Larkins Vs NLRC

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Larkins vs NLRC

Facts:

On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional
ArbitrationBranch No. III of the NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga for illegal
dismissal andunderpayment of wages.

Charges were against petitioner


T/Sgt Aldora Larkins
who was a member of the UnitedStates Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the
dormitories of the Third AircraftGeneration Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base,
Pampanga.,
Lt. Col. Frankhauster
, and
Joselito Cunanan
, the new contractor (JAC Maintenance Services) employed for 3 AGS.

Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser


failed to answer the complaint and to appear at thehearings
. They, likewise,
failed to submit their position paper
, which the
Labor Arbiter
deemed a waiver on their part to do so. The case was therefore submitted for
decisionon the basis of private respondents'
position paper and supporting documents
whichtherefore on November 21, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
granting all theclaims of private respondents. He found both Lt. Col. Frankhauser
and petitioner
"guiltyof illegal dismissal"
and ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full backwages, or if that
is no longer possible, to pay private respondents' separation pay.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter
never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the
complaints, bothoriginal and amended, were ever served on her. In her
"Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal," petitioner argued that the attempts to
serve her with notices of hearing werenot in accordance with the provisions of the
R.P.

U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947.

Issue:

Petitioner's contention that the questioned resolutions are


null and void
becauserespondent Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain and
decide the case.Petitioner alleges that she never received nor was served,
any summons or copies of theoriginal and amended complaints, and therefore the
Labor Arbiter had no jurisdictionover her person under Article XIV of the R.P.

U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
For Reference:

R.P.

U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
". . . [N]o process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except with
thepermission of the commanding officer of such base; but should the commanding
officerrefuse to grant such permission he shall forthwith take the necessary
steps . . . to servesuch process, as the case may be, and to provide the attendance
of the server of suchprocess before the appropriate court in the Philippines or
procure such server to makethe necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such
service as the case may require."
Ruling:
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case as summonses and other
processesissued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States
Armed Forcespersonnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served
therein only with thepermission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his
permission, he shouldinstead designate another person to serve the process, and
obtain the server's affidavitfor filing with the appropriate court. Respondent Labor
Arbiter did not follow
saidprocedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt. Col. Frankhauser and not
the BaseCommander.

Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was ever issued
andserved on her. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to
her
BUT
as contended notices of hearing are not summonses. The provisions and
prevailing jurisprudence in Civil Procedure may be applied by analogy to NLRC
proceedings(Revised Rules of the NLRC, Rule I, Sec. 3). It is basic that the Labor
Arbiter cannotacquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the
latter being servedwith summons (
cf.

Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals


, 206 SCRA 244 [1992];
FilmercoCommercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
, 149 SCRA 193 [1987]). In theabsence of service of summons or a valid waiver
thereof, the hearings and judgmentrendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and
void.

Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in


the oralargument before the said body. This, however, does not constitute a waiver
of the lackof summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction
of the LaborArbiter. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack
of jurisdiction, butthese grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the
issue of the lack of jurisdiction. In effect, petitioner set forth only one issue and
that is the absence of jurisdiction over her person. If an appearance before the
NLRC is precisely to questionthe jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of
the defendant, then thisappearance is not equivalent to service of summons (
De los Santos v. Montera
, 221SCRA 15 [1993]).

Be that as it may, on the assumption that petitioner validly waived service of


summonson her, still the case could not prosper. There is no allegation from the
pleadings filedthat Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner were being sued in their
personal capacities fortortious acts (
United States of America v. Guinto
, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). However,private respondents named 3 AGS as one of
the respondents in their complaint.

Indeed, assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United States
Government andthe monetary claims of private respondents proved, such awards
will have to besatisfied not by Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner in their personal
capacities, but bythe United States government (
Sandres v. Veridiano II
, 162 SCRA 88 [1988
Shauf v. CA (consti1)
Shauf v. CA
Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi,
respondents

Second Division
Doctrine: official v. personal capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: November 27, 1990
Ponente: Justice Regalado

Facts:

 Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the
US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office
at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
 By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal
employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian
personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason
of her nationality and sex.
 Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser
for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically
selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but
will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that
time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment
was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the
Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the
complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint
decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
 Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service
Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
 RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages
+ 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
 Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be
collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that
they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their
official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They
claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the
exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust
all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision.
According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
 Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is
not a suit against the US government which would require consent.
 Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule
allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is
applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
 Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

Held:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are
hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio:

 They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
 It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
 Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights
have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the
personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."The rationale for
this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice

 In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular
or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents
committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.
 There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q.
Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her
sex, color and origin.
 She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas,
Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter
hours in human behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human
behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service
eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base
at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same
position in 1976.
 In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not
even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO
which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

 Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article
II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race, or creed..
 There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing
the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida
Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this,
they should be held accountable

 Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her
remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian
employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone
remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
 SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a
matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will
best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking
redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and
inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score.

Republic vs. Sandoval (Consti1)


(Two petitions consolidated.)

En Banc

Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993

Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:

 The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre
(background: Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition,
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31
and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which
dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines
 May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in
their personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in
financial responsibility of the government
 Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
 In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what
they called "genuine agrarian reform"
 The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their
problems and demands such as:
 giving lands for free to farmers
 zero retention of lands by landlords
 stop amortizations of land payments
 Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on
January 15, 1987
 On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
 Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention
of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting
 Tension mounted the next day
 The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and
prevented the employees from going inside their offices
 On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo,
Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands
 On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng
Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)
 Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily
infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending
 Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
 The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
 From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place;
"pandemonium broke loose"
 After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)
 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the
group of marchers
 Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor
physical injuries
 The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February
27, 1987 as follows
 The march did not have any permit
 The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law
 The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian
attire (prohibited by law)
 There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
 The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
 It is not clear who started the firing
 The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse
the crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because:
 there was no order to use them
 they were incorrectly prepositioned
 they were out of range of the marchers
 The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified,
uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the
marchers
 The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the
Western Police District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be
prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
 Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
 It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally
without permit and for inciting sedition
 Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their
failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal
operations in Mendiola:
 Gen. Ramon E. Montaño
 Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
 Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
 Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
 Col. Cezar Nazareno
 Maj. Filemon Gasmin
 Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims
to be compensated by the government
 It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for
damages from the government
 No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
 On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the
Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in
the Mendiola incident
 Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent
 Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
 Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver
 Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
Issues:

1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or
not this is a suit against the State with its consent)
 Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for
the government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by
President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
Holding:

1. No.
 This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
2. No.
Ratio:

1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its
consent
 The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the State
 The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only
as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State immediately
 President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are
not tantamount to a waiver by the State
2. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
1. When the Republic is sued by name;
2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government
 Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their
official functions during the incident, their functions ceased to be official the
moment they exceeded their authority
 There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms.
 Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired
at the crowd instead

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