Law of Evidence: Rangarajan
Law of Evidence: Rangarajan
Law of Evidence: Rangarajan
s. Rangarajan
6. For an illustration of this aspect see Ji. v. Gopa/, 3 I. L. R. Madras 271 per
Turner, C.J., at page 282, “Now if we examine the Indian Act 11 of 1855 it
will be seen to have had for its object the improvement of the Law of
Evidence, and there is not to be found throughout it the smallest exclusion o f
evidence which had, under English law, been upto that time receivable.
Improvement was in the direction, which had set in England, of admitting not
excluding” .
7. Gujju L a ll v. Fatteh Lall, 6 1. L. R. Calcutta 171 See the dissenting view of
the only Indian judge on the bench which decided this case; “That decisions
like the one under our consideration have been frequently admitted in our
Courts as evidence, is, I believe, a proposition beyond all dispute, and I do
not see any reason why we should depart from this practice merely because
it is opposed to the English law of evidence” (at page 179).
LAW OF EVIDENCE 265
facts, and facts fall into tw o classes, those which can, and those
which can n o t, be perceived by the sense.
I8a. Section 3.
19. Section 5.
LAW OF e v id e n c e 269
Facts not otherwise relevant would also becom e relevant (1) if they
are inconsistent w ith any fact in issue or relevant fact; and ( 2) if by
themselves or in connection w ith other facts they m ake the existence or
non-existence o f any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable o r
improbable,^® This provision is in consonance with th e idea th at some
facts though logically relevant are n o t legally relevant. Instances o f such
20. Section 6.
21. Section 7.
22. Section 9.
23. Section 11.
270 the INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
exclusion would be those which fall under th e hearsay rule and the fu r
ther rule which requires th a t no transaction between th e tw o parties
ought to operate to the disadvantage o f a th ird party. U n d er the latte r
would fall (a) statem ents m ade behind the back of a person against
whom they are sought (o be used as evidence and (b) sim ilar unconnec
ted transactions as well as opinions o f th ird parties.
24. Section 8.
25. Illustration (g) to settion 32.
26. Illustration (h) to section 32,
LAW OF EVIDENCE 271
gunshot wounds and he died 20 days after adm ission into the hospital,,
and the death was not connected with the injuries received during th e
occurrence, th e same was n o t held to fall under section 32(1).“^
'-<dharacter
The question when the character o f a person becomes relevant is
one of some nicety and has been provided by sections 52 to 55; sections
53 and 54 deal with the character o f the accused in crim inal cases while
the other tw o sections are concerned with civil cases. The character of
witnesses, as distinct from parties, to a proceeding has been separately
dealt w ith under sections 146(3) and 155(4). C haracter includes both
reputation and disposition; but, except as provided in section 54
evidence may be given only o f general reputation or disposition.
R eputation is n o t based upon personal knowledge of the person but is
the estim ation in which the public holds him. D isposition can, hoW'
ever, be spoken to only by those having personal knowledge. In civil
cases, the character o f any person concerned being such as to render
probable or im probable any conduct im puted to him is irrelevant except
in so fa r as such character appears from facts otherwise relevant.^® B ut
in civil cases the character o f any person such as to affect the am ount
o f damages which he ought to receive, is relevant.®" In criminal pro-
ceedings the fact th a t the accused is of a good character is relevant. “>■
B ut bad character of an accused is irrelevant, unless evidence has been
given th a t he has good character.®* B ut the last requirem ent would
n o t apply to cases in which the bad character o f a person is itself a fact
in issue or previous conviction is itself relevant as evidence of bad
character.
Witnesses to character may be cross-examined and re-examined.*®
T he evidence o f a previous conviction, as already noticed, could be re
levant.®^ Evidence as to previous conviction is m ade relevant by
section 75 of the Indiau Penal Code in cases wJierc the accused is liable
to enhanced ptinishm ent.
J Admissions
Thus while all confessions are admissions, the converse is not true.
a doubt in the mind o f the court and not fo r the prosecution to prove
th a t it was voluntarily made. If such a confession is, however, made
after the impression caused by any such inducement, th reat or prom ise
has, ia th e opinion of the court, been full^ removed, it is relevant.®"
Inform ation as to past user, or the past history, o f the object produced
is n o t related to its discovery in th e setting in which it is discovered.
Inform ation supplied by a person in custody th a t he w ould produce the
knife concealed in the ro o f o f his house did not lead to the discovery o f
a knife since knives were discovered many years ago.
Statem ents
(a) the proceeding was betw een the sam e parties o r their represen-
tatives-in-interest ;
(b) the adverse party h ad the right and o pportunity o f cross-
examining them ;
(c) the questions in issue are substantially the sam e in both th e
proceedings.’-
and effect of th e statem ent and the circum stances under which it was
made.^"*
P ro o f
P ro o f may be either o ral or docum entary. All facts, except th e
contents o f docum ents, may be proved by oral.evidence.^® I f it is oral
evidence it m ust in all cases be direct; if it refers to a fact w hich could
be seen it must be the evidence o f one who says he saw i t ;' iF it refers to
a fact which could be heard, it m ust be the evidence o f one w ho says he
heard i t ; if it refers to a fact w hich could be perceived by any o th er
sense or in any oth er m anner, it m ust be by one who says he perceived
it by that sense or in th at m anner ; if it refers to an opinion or to th e
grounds on which th a t opinion is held it m ust be the evidence o f a
person who holds th a t opinion on those grounds. T here is, however, a
clear distinction between the factum and tru th o f a statem ent. A
statem ent m ade to a witness by a person who is n o t him self called as
witness may or may n o t be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadm issible
when th e object o f the evidence is to establish w hat is contained in th e
sta te m e n t; it is n o t hearsay b u t would be adm issible w hen it is p ro p o sed
to establish n o t th e tru th o f th e statem ent, b u t th e fact it was m ade.
The contents o f docum ents m ay be proved either by prim ary o r
secondary evidence.^® Prim ary evidence m eans the docum ent itself,
which is produced for the inspection o f the court. W hen it is in several
p a rts each p art is prim ary evidence o f th e d o c u m e n t; w hen it is executed
in coun terp arts, each co u n terp art is executed by one or m ore o f the
parties, each counterpart is prim ary evidence as against’ the parties
executing it. W here a num b er o f docum ents are all m ade by one
uniform process (printing, lithography, p h otography etc.), each is
prim ary evidence o f the contents of th e rest ; b u t not w here they are all
copies o f the same.^
offence o f rape o f a girl o f eight years, om ission to adm inister o ath even
to an ad u lt bears only on the credibility o f the witness and n o t on his
competency. The O aths A ct does not deal w ith com petency o f a witness
b u t only subjects a person giving false evidence to a crim inal prosecu
tion. A child witness m ay require corroboration though it w ould not
be illegal to base a conviction o n the testim ony o f such child witness
alone. Before a child witness is exam ined the court usually puts a few
prelim inary questions to see its capacity o f understanding and knowledge
o f the dilference between tru th and falsehood. A w om an w ho is ravished
is a com petent witness. W hen the circum stances w arrant, the u n co rro
borated testim ony o f the prosecutrix in a rape case can be legally acted
upon. The religion of a witness is no b ar to com petency. T here is a
specific provision regarding the reception o f testim ony o f dum b witnesses
provided the m anner in which th e evidence given by th e dum b witness
is made intelligible by w riting o r signs m ade in open court.^*’
The court may presum e the existence o f any fact which is JikeJy to
happen regard being had to the com m on course o f n atu ral events,
hum an conduct and public and private business in their relation to the
facts o f the particu lar case.^® The cou rt can call for p ro o f unless it is
prescribed by th e A ct th a t it “ m ay presum e” a fact and shall regard a
fact as proved when it “ shall presum e” a fact ; it shall n o t, however,
allow any evidence to disprove a fact where it has been declared th at
one fact is conclusive p ro o f of an other.
A ttestation
(1) Any fact may be proved which would invalidate a docum ent o r
which w ould entitle any person to a decree relating thereto,
such as fraud, intim idation, illegality, w ant of due execution,
w ant o f capacity in any contracting p arty , want o r failure o f
consideration, o r m istake in fact or law.
(2) The existence o f any separate oral agreem ent as to any m atter
on which a docum ent is silent, b u t n o t inconsistent w ith the
term s regard being had, however, to the degree o f form ality o f
the docnm ent.
(3) The existence o f any separate oral agreem ent, constituting a
condition precedent to the attaching o f any obligation under
any such contract, grant or disposition o f property.
(4) The existence o f any subsequent oral agreement to rescind o r
m odify such contract, grant o r disposition o f property except
in cases where such contract is by law required to be in w riting
o r has been registered according to law pertaining to registra
tio n o f docum ents.
(5) Any usage o r custom b y which incidents n o t m entioned in any
contract are usually annexed to contracts o f th at description,
subject to the further condition th a t the annexing o f such
incident is not repugnant to or inconsistent with th e express
term s o f th e contract.
( 6) Any fact w hich shows in w hat m anner the language o f a
docum ent is related to existing facts’^.
Judicial notice
There are some facts o f which evidence need not be given if they
are relevant, and if the co u rt can take judicial notice o f them o r if
they are adm itted by the other side.®^ A p art from these two categories
certain facts may be taken judicial notice o f by the court and those
facts need not be proved.®® The reason for this is th a t they are
considered to be well-known —to o notorious and so well-known th a t it
would be an insult to intelhgence if evidence is offered to prove the
existence o f those facts. This provision®" m ay have to be widened
sufficiently to tak e in many m ore facts w hich may properly belong to
this category in the light o f the advancem ent o f hum an knowledge. T he
Suprem e C o u rt was o f the view th a t no judicial noticc could be taken
o f R attigan’s Digest concerning a poin t o f custom ary law in the P unjab
in spite o f the same having been compiled w ith great effort. In th a t
case the custom pleaded was th a t the sister was excluded from in h erit
ance by her b ro th e r’s collaterals. The alleged custom was required to
be proved®'^
84. Section5(5.
85. Section 57.
86. Section 57.
87. Ujagar Singh v. M st. Jeo, (1959) Supp 2 S.C .R . 781.
88. Sections 122 to 127.
89. Section 122.
90. Section 123.
91. Section 124.
LAW OF EVIDENCE 297
claim w ithout looking a t the docum ent containing the subject m atter, o f
course with the help o f o th er evidence. I f th e co u rt disagrees with
the oflScer claim ing such privilege the co n ten ts o f th e docum ents are to
be disclosed ; it would n o t be looked into if th e co u rt agrees with the
claim o f privilege. I f th e privilege is claim ed under the la tte r provision
then th e cou rt m ay look into th e docum ent and decide upon the p ro
priety o f the claim . T h e docum ent w ould be re tu rn e d to the officer and
the claim o f privilege upheld w ithout its being disclosed to anybody if
th e co u rt upholds th e claim o f privilege. T h e m ere fact th a t privi-
ledge could be claim ed w ith reference to a docum ent w hich is sum m oned
by cou rt would n o t excuse th e person sum m oned from bringing the
docum ent to co u rt because it is only the co u rt which has to decide
upon th e validity o f any such claim o f privilege o r objection to its being
produced.*'"
Professional com m unications betw een law yer and client are privi-
ledged unless the client expressly consents to the disclosure o f any such
com m unication made to the law yer fo r the purpose o f his p r o
fessional em p lo y m en t; this applies to the contents or conditions of any
docum ent with which the law yer becam e acquainted in the course o f
discharging his professional duties as well as to th e advice given by him .
T he exceptions, however, are th a t there is no privilege in respect o f any
com m unication made in furtherance o f any illegal purpose o r any fact
observed by the lawyer in the course o f his em ploym ent showing th a t
any crime or fraud has been com m itted since the com m encem ent o f his
professional em ploym ent. This obligation w ould continue even after
th e professional em ployment has ceased.®*® T he same provisions are
extended to interpreters, clerks o r servants o f the lawyer.”® The privi-
ledge is not w aived by the m ere fact o f the p a rty giving evidence at his
ow n instance or otherwise.^ N o one shall be compelled to disclose to
th e court any such coniidential com m unication unless the p a rty olfers
him self as a witness in which case he may be compelled to disclose any
such com m unication as may appear to the court necessary to be know n
in order to explain any evidence given by him.^ N o witness w ho is n o t
a party to a suit shall be com pelled to produce his title deeds to any
property, or any docum ent by virtue o f which he holds any p ro p erty as
pledgee or m ortgagee, or any docum ent the production o f w hich m ight
tend to crim inate him, unless he has agreed in w riting to produce them.'*
E s to p p e l
4. Section 132.
5. Section 115.
6. Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore 1952 S.C .K . 418 ;G y a rsi B a iv . Dhansukh Z al,
A .l.R . 1965 S.C . 1055.
7. Section 116.
300 THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTRM
Burden of proof
8. Section 117.
9. Noakala Setharamaiah v. Kotaiak Naldu, A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 1354.
10. Sections 101-103,
11. Section 101.
12. Section 101.
13. Section 103.
14. Section 104.
15. Section 105.
16. Section 106.
LAW OF EVIDENCE 301
'Conclusive proof
W hen any question o f filiation arises th e fact th a t any person was
b orn during the continuance o f a valid m arriage between his m other
an d any m an, o r w ithin 280 days after its dissolution, the m other
rem aining unm arried, shall be conclusive p ro o f th at he is the legitimate
son o f th at m an, unless it is show n th a t the p arties to the m arriage had
no access to each o th er when he could have been begotten.^®
Suggested Readings
1. The Indian Evideace Act, 1872.
2. C.D. Field, T/ie Law o f Evidence, 6 vols. (10th ed. 1970-73),
3. Journal o f the Indian Law Institute, Special Issue (1972) on the Indian Con
tract Act and the ladian Evidence Act.
4. V.B. Raju, Commeartries on the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, 2 vols. (3rd cd. 1970).
5. Ratanlal Ranchhoddas and Dhirajlal Thakore. Hindu Law o f Evidence.
6. Y-H. R ao and Y .R . Rao, Circumstanlia! and Presumptive Evidence.
7. V.P. Sarathi, The Elements o f the Law o f Evidence.
S. S.C. Sarkar, The Law o f Evidence.
9. A. Thakur, The Law o f Evidence.
10. J.G . Woodroffe and Amir All, r/i(> £an'o/£v(cfence, 4 vols, (12th ed. 1968 by
J.P. Singhal).