Republic of The Philippines Sandiganbayan Quezon City: Et At

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SANDIGANBAYAN
QUEZON CITY
REPUBLIC SB-14-CVL-0002
PHILIPPINES, For: Forfeiture of Properties
Under R. A. No. 1379
HERNANDO B. PEREZ, et at, CABOTAJE-TANG, PJ

Respondents. QUIROZ,lJ:
ESTOESTA,2J:
ECONG,3J: and
MIRANDA,4 J:
Promulgated
<J~y rq',?Dtf,
For resolution are the following:

1. Respondents Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez
and Ramon Antonio C. Arceo, Jr.'S5 Motion for Issuance of
Resolution Nunc Pro Tunc dated April 28, 2016y-:'
1 Signatory to the Resolution promulgated on July 8, 2015 per Administrative Order No. 099-2015 dated
March 18, 2015
2 Designated as Special Member of a Special Division of Five Justices in the Third Division pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 4-C-2016 dated March 7, 2016
3 Designated as Special Member of a Special Division of Five Justices in the Third Division pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 4-C-2016 dated March 7, 2016
4 Designated as Special Member of the Special Third Division, in lieu of Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo
who is temporarily incapacitated, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 340-2016 dated Decembe
2016
5 hereinafter respondents Perez, et 01.
6 pp. 220-232, Vol. II, Record
II?J
RESOLUTION
Republic vs. Perez, et at.
SB-14-CYL-0002
2. Respondents Perez, et al.'s Motion to Reconsider

Resolution dated April 18, 2016 Denying the Motion to Dismiss
of Respondent Escaler dated May 3,2016;7
3. Respondent Ernest De Leon Escaler's Motion for
Reconsiderdtion (of the Resolution promulgated on April 18,
2016) dated May 3,2016;8 and
4. Respondents Perez, et al.'s Urgent Manifestation and
Motion dated July 18, 2016.9
THE MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF RESOLUTION

NUNC PRO TUNC
Respondents Perez, et al. pray that the Court issue a

resolution nunc pro tunc allegedly to clarify the dispositive
portion of the Court's Resolution promulgated on April 18,
2016, which granted their motion for reconsideration. They
argue that in their said motion for reconsideration, they
explicitly prayed that the Court set aside its Resolution dated
July 8, 2015, ordering the remand of the case to the Office of
the Ombudsman for the conduct of the necessary proceedings,
and in lieu thereof render a new one ordering the dismissal of
the petition. They claim that in granting their motion for
reconsideration, the Court discussed their argument that the
remand of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman violates
their right to due process and speedy disposition of their cases
and that there is nothing for the Ombudsman to approve or
disapprove to warrant a remand. Thus, they argue that the
Court should have also dismissed the case. However, the
dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution merely states
that the parties' respective motions for reconsideration are
"granted." Thus, respondents Perez, et al. contend that a
resolution nunc pro tunc "is imperative to make the dispositive
portion of the resolution as far as the respondents-movants
are concerned could be placed in proper form and in
operational terms so that the resolution be made to speak the
t~th and articulate what reasonably could be implici~
. 7 pp. 269-285, Record, Vol. II / .
8 pp. 233-264, id
9 pp. 418-424, id
RESOLUTION
Republic vs. Perez, et al.
SB-14-CYL-0002
assumed." Otherwise, they contend that the grant of their

motion for reconsideration would have absolutely no meaning.
In addition to the motion for the issuance of a resolution

nunc pro tunc, respondents Perez, et al. move for a
reconsideration of the Court's Resolution promulgated on April
18, 2016, which denied respondent Escaler's motion to
dismiss. 10 They advance the following grounds in support
thereof:
(1) the complaint for forfeiture is jurisdictionally
defective allegedly because there was no valid previous inquiry
similar to a preliminary investigation that was conducted prior
to the commencement of the petition in court, and that they
were not furnished copies of the order of the Ombudsman
constituting a special panel of reviewers and the memorandum
prepared by the said special panel of reviewers recommending
the institution of this case;
(2) the period of nine [9]years that the case pended with
the Office of the Ombudsman constitutes inordinate delay
warranting the dismissal of the case;
(3) the filing of the petition is barred by the dismissal of
the case entitled "People vs. Sandiganbayan, et aZ. ,"11 which
is a companion case; and
(4) the petitioner engages in forum shopping because it
previously filed a forfeiture case against spouses Hernando
and Rosario Perez which was dismissed by the Office of the
Ombudsman in January 22, 2016.
Respondent Escaler also filed a motion

reconsideration of the same Resolution and "demand[ed]
dismissal of this unfounded, if not malicious petition."
arguestha~
10 Respondents Perez, et a/. adopted respondent Escaler's motion to dismiss.

11 712 SeRA 359 (2013) .
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
~
(1) the rights to due process and speedy disposition of
cases are human rights while the right of the State to recover
ill-gotten properties is a property right; he concludes that
human right is imprescriptible and should take precedence
over property right;
(2) R. A. No. 1379, which governs the procedure in

initiating a petition for forfeiture, requires the filing of a
complaint by a taxpayer which shall be subjected to a previous
inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation before a petition
for forfeiture can be filed; that this complaint by a taxpayer is
the complaint referred to by the Constitution and R. A. No.
6770 which should be acted upon promptly by the
OmbudsmaJ;l and which the Constitution requires to be
speedily acted upon. It does not refer to the petition for
forfeiture or Information filed in Court; thus, the
determination of the question of delay based on the date of
filing of the petition before the court has no legal basis;
(3) this case should be dismissed on the ground of

violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case; the
Court's declaration that "such delay actually worked to their
advantage because they hold onto this very day the alleged ill-
gotten wealth as no action was filed by the government to
recover it during the said interregnum" is tantamount to a pre-
judgment of this case because it presumes that the property in
question is ill-gotten; that the reliance by the Court on Garcia
vs. Executive Secretary12 insofar as the issue of delay is
concerned is erroneous;
(4) R. A. No. 1379 covers only public officers and

employees; hence, the petition does not state a cause of action
against him because he is a private individual; and
(5) the Court erred in concluding that he is deemed to

have hypothetically admitted the allegations in the petition
when he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action because the admission is limited only to all
material and relevant fa~
~
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002 •
x----------------- ------ -------------------- --- --x
In the same motion for reconsideration, respondent

Escaler insists that petitioner has not complied with the
following alleged conditions precedent to the filing of the
present petition: (1) complaint for forfeiture filed by a taxpayer;
(2) conduct of inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation; (3)
the Joint Resolution dated November 6, 2006 issued by the
Office of the Ombudsman was not attached to the petition
upon filing with the Court as well as the belated submission of
the Memorandum dated January 28, 2013; and (4)
certification issued by the Officeof the Ombudsman pursuant
to Section 2 of R. A. No. 1379.
In its consolidated comment/ opposition, the petitioner

argues that respondents Perez, et al.'s motion for the issuance
of a resolution nunc pro tunc is a mere superfluity and
unnecessary. According to the petitioner, the dispositive
portion of the assailed Resolution is clear and obvious that
what was reconsidered was the Court's order to remand the
case to the Office of the Ombudsman as embodied in its
Resolution promulgated on July 8, 2015. It argues that the
fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution
likewise denied respondent Escaler's motion to dismiss clearly
shows that the Court found the petition meritorious.
Insofar as the two (2) motions for reconsideration are
concerned, the petitioner claims that "respondents merely
reiterated their arguments in their previous pleading but they
did not introduce any new significant issue that will call for
the reversal of the Resolution." It contends that the cases
cited by the respondents to supposedly support their claim of
inordinate delay in the filing of the petition involved different
factual milieu; hence, the respondents erred in relYingon the
said cases. It points out that the memorandum review of the
special panel of reviewers did not introduce new factual issues
and new pieces of evidence. It merely reiterated the
recommendation of the panel of prosecutors that conducted
the preliminary investigation of this case in the Joint
Resolution dated November 6, 2006. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said Joint Resolution which
recommended, among others, the filing of the £ feit~
RESOLUTION
Republic vs. Perez, etal.
SB-14-CVL-0002
proceedings under R. A. No. 1379 against the respondents.

Thus, it maintains that contrary to respondents' claim, they
were duly accorded their right to due process.13
Respondents Perez, et al. filed a reply to the petitioner's
opposition insisting that there is a need to clarify the fallo of
the assailed resolution. According to them, their motion for
reconsideration prays not only for a reconsideration of the
Court's resolution remanding the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman but for the dismissal of the case. However, the
dispositive portion ofthe assailed Resolution merely "granted"
their motions for reconsideration without any qualification.
They argue that mere reiteration of the issues already passed
upon by the Court does not automatically make the motion for
reconsideration pro forma. They also argue that the petitioner
admits that the present case is an offshoot of the
circumstances involved in the robbery case which was ordered
dismissed by this Court. Since the robbery case was already
dismissed, they conclude that the petitioner is now barred
from filing the present petition on the ground of
conclusiveness ofjudgment. 14
The petitioner then filed a rejoinder insisting that the
present forfeiture case is an independent civil action; that the
civil liability~for forfeiture does not arise from the commission
of the criminal offense as held by the Supreme Court in Garcia
vs. Sandiganbayan;15 and, that the cause of action in this
forfeiture case is entirely different from the robbery and other
criminal cases that were dismissed.16
Respondents Perez, et al., filed a reply (should be sur-
rejoinder) to the above rejoinder. It maintains that the
petitioner's admission in its comment that this forfeiture case
is an offshoot of the circumstances involved in the criminal
cases, which were ordered dismissed by the Court, necessarily
shows that the civil liability for forfeiture arises from the said
criminal offense. They also take issue with the petitioner's
argument in its comment/ opposition that a forfeiture case is
not affected"byprescription, laches and estoppel. According to
them, such r:u1eis subject to exception such as when the~
13 pp. 310- ; Record, Vol. II

14 pp. -328, Record, Vol. II
15 3 SeRA 348 (2009)
16 pp. 3'37-340, Record, Vol. II
r ~ '.
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
will be used to perpetrate an injustice which is what happened

in their case. 17
The petitioner rebuts the aforesaid arguments of
respondents Perez, et al. by claiming that respondents Perez,
et al. confuse the filing of this forfeiture case with the filing of
the claim for civil liability arising from a criminal offense which
is deemed instituted with the criminal action: It argues that
this forfeiture case is an independent civil action under R. A.
No. 1379 which questions the respondents' acquisition of
monies/properties amounting to more or less
US$2,000,OOO.00,there being prima facie evidence that the
same was illegallyacquired or ill-gotten. 18
Respondent Escaler also filed a reply to the petitioner's
comment/ opposition. He claims that if the petitioner only
read his motion for reconsideration, it would have noted the
following significant· and material arguments which would
allegedly warrant the reversal of the assailed Resolution:
(1) his constitutional rights to due process and speedy
disposition of case, being human rights, take precedence over
the State's constitutional right to recover unlawfully acquired
properties which is a mere property right;
(2) the reckoning point in determining whether there was
inordinate delay in the disposition of a civil case is the date of
filing of the taxpayer's complaint and not the filing of the civil
complaint in Court;
(3) the petition fails to state a cause of action as there
was no allegation of the critical and jurisdictional information
required by Section 3 of R. A. No. 1379 and that the Joint
Resolution dated November 6, 2006 and Memorandum dated
January 28, 2013, which are the bases in filing the petition,
were not attached to the petition; and
(4) there is no such office known as the FIO; hence, it
cannot file the present complaint.
Respondent Escaler claims that the petitioner failed to

comprehend the rationale of the cases he cited to show
inordinate delay; that petitioner's justification that,"i had to
17 pp. 385-388, Record, Vol. II

/l
18 Prosecution's Rebutter dated July 18, 2016; pp. 412-417, Record, Vol. II
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
contend with different banking rules and the prevailing law of

the country in obtaining foreign documents" is unavailing
because the same justification had already been debunked by
the Supreme Court in another case involving the same parties
and arising from the same factual antecedents; that he could
not have asserted his right to speedy disposition of cases
because the complaint filed by Jimenez was not for forfeiture
but for criminal and administrative offenses. He also claims
that he was not impleaded as one of the respondents in the
caption of the Joint Resolution dated November 6,2006 issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Finally, he claims that the
delay of twelve (12) years in terminating the preliminary
investigation could not be said to be mere inadvertence and
the said delay is a transgression of his right to due process
and speedy disposition of cases. 19
In its rejoinder, the petitioner argues that had it not
examined and compared respondent Escaler's allegations in
his motion for reconsideration with his motion to dismiss, it
would not have concluded that respondent Escaler failed to
introduce any new significant issue. It maintains that the
cases relied upon by respondent Escaler are inapplicable to
his case and that a forfeiture case is completely separate or
distinct from any criminal action as the subject and nature of
the case are different.20
RESPONDENT PEREZ, ET AL.'S URGENT

MANIFESTATION AND MOTION
Respondents Perez, et al. filed an Urgent Manifestation

and Motion21 pointing out that the orders and resolutions
issued by this Court were signed by different Justices of this
Court. In particular, they point to the assailed Resolution
which was signed by the Presiding Justice as Chairperson
with Justices Ma. Cristina J. Cornejo and Ma. Theresa Dolores
C. Gomez-Estoesta as members and Justices Alex L. Quiroz
and Geraldine Faith Econg issuing their dissenting opinions.
According to respondents Perez, et al., there is no indication ~
19 espondent Escaler's Reply dated June 17, 2016; pp. 355-375, Record, Vol. II /",
20 Petitiqner's Rejoinder dated July 29, 2016; pp. 440-443, Record, Vol. II
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
the face of the assailed Resolution why Justices Cornejo and

Estoesta, who belong to different Divisions of the Court,
participated in the rendition of the assailed Resolution and
there is also no indication why Justices Samuel R. Martires
and Sarah Jane T. Fernandez, who participated in the
issuance of the order submitting for resolution the
respondents' motion for reconsideration, did not participate in
the rendition of the assailed Resolution. Thus, respondents
Perez, et al. pray, in the alternative, that the Court consider
the assailed Resolution void and that their motions raffled
back to the original Third Division to rule on their motions for
reconsideration. 22
The petitioner opposed the aforesaid urgent
manifestation and motion. It points out that the Court's
Resolution promulgated on July 8, 2015 was resolved by the
Presiding Justice as the ponente and concurred in by
Associate Justices Alex L. Quiroz and Maria Cristina J.
Cornejo. On the other hand, the Resolution promulgated on
April 18, 2016, which resolved respondents' separate motions
for reconsideration of the Court's Resolution promulgated on
July 8, 2015, was resolved by the Presiding Justice as the
ponente and concurred in by Associate Justices Maria Cristina
Cornejo and Ma. Theresa Dolores Gomez-Estoesta, with
Associate Justices Alex L. Quiroz and Geraldine Faith Econg
dissenting. It thus claims that the Special Third Division
complied with Section 2(a), Rule IX of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan which provides that the motion
for reconsideration shall be acted upon by the ponente and the
other members of the Division who participated in the decision
or resolution sought to be reconsidered as well as Section 1(b),
Rule VIII which provides that in the event that a unanimous
vote of three (3) Justices in a Division is not obtained, the
Presiding Justice shall designate by raffle and on rotation
basis two (2) Justices from all the other members of the
Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily to form a special division of
five (5) Justices. Petitioner also contends that the
respondents' piece-meal manner by which they seek relief has
resulted in contradicting stances. Allegedly,the respondents
seek a clarification of the assailed Resolution, then they ask
for a reconsideration of the same Resolution a d ow they
/'
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
want another set of Justices to resolve their motions for

reconsideration.23
After an assiduous examination of the arguments of the

parties, the Court finds the subject motions bereft of merit.
I. There is no legal basis for

respondents Perez, et aL's
prayer for the issuance of a
resolution nunc pro tunc.
The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some

act of the court done at a former time which was not then
carried into the record. The power of a court to make such
entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of
judicial action which has been actually taken. It may be used
to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak
what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the court
has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have
rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper
judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions
by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. 24
Thus, a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has
no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to
enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered,
but which had not been entered of record as rendered. In all
cases, the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro
tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a
mere right to a judgment will not furnish the basis for such an
entry. 25
In this case, the record shows that respondent Escaler
filed a motion to dismiss which was adopted by respondents
Perez, et al. In its Resolution promulgated on July 8, 201~
23 .444-449, Record, Vol. II / /
24 Magno vs. Magno, G. R. No. 206451, August 17, 2016 .
25/d.
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x ------------------------1------------- ---------- X
the Court did not resolve the said motion to dismiss. Instead,
it ordered the remand of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman: 26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is

REMANDED to the Officeof the Ombudsman for the conduct
of the necessary proceedings conformably with the directive
of then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez 'in the Joint
Resolution dated November 6, 2006. The said office is given a
NON-EXTENDIBLE period of sixty (60) days within which to
finish the said proceedings. The Office of the Ombudsman is
likewise directed to immediately report the result of the said
proceeding to the Court within five (5) days from its
termination.
The parties filed their respective motions for

reconsideration which were granted by the Court in its
assailed Resolution. The Court ratiocinated:
The Court ordered the remand of this case to the

Office of the Ombudsman after noting that the record of
this case is bereft of any showing that the directive of
then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez in her
marginal note in the Joint Resolution dated November 6,
2006, was complied with.28 The remand of this case to
the Office of the Ombudsman was made conformably
with the teachings of the Supreme Court in Perez vs.
Sandiganbayan.29
Evidently, the issue of whether the Office of the

Ombudsman complied with the directive of then
Ombudsman Gutierrez in her marginal note in the Joint
Resolution dated November 6, 2006, issued by the
Special Panel of Investigators, would not have surfaced
had the aforesaid documents been incipiently attached
to the present petition upon the filing thereof with ~

27 emphasis in the original
28 p. 65, Joint Resolution; p. 358, Yolo I, Record
29503 SeRA 252 (2006)
RESOLUTION
Republic vs. Perez, el at.
SB-14-CVL-0002
x--------------------------------------- --------- x
Court. "This presents an opportune time to remind the

counsel of the petitioner to be more diligent in the
performance of their duties to prevent, if not avoid, any
unnecessary delay in the resolution of the incidents
pending before the Court.
At any rate, the Court resolves to admit, as it

hereby admits, the said documents in the higher
interest of justice. Accordingly, the Court reconsiders its
Resolution promulgated on July 5, 2015, remanding this
case to the Office of the Ombudsman, considering that
the petitioner has presented proof of its compliance with
the directive of then Ombudsman Gutierrez.
In the same assailed Resolution, the Court denied

respondents' motion to dismiss on the ground that there was
no violation of respondents' right to speedy disposition of
cases, among other grounds. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties' respective motions for

reconsideration are GRANTED. Respondent ,Ernest DL.
Escaler's Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Application
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated
February 5, 2015,30 which was adopted by respondent
Hernando B. Perez, et al. as their own in their Manifestation
dated March 27,2015, is DENIED for lack of merit.
The import of the Court's Resolution promulgated on

July 8, 2015 is unmistakable. The Court ordered the remand
of this case to the Officeof the Ombudsman for compliance by
the prosecution with the directive of then Ombudsman
Gutierrez for the conduct of the necessary proceedings in the
forfeiture proceedings. The Court did not yet resolve
respondents' motion to dismiss. In its subsequent assailed
Resolution promulgated on April 18, 2016, the Court granted
the parties' motions for reconsideration of the Court's order to
rem thi~ case to the Office of the Ombudsman, when the
Itioner submitted its compliance with the afore/7Said
:fJ p. 624, Vol. I, Record
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
directive. In the same Resolution, the Court then proceeded to

resolve respondents' motion to dismiss which it denied for
want of merit.
Clearly, there is no judicial action which needs to be
carried into the assailed Resolution to make the record speak
the truth. Thus, there is no basis for the prayer that the
Court render a resolution nunc pro tunc.
II. The prayer of respondents

Perez, et aL that this case be
ramed back to the original
Third Division and for it to
resolve their motion for
reconsideration is devoid of
merit.
Section 1(b), Rule VIII and Section 2(a), Rule IX of the

Revised Intemal Rules of the Sandiganbayan respectively,
provide:
~
Section 1. Votes Required to Decide. -
(b) In Division - The unanimous vote of three

(3) Justices in a Division shall be necessary for the
rendition of a judgment or final order. In the event a
unanimous vote is not obtained, the Presiding Justice
shall designate by raffle and on rotation basis two (2)
Justices from all the other members of the
Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them, forming a
Special Division of five (5) Justices, and the vote of a
majority of such Special Division shall be necessary for
the ren~itiOn of a judgment or final ord~
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
Section 2. The Justices Who Shall Act on a

Motion for NewTrial or Reconsideration. -
(a) Motions for NewTrial or Reconsideration of a
decision or resolution shall be acted upon by the
Ponente and the other members of the Division who
participated in the decision or resolution sought to be
reconsidered, irrespective of whether or not such
members are already in other divisions at the time the
said motions were filed. They shall be· deemed
constituted as a Special Division of the Division to
which the Ponente belonged at the time of the
promulgation of the decision or resolution.
In this case, the Resolution promulgated on July 8,2015,

which ordered the remand of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman, was issued by the Special Third Division
composed of the following: Presiding Justice Amparo M.
Cabotaje- Tang, as the Chairperson and ponente and Associate
Justices Alex L. Quiroz and Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, as
special members and who signed the said resolution per
Administrative Order No. 099-2015 dated March 18, 2015.31
The parties filed separate motions for reconsideration
which were granted by the Special Third Division in its
Resolution promulgated on April 18, 2016 or the assailed
Resolution .. Pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule IX of the Revised
Intemal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, Associate Justices
Quiroz and Camejo participated in the resolution of said
motions since they earlier participated in the resolution sought
to be reconsidered.
Further, pursuant to Section l(b), Rule VIII, when the

unanimous vote of the three (3) justices cannot be obtained,
the Presiding Justice shall designate two (2) justices to sit
temporarily forming a special division of five (5) justices.
Th ,Associate Justices Estoesta and Econg were deSign~
31 p. 7 of the Resolution promulgated on July 8, 2015; p. 25, Record, Vol. \I

RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x ------------------------------ -------------- --- -x
as special members of special division of five (5)justices, per

Administrative Order No. 099-2015 dated March 18, 2015,
considering the dissent of Associate Justice Quiroz. To be
sure, this is dearly indicated in the assailed Resolution.32
To grant respondents Perez, et al.'s prayer that their
motions for reconsideration be raffled back to the original
Third Division and for the latter to resolve the said motion will
constitute a violation of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
III. Respondents' right to speedy

disposition of their case was
not violated.
The concept of speedy disposition of case is relative or

flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. For this reason, [a] II
balancing test of applYing societal interests and the rights of

the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis. "33
Respondent Escaler's cited cases to support his claimed
violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases are not
applicable here because of the difference in factual milieu. The
Court quotes with approbation the refutation of the petitioner
thereto in its Comment/Opposition dated May 16,2016:
15. As in their previous motions, respondents kept

harping on the supposed inordinate delay in the filing of
the petition citing the cases of Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,
Roque versus Office of the Ombudsman and Duterte vs.
Sandiganbayan by simply focusing on the numerical
computation of time without due regard to the factual
milieu of those cases as compared to the attending
circumstances in the instant case. Their reliance
therefore, in the aforementioned cases are bereft of
meritL::?
32 p. 1 of the Resolution promulgated on April 18, 2016; p. 162, Record, Vol. II
33 Almeda vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G. R. No. 204267, July 25,2016
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
16. In the case of Tatad us. Sandiganbayan,

political motivation was the primary consideration for
the filin'gof the case. At the time the complaint was filed
before the Tanodbayan, petitioner Tatad had a falling
out with Pres. Marcos. Likewise, there was blatant
departure from the rules of preliminary investigation
because instead of requiring the submission of the
Affidavits of Complaint, the Tanodbayan referred the
case back to the Presidential Security Command which
was under the control of Pres. Marcos. Moreover, there
was no complex factual and legal issues involved in the
case as the charges were for non-filing of SALN and
violation of Section 3(e) for allegedly favoring his
brother-in-law in a transaction.
17. As for the Angchangco, Jr. case, the Office of
the Ombudsman in its Joint Resolution dated 06
November 2006 had squarely addressed its difference
and inapplicability herein. Petitioner Angchangco, Jr.
had filed several motions for early resolution of his case
before the Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao, thereby
asserting his right to speedy disposition of the case.
Moreover, petitioner Angchangco, Jr. was prejudiced by
the delay as he was deprived of the fruits of his
retirement, whereas, respondents herein actually gained
and benefitted from the questioned wealth as it is still in
their disposal.
18. It would, be unfair to treat the instant case
similar to the Roque case, as the latter case did not
involve or raise a complex legal issue. Neither was there
any explanation provided for the delay. In this case,
however, there was a foreign element that should be
considered as it involved foreign banking transactions
which involved three different countries. The first bank
transaction originated from Cayman where the money
was sourced, thereafter transferred to a bank in
Hongko,ng and again transferred to another bank
account in Switzerland. The complexity of tracing and
establishing the existence of this ill-gotten wealth
justified the period of filing of the complaint for
preliminary inquiry and the filing of the petition before
this Honorable Court. The Republic had to contend with
different banking rules and the prevailing law of the
country in obtaining foreign documents. Likewise, the
enses raised by spouses respondents' Perez and
Arceo presented difficult concepts in law /7
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
contributed to the length of time in the disposition of

this case.
19. Respondents should not even compare their
situation in Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan case where the
petitioners were deprived of a legitimate preliminary
investigation as they were made to comment under oath
of allegations in a civil case and in a COA Special Audit
Report. Petitioners were clueless that they were being
subjected to a preliminary investigation, hence could
not have asserted their right to speedy disposition of the
case. On the contrary, respondents herein participated
in the preliminary investigation and were completely
aware of the possible filing of a forfeiture proceeding
against them. The opportunity therefore to assert their
constitutional rights had always been available to the
respondents but they opted to aggressively argue the
same only at this time where the forfeiture case already
been instituted.
20. Further, the case of Ligot, et. al. vs. Republic
has no bearing in this case because the issue therein
pertain~ to the propriety of extending a freeze order
under R.A. No. 9160 or the Anti-Money Laundering Law
which provides for specific period, unlike in the
forfeiture case instituted under R.A. No. 1379.
21. Ultimately, respondents try to shield
themselves with the Supreme Court's ruling in People
versus Sandiganbayan where the criminal cases against
herein respondents Hernando Perez, Escaler and Arceo,
Jr. for robbery and violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019 were dismissed due to inordinate delay and
violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Respondents claim that in the ruling of the said case,
the guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under
Section 16 of Article III is applicable to all cases.
Petition~r begs to disagree.
22. It is recognized that the present case is an
offshoot of the circumstances involved in the criminal
cases. While forfeiture proceedings is civil in nature, it
can be said that it is unique and one imbued with
public interest, the property involved being illegally
acquired or unexplained wealth; such that no
than the Constitution guaranteed the exee tio /7ore
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x--- ----------------------------------------- ----x
prescription, laches or estoppel of the right of the State

to recover unlawfully acquired properties.34
Also, this Court already extensively passed upon this

issue of alleged violation of the respondents' right to speedy
disposition of cases in its assailed Resolution, to wit:
I. Re: Alleged Violation of the

Respondents' Rights to
Speedy Disposition of
Cases
The Court finds the invocation by respondent

Escaler of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
People vs. Sandiganbayan35 highly misplaced.
First. This case involves a petition for forfeiture of
alleged ill-gotten wealth and/ or unexplained wealth of
the herein respondents. Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the right of
the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties is
imprescriptible, to wit:
Section 15. The right of the State to

recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.
To sustain therefore the respondents' claim of a

violation of their right to a speedy disposition of their
case would negate and render nugatory the
constitutionally-ordained imprescriptibility of the State's
right to institute an action to recover ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed, the State could initiate an action for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth at any time and without
r~gard to the rule on prescription, laches or estop~
at pp. 3-5; pp. 312-314, Record, Vol. II / /

35 Supra
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x------------------------- -------------- --------- x
because "xxx to bar the Government from recovering ill-

gotten wealth would result in the validation or
legitimization of the unlawful acquisition ... "36
Second. In Marcos, Jr. vs. Republic, 37 the

Supreme Court categorically declared that a forfeiture
proceed!ng under R.A. No. 1379 is civil in nature. In
fact, respondent Escaler himself admits that the present
petition for forfeiture is civil in nature.38 Accordingly,
the provisions of the Rules of Court on institution of
actions should apply to this case.
Section 5, Rule I of the Rules of Court provides
that, "fA] civil action is commenced by the filing of the
original complaint in court." Plainly, the commencement
of a civil action is reckoned from the time of filing of the
original complaint in court; hence, it is only at this time
may it be correctly argued that a civil case has been
instituted before a court.
The present petition for forfeiture was filed with
the Court on November 14, 2014. Thus, this civil
action was deemed instituted only on the said date
pursuant to the aforesaid rule.
Certainly, the preliminary inquiry conducted by
the Officeof the Ombudsman before November 14,2014
cannot be considered the initiation of the petition for
forfeiture against the respondents thereby negating a
proper invocation of their right to a speedy disposition
of cases with respect thereto. Perforce, the operative
effect of the delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation of the related criminal cases cannot be
brought. to bear on the preliminary inquiry conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman leading to the
institution of the present petition. To do so would
amount to a fusion of the said criminal cases with this
civil case for forfeiture which are entirely separate and
distinct from each other and governed by different rules,
both substantive and procedural. The most notable
substantive difference is that crimes prescribe while, as
hereinbefore indicated, the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public official or
employees from them or from their nomin
36Republic vs. Migrino, 198 SCRA 289 (1990)

37671 seRA 280 (2012)
38 p. 4, Respondent Escaler's Motion to Dismiss; p. 627, Vol. I, Record
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x--------------------- -------------- ------------- x
transferees is constitutionally-declared imprescriptible.

In the words of the constitution itself, such right of the
State "shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel. "39
Third. Assuming that respondents may validly

invoke their right to speedy disposition of cases during
the preliminary inquiry before the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Court finds that there was no
violation of their right to speedy disposition of their
case.
In Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan,40 the Supreme
Court instructs the courts to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis. Guided by this teaching, the
Court shall now assess the established facts in this
case.
The record
of this case discloses that on
November 14, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO)
of the Office of the Ombudsman "filed" a Complaint
dated November 11, 2005, against the herein
respondents for violation of R.A. No. 1379 with the
Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudication
and Monitoring Office (PAMO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman.41 It is worthy to note, however, that the
factual backdrop of this case had its genesis from the
Complaint-Affidavit dated December 23, 2002, which
was filed by then Congressman Mario "Mark (MJ)
Jimenez" B. Crespo, against the herein respondents
before the Officeof the Ombudsman.42
Thereafter, or on December 13, 2005,
respondents Perez, et al. filed their Consolidated Joint
Counter-Affidavit dated December 12, 2005.43 Instead of
filing of his counter-affidavit, respondent Escaler filed a
Motion to Disqualifyj Inhibit the Office of the Ombudsman
from Conducting the Preliminary Investigation and to
Tum Over the Conduct of the Proceedings to the
Departrrtentof Justice and Ad CautelamSuspensi0'/7
39 Section 15, . Ie XI
40442 S 294 (2004)
8, Vol. I, Record
p. 22, id
43 p. 475, id
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x---------- -------.------------------------------- x
the Period to File Counter-Affidavit and/or Deferment of

Proceedings. 44
After the necessary proceedings were conducted,
the Special Panel constituted by the Ombudsman to
investigate the complaints against the herein
respondents issued a Joint Resolution dated November
6, 2006,45 which recommended, among other matters,
the institution of a forfeiture proceedings against the
herein respondents after the conduct of the May 2007
general elections pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. No.
1379. 46
In her marginal note appearing on the said Joint

Resolution, however, then Ombudsman Gutierrez
directed that the aforesaid recommendation be referred
to another panel for further study.47
On May 3, 2012, Ombudsman Mora,1es issued

Office Order No. 177, series of 2012, constituting a
Special Panel of Reviewers which was tasked to review
the matter of initiation of forfeiture proceedings
pursuant to the said directive of then Ombudsman
Gutierrez. 48
Conformably with the said directive, on January

28, 2013, the Special Panel of Reviewers submitted
their Memorandum of even date to Ombudsman
Morales. The said special panel recommended the filing
of the petition for forfeiture after the May 13, 2013
elections.49 Said recommendation was approved by
Ombudsman Morales on January 30, 2013.50
Thus, on November 14, 2014, the present

petition for forfeiture was filed with the Court, or after
nine (9) years from the "filing" of the complaint for
forfeiture by the FIO on November 14, 2005, before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Between December 13, 2005
and November 14, 2014, the respondents did not file
any motion with the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve
and/or terminate the preliminary inquiry before ~
44 Please refer to Respondent Escaler'sReply dated March 7, 2006, p. 564, id.

45 p. 300, Record
46 pp.62-63, Joint Resolution; pp. 355-356, Vol. I, Record; emphasis supplied

47 p. 65, id; P 358, id
48 p. 45, Vol. II, Record
49 p. 46, id
50 p. 52, id
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
Thus, the decisive question is whether this length

of time it took the Office of the Ombudsman to
terminate the preliminary inquiry violated the herein
respondents' right to a speedy disposition of their case.
Based on the above recorded events, the Court
rules in the negative.
It needs to be underscored that speedy disposition
is a relative and flexible concept. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.
Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. In determining
whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of
cases has been violated, the Supreme Court has laid
down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.51
Here, although the preliminary inquiry pended
before the Office of the Ombudsman for nine (9) years,
there is no showing that such delay was deliberately
employed by the said office in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense of the herein respondents and/ or
to gain' some tactical advantage over them. Thus, the
delay should be weighed less heavily against the State
as held in Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan: 52
Closely related to the length of delay is the

reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to
different reasons or justifications invoked by the
State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to
delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be weighted
heavily against the State. Also, it is
improper for the prosecutor to intentionally
delay to gain some tactical advantage over
the defendant or to harass or prejudice him.
On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be
weighted less heavily against the State.
Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
/factors for granting a continuance. 53
eta v,. Executive Secretary. 677 SCRA 750 (2012) '"'//

2Supra
53 Emphasis supplied
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x--- ------------------------------------ --------- x
Moreover, respondents Escaler and Perez, et al.

never took any positive action to assert their right to a
speedy disposition of the preliminary inquiry then
being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Their
inaction may thus be considered a waiver of their right
to a speedy disposition of the said preliminary inquiry
conformably with the teachings of the Supreme Court in
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 54 to wit:
In this case, there was no allegation,

whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is
being questioned by petitioner is the delay in the
confirmation of sentence by the President.
Basically, the case has already been decided by
the General Court Martial and has also been
reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities
without any delay. The only thing missing then
was the confirmation of sentence by the
President. The records do not show that, in
those six (6) years from the time the decision
of the General Court Martialwas promulgated
until the sentence was finally confirmed by
the President, petitioner took any positive
action to assert his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. This is akin to what
happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, where,
in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of
delay, the Court still held that the petitioner
could not rightfully complain of delay
violative of his right to speedy trial or
disposition of his case, since he was part of
the reason for the failure of his case to move
on towards its ultimate resolution. The Court
held, inter alia:
In the case before us, the petitioner merely
sat and waited after the case was submitted for
resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the
case below was reraffled from the RTC of
Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon
and only after respondent trial judge of the latter
court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to
follow-up and complete the transcript of
stenographic notes that matters started to get
moving towards a resolution of the case. More
importantly, it was only after the new trial judge
reset the retaking of the testimonies to
______
54supra
N_o_ve_m_b_e_r_9,1990 because of petitioner
/
n '
tk
RESOLUTION
Republic vs. Perez, e1 at.
SB-14-CYL-0002
absence during the original setting on October

24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became
zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial
and disposition.
In the present case, there is no question

that petitioner raised the violation against his
own right to speedy disposition only when the
respondent trial judge reset the case for
rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would
have just continued to sleep on his right - a
situation amounting to laches - had the
respondent judge not taken the initiative of
determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could
dispose of the case. The matter could have taken
a different dimension if during all those ten
years between 1979 when accused filed his
memorandum and 1989 when the case was
reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting
his right which was granted him in 1987 when
the new constitution took effect, or at least made
some overt act (like a motion for' early
disposition or a motion to compel the
stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes)
that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence
would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such
right.
While this Court recognizes the right to
speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right
to a speedy trial, and although this Court has
always zealously espoused protection from
oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable
to the party involved, at the same time, we hold
that a party's individual rights should not
work against and preclude the people's
equally important right to public justice. In
the instant case, three people died as a result of
the crash of the airplane that the accused was
flying. It appears to us that the delay in the
disposition of the case prejudiced not just the
accused but the people as well. Since the
accused has completely failed to assert his right
seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent
judge was not in a position to dispose of the case
on the merits due to the absence of factual
asis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the
parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court
todispen; S;ial justiceinthepre~
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x--------------------- ---------------------- ----- x
Time runs against the slothful and those

who neglect their rights. In fact, the delay in
the confirmation of his sentence was to his
own advantage, because without the
confirmation from the President, his
sentence cannot be served. 55
Just like in Garcia, the herein respondents raised

nary a whimper during the pendency of the
preliminary inquiry before the Office of the
Ombudsman although they were very much aware of
such fact. They did not assert their right to a speedy
disposition of the preliminary inquiry after then
Ombudsman Gutierrez directed a further study of the
recommendation of the Special Panel to file a petition
for forfeiture against their properties. Based on the
allegations in the petition and its annexes, it appears
that respondent Perez, as then Secretary of the
Department of Justice, extorted money from then
Congressman Jimenez in the amount of $2 Million.
Also, based on the document appended to the petition,
the said money was transferred to the bank account of
respondent Escaler in Hong Kong. From the said bank
account, the money was deposited to the bailk accounts
of respondents Rosario S. Perez, Ramon Antonio Castillo
Arceo, Jr. and Escaler. In other words, the petition and
its anneiXesallege that public officewas used to commit
a crime and to amass and conceal ill-gotten wealth.
More importantly, respondents have not asserted
any actual or threatened prejudice occasioned them by
reason of the delay in the termination of the
preliminary inquiry. In fact, such delay actually
worked to their advantage because they hold to this very
day the alleged ill-gotten wealth as no action was filed
by the government to recover it during the said
interregnum.
Thus, balancing the private constitutional right of
the respondents to a speedy disposition of their case
and the imprescriptible right of the State to institute an
action to recover 'ill-gotten wealth, the balance should
be tilted in favor of the State's right to public justice.
Indeed, the State must be given a fair chance to prove
its case"/!
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x --- ---------------------- ----------------------- x
IV. The Office of the Ombudsman is

expressly vested with the power
and authority to file any case
against any public officer or
employee whose act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.
The determination of what charges to file and who are to

be charged are matters addressed to the discretion of the
Ombudsman.56
Indeed, in Galario vs. Office of the Ombudsman,57the
Supreme Court declared:
Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution, enumerates the powers, functions, and
duties of the Office of the Ombudsman, among which is
to:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.

6770) likewise provides:
Sec 15. Powers, Functions and

Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission
• Ram;scal, J •• YS. Sand;ganbayan, 499 seRA 375 (2006) ~

57527 seRA 190 (2007)
RESOLUTION
Republic vs. Perez, et af.
SB-14-CVL-0002
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or

inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases. (Emphases
supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing constitutional and

statutory provisions that the Ombudsman is given a
plenary' and unqualified authority with respect to its
investigatory and prosecutory power, subject only to the
constitutional limitations, and its coverage cannot be
limited to the allegations in any complaint-affidavit that
may have been filed against a public officer. In fact, the
Ombudsman may investigate and prosecute on its own,
without need for a complaint-affidavit, for as long as the
case falls within its jurisdiction. Hence, regardless of
the allegations and accusations against the public
officer in the affidavit-complaint, it still rests upon·
the Ombudsman to determine the proper crime or
offense which can be charged against the public
officer depending on the findings of the Ombudsman
in the preliminary investigation. 58
Thus, while the complaint-affidavit of Mark Jimenez

charged respondents with criminal and administrative cases
only, the Ombudsman is not thereby precluded from making a
finding that there is likewise a ground to file forfeiture
proceedings against respondents, if warranted, and file the /
appropriateactionin cour/4
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x --------------- ------------- ---- --- --- ---------- x
V. The Ombudsman's Joint

Resol'Lltion dated November 6,
2006 was attached to the
petition/record of this case;
moreover, the defect, if any, on
the petition when it was filed with
this Court was cured.
Contrary to respondents' claim, the Ombudsman's Joint

Resolution dated November 6, 2006 was attached to the
petition/record of this case.59 Insofar as the belated
submission of the Memorandum dated January 28, 2013 of
the Special Panel of Reviewers is concerned, suffice it to state
that this Court admitted it in the higher interest of justice
since the failure of the petitioner to incipiently attach to its
petition the said memorandum is a mere technicality.
In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections.60 The rumination of the High Court in the early
case of Alonso vs. Villamor,61still soundly resonates to this
day:
The error in this case is purely technical. To take

advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does
not appeal to a fair sense ofjustice. Its presentation as
fatal to the plaintiffs case smacks of skill rather than
right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which
each contending party fully and fairly lays before
the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside
as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of
form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
duels, are '\ not to be won by a rapier's th~
59 pp. 3 - 59, Records, Vol. I

60 erlines Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Philippine National Construction Co., 519 SCRA 432 (2007),
Iting Durban Apartments Corporation vs. Catacutan, 477 SCRA801 (2005)
61 16 Phil 315 (1910); emphasis supplied
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid

to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There
should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant
should"be permitted to challenge a record of a court of
these Islands for defect of form when his substantial
rights have not been prejudiced thereby.
VI. This court has not prejudged

this case.
Respondent Escaler cannot successfully claim that his

case has been prejudged because the Court already presumed
that the property in question is ill-gotten and that he holds the
same. As can be seen from the assailed Resolution itself, the
Court used the word "alleged"in reference to property subject
of this case: "such delay actually worked to their advantage
because they hold to this very day the alleged ill-gotten
wealth as no action was filed by the government to recover it
during the said interregnum."
VII. There is no forum-shopping

in this case.
The test for determining whether a party violates the rule

against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration
or where the elements of litis pendentia are present.
On the one hand, the requisites of litis pendentia are the
following: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the
same facts; and (c) identity of the two cases such tha
judgment in one, regardless of which party is
would amount to res judicata in the other ~
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
On the other hand, there is res judicata where the

following four (4) essential conditions concur, viz.: [1] there
must be a final judgment or order; [2] the court rendering it
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
[3] it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and [4] there
must be, between the two (2) cases, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.63
The subject of this forfeiture case is the respondents'
alleged ill-gotten wealth in the amount of US$2,000,000.00
which they purportedly extorted from Jimenez sometime in
2001. On the other hand, the subject of the forfeiture case
which was dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman in its
Resolution dated October 27, 2014 refers to respondents
spouses Perez's properties stated in their Statements of Assets
and Liabilities for the years 1995 to 2000. In fact, the Office of
the Ombudsman made the following clarification in the said
Resolution:64
Before gOIngany further, it is well to state that

respondents have mistakenly associated the present
case with the Sandiganbayan cases. It should be noted
that the Sandiganbayan cases emanated from the sworn
statement of former Congressman Mark Jimenez stating
that respondent Hernando allegedly extorted from him
US$2,000,000.00 and that US$1,999,965.00 was
already transferred to the latter's foreign bank account.
On the other hand, the present complaint was primarily
based on the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN)of respondents as of years ending 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. The Sandiganbayan
cases lJave no bearing in the issues of the present
complaint.
The alleged notation disapproving in part of the
Resolution issued relative to the Sandiganbayan cases
fails to convince. Even assuming that there was indeed
such a notation, it should be read in its context. The
recommendation was for the forfeiture of the alleged
extorted amount of US$1,999,965 by respondent
Hernando from Mr. Jimenez. In the present case,
however, nowhere can it be deduced that the
egations of the complaint refer in any manner~
63/d •.# " / /
64 Annex 1, Respondents Perez, et ol.'s Motion to Reconsider; pp.286-298, Record, Vol II

RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x---------------------- ----- --------------------- x
the alleged extorted amount. Hence, notwithstanding

the dismissal of the Sandiganbayan cases, the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment cannot be applied in this
case.65
Unquestionably, there is no forum-shopping to speak of

because there is no identity of the cause of action between this
case and the forfeiture case that was earlier dismissed by the
Officeof the Ombudsman.
VIII.The other issues raised by the

respondents are mere rehash of
their earlier submissions which
have been passed upon and
rejected by this Court.
The respondents raise the following other issues: (1)

failure of the petition for forfeiture to state a cause of action
against respondents, (2) non-compliance with the conditions
precedent to the filing of the petition for forfeiture including
the authority of the FIO to initiate the present complaint, (3)
non-inclusion of respondent Escaler's name in the caption of
the case, (4) prescription in filing petition for forfeiture, (5)
admission of facts when a motion to dismiss is filed, (6) the
applicability of the Garcia case and other cases cited by
respondents and (7) the effect of the dismissal of the criminal
cases against them and the Supreme Court's decision in
People vs. Sandiganbayan66 to the present petition.
To be sure, the aforesaid issues have been previously
raised by the respondents in their motion to dismiss. They
were thoroughly considered and directly passed upon by the
Court in its assailed Resolution, thu~
.'
65 emphasis supplied
66712 SeRA 359 (2013)
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
II. The present petition for

forfeiture states a cause of
action against the respondents.
Having settled that there was no violation of the

herein respondents' right to a speedy disposition of their
case, the Court shall now proceed to address the other
issues raised by respondent Escaler in his motion to
dismiss.
Respondent Escaler argues that the present
petition should be dismissed because it allegedly fails to
state a cause of action against him. He claims that a
petition for forfeiture under Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379
covers and applies only to public officers and
employees. According to respondent Escaler, he has
never been a public officer or employee and that there is
no allegation in the petition that he acquired an amount
of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee. He thus
concludes that the "Petitioner has no right to recover
from [Him], a private individual, any alleged unlawfully
acquired property. The right to so recover applies only if
the person from whom it is to be recovered is a public
officer or employee."67
The Court finds the said argument devoid of merit.
Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Cause of action, defined. A cause

of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.
The essential elements of a cause of action are as

follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant
not to violate such right; and (3)An act or omission on
the part of the defendant in violation of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latte~
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other

relief. 68
In this case, there is no question that respondent

Escaler was never appointed or elected to any
government position. This, however, has no ~nervating
impact in determining whether the petitioner has a
cause of action against him.
In Fluor Daniel, Incorporated-Philippines vs.

E.B. ViZZarosa& Partners, Co. Limited,69 the Supreme
Court laid down the following test to determine whether
a petition or complaint states a cause of action, to wit:
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the

last element that a cause of action arises, giving
the plaintiff a right to file an action in court for
recovery of damages or other relief. The test of
sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint
as constituting a cause of action is whether
or not admitting the facts alleged, the court
could render a valid verdict in accordance
with the prayer of the complaint. That in
determining sufficiency of cause of action, the
court takes into account only the material
allegations of the complaint and no other, is
not a hard and fast rule. In some cases, the
court considers the documents attached to
the complaint to truly determine sufficiency
of cause of action.
We have ruled that a complaint should not
be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of
action if it appears clearly from the complaint
and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled
to relief. The converse is also true. The
complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of
action if it is obvious from the complaint and its
annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any
relief.70
Applying the aforesaid jurisprudential precepts to

this case and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 1379
vis a vis the allegations in the subject petition r
68Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 455 SCRA 175 (2005)
69528 SCRA 321(2007)
70 Emphasis supplied; citations omitted
f~
RESOLUTION ~.
Republic vs. Perez, ef at.
SB-14-CYL-0002
forfeiture, it is readily clear that the Republic has

sufficiently stated its cause of action against respondent
Escaler and his co-respondents.
The right of the Republic to recover a public officer
or employee's unlawfully acquired properties is based
on R.A. No. 1379. Section 1 thereof reads:
Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the

p-y.rposes of this Act, a "public officer or
employee" means any person holding any
public office or employment by virtue of an
appointment, election or contract, and any
person holding any office or employment, by
appointment or contract, in any State owned or
controlled corporation or enterprise.
(b)"Other legitimately acquired
property" means any real or personal property,
money or securities which the respondent has at
any time acquired by inheritance and the
income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his
becoming a public officer or employee, or any
property (or income thereof) already pertaining
to him when he qualified for public office or
employment, or the fruits and income of the
exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It
shall not include:
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the
respondent, but its ownership is concealed by
its being recorded in the name of, or held by,
the respondent's spouse, ascendants,
descendants, relatives, or any other person.
2. Property unlawfully acquired by the
respondent, but tran.sferred by him to another
person or persons on or after the effectivity of
this Act.
3. Property donated to the respondent
during his incumbency, unless he can prove
to the satisfaction of the court that the
donation is lawful.?1
The first sentence of Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379

" ~tates that: "Whenever any public officer or emP10ye~
71 Emphasis and underscoring supplied

RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x ------ ---- ------------ ----- ------- ---- ---------- x
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property

which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired ..."
Plainly, R.A. No. 1379 empowers the Republic to
forfeit a. public officer or employee's properties which are
manifestly out of proportion to his/her salary as such
public officer or employee and to his/her other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. The law provides a prima facie presumption
that these properties have been unlawfully acquired by
the said public officer or employee. Also, these
unlawfully acquired properties must be owned by the
public officer or employee before the Republic could
forfeit the same.
Notably, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1379 distinguishes

between "other legitimately acquired properties" and
"property unlawfully acquired" by the respondent public
official or employee.
"Other legitimately acquired properties" pertain

to
any real or personal property, money or securities which
the respondent public official or employee has at any
time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or
by gift inter vivos before his becoming a public officer or
employee, or any property (or income thereof) already
pertaining to him/her when he/she qualified for public
office or employment, or the fruits and income of the
exclusive property of the respondent's spouse.
This shall not include: (1) property unlawfully

acquired by the public officer or employee, but its
ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the
name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse,
ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person,
(2)property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but
transferred by him to another person or persons on or
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 1379, and (3)property
donated to the respondent public official during his
incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of
the court that the donation is lawful.
Evidently, R.A. No. 1379 contemplates situations

where the public officer or employee would conceal
ownership of the properties he / she unlawfully acquired.
/!
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x--------- ----- ----- ----------- ---------- -------- x
As stated above, the public officer or employee may

conceal or transfer the ownership of his / her unlawfully
acquired properties in the name of his spouse, relatives
or any other person. When the public officer or
employee conceals or transfers the ownership of his/her
unlawfully acquired properties to his spouse, relatives
or any other person, is the Republic left without any
remedy under the R.A. No. 1379 considering that the
proceedings stated therein is especially for the forfeiture
of the unlawfully acquired property of a public official or
employee?
The answer is a resounding NO.
In case a public officer or employee conceals
and/ or' transfers the ownership of his/her unlawfully
acquired property to his/her spouse, relatives or any
other person, the Republic could still validly forfeit the
same since the ownership of the said property is still
traceable to the public officer or employee. In order,
however', for the Republic to forfeit the said property,
the public officer or employee's spouse, relatives or any
other person, to whom the ownership of the said
property was concealed or transferred, must be
impleaded by the Republic in the forfeiture case that it
would file. By impleading the said spouse, relatives or
any other person in the forfeiture case, the Republic
would have a complete settlement of its case against the
erring public officer or employee. In the same vein, it
would give the spouse, relative or any other person to
whom the property was transferred or concealed the
opportunity to prove his/her legitimate ownership of the
subject property. Thus, it is not only proper but
indispensable to implead the said spouse, relative or
any other person in the forfeiture proceedings
notwithstanding the fact that the said person/s is/are
private individual/ s.
Further, it is jurisprudentially settled that in filing
a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits
the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts
contained in the plaintiffs complaint.72 In this case, the
pertinent allegations in the subject petition for forfeiture
rea/?
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x------------------------------------------------ x
10. Due to pressures, threats and

intimidation exerted by respondents Hernando
B. Perez and Ernest DL. Escaler upon the
person of MARIO "MARK (MJ) JIMENEZ" B.
CRESPO (Jimenez), Jimenez was forced to give
in to the demand of respondents Hemando B.
Perez and Ernest DL. Escaler to pay the sum of
Two Million ($2,000,000.00) Dollars in exchange
for the cessation of such threats and
intimidation upon the person of Jimenez;
(Photocopy of Jimenez's Affidavit and its
annexes, and Supplemental Affidavit, are hereto
attached as Annexes "D" and "E", respectively,
as integral parts of this Petition)
11. Respondent Escaler suggested how the
money would be transferred to a bank account
in Hong Kong, and would fax the transaction
details to Jimenez for immediate
implementation. On February 14, 2001,
respondent Escaler faxed a copy of the
instruction to Jimenez for the transfer of the
US$2.0 Million (Photocopy of the facsimile
message is hereto attached as Annex "F" to form
as integral part of this Petition);
13. Consistent with respondent Escaler's

instructions, on February 23, 2001, Trade and
Commerce . Bank, Cayman Islands iss1.led a
confirmation receipt of the amount of
US$1,999,965.00 by Coutts Bank, Hong Kong,
in favor of the beneficiary, Account No. HO13706
(Annex "G");
14. On 06 March 2001, the amount of
US$1.0 Million was transferred to EFG Private
Bank Branch, Singapore;
15. On May 16, 2001, the amount of
US$1,495,000.00 was remitted to respondent
Escaler's Coutts Bank, Hong Kong Account No.
H013706 from Golden Profits, Ltd. Via the
Standard Chartered Bank, New York; and on 23
May 2001, the following three (3) fund
transactions from Escaler's Coutts Bank Hong
Kong Account No. H013706 were made:
(i) US$250,000.00 in bank draft was

issued to Respondent Ramon C. Arceo, brother-
in:law of respondent former Secretary per~
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x-------------------------------------------- ----x
(ii) US$200,000.00 were transferred to

respondent Escaler's Citibank Manila Dollar
Savings Account No. 243-69772; and
(iii) US$700,000.00 were transferred to
EFG Private Bank Branch, Singapore.
That the instruction indeed came from

respondent Escaler was amply shown by his use
of specific fax number "632-892-85-19", which
number is traced to him, in giving out the
instruction to Jimenez (Annex "D-2") as well as
in sending to and receiving communications
from Coutss Bank, Hong Kong (Annexes "H-63",
"H-65", "H-69 to 70" and "H-72"). In addition, in
the "Private Banking Application" form prepared
by respondent ESCALERin opening Account No.
H013706, he indicated the same fax number -
"632-892-85-19 as his Office Fax number
(Annex H-15).
20. Account No. HO13706 is the actual
recipient of US$1,999,965 bank transfer from
the Trade and Commerce Bank, Cayman
Islands;
22. Respondent Escaler is the owner of

Account No. HO13706 at Coutts Bank, Hong
Kong. Based on the bank records and on the
affirmation executed by MS. WENDYLEE WING
TAK,Manager of Regulatory Risk of Coutts Bank
von Ernst Ltd., Account No. H013706 was
opened by respondent ERNEST L. ESCALER on
01 December 1998 and was closed on 18 July
2001 (Annexes "H" to "H-113");
24. Account No. H013706 transferred

funds in the total amount of US$1.7 Million to
Account Nos. 338 118 and/or 348 118 at EFG
Private Bank AG; US$200,000.00 to Account
243-69772 at Citibank Manila; and
Issued/funded US$250,000.00 Bank Draft III
favor of respondent Ramon C. Arceo, Jr.:
/ a. On March 06, 2001, the amount of
US$l,OOO,OOO.OO
br
was debited from Account No.
H013706 and was transferred to Account 338
U8. This transaction is supported
11#7
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
instruction letter of respondent Ernest DL.

Escaler ordering the bank transfer
US$l,OOO,OOO.OOto Account No. 348 118
(Annexes "H-75" to "H-76").
b. On 23 May 2001, the following

transactions involving Account No. H013706
based on instructions of respondent Ernest DL.
Escaler (Annexes "H-108" to "H-109") occurred:
b.1. US$250,000.00 were debited by the
issuance of a bank draft in favor of Respondent
Ramon C. Arceo, Jr. (Annexes "H-96" to "H-97"
and "H-110" to "H-111");
b.2. US$200,000.00 were debited and the

same was transferred to Account No. 243-69772
maintained by respondent Ernest DL. Escaler at
Citibank, Manila (Annex "H-95");
b.3. US$700,000.00 were debited and

transferred to Account No. 348 118 at EFG
Private Bank Branch, Geneva, Switzerland
(Annexes "H-93" to "H-94" and "H-113").
25. Respondents Hernando B. Perez,

Rosario S. Perez and Ramon Antonio A. Arceo,
Jr. are identified as the owners of Account Nos.
338 118 and/or 348 118, the recipient of a total
amount of US$1.7 Million (Annexes "I" to "1-69")
from respondent Ernest DL Escaler's Account
No. HO13706 in Coutts Bank, Hong Kong: ,
27. Records will reveal that respondent

Hyrnando B. Perez did not disclose in his 2001
and 2002 Statements of Assets, Liabilities and
Net Worth (SALNs)his and/or his wife's financial
interest of at least US$1,700,000.00, transferred
to their accounts (338 118 and 348 118) by
respondent Escaler in 2001. The declared total
assets of respondent Hernando B. Perez in his
SALNfor CY 2001 and 2002 (Annexes "0" to "0-
3" and Annexes "P" to "P-3") amounted only to
PhP40,304,781.94 as of December 31, 2001,
and PhP40,278,585.57 as of December 31,
2002. The total amount of assets declared by
him obviously did not include the US$l. 7 Million
deposited to their bank accounts at EFG Private
BankAG~
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x---------------------------- ------ ------------- -x
28. Considering that respondent

Hernando B. Perez, during his incumbency as
public officer, unlawfully acquired
monies/properties which are manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer
and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property, such
monies/properties amounting to more or less
US$2,OOO,OOO.OO are subject of forfeiture in
favorof the government.73
Based on the aforesaid allegations, which were

hypothetically admitted by the respondents, respondent
Hernando B. Perez, during his incumbency as Secretary
of the Department of Justice, with the help of
respondent Escaler, extorted $2 Million from then
Congressman Jimenez who transferred the said amount
to the bank account of respondent Escaler at the Coutts
Bank ~in Hong Kong. When the amount of
US$1,999,965.00 was received by respondent Escaler in
his account at the Coutts Bank in Hong Kong, a total
amount of $1.7 Million were transferred to the bank
accounts of respondents Perez, et al. $200,000.00 were
then debited to Account No. H013706 and the same
were transferred to Account No. 243-69772 maintained
by respondent Ernest DL. Escaler at Citibank, Manila.
The inclusion of respondent Escaler in this case is
therefore imperative considering that, based on his
hypothetical admission, a portion of the unlawfully
acquired property of respondent Perez, in the amount of
$200,000.00, ended up in his bank account.
Respondent Escaler must continue to be impleaded and
stand trial in this forfeiture case to have a complete
determination and/or settlement of the claims of the
Republic against respondent Perez, et al.
The petitioner has complied

with the conditions precedent
to the filing of the present
petition.
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
Respondent Escaler next argues that this case

should be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to
comply with the followingconditions precedent: (1) prior
complaint by a taxpayer, (2) previous inquiry similar to
a preliminary investigation, (3) absence of certification
that there is a reasonable ground to believe that there
was a v.iolation of R.A. No. 1379 and that respondent
Escaler is probably guilty thereof, and (4) period to file
the petition for forfeiture has already expired.
The Court shall address the said arguments In

seriatim.
1. The FIO of the Office of

the Ombudsman has authority
to initiate complaints for
forfeiture.
Respondent Escaler asserts that there was no

prior complaint filed by a taxpayer before the Office of
the Ombudsman pursuant Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379.
According to him, the complaint-affidavit of then
Congressman Jimenez did not charge him or the other
respondents with a violation of R.A. No. 1379.
Respondent Escaler further claims the FIO of the Office
of the Ombudsman is not a taxpayer that may initiate
any complaint for forfeiture. "The FIG is not even a
juridical person, neither does it pay taxes to the
Govemment. By no stretch of imagination can the FIG be
considered a taxpayer."74
The Court finds the said argument unmeritorious.
To be sure, the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to investigate and initiate a petition for
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No.
1379 is now firmly settled pursuant to the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Garcia vs.
Sandiganbayan.75 Th~
74 p. 10, Respondent Escaler'sMotion to Dismiss; p. 633, Yol. I, Record

75460 SeRA 600 (2005)
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x------ --------- --------------------------------- x
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who

should file the petition for forfeiture under
R.A. No. 1379. However, the Ombudsman's
exercise of the correlative powers to
investigate and initiate the proper action for
recovery of ill-gotten and! or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for the
recovery of ill-gotten and! or unexplained
wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. As
regards such wealth accumulated on or before
said date, the Ombudsman is without authority
to commence before the Sandiganbayan such
forfeiture action - since the authority to file
forfeiture proceedings on or before 25 February
1986 belongs to the Solicitor General -
although he has the authority to investigate
such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February
1986, pursuant to the Ombudsman's general
investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No.
6770.
It is obvious then that respondent

Office of the Ombudsman acted well within
its authority in conducting the investigation
of petitioner's illegally acquired assets and in
filing the petition for forfeiture against him.
The contention that the procedural
requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379
were not complied with no longer deserve
consideration in view of the foregoing
discussion. 76
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
2. There was a previous

inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation that
was conducted prior to the
commencement of this petition
in court.
Respondent Escaler claims that this case should

be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that a
previous inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation
was conducted prior to the filing of this case with Court.
He points to the fact that based on the Joint Resolution
dated November 6, 2006, the FIO filed its own complaint
for violation of R.A. No. 1379.78 He, however, claims that
the recommendation in the said joint resolution for the
institution of the forfeiture proceedings was exempted
by then Ombudsman Gutierrez from her approval as
shown by her marginal note. Respondent Escaler
further asserts that the caption of the Joint. Resolution
dated November 6, 2006, relative to the forfeiture
proceedings, merely mentions respondent Hernando B.
Perez and Rosario S. Perez. He therefore concludes that
it was ~"obvious that [he} was not charged, was not
included in, nor notified oj, much less participated in, the
previous inquiry required by the law in forfeiture case
filed pursuant to R.A. No. 1379. Consequently, the
impleading of Ernest De Leon Escaler as a respondent in
this Petition is unfounded, oppressive and malicious."79
Contrary to respondent Escaler's claims, the
record of this case shows that that the Office of the
Ombudsman actually conducted an inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of this case
before the Court.
First. The FIO of the Office of the Ombudsman
filed a Complaint dated November 11, 2005 against the
herein respondents for violation of R.A. No. 1373 on
November 14, 2005.80 Th/7
78 p. 10, Respondent Escaler'sMotion to Dismiss; p. 633, Yolo I, Record

79 p. 12, id; p. 635, id
80 p. 378, Vol. I, Record
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x---------------------------- ------- --------- ----x
The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the

Office of the Ombudsman, as nominal
complainant, hereby files this complaint
before the Preliminary Investigation,
Administrative Adjudication and Monitoring
Office (PAMO)against the following
respondents, namely:
C. Former Justice Secretary HERNANDO

BENITO PEREZ; ROSARIO SALVADORPEREZ;
ERNEST L. ESCALER; RAMON ANTONIO C.
ARCEO Jr.; and JOHN DOES, for violation of the
provisions of R.A. No. 1379 (An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property
Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefore). 81
The aforesaid complaint thereafter narrates why

the said respondents should be charged with a violation
of R.A. No. 1379.
Second. Acting on the said complaint of the FIO
(and that of then Congressman Jimenez), the PAMO
directed the herein respondents to file their respective
counter-affidavits.82
Pursuant to the said directive, respondents Perez,
et al. filed their Consolidated Joint Counter-Affidavit
dated December 12, 2005.83 In the said joint counter-
affidavit, respondents Perez, et al., directly addressed
the charges that they violated R.A. No. 1379.84 In fine,
they denied receiving money from then Congressman
Jimenez and claimed that the amount of US$l. 7 Million
"was the amount which was escrowed by EE (Ernest
Escaler) to pay the shareholdings owned by HBP
(Hernando B. Perez), his business associates, and his
family· corporation in Malvarosa Ventures, which,
however, did not materialize, hence the said amount
reverted to EE. In other words, the said amount n~
81 p. 1, FIO's Complaint dated November 11, 2005; id

82 p. 18, Joint olution dated November 6, 2006; p. 314, Yol. I, Record
83 p. 475 .
84 P. s. 25-29, pp. 27-29, Respondents Perez, et al.'s Consolidated Joint Counter-Affidavit; pp. 501-
503, id
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
came into the possession of HBP and did not in any way
benefit him or RSP (Rosario S. Perez) and RAA (Ramon
Antonio C. Arceo, Jr.)."85
Respondent Escaler, on the other hand, did not

file any counter-affidavit. Instead, he filed' a motion
seeking to disqualify the Officeof the Ombudsman from
conducting the preliminary investigation and turn over
the said case to the Department of Justice on the
ground of prejudgment and the use of evidence allegedly
improperly obtained.86 Said motion was denied by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Despite repeated opportunity
given him to submit his counter-affidavit, he chose not
to do so. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman deemed
respondent Escaler's failure to submit his counter-
affidavit a waiver and, consequently, submitted the case
for resolution based on the pleadings available in the
record.87
Third. In its Joint Resolution dated November 6,
2006, the Special Panel of Investigators recommended
the institution of the forfeiture proceedings against the
herein respondents after the May 2007 elections. This
recommendation was not immediately implemented
because then Ombudsman Gutierrez ordered that a new
panel be constituted to study the said recommendation.
Fourth. Thereafter, Ombudsman Morales issued
Office Order No. 177, dated May 3, 2012, series of 2012,
constituting a Special Panel of Reviewers which was
tasked to review the matter of initiation of forfeiture
proceedings pursuant to the said directive of then
Ombudsman Gutierrez.88 On January 28, 2013, the
Special Panel of Reviewers submitted their Memorandum
of even date to Ombudsman Morales recommending the
filing of a petition for forfeiture against the herein
respondents after the May 13, 2013 elections.89 Said
recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Morales
on January 30, 2013.90
Under the obtaining facts, it is indisputable that
an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was
conducted prior to the filingof the petition for fOrfeitr
85 Par. 27, p. 29, id; p. 503, id

86 p. 24, Joint Resolution dated November 6, 2006; p. 320, id
87 pp. 28-29, id; pp. 324-325, id
88 p. 45, Vol. II, Record
89 p. 46, id
90 p. 52, id
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
subject of this case. Contrary to the assertion of

respondent Escaler, he was notified of the said
proceedings. In fact, he even filed a motion to disqualify
and to inhibit the Office of the Ombudsman from
hearing the complaints against them. Respondent
Escaler cannot therefore claim that "fhej was not
charged, was not included in, nor notified of, much less
participated in, the previous inquiry required by the law
in forfeiture case filed pursuant to R.A. No. 1379."
,
Moreover, respondent Escaler cannot validly claim
that since his name is not included in the caption of the
Joint Resolution as one of the respondents in the
complaint for forfeiture, it necessarily follows that he
was not included in the said charge. The caption of the
Joint Resolution is immaterial and irrelevant in
determining whether respondent Escaler should be
charged with a violation of R.A. No. 1379.
It is a settled rule that what determines the nature

of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction
over the case are the allegations in the complaint.
The cause of action in a complaint is not what the
designation of the complaint states, but what the
allegations in the body of the complaint define or
describe. The designation or caption is not
controlling, more than the allegations in the
complaint, for it is not even an indispensable part of
the complaint.91
Here, the petition for forfeiture specifically

includes respondent Escaler as one (1) of the
respondents.
3. There was a certification

issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379.
Respondent Escaler further claims that the

petitioner failed to submit a certification that there is a
reasonable ground to believe that there was a violation
of R.A. No. 1379 because the directive of then
o budsman Gutierrez was not carried into effe~
I
91Hernudd vs. Lofgren, 534 seRA 205(2007)
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
x-------------------------- ------ ----------- -----x
The aforesaid argument of respondent Escaler is

negated by the Memorandum dated January 28, 2013,
of the Special Panel of Reviewers, submitted by the
petitioner albeit belatedly. To repeat, this panel was
constituted by Ombudsman Morales to study the
recommendation in the Joint Resolution dated November
6, 2006 for the institution of forfeiture proceedings
against the herein respondents. The pertinent portion of
the said memorandum reads:
On the basis of the foregoing, We submit

and so hold that by virtue of the proceedings
conducted by the Special Panel in the case
docketed as OMB-C-C-05-0635-K(F), there
appears to be a reasonable ground to believe
that a violation of Republic Act No. 1379 has
been committed by Respondents Hernando B.
Perez, Ernest L. Escaler, Ramon Antonio C.
Arceo, Jr. and Rosario S. Perez, and that they
are probably guilty thereof. Thus, the referral of
the matter to the Special Panel xxx which
conducted the previous inquiry for the
preparation and filing of the requisite Petition for
Forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 appears
to be warranted.92
The fact that the herein respondents were not

notified of the said review has likewise no material
bearing on this case. It is worthy to emphasize that the
herein respondents were already given sufficient
opportunity to address the complaints that were filed
against them. In fact, respondents Perez, et al.
submitted their consolidated joint counter-affidavit
explaining why the complaint for violation of R.A. No.
1379 should not be given due course.
Moreover, the directive of then Ombudsman

Gutierrez was merely for the referral of the findings of
the Special Panel relative to the commencement of a
forfeiture proceeding to another panel for further study.
It did not direct the conduct of a new inquiry since, as
shown by the record of the case, there was already a
previous compliancewith the said reqUiremen/i
92 pp. 5-6, Memorandum dated January 28, 2013; pp. 92-93, Vol. II, Record
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CYL-0002
4. The period to file a

petition for forfeiture does not
prescribe.
Respondent Escaler invokes the provlslOn in

Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which states that, "the right
to file such petition shall prescribe after four years from
the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or
expirat~on of the term of the officers or employee
concerned xxx," in claiming that the period within which
to file this petition for forfeiture had already prescribed.
He claims that "in paragraph 9 of the Petition, the
petitioner avers that respondent Secretary Perez resigned
on January 02, 2003. We therefore respectfully submit
that the non-compliance with the four-year period to file
this petition warrants the immediate dismissal thereof"93
In Republic vs. Migrino,94 the Supreme Court
categorically declared that the provision in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 1379 which states that, "[t]he right to file such
petition !for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth] shall
prescribe within four years from the date of resignation,
dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the
officer or employee concerned," is already deemed
modified or repealed by Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that "The right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel."
Respondent Escaler further argues that this
petition for forfeiture should be dismiss~d because
petitioner's "cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment." He claims that the dismissal of the criminal
cases filed against him, i.e., SB-08-CRM-0265 and SB-
08-CRM-0266, operates as a bar to the continuation of
the proceedings herein.
The Court disagrees.
A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata
whenthe followingelementsare prese//
93 p. 14 espondent Escaler'sMotion to Dismiss; p. 637, Yol. II, Record

• 94 SeRA 289 (1990)
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
x-------------------------------------- ---------- x
1. The former judgment is final;

2. It is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties;
3. It is a judgment or an order on the merits; and
4. There is between the first and the second action
identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action.95
Here, there is absolutely no identity of subject

matter and causes of action between the criminal cases
aforementioned and the present petition for forfeiture of
illegally-acquired properties.
To, be sure, the subject matter of the criminal

cases was whether or not respondents committed a
violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 (SB-
08-CRM-0265) and robbery under Article 293, in
relation to Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code (SB-
08-CRM-0266).
On the other hand, the subject matter of this

proceeding is whether the properties subject of the
petition for forfeiture were illegally acquired within the
contemplation of R.A. No. 1379. Thus, any disposition of
the criminal cases involving the herein respondents has
absolutely no bearing on this proceeding. Neither does
the disposition of this case have any effect on the said
criminal cases.
Finally, there is no identity of causes of action

between the criminal cases and this petition for
forfeiture because a forfeiture proceeding is entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal cases involving
the same act or omission. The teachings of the Supreme
Court in Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan96 illumine:
Petitioner's posture respecting Forfeitures I and II

being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th
Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is
flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first
assumption being that the forfeiture cases are ~
95Luzon Developtn,ent Bank v. Conquilla, 470 SCRA 533 (2005), citing Allied Ban
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 252 (1994)
96 603 SCRA 348 (2009)
RESOLUTION
SB-14-CVL-0002
corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex

delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May
20, 2005 Resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases
does not arise from the commission of a criminal
offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that

safeguards the right of the State to recover
unlawfully acquired properties. The action of
forfeiture arises when a "public officer or
employee [acquires] during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion of his salary . . . and to his other
lawful income .... " 14 Such amount of property
is then presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. 15 Thus "if the respondent
[public official] is unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court
shall declare such property forfeited in favor of
the State, and by virtue of such judgment the
property aforesaid shall become property of the
State ....
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14,

Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over
cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos,
his immediate family and business associates, authorizes
under its Sec. 3 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA
1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal
proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential
Commission on Good Government to file independent civil
actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have

Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature
while the Latter Is Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture

case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action
separate and different from a plunder case, thus
negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in
Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases.97 In a
prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is
the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of
RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
is "sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlaw~
.97 emphasis supplied / •

I.··. _f.
'.- •.....
•
RESOLUTiON
SB-14-CYL-0002
scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-

gotten wealth]". On the other hand, all that the court needs
to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379
is the disproportion of respondent's properties to his
legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he
acquired~ said properties. As correctly formulated by the
Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties
under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a
determination of a specific overt act committed by the
respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the
illegal wealth. 98
In sum, there is nothing in the record which the Court

had done and should have included in its assailed Resolution
to make th~' same speak the truth; hence, an entry nunc pro
tunc is not in order. Moreover, there is no valid basis for
respondents Perez, et. al.'s prayer to consider the assailed
Resolution void, and that their motions be raffled back to the
original Third Division for its resolution. Finally, the
respondents have failed to present any tenable ground that
would merit a reversal of the Court's Resolution promulgated
on April 18,2016.
"
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the following motions
for lack of merit:
1. Respondents Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez
and Ramon Antonio C. Arceo, Jr.'s Motion for Issuance of
Resolution Nunc Pro Tunc dated April 28,2016;
2. Respondents Perez, et al.'s Motion to Reconsider
Resolution dated April 18, 2016 denying the Motion to Dismiss
of Respondent Escaler dated May 3, 2016;
3. Respondent Ernest De Leon Escaler's Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Resolution promulgated on April 18,
2016) datedMay3,2016;an/!
fhJ
RESOLUTION
Republic vs. Perez, e~at.
SB-14-CYL-0002
x------------------ --------- ----------------- ----x
4.
Respondents Perez, et al.'s Urgent Manifestation and
Motion dated July 18, 2016.
----...
MA. ~A DOLORES . MIRANDA
GOMEZ-ESTOESTA Associate Justice
Associate Justice
'7 /
"
~~
GERALDINE FAIT~ ECONG
Associate Justice
~A-tf~ ~
~
SB-14-CVL-0002 - REPUBLIC· OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v.
HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO S. PEREZ, ERNEST DE LEON
ESCALER and RAMON ANTONIO CASTILLO ARCEO, Jll., Respondents.
J(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J(
DISSENTING OPINION
Before Us is a suit for civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, the dismissal
of which is now being sought.
On one end are the respondents asserting their constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases under Section 16, Article III of the Philippine Constitution I
and on the other is the Republic citing the imprescriptible right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or emfloyees as
provided for under Section 15, Article XI of the Philippine Constitution.
This is not the first time that the respondents asked for the dismissal of a case
against them using this particular ground. On the contrary, it was the sole basis of
the quashal of the information against them for robbery/extortion by the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan3 and which was affirmed by no less than the
highest court of the land.4
Now, will the same constitutional provision on speedy disposition of cases benefit
the respondents and sustain the dismissal herein sought? In answering this
question, the majority made a distinction between a criminal case and a civil case.
This is where We diverge.
The guarantee provided for under Section 16, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution is not selective in application. Thus, in Cadalin vs. Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator,S as reiterated in People of
the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan,6 the Supreme Court made the following
pronouncement, to ';Vit:
"xxx... the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases is not limited to

the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice."?
I "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. quasi-judicial. or
administrative bodies."
2 "The right of the State to recover properties unlawjilily acquired by public officials or employees. from them or from
their nominees or transferee~. shall not be barred by prescription. laches. or estoppel."

J People of the Philippines vs. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, SB-08-
CRM-0266, 20 November 2008.

4 People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, Jr., G.R. No. 188165, II December 2013,712 SCRA 359.
5 Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et.a!. v. Philippine Overseaseas Employment Administrators, et.a!., G.R. Nos. 105029-32,5
December 1994, 238 SCRA 722.
6 People vs. Sandiganbayan, supra note 4.
7 Cadalin vs. POEA's Admnistrator, supra note 5 at 765.
Proceeding from the above, from the moment the Office of the Ombudsman
commenced their investigation into the forfeiture case, due process immediately
came into play and the right to speedy disposition of cases began to operate in
favor of the respondents.
To understand the invocation of these constitutional guarantees, I am behooved to

give a brief overview of the timeline of this case.
The slew of cases against herein respondents stemmed from the expose made by
Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama during the latter part of 2002. The Supreme
Court recounts - .
"On November 12, 2002, Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan

(Cong. Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the House of
Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high
ranking government official whom he then called the "2 Million Dollar
Man." In reaction, the Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti-
Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the expose of
Congo Villarama. PAGC sent written communications to Congo Villarama,
Congo Mark Jimenez, Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary of
Justice Hernando B. Perez inviting them to provide information and
documents on the alleged bribery subject of the expose. On November 18,
2002, Congo Villarama responded by letter to PAGC's invitation by
confirming that Secretary Perez was the government official who "ha[d]
knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose." In his own
letter of November 18, 2002, however, Secretary Perez denied being the
Million-Dollar Man referred to in Congo Villarama's privilege speech. On
November 25, 2002, Congo Jimenez delivered a privilege speech in the
House of Representatives confirming Congo Villarama's expose, and
accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him in February
2001. ,,8 (emphasis supplied)
On the same day when Congressman Mark Jimenez identified Secretary Perez as
the "2 Million Dollar Man," the Office of the Ombudsman began to make its own
inquiry. Thus-
"On November 25, 2002, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested

PAGC to submit documents relevant to the expose. On November 26, 2002,
Ombudsman Marcelo formally requested Congo Jimenez to submit a sworn
statement on his expose. Congo Jimenez complied on December 23, 2002
by submitting his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
complaint-affidavit was initially docketed as CPL-C-02-1992. On the same
day, the Special Action Team of the Fact Finding and Intelligence Research
Office (FIRO) of the Office of the Ombudsman referred Congo Jimenez's
complaint-affidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
and to the Administrative Adjudication Board, both of the Office of the
Ombudsman, for preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication,
respectively.
The complaint-affidavit of Jimenez was re-docketed as OMB-C-C-02-
0857L, for the criminal case in which the respondents were Secretary Perez,
Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon C. Arceo, Jr.; and as OMB-C-A-02-0631L, for
the administrative case involving only Secretary Perez as respondent.,,9
(emphasis supplied)
An investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman ensued subsequent to the filing

of the complaint-affidavit by Congo Jimenez.
The investigation conducted may be categorized into two distinct phases - the
fact-finding investfgation and the preliminary investigation. This distinction,
however, is merely for purposes of providing a bird's-eye view of how the
investigation proceeded because the Supreme Court had already ruled that for
purposes of determining whether there has been a violation of the respondents'
right to the speedy disposition of their cases, distinguishing one from the other
bears no materiality. Thus -
"The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be
considered a part of the preliminary investigation because the former was
only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period spent in the
former should not be factored in the computation.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the

Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered
inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or
not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter
for purposes of determining if the respondents' right to the speedy
disposition oftheir cases had been violated."lo
The fact-finding investigation commenced in 2003 when, on 2 January 2003, the

Office of the Ombudsman constituted a special panel to look into CPL-C-02-
1992. II The panel immediately came out with its recommendation for the conduct
of a full-blown fact-finding investigation by the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Research Office (FIRO), which recommendation was approved by Ombudsman
Marcelo on 15 January 2003.12 The Field Investigation Office (formerly FIRO)
completed its fact-finding investigation on 11 November 2005.13 It filed a
complaint as nominal complainant on 14 November 2005 against the
respondents 14 and prayed that -
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of

this Honorable Office, that:
9 Id., at pp. 365 - 366.

10Id., at p. 415.
II Id., at p. 366.
12 Id.
13 Records, Volume I, pp. 378-398.
14 Ibid.
a. After preliminary investigation, an Information be filed in court
charging the respondents, namely: former Justice Secretary HERNANDO
BENITO PEREZ; ROSARIO SALVADOR PEREZ; ERNEST L.
ESCALER; RAMON ANTONIO C. ARCEO, Jr.; and JOHN DOES, for
conspiring, confederating and helping one another in committing Graft and
Corruption, as defined and penalized under Section 3(b) of RA No. 3019
(the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended) in demanding and/or
extorting US$2.0 Million from Mr. Jimenez, out of which, they actually
received US$I,999,965.00;
b. After preliminary investigation, an Information be filecJ in court

charging respondent former Justice Secretary HERNANDO BENITO
PEREZ for violation of i) Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of RA No.
6713, ii) Article 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal Code, and iii) Article
171, paragraph 4 (Falsification), for not disclosing in his 2001 and 2002
SALNs the amount of US$1.7 Million which was found to have been
deposited in their Bank Account Nos. 338 118 and 348 118 at EFG Private
BankAG. 1
c. After an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation, a Petition be

filed in court for the forfeiture in favor of the government of the
US$I,999,965.00 bank deposits of the respondents, or any property of
equivalent value belonging to any or of all of the respondents, pursuant to
the provisions ofRA No. 1379;
d. That this Complaint be consolidated, its records incorporated, and the

same jointly investigated, with the complaint of Mr. Jimenez docketed as
OMB-CC-02-0857-L and OMB-C-A-02-0631-L, together with the related
Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit he filed on June 4, 2003;
e. Considering the participation of respondent ROSARIO S. PEREZ in

the commission of the crimes as established by the evidence on records, she
be impleaded as co-conspirator and/or co-principal in the charges filed by
Mr. Jimenez; and
f. Other relief and remedies as are just and equitable under the premises
are likewise prayed for.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this Complaint this 11th

day of November 2005 at Quezon City, Philippines." 15 (underscoring
supplied)
After the FIO came out with its recommendation, it forwarded the complete
records of the case to the Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudicati
and Monitoring Office (PAMO) for appropriate action. 16
15 Id., at p. 396 - 397.

16 Records, Volume I, p. 314.
The complaints were docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0857-L, OMB-C-C-05-0633-K,
OMB-C-C-05-0634-K (criminal cases) and OMB-C-C-05-0635-K (forfeiture
case).
On 23 November 2005, the respondents were directed to submit their counter-

affidavits. 17 Hence, on 13 December 2005, they filed a Consolidated Joint
l8
Counter Affidavit and answered the following charges:
1. C-C-05-0633-K, for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section of R.A. No,

6713, Article 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal Code, and Article 171, paragraph
4 (Falsificiation); 19
2. C-C-05-0634-K for violation of Section 3(b) or R.A. No. 3019;20 and
3. C-C-5-0635-K for violation of the Provision ofR.A. 1379.21
On 6 November 2006, the special panel issued its recommendation for the filing
of criminal cases against the respondents as well as the institution of a forfeiture
suit under Republic Act No. 1379.22 Its recommendation reads as follows-
"WHEREFORE, finding probable cause, let criminal Informations be filed

against the following respondents:
(1) Former Secretary Hernando Benito Perez; Rosario Salvador

Perez, Ernest L. Escaler; Ramon Antonio C. Arceo, Jr. for
Extortion (Robbery), defined and punishable under paragraph
5 of Article 294 in relation to Article 293 of the Revised
Penal Code;
(2) Former Secretary Hernando Benito Perez; Rosario Salvador

Perez, Ernest L. Escaler; Ramon Antonio C. Arceo, Jr., for
violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended);
(3) Former Secretary Hernando Benito Perez for Falsification of

Public Documents defined and penalized under paragraph
(4), Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
(4) Former Secretary Hernando Benito Perez for violation of

Section 7 of Republic Act 3019 in relation to Section 8 of
Republic Act 6713.
Additionally, in consonance with Section 2 of Republic Act 1379, let a

Petition for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property under Republic Act
1379 be filed against Former Secretary Hernando Benito Perez; Rosario
Salvador Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon Antonio C. Arceo, Jr., after
the conduct of the general elections in May 2007.
11People ys. Sandiganbayan, supra note 4 at 367.

18Records, Volume I, pp. 475 - 506.
19 Records, Volume I, pp. 484 - 493.
20 Records, Volume I, pp. 494 - 50 I.


On 5 January 2007, then Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the
recommendation, albeit partially. Her recommendation reads as follows -
"Approved: Except the recommendation on the initiation of forfeiture

proceedings which should be referred to another panel for further study.,,24
Henceforth, four criminal informations were filed against the respondents before
the Sandiganbayan on 18 April 2008. The informations for violation of Section
3(b) ofR.A. No. 3019 and Robbery were quashed on 13 November 200825 and 20
November 2008,26 respectively. The motions for reconsideration by the State were
denied on 21 April 200927 (violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019) and on 19
June 200928 (robbery); thus, the elevation by the State of the cases to the Supreme
Court via petitions for certiorari on 22 June 200929 (G.R. No. 188165, for the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265) and 24 August 200930 (G.R.
No. 189063, for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266). The
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of these criminal cases by the
Sandiganbayan on 11 December 2013.31
In the meantime that the criminal cases were moving forward, the review on the
initiation of a forfeiture suit languished for more than 5 years - from January 2007
until May 2012. To this day, the gap remains unexplained. It was only on 3 May
2012 when the Office of the Ombudsman took up the recommendation of then
Ombudsman Gutierrez and constituted a special panel to look into the initiation of
forfeiture proceedings. The panel's recommendation was submitted on 28
January 2013 and, on 14 November 2014, the present suit was filed before this
Court.
At this juncture, I humbly reiterate my position that, contrary to the assertion by

the Office of the Ombudsman, the imprescriptible right of the State in its pursuit to
recover unlawfully acquired properties is not in question. The challenge posed is
on the extremely alarming interpretation accorded to this right that is now being
used as a cloak for the derogation of the rights guaranteed to citizens under the
Bill of Rights.
Our law on civil forfeiture affords the respondents the right to a preliminary
inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation32 precisely because these respondent /

24 Records, Volume I, p. 358.
2S People vs. Sandiganbayan, supra note 4 at 374 - 378.
26 [d., at pp. 386 - 390.
27 [d., at pp. 379 - 385.
28 [d., at. pp. 390 - 398.
29 [d., at p. 385.
30 [d., at. p. 398.
31 People vs. Sandiganbayan, supra note 4.
32 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379. "Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency
an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed primajacie
to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal
who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to
the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalfofthe Republic of the Philippines, in the
Court of First Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition
for a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should
remain to be entitled to the guarantee of due process regardless of whatever
classification their case falls into - may it be criminal, civil or administrative. It
must be remembered that ours is "a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.,,33
The right to due process goes hand-in-hand with the right to speedy disposition of
cases. And while the right to speedy disposition of cases eludes mathematical
reckoning, a delay of almost 12 years reckoned from the time the fact-finding
investigation commenced on 2 January 2003, or almost 10 years reckoned from
the time the respondents filed their counter-affidavit before the Office of the
Ombudsman on 13 December 2005, which cannot be explained and must therefore
hide behind the invocation of the imprescriptible right of the State to recover
unlawfully-acquired properties is the height of arbitrariness and injustice.
This is not the first time that the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired
properties and the right of an individual under the Bill of Rights have been pitted
against each other. The Constitutional Commission trod on the same path when it
deliberated whether to delete or retain Section 8 of Proposed Resolution No. 540
(Article on Transitory Provisions) granting the PCGG the power to issue
sequestration orders which, ordinary circumstances obtaining, constitute a
violation of the guarantee to due process under the Bill of Rights. The stand that I
take is akin to that taken by Fr. Joaquin Bernas. To demonstrate, I would like to
quote passages from the deliberations of the Commission on 7 October 1986:
"FR. BERNAS. I would ask for the deletion of Section 8 of the Transitory
Provisions for these reasons: Either it is necessary or it is unnecessary, or if
it is necessary, it is oppressive.
We have listened to the arguments principally of Commissioner Romulo

which tried to establish that what the PCGG has been doing are things
which can be done even under normal processes. The thrust of the argument
is, therefore, it would be unnecessary. This provision would be 'unnecessary
except - as Commissioner Romulo has explained very well - as a safety
measure, as a sanitary shield as it were. If however, it is necessary, it can
only be necessary because as explained by the committee, it runs smack
against the Bill of Rights. What I would like to avoid is precisely the
situation where, as we enter into the normalization of constitutional
processes, we aim a sword against the very heart of a Constitution which is
the Bill of Rights. To my mind, that would not be a very good way to
continue a revolution.
If we delete this provision, what will happen? Executive Order Nos. 1,2 and
14 will be there. They will be automatically erased by the silence of a
Constitution. Their validity or invalidity can still be argued before the
Supreme Court, which is the proper place for a decision on this matter.
In other words, when I say delete, I am not necessarily saying that it will
leave the PCGG on the lurch. But the Supreme Court should be given the
opportunity to examine the PCGG in the concrete as it exists now under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14. Let us give the Supreme Court a chanc
to find out which of these are abhorrent to democratic processes.
not be declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall be tiled within one year before any
election or within three months before any special election." (emphasis supplied)
33 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518.
I would not grant that millions or billions of dollars are involved. That is a
monetary value. But there are values in the Constitution which are beyond
monetary estimation. And when we begin to disregard these values which
have been there for a long time and we begin to put a dollar value on them,
then I think we are in a very bad situation. So for these reasons, and as an
act of confidence in the renovated Supreme Court, I ask for the deletion of
Section 8 and to leave the entire matter to judicial investigation.,,34
"MR. OPLE. Madam President, yesterday when I participated in the debate,

I indicated that I would like to keep an open mind on the issue of deletion.
Since then, I have determined that it is my duty now to speak in favor of the
Bernas amendment for deletion, if only to rescue the good father from the
loneliness of his crusade. Of course, I have circulated three proposed
amendments and I hope, in the event that the motion for deletion loses, I
would be in a position to improve upon this proposed section, especially
from the standpoint of the Bill of Rights so that later I can support an
amended provision more compatible with the Bill of Rights and due
process.
Madam President, all throughout these debates, I have noted a tendency to

look at the Bill of Rights in a cavalier manner. For example, I was
disappointed yesterday when my friend, Commissioner Romulo, in answer
to one of my questions, said that if there is a clash between the Bill of
Rights, particularly Section 3 and the writ of sequestration provision where
an order is contested before a court, there would be a little margin of
freedom for the courts to uphold the Bills of Rights precisely because of this
provision. The Bill of Rights, Madam President, is by the protestations of all
Commissioners, the heart of this Constitution. When we wrote the Bill of
Rights, I do not think we made this reservation in our minds and hearts that
any portion of it could be allowed to be vitiated, no matter how
preponderant the pretext for it might be in terms of the moral grandeur of
such an objective. Father Bernas is right. When one writes a Bill of Rights
and in the same breath agrees to vitiate some of its provisions, one might be
accused of a double standard. What will prevent equally urgent
considerations such as national security from affecting the attituae of, let us
say, those in charge of national security towards the Bill of Rights? There is
a provision there that we amended - the liberty of abode and the right to
travel - and we said this prohibits hamletting which is a forcible evacuation
of families in certain villages, in a zone of actual or potential hostilities. And
when we relax our standards and vigilance over Section 3 of the Bill of
Rights, are we not sending a signal to some of these people in the military,
that because national security is equally imperative as goal of this nation,
that the provision on the liberty of abode can also be vitiated in the name of
larger goals of the State?
I think, historically, we are forewarned that the question of ends and means
has nagged many societies and many governments before us. In the 15th
century, Miguel de Torquemada established a record of sorts in Spain by
causing the execution of 2,000 heretics and, of course, at that time, he was
hailed and acclaimed for the majesty of that achievement. In the name of the
purity of Catholic beliefs, 2,000 people suspected of heresy were
systematically eliminated. And, of course, this dilemma of mankind as
between ends and means has dominated the agenda of social and political
thinkers for a long time.
It is said that political science begins with Machiavelli's book, "The

Prince." According to this book, if you want to preserve yourself in the
political world, it is essential that you falsify things. It is essential for your
own political survival and for the maintenance of power, if yOll are already
in power, to disregard the ethics and moral values that otherwise bind a
community, and probably in some ways this is correct. You have to enter
into many compromises in politics to be able to survive and yet there are
those distinguished by a hard core belief in their own ethical values and
even if they face defeat in an election, they refuse to compromise their own
beliefs. Then that is the price that they willingly accept.
Madam President, I am not saying that there is a direct correspondence

between what I have said and the issue of the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. I
think no one dissents from the view that this country is entitled to the
recovery of any stolen possessions. At the same time, do we have to see this
within the frame of the rights that we have enshrined in this Constitution for
the people or shall we elect - as the body historically charged with the task
of writing down this new Constitution to allow situations where, in
proportion to the nobility of objections, there is a mandate to relax our
vigilance and standards with respect to the rights of the people that we
ourselves have written into this Constitution and which will detract
undoubtedly from the majesty and nobility of this Constitution that we are
preparing for our people?
And so, Madam president, may I conclude by saying that in my heart, my

awareness of the complex dilemma of ends and means, as it has worked
throughout history, impels me now to defend the Bernas amendment for a
deletion. This is without prejudice to my presenting amendments later, if the
motion to delete loses so that more of us can support wholeheartedly this
Section 8 of the Transitory Provisions.
Thank you.,,35
The backdrop of that debate was that the country was under extraordinary times
and faced with the extraordinary responsibility of re-building a nation from the
ground. Weare already three decades away from that deliberation and we have
been provided a Constitution to uphold. It is therefore disheartening to be
summoned now to rule on a similar issue.
The sentiment I advance is best re-echoed in the pronouncement of the Supreme

Court in the 1994 case of Allado vs. Diokno3 and with which I choose to
punctuate my vote on this particular issue -
"The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the
seeming immensity of government power which when unchecked becomes
tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the Constitution, particularly the Bill of
Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state actions. But
on occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter.
In consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case before us,
35 Ibid., pp. 541-542.

36 G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SeRA 192.
if uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort
inflicted by government agents is not reflective of responsible government.
Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason of their high and prestigious
office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting
unnecessary injury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people
from vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice;
hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the law.
This is essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But this
does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of
the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy
and disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution.,,37
SB-14-CVL-002: Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Hernando
Benito Perez, Rosario A. Perez, Ernest De Leon Escaler and Ramon Antonio
Castillo Arceo, Jr., Respondents.
I join in the dissent of Honorable Alex L. Quiroz and subscribe to his

discussion that inordinate delay, which is attendant in this case, violates
Respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their case before the Office
of the Ombudsman.
On the other hand, worthy of scrutiny is the second paragraph of Section 2

of R.A. No. 1379, which reads:
x x x That the right to file such petition shall prescribe after four
years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or
expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except
as to those who have ceased to hold office within ten years prior
to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings shall
prescribe after four years from the approval hereof.
In the case of Republic thru the PCGG v. Migrinol, the Supreme Court
declared that:
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 should be deemed amended or

repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "[t]he right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel".
Does this mean, therefore, that Respondents can no longer rely on their
assertion that inordinate delay by the Office of the Ombudsman, which is
violative of their right to the speedy disposition of this case, will cause the
dismissal of this case because of Article XI Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution, which declares that the State's right to recover unlawfully
acquired properties of government officials and employees cannot be
barred by prescription, laches or estoppel?
The answer sho\,Jldbe in the negative.
1 Republic of the Philippines thru: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), AFP
Anti-Graft Board, Col. Ernesto A. Punsalang and Peter T. Tabang v. Hon. Eutropio Mig~ino, and
Troadio Tecson, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990.
Page 1 of 6
1v
First, a person's right to the speedy disposition of a case against him or her
is protected under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is known as the
Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights enumerates a person's (not just citizen's)
rights that are self-enabling, inalienable, indubitable, and it serves as a
limitation to the acts of the state. Generally, any governmental action in
violation of the Bill of Rights is void. These provisions are also generally self-
executing.2
Thus, the Supreme Court held:

The Bill qf Rights is a set of prescriptions setting forth the
fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and
imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of those rights. The Bill of Rights is
designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
against the assault of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles. 3
Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates "The Ombudsman

and his Deputies, as protectors of the people" to bear the duty to "act
promptly on co.mplaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations" as well as "notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof.' Certainly, the duty of the Ombudsman to act promptly and
expeditiously irl the performance of its function is not just limited to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases but also includes administrative
investigations as well as preliminary inquiries under R.A. No. 1379, which is
akin to preliminary investigation in criminal cases.
In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan4, the Supreme Court explained that "As the

institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the
Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in order to ensure that
cases before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose
those who are responsible for its delays x x x."
Moreover, the Supreme Court, through Mme Justice Angelina Sandoval-

Gutierrez in Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsmans, held that the
Ombudsman w.as:
x x x constitutionally created to be the "protector of the people, "

with the expressed mandate that it "shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereot including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and
2 Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political law (2009).

3 PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973.
4 G.R. Nos. 191411 and 191871, July is, 2013.
S G.R. Nos. 174902-06, February is, 2008, 569 Phil 309-323.
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the
people. "
To attain its mandate, Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6770

(The Ombl,Jdsman Act of 1989) bestowed upon respondent broad
and tremendous powers and functions generally categorized as
follows: ir1Vestigatory power, prosecutory power, disciplinary
power, contempt power, public assistance functions, authority to
inquire and obtain information, and function to adopt, institute
and implement preventive measures, thus:
SEe. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the

recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
involved therein.
These powers, functions and duties are aimed to enable
respondent to be "a more active and effective agent of the people
in ensuring accountability in public office." Unfortunately,
respondent has transgressed its constitutional and statutory
duties. When the Constitution enjoins respondent to "act
promptly" on any complaint against any public officer or
employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily resolve the
same. But respondent did not act promptly or resolve speedily
petitioners' cases. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman requires that the hearing officer is givefJ',a definite
period of "not later than thirty (30) days" to resolve the case after
the formal investigation shall have been concluded. Definitely,
respondent did not observe this 3D-day rule.
In the instant case, there was a long gap or a stall in the processing of this
case from the time Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez wrote her
disagreement to the recommendation of the Special Panel for the filing of
the forfeiture case for violation of R.A. No. No. 1379 on November 6, 2006
to the time when Ombudsman Hon. Conchita Carpio-Morales ordered the
creation of a Special Panel of Reviewers in Office Order No. 177, Series of
2012 tasked to review the matter of filing a petition for forfeiture under R.A.
No. No. 1379 on May 3, 2012. It took the Office of the Ombudsman almost
six (6) years to constitute a Special Panel so tasked to conduct a further study
on the matter of filing a petition for forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No.
No. 1379! And the state has not offered any rhyme or reason for such a long
stall in the proceedings.
Second, the Supreme Court, in at least two cases for civil forfeiture under
R.A. No. No. 1379, recognized the right of the Republic to the speedy
disposition of its case. In the first case, It reasoned:
Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this
case. It would readily be apparent to a reasonable mind that
respondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to every
procedural device to delay the resolution hereof. There is justice
waiting to be done. The people and the State are entitled to
favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to restore the
ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner, the Republic
of the Philippines, within the shortest possible time. 6
Also worth mentioning is the Court's reasoning in the Joint Resolution of the
cases of Marcos v. Republic7, and Marcos v. Republic8:
We reiterate our observations in the Swiss Deposits case:
"Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this
case. It would readily be apparent to a reasonable mind that
respondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to every
procedural device to delay the resolution hereof. .. The people and
the State are entitled to favorable judgment free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays ... /I
In the above cases, the right of the Republic, a party in a civil forfeiture case,
to the speedy disposition of its case was recognized by tne Supreme Court;
thus, the act of the Sandiganbayan in rendering a summary judgment is a
clear manifestation of the court stepping in to uphold a party's right (in this
case, the Republic's) to the speedy disposition of its case.
If the Republic, as a Petitioner in a civil case for forfeiture under R.A. No.
1379, has a right to the speedy disposition of its case, then conversely, it
could validly be maintained that Respondents in the said case also have a
right to the speedy disposition of the case against them.
So, how can Section 2 of R.A. No 1379, as amended by Article XI Section 15

of the 1987 Constitution then find application?
It is submitted that Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379 is applicable at the time the
Republic files or institutes a petition for civil forfeiture. But, when the case
is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman'or the courts, then
the Republic's right to recover said properties is subject to the right of the
Respondents to the speedy disposition of their case. Otherwise stated, while
the Republic's right to investigate or make preliminary inquiries, file or
inititate an action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth cannot be bound or
6 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003,461 Phil 598-616 and G.R. No.
152154, November 18, 2003.
7 G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014.
8 G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014.
Page 4 of 6
--tv
limited by prescription, estoppel or laches, once the case progresses at the
preliminary stages or in the trial stages, the same should be limited by the
basic right of an individual to the disposition of the casesagainst him.
This conclusion can be drawn from the phrases contained in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 1379 and in Article XI Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The former
refers to the State's (or Republic's) "right to file" while the latter starts with
the phrase" the right to recover". These phrases connote an initiation of an
action by the State against public officials and employees in order to recover
unlawfully acqu)red properties.
Prescription is an effect of the lapse of time to the right of an entity to assert

its right or claim. This concept is clearly related to the initiation of an action
or claim against another person. And, in the case of civil forfeiture, the 1987
Constitution provides that the lapse of time does not bar the right of the
State to commence an investigation or initiate an action to for recovery of
unlawfully acquired properties.
Of course it can well be asserted that the Republic has every right to initiate
the investigation or inquiry into the unlawfully acquired properties of
respondents for it cannot barred by prescription. But once, the action is
initiated, filed or pending, it is incumbent upon the Ombudsman, the
representative of the Republic, to prosecute its case with adequate pace or
speed so as not to trample on respondents' rights.
.
On the other hand, the principle of estoppel is "the operation o/the principle
that an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon." 9 Simply stated, it means that a person can no longer claim
otherwise, if he led another person to believe in a fact or certain set of facts
by reason of his action, inaction when required to do something or through
negligence.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The
defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the
character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of
plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from
asserting his claim at all, becauseto allow him to do so would be inequitable
and unjust to defendant.lO
There is no argument that the State is immune from the principle of estoppel
and it could not be bound by any action, declaration, inaction or
misdeclaration of its officials, particularly in the matter of recovery of
9 Panay Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Manuel Loring, Jr., G.R. No. 81939, June29, 1989.
10 Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121038, July 22, 1999.
Page 5 of 6
7tI
unlawfully acquired properties by any of its officials or employees. However,
this is not even relevant in the instant case as there are no allegations of
estoppel or laches.
But, even if such were alleged, it should not be forgotten that the
Ombudsman, as a duty bearer under the Constitution, should have acted
promptly and disposed of the case against the respondents, in whatever
manner it should see fit. The Human Rights-Based approach to
developmentll which was adopted by the United Nations in 2003 and also
known as the UN Common Understanding on a Human-Rights-Based
Approach (HRBA) to Development Cooperation, defines duty bearers, such
as the Office of the Ombudsman, are those actors who have a particular
obligation or responsibility to respect, promote and realize human rights and
to abstain from human rights violations. It is, therefore, the solemn duty of
the said office to respect Respondents' right to the speedy disposition of this
case.
Lastly, it would be absurd to assert that Respondents will lose their right to
the speedy disposition of the instant case because of the primacy of the right
of the State to recover ill-gotten or unlawfully acquired properties
considering that the former is a right of every person so charged, whether
criminally, civilly or administratively. At best, courts should find a way to
harmonize the two constitutional provisions.
WHEREFORE,premises considered, I vote for the dismissal ofthe instant case

for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 against herein Respondents.
GERAL=I~.~NG
Associate Justice
11 See more at http://www.unfpa.org/human-rights-based-approach#sthash.YvuGiZps.dpuf.

Page 6 of 6

Republic of The Philippines Sandiganbayan Quezon City: Et At

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Republic of The Philippines Sandiganbayan Quezon City: Et At

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Republic of The Philippines Sandiganbayan Quezon City: Et At

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HERNANDO B. PEREZ, et at, CABOTAJE-TANG, PJ

For resolution are the following:

2. Respondents Perez, et al.'s Motion to Reconsider

THE MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF RESOLUTION

Respondents Perez, et al. pray that the Court issue a

assumed." Otherwise, they contend that the grant of their

In addition to the motion for the issuance of a resolution

Respondent Escaler also filed a motion

10 Respondents Perez, et a/. adopted respondent Escaler's motion to dismiss.

(2) R. A. No. 1379, which governs the procedure in

(3) this case should be dismissed on the ground of

(4) R. A. No. 1379 covers only public officers and

(5) the Court erred in concluding that he is deemed to

In the same motion for reconsideration, respondent

In its consolidated comment/ opposition, the petitioner

proceedings under R. A. No. 1379 against the respondents.

13 pp. 310- ; Record, Vol. II

will be used to perpetrate an injustice which is what happened

Respondent Escaler claims that the petitioner failed to

17 pp. 385-388, Record, Vol. II

contend with different banking rules and the prevailing law of

RESPONDENT PEREZ, ET AL.'S URGENT

Respondents Perez, et al. filed an Urgent Manifestation

the face of the assailed Resolution why Justices Cornejo and

want another set of Justices to resolve their motions for

After an assiduous examination of the arguments of the

I. There is no legal basis for

The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is

The parties filed their respective motions for

The Court ordered the remand of this case to the

Evidently, the issue of whether the Office of the

26 pp. 22-25, Record, Vol. II

Court. "This presents an opportune time to remind the

At any rate, the Court resolves to admit, as it

In the same assailed Resolution, the Court denied

WHEREFORE, the parties' respective motions for

The import of the Court's Resolution promulgated on

directive. In the same Resolution, the Court then proceeded to

II. The prayer of respondents

Section 1(b), Rule VIII and Section 2(a), Rule IX of the

(b) In Division - The unanimous vote of three

Section 2. The Justices Who Shall Act on a

In this case, the Resolution promulgated on July 8,2015,

Further, pursuant to Section l(b), Rule VIII, when the

31 p. 7 of the Resolution promulgated on July 8, 2015; p. 25, Record, Vol. \I

as special members of special division of five (5)justices, per

III. Respondents' right to speedy

The concept of speedy disposition of case is relative or

balancing test of applYing societal interests and the rights of

15. As in their previous motions, respondents kept

16. In the case of Tatad us. Sandiganbayan,

contributed to the length of time in the disposition of

prescription, laches or estoppel of the right of the State

Also, this Court already extensively passed upon this

I. Re: Alleged Violation of the