB, and
ROMEO SALIDO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated 27 October 2006 and Resolution2 dated 29
June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64970. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court
affirmed the Decision3 dated 12 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 6th Judicial Region,
Branch 1, Kalibo, Aklan, in Civil Case No. 5511, which reversed the Decision4 dated 6 April 1998 of the 7th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ibajay-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, in Civil Case No. 156; and declared 5 the
herein respondent-Spouses Martin and Lourdes Maglunob (Spouses Maglunob) and respondent Romeo
Salido (Romeo) as the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 12897 with an area of 982 square meters, more
or less, located in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan (subject property). In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court
denied herein petitioner Elvira T. Arangote's Motion for Reconsideration.

Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, is the registered owner of the subject
property, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-1748.6 Respondents Martin (Martin II)
and Romeo are first cousins and the grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan (Esperanza), from
whom petitioner acquired the subject property.

The Petition stems from a Complaint7 filed by petitioner and her husband against the respondents for
Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction, and
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 156.

The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the subject property from her uncle Victorino Sorrosa by
virtue of a notarized Partition Agreement8 dated 29 April 1985, executed by the latter's heirs. Thereafter,
Esperanza declared the subject property in her name for real property tax purposes, as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 16218 (1985).9

The Complaint further stated that on 24 June 1985, Esperanza executed a Last Will and
Testament10bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and her husband, but it was never probated. On
9 June 1986, Esperanza executed another document, an Affidavit,11 in which she renounced, relinquished,
waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest and participation whatsoever in the subject property in
favor of petitioner and her husband. On the basis thereof, Tax Declaration No. 16218 in the name of
Esperanza was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 1666612 (1987) was issued in the name of the petitioner
and her husband.

In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject property. On 26 March 1993, OCT
No. CLOA-1748 was issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the name of
petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote. However, respondents, together with some hired persons,
entered the subject property on 3 June 1994 and built a hollow block wall behind and in front of petitioner's
house, which effectively blocked the entrance to its main door.

As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her husband were compelled to institute Civil Case No. 156.

In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156, respondents averred that they co-owned the
subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her siblings, Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject
property, in equal shares, from their father Martin Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas and Inocencia passed
away, their shares passed on by inheritance to respondents Martin II and Romeo, respectively. Hence, the
subject property was co-owned by Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his wife Lourdes), and
respondent Romeo, each holding a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus, Esperanza could not validly
waive her rights and interest over the entire subject property in favor of the petitioner.
Respondents also asserted in their Counterclaim that petitioner and her husband, by means of fraud, undue
influence and deceit were able to make Esperanza, who was already old and illiterate, affix her thumbmark
to the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986, wherein she renounced all her rights and interest over the subject
property in favor of petitioner and her husband. Respondents thus prayed that the OCT issued in petitioner's
name be declared null and void insofar as their two-thirds shares are concerned.

After trial, the MCTC rendered its Decision dated 6 April 1998 in Civil Case No. 156, declaring petitioner and
her husband as the true and lawful owners of the subject property. The decretal portion of the MCTC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

A. Declaring the [herein petitioner and her husband] the true, lawful and exclusive owners and entitled to
the possession of the [subject property] described and referred to under paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 16666 in the names of the [petitioner and her husband];

B. Ordering the [herein respondents] and anyone hired by, acting or working for them, to cease and desist
from asserting or claiming any right or interest in, or exercising any act of ownership or possession over the
[subject property];

C. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner and her husband] the amount of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fee. With cost against the [respondents].13

The respondents appealed the aforesaid MCTC Decision to the RTC. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case
No. 5511.

Respondents argued in their appeal that the MCTC erred in not dismissing the Complaint filed by the
petitioner and her husband for failure to identify the subject property therein. Respondents further faulted
the MCTC for not declaring Esperanza's Affidavit dated 9 June 1986 - - relinquishing all her rights and
interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband - - as null and void insofar as
respondents' two-thirds share in the subject property is concerned.

On 12 September 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision reversing the MCTC Decision dated 6 April 1998. The
RTC adjudged respondents, as well as the other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the lawful owners and
possessors of the entire subject property. The RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) The appealed [D]ecision is REVERSED;

2) [Herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob are declared the lawful owners and
possessors of the whole [subject property] as described in Paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint, as against the
[herein petitioner and her husband].

3) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to immediately turn over possession of the [subject property] to
the [respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob; and cralawlibrary

4) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to pay [respondents] attorney's fees of P5,000.00, other
litigation expenses of P5,000.00, moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.14

Petitioner and her husband filed before the RTC, on 26 September 2000, a Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration15 on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of a Deed of Acceptance 16dated 23
September 2000, and notice17 of the same, which were both made by the petitioner, for herself and in
behalf of her husband,18 during the lifetime of Esperanza. In the RTC Order19 dated 2 May 2001, however,
the RTC denied the aforesaid Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration.
The petitioner and her husband then filed a Petition for Review, under Rule 42 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, before the Court of Appeals, where the Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64970.

In their Petition before the appellate court, petitioner and her husband raised the following errors committed
by the RTC in its 12 September 2000 Decision:

I. It erred in reversing the [D]ecision of the [MCTC];

II. It erred in declaring the [herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob as the lawful
owners and possessors of the whole [subject property];

III. It erred in declaring [OCT] No. CLOA-1748 in the name of [herein petitioner] Elvie T. Arangote as null
and void;

IV. It erred in denying [petitioner and her husband's] [M]otion for [N]ew [T]rial or [R]econsideration dated
[26 September 2000; and cralawlibrary

V. It erred in not declaring the [petitioner and her husband] as possessors in good faith.20

On 27 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying the Petition for Review of petitioner
and her husband and affirming the RTC Decision dated 12 September 2000. Petitioner and her husband's
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
29 June 2007.

Hence, petitioner21 now comes before this Court raising in her Petition the following issues:

I. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared the [petitioner and her husband's title to the subject property] null and void;

II. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it declared
the Affidavit of Quitclaim null and void; andcralawlibrary

III. Whether the [RTC] and the Honorable Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rejected petitioner's claim as possessors (sic) in good faith, hence,
entitled to the rights provided in [Article] 448 and [Article] 546 of the Civil Code.22

Petitioner contends that the aforesaid OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued in her name on 26 March 1993 and
was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Aklan on 20 April 1993. From 20 April 1993 until the institution of
Civil Case No. 156 on 10 June 1994 before the MCTC, more than one year had already elapsed. Considering
that a Torrens title can only be attacked within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration on the ground of fraud and that such attack must be through a direct proceeding, it was an
error on the part of the RTC and the Court of Appeals to declare OCT No. CLOA-1748 null and void.

Petitioner additionally posits that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals committed a mistake in declaring
null and void the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986 executed by Esperanza, waiving all her rights and interest over
the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. Esperanza's Affidavit is a valid and binding proof
of the transfer of ownership of the subject property in petitioner's name, as it was also coupled with actual
delivery of possession of the subject property to petitioner and her husband. The Affidavit is also proof of
good faith on the part of petitioner and her husband.

Finally, petitioner argues that, assuming for the sake of argument, that Esperanza's Affidavit is null and
void, petitioner and her husband had no knowledge of any flaw in Esperanza's title when the latter
relinquished her rights to and interest in the subject property in their favor. Hence, petitioner and her
husband can be considered as possessors in good faith and entitled to the rights provided under Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code.

This present Petition is devoid of merit.

It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and
weigh evidence by the parties all over again. This Court's jurisdiction is, in principle, limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. 23 This rule, however, is subject to
several exceptions,24 one of which is present in this case, i.e., when the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.

In this case, the findings of fact of the MCTC as regards the origin of the subject property are in conflict with
the findings of fact of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Court will have to examine the
records to determine first the true origin of the subject property and to settle whether the respondents have
the right over the same for being co-heirs and co-owners, together with their grand aunt, Esperanza, before
this Court can resolve the issues raised by the petitioner in her Petition.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, this Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals as regards the origin of the subject property and the fact that respondents, with their grand aunt
Esperanza, were co-heirs and co-owners of the subject property.

The records disclosed that the subject property was part of a parcel of land25 situated in Maloco, Ibajay,
Aklan, consisting of 7,176 square meters and commonly owned in equal shares by the siblings Pantaleon
Maglunob (Pantaleon) and Placida Maglunob-Sorrosa (Placida). Upon the death of Pantaleon and Placida,
their surviving and legal heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate in July
1981,26 however, the Deed was not notarized. Considering that Pantaleon died without issue, his one-half
share in the parcel of land he co-owned with Placida passed on to his four siblings (or their respective heirs,
if already deceased), namely: Placida, Luis, Martin I, and Victoria, in equal shares.

According to the aforementioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate, the surviving and
legal heirs of Pantaleon and Placida agreed to have the parcel of land commonly owned by the siblings
declared for real property tax purposes in the name of Victorino Sorrosa (Victorino), Placida's husband.
Thus, Tax Declarations No. 5988 (1942),27 No. 6200 (1945)28 and No. 7233 (1953)29 were all issued in the
name of Victorino.

Since Martin I already passed away when the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate was
executed, his heirs30 were represented therein by Esperanza. By virtue of the said Deed, Martin I received as
inheritance a portion of the parcel of land measuring 897 square meters.

After the death of Victorino, his heirs31 executed another Partition Agreement on 29 April 1985, which was
notarized on the same date. The Partition Agreement mentioned four parcels of land. The subject property,
consisting of a portion of the consolidated parcels 1, 2, and 3, and measuring around 982 square meters,
was allocated to Esperanza. In comparison, the property given to Esperanza under the Partition Agreement
is bigger than the one originally allocated to her earlier under the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition of Estate dated July 1981, which had an area of only 897 square meters. It may be reasonably
assumed, however, that the subject property, measuring 982 square meters, allocated to Esperanza under
the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985, is already inclusive of the smaller parcel of 897 square meters
assigned to her under the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate dated July 1981. As
explained by the RTC in its 12 September 2000 Decision:

The [subject property] which is claimed by the [herein petitioner and her husband] and that which is
claimed by the [herein respondents] are one and the same, the difference in area and technical description
being due to the repartition and re-allocation of the parcel of land originally co-owned by Pantaleon
Maglunob and his sister Placida Maglunob and subsequently declared in the name of [Victorino] under Tax
Declaration No. 5988 of 1949.32

It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanza's exclusive share, but also that of
the other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I.
Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985 Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating
that she was doing so not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does not
mean that Esperanza was already the exclusive owner thereof. The evidence shows that the subject
property is the share of the heirs of Martin I. This is clear from the sketch33 attached to the Partition
Agreement dated 29 April 1985, which reveals the proportionate areas given to the heirs of the two siblings,
Pantaleon and Placida, who were the original owners of the whole parcel of land34 from which the subject
property was taken.

Further, it bears emphasis that the Partition Agreement was executed by and among the son, grandsons,
granddaughters and cousins of Victorino. Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the cousin of
Victorino, as she was only Victorino's grandniece. The cousin of Victorino is Martin I, Esperanza's father. In
effect, therefore, the subject property allotted to Esperanza in the Partition Agreement was not her exclusive
share, as she holds the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, who was already deceased at
the time the Partition Agreement was made.

To further bolster the truth that the subject property was not exclusively owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit
she executed in favor of petitioner and her husband on 6 June 1985 was worded as follows:

That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and quitclaim all my rights, share, interest and participation
whatsoever in the [subject property] unto the said Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T. Arangote, their
heirs, successors, and assigns including the improvement found thereon; 35

Logically, if Esperanza fully owned the subject property, she would have simply waived her rights to and
interest in the subject property, without mentioning her "share" and "participation" in the same. By including
such words in her Affidavit, Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver, renunciation, and quitclaim
to her one-third share and participation in the subject property.

Going to the issues raised by the petitioner in this Petition, this Court will resolve the same concurrently as
they are interrelated.

In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property from the notarized Affidavit executed by
Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her rights, share, interest and participation over the same in
favor of the petitioner and her husband.

A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to be. Esperanza's Affidavit is, in
fact, a Donation. Esperanza's real intent in executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the
subject property to petitioner and her husband.

As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her husband under the said Affidavit, the donation is
regarded as a pure donation of an interest in a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil
Code.36 Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real
property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may
be made either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the acceptance
is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the same must be
noted in both instruments.

This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit executed by Esperanza
relinquishing her rights, share, interest and participation over the subject property in favor of the petitioner
and her husband suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid requisites of the
law.
In Sumipat v. Banga,37 this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to
the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and
the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If
the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the Deed of
Donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void.38

In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first requisite, as
it was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second
and third requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner and her husband
either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the said
donation, there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the
Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is null and void.

The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39 dated 23 September 2000, as well as the notice40 of such
acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the petitioner
several years after the Complaint was filed in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its Decision
dated 12 September 2000, although it was still during Esperanza's lifetime. Evidently, its execution was a
mere afterthought, a belated attempt to cure what was a defective donation.

It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And
granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for
proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of
Donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance.41 At the very least, this last legal requisite
of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the
Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the
donation by petitioner. For this reason, even Esperanza's one-third share in the subject property cannot be
adjudicated to the petitioner.

With the foregoing, this Court holds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and
void Esperanza's Affidavit.

The next issue to be resolved then is whether the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, erred in declaring
OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of petitioner and her husband null and void.

Again, this Court answers the said issue in the negative.

Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Such proscription has long been enshrined in Philippine jurisprudence. The judicial action required to
challenge the validity of title is a direct attack, not a collateral attack. 42

The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or
enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different
relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a
certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as
void.43

A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the defendant is the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the
complaint becomes the defendant. It stands on the same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules
as if it were, an independent action.44

In their Answer to the Complaint for Quieting of Title filed by the petitioner and her husband before the
MCTC, respondents included therein a Counterclaim wherein they repleaded all the material allegations in
their affirmative defenses, the most essential of which was their claim that petitioner and her husband - - by
means of fraud, undue influence and deceit - - were able to make their grand aunt, Esperanza, who was
already old and illiterate, affix her thumbmark to the Affidavit, wherein she renounced, waived, and
quitclaimed all her rights and interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. In
addition, respondents maintained in their Answer that as petitioner and her husband were not tenants either
of Esperanza or of the respondents, the DAR could not have validly issued in favor of petitioner and her
husband OCT No. CLOA-1748. Thus, the respondents prayed, in their counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156
before the MCTC, that OCT No. CLOA-1748 issued in the name of petitioner, married to Ray Mars E.
Arangote, be declared null and void, insofar as their two-thirds shares in the subject property are concerned.

It is clear, thus, that respondents' Answer with Counterclaim was a direct attack on petitioner's certificate of
title. Furthermore, since all the essential facts of the case for the determination of the validity of the title are
now before this Court, to require respondents to institute a separate cancellation proceeding would be
pointlessly circuitous and against the best interest of justice.

Esperanza's Affidavit, which was the sole basis of petitioner's claim to the subject property, has been
declared null and void. Moreover, petitioner and her husband were not tenants of the subject property. In
fact, petitioner herself admitted in her Complaint filed before the MCTC that her husband is out of the
country, rendering it impossible for him to work on the subject property as a tenant. Instead of cultivating
the subject property, petitioner and her husband possessed the same by constructing a house thereon.
Thus, it is highly suspicious how the petitioner was able to secure from the DAR a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) over the subject property. The DAR awards such certificates to the grantees only if
they fulfill the requirements of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).45 Hence, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and void
OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of the petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.

Considering that Esperanza died without any compulsory heirs and that the supposed donation of her one-
third share in the subject property per her Affidavit dated 9 June 1985 was already declared null and void,
Esperanza's one-third share in the subject property passed on to her legal heirs, the respondents.

As petitioner's last-ditch effort, she claims that she is a possessor in good faith and, thus, entitled to the
rights provided for under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

This claim is untenable.

The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:

Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor by
extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Every possessor in good
faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that what he believed to be true
is not so.46

In the present case, when respondents came to know that an OCT over the subject property was issued and
registered in petitioner's name on 26 March 1993, respondents brought a Complaint on 7 August 1993
before the Lupon of Barangay Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, challenging the title of petitioner to the subject
property on the basis that said property constitutes the inheritance of respondent, together with their
grandaunt Esperanza, so Esperanza had no authority to relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner.
From that moment, the good faith of the petitioner had ceased.
Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, because the rights
mentioned therein are applicable only to builders in good faith and not to possessors in good faith.

Moreover, the petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith of the house on the subject property.
In the context that such term is used in particular reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, a builder in
good faith is one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner
and unaware of any defect in his title or mode of acquisition.47

The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land
if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υ αl lαω lιbrα rÿ

Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right to indemnity.

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in
their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

Under the foregoing provisions, the builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of
the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession,
i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance,
compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. In order, however, that the builder can
invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the
landowner, he should be able to prove good faith on his part.48

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence
of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a
concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It
implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder
upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in
good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates
it.49

In this case, the subject property waived and quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioner and her husband in
the Affidavit was only covered by a tax declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did not even bother
to look into the origin of the subject property and to probe into the right of Esperanza to relinquish the
same. Thus, when petitioner and her husband built a house thereon in 1989 they cannot be considered to
have acted in good faith as they were fully aware that when Esperanza executed an Affidavit relinquishing in
their favor the subject property the only proof of Esperanza's ownership over the same was a mere tax
declaration. This fact or circumstance alone was enough to put the petitioner and her husband under
inquiry. Settled is the rule that a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a
claim of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership; it is, at best, an indicium of possession in
the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is
evidence of ownership or of a right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.50
With the foregoing, the petitioner is not entitled to the rights under Article 448 and 546 as the petitioner is
not a builder and possessor in good faith.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64970, dated 27 October 2006 and 29 June 2007, respectively,
affirming the RTC Decision dated 12 September 2000 in Civil Case No. 5511 and declaring the respondents
the lawful owners and possessors of the subject property are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
7. [G.R. NO. 160132 : April 17, 2009] Naranja v CA

SERAFIN, RAUL, NENITA, NAZARETO, NEOLANDA, all surnamed NARANJA, AMELIA NARANJA-
RUBINOS, NILDA NARANJA-LIMANA, and NAIDA NARANJA-GICANO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, LUCILIA P. BELARDO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, REBECCA CORDERO, and
THE LOCAL REGISTER OF DEEDS, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition seeks a review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 13, 2002 and
Resolution2 dated September 24, 2003 which upheld the contract of sale executed by petitioners'
predecessor, Roque Naranja, during his lifetime, over two real properties.

Roque Naranja was the registered owner of a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 4 in Consolidation-
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Pcs-886, Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of 136 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18764. Roque was also a co-owner of an adjacent lot, Lot No. 2, of
the same subdivision plan, which he co-owned with his brothers, Gabino and Placido Naranja. When Placido
died, his one-third share was inherited by his children, Nenita, Nazareto, Nilda, Naida and Neolanda, all
surnamed Naranja, herein petitioners. Lot No. 2 is covered by TCT No. T-18762 in the names of Roque,
Gabino and the said children of Placido. TCT No. T-18762 remained even after Gabino died. The other
petitioners - Serafin Naranja, Raul Naranja, and Amelia Naranja-Rubinos - are the children of Gabino.3

The two lots were being leased by Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. for 30 years from 1962-1992. For his
properties, Roque was being paid P200.00 per month by the company.4

In 1976, Roque, who was single and had no children, lived with his half sister, Lucilia P. Belardo (Belardo),
in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. At that time, a catheter was attached to Roque's body to help him
urinate. But the catheter was subsequently removed when Roque was already able to urinate normally.
Other than this and the influenza prior to his death, Roque had been physically sound.5

Roque had no other source of income except for the P200.00 monthly rental of his two properties. To show
his gratitude to Belardo, Roque sold Lot No. 4 and his one-third share in Lot No. 2 to Belardo on August 21,
1981, through a Deed of Sale of Real Property which was duly notarized by Atty. Eugenio Sanicas. The Deed
of Sale reads:

I, ROQUE NARANJA, of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of Bacolod City, do hereby declare that I am
the registered owner of Lot No. 4 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Bacolod, consisting of 136 square
meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and a co-owner of Lot No. 2,
situated at the City of Bacolod, consisting of 151 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762 and my share in the aforesaid Lot No. 2 is one-third share.

That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine Currency, and
other valuable consideration, receipt of which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction, by
these presents, I hereby transfer and convey by way of absolute sale the above-mentioned Lot No. 4
consisting of 136 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and my one-third share
in Lot No. 2, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762, in favor of my sister LUCILIA P. BELARDO,
of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Alfonso D. Belardo, and a resident of Pontevedra, Negros Occidental,
her heirs, successors and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 21st day of August, 1981 at Bacolod City,
Philippines.

(SGD.)
ROQUE NARANJA6
Roque's copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T-18762 were entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for registration of
the deed of sale and transfer of the titles to Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be registered because
Belardo did not have the money to pay for the registration fees. 7

Belardo's only source of income was her store and coffee shop. Sometimes, her children would give her
money to help with the household expenses, including the expenses incurred for Roque's support. At times,
she would also borrow money from Margarita Dema-ala, a neighbor.8 When the amount of her loan
reached P15,000.00, Dema-ala required a security. On November 19, 1983, Roque executed a deed of sale
in favor of Dema-ala, covering his two properties in consideration of the P15,000.00 outstanding loan and an
additional P15,000.00, for a total of P30,000.00. Dema-ala explained that she wanted Roque to execute the
deed of sale himself since the properties were still in his name. Belardo merely acted as a witness. The titles
to the properties were given to Dema-ala for safekeeping.9

Three days later, or on December 2, 1983, Roque died of influenza. The proceeds of the loan were used for
his treatment while the rest was spent for his burial.10

In 1985, Belardo fully paid the loan secured by the second deed of sale. Dema-ala returned the certificates
of title to Belardo, who, in turn, gave them back to Atty. Sanicas. 11

Unknown to Belardo, petitioners, the children of Placido and Gabino Naranja, executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs12 on October 11, 1985, adjudicating among themselves Lot No. 4. On February 19,
1986, petitioner Amelia Naranja-Rubinos, accompanied by Belardo, borrowed the two TCTs, together with
the lease agreement with Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., from Atty. Sanicas on account of the loan being
proposed by Belardo to her. Thereafter, petitioners had the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs notarized
on February 25, 1986. With Roque's copy of TCT No. T-18764 in their possession, they succeeded in having
it cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-140184, issued in their names.13

In 1987, Belardo decided to register the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981. With no title in hand, she was
compelled to file a petition with the RTC to direct the Register of Deeds to annotate the deed of sale even
without a copy of the TCTs. In an Order dated June 18, 1987, the RTC granted the petition. But she only
succeeded in registering the deed of sale in TCT No. T-18762 because TCT No. T-18764 had already been
cancelled.14

On December 11, 1989, Atty. Sanicas prepared a certificate of authorization, giving Belardo's daughter,
Jennelyn P. Vargas, the authority to collect the payments from Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. But it appeared
from the company's Advice of Fixed Payment that payment of the lease rental had already been transferred
from Belardo to Amelia Naranja-Rubinos because of the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs.

On June 23, 1992, Belardo,15 through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Rebecca Cordero, instituted a suit
for reconveyance with damages. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Belardo as the
sole legal owner of Lot No. 4, declaring null and void the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, and TCT No.
T-140184, and ordering petitioners to reconvey to her the subject property and to pay damages. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 7144.

Subsequently, petitioners also filed a case against respondent for annulment of sale and quieting of title with
damages, praying, among others, that judgment be rendered nullifying the Deed of Sale, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel the annotation of the Deed of Sale on TCT No. T-18762. This
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7214.

On March 5, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision in the consolidated cases in favor of petitioners. The trial
court noted that the Deed of Sale was defective in form since it did not contain a technical description of the
subject properties but merely indicated that they were Lot No. 4, covered by TCT No. T-18764 consisting of
136 square meters, and one-third portion of Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-18762. The trial court held
that, being defective in form, the Deed of Sale did not vest title in private respondent. Full and absolute
ownership did not pass to private respondent because she failed to register the Deed of Sale. She was not a
purchaser in good faith since she acted as a witness to the second sale of the property knowing that she had
already purchased the property from Roque. Whatever rights private respondent had over the properties
could not be superior to the rights of petitioners, who are now the registered owners of the parcels of land.
The RTC disposed, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing Civil Case No. 7144.

2. Civil Case No. 7214.

a) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981, executed by Roque Naranja, covering his one-third
(1/3) share of Lot 2 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-886, being a portion of the consolidation
of Lots 240-A, 240-B, 240-C and 240-D, described on plan, Psd-33443 (LRC) GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55 in
favor of Lucilia Belardo, and entered as Doc. No. 80, Page 17, Book No. XXXVI, Series of 1981 of Notary
Public Eugenio Sanicas of Bacolod City, as null and void and of no force and effect;

b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel Entry No. 148123 annotate at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762;

c) Ordering Lucilia Belardo or her successors-in-interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees, the amount of P500.00 as appearance fees.

Counterclaims in both Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.16

On September 13, 2002, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA held that the unregisterability of a deed
of sale will not undermine its validity and efficacy in transferring ownership of the properties to private
respondent. The CA noted that the records were devoid of any proof evidencing the alleged vitiation of
Roque's consent to the sale; hence, there is no reason to invalidate the sale. Registration is only necessary
to bind third parties, which petitioners, being the heirs of Roque Naranja, are not. The trial court erred in
applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code to the case at bar since petitioners are not purchasers of the said
properties. Hence, it is not significant that private respondent failed to register the deed of sale before the
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 5, 1997 in Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Civil Case No. 7214 is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.

2. In Civil Case No. 7144, the extrajudicial settlement executed by the heirs of Roque Naranja adjudicating
among themselves Lot No. 4 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs - 886 of the Bacolod Cadastre is
hereby declared null and void for want of factual and legal basis. The certificate of title issued to the heirs of
Roque Naranja (Transfer Certificate of [T]i[t]le No. T-140184) as a consequence of the void extra-judicial
settlement is hereby ordered cancelled and the previous title to Lot No. 4, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
18764, is hereby ordered reinstated. Lucilia Belardo is hereby declared the sole and legal owner of said Lot
No. 4, and one-third of Lot No. 2 of the same consolidation-subdivision plan, Bacolod Cadastre, by virtue of
the deed of sale thereof in her favor dated August 21, 1981.

SO ORDERED.17

The CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on September 24, 2003. 18 Petitioners filed this Petition
for Review, raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN IGNORING THE
POINT RAISED BY [PETITIONERS] THAT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH DOES NOT COMPL[Y] WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 496 IS [NOT] VALID.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEED OF SALE [OF REAL PROPERTIES] IS VALID CONSIDERING THAT
THE CONSENT OF THE LATE ROQUE NARANJA HAD BEEN VITIATED; x x x THERE [IS] NO CONCLUSIVE
SHOWING THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERATION AND THERE [ARE] SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES IN THE
NOTARIZATION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS.19

In her Comment, private respondent questioned the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to the Petition for Review, which was signed by a certain Ernesto Villadelgado without a special
power of attorney. In their reply, petitioners remedied the defect by attaching a Special Power of Attorney
signed by them.

Pursuant to its policy to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal, the Court had previously
excused the late submission of a special power of attorney to sign a certification against forum-
shopping.20 But even if we excuse this defect, the petition nonetheless fails on the merits.

The Court does not agree with petitioners' contention that a deed of sale must contain a technical
description of the subject property in order to be valid. Petitioners anchor their theory on Section 127 of Act
No. 496,21which provides a sample form of a deed of sale that includes, in particular, a technical description
of the subject property.

To be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a technical description of the subject property. Contracts of
sale of real property have no prescribed form for their validity; they follow the general rule on contracts that
they may be entered into in whatever form, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present.22 The requisites of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or
meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.

The failure of the parties to specify with absolute clarity the object of a contract by including its technical
description is of no moment. What is important is that there is, in fact, an object that is determinate or at
least determinable, as subject of the contract of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided in Section 127 of
Act No. 496 is only a suggested form. It is not a mandatory form that must be strictly followed by the
parties to a contract.

In the instant case, the deed of sale clearly identifies the subject properties by indicating their respective lot
numbers, lot areas, and the certificate of title covering them. Resort can always be made to the technical
description as stated in the certificates of title covering the two properties.

On the alleged nullity of the deed of sale, we hold that petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof to show
that Roque executed the deed of sale under the undue influence of Belardo or that the deed of sale was
simulated or without consideration.chanrobles virtual law library

A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. It must
be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it does not present strong, complete, and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects provided by law. 23

Petitioners allege that Belardo unduly influenced Roque, who was already physically weak and senile at that
time, into executing the deed of sale. Belardo allegedly took advantage of the fact that Roque was living in
her house and was dependent on her for support.

There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another,
depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.24 One who alleges any defect, or the lack of consent
to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence, must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence,
such specific acts that vitiated the party's consent; otherwise, the latter's presumed consent to the contract
prevails.25 For undue influence to be present, the influence exerted must have so overpowered or
subjugated the mind of a contracting party as to destroy his free agency, making him express the will of
another rather than his own.26

Petitioners adduced no proof that Roque had lost control of his mental faculties at the time of the sale.
Undue influence is not to be inferred from age, sickness, or debility of body, if sufficient intelligence
remains.27 The evidence presented pertained more to Roque's physical condition rather than his mental
condition. On the contrary, Atty. Sanicas, the notary public, attested that Roque was very healthy and
mentally sound and sharp at the time of the execution of the deed of sale. Atty. Sanicas said that Roque
also told him that he was a Law graduate.28

Neither was the contract simulated. The late registration of the Deed of Sale and Roque's execution of the
second deed of sale in favor of Dema-ala did not mean that the contract was simulated. We are convinced
with the explanation given by respondent's witnesses that the deed of sale was not immediately registered
because Belardo did not have the money to pay for the fees. This explanation is, in fact, plausible
considering that Belardo could barely support herself and her brother, Roque. As for the second deed of
sale, Dema-ala, herself, attested before the trial court that she let Roque sign the second deed of sale
because the title to the properties were still in his name.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale was not supported by a consideration since no receipt was
shown, and it is incredulous that Roque, who was already weak, would travel to Bacolod City just to be able
to execute the Deed of Sale.

The Deed of Sale which states "receipt of which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction" is an
acknowledgment receipt in itself. Moreover, the presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration
cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.29

Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.30 As heirs of Roque, petitioners
are bound by the contract of sale that Roque executed in favor of Belardo. Having been sold already to
Belardo, the two properties no longer formed part of Roque's estate which petitioners could have inherited.
The deed of extrajudicial settlement that petitioners executed over Lot No. 4 is, therefore, void, since the
property subject thereof did not become part of Roque's estate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September
13, 2002 and Resolution dated September 24, 2003 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
8. [G.R. No. 85240. July 12, 1991.] Claudel v CA

HEIRS OF CECILIO (also known as BASILIO) CLAUDEL, namely, MODESTA CLAUDEL, LORETA
HERRERA, JOSE CLAUDEL, BENJAMIN CLAUDEL, PACITA CLAUDEL, CARMELITA CLAUDEL, MARIO
CLAUDEL, ROBERTO CLAUDEL, LEONARDO CLAUDEL, ARSENIA VILLALON, PERPETUA CLAUDEL
and FELISA CLAUDEL, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MACARIO,
ESPERIDIONA, RAYMUNDA and CELESTINA, all surnamed CLAUDEL, Respondents.

Ricardo L. Moldez for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library

Juan T. Aquino for private respondents

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 04429 1 and the reinstatement of the decision of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, Branch CXI, in Civil Case No. M-5276-P, entitled. "Heirs of Macario Claudel, et al. v. Heirs of Cecilio
Claudel, et al.," which dismissed the complaint of the private respondents against the petitioners for
cancellation of titles and reconveyance with damages. 2chanrobles virtual law library

As early as December 28, 1922, Basilio also known as "Cecilio" Claudel, acquired from the Bureau of Lands,
Lot No. 1230 of the Muntinlupa Estate Subdivision, located in the poblacion of Muntinlupa, Rizal, with an
area of 10,107 square meters; he secured Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7471 issued by the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Rizal in 1923; he also declared the lot in his name, the latest Tax Declaration
being No. 5795. He dutifully paid the real estate taxes thereon until his death in 1937. 3 Thereafter, his
widow "Basilia" and later, her son Jose, one of the herein petitioners, paid the taxes.

The same piece of land purchased by Cecilio would, however, become the subject of protracted litigation
thirty-nine years after his death.

Two branches of Cecilio's family contested the ownership over the land-on one hand the children of Cecilio,
namely, Modesto, Loreta, Jose, Benjamin, Pacita, Carmelita, Roberto, Mario, Leonardo, Nenita, Arsenia
Villalon, and Felisa Claudel, and their children and descendants, now the herein petitioners (hereinafter
referred to as HEIRS OF CECILIO), and on the other, the brother and sisters of Cecilio, namely, Macario,
Esperidiona, Raymunda, and Celestina and their children and descendants, now the herein private
respondents (hereinafter referred to as SIBLINGS OF CECILIO). In 1972, the HEIRS OF CECILIO partitioned
this lot among themselves and obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title on their shares, as
follows:

TCT No. 395391 1,997 sq. m. �� Jose Claudelchanrobles virtual law library

TCT No. 395392 1,997 sq. m. �� Modesta Claudel and childrenchanrobles virtual law library

TCT No. 395393 1,997 sq. m. �� Armenia C. Villalonchanrobles virtual law library

TCT No. 395394 1,997 sq. m. �� Felisa Claudel 4chanrobles virtual law library

Four years later, on December 7, 1976, private respondents SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, filed Civil Case No.
5276-P as already adverted to at the outset, with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a "Complaint for
Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with Damages," alleging that 46 years earlier, or sometime in 1930,
their parents had purchased from the late Cecilio Claudel several portions of Lot No. 1230 for the sum of
P30.00. They admitted that the transaction was verbal. However, as proof of the sale, the SIBLINGS OF
CECILIO presented a subdivision plan of the said land, dated March 25, 1930, indicating the portions
allegedly sold to the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As already mentioned, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch CXI, dismissed the complaint,
disregarding the above sole evidence (subdivision plan) presented by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, thus:
Examining the pleadings as well as the evidence presented in this case by the parties, the Court can not but
notice that the present complaint was filed in the name of the Heirs of Macario, Espiridiona, Raymunda and
Celestina, all surnamed Claudel, without naming the different heirs particularly involved, and who wish to
recover the lots from the defendants. The Court tried to find this out from the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs but to no avail. On this point alone, the Court would not be able to apportion the property to the
real party in interest if ever they are entitled to it as the persons indicated therein is in generic term
(Section 2, Rule 3). The Court has noticed also that with the exception of plaintiff Lampitoc and (sic) the
heirs of Raymunda Claudel are no longer residing in the property as they have (sic) left the same in 1967.
But most important of all the plaintiffs failed to present any document evidencing the alleged sale of the
property to their predecessors in interest by the father of the defendants. Considering that the subject
matter of the supposed sale is a real property the absence of any document evidencing the sale would
preclude the admission of oral testimony (Statute of Frauds). Moreover, considering also that the alleged
sale took place in 1930, the action filed by the plaintiffs herein for the recovery of the same more than thirty
years after the cause of action has accrued has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment dismissing the complaint, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5chanrobles virtual law library

6
On appeal, the following errors were assigned by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DESPITE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE
SHOWING THE PORTION SOLD TO EACH OF PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSORS.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ANY DOCUMENT
EVIDENCING THE ALLEGED SALE.

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDIT TO THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A, SHOWING THE PORTIONS
SOLD TO EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.

4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PLAINTIFFS AS OWNERS OF THE PORTION COVERED BY
THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A.

5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS. 395391, 395392,
395393 AND 395394 OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL AS NULL AND VOID.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the following grounds: library

1. The failure to bring and prosecute the action in the name of the real party in interest, namely the parties
themselves, was not a fatal omission since the court a quo could have adjudicated the lots to the SIBLINGS
OF CECILIO, the parents of the herein respondents, leaving it to them to adjudicate the property among
themselves.

2. The fact of residence in the disputed properties by the herein respondents had been made possible by the
toleration of the deceased Cecilio. library

3. The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to consummated sales as in the case at
bar where oral evidence may be admitted as cited in Iñigo v. Estate of Magtoto 7 and Diana, et
al. v.Macalibo. 8chanrobles virtual law library

In addition,

. . . Given the nature of their relationship with one another it is not unusual that no document to evidence
the sale was executed, . . ., in their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience and
foresight, and in their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. . .
. 9chanrobles virtual law library
4. The defense of prescription cannot be set up against the herein petitioners despite the lapse of over forty
years from the time of the alleged sale in 1930 up to the filing of the "Complaint for Cancellation of Titles
and Reconveyance . . ." in 1976.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

According to the Court of Appeals, the action was not for the recovery of possession of real property but for
the cancellation of titles issued to the HEIRS OF CECILIO in 1973. Since the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO
commenced their complaint for cancellation of titles and reconveyance with damages on December 7, 1976,
only four years after the HEIRS OF CECILIO partitioned this lot among themselves and obtained the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Titles, then there is no prescription of action yet.

Thus the respondent court ordered the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 395391,
395392, 395393, and 395394 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the names of the HEIRS OF
CECILIO and corollarily ordered the execution of the following deeds of reconveyance:

To Celestina Claudel, Lot 1230-A with an area of 705 sq. m. library

To Raymunda Claudel, Lot 1230-B with an area of 599 sq. m. law library

To Esperidiona Claudel, Lot 1230-C with an area of 597 sq. m.

10
To Macario Claudel, Lot 1230-D, with an area of 596 sq. m. chanrobles virtual law library

The respondent court also enjoined that this disposition is without prejudice to the private respondents, as
heirs of their deceased parents, the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, partitioning among themselves in accordance
with law the respective portions sold to and herein adjudicated to their parents.

The rest of the land, lots 1230-E and 1230-F, with an area of 598 and 6,927 square meters, respectively
would go to Cecilio or his heirs, the herein petitioners. Beyond these apportionments, the HEIRS OF CECILIO
would not receive anything else.

The crux of the entire litigation is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
disposing the question of the true ownership of the lots.

And the real issues are:

1. Whether or not a contract of sale of land may be proven orally:

2. Whether or not the prescriptive period for filing an action for cancellation of titles and reconveyance with
damages (the action filed by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO) should be counted from the alleged sale upon which
they claim their ownership (1930) or from the date of the issuance of the titles sought to be cancelled in
favor of the HEIRS OF CECILIO (1976).

The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once consummated, is valid regardless of the form it may have been
entered into. 11 For nowhere does law or jurisprudence prescribe that the contract of sale be put in writing
before such contract can validly cede or transmit rights over a certain real property between the parties
themselves.

However, in the event that a third party, as in this case, disputes the ownership of the property, the person
against whom that claim is brought can not present any proof of such sale and hence has no means to
enforce the contract. Thus the Statute of Frauds was precisely devised to protect the parties in a contract of
sale of real property so that no such contract is enforceable unless certain requisites, for purposes of proof,
are met.

The provisions of the Statute of Frauds pertinent to the present controversy, state:

Art. 1403 (Civil Code). The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
 xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases,
an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an
interest therein;

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

(Emphasis supplied.)

The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations
depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated
contracts and transactions to be evidenced in Writing. 12chanrobles virtual law library

The provisions of the Statute of Frauds originally appeared under the old Rules of Evidence. However when
the Civil Code was re-written in 1949 (to take effect in 1950), the provisions of the Statute of Frauds were
taken out of the Rules of Evidence in order to be included under the title on Unenforceable Contracts in the
Civil Code. The transfer was not only a matter of style but to show that the Statute of Frauds is also a
substantive law.

Therefore, except under the conditions provided by the Statute of Frauds, the existence of the contract of
sale made by Cecilio with his siblings 13can not be proved. library

On the second issue, the belated claim of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO who filed a complaint in court only in
1976 to enforce a light acquired allegedly as early as 1930, is difficult to comprehend.

The Civil Code states:

Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:

(1) Upon an oral contract . . . (Emphasis supplied).

If the parties SIBLINGS OF CECILIO had allegedly derived their right of action from the oral purchase made
by their parents in 1930, then the action filed in 1976 would have clearly prescribed. More than six years
had lapsed.

We do not agree with the parties SIBLINGS OF CECILIO when they reason that an implied trust in favor of
the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO was established in 1972, when the HEIRS OF CECILIO executed a contract of
partition over the said properties.

But as we had pointed out, the law recognizes the superiority of the torrens title.

Above all, the torrens title in the possession of the HEIRS OF CECILIO carries more weight as proof of
ownership than the survey or subdivision plan of a parcel of land in the name of SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.

The Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the torrens title. No possession by any person of any
portion of the land could defeat the title of the registered owners thereof. 14
A torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse, open and notorious possession. A
registered title under the torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once registered, is
notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration. 15

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the
effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with
the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain, as only the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. 16

It is true that in some instances, the Court did away with the irrevocability of the torrens title, but the
circumstances in the case at bar varied significantly from these cases. virtual law library

In Bornales v. IAC, 17 the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title was disregarded when the
transferee who took it had notice of the flaws in the transferor's title. No right passed to a transferee from a
vendor who did not have any in the first place. The transferees bought the land registered under the torrens
system from vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud. With this knowledge, they can not
invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest.
This is because the torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible, should not be used as a means
to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.

Mere registration of the sale is not good enough, good faith must concur with registration. Otherwise
registration becomes an exercise in futility. 18chanrobles virtual law library

In Amerol v. Bagumbaran, 19 we reversed the decision of the trial court. In this case, the title was
wrongfully registered in another person's name. An implied trust was therefore created. This trustee was
compelled by law to reconvey property fraudulently acquired notwithstanding the irrevocability of the
torrens title. 20chanrobles virtual law library

In the present case, however, the facts belie the claim of ownership.

For several years, when the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, namely, Macario, Esperidiona Raymunda, and Celestina
were living on the contested premises, they regularly paid a sum of money, designated as "taxes" at first, to
the widow of Cecilio, and later, to his heirs. 21 Why their payments were never directly made to the
Municipal Government of Muntinlupa when they were intended as payments for "taxes" is difficult to square
with their claim of ownership. We are rather inclined to consider this fact as an admission of non-ownership.
And when we consider also that the petitioners HEIRS OF CECILIO had individually paid to the municipal
treasury the taxes corresponding to the particular portions they were occupying, 22 we can readily see the
superiority of the petitioners' position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Renato Solema and Decimina Calvez, two of the respondents who derive their right from the SIBLINGS OF
CLAUDEL, bought a portion of the lot from Felisa Claudel, one of the HEIRS OF CLAUDEL. 23 The Calvezes
should not be paying for a lot that they already owned and if they did not acknowledge Felisa as its owner.

In addition, before any of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO could stay on any of the portions of the property, they
had to ask first the permission of Jose Claudel again, one of the HEIRS OF CECILIO. 24 In fact the only
reason why any of the heirs of SIBLINGS OF CECILIO could stay on the lot was because they were allowed
to do so by the HEIRS OF CECILIO. 25chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing, we find that the appellate court committed a reversible error in denigrating the
transfer certificates of title of the petitioners to the survey or subdivision plan proffered by the private
respondents. The Court generally recognizes the profundity of conclusions and findings of facts reached by
the trial court and hence sustains them on appeal except for strong and cogent reasons inasmuch as the
trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses in a case.
No clear specific contrary evidence was cited by the respondent appellate court to justify the reversal of the
lower court's findings. Thus, in this case, between the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court, those of the trial court must prevail over that of the latter. 26chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision rendered in CA-G.R. CV No.
04429, and we hereby REINSTATE the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 28, Pasay
City) in Civil Case No. M-5276-P which ruled for the dismissal of the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and
Reconveyance with Damages filed by the Heirs of Macario, Esperidiona Raymunda, and Celestina, all
surnamed CLAUDEL. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
9. [G.R. No. 175763. April 11, 2012.] Bienvenido v Gabriel

HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, NAMELY: ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON
AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ
GABRIEL-ARNEDO MARRIED TO ARTURO ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO MARRIED TO
FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD MARRIED TO
EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, AND ERLINDA VELASQUEZ MARRIED TO HERMINIO VELASQUEZ,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated August 18, 2006
and Resolution2 dated December 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224. The
CA affirmed the Decision3 dated November 19, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
267 in Civil Case No. 67846 dismissing petitioners‟ complaint for declaration of nullity of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1035, reconveyance and damages, as well as respondents‟ counterclaims
for damages and attorney‟s fees. cralaw

Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada,
Municipality of Taguig (now part of Pasig City, Metro Manila). The first parcel (“Lot 1”) with an area of
686 square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel under Tax Declaration (TD)
Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued for the years 1949 and 1966, while the second parcel (“Lot 2”) consisting
of 147 square meters was originally declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos.
6418 and 9676 issued for the years 1966 and 1967.4 For several years, these lands lined with
bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.

Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her
inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold
the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga. Said document states:

DAPAT MALAMAN NG LAHAT NG MAKABABASA

Na, akong Benita Gabriel, balo sa nasirang Calixto Lontoc, Filipina may karapatang gulang naninirahan
sa nayon ng Palingon, Tagig, Rizal, x x x sa pamamaguitan nitoy

ISINASAYSAY KO AT PINAGTITIBAY

1.) Na, sarili ko at tunay na pagaari ang isang lagay na lupang kawayanan na sapagkat itoy kabahagui
ko sa aking kapatid na [J]ose Gabriel, na itoy mana ko sa aking nasirang ama Mateo Gabriel sa kami
lamang dalawa ng aking kapatid na binabanguit ko na Jose Gabriel siyang mga anak at tagapagmana
ng aming amang nasirang Mateo Gabriel, maliban sa amin ay wala nang iba, kayat kami ay naghati
sa mga ari-arian na na iwan sa amin ng nasirang ama namin na Mateo Gabriel, na ang lupang
kawayanang itoy may nakatanim na walong (8) punong kawayan at na sa pook na kung pamagatan
ay Ruhale nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, at na sa loob ng mga kahanganan at sukat na
sumusunod[:]

Na, ang kahangan sa Hilagaan Sapang Ruhale at Vicente Bunye, sa Amihanan Felipe Pagkalinawan, sa
Timugan Juan Flores, at sa Habagatan Apolonio Ocol may sukat na 6 areas at 85 centiareas may
halagan amillarada na P80.00) Pesos alinsunod sa Tax Blg. 20037, sa pangalan ng aking kapatid na
Jose Gabriel. Na, ang lupang itoy hindi natatala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 496 ni sa susog gayon din sa
Hipotecaria Espanola itoy may mga mojon bato ang mga panulok at walang bakod.

2.) Na, alang-alang sa halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na Pisong salaping guinagamit dito sa
Filipinas na bago dumating ang mga sandaling itoy tinaggap ko at ibinayad sa akin ng boong
kasiyahang loob ko ng magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, mga Filipinos may mga
karapatang gulang mga naninirahan sa nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, ngayon ay inilipat ko at
ipinagbili ng bilihang tuluyan (Venta real soluta) ang isinasaysay kong lupang kawayanan sa itaas nito
ng nasabi halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na Piso at sa nabanguit na magasawang GABRIEL
SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, gayon din sa lahat ng mga tagapagmana nila, ngayong mga arao na ito
ay ang may hawak at namamahala ng lupang itoy ang mga nakabili sa akin na magasawang GABRIEL
SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA.

3.) Na, ang kasulatang itoy ng bilihan ay nais na itala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 3344.

NA SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITOY ako ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito dito sa Tagig, Rizal,
ngayong ika - 28 ng Junio 1944.

(Nilagdaan) BENITA GABRIEL5

Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel‟s own daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit,
when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who
was Florencia‟s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of
petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. 6 Petitioners then took
possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax
purposes, as shown by TD No. 11445 issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenido‟s wife, Araceli C.
Tanyag; TD No. 11445 cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. TD Nos. 3380 and 00486
also in the name of Araceli Tanyag were issued in the years 1974 and 1979.7

As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed
of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and
declared the same for tax purposes as shown by TD Nos. 11361, 3395, 120-014-00482, 120-00-014-
20-002-000, C-014-00180 and D-014-00182 issued for the years 1969, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1991 and
1994.8 Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both
Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones9; they fenced the premises and introduced
improvements on the land.10

Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured TD No. 120-014-01013 in his name
over Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters. Said tax declaration
supposedly cancelled TD No. 6425 over Lot 1 and contained the following inscription 11:

Note: Portions of this Property is Also Declared

in the name of Araceli C. Tanyag under
T.D.#120-014-00858 686 sq. m.

Also inscribed on TD No. 120-014-0085812 (1979) in the name of Araceli Tanyag covering Lot 1 are the
following:

This property is also covered by T.D. #120-014-01013

in the name of Jose P. Gabriel
1-8-80
which notation was carried into the 1985, 1990 and 1991 tax declarations, all in the name of Araceli
Tanyag.

On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 67846 alleging that respondents never
occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in TD
No. 120-014-01013 such that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of
Jose Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No.
1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject land in the name of respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was
null and void from the beginning.13

On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for
they have not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in
respondents‟ name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one year after
its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured.14
Respondents‟ evidence showed that the subject land was among those properties included in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Jose P. Gabriel15 executed on October 5, 1988, covered by TD No.
B-014-00643 (1985) in the name of Jose Gabriel. Respondents declared the property in their name
but the tax declarations (1989, 1991 and 1994) carried the notation that portions thereof (686 sq.
ms.) are also declared in the name of Araceli Tanyag. On October 28, 1998, OCT No. 1035 16 was
issued to respondents by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila under Decree No. N-219177
pursuant to the Decision dated September 20, 1996 of the Land Registration Court in LRC Case No. N-
11260, covering Lot 1836 MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, Plan Ap-04-002253, with an area
of 1,560 square meters.

On the other hand, respondents‟ TD Nos. D-014-00839 and D-014-01923 issued in 1993 and 1999
respectively, showed that respondents sold 468 square meters of Lot 1 to Jayson Sta. Barbara. 17 The
segregation of said 468 square meters pertaining to Jayson Sta. Barbara was reflected in the approved
survey plan of Lot 1836 prepared by respondents‟ surveyor on March 18, 2000. 18

At the trial, petitioners presented their witness Arturo Tanyag, son of Bienvenido Tanyag and Araceli
Tanyag who died on March 30, 1968 and October 30, 1993, respectively. He testified that according
to Florencia Sulit, Benita Gabriel-Lontoc and her family were the ones in possession of Lot 1 since
1944; Benita Gabriel had executed an Affidavit of Sale declaring said property as her inheritance and
conveying the same to spouses Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. He affirmed that they had been in
possession of Lot 1 from the time Bienvenido Tanyag bought the land from Florencia Sulit in
1964. Based on the boundaries indicated in the tax declaration, they fenced the property, installed
Juana Quinones as their caretaker who also attended to the piggery, put up an artesian well and
planted some trees. From 1964 up to 1978, nobody disturbed them in their possession or claimed
ownership of the land; four years after acquiring Lot 1, they also purchased the adjacent property (Lot
2) to expand their piggery. Lot 2 was also separately declared for tax purposes after their mother
purchased it from Agueda Dinguinbayan. He had personally witnessed the execution of the 1968 deed
of sale including its notarization, and was also present during the physical turn over of Lot 2 by the
seller. In fact, he was one of the instrumental witnesses to the deed of sale and identified his
signature therein. He further described the place as inaccessible at that time as there were no roads
yet and they had to traverse muddy tracks to reach their property. 19

Arturo further testified that the first time they met Jose Gabriel was when the latter borrowed from
their mother all the documents pertaining to their property. Jose Gabriel came looking for a piece of
property which he claims as his but he had no documents to prove it and so they showed him their
documents pertaining to the subject property; out of the goodness of her mother‟s heart, she lent
those documents to her brother Jose Gabriel. During the cadastral survey conducted in 1976, they
had both lots surveyed in preparation for their consolidation under one tax declaration. However, they
did not succeed in registering the consolidated lots as they discovered that there was another tax
declaration covering the same properties and these were applied for titling under the name of Jose
Gabriel sometime in 1978 or 1980, which was after the time said Jose Gabriel borrowed the
documents from their mother. No notice of the hearings for application of title filed by Jose Gabriel
was received by them. They never abandoned the property and their caretaker never left the place
except to report to the police when she was being harassed by the respondents. He also recalled that
respondents had filed a complaint against them before the barangay but since no agreement was
reached after several meetings, they filed the present case.20

The next witness for petitioners was Juana Quinones, their caretaker who testified that she had been
staying on petitioners‟ property since 1964 or for 35 years already. She had built a nipa hut and
artesian well, raised piggery and poultry and planted some root crops and vegetables on the land. At
first there was only one parcel but later the petitioners bought an additional lot; Arturo Tanyag gave
her money which she used for the fencing of the property. During all the time she occupied the
property there was nobody else claiming it and she also had not received any notice for petitioners
concerning the property, nor the conduct of survey on the land. On cross-examination, she admitted
that she was living alone and had no Voter‟s ID or any document evidencing that she had been a
resident there since 1964. Although she was living alone, she asks for help from other persons in
tending her piggery.21

Angelita Sulit-delos Santos, cousin of petitioners and also of respondents, testified that she came to
know the subject property because according to her paternal grandfather Gabriel Sta. Ana Sulit, her
maternal grandmother Benita Gabriel-Lontoc mortgaged the property to him. It was Benita Gabriel
Lontoc who took care of her, her siblings and cousins; they lived with her until her death. She
identified the signature of Benita Gabriel in the 1944 Affidavit of Sale in favor of Gabriel Sulit. Lot 1
consisting of 600 square meters was vacant property at that time but her family was in possession
thereof when it was sold to Gabriel Sulit; it was her father Eliseo Sulit and uncle Hilario Sulit, who
were incharge of their property. On cross-examination, she was asked details regarding the supposed
mortgage of Lot 1 to Gabriel Sulit but she admitted she does not know anything as she was still very
young then.22

Respondents‟ first witness was Roberto Gabriel Arnedo, son of Luz Gabriel-Arnedo. He testified that
when he was about 5 or 6 years old (1953 or 1954), his grandfather Jose Gabriel used to bring him
along to visit the subject property consisting of 1,763 square meters based on the tax declaration and
OCT. They had picnics and celebrate his grandfather‟s birthday there. He recalled accompanying his
grandfather in overseeing the planting of gumamela which served as the perimeter fence. Jose Gabriel
had not mentioned anything about the claim of petitioners over the same land; Jose Gabriel handed
the documents pertaining to the land to his eldest aunt and hence it now belongs to them. 23 On cross-
examination, he claimed that during those years he had visited the land together with his grandfather,
he did not see Florencia Sulit and her family. 24

Virginia Villanueva, daughter of Salome Gabriel, testified that they acquired the subject property from
their grandfather Jose Gabriel who had a tax declaration in his name. Her mother furnished them
with documents such as tax declarations and the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose Gabriel;
they also have an approved survey plan prepared for Salome Gabriel. She does not know the
petitioners in this case.25 On cross-examination, she said that the subject property was inherited by
Jose Gabriel from his father Mateo Gabriel; Jose Gabriel was the sole owner of the land while Benita
Gabriel has separate properties in Palingon and Langkokak.26 Though they are not actually occupying
the property, they visit the place and she does not know anybody occupying it, except for the portion
(486 square meters) which petitioners sold to Sta. Barbara. A nine-door apartment was built on the
said portion without their permission. She had talked to both Sta. Barbara and with Arturo Tanyag
they had meetings before the barangay; however, petitioners filed the present case in court. She
insisted that there is nobody residing in the subject property; there is still the remaining 901 square
meters which is owned by their mother. She admitted there were plants on the land but she does not
know who actually planted them; it was her grandfather who built a wooden fence and gumamela in
the 1960s. As to the hearings on the application for title, she had not attended the same; she does
not know whether the petitioners were notified of the said hearings. She also caused the preparation
of the survey plan for Salome Gabriel. On the increased area of the property indicated in the later
tax declarations, she admitted the discrepancy but said there were barangay roads being built at the
time.27

Esmeraldo Ramos, Municipal Assessor of Taguig, testified that he was formerly a Land Appraiser in the
Office of the Municipal Assessor of Taguig and in the course of his duties had certified one of the tax
declarations in the name of respondents (TD No. EL-014-10585). He identified and verified said
document and the other tax declarations submitted in court by the respondents. He admitted that on
January 10, 1980, they made the entry on TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel that the same was
cancelled by TD No. 120-014-01013 also in the name of Jose Gabriel who presented a supposed deed
of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag which caused the earlier cancellation of TD No. 6425 in his
name. However, upon investigation they found out that the seller Florencia Sulit was not the owner
because the declared owner was Jose Gabriel; even the deed of sale recognized that the property was
declared in the name of Jose Gabriel. They also discovered from the cadastral survey and tax
mapping of Taguig that the property is in the name of Jose Gabriel both in the Bureau of Lands and
Municipal Assessor‟s Office. As far as he knows, it was Jose Gabriel who owned the subject property
which he usually visited; he recalled that around the late 70‟s and 80‟s, he ordered the fencing of
barbed wire and bamboo stalks on the land which is just 3 lots away from his own property. As to the
discrepancy in the area of the property as originally declared by Jose Gabriel, he explained that the
boundaries in the original tax declaration do not change but after the land is surveyed, the boundaries
naturally would be different because the previous owner may have sold his property or the present
owner inherits the property from his parents. He admitted that the tax declaration is just for tax
purposes and not necessarily proof of ownership or possession of the property it covers. 28
Respondents‟ last witness was Antonio Argel who testified that he had resided for 52 years on a land
near the subject property and as far as he knows it was Jose Gabriel who owns it and planted
thereon. On cross-examination, he admitted that Jose Gabriel was not in physical possession of the
property. He just assumed that the present occupants of the property were allowed by Jose Gabriel to
stay therein because he is the owner. There is an apartment and three small houses existing on the
property, and about five families are living there. He confirmed that there is a piggery being
maintained by a certain Juana who had been residing there maybe for fifteen years already. 29

In rebuttal, petitioners presented two witnesses who are owners of properties adjoining that of the
subject land. Rodante Domingo testified that it was only now did he learn that the property of Arturo
Tanyag is already titled in the name of respondents. He was not aware of the titling proceeding
because he never received any notice as adjoining owner. His own property is already titled in his
name and he even asked Arturo Tanyag to act as a witness in his application for titling. 30 On the
other hand, Dado Dollado testified that he acquired his property in 1979. He likewise affirmed that he
did not receive any notice of the proceedings for application for titling filed by respondents and it was
only now that he learned from Arturo Tanyag that the subject property was already titled in the names
of respondents.31

The last rebuttal witness for petitioners was Dominador Dinguinbayan Ergueza, son of Agueda
Dinguinbayan. He testified that the subject property was formerly owned by his mother and the
present owner is Araceli Tanyag who bought the same from his mother in 1968. He described the
boundaries of the property in relation to the adjoining owners at that time; presently, the left portion
is already a street (Rujale St.) going towards the sea. He admitted that his wife, Livina Ergueza was
an instrumental witness in the 1968 deed of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag.32

In its decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim, holding that
petitioners failed to establish ownership of the subject property and finding the respondents to be the
declared owners and legal possessors. It likewise ruled that petitioners were unable to prove by
preponderance of evidence that respondents acquired title over the property through fraud and deceit.

Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court‟s ruling. The CA found that apart from
the Affidavit executed by Benita Gabriel in 1944 claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their father,
Mateo Gabriel, there is no evidence that she, not Jose Gabriel, was the true owner thereof. It noted
that just four years after Benita Gabriel‟s sale of the subject property to the Sulit spouses, Jose
Gabriel declared the same under his name for tax purposes, paying the corresponding taxes. The
appellate court stressed that petitioners‟ allegation of bad faith was not proven.

Petitioners‟ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assail the CA in not finding that the respondents obtained OCT No. 1035 in their names
fraudulently and in bad faith. They also claim to have acquired ownership of the subject lots by
virtue of acquisitive prescription.

The issues presented are: (1) whether respondents committed fraud and bad faith in registering the
subject lots in their name; and (2) whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive
prescription.

Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not
a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over
the particular property described therein.33 Thus, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens
title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true
owners. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the
findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person‟s name, to its rightful or legal owner,
or to the one with a better right.34

An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is
in possession of the property subject of the acts.35 The totality of the evidence on record established
that it was petitioners who are in actual possession of the subject property; respondents merely
insinuated at occasional visits to the land. However, for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to
prosper, this Court has held that the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.36

The CA correctly observed that the only evidence of Benita Gabriel‟s supposed title was the 1944
Affidavit of Sale whereby Benita Gabriel claimed sole ownership of Lot 1 as her inheritance from their
father, Mateo Gabriel. The property until 1949 was still declared in the name Jose Gabriel despite the
1944 sale executed by Benita Gabriel in favor of spouses Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. As to the alleged
fraud perpetrated by Jose Gabriel and respondents in securing OCT No. 1035 in their name, this was
clearly not proven as Arturo Tanyag testified merely that Jose Gabriel borrowed their documents
pertaining to the property. No document or testimony was presented to show that Jose Gabriel
employed deceit or committed fraudulent acts in the proceedings for titling of the property.

However, the CA did not address the issue of acquisitive prescription raised by the petitioners. In
their Complaint before the lower court, petitioners alleged -

15. Defendants never occupied the whole area of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1603 (686
sq. m.) neither were they able to set foot on the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 6542 [sic]
for the reason that those lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse and notorious possession
of the plaintiffs against the whole world for more than thirty years which is equivalent to title.

x x x x37

Such character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of controversy is a
factual issue. Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as only questions of law shall be raised in such
petitions. While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from
the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to
arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.38

In this case, the CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners have not acquired any right over the
subject property simply because they failed to establish Benita Gabriel‟s title over said property. The
appellate court ignored petitioners‟ evidence of possession that complies with the legal requirements
of acquiring ownership by prescription.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of
time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted.39 Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and
not clandestine.40 It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.41

On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Petitioners‟ adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance of TD No. 1145 in the name
of Araceli Tanyag, which tax declaration cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. 42 It is
settled that tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the
property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property,
they may become the basis of a claim for ownership.43 Petitioners‟ caretaker, Juana Quinones, has
since lived in a nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended a piggery on the land. Aside from paying
taxes due on the property, petitioners also exercised other acts of ownership such as selling the 468-
square meter portion to Sta. Barbara who had constructed thereon a nine-door apartment building.

It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the property by securing a tax
declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel albeit over a bigger area than that originally declared. In
1998, they finally obtained an original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763 square meters
which included Lot 1. Did these acts of respondents effectively interrupt the possession of petitioners
for purposes of prescription?

We answer in the negative.

In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon44 this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil
Code45 held that civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor
and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. Thus:

Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons
to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets
limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise
to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should
desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be
absolved from the complaint.

Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil
interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial
summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by
petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt
respondents‟ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the
conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of
Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there
remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was
merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is
that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no
judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its
affirmance of the RTC‟s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons
which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were
not able to interrupt respondents‟ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive
prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse
Claim. (Emphasis supplied.)

From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the latter have been in
continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the
property for the period and in the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right
cannot be defeated by respondents‟ acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and
obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.

This notwithstanding, we uphold petitioners‟ right as owner only with respect to Lot 1 consisting of
686 square meters. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale
from the original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan. Respondents asserted that the 147 square
meters covered by the tax declarations of Dinguinbayan being claimed by petitioners is not the same
lot included in OCT No. 1035.

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity
of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the
identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. 46 In this
case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so
that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in OCT No. 1035, which
would have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square meters was erroneously included in
respondents‟ title. The testimony of Agueda Dinguinbayan‟s son would not suffice because said
witness merely stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his
mother. On his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation
for the consolidation of the two parcels. However, no such plan was presented in court. cralaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated August 18, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224 is MODIFIED in that petitioners heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli
Tanyag are hereby declared the owners of 686 square meters previously declared under Tax
Declaration Nos. 11445, 120-014-00486, 120-014-0085, B-014-00501, E-014-01446, C-014-00893
and D-014-00839 all in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which lot is presently covered by OCT No. 1035
issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila in the name of respondents Salome Gabriel,
Nestor R. Gabriel, Luz Gabriel-Arnedo, Nora Gabriel-Calingo, Pilar Gabriel-Mendiola, Minerva Gabriel-
Natividad and Erlinda Gabriel-Velasquez. Respondents are ORDERED to RECONVEY the said 686-
square meter portion to the petitioners.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
10. [G.R. No. 169898. October 27, 2006.] Sps Aguirre v Villanueva

SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE, petitioners, vs.

HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, NAMELY: JOSE T. VILLANUEVA, PABLO T. VILLANUEVA,
PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO T. VILLANUEVA, DELIA V. DELA TORRE, JUANITA V.
INGLES, & SABELITO V. GELITO, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 1 dated
March 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72530 which affirmed the
Decision2 dated August 6, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, in Civil Case
No. 5745, declaring private respondents as absolute owners of the subject parcel of land. Likewise
assailed is the September 20, 2005 Resolution3 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

A complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, tax declarations and
recovery of ownership and possession with damages was filed by private respondents against
petitioners.

Private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children and grandson of the late spouses
Lucas Villanueva and Regina Tupas Villanueva; that during the lifetime of Lucas Villanueva, he
owned a parcel of residential land designated as Lot 764-A situated at Barangay Balabag, Malay,
Aklan with an area of 140 square meters, more or less, and declared for taxation purposes under his
name under Tax Declaration No. 252 (1947); that spouses Villanueva possessed the subject parcel
of land during their lifetime openly, publicly and continuously in the concept of an owner and after
their death, they were succeeded by their children; that sometime in August 1997, petitioners and
their hired laborers fenced the whole land in question without the knowledge and consent of private
respondents; that when confronted by private respondents concerning the fencing of the land,
petitioners alleged that they acquired the same through inheritance from their father, Eutiquiano
Salazar, who in turn purchased the land from the late Ciriaco H. Tirol by virtue of a Deed of
Exchange of Real Property.

In their Answer,4 petitioners claimed that petitioner Anita S. Aguirre is the lawful owner and actual
possessor of the land in question, it being a portion of a bigger parcel of land she inherited from her
deceased parents Eutiquiano Salazar and Regina Supetran Salazar who bought the land from
Ciriaco H. Tirol per Deed of Exchange of Real Property5 dated December 31, 1971 and registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Aklan; that the parcel of land is included under Tax Declaration
No. 4033 (1953) in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol and the same is in the possession of the Tirol
family as owner thereof continuously, openly and adversely even before the second world war; that
the land had been surveyed as part of Cadastral Lot 764, NP-06-000001, Malay Cadastre, in the
name of Eutiquiano Salazar by the Bureau of Lands; that the land has been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 1264 (1974) and subsequent tax declarations in the name of Eutiquiano Salazar;
that the land was first fenced with bamboos in 1981 and with cement hollow blocks in 1985 without
any opposition from private respondents; and that the action is barred by prescription and private
respondents are guilty of laches in failing to assert their alleged right of ownership after the lapse of
more than fifty (50) years since it was possessed by the heirs of the late Trinidad vda. de Tirol.

On August 6, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

 1. Declaring the plaintiffs the lawful owners and entitled to possession of the land in
question identified as Lot 764-A in the Commissioner's Sketch marked Exhibit "L",
and as owners, are entitled to the possession of the same;

2. Ordering the defendants to restore possession of the land in question to the

plaintiffs;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of One Thousand Eight
Hundred Pesos (P1,800.00) by way of litigation expenses, and another sum of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as reimbursement for attorney's fees; and

4. Ordering the Provincial Assessor of Aklan to issue a new tax declaration of the
land in question in the name of the plaintiffs upon compliance of the requirements of
that office and upon payment of appropriate taxes on the land including back taxes, if
any.

For insufficiency of evidence, plaintiffs claim for moral damages is denied and for lack of
merit, defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED.

With cost against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.6

The trial court noted that the tax declarations in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol and the survey
plan did not establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is the owner and possessor of the land in question,
thus, he has no right to transfer ownership of the same to Eutiquiano Salazar; that petitioners were
not possessors in good faith since they knew as early as 1954 that private respondents were in
possession of the land; that petitioners did not acquire the land via extraordinary acquisitive
prescription considering that their possession only lasted for 26 years from 1971 up to 1997 when
private respondents first instituted the complaint.

On March 17, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying petitioners’ appeal and
affirming in toto the trial court’s decision.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition raising the following issues:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE AGUIRRES HAD
ACQUIRED TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY VIA ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE VILLANUEVAS’
CAUSE OF ACTION HAD BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION;

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE RULE
ON LACHES;

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VILLANUEVAS WERE IN
"POSSESSION" AND "OWNERSHIP" OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE
EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE BETWEEN CIRIACO TIROL AND THE
AGUIRRES’ ASCENDANT-PREDECESSOR IN 1971;
 V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AGUIRRES HAVE NOT
PROVED THE ROOT OF THEIR RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY; AND

VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING FOR THE AGUIRRES
THE FACT THAT THE LATTER HAD "JUST TITLE," AND HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF
THE DISPUTED PROPERTY "IN GOOD FAITH" SINCE 1971. 7

We find merit in the petition.

This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts
is manifestly mistaken, as in the instant case, we can review the evidence in order to arrive at the
correct factual conclusions based on the record.8

Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through
the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession
in good faith and with just title for 10 years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription
can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30
years.9

Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession must be for at least 10 years, in good
faith and with just title. Possession is "in good faith" when there is a reasonable belief that the person
from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his
ownership.10 There is "just title" when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property
through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but
the grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right. 11

In the instant case, we find sufficient evidence to support petitioners’ claim that the requirements for
ordinary prescription are present.

The trial court found that petitioners’ possession was for more than 10 years and with just title, thus:

There is no question that the defendants have been in public, and uninterrupted possession
of the land in question in the concept of an owner for a span of twenty six (26) years from the
time the land in question was included in the deed of exchange in 1971 up to the time the
plaintiffs complained in 1997 (Exh. "K"). There is also no question that defendants’
possession of the land in question was with just title. Just title in the sense that the
defendants acquired the land in question by way of exchange which is one of the modes
recognized by law in acquiring ownership. 12

Contrary however to the findings of the trial court, petitioners possessed the property in good faith.
Petitioner Anita Aguire’s father, Eutiquiano Salazar, bought the subject property from Ciriaco Tirol,
whose claim on the property is founded on the following documents: (1) Tax Declaration No. 729 in
the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol for the year 1945 (Exhibit "4"); (2) Tax Declaration No. 4033 in the
name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol for the year 1953 (Exhibit "4-A"); and (3) the survey plan approved by
the Bureau of Lands in 1952 (Exhibit "6"). Thus, petitioners honestly believed that ownership of the
subject parcel of land was transmitted to Anita by succession from his deceased father, and who
thereafter possessed the property and exercised dominion over it.
Likewise, the trial court’s finding that petitioner Anita Aguirre was not a possessor in good faith since
she knew as early as 1954 that private respondents were in possession of the disputed land has no
basis. Anita Aguirre testified that Magdalena Tupas built a house in the controverted property in
1957 with the permission of Bernardo Escalante, the administrator of the Tirols.13

To prove their ownership, petitioners presented Tax Declaration No. 1264 for the year 1974 (Exhibit
"4-B") and other tax declarations (Exhibits "4-C, "4-D", "5" and submarkings) for the year 1980 to
1994, in the name of Eutiquiano Salazar declaring the subject land for taxation purposes. While tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and
can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. 14

Records also show that Lucas Villanueva, private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, did not
actually possess the subject property during his lifetime. Private respondent Delia Villanueva Dela
Torre, testified that her parents while still alive resided in Sitio Din-iwid, Balabag, Malay, Aklan, about
less than a kilometer away from the land in question. 15 Neither did any of the private respondents
ever reside therein.16 The actual possession by the private respondents rests solely on the
possession of Magdalena Tupas and her husband for eight years allegedly with the permission of
Regina Tupas Villanueva. However, the testimonies of Rubio Sastre and Magdalena Tupas
regarding the actual possession of Lucas Villanueva through planting of trees and gathering of fruits
cannot be given full weight and credence because the witnesses were of tender years then, barely
seven or twelve years old, and did not have discernment of the concept of possession and
ownership. Moreover, no evidence was presented on how Lucas Villanueva acquired the land in
question from Eusebio Sacapano, the uncle of Regina Tupas Villanueva. In addition, Tax
Declaration No. 252 for the year 1947 (Exhibit "C") in the name of Lucas Villanueva does not have
probative value since it was executed four years after the death of Lucas Villanueva in 1943. Tax
receipts submitted by the private respondents in payment for the year 1986 up to 1996 were actually
paid on the same day, February 20, 1996 by his son Dionito Villanueva. 17

On the other hand, after buying the property in 1971, petitioners possessed the same in the concept
of an owner. They peacefully occupied it, built fences, planted plants and used the same as ingress
and egress towards their cottages. Having been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
disputed land in good faith and with a just title since 1971 until 1997, petitioners doubtlessly obtained
title by ordinary acquisitive prescription.

Moreover, the action is barred by laches which is defined as the failure to assert a right for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds
of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. 18

In the instant case, private respondents knew as early as 1981 that petitioners are building fences in
the perimeter of the disputed land but did not take action to assert their rights over the subject parcel
of land. They waited 16 long years to oust petitioners from the possession of the land. Definitely,
laches had already set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 17, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72530, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 5745, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are
hereby DECLARED as lawful owners of the subject property through acquisitive prescription.
SO ORDERED.
11. [G.R. NO. 171068. September 5, 2007.] Heirs of Arzanon-Crisologo v Ranon

HEIRS OF MARCELINA ARZADON-CRISOLOGO, represented by Leticia C. del Rosario, MAURICIA

ARZADON and BERNARDO ARZADON, Petitioners, v. AGRIFINA RAÑON, substituted by SUZIMA
RAÑON-DUTERTE and OTHELO RAÑON, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552, dated 10 November 2005 and 12 January 2006, respectively,
which affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated 8 August 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 3875-18. The RTC reversed the 11 December 2001 Decision4 of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Badoc-Pinili, Badoc, Ilocos Norte, in Civil Case No. 141-B.

Records show that on 18 October 1995, Agrifina Rañon5 filed a Complaint6 against spouses Conrado and Mila
Montemayor (spouses Montemayor) with the MCTC of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, claiming ownership over an
unregistered residential lot (subject property) situated at Brgy. No. 2 Badoc, Ilocos Norte, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 420809, more particularly described as follows:

"RESIDENTIAL with an area of 472 sq. ms. (sic) Bounded on the North by Ladera St.; on the East by
Dionisio Ladera; on the South by Buenaventura Arzadon; and on the West by Rafael Ladera; Assessed
at P1700.00 under Tax Dec. No. 420809."7

According to Agrifina Rañon, her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and
ownership over the subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had built a
house on the subject property where she and her family had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her
family was already residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they
continued to visit the subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon. However, in August of
1986, her daughter, Zosie Rañon, discovered that the subject property was already in the name of the
spouses Montemayor under Tax Declaration No. 0010563 which was purportedly issued in their favor by
virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses Montemayor executed themselves. The
Affidavit was alleged to have created a cloud of doubt over Rañon's title and ownership over the subject
property.

Hence, Agrifina Rañon sought a Writ of Preliminary Injunction8 against the spouses Montemayor
commanding them to cease and desist from further exercising any right of ownership or possession over the
subject property. She further prayed that she be finally declared the true and lawful owner of the subject
property.

The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by purchase from Leticia
del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous owners for a consideration
of P100,000.00.9

On 22 July 1996, the Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo, (represented by Leticia A. Crisologo del Rosario),
Mauricia Arzadon, and Bernardo Arzadon (petitioners) filed an Answer in Intervention10 claiming, inter alia,
that they are the rightful owners of the subject property, having acquired the same from their predecessors-
in-interest. They averred that there existed no liens or encumbrances on the subject property in favor of
Agrifina Rañon; and that no person, other than they and the spouses Montemayor, has an interest in the
property as owner or otherwise.

Per petitioners' allegations, their predecessors-in-interest, spouses Timoteo and Modesta Alcantara (spouses
Alcantara) bought the subject property from its owner, Rafael Ladera, on 2 May 1936. The spouses
Alcantara then built a house of strong materials on the subject property which served as their conjugal
home. Residing with them was Timoteo Alcantara's sister, Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon. As the spouses
Alcantara died without issue, their properties were left to Timoteo Alcantara's nearest of kin, Augustina
Alcantara-Arzadon and Tiburcio Alcantara, sister and brother, respectively, of Timoteo Alcantara. Tiburcio
Alcantara also died without any known heir; thus, leaving the subject property in Augustina Alcantara-
Arzadon's sole favor. Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon is the mother of petitioners Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo
(now deceased and whose heirs are represented by Leticia del Rosario) and Mauricia Arzadon. Bernardo
Arzadon is the son of Mauricia Arzadon.

Petitioners asseverated further that Bernardo Arzadon had lived in the house constructed on the subject
property until 1985 when it was gutted by fire. To further support their claims, petitioners averred that they
had religiously paid the real estate taxes on the subject property. Finally, by way of a counterclaim,
petitioners sought compensation for the damages which they allegedly suffered by reason of the baseless
filing of the instant suit.

On 22 October 1999, the MCTC issued an Order11 dropping the name of the spouses Montemayor from the
caption of the case on the ground that sometime in 1996, Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon had
repurchased the subject property from the spouses Montemayor for the consideration of P100,000.00. As a
result, the spouses Montemayor had no more interest or claim whatsoever on the property in litigation.

On 11 December 2001, the MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners. The decretal portion
thereof reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the [petitioners] to be the true and lawful owners of one-half (1/2) portion of the undivided
whole of the lot-in-suit by mode of succession pursuant to [A]rticle 1001 of the [C]ivil [C]ode of the
Philippines;

2. Declaring the [petitioners] to have the better right over the other half of the undivided whole of the lot-
in-suit by mode of prescription pursuant to [A]rticle 1137 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

3. Dismissing the counter-claim of the [petitioners] against the [respondents];

4. Ordering [petitioners] to pay the cost of the suit.12

First, the MCTC ruled that while the adverse claims of Agrifina Rañon on the subject lot against the spouses
Alcantara may have started in 1962, this adverse possession was interrupted in the year 1977 due to the
filing of an adverse claim by petitioner Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo with the Office of the Assessor. In 1977,
the tax declaration in the name of Valentin Rañon, Agrifina Rañon's husband, was cancelled and a new tax
declaration was issued in Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo's name. The MCTC said that the period of possession
of the spouses Rañon in the concept of an owner from 1962 to 1977 did not ripen into ownership because
their occupation was in bad faith. The Civil Code requires, for acquisitive prescription of real property, 30
years of uninterrupted possession if the same is wanting in good faith and without a just title.

Second, the MCTC held that by virtue of succession, petitioners are entitled to one-half of the subject
property. This is because according to Article 100113 of the Civil Code, should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or the widower (who are without issue), the latter shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. The spouses Alcantara
died without issue. As between Timoteo Alcantara and Modesta Alcantara, the former predeceased the
latter. Timoteo Alcantara was survived by (1) his brother Tiburcio Alcantara, who also died without any
known heir; and (2) his sister Augustina Alcantara. Thus, following the death of the spouses Alcantara, only
the children of Augustina Alcantara, namely Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo and Mauricia Arzadon, stand to
inherit Timoteo Alcantara's share in the subject property.

Moreover, the MCTC declared that for the part of Modesta Alcantara, there was no legal heir who claimed
the other half of the property which she14inherited from her husband, Timoteo Alcantara who predeceased
her. On this portion, the MCTC held that petitioners exercised rights of ownership and dominion over the
same by periodically visiting the lot and cleaning it.15 It also held that from 31 August 1977, when
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an adverse claim for herself and for
her brothers and sisters which led to the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 44120 in her name, to 11
December 2001,16 there is a total of 33 years, three months and 10 days which is sufficient to claim
ownership over the subject property by adverse possession under Article 113717 of the Civil Code.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MCTC.

The RTC declared that the respondent Rañons who are heirs of the original plaintiff had acquired the subject
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription, and therefore adjudged respondents to be the absolute owners
thereof; thus, in the 8 August 2002 Decision of the RTC, it held:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the trial [c]ourt is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the [respondents] as the absolute owners of the parcel of land in suit, having acquired the
same through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

No costs.18

In its findings, the RTC declared that a more circumspect scrutiny of the evidence showed that for a long
time from the death of the spouses Alcantara, no one adjudicated the subject property unto themselves.
Although petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest claimed to have successional rights over the subject
property, they did not take action to have the same adjudicated to themselves or, at least, to have the same
declared for taxation purposes. The RTC ruled that petitioners had slept on their rights. On the part of the
respondent Rañons, in 1962, Valentin Rañon, respondents' father, declared the subject property in his name
for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. In the years that followed, his wife, Agrifina
Rañon, declared the same in her name for taxation purposes, as well as paid the real estate taxes on the
subject property. In 1977, the latter even mortgaged the subject property with the Philippine National Bank.
It was only in 1977 when petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo executed an
Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership and declared the subject property in her name and paid its taxes.

The RTC elucidated in this wise, to wit:

It bears to note that since the death of Timoteo Alcantara until the year 1977, [petitioners], as well as their
predecessors-in-interests (sic) had not taken any concrete step in exercising their supposed successional
rights over the parcel of land in suit, or at least, the Intervenors should have always [stayed] on their guard
or especially vigilant against anyone who would secure a claim to the said parcel of land, more so that
Valentin Rañon and plaintiff Agrifina Rañon were then living with them. It is very unfortunate that it was
only in 1977 that the Intervenors made known to others of their supposed successional rights over the
parcel of land in suit. Relief is denied to a claimant whose right has become stale for a long time,
considering that some other persons like [respondents] had wayback (sic) taken the necessary action in
claiming the parcel of land in suit. It is the vigilant and not the sleepy that is being assisted by the laws.
(Ledita Burce Jacob v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92159, July 1, 1993).

It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that because of the claim of the [respondents] to have acquired the
parcel of land in suit by acquisitive prescription, the Intervenors who belatedly claimed to be the legal and
compulsory heirs of the late Timoteo Alcantara, as ruled by the trial court, had regrettably forfeited their
such (sic) successional rights, simply due to their inaction for a long period of time. Hence, contrary to the
findings of the trial court, the [petitioners] are not entitled to the one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land
in suit.19

Likewise, the RTC reasoned that the Notice of Adverse Claim executed by petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo against the Rañons in 1977 implied that respondents have been in
possession of the subject property. On this matter, the RTC said, viz:

Evidently, the trial court considered by implication that the execution by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo of said
Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership in 1977 to have interrupted the running of the prescriptive period on
the possession by the [respondents] of the parcel of land in suit. It bears to stress on (sic) this point, that
the Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership executed by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo is nothing but a notice
of a claim adverse to the [respondents]. By its nature, its implication is that the [respondents] have been in
possession of the parcel of land in suit in some concept. But definitely, said Adverse Claim does not, upon its
execution, operate to toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there is a necessity to
determine the validity of the same. And this could only be done by the filing of the necessary action in court
such [as] contemplated in the provisions of Article 1123 of the Civil Code. It is only on (sic) such instance
that the prescriptive period should be deemed interrupted. And undisputedly, nothing had been done by the
Intervenors after the execution of said Adverse Claim by Marcelina Crisologo, except of course as they
claimed, and as held by the trial court, they started to possess the parcel of land in suit. Regretably (sic),
however, such possession by the Intervenors of the parcel of land in suit does not benefit them for purposes
of prescription.20

The RTC also declared that the Rañons have been in possession of the parcel of land in the concept of an
owner since 1962. Even as they had gone to live in Manila following the burning of the house on the subject
property, they continued to exercise acts of dominion over the same by visiting and looking after the
property. The RTC also considered in favor of the respondents, the admission of petitioner Bernardo Arzadon
and the petitioners' witnesses that Valentin Rañon and Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the house on the
subject lot since 1947, which shows that they had been in possession of the subject property for a period of
more than 50 years.

On review before the Court of Appeals, the Decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto.

The Court of Appeals held that when Valentin Rañon executed the affidavit declaring himself to be the true
and lawful owner of the subject property in 1962, the same was a repudiation of petitioners' legal title over
it. The repudiation, coupled with the payment of realty taxes, was made with the knowledge of petitioners,
who failed to act against it. Thus, from 1962 up to the filing of the action in 1995, respondents continued to
adversely occupy the property. In the assailed 10 November 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled:

Moreover, respondents' payment of realty taxes made with the knowledge and consent of petitioners and
went unchallenged for a number of years, indubitably show their positive claim as owners of the property.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. It is only where payment of taxes is
accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be
material in supporting a claim of ownership.

Needless to state, from 1962 onwards, prescription begun to run against petitioners and was not in any way
interrupted from their mere execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim since the notice of adverse claim
cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law.
And even if We are to eliminate the question of good faith in determining the prescriptive period, evidence
are (sic) still abundant to substantiate respondents' thirty years of possession in the concept of owner
commencing from 1962 until 1995 when the complaint below was filed.21

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
following manner, to wit:

After a careful study of the grounds relied upon by petitioners We find no new matters raised to justify a
modification much less, a reversal of the Decision sought to be reconsidered. To reiterate, even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that petitioner merely tolerated the Rañons (sic) occupancy of the subject property, it must
be stressed that the execution in 1962 of Valentin Rañon's Affidavit, the corresponding payment of realty
taxes and other acts of dominion which went unchallenged by the petitioners, had effectively severed their
alleged juridical relation. Suffice it to state that these acts, taken as a whole, vest upon the Rañons the right
to claim ownership over the subject property irrespective of whether the nature of their occupation was
rooted from the mere tolerance of the Arzadons or from a bona fide sale between Agrifina Rañon and Rafael
Ladera.22

Hence, the instant Petition.

The primordial issue in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that respondents
had acquired ownership over the subject property through uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Petitioners dispute the findings of the Court of Appeals
and the RTC in declaring that acquisitive prescription has set in against them and in favor of the
respondents. They claim that the evidence does not support respondents' contention that they have been in
public, notorious, and uninterrupted possession over the subject property in the concept of an owner since
1962 as alleged in their Complaint. Instead, petitioners rely on the finding of the MCTC that respondents
were not able to prove their adverse claim for an uninterrupted period of thirty years.

At this juncture, we take an opportune look at the applicable rules on the acquisition of ownership through
prescription.

Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. 23 It is
concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.24 Possession
is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.25 It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;26 exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;27 and notorious
when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.28 The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the
essential elements of acquisitive prescription.

Article 1117 of the Civil Code is instructive:

Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Articles 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code fix the periods of possession,29which provide:

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.30 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character.31 Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires a period of possession of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an
uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years.32

Were respondents able to sufficiently satisfy the legal requirements to prove prescription?cra lawlibrary

To recapitulate, respondents traced their claim of ownership from the year 1962 until the filing of their
Complaint for Ownership before the MCTC on 18 October 1995. To support their possession, they rely on an
Affidavit executed on 19 October 1962 by Valentin Rañon claiming ownership over the subject property by
virtue of an alleged sale. The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in declaring that the
execution by Valentin Rañon of the Affidavit in 1962 was an express repudiation of petitioners' claim over
the property. By virtue of such Affidavit, respondents were able to cancel Tax Declaration No. 02853 in the
name of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Timoteo Alcantara who was shown to have paid taxes on the
subject property in 1950. Hence, in 1962, Tax Declaration No. 033062 was issued in the name of Valentin
Rañon. The same was subsequently cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 033106, which was in the name of his
wife, Agrifina Rañon. The same was likewise cancelled in 1967 by Tax Declaration No. 420809, similarly
under the name of Agrifina Rañon. In 1977, however, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Marcelina
Arzadon-Crisologo filed an Adverse Claim and a Notice of Ownership claiming that the subject property
which is not yet registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laoag City is declared under Tax
Declaration No. 420809 in the name of Valentin Rañon for taxation purposes only; but that they have been
in possession of the said land publicly, peacefully and continuously without any intervention or interruption
for more than 15 years.
However, a question must be asked: did the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by petitioners constitute an
effective interruption since 1962 of respondents' possession of the subject property?cra lawlibrary

The answer is in the negative.

Article 112333 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the
possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 112434 sets limitations as to when
such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it
should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should
allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For
civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the
case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a
notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents' possession. Such a notice could not have
produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial
validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code.
What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no
judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the
RTC's ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil
interruption provided for under the law.35 In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt
respondents' adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to
run in respondents' favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.

From another angle, we find that, quite clearly, questions of fact exist before us. There is a question of
fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and
the probability of the situation.36

Thus, we find proper the application of the doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding
those of the trial court are binding upon this Court.37 Even though the rule is subject to exceptions,38 we do
not find them applicable in the instant case.

As found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, nothing was done by petitioners to claim
possession over the subject property from the time their predecessors-in-interest had lost possession of the
property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura
subveniunt. The law comes to the succor only to aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. It
was only in 1977 when they attempted to call the attention of respondents, which as earlier discussed, did
not even operate as an interruption on the latter's possession. The RTC and the Court of Appeals held that
from 1962 to the time they filed their Complaint before the MCTC and until the present time, respondents
occupied without interruption the subject property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring ownership
via extraordinary acquisitive prescription. To reiterate, the RTC's factual findings based on the evidence on
record were manifestly in favor of respondents, to wit:

Thus, by preponderance of evidence, it has been established preponderantly that the [respondents] have
been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously, peacefully, publicly, notoriously, uninterrupted
and in the concept of an owner since 1962 to the present. The fact that the [respondents] have gone to live
in Manila right after the house built in the parcel of land in suit was burned in 1988, they, however, then and
thereafter intermittently come to Badoc, Ilocos Norte purposely to look after and to visit the parcel of land in
suit. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property. One needs (sic) not to (sic) stay on it. The acts
exercised by the [respondents] over the parcel of land in suit are consistent with ownership. Possession in
the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before it can be said that he is in possession [thereof]. (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175, cited in
the case of Somodio v. Court of Appeals, et al., 235 SCRA 307). It is sufficient that the [respondents] were
able to subject the parcel of land to the action of their will.
Furthermore, the Court finds it (sic) significant the testimonies of [petitioner] Bernardo Arzadon and his
witnesses Leonila Arzadon and Elpidio Evangelista who categorically testified to the effect that Valentin
Rañon and [respondent] Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the house standing on the parcel of land in suit
since 1947. Basically, the defendants are bound by their admissions and also bound by the testimonies of
the witnesses they presented. And going along with their respective testimonies, from 1947 to 1977 or for
[a] period of thirty (30) years the [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit enough
to invoke extraordinary acquisitive prescription, pursuant to the provisions of Article 113439 (sic) of the New
(sic) Civil Code. However, as earlier stated, the [respondents], contrary to the claim of the [petitioners] and
findings of the trial court, have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously and
uninterrupted from 1962 to the present but because of the admissions of the [petitioners], the
[respondents] have been in possession of the same from 1947 to the present or for more than fifty (50)
years now.40

The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject property for a
period of more than 30 years in repudiation of petitioners' ownership had been established. During such
length of time, respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, and paid taxes in
their name. Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession.41 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property.42 As is well known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by
the tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.43 The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming
the factual findings of the RTC that respondents had validly established their claim of ownership over the
subject property through acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 2005 and
the Resolution dated 12 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.