Sps Cruz V Sun Holidays

G.R. No.
186312 June 29, 2010
SPOUSES DANTE CRUZ and LEONORA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
SUN HOLIDAYS, INC., Respondent.
Facts: Spouses Cruz lodged a Complaint against Sun Holidays, Inc. with the (RTC) of Pasig City for damages
arising from the death of their son (Ruelito) who perished with his wife on September 11, 2000 on board
the boat M/B Coco Beach III that capsized en route to Batangas from Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro
where the couple had stayed at Coco Beach Island Resort (Resort) owned and operated by respondent.
The stay of the newly wed Ruelito and his wife at the Resort from September 9 to 11, 2000 was by virtue
of a tour package-contract with respondent that included transportation to and from the Resort and the
point of departure in Batangas.
Miguel C. Matute (Matute), a scuba diving instructor and one of the survivors, gave his account of the
incident that led to the filing of the complaint as follows:
On September 11, 2000, Matute and 25 other Resort guests including petitioners’ son and his wife trekked
to the other side of the Coco Beach mountain that was sheltered from the wind where they boarded M/B
Coco Beach III, which was to ferry them to Batangas.
Shortly after the boat sailed, it started to rain. As it moved farther away from Puerto Galera and into the
open seas, the rain and wind got stronger, causing the boat to tilt from side to side and the captain to step
forward to the front, leaving the wheel to one of the crew members.
The waves got more unwieldy. After getting hit by two big waves which came one after the other, M/B
Coco Beach III capsized putting all passengers underwater.
The passengers, who had put on their life jackets, struggled to get out of the boat. Upon seeing the
captain, Matute and the other passengers who reached the surface asked him what they could do to save
the people who were still trapped under the boat. The captain replied "Iligtas niyo na lang ang sarili niyo"
(Just save yourselves).
Petitioners filed the Complaint, alleging that respondent, as a common carrier because the transporting
of its guests is an integral part of its resort business and was guilty of negligence in allowing M/B Coco
Beach III to sail notwithstanding storm warning bulletins issued by (PAGASA) as early as 5:00 a.m. of
September 11, 2000.
Respondent denied being a common carrier, alleging that its boats are not available to the general public
as they only ferry Resort guests and crew members. Nonetheless, it claimed that it exercised the utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of its passengers; contrary to petitioners’ allegation, there was no storm
on September 11, 2000 as the Coast Guard in fact cleared the voyage; and M/B Coco Beach III was not
filled to capacity and had sufficient life jackets for its passengers.
The Captain of M/B Coco Beach III, averred that the Resort customarily requires four conditions to be met
before a boat is allowed to sail, to wit: (1) the sea is calm, (2) there is clearance from the Coast Guard, (3)
there is clearance from the captain and (4) there is clearance from the Resort’s assistant manager. He
added that M/B Coco Beach III met all four conditions on September 11, 2000, but a subasco or squall,
characterized by strong winds and big waves, suddenly occurred, causing the boat to capsize.
Pasig RTC dismissed petitioners’ Complaint
The appellate court denied petitioners’ appeal, holding, among other things, that the trial court correctly
ruled that respondent is a private carrier which is only required to observe ordinary diligence; that
respondent in fact observed extraordinary diligence in transporting its guests on board M/B Coco Beach
III; and that the proximate cause of the incident was a squall, a fortuitous event.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is a common carrier.
Held: YES.
Petitioners correctly rely on De Guzman v. Court of Appeals in characterizing respondent as a common

carrier.
The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering
their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as
"a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article
1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
Indeed, respondent is a common carrier. Its ferry services are so intertwined with its main business as to
be properly considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of respondent’s ferry services in its resort
operations is underscored by its having its own Coco Beach boats. And the tour packages it offers, which
include the ferry services, may be availed of by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These services
are thus available to the public.
That respondent does not charge a separate fee or fare for its ferry services is of no moment. It would be
imprudent to suppose that it provides said services at a loss. The Court is aware of the practice of beach
resort operators offering tour packages to factor the transportation fee in arriving at the tour package
price. That guests who opt not to avail of respondent’s ferry services pay the same amount is likewise
inconsequential. These guests may only be deemed to have overpaid.
When a passenger dies or is injured in the discharge of a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the
common carrier is at fault or negligent. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.
The evidence shows that PAGASA issued 24-hour public weather forecasts and tropical cyclone warnings
for shipping on September 10 and 11, 2000 advising of tropical depressions in Northern Luzon which
would also affect the province of Mindoro.
A very cautious person exercising the utmost diligence would thus not brave such stormy weather and
put other people’s lives at risk. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers demands that
they take care of the goods or lives entrusted to their hands as if they were their own. This respondent
failed to do.
Respondent’s insistence that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event does not impress either.
To fully free a common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and
only causeof the loss. And it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before,
during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event.
Article 1764 vis-à-vis Article 2206 of the Civil Code holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of
carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2)
indemnity for loss of earning capacity and (3) moral damages.

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G.R. No.

186312 June 29, 2010

SPOUSES DANTE CRUZ and LEONORA CRUZ, Petitioners,

Pasig RTC dismissed petitioners’ Complaint

Issue: Whether or not respondent is a common carrier.

Petitioners correctly rely on De Guzman v. Court of Appeals in characterizing respondent as a common

The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:

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