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Joseph Solomon Delmedigo: Student of

Galileo, Teacher of Spinoza
a
Jacob Adler
a
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Version of record first published: 10 Dec 2012.

To cite this article: Jacob Adler (2012): Joseph Solomon Delmedigo: Student of Galileo, Teacher of
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 Intellectual History Review, 2012, iFirst article, 1–17
Special Issue: Galileo and Spinoza
Guest Editor: Filip Buyse

JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO: STUDENT OF GALILEO, TEACHER OF

SPINOZA

Jacob Adler
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INTRODUCTION

The surviving works of Spinoza1 make no mention of Galileo, a somewhat surprising fact on
several accounts. First, Spinoza was a lens grinder – that is, not an ordinary maker of spectacles,
but of scientific optical instruments – and Galileo was a pioneer in that field (as we shall see
below). Secondly, among the books in Spinoza’s library were seven on astronomy,2 evincing a
serious interest in the subject, and Galileo was one of the masters of astronomy. Thirdly, just
as Spinoza was leaving the confines of the Jewish community in 1656, a bitter controversy
over Copernicanism was arising in the Netherlands – specifically, centered in Leiden, near Rijns-
burg, where Spinoza had moved,3 a controversy in which the religious conservatives sought to
rein in the freedom to philosophize (a term that then included the practice of natural science):
one would expect some reference to the person who sacrificed his freedom for the sake of helio-
centrism. Yet there is at least one figure who connects these two great thinkers: Joseph Solomon
Delmedigo, known in Hebrew by his acronym, Yashar of Candia.4 Delmedigo, who lived from
1591 to 1655, was a rabbi, medical doctor, philosopher, mathematician, and astronomer. He was
born on the island of Crete (then called ‘Candia’) into a family that looked favorably upon secular
learning. At the age of 15, he was sent to the University of Padua to study medicine, though it
appears that he studied other things as well. Records of Padua graduates for those years do not
exist, but Barzilay argues that Delmedigo must have completed his studies there in 1613. After

1
Biographical facts about Spinoza can be conveniently accessed in S. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999). Unless the reference is to some controversial or obscure matter, readers are referred to the
Nadler book.
2
Items 6, 20, 21, (66), (70), (76), and (77) in the posthumous inventory in J. Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s
(Leipzig, 1899), 162.
3
R. Vermij, The Calvinist Copernicans: The Reception of the New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575–1750 (Amster-
dam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2002), 272–94.
4
The main primary sources for Delmedigo’s biography are in his own works, especially in the passages written by editors
and others. The main secondary sources are A. Geiger, ‘Zum Verständnisse Josef Salomo del Medigo’s’, in his Melo Chof-
najim (Berlin, 1840), German section, ix–lvi; G. Alter, Two Renaissance Astronomers, Rozpravy Č eskoslovenské Aka-
demie Vĕd, Ř ada Matematických a Přírodních Vĕd, 68:11, (Prague: Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy
of Sciences, 1956); and I. Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo (Yashar of Candia): His Life, Works and Times
(Leiden: Brill, 1974). Yashar is an acronym of Yosef Shelomoh Rofe’, i.e., Joseph Solomon, M.D.

Intellectual History Review

ISSN 1749-6977 print/ISSN 1749-6985 online
©2012 International Society for Intellectual History
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 2 J. ADLER

graduating, Delmedigo began a life of wandering: He first returned to Crete, then traveled to
Egypt, Constantinople, Poland, Hamburg, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and finally Prague, where he
spent his final years.
Though he wrote voluminously, Delmedigo published relatively little, and that little was pub-
lished reluctantly. In 1629 the book Sefer ʼElim (‘The Book of Elim’; cf. Exodus 15:27) appeared
from the press of Menasseh Ben Israel. In the same year, Taʻalumot Ḥ okhmah appeared in Basel.5
His translation of some of the Aphorisms of Hippocrates has survived and exists now in a critical
edition.6 With few exceptions, the rest of his works have been lost.7

DELMEDIGO AS STUDENT OF GALILEO

Galileo was in the literal sense one of Delmedigo’s teachers: he is one of the few persons named
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by Delmedigo in that capacity. Delmedigo indeed refers to Galileo in Hebrew as rabbi, which
some have gone so far as to translate as ‘my rabbi’,8 but which clearly means simply ‘my
master’ or ‘my teacher’.9 Still, the term reflects the close relationship that existed between Del-
medigo and Galileo and the esteem in which the pupil held his master. Galileo let Delmedigo
look through his telescope, a 30x telescope, then the most powerful in the world.10 This must
have been just after his development of that instrument, which occurred in late 1609 or early
1610,11 since in September of that same year Galileo left Padua.12 Use of the telescope was a con-
siderable privilege: Galileo was secretive about his newly developed instrument.13

5
J.S. Delmedigo, Sefer ʼElim, edited by M. Ben Israel (Amsterdam, 1629; second edition, Odessa, 1864). All citations refer
to the second edition, which (unlike the first) is paginated continuously. The first edition is available online at http://www.
seforimonline.org/seforimdb/pdf/70.pdf. J.S. Delmedigo, Taʻalumot Ḥ okhmah, edited by S. Ashkenazi, 2 vols (Basel,
1629). The latter is sometimes known by its Latin title, Abscondita Sapientiae. The first volume of Taʻalumot
Ḥ okhmah is an anthology of works, only some of which are by Delmedigo. The second volume contains his Novelot
Ḥ okhmah and Novelot ’Orah.
6
M. David, ‘Critical Edition of Hippocrates’ Aphorisms translated into Hebrew by J. S. Delmedigo (1591–1655), sections
IV, V’, Korot, 7 (1979), 680–709.
7
For a list of Delmedigo’s unprinted works, see Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo, 328–37. A recently examined manu-
script appears to contain two additional works by Delmedigo, hitherto presumed lost; see J.I. Pfeffer, ‘Authorship in a
Hebrew Codex . . . MS 199: Tracing Two Lost Works by Delmedigo’, Christ Church Library Newsletter, 6:3 (2010),
1–6.
8
T.M. Rudavsky, ‘Galileo and Spinoza: Heroes, Heretics, and Hermeneutics’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 62:4 (2001),
611–31 (618); A. Neher, ‘Copernicus in the Hebraic Literature from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of
the History of Ideas, 38:2 (1977), 211–26 (214). When referring to an actual rabbi, Delmedigo uses such honorifics as
morenu ha-rav rav or kevod ha-rav rav, i.e., ‘our teacher and master, Rabbi [so-and-so]’, or ‘his honor the rabbi,
Rabbi [so-and-so]’. See Delmedigo, ʼElim, 131.
9
It is so translated by Isaac Barzilay: see Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo, 151, 161; and by George Alter: see Alter,
Two Renaissance, 64. The meaning of the word is made clear by a passage in Matsref la-Ḥ okhmah, where Delmedigo uses
the same word to describe Plato as the teacher – surely not rabbi! – of Aristotle: see Delmedigo, Matsref la-Ḥ okhmah, in
his Taʻalumot Ḥ okhmah, vol. 1, part 1, 1a–36b. Cited here from the second edition (Odessa, 1864), 84.
10
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 301, 417, 432. Galileo himself says that his telescope magnified 30 times; Van Helden says it was
only 20. See G. Galilei, Sidereus Nuncius, translated by A. van Helden (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989),
9, 38.
11
It was constructed in November 1609 and then improved by January 1610; see the Introduction to Galilei, Sidereus
Nuncius, 9, 14.
12
J. Renn, Galileo in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 286.
13
Renn, Galileo in Context, 308–10.
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 3

Delmedigo was also a student of Galileo’s in that he was a reader of Galileo’s writings. He
mentions reading Galileo’s book,14 which, though unnamed by Delmedigo, is obviously the Side-
reus Nuncius. Delmedigo refers to Galileo’s discovery that the Milky Way and other nebulosities
are in fact clusters of stars so small, and so closely packed, that they appear as one luminous
object. The telescope, however, allows the eye to clearly see the distinct stars making up these
heavenly bodies. This is indeed one of the principal discoveries reported in the Sidereus
Nuncius.15
Delmedigo’s discussion of the geography of the moon is little more than a translation of the
corresponding discussion in the Sidereus Nuncius. In fact, if it were being judged by the biblio-
graphical standards of the twenty-first century, we would have to call it a plagiarism,16 his only
original contribution being perhaps the word selenographia.17
Delmedigo also writes about sunspots, the phases of Venus, and the odd shape of the planet
Saturn, subsequently determined by higher-power telescopes to be the now well-known
rings.18 All these are mentioned by Galileo.19
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Harder to place is Galileo’s probable influence on Delmedigo in the matter of faith versus
reason, or scripture versus science. It is hard to imagine that they failed to discuss this topic.
One can indeed find passages where they seem to be thinking along the same lines. Thus Galileo:

[S]ince the Holy Ghost did not intend to teach us whether heaven moves or stands still, whether its
shape is spherical or like a discus or extended in a plane, nor whether the earth is located at its
center or off to one side, then so much the less was it intended to settle for us any other conclusion
of the same kind. [. . .] Now if the Holy Spirit has purposely neglected to teach us propositions of
this sort as irrelevant to the highest goal (that is, to our salvation), how can anyone affirm that it is obli-
gatory to take sides on them [. . .]? I would say here something that was heard from an ecclesiastic of
the most eminent degree: ‘That the intention of the Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven,
not how heaven goes’.20

We believe that Solomon and Moses and all the other holy writers knew the constitution of the universe
perfectly well, as they also knew that God did not have hands or feet or wrath or prevarication or regret.
We cast no doubt on this, but we say that [. . .] the Holy Ghost spoke thus for the reasons set forth.21

14
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 432.
15
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 432; Galilei, Sidereus Nuncius, 62–4. The discovery of the nature of the Milky Way is mentioned on
the very title page of the first edition; see the translated title page in Galilei, Sidereus Nuncius, 35.
16
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 433–4. Galilei, Sidereus Nuncius, 42–4.
17
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 432. The word occurs also in Francis Bacon’s Instauratio Magna (London, 1620), 279, nine years
before the publication of ʼElim, but Delmedigo may still be the inventor, on the assumption that he wrote these astronom-
ical parts during shortly after his student days with Galileo. There is some reason to think that this may be the case. Del-
medigo refers to Galileo’s Sidereus Nuncius as ‘his book’, leading one to suppose that those words were written at a time
when Galileo had not yet published anything further on astronomy. Galileo’s next astronomical work to appear was the
Letters on Sunspots (Augsburg, 1612)
18
Sunspots: Delmedigo, ʼElim, 413; Saturn: Delmedigo, ʼElim, 301; Venus: Delmedigo, ʼElim, 300.
19
Sunspots: G. Galilei, History and Demonstrations Concerning Sunspots and Their Phenomena (‘Letters on Sunspots’),
translated by S. Drake in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), 87–144. Venus:
G. Galilei, Letter to Giuliano de’ Medici (11 December 1610), excerpted in Sidereus Nuncius, 107–8. Saturn:
G. Galilei, Letter to the secretary of Cosimo II de’ Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany, excerpted in Sidereus Nuncius, 102.
20
G. Galilei, Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, 185–6. The Letter was written
in 1615, but not published until 1636: see Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, 145, 171n.
21
G. Galilei, Notes, cited in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, 161, 9.
 4 J. ADLER

Compare these with the following passage from Delmedigo’s Matsref la-Ḥ okhmah [‘Crucible
of Wisdom’]:

Do not be disturbed by my words, for if you read chapter 42 of the second part of the Guide [of the
Perplexed], you will recognize and know that all the verses of the Torah that assert the existence of
[angels] were [perceived by the prophet] in a dream or prophetic vision. You know that prophecy
does not come to teach the sciences, but depends rather on the imagination of the prophet, which
may not coincide with the true reality. For its fundamental goal is practical, viz, the fulfillment of
the commandments. One should therefore not try to use the words of the Torah to prove anything in
natural science or metaphysics, or to decide between the philosophical opinions. For the Torah
speaks in human language. [. . .] And though the prophets may have been the great men of science
of their time, still prophecy follows the common opinions of the time and the views accepted by the
majority.22

It is interesting to note that for Galileo, the main goal of scripture is salvation; for Delmedigo, it
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is the observance of the commandments. This difference corresponds to the difference between
Christianity and Judaism. It is clear then that Delmedigo was acquainted with views like that
of Galileo, and very likely learned about them in part from him. But whether Delmedigo
agreed with such views is another matter. Delmedigo in fact ascribes the just-quoted passage
to an unnamed Jewish sage, whom he accuses of ‘twist[ing] the words of the Torah so as to
make them to fit [his] system’.23 Yet for all that, Delmedigo may indeed agree with the words
of the anonymous sage: it is not beyond conception that he himself may even be the anonymous
sage. In any case, he gives a strong indication within the book itself that the opinions expressed in
Matsref la-Ḥ okhmah are not those of the author:

Here I am writing against the philosophers and on behalf of the Cabbalists, since I was asked to do so
by one of the dignitaries of the Jewish community whose heart is attracted at the moment to the Cab-
balah. [. . .] Should he tomorrow be in a different mood and, entertaining a predilection for philosophy,
ask me to praise and extol it, I shall eagerly undertake a vigorous defense of it. [. . .] [Y]ou must not
think to fathom the mind of authors on the basis of the views they express in their books.24

What, then, is Delmedigo’s view on the subject? It is indeed hard to tell. His writings seem to
espouse contradictory views,25 to the extent that parts of his works may strike one as incoherent. It
is possible that he was one of those thinkers – among whom we may number some of the greats –
who constantly review and critique their own works, thus changing their opinions quite fre-
quently.26 Or he may have purposely written in a puzzling way, à la Leo Strauss, so as to
conceal his radical views from the eyes of those who would be disturbed or angered by
them.27 Or he may after all simply be confused or incoherent in places.

22
Delmedigo, Matsref, 1a–36b. Cited here from the second edition (Odessa, 1864), 85. The first edition was in Spinoza’s
library; see J. Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s (Leipzig, 1899), 161 item (56).
23
Delmedigo, Matsref, 85. Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo, 178, overlooks the fact that Delmedigo is quoting
someone else’s words.
24
Delmedigo, Matsref, 58; as cited in Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo, 242.
25
See Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo, 175–81 and the passages from Delmedigo’s works cited there.
26
Hilary Putnam comes to mind as an example of this sort of thinker.
27
See L. Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 5

In any case, whether he accepted such views or not, his thoughts on the relation of science and
scripture could not but be influenced by the thought of the man he calls his teacher.
We conclude this section with a matter of detail. Delmedigo refers to the theorem of Euclid that
proves the rule of three as the ‘Golden Theorem’ – a very unusual designation, since the phrase
‘Rule of Three’ is nearly universal. Galileo writes, ‘Euclid teaches us: Given three numbers, to
find the fourth proportional. This is the Golden Rule, called rule-of-three by practitioners who
find the fourth proportional to the three given.’28

DELMEDIGO AS TEACHER OF SPINOZA

Delmedigo was not in the literal sense the teacher of Spinoza. He left Amsterdam in 1629 or 1630,
never to return (as far we know).29 Spinoza was not born until 1632, so could not have met Del-
medigo. Yet Spinoza learned from Delmedigo’s writings: they stood on his bookshelf. As we
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have already seen, Spinoza owned a copy of Taʻalumot Ḥ okhmah. In the inventory of Spinoza’s
library, taken just after his death, the item after Taʻalumot Ḥ okhmah is not listed by title, but
simply by description: ‘Een Rabbinsch Mathematisch boeck’, i.e., a mathematics book written
in Hebrew.30 The supposition is that the title page had fallen away, as often happens with
well-used old books (Spinoza’s copy of ʼElim was forty-eight years old by the time the posthu-
mous inventory was taken), so the inventory-taker, not knowing Hebrew, looked at the book and
described it as best he could. This supposition is more than just conjecture: the copy of Sefer ʼElim
owned by the library of the University of California, Los Angeles, does in fact bear on its spine the
title, Tractatus Varii Mathematici, placed there by the bookbinder.31 J. d’Ancona seems to have
been the first to suggest that the rabbinsch mathematisch boeck is Delmedigo’s other major pub-
lication, Sefer ʼElim.32 Critical reception of d’Ancona’s paper has been mixed.33 Though the
details of D’Ancona’s argument may well be called into question, his conclusion – the influence
of Delmedigo’s Sefer ʼElim on Spinoza – may be accepted. ʼElim was in fact the source of one of
Spinoza’s key insights.
Even without considering the detailed correspondences, the idea that Spinoza read ʼElim has
considerable plausibility. ʼElim was indeed just the sort of thing that the young Spinoza would

28
G. Galilei, Operations of the Geometric and Military Compass, 1606, translated by S. Drake (Washington, DC: Smith-
sonian Institution Press, 1978), 48. Galileo is referring to Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, Part 9, Prop. 19, which he more
or less quotes. In the Elements it reads, ‘Given three numbers, to investigate when it is possible to find a fourth proportional
to them’. Euclid, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements, translated by T.L. Heath, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1908), vol. 2, 409.
29
Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo, 78.
30
Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s, 161, item (57). The word ‘rabbinic’ and its cognates were frequently used
in the seventeenth century to refer to rabbinic (as opposed to Biblical) Hebrew. See, e.g., Barzilay, Yoseph Shlomo Del-
medigo, 79.
31
See the online catalog at http://melvyl.worldcat.org/title/elim/oclc/23176308&referer=brief_results, accessed 6 October
2010.
32
J. d’Ancona, ‘Delmedigo, Menasseh Ben Israel en Spinoza’, Genootschap voor de Joodsche Wetenschap in Nederland,
Bijdragen en Mededeelingen, 6 (1940), 105–52.
33
See I.S. Révah, Spinoza et le Dr Juan de Prado (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1959), 17; T. de Vries, Baruch de
Spinoza in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1970), 28–9, 35; Z. Levy, Baruch
or Benedict: On Some Jewish Aspects of Spinoza’s Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 25–6, 48, 84;
Y. Kaplan, An Alternative Path to Modernity (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 253; F. Mignini, editorial matter to Spinoza, Korte
verhandeling van God, de mensch en deszelvs welstand (L’Aquila: Japadre Editore, 1986), 377.
 6 J. ADLER

have been looking for. Here was a book published in Amsterdam by the respectable Rabbi Man-
asseh Ben Israel, with approbations from four respectable Venetian rabbis.34 It would be hard for
anyone to object to a young man’s reading such a work. But a radically inclined reader could
search through Sefer ʼElim for the shocking views that are sprinkled here and there among the
mass of bland assurances and unthreatening mathematical calculations (in much the way that las-
civious twentieth-century readers have at times had to satisfy their craving by seeking out the racy
passages discreetly placed here and there in otherwise respectable novels). ʼElim even contains an
apology on behalf of young men who express radical opinions:

Believe me, my dear friend, those who say with their mouth that the intellect is corrupted [at death] do
not really believe so, if they are true philosophers and sages. Perhaps they just want to display to the
nations their wisdom and philosophization.35

[. . .] I have no fear [. . .] . For I see that their deeds are not so bad [. . .] . It is true that you can see
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beginning philosophy students all saying, on the basis of proofs they learned from Aristotle, that it
is impossible for a form [such as the soul] to persist without a body [. . .] . After their thoughts
have matured and they have reached the age of wisdom, they will change their opinions [. . .] .36

We can imagine the young Spinoza reading ʼElim, with his elders clucking in disapproval,
unable to stop him from reading a book with such approbations.
Now, Delmedigo does not claim originality for most of what he writes in ʼElim. For the most
part, he is simply reporting the thoughts and discoveries of others. There are, however, some
exceptions. The then-conventional view was that a proposition is necessarily complex: that is,
a proposition affirms (or denies) that a predicate applies to a subject. After outlining this conven-
tional view, Delmedigo then takes the unusual step of expressing his own view, dissenting from
the received opinion:

Nevertheless, [of] the truth that is in the intellect, some is simple and some is complex. Examples of the
complex: If I conceive that man is an animal, it is true; if [I conceive] that man is a fish, it is false.
Examples of the simple: If I conceive of a man, I am conceiving of something that exists, so it is
true; and if I conceive of a vacuum, which does not exist, I am conceiving of something false. For
in the first case, the concept agrees with reality, and in the second, it does not. Hence the philosophers
say that complex truth cannot be attributed to simple things, [and in so saying they are correct]; but
simple truth can indeed be attributed to them.37

Now, there are two points to be noted: First, noncomplex concepts (such as ‘man’ or ‘fish’) can
be true or false. Secondly, it would appear that this is so because acts of apprehension intrinsically
involve assertion or denial (’imut or me’un). That is, if I contemplate the whiteness of snow, I am
actually asserting (or denying) that snow is white, not merely entertaining the possibility that
snow is white.

34
Delmedigo, ʼElim, xxv–xxvi. Page xxv is misnumbered ‘4’, and page xxvi bears no number at all. The four rabbis are
Simhah Luzzato, Leon Modena, Nehemiah Saraval, and Jacob Levi.
35 ˙
‘Philosophization’: Heb. hitpalsefut. The Hebrew word may simply mean ‘philosophizing’, but it also can have a pejora-
tive sense, implying that one is pretending to be a philosopher. My use of the odd word philosophization is intended to
convey this pejorative meaning
36
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 85.
37
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 78–9.
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 7

Now, the view that there can be noncomplex propositions is not entirely unprecedented, but the
conventional wisdom was overwhelmingly to the contrary. Propositions that appear to be non-
complex were generally understood to be elliptical. Thus, for example, if we say ‘It is raining’
(a single word in Greek or Latin), we really mean ‘Zeus is raining’; if we say legitur, we
really mean lectio fit, i.e., ‘reading takes place’. A few thinkers, such as Dionysius Thrax,
taught the opposite, but they are a distinct and extremely small minority.38
Similarly, the conventional wisdom would have us distinguish between merely apprehending a
proposition and asserting or denying it,39 a distinction that Delmedigo rejects. In this case, as con-
trasted with the previous one, the conventional wisdom is not quite so unanimously held, for Aris-
totle himself seems not to distinguish between conceiving of a proposition and accepting or
rejecting it.40 But by Delmedigo’s time the consensus was otherwise.
Delmedigo thus seems to leave us no way of merely contemplating a proposition, without
asserting its truth or falsity. It appears that we cannot suspend our judgment. If Delmedigo
were to change his mind about even one of the two points just noted, it would be different, for
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one could then think noncomplex thoughts without or asserting or denying them, or one could
combine them without asserting or denying the result. Delmedigo blocks both of these possibili-
ties. Delmedigo’s position, moreover, relies on his assertion of two very unusual positions.
There is an obvious parallel in Spinoza’s doctrine of the identity of intellect and will.41 As
Spinoza states in Ethics, Part 2, Prop. 49, ‘In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation or nega-
tion, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea.’ This is one of Spinoza’s most
striking teachings. Contained within this doctrine is the teaching that an idea has intrinsic asser-
tive force. What reader of Spinoza is not surprised to learn that the idea of, say, a circle necessarily
affirms the existence of a circle? One who has the idea of a circle cannot simply contemplate this
idea, while suspending judgment as to the existence of the circle. As Spinoza says, using one of
his most memorable phrases, many people ‘look on ideas [. . .] as mute pictures on a panel, and
preoccupied with this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirma-
tion or negation’.42 (The people preoccupied with this prejudice are, of course, the Cartesians,
who believe that the will has power over the intellect, that we can choose to suspend belief
even regarding things that are quite evident.) This principle applies to all ideas, even the simplest.
We therefore find a counterpart in Spinoza to both of Delmedigo’s unusual doctrines.
Now, the doctrine of identity of intellect and will is one of the most distinctive of Spinoza’s
teachings. It profoundly shapes the whole cast of the Ethics. It marks one of the crossroads
where Spinoza decisively parts ways with Descartes, who in so many ways exercised a profound
influence on him. And it appears to be borrowed from one of Delmedigo’s few philosophical
innovations. In fact, the scholium to Proposition 49 of Part 2, one of the longest scholia in the

38
G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity,
North-Holland Linguistic Series; 8 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973), 95–6; G. Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and
Humanist Theories of the Proposition, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen,
Afd. Letterunde, Nieuwe Reeks; 103 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1980), 23.
39
Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories, 74–6.
40
Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 28–9.
41
Spinoza, Ethics, Part 2, Prop. 49 and scholium thereto = G 1:130–6. The letter ‘G’ followed by a sequence of numbers
indicates volume and page of the standard edition of Spinoza’s works, Opera, edited by C. Gebhardt, 5 vols (Heidelberg:
Im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1925). All translations of Spinoza’s works are taken from
B. de Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza, edited by E.M. Curley, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985).
42
Ethics, Part 2, Prop. 49, scholium = G 2:132.
 8 J. ADLER

Ethics, may be taken as a meditation on the cited passage from Delmedigo’s Sefer ʼElim. If so, we
must conclude that Delmedigo was in the truest sense one of Spinoza’s teachers.
Of course, one cannot provide a demonstrative proof that Spinoza took this teaching from Del-
medigo, short of discovering some previously unknown document from Spinoza’s hand. The cir-
cumstantial evidence, however, is very strong. There are independent reasons (as we shall see
below) to think that Spinoza read ʼElim. The teachings in question, if not unique, are at least
highly unusual in the works that preceded Delmedigo’s ʼElim. So we have a likely case of bor-
rowing and influence. The alternative is to suppose that the doctrine of identity of intellect and
will is original with Spinoza, and not borrowed from anyone. Such a thought is not beyond the
realm of possibility: Spinoza was a highly original thinker and it is not beyond his capacity to
have come up with a highly original doctrine. But this alternative is highly implausible. It
would be as if someone were seen reading A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and, a
short time later, were heard saying, ‘A proposition that cannot be verified is meaningless.’43 It
would strain credulity to suppose that this person had not learned this doctrine from Ayer’s
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book; and it would strain credulity to suppose that Spinoza did not learn the identity of intellect
and will from Delmedigo’s Sefer ʼElim.
Not only this: It can be shown with a high degree of probability that Spinoza derived his epis-
temological categories from ʼElim.44 The scheme of epistemological categories is well-known to
students of Spinoza. In its final form, as found in the Ethics, Part 2, Prop. 40, scholium 2, it may be
presented thus:
1. Opinion or Imagination, consisting of
a. Vague Experience
b. Signs
2. Reason
3. Intuition
Similar schemes are found in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TDIE)45 and the
Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being (KV).46 The scheme found in the Ethics most
closely resembles that found in the Short Treatise, since it contains three main categories, one of
which is divided into two subcategories, in the same way as the Ethics:
1. Belief or Opinion, consisting of
a. Experience
b. Report
2. True Belief
3. Clear and Distinct Concept
The Emendation of the Intellect has four categories that closely resemble those of the Short
Treatise and the Ethics, but they are arranged in a simple four-part scheme, not the 3/4-part
arrangement found in the Ethics and the Short Treatise.
Now, there is some initial reason to suppose that Spinoza may have derived his epistemological
categories from some outside source. Spinoza is known to have done such things, deriving other

43
Cf. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (London: Gollancz, 1936), 35.
44
For a more detailed account of this subject, see J. Adler, ‘Epistemological Categories in Delmedigo and Spinoza’, Studia
Spinozana, 15 (1999): 205–30.
45
TDIE §19 = G 2:10.
46
KV Part 2, Chapter 1 = G 1:54.
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 9

categories from outside sources, often without attribution. Moreover, Spinoza’s procedure in
writing the Short Treatise seems often to have involved taking over some existing outline from
another writer, the details of which were then filled in by Spinoza in accord with his own
views. The sequence of chapters on the passions, for example (Part 2, Ch. 5–14), derives from
Descartes.47 The classification of causes is taken from Burgersdijck.48 The seven initial questions
on God are, according to d’Ancona, derived from Delmedigo.49 The Emendation of the Intellect
(or the Short Treatise, if once considers that to be earlier) marks the first appearance of Spinoza’s
epistemological categories. In both cases, they are introduced with essentially no preparation. In
the Emendation of the Intellect, the epistemological categories are introduced with no further
words than, ‘If I consider them accurately, I can reduce [all my perceptions] to four main
kinds.’50 Similarly, in the Short Treatise, he writes, ‘[L]et us begin with those which are first
known to us, viz. certain perceptions, or the consciousness, of the knowledge ourselves and of
those things that are outside us. We acquire these perceptions then, either 1. simply through
“belief” [. . .]’ and so on with the other modes of perception.51 One is led to suspect that the
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scheme of epistemological categories is derived from an outside source.

Delmedigo presents just such a possible source. Within Sefer ʼElim (occupying pages 76–93 of
the second edition) we find a small treatise on epistemology called Ner Elohim, the Lamp of God.
It is here that Delmedigo sets forth the epistemological concepts which, I argue, form the starting
point for Spinoza’s concepts. There are other discussions scattered here and there in ʼElim, most
prominently in a discussion of medical epistemology52 included in Delmedigo’s commentary on
the Aphorisms of Hippocrates,53 as well as discussions of mathematical epistemology.54 The first
point to be noted is the number of agreements between the epistemological teachings of Ner
Elohim and those of Spinoza. First, we find the same three- or four-part scheme: three categories
of knowledge, the lowest being subdivided into two subcategories:
1. ‘Belief’ (‘emunah) or ‘experience’ (in the wide sense) (nisayon or beki’ut), including:
a. ‘Experience’ in the narrow sense
b. ‘Reception’ (kabalah), i.e. that which one has learned from others
2. ‘Thought’ or ‘reason’ (maḥashavah, and sometimes sevara’)
3. ‘Science’ (yedi’ah)
Two notes: First, ‘reception’ (kabalah) is the same as ‘report’, only viewed from the side of the
hearer, rather than the transmitter. Secondly, the double translation (‘thought’ and ‘reason’)
reflects an ambiguity in the Hebrew word, which in this case should more correctly be translated
as ‘reason’.55

47
B. de Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza, edited by E.M. Curley, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985), 102, n. 4
48
Spinoza, Collected Works, 1:80, n. 2.
49
Ancona, ‘Delmedigo, Menasseh Ben Israel en Spinoza’, 136–47.
50
TDIE §19 = G 2:10. Curley points out that the text of the TDIE as found in the Dutch translation of 1677 reads ‘three
main kinds’ rather than ‘four main kinds’ .Very likely Spinoza here, too, had in mind the three/four-fold categorization.
See Spinoza, Collected Works,1:12 n. 13.
51
KV Part 2, chapter 1 = G 1:54.
52
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 111–13.
53
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 109–16.
54
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 222–3, 356–7, 364–7.
55
See Adler, ‘Epistemological Categories’, 212–14.
 10 J. ADLER

In claiming that Spinoza derived his categories from Delmedigo, I am not saying that the cat-
egories correspond exactly. Indeed, Spinoza himself changed his views over time. The claim is
only that Delmedigo’s scheme served as a starting point for Spinoza’s.
Now, in making any such claim, one must beware of coincidence. Though the similarity
between the two is remarkable, it would not be far-fetched to suppose that two philosophers,
working independently, might have devised similar epistemological schemes, or that Spinoza
could have adapted one of the more or less similar schemes found in other authors.56 Descartes
has also been suggested, particularly in regard to the concept of intuition,57 and, given Spinoza’s
interest in Descartes, it would be surprising if there were not some influence. There are, however,
similarities of detail that make it quite unlikely that anyone other than Delmedigo gave Spinoza
the basic frame of his epistemological categories.58
The most astonishing similarity is in an example used by both Spinoza and Delmedigo. Both
philosophers point out that the same thing can be known by more than one kind of knowledge.
Both use as an example the Rule of Three:
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Given three numbers a, b, and c, there is a fourth number d, such that

a/b = c/d; and the fourth number can be found by means of the formula
d = bc/a.

Both mention that this principle can be known by reason, specifically, by understanding the
relevant demonstration in Euclid. They both mention the same proposition of Euclid’s Elements
of Geometry, Bk. 7, Prop. 19. In algebraic notation this proposition says:

a : b :: c : d if and only if ad = bc.

Both mention that in the case of small numbers, this truth can be known intuitively. Both use
the same four numbers in their example: 2, 3, 4, 6.59 And both discussions contain the same
peculiar quirk – one might almost call it a mistake. Both, as noted, cite Bk. 7, Prop. 19 of

56
Juan de Prado and Franciscus van den Enden have been suggested. See Adler, ‘Epistemological Categories’, 216–18.
57
See T. Sorell, G.A.J. Rogers, and J. Kraye, Introduction to Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer,
2010), xi, and Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by
J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:16–17.
58
With reference to Descartes, it should be noted that Descartes offers no comprehensive taxonomy of kinds of knowledge
other than that found in the Preface to the French translation of the Principles of Philosophy; see Les Principes de Philo-
sophie, translated by Claude Picot (Paris, 1647), fol. b iv r–v. This taxonomy differs significantly from what we find in both
Delmedigo and Spinoza: in particular, we do not see the 3/4-part division. Nor do we find, either there or elsewhere in the
writings of Descartes, the emphasis on experience in the sense of knowledge gained by repeated encounters with a subject
matter (Erfahrung rather than Erlebnis).
59
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 87, 365. Spinoza, TDIE §§23–24 = G 2:11–12. In KV Part 2, Chapter 1, Spinoza uses the example of
the Rule of Three, without mentioning any specific numbers. In Ethics 2:40 Sch. 2 = (G 2:122) Spinoza gives the same
example but with different numbers (1, 2, 3, 6). In the cited passage from ʼElim, Delmedigo refers only to ‘Proposition
19’, without mentioning which book of Euclid’s Elements it is from. The book can, however, be identified by Delmedigo’s
internal cross-references. On page 365 Delmedigo notes that this proposition is known as ‘the Golden Proposition’ (or
‘Golden Theorem’; limud ha-zahav). On page 367, §16 begins with the words, ‘You expressed regret concerning the
Golden Proposition, that it is not reliable’. The ‘you’ is Zeraḥ ben Natan, to whose questions Delmedigo is replying.
Turning to Zeraḥ’s question (34, § 16), we see that he begins, ‘My heart melts like wax within me concerning Proposition
19 of Book 7 of the Elements.’ Thus the ‘Golden Proposition’ is Bk. 7, Prop. 19. But Delmedigo has evidently forgotten
Galileo’s use of the term, since Galileo clearly refers to Proposition 19 of Book 9.
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 11

Euclid as proof of the Rule of Three, but that is odd, for this rule is found in Euclid as Proposition
19 of Book 9, not Book 7. Of course, it is not absolutely a mistake, since one can easily find the
desired fourth number using Proposition 19 of Book 7, but it is peculiar to cite that proposition
when Bk. 9, Prop. 19 is the one that contains the precise principle at issue.60 This reference to a
proposition of Euclid other than the one would expect thus constitutes yet another shared
peculiarity of Spinoza and Delmedigo. It would seem thus that Spinoza is here relying on Delme-
digo’s text without verifying the quotation by consulting the Euclidean text.
Given these parallels between Delmedigo and Spinoza, it is hard to imagine that they came
about by way of coincidence.

APPLICATION

Spinoza’s use of Delmedigo, however interesting, would be of only antiquarian value if it did not
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help us understand Spinoza’s own works. And since (as I propose in this section) we can indeed
better understand Spinoza’s epistemology in the light of Delmedigo’s, the argument for the con-
nection between them is corroborated.
One prominent fact about Delmedigo’s discussion is that it draws heavily on medical epistem-
ology, so much so that it is not Aristotle or Boëthius, but Galen whom he refers to as ‘the eminent
logician’ (ha-hegyoni ha-me‘uleh).61 This now mostly forgotten field was once a vital part of
medicine. Indeed, the terms ‘rationalist’ and ‘empiricist’ were first applied to rival groups of phys-
icians, and only later to philosophers.62 These schools were still alive at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, although they fell into rapid decline as the century progressed, and with
them medical epistemology disappeared as a distinct subject. One of its last major practitioners
– perhaps we should call him the last great medical epistemologist – was Santorio Santorio,
who taught medicine at Padua in the early seventeenth century.63 Santorio deserves this title in
that he was one of the last medical theorists to take medical empiricism seriously as an alternative
to rationalism.64 Delmedigo does not mention studying with Santorio, but given Delmedigo’s
decided preference for learning from people, rather than books,65 it is hard to imagine he
would not have taken advantage of this opportunity.

60
Book 9, Prop. 19 of the Elements reads, ‘Given three numbers, to investigate when it is possible to find a fourth pro-
portional to them’. Euclid, The Thirteen Books, 2:409.
61
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 80.
62
M. Frede, ‘Introduction to Galen’, Three Treatises on the Nature of Science (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), ix. There
seems, unfortunately, to be no comprehensive or even general study of medical epistemology. Perhaps the reason is, as
Frede suggests (x), that historians of philosophy see it as a medical matter, and hence outside their purview. The interested
reader can begin with Frede’s introduction and with several of the papers in the collection edited by V. Nutton, Galen:
Problems and Prospects (London: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1981). There are also some useful
papers in Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions, edited by D.G. Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), but the general orientation of the book is more sociological than philosophical.
63
A. Castiglioni, ‘Life and Work of Sanctorius’, translated by E. Recht, Medical Life, 38.12 (n.s., no. 135) (1931), 727–85;
R. Major, ‘Santorio Santorio’, Annals of Medical History, 10:5 (1938), 369–81.
64
Santorio’s discussion of medical epistemology may be found in his modestly titled work, S. Santorio, Methodi Vitan-
dorum Errorum Omnium, Qui in Arte Medica Contingunt [Methods for Avoiding All the Errors that Occur in the Art
of Medicine] (Venice, 1603); I consulted the Venice, 1660 edition. Books 11, 12, and part of 13 (348–403) are
devoted to a discussion of medical epistemology.
65
‘I sought to gain a thorough knowledge of all these [sciences] directly from the lips of outstanding practitioners, [. . .]
each of whom is an expert in his own field. [. . .] I clung to them in every city and state.’ Delmedigo, ʼElim, 117.
 12 J. ADLER

Delmedigo’s connection with medical epistemology becomes obvious from an example he

uses to show that one thing can be known in various ways. Aside from the mathematical
example we have already seen, there is a medical example. The medical example, in fact, is
found within his main discussion of epistemology, whereas the mathematical example occurs
much later in the book. Delmedigo considers the proposition that gourds are beneficial for
those suffering from malaria. The rationalist physician demonstrates this proposition syllogisti-
cally. The empiricist physician either generalizes from his experience with malariacs, or relies
on what he has learned from his teacher
We may note in passing the similarity between this example and Spinoza’s use of the example
of the Rule of Three: in each case, there is (a) learning from a teacher, (b) experience built up from
a number of examples, and (c) knowledge based on reason. (In Spinoza’s example there is intui-
tive knowledge, which does not apply in the case of medicine.)
Later in ʼElim Delmedigo presents not just an example but a discussion directly devoted to
medical epistemology.66 Delmedigo generally sides with the rationalists, though he gives
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occasional credit to the empiricists.67

Medical empiricism and rationalism differ from their philosophical counterparts in that the
medical rationalists say one should use experience and reason, whereas the empiricists say that
one should rely on experience alone.68 The empiricists’ claim to rely on experience alone is
obviously a hyperbole, since it is hard to see how one could practice without reasoning at least
in some small measure, though it is not clear exactly what modes of reasoning they were
willing to allow.69 One recurring theme among the medical rationalists was that the mere collation
of examples could never yield reliable knowledge; rather it is the intellect, by its own action, that
draws a reliable generalization from the data available.70
We can tell that Spinoza, too, had medical epistemology in mind from a footnote to the TDIE,
where he writes, ‘Here I shall discuss experience somewhat more fully, and examine the Method
of proceeding of the Empirical Physicians71 and the new Philosophers.’72 Similarly, in the Short
Treatise, Spinoza gives an example of experiential knowledge from ‘the practice of those doctors
who, having found a certain remedy to be good in some cases, are accustomed to regard it as
something infallible’.73 The reference is, of course, to empirical doctors, since rationalists
would not generalize until they had investigated the circumstances which might affect the cure.74

66
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 111–13. This discussion is part of Delmedigo’s Commentary on the first two Aphorisms of Hippo-
crates, ʼElim, 109–16.
67
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 113.
68
Delmedigo, ʼElim, 112–13; Frede, ‘Introduction to Galen’, xxiii; Santorio, Methodi, 349, 381.
69
Frede, ‘Introduction to Galen’, xxiii.
70
Santorio, Methodi, 383–5.
71
Curley translates ‘Empiricists’, but the original has Empiricorum, which dictionaries of the time translate as ‘Empirical
Physicians’. See, e.g., Dictionarium Tetraglotton (Antwerp, 1567), s.vv. empirice, empiricus; F. Gouldman, A Copious
Dictionary (London, 1664), s. vv. empirice, empiricus; L. Meijer, L. Meijers Woordenschat (Amsterdam, 1688), 381,
s.v. empirici. I have found no sixteenth- or seventeenth-century dictionary that defined ‘empiricus’ as anything other
than a kind of physician.
72
Spinoza, TDIE §27, note = G 2:13.
73
Spinoza, KV Part 2, Ch. 3, §10 = G 1:58; my translation. Curley has ‘the practice of Doctors. When they have found a
certain remedy to be good in some cases, they usually regard it as something infallible.’ The original reads ‘de practyk van
de doctors, die zeeker remedie eenigemaalen goet gevonden hebbende, hetzelve als een onfeylbaar dink gewoon zijn te
houden’. I take the relative clause (‘die [. . .] hebbende’) as a restrictive clause. Obviously not all doctors, then or now,
are as rash in prescribing medications as those described in this sentence.
74
Santorio, Methodi, 379.
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 13

How does this help us with Spinoza? First, it suggests that experience means not ‘conscious
awareness’ or ‘sense experience’ but rather refers to the skill and conviction of a person of
great experience in a field of endeavor. In German, we could say that it is not Erlebnis but Erfah-
rung. English lacks a special word, but when we speak of an ‘experienced car mechanic’ (or
plumber or medical doctor), we are using the word in the sense in question. For an employer
seeking to hire an experienced car mechanic does not wish to hire someone who has simply
seen and heard many automobiles, but someone who has learned something by working on
many automobiles and observing others doing so. In particular, ‘experience’ is the kind of experi-
ence one gets without theorizing about one’s subject. The empirical physician does not know why
his cures work, nor indeed does he care. It would in fact be a distraction from his task to begin
theorizing about the nature of disease and cure. He simply proceeds on the basis of experience,
without reasoning about it or analyzing it. It is evidently this kind of experience that Spinoza is
referring to when he speaks of experience as ‘random’ (or ‘vague’; vaga)75 or as ‘not determined
by the intellect’,76 or when ‘the Mind [. . .] perceives things from the common order of nature, i.e.,
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so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous encounters with things’.77 For the empirical
physicians held precisely that one should not engage in (what they saw as) idle theorizing, but
should indeed let one’s medical practice be determined externally by one’s experience with
patients.
Secondly, it explains Spinoza’s (and Delmedigo’s) linking of experience and report as two
parts of a single category. An empirical physician learns on the basis of personal observation,
but since any one person’s experience is limited, one must rely on the reports of other doctors,
relating their experiences. Empirical physicians thus speak of the two sources of knowledge as
‘autopsy’78 and ‘history’.79
Thirdly, it suggests that the category of reason – the second-highest kind of knowledge –
involves reason and experience, not reason apart from experience. This conclusion has been
reached by others on other grounds.80 The essence of Spinoza’s rationalism is not that pure
reason is capable of understanding the world, but rather that the world as we perceive it is intel-
ligible – in fact, insofar as it is related to God, it is completely intelligible.81 This view of reason as
a source of knowledge may be what Spinoza is referring to in TDIE §19, when Spinoza describes
‘random experience’ as ‘experience that is not determined by the intellect’.82 Reason would then
involve experience that has been determined by the intellect – i.e., experience that has been ana-
lyzed in terms of the basic physical properties as described in the ‘Physical Digression’ after Pt. 2,

75
Spinoza, Ethics 2, Prop. 40, scholium 2 = G 2:122.
76
Spinoza, TDIE §19 = G 2:10.
77
Spinoza, Ethics 2 Prop. 29, scholium = G 2:114.
78
‘Autopsy’ not in the sense of post-mortem examination, but in the etymological sense: knowledge based on what one has
seen with one’s own eyes.
79
Frede, ‘Introduction to Galen’, xxvi–xxvii. Santorio, Methodi, 249. The connection between experience and report in
empirical medicine is made explicitly, though obliquely, by the Spinozistic writer Petrus van Balen. See his De Verbeter-
ing der Gedagten [excerpts], edited by M.J. van den Hoven (Baarn: Ambo, 1988), Part 1, ch. 1.
80
See, e.g., A. Gilead, ‘The Indispensability of the First Kind of Knowledge’, in Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human
Mind (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 209–21; I. Franck, ‘Spinoza’s Logic of Inquiry: Rationalist or Experientialist’, in The Philos-
ophy of Baruch Spinoza, edited by R. Kennington (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1980), 247–
72; R. Kennington, ‘Analytic and Synthetic Methods in Spinoza’s Ethics’, in Kennington, Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza,
293–318.
81
See my article ‘Spinoza’s Physical Philosophy’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 78:3 (1996), 253–76.
82
G 2:10.
 14 J. ADLER

Prop. 13 and referred to in Pt. 2, Prop. 38. (The same holds true, of course, of the psychic counter-
part of these physical terms.) The process is similar to that described by Delmedigo in regard to
gourds and fever.83
The upshot, according to the rationalist, is that the knowledge gained by the experience is
indeed a sort of knowledge, but it is not reliable: it will on occasion lead one astray.84 For
many ordinary purposes of life, this may be good enough.85 But as a guide to the good
life, such knowledge falls short, because ‘good is what we know certainly is a means by
which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set
before us.’86
With regard to the third kind of knowledge, or intuition, we can make only a suggestion. This
suggestion, of course, comes not from medical epistemology, but from Delmedigo’s general dis-
cussion. There is a question as to whether intuition, for Spinoza, is inferential or non-inferential.
In calling it ‘intuition’ Spinoza suggests that it is non-inferential. But he also describes this kind of
knowledge as ‘proceed[ing] from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of
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God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ and says that when we know intuitively
that 1:2::3:6 ‘we infer the fourth number from the ratio’,87 which suggests that it is inferential.
From Delmedigo we can derive the suggestion that this kind of knowledge may be inferential
or non-inferential; but if inferential, the inference must be of the kind that we can survey all at
once.
Beyond these suggestions about specific types of knowledge, we can draw a more general
observation. Medical epistemology was a practice-oriented epistemology. It asked not, ‘What
can doctors know?’ but rather, ‘What must doctors know so that they can cure the sick and main-
tain the health of the healthy? And how can they obtain this knowledge?’ Purely theoretical
knowledge, with no relation to practice, is irrelevant in this context. Galen, though vitally inter-
ested in epistemology, and even noted for his philosophical as well as medical works, notably
eschewed questions that one might call ‘purely philosophical’, though the philosophers of his
times (as of ours) considered such questions of great importance.88 A philosopher seeking a com-
prehensive theory of knowledge is bound to feel frustrated by the medical epistemologist’s more
limited goal. It seems that Spinoza’s epistemology, too, was a practice-oriented epistemology: a
wider one, of course, than that of physicians, but still an epistemology devoted to a pair of prac-
tical questions: ‘What must human beings know so as to free themselves from bondage and
achieve freedom? And how can they obtain this knowledge?’ There is, indeed, some evidence
that Spinoza viewed his project in this way: his philosophy is to the mind as medicine is to the
body. Leibniz, in a noted dated 1676, records a conversation with Spinoza’s friend, Ehrenfried
Walther von Tschirnhaus, in which Tschirnhaus relates the contents of an unpublished book of
Spinoza – obviously the Ethics. ‘Le livre sera,’ writes Leibniz, ‘de Deo, mente, beatitudine seu

83
This suggestion thus goes against Curley’s translation of the definition of random experience as found in the TDIE.
Curley translates, ‘There is the Perception we have from random experience, [which] has this name only because it
comes to use by chance, and we have no other experiment [experimentum] that opposes it.’ I would understand experi-
mentum as ‘experience’ rather than ‘experiment,’ in consonance with Ethics 2:17.
84
Delmedigo, 112–13.
85
‘[By random experience] I know almost all the things that are useful in life’ – TDIE § 20 = G2:11.
86
Spinoza, Ethics, Part 4, Preface = G 2:208 (emphasis added).
87
Spinoza, Ethics 2, Prop. 40, scholium 2.
88
Compare Frede’s remarks on Galen in Frede, ‘Introduction to Galen’, xvii–xviii.
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 15

perfecti hominis idea, de Medicina mentis, de Medicina corporis, etc.’89 Tschirnhaus (himself a
medical practitioner90) later published a pair of Spinozistic books entitled Medicina Mentis and
Medicina Corporis.91 This evidence is admittedly indirect, but it seems unlikely that Tschirnhaus
would have applied such a striking phrase as medicina mentis to Spinoza’s philosophy had not
Spinoza himself described it in such terms. Indeed, the phrase intellectûs emendatio that
occurs in the title of one of Spinoza’s books can be understood in this way.92 Jacques de
Basnage, author of the first modern history of the Jews, does indeed so understand it, referring
to Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect as the treatise on the Guérison de l’Entendement,
a phrase that in the English version appears as ‘Cure of the Understanding’.93 In that work,
Spinoza says his goal is ‘medendi intellectus, ipsumque [. . .] expurgandi’, i.e., in Curley’s trans-
lation, ‘healing the intellect, and purifying it’94 – both verbs have medical connotations, although
the translation makes that fact clear only for the first.95 (The comparison between healing the body
and healing the intellect is drawn at much greater length by the Spinozistic writer Petrus van
Balen.96) Seen in this light, it would not therefore be surprising if Spinoza’s epistemology
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showed the limitations that are to be expected in a practice-oriented epistemology. This point
in a way is obvious – but not so obvious as to prevent anthologists from excerpting Parts 1
and 2 from the Ethics and omitting Parts 3 through 5.
The physician’s model of a healthy body has its counterpart in Spinoza’s idea of a model or
exemplar of human nature as a standard at which we are to aim.97 The idea of such a model or
exemplar is found under various names in the TDIE, the Short Treatise, and the Ethics, where
Spinoza refers to it by the title of ‘the free person’.98 The state of a person burdened by passions
can be compared with this exemplar of a free person, and the remedy will become clear, as we see
in the Ethics on the first pages of Part 3, which indeed bears the subtitle, ‘On the Power of the
Intellect, or On Human Freedom’. We read, for example, that some of the passions that are

89
In Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s, 201. It is also of interest that Leibniz, in writing to Spinoza (Ep. 45),
addresses his letter to Monsieur Monsieur SPINOSA[,] Medecin tres celebre et philosophe tres profond (G 4:231; ortho-
graphy as in original).
90
See my article, ‘The Education of E.W. von Tschirnhaus’, Journal of Medical Biography, forthcoming.
91
E.W. von Tschirnhaus, Medicina Mentis (Amsterdam, 1687); E.W. von Tschirnhaus, Medicina Corporis (Amsterdam,
1686); both reprinted from the second edition of 1695 under the title Medicina Mentis et Corporis (Hildesheim: G. Olms,
1964). The edition dated 1687 actually appeared in 1686. See the translator’s preface to Tschirnhaus, Médecine de l’Esprit,
translated by J.-P. Wurtz (Paris: Éditions Ophrys and Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1980), 14–15. On
the comparison of philosophy and medicine, see Tschirnhaus, Médecine de l’Esprit, 19–20.
92
In the Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968) one finds, among the meanings of the verb emendo, the defi-
nition (3c): ‘To cure or relieve (a disease or its victims)’.
93
J. Basnage, Histoire des Juifs (The Hague, 1716), 9:1040; J. Basnage, The History of the Jews, translated by T. Taylor
(London, 1708), 743.
94
Spinoza, TDIE § 16 = G 2:9.
95
For the medical significance of the verb expurgo, see the Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v., def. 1b.
96
Van Balen, De Verbetering der Gedagten, Part 1, chapter 1–3, 1–21 of the first edition 54–63 of Van der Hoven’s
edition. Van der Hoven has some illuminating remarks on the history of the metaphor of philosophy as medicine of
the mind; see 26–27 of his Introduction.
97
David Savan, ‘Spinoza: Scientist and Theorist of Scientific Method’, in Spinoza and the Sciences, edited by Marjorie
Grene and Debra Nails (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), 95–123. David Savan (118–21) also discusses the role of models or
exemplars in Spinoza’s epistemology. As Savan points out, such a model is of use even in purely descriptive-theoretical
science. Nonetheless, it is far more at home in the practice-oriented science under discussion here.
98
Such a model or exemplar is discussed in Spinoza, TDIE §13 = G 2:8, Spinoza, KV Part 2, chapter 4, 7–8 = G 1:60–1,
and Spinoza, Ethics 4, Preface = G 2:208. This model or exemplar is evidently the same as the ‘free man’ discussed in
Spinoza, Ethics 4, Prop. 66, scholium, and Propositions 67–P73.
 16 J. ADLER

distinguished by the fact that they are accompanied by the idea of an external cause. The free
person, however, is led by reason, which is not subject to external causes. The remedy for this
kind of servitude is to detach the affect from the idea of the external cause and connect it with
another idea.99 As with the physician, the methods of division and resolution lead to a clear per-
ception of the change that is needed to achieve the proper state of the person. Indeed, as with the
physician, Spinoza applies the allopathic principle, contraria contrariis curantur (‘contraries are
cured by contraries’): ‘an affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to,
and stronger than, the affect to be restrained.’100
If even the second kind of knowledge is based on experience, in what sense can we still call
Spinoza (and Delmedigo) a rationalist? The rationalism of both Spinoza and the rationalist
physicians consists in the faith that logical methods will lead to certainty concerning the cure
for every ill. As Santorio says, his method allows the physician to eliminate all ‘contingency
and probability’.101 Spinoza’s rationalism is expressed in the conviction that ‘[t]here is no
affection of the Body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept.’102 The current
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methods of science and medicine, which support their conclusions with at best a high degree
of probability, would have been dismissed by both Santorio and Spinoza as insufficient. (Del-
medigo, though a rationalist, retained, as we have seen, sufficient skepticism – or perhaps it was
simply inconsistency – as to agree with the empirical physicians that the degree of certainty
claimed by the rationalists could not in fact be attained.) Both Santorio and Spinoza had
faith that by logical analysis of experience one could, at least in theory, come to know all
that one needs to know about the sufferer and the required cure, without having recourse to
merely probabilistic methods.103 In both cases, this faith rests on the belief that the analysis
will terminate in something simple and unanalyzable – that is, something that neither needs
nor allows of analysis.
Some of the considerations proposed above call for further investigation, but space and time
prevent us from entering into them further here. For the present let it suffice to have indicated
an important source of Spinoza’s epistemological doctrine, and a potentially significant resource
for understanding it.

SPINOZA, STUDENT OF GALILEO?

We have seen that Delmedigo learned from Galileo, and Spinoza from Delmedigo. But on the
basis of what we have seen so far, it would seem that what Spinoza learned from Delmedigo, Del-
medigo did not learn from Galileo. Is there then any indirect transmission: Is there anything that
Delmedigo learned from Galileo and passed on to Spinoza? We may answer in the affirmative. All
three were concerned with problems of the relation of scripture and science. We saw above how
Galileo reconciled his discoveries with scripture: he relied on the view that the purpose of scrip-
ture – what came to be called the scope of scripture – is to convey those teachings necessary for
salvation, not scientific truth (a view championed not much later by the Dutch theologian,

99
Spinoza, Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 2 = G2:534–6.
100
Spinoza, Ethics, Part 4, Prop. 7 = G 2:214.
101
Santorio, Methodi, bk. 6, ch. 4, cited in Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs, and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned
Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 301.
102
Spinoza, Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 4 = G 2:282.
103
Compare Maclean, Logic, Signs, and Nature, 167–70.
 JOSEPH SOLOMON DELMEDIGO 17

Christoph Wittich. Indeed, Klaus Scholder goes so far as to call Galileo ‘the first to formulate
104

[the] basic principles [. . .] of biblical criticism’.105 Delmedigo conveys a version of this doctrine
in the Crucible of Wisdom (quoted above), though it is hard to tell whether he really endorses it.
The version cited by Delmedigo is adapted to Judaism, as noted above, in that it says that the
purpose of scripture is to make possible the fulfillment of the commandments (mitzvot), rather
than teaching doctrines necessary for salvation. Although classic Jewish commentators might
agree that the primary purpose of scripture is for the sake of the mitzvot,106 they would hardly
agree that scripture’s teachings on other matters are not reliable.
Now, with one exception, the statement quoted by Delmedigo might be taken as a summary of
Chapter 13 of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP). Spinoza would agree that the
purpose of scripture is to inspire correct behavior – what he calls ‘obedience’ – but would
deny that the prophets had any great scientific knowledge.107 But Spinoza goes one step
beyond Delmedigo. Delmedigo never proposes abandoning the mitzvot. Spinoza not only pro-
poses abandoning the mitzvot; he actually abandons them.108 But even this abandonment, surpris-
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ingly, can be fit into a Jewish frame of reference. Spinoza argues that the mitzvot constituted the
civil law of the Israelite Kingdom; with the demise of that kingdom, they have become irrele-
vant.109 Keeping the mitzvot would be equivalent to a twenty-first-century citizen of the southern
United States observing the laws of the Confederate States of America, a nation that ceased to
exist in 1865. Surprisingly, this was a doctrine shared by some mainstream Jewish writers,
except that they held that Jews should continue to observe the mitzvot to stay in training, as it
were, so that when the Messiah comes and brings them back, they will not be ignorant of, and
untrained in, the observance of the mitzvot. (It would be as if our American Southerner kept
obeying the laws of the CSA, secure in his belief that the South would rise again.) Naḥmanides
is the name most frequently associated with this view.110 Spinoza, however, thinks that the very
nature of the Jewish religion makes a return to the Land of Israel essentially impossible.111 Thus
the transmission from Galileo, via Delmedigo, to Spinoza. Thus, for Spinoza, the rays of the Gali-
lean sun, focused through Delmedigo’s lens, cause Judaism to evaporate without leaving a trace.

University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

104
See C.H. Cosgrove, Appealing to Scripture in Moral Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 122–3.
105
K. Scholder, The Birth of Modern Critical Theology, translated by J. Bowden (London: SCM Press and Philadelphia:
Trinity Press International, 1990), 64 (word order changed).
106
See, for example, Rashi’s commentary on Genesis 1:1 in Metsudah Chumash/Rashi (New York: Ktav, 1991).
107
Spinoza, TTP, Chapter 13, G 3:167–8.
108
Spinoza, TTP, Chapter 5, G 69–76; J. Brun, La veritable religion des Hollandois [sic] (Amsterdam, 1765), 158–9.
109
Spinoza, TTP, Chapter 5, G 69–76.
110
See A. Ravitzky, ‘“Waymarks to Zion”: The History of an Idea’ (in Hebrew) in The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish
Thought, edited by M. Hallamish and A. Ravitzky (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1991), 1–39, esp. 8–13.
111
Spinoza, TTP, Chapter 3, G 57.