Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958

JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner,

Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having
published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and
influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and
determination before said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957 and the supplementary petition
thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc., praying for reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission of May 4
and 13, 1957, awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot boxes to the National Shipyards & Steel
Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and the respective answers of the latter two corporations to said petitions; and which
article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its
Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections."

Petitioner, answering summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared and filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:

a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in
the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same, for should Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 180, vesting the Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for in Rule of the Court under the same procedure
and with the same penalties provided therein," be applied to the case at hand, said provision would be unconstitutional.

b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, the same cannot be applied to the instant case, where
the Commission is exercising a purely administrative function for purchasing ballot boxes.

c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power cannot apply to the present case because the
matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a closed case when the article in question was published.

d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending, the article in question was a fair report because it
could be assumed that the news report of the respondent was based on the motion for reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel
where there was an allegation of fraud, etc.

The Commission, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days within which to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to investigate and punish
petitioner for contempt in connection with the alleged publication. Hence the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper
negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic
Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at
P17.64, P14.00, and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on
Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the
latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot
boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957.

Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of May 13, 1957. The
first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May 16, 1957.
The second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20, 1957, and
because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions, the Commission resolved to
conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, after
these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the
ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4, 1957, the Commission issued its resolution
denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday
Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation.

The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of
an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said
Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and undermine the function of the
Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our Constitution to take charge of the
enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of free,
orderly, and honest elections (Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General, 85
Phil., 101; 47 Off. Gaz. 2356). Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it "shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials"
(Section 2, Article X). The Revised Election Code supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these
powers are those embodied in Section 5 thereof which, for ready reference, we quote:

SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. — The Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have the power to
summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise take
testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and delegate such power to any officer. Any controversy submitted
to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted from the time the
corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have the
power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein.

Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt of the
Commission.

Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ
of certiorari accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.

It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections.
And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the
same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a
court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The
Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies
that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what question may come within this category, neither the
Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving the
right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places,
and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought it
for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between
a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action
by the Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.

Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election which might not have been free, orderly and honest for
such matter devolves upon other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil., 148; 47 Off.
Gaz. 2851); neither does it have the power to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon the
courts or the electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the votes before the proclamation of
election even if there are discrepancies in the election returns for it is a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on
Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does it have the power to order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a candidate had been
proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently this Court has held that the Commission
has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors
(Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil., 136).

On the other hand, it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs.
Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off. Gaz. 3863); to annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers (Mintu vs.
Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and to investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of
canvassers (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722). And as to what are the ministerial duties which the Commission on
Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of elections, the following resume made by the Commission itself in a
controversy which was submitted to it for determination is very enlightening:
 In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the first duty of the Commission is to set
in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms
and ballots, appointments of members of the boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling places
to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery in order that
the people who are legally qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able to cast their votes to express their sovereign
will. It is incumbent upon the Commission to see that all these preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest elections.
All provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations relative to these processes preparatory for election day. It is
incumbent upon the Commission on Elections to see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly and in an
orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission or its authorized representatives, in establishing precincts or designating
polling places, must act freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also essential that the printing of election forms and the
purchase of election supplies and their distribution are done freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further essential
that the political parties or their duly authorized representatives who are entitled to be represented in the boards of inspectors
must have the freedom to choose the person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the country. It is further
essential that once organized, the boards of inspectors shall be given all the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in
accordance with law freely, honestly and in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words, it is the duty of the
Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill
their duties without any pressure, influence and interference from any private person or public official. All these preparatory
steps are administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of the Commission to
resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any official in these preparatory steps are within the
exclusive power of the Commission to correct. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for investigation. Of these
preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list of voters is the matter involved in this case, which to our mind is
completely an administrative matter. (Decision of the Commission on Elections, October 28, 1951, In Re Petition of Angel
Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196)1

Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes
ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appoinments of members of the board of
inspectors, appointment of precincts and designation of polling preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to as to put in readiness on
election day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes
to be used in the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the
elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case before us. It stems from the ministerial act of the
Commission in requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections and in so proceeding it provoked a
dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job.

Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely
refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections
ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently,
in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46
Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute
of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making
effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts
vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to
submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the
charge under consideration.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the case set forth in its resolution of
June 20, 1957, with pronouncement as to costs.

The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. 699-CFI February 28, 1980

DANIEL GALANGI, Complainant, vs. HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, District Judge, Court of First Instance of
Lagawe, Ifugao, Respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

This is an administrative case filed by complainant Daniel Galangi against District Judge Francisco Men Abad of the
Court of First Instance of Ifugao for gross ignorance of the law, unwarranted detention and violation of his
constitutional rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts of the case are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

Sometime in May, 1973, Mayor Julian Dulawan of Kiangan, Ifugao filed Adm. Case No. 5 against Vice-Mayor Daniel
Galangi, complainant herein, for dishonesty, misconduct in office and oppression before the Provincial Board of Ifugao
(Annex "B" of the Complaint, pp. 10-13, Rollo). The said Provincial Board composed of Governor G. Lumauig Board
Members D. Pamorca and N. Hangdaan convened on February 26, 1974 to hear the administrative complaint. When
Galangi was called upon to subscribe to an oath before the commencement of the formal investigation, he steadfastly
refused alleging that he had not received a copy of the charges filed against him (Exh. "7"-"7-C"). At the request of
Galangi, the Board gave him up to March 8, 1974 to submit his written explanation to the charges (Exh. "7-B").
However, Galangi failed to appear or submit his written explanation or answer to the charges on March 8,
1974.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thereafter or on March 12, 1974, the Provincial Board convened and issued Resolution No. 16 petitioning the proper
court of justice to cite Galangi for contempt and for the Provincial Fiscal of Lagawe to file the necessary contempt
proceedings (p. 8, Rollo). Upon the filing with the court of first instance of Ifugao (p. 5, Rollo) by Provincial Fiscal
Macli-ing of the petition to declare the complainant in contempt, herein respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad,
presiding over the court, after a summary hearing, issued an Order, dated March 13,1974 (Annex "B", p. 13, Rollo),
declaring Galangi in direct contempt of the Provincial Board in session and imposed upon him the penalty of
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days as well as the Order for his arrest (Annex "C", P. 10, Roll•).
Consequently, Vice-Mayor Galangi was detained on March 22, 1974 (Annex "D", p. 15, Rollo) On the same date,
complainant requested respondent Judge for a copy of the compt of the Provincial Board of Ifugao (Annex "E", p. 16,
Rollo) and on March 27, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Contempt (Annex "F", pp. 17-20, Rollo)
praying that he be released provisionally upon posting of a bail bond, which respondent judge denied in an order
dated March 28,1974 (Annex "G", p. 21-22, Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 28, 1974, complainant Galangi filed an Urgent Motion for Bail (Exh. "H", p. 23, Rollo) which respondent
judge likewise denied in an order on the same day (Annex 1 p. 24, Rollo) for lack of legal basis stating that "... In
view of the fact that the nature of the offense and the penalty imposed upon him is that of direct contempt and
especially because he has almost served two thirds (2/3) of his sentence, the same is not bailable." chanrobles virtual
law library

The record shows that complainant Galangi was cited in respondent's court for alleged disrespect and in disobedience
of the Order of the Provincial Board of Ifugao which is a duly constituted body to hear and decide administrative cases
against a local government official but it may be noted without going into the merits of the charge that he was within
his rights in demanding that he be furnished a copy of the charges against him. Assuming arguendo that he had
committed a contumacious act, the same, however, was not committed "in the presence of or so near a court or judge
as to obstract or interrupt the proceedings before the same ..." (Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court), Hence, the
charge against complainant was an indirect contempt and not direct contempt as found by respondent judge. The
correct proceeding should have been for indirect contempt and the Petitioner's right to be informed of the charges
against him as well as his right to be heard should have been observed in consonance with Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court which reads: chanrobles virtual law library
Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for contempt:

xxx xxx xxx

Corollary to the aforequoted provisions is Section 4 of the same rule which provides that indirect contempt may be
punished when committed against an administrative officer or any non-judicial person, committee or other body, to
wit: chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 4. Charge; where to be filed. - Where the contempt, under the preceding section, has been committed at a
superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such superior court. Where
such contempt has been committed against an inferior court or judge, the charge may be filed with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city in which the inferior court is sitting, but the proceedings may also be instituted in such
inferior court subject to appeal to the Court of First Instance of such province or city in the same manner as is
provided in section 2 of this rule. And where a contempt punishable under these rules has been committed against an
administrative officer or any non-judicial person committee or other body, the charge may be filed with the Court of
First Instance of the province or city in which the contempt has been committed. (Emphasis supplied).

Verily, respondent judge erred in not assessing the fact that a judo may summarily declare a person in direct
contempt only when the person committed the act or acts constituting the said offense, in the presence of or near a
court or judge, who may have actually witnessed or perceived the commission of the punishable act or acts, such that
there is indeed no need for another court proceeding to prove that the acts were actually committed. Logic dictates
that when the judge himself witnesses the very act constituting direct contempt, he may summarily declare the culprit
in direct contempt and punish him accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the instant case, the contumacious act of herein petitioner was committed before the Provincial Board of Ifugao,
which was, indeed, beyond the perception of respondent judge. Under such circumstances, the charge against
complainant merely constituted indirect contempt which should be heard first as provided for in Section 3 of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. The investigator, then Court of Appeals Justice Mariano Agcaoili, correctly held in his Report
that: chanrobles virtual law library

... Considering that herein petitioner refused to be sworn to before the Provincial Board and considering that the
aforesaid Rule punishes for direct contempt a person who refuses to be sworn to when lawfully required to do so,
respondent Judge believed that petitioner should be summarily punished for direct contempt. However, respondent
Judge had erred in not assessing the fact that a Judge may summarily declare a person in direct contempt only when
the person committed the acts constituting the said offense, before the presence of or near the Judge, who may have
actually witnessed or perceived the commission of the punishable acts, such that there is indeed no need for another
court proceeding to prove that the acts were actually committed. Logic dictates that when the judge himself witnesses
the very act constituting direct contempt, he need not conduct a hearing to assess and resolve the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the instant case, however, the contumacious act of herein petitioner was committed before the Provincial Board,
which was, indeed, beyond the perception of respondent Judge. Consequently, the act committed by Vice-Mayor
Galangi was indirect contempt, which should be heard as provided for in Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

The carelessness and lack of circumspection on respondent's part, to say the least, in peremptorily sentencing
complainant to ten (10) days imprisonment without hearing and due process of law and in refusing to grant him bail
to enable him to elevate the matter to the higher courts on the grossly erroneous ground that complainant "has
almost served two-thirds (2/3) of his sentence (and) the same is not bailable warrant the imposition of a penalty on
respondent as a corrective measure, so that he and others may be properly warned about carelessness in the
application of the proper law and undue severity in denying a citizen's motion for bail and an opportunity to seek
recourse from the higher courts against the summary penalty of imprisonment imposed by respondent. After all, if
respondent were right in his view that the complainant had been guilty of direct contempt and was not entitled to any
hearing, he would be sustained by the higher court and the penalty imposed by him would stand and would have to
be discharged by complainant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Court imposes upon respondent a fine equivalent to his actual salary for one (1) month payable
within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963

QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM
PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD, Respondent-
Appellee.

Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. Oben for petitioners-appellants.
Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:chanrobles virtual law library

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037) denying the
petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy,
Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of
the case, briefly stated, are as follows:.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the
Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license
from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners,
Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the
Philippine and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank,
and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of
U.S. dollars.1chanrobles virtual law library

Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the
presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and cash bond for
P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented against
them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute legal ground for
deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion
to dismiss having been denied by order of the Board of February 9, 1953, petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a
petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition was given due course in our resolution of July 7, 1953,
but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was docketed in the lower
court as Special Proceeding No. 20037.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges No. R-
425 against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among others, that
the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the
authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted
bribery of a public official, he was found in the same decision of the trial court that he did actually offer money to an
officer of the United States Air Force in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the
investigation of the purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the delegation by
the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether
the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court,
likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's
temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the
amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal.
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail, but before the charges
filed against them were actually investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the question of jurisdiction of the
Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First Instance, and now before us. Petitioners-
appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation
Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other
words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was
empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did
not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone,
because in its Section 52, it provides:.

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the
Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act
Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No.
613).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. - A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall
not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon
which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the
right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses."

While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the President the
authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under
Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation
proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien-which provision
was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the
recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the,
exercise of this power by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions. 2chanrobles virtual
law library

Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two
ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport, still he
may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other, as it
would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an unstated or undefined
ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive. This contention is not without merit,
considering that whenever the legislature believes a certain act or conduct to be a just cause for deportation, it
invariably enacts a law to that effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been added to those
originally contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as justifying deportation of an alien, as well as other
laws which provide deportation as part of the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding
or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations - an economic sabotage - which is a
ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are
shown to have committed the act charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a
reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said
Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The first executive order on the subject was that of Governor
General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934), constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners,
to conduct investigations and thereafter make recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29,
1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be
undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and
regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding recommendation. 3 Since then, the Deportation Board has
been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e.,
whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the
Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated to the respondent
Deportation Board.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No. 613 wherein
the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority, among others, to make arrests, fails to provide
the President with like specific power to be exercised in connection with such investigation. It must be for this reason
that President Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947,
providing -

For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board created under
Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4, 1947, and facilitating the execution of the order of deportation whenever
the President decides the case against the respondent. I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order that all respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such conditions as he may prescribe. .

xxx xxx xxx

Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien under
investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his
Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the
Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under
detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such
conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the
President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. But the Solicitor
General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry
into effect the power of deportation granted him, such as the authority to order the arrest of the foreigner charged as
undesirable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is
guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.

3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights,
Philippine Constitution).

As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et
al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is
placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people
and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable
innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon
which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement - "to be determined by the judge" - is not found in
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify
who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be
authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the
express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered
by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading
to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled
to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an
administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a
final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as
then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for
example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of
contempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power
of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the
investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of
President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was
authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this
proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide - on whether or not the President himself can order the
arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued.
We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding without deciding that the President can personally
order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation
Board.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of
discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the
liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe
the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent
upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the
same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon
whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official
functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of
power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve
the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be
viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then
guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the
people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky
foundation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation Board (G.R.
No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was not squarely raised in that
proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's proposition that the President had no inherent power to
deport and that the charges filed against him did not constitute ground for deportation.
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation
Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of
arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such
order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No
costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21624 February 27, 1968

SEGUNDO SANTOS, petitioner,

Castro M. Baltazar for petitioner.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Segundo Santos was, for a number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4) of the Department of Labor.
His monthly pay was P259 per month, or P3,108 per annum. On August 24, 1960, he was extended an appointment (promotion) as
Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office No. 3, Manila) with compensation per annum of P3,493, vice Juan Mendoza, Jr., resigned. This
appointment, effective September 1, 1960, was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962, and released to the
Department of Labor on May 25, 1962.

In June of 1962, respondent Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco, one of the respondents, to the same position of
Labor Conciliator II. 1

Petitioner's demand for the revocation of respondent Tionco's appointment and payment to him (Santos) of salary differentials
was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor.

From the foregoing events stemmed the present petition for mandamus filed on August 20, 1962 three days before Santos
actually retired from the service which was an August 23, 1962. 2 The petition prays, inter alia, that respondents be commanded to
nullify the appointment of Tiongco, and to uphold as legal and existing petitioner's appointment, as Labor Conciliator II, from September
1, 1960; and that the salary differentials aforesaid be paid petitioner. Respondents seasonably answered the petition.

Before the case could be tried on the merits that is, on February 14, 1963, Santos died. A motion to substitute the "Estate of
Segundo Santos, deceased." represented by Rodolfo Santos, one of the heirs, was filed. This triggered a move on respondents' part to
seek dismissal of the case.

The court, on April 10, 1963, dismissed the petition without costs. Hence, this appeal on purely questions of law.

1. The threshold question is this: May the Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be substituted in place of petitioner herein?

Public office is a public trust. 3 It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto. In this sense, it is not property which
passes to his heirs. None of the heirs may replace him in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased
Segundo Santos may not press Santos' claim that he be allowed to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II. Actio personalis
moritur cum persona.

But jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction continues until the termination of the suit. It
is true that what is left is a money claim for salary differentials. But death will not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim — it subsists.
Resolution of this question depends upon the right of Segundo Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II.

We rule that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may be substituted for him in the present proceedings. We do so
now.1äwphï1.ñët

2. We go to the merits.

Stripped of unnecessary details, the facts are: On August 24, 1960, petitioner, a second grade eligible, was appointed Labor
Conciliator II at an annual compensation of P3,493 effective September 1, 1960. As far as salary is concerned, no law, rule or
regulation has been violated. Because, an annual pay of P3,493 is well within the range provided for second grade civil service
eligibles. 4
 Respondents challenge the legality of petitioner's appointment as Labor Conciliator II. They say that such appointment is within
the prohibition set forth in the memorandum circular of the Civil Service Commission dated February 16, 1961, thus: "Employees should
not be assigned or promoted to positions the initial rate of the salary allocation of which exceed the maximum allowable for their
eligibility." Respondents likewise aver that it was because of this circular, that the appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was
recalled on September 7, 1961. The circular was not violated.

And the withdrawal of petitioner's appointment is not a proven fact. What the record clearly discloses is that the original
appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was not taken out of the Civil Service Commission; it was approved by the
Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962 and released to the Secretary of Labor on May 25, 1962.

More important now is that the defense of recall has been abandoned by respondents. The case was ready for trial below. They
did not go to trial. Instead, they thought it advantageous to them — upon petitioner's death — to submit their case on their motion to
dismissed solely on legal grounds, namely, that the death of petitioner extinguished the controversy, and that the remaining claim for
damages is ancillary to mandamus and is also abated by death.

The money claim here involved, however, descended to Santos' heirs. And, as we have earlier in this opinion stated, his Estate
may prosecute that claim to its conclusion.

It will not be in harmony with our sense of justice to return this case to the court below — at this stage — just to allow
respondents to prove their defense of recall of petitioner's appointment.

Respondents had a choice: To go to trial on the merits upon the issues raised in their answer; or, seek to overthrow petitioner's
case on legal issues. They did elect the latter. They cannot be permitted once again to return to the lower court for a trial on the
merits. 5 Suitors should not normally be allowed to gamble with court proceedings in the hope of obtaining beneficial results. It is unfair
that this case should, on respondents' choice, be made to bounce from the lower court to this Court, and back to the lower court and
perhaps only to be appealed once again to an appellate court. The ensuing delay, increased cost of litigation, and trouble and anxiety
and harassment to be caused to the adverse party, the wastage of the courts' time — these are reasons potent enough to support this
view.

At all events, petitioner's right to salary differentials and the duty to pay him are both clear. Civil Service approval completed
petitioner's appointment, 6 clinched the case for him.

3. The rest is a question of mathematical computation. Petitioner's pay as Labor Conciliator I was at the rate of P259 per month
or P3,108 per annum. His increased compensation as Labor Conciliator II from September 1, 1960, to August 23, 1962, the date of his
retirement, is at the late of P3,493 per annum, specified in his promotional appointment, and reiterated in the 5th indorsement of the
Commissioner of Civil Service to the Secretary of Labor dated May 22, 1962. He is entitled only to the pay set forth in his appointment,
and no more — absent a legal adjustment thereof. There is no such adjustment here. Petitioner's salary differentials during the period
covered amounts to P761.68. And this should be paid to his Estate.

Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to reverse the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 10, 1963, and
to direct the Secretary of Labor and the corresponding Cashier to pay the Estate of the deceased petitioner Segundo Santos the sum of
P761.68.

No costs. So ordered.