354 Supreme Court Reports Annotated: Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

8/29/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 319
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 116320. November 29, 1999.
ADALIA FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

HERBY COMMERCIAL & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
AND JAIME C. ONG, respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of

trial courts which are factual in nature, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, deserve to be respected and affirmed by the Supreme
Court, provided it is supported by substantial evidence on record.—As
regards the forgery, we concur with the lower courts’ finding that Francisco
forged the signature of Ong on the checks to make it appear as if Ong had
indorsed said checks and that, after indorsing the checks for a second time
by signing her name at the back of the checks, Francisco deposited said
checks in her savings account with IBAA. The forgery was satisfactorily
established in the trial court upon the strength of the findings of the NBI
handwriting expert. Other than petitioner’s self-serving denials, there is
nothing in the records to rebut the NBI’s findings. Well-entrenched is the
rule that findings of trial courts which are factual in nature, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve to be respected and affirmed by
the Supreme Court, provided it is supported by substantial evidence on
record, as it is in the case at bench.
Negotiable Instruments Law; Indorsement; The Negotiable Instruments
Law provides that where any person is under obligation to indorse in a
representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative
personal liability.—Petitioner claims that she was, in any event, authorized
to sign Ong’s name on the checks by virtue of the Certification executed by
Ong in her favor giving her the authority to collect all the receivables of
HCCC from the GSIS, including the questioned checks. Petitioner’s
alternative defense must similarly fail. The Negotiable Instruments Law
provides that where any person is under obligation to indorse in a
representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative
personal liability. An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is
merely signing in behalf of the principal and must disclose the name of his
principal; otherwise he shall be held personally liable. Even assuming that
Francisco was authorized by HCCC to sign Ong’s name, still, Fran-
______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cdb70451d3b214c26003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
355
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 355
cisco did not indorse the instrument in accordance with law. Instead of
signing Ong’s name, Francisco should have signed her own name and
expressly indicated that she was signing as an agent of HCCC. Thus, the
Certification cannot be used by Francisco to validate her act of forgery.
Civil Law; Damages; Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.—Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.Due to her
forgery of Ong’s signature which enabled her to deposit the checks in her
own account, Francisco deprived HCCC of the money due it from the GSIS
pursuant to the Land Development and Construction Contract. Thus, we
affirm respondent court’s award of compensatory damages in the amount of
P370,475.00, but with a modification as to the interest rate which shall be
six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from the date of the filing of
the complaint since the amount of damages was alleged in the
complaint;however, the rate of interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the time the judgment in this case becomes final and executory
until its satisfaction and the basis for the computation of this twelve percent
(12%) rate of interest shall be the amount of P370,475.00.
Same; Same; Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00.—We also sustain the award of exemplary damages
in the amount of P50,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Considering petitioner’s fraudulent act, we hold that an award of
P50,000.00 would be adequate, fair and reasonable. The grant of exemplary
damages justifies the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00,
and the award of P5,000.00 for litigation expenses.
Same; Same; Appellate court’s award of P50,000.00 in moral damages
is warranted.—The appellate court’s award of P50,000.00 in moral damages
is warranted. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
granted upon proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury. Ong testitified that he suffered sleepless
nights, embarrassment, humiliation and anxiety upon discovering that the
checks due
356
his company were forged by petitioner and that petitioner had filed baseless
criminal complaints against him before the fiscal’s office of Quezon City
which disrupted HCCC’s business operations.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Enrique Agana & Associates for petitioner.
Nelson A. Loyola for private respondents.
Eliseo P. Vencer II for intervenors.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
1
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari
2
is the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the decision rendered by Branch 168
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35231 in
favor of private respondents.
The controversy before this Court finds its origins in a Land
Development and Construction Contract which was entered into on
June 23, 1977 by A. Francisco Realty & Development Corporation
(AFRDC), of which petitioner Adalia Francisco (Francisco) is the
president, and private respondent Herby Commercial &
Construction Corporation (HCCC), represented by its President and
General Manager private respondent Jaime C. Ong (Ong), pursuant
to a housing project of AFRDC at San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
financed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Under the contract, HCCC agreed to undertake the construction of
35 housing units and the development of 35 hectares of land. The
___________________
1 The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 18555 and the decision was
promulgated on June 29, 1992 by the Special Seventeenth Division composed of
Cancio C. Garcia (ponente), Serafin E. Camilon, and Cezar D. Francisco.
2 The decision was penned by Benjamin V. Pelayo and promulgated on February
16, 1988.
357
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 357

payment of HCCC for its services was on a turn-key basis, that is,
HCCC was to be paid on the basis of the completed houses and
developed lands delivered to and accepted by AFRDC and the GSIS.
To facilitate payment, AFRDC executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of HCCC to enable the latter to collect payments directly from
the GSIS. Furthermore, the GSIS and AFRDC put up an Executive
Committee Account with the Insular Bank of Asia & America
(IBAA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 from which checks would

be issued and co-signed by petitioner Francisco and the GSIS Vice-
President Armando Diaz (Diaz). 3
On February 10, 1978, HCCC filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Francisco, AFRDC and
the GSIS for the collection of the unpaid balance under the Land
Development and Construction Contract in the amount of
P515,493.89 for completed and delivered housing units and land
development. However, the parties eventually arrived at an amicable
settlement of their differences, which was embodied in a
Memorandum Agreement executed by HCCC and AFRDC on July
21, 1978. Under the agreement, the parties stipulated that HCCC had
turned over 83 housing units which have been accepted and paid for
by the GSIS. The GSIS acknowledged that it still owed HCCC
P520,177.50 representing incomplete construction of housing units,
incomplete land development and 5% retention, which amount will
be discharged when the defects and deficiencies are finally
completed by HCCC. It was also provided that HCCC was indebted
to AFRDC in the amount of P180,234.91 which the former agreed
would be paid out of the proceeds from the 40 housing units still to
be turned over by HCCC or from any amount due to HCCC from the
GSIS. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the case upon the
filing by the parties of a joint motion to dismiss.
Sometime in 1979, after an examination of the records of the
GSIS, Ong discovered that Diaz and Francisco had exe-
_________________
3 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-24628.
358

4
cuted and signed seven checks, of various dates and amounts,
drawn against the IBAA and payable to HCCC for completed and
delivered work under the contract. Ong, however, claims that these
checks were never delivered to HCCC. Upon inquiry with Diaz, Ong
learned that the GSIS gave Francisco custody of the checks since
she promised that she would deliver the same to HCCC. Instead,
Francisco forged the signature of Ong, without his knowledge or
consent, at the dorsal portion of the said checks to make it appear
that HCCC had indorsed the checks; Francisco then indorsed the
checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of the
checks and deposited the checks in her IBAA savings account.
IBAA credited Francisco’s account with the amount of the checks
and the latter withdrew the amount so credited.
On June 7, 1979, Ong filed complaints with the office of the city
fiscal of Quezon City, charging Francisco with estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents. Francisco denied having
forged Ong’s signature on the checks, claiming that Ong himself

indorsed the seven checks in behalf of HCCC and delivered the
same to Francisco in payment of the loans extended by Francisco to
HCCC. According to Francisco, she agreed to grant HCCC the loans
in the total amount of P585,000.00 and covered by eighteen
promissory notes in order to obviate the risk of the non-completion
of the project.
_________________
4 1. Check No. 0756055, dated October 20, 1977, for P61,800.00 (Exhibit C).
2. Check No. 0756067, dated October 27, 1977, for P67,100.00 (Exhibit C-1).
4. Check No. 0756081, dated November 5, 1977, for P32,050.00 (Exhibit C-3).
7. Check No. 0756082, dated November 5, 1977, for P65,100.00 (Exhibit C-6).
359
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 359

As a means of repayment, Ong allegedly issued a Certification

authorizing Francisco to collect HCCC’s receivables from the GSIS.
Assistant City Fiscal Ramon M. Gerona gave credence to Franciscos
claims and accordingly, dismissed the complaints, which dismissal
was affirmed by the Minister of Justice in a resolution issued on
June 5, 1981.
The present case was brought by private respondents on
November 19, 1979 against Francisco and IBAA for the recovery of
P370,475.00, representing the total value of the seven checks, and
for damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs. After
trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
private respondents, the dispositive portion of which provides—
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor

of the plaintiffs and against the defendants INSULAR BANK OF ASIA &
AMERICA and ATTY. ADALIA FRANCISCO, to jointly and severally pay
the plaintiffs the amount of P370.475.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until the full
amount is paid; moral damages to plaintiff Jaime Ong in the sum of
P50,000.00; exemplary damages of P50,000.00; litigation expenses of
P5,000.00; and attorney’s fees of P50,000.00.
With respect to the cross-claim of the defendant IBAA against its co-
defendant Atty. Adalia Francisco, the latter is ordered to reimburse the
former for the sums that the Bank shall pay to the plaintiff on the forged
checks including the interests paid thereon. Further, the defendants are
ordered to pay the costs.
Based upon the findings of handwriting experts from the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the trial court held that Francisco had
indeed forged the signature of Ong to make it appear that he had
indorsed the checks. Also, the court ruled that there were no loans
extended, reasoning that it was unbelievable that HCCC was
experiencing financial difficulties so as to compel it to obtain the
loans from AFRDC in view of the fact that the GSIS had issued
checks in favor of HCCC at about the same time that the alleged
advances were made. The trial court stated that it was plausible that
Fran-
360

cisco concealed the fact of issuance of the checks from private

respondents in order to make it appear as if she were
accommodating private respondents, when in truth she was lending
HCCC its own money.
With regards to the Memorandum Agreement entered into
between AFRDC and HCCC in Civil Case No. Q-24628, the trial
court held that the same did not make any mention of the forged
checks since private respondents were as of yet unaware of their
existence, that fact having been effectively concealed by Francisco,
until private respondents acquired knowledge of Francisco’s
misdeeds in 1979.
IBAA was held liable to private respondents for having honored
the checks despite such obvious irregularities as the lack of initials
to validate the alterations made on the check, the absence of the
signature of a co-signatory in the corporate checks of HCCC and the
deposit of the checks on a second indorsement in the savings
account of Francisco. However, the trial court allowed IBAA
recourse against Francisco, who was ordered to reimburse 5
the IBAA
for any sums it shall have to pay to private respondents.
Both Francisco and IBAA appealed the trial court’s decision, but
the Court of Appeals dismissed IBAA’s appeal for its failure to file
its brief within the 45-day extension granted by the appellate court.
IBAA’s motion for reconsideration and petition for review on
certiorari filed with this Court were also similarly denied. On
November 21, 1989, IBAA and HCCC entered into a Compromise
Agreement which was approved by the trial court, wherein HCCC
acknowledged receipt of the amount of P370,475.00 in full
satisfaction of its claims against IBAA, without prejudice to the
right of the latter to pursue its claims against Francisco.
On June 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
ruling, hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner,
assigning the following errors to the appealed decision—
________________
5 RTC Records, 455-464.
361
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 361

1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that

private respondents did not owe Petitioner the sum covered
by the Promissory Notes Exh. 2-2-A-2-P (FRANCISCO).
Such conclusion was based mainly on conjectures, surmises
and speculation contrary to the unrebutted pleadings and
evidence presented by petitioner.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Petitioner falsified the signature of private respondent ONG
on the checks in question without any authority therefor
which is patently contradictory to the unrebutted pleading
and evidence that petitioner was expressly authorized by
respondent HERBY thru ONG to collect all receivables of
HERBY from GSIS to pay the loans extended to them.
(Exhibit 3).
3. That respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
seven checks in question were not taken up in the
liquidation and reconciliation of all outstanding account
between AFRDC and HERBY as acknowledged by the
parties in Memorandum Agreement (Exh. 5) is a pure
conjecture, surmise and speculation contrary to the
unrebutted evidence presented by petitioners. It is an
inference made which is manifestly mistaken.
4. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming 6
the
decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not Francisco forged the
signature of Ong on the seven checks. In this connection, we uphold
the lower courts’ finding that the subject matter of the present case,
specifically the seven checks, drawn by GSIS and AFRDC, dated
between October to November 1977, in the total amount of
P370,475.00 and payable to HCCC, was not included in the
Memorandum Agreement executed by HCCC and AFRDC in Civil
Case No. Q-24628. As observed by the trial court, aside from there
being absolutely no mention of the checks in the said agreement, the
amounts represented by said checks could not have been included in
the Memorandum Agreement executed in 1978 because private
respondents only discovered Francisco’s acts of forgery in 1979. The
lower courts found that Francisco was able to easily conceal from
private respondents even the fact of the issuance
_______________
6 Rollo, 19-20.
362

7
of the checks since she was a co-signatory thereof. We also note
that Francisco had custody of the checks, 8as proven by the check
vouchers bearing her uncontested signature, by which she, in effect,
acknowledged having received the checks intended for HCCC. This
contradicts Francisco’s claims that the checks were 9
issued to Ong
who delivered them to Francisco already indorsed.
As regards the forgery, we concur with the lower courts’ finding
that Francisco forged the signature of Ong on the checks to make it
appear as if Ong had indorsed said checks and that, after indorsing
the checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of the
checks, Francisco deposited said checks in her savings account with
IBAA. The forgery was satisfactorily established in the trial court 10
upon the strength of the findings of the NBI handwriting expert.
Other than petitioner’s self-serving denials, there is nothing in the
records to rebut the NBI’s findings. Well-entrenched is the rule that
findings of trial courts which are factual in nature, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve to be respected and
affirmed by the Supreme Court, 11
provided it is supported by
substantial evidence on record, as it is in the case at bench.
Petitioner claims that she was, in any event, authorized to sign
Ong’s name on the checks by virtue of the Certification executed by
Ong in her favor giving her the authority to collect all the
receivables
12
of HCCC from the GSIS, including the questioned
checks. Petitioner’s alternative defense must similarly fail. The
Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where any person is under
obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in
such terms as to negative
________________
7 RTC Decision, 7-8; CA Decision, 10.

8 Exhibits E-1 to E-7.
9 Rollo, 29.
10 Exhibits P-1, P-2.
11 Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 643 (1997); Fuentes vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 703 (1997); People vs. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305 (1997).
12 Rollo, 30-33.
363
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 363

13
personal liability. An agent, when so signing, should indicate that
he is merely signing in behalf of the principal and must disclose the
14
14
name of his principal; otherwise he shall be held personally liable.
Even assuming that Francisco was authorized by HCCC to sign
Ong’s name, still, Francisco did not indorse the instrument in
accordance with law. Instead of signing Ong’s name, Francisco
should have signed her own name and expressly indicated that she
was signing as an agent of HCCC. Thus, the Certification cannot be
used by Francisco to validate her act of forgery. Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently15
causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same. Due to her forgery of Ong’s
signature which enabled her to deposit the checks in her own
account, Francisco deprived HCCC of the money due it from the
GSIS pursuant to the Land Development and Construction Contract.
Thus, we affirm respondent court’s award of compensatory damages
in the amount of P370,475.00, but with a modification as to the
interest rate which shall be six percent (6%) per annum, to be
computed from the date of the filing of the complaint
16
since the
amount of damages was alleged in the complaint; however, the rate
of interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time
the judgment in this case becomes final and executory until its
satisfaction and the basis for the computation of this twelve percent
(12%) rate of interest shall be the amount of P370,475.00. This is in
accordance with the doctrine enunciated in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. vs. Court of
_________________
13 Act No. 2031, sec. 44.

14 Id., sec. 20. Liability of person signing as agent, and so forth.—Where the
instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs
for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the
instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him
as an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal,
does not exempt him from personal liability; Philippine Bank of Commerce vs.
Aruego, 102 SCRA 530 (1981).
15 Civil Code, art. 20.
16 RTC Records, 5.
364

17
Appeals, et al., which 18was reiterated in Philippine National Bank
vs. Court
19
of Appeals, Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals 20 and in Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, which provides that—
1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the

payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially

demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to
the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but
when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at
the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2,
above, shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from such
_________________
17 234 SCRA 78 (1994).

18 263 SCRA 766 (1996).
19 275 SCRA 621 (1997).
20 286 SCRA 257 (1998).
365
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 365

finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being

deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
We also sustain the award of exemplary damages in the amount of

P50,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Considering petitioner’s fraudulent act, we
hold that an award of P50,000.00 would be adequate, fair and
reasonable. The grant of exemplary damages justifies the award of
attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, and the award of

21
P5,000.00 for litigation expenses.
The appellate court’s award of P50,000.00 in moral damages is
warranted. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages
may be granted upon proof of physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
22
feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Ong testified
that he suffered sleepless nights, embarrassment, humiliation and
anxiety upon discovering that the checks due his company were
forged by petitioner and that petitioner had filed baseless criminal
complaints against him before, the fiscal’s office
23
of Quezon City
which disrupted HCCC’s business operations.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the respondent court’s decision
promulgated on June 29, 1992, upholding the February 16, 1988
decision of the trial court in favor of private respondents, with the
modification that the interest upon the actual damages awarded shall
be at six percent (6%) per annum, which interest rate shall be
computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on November
19, 1979. However, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%)
per annum from the time the judgment in this case becomes final and
executory and until such amount is fully paid. The basis for
computation of
_______________
21 Civil Code, art. 2208 (1); Tan Kapos vs. Masa, 134 SCRA 231 (1985).
22 People vs. Teodoro, 280 SCRA 384 (1997).
23 TSN, November 14, 1980, 51-53; Complaint, 4.
366

Fontanilla, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
the six percent and twelve percent rates of interest shall be the
amount of P370,475.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ.,

concur.
Reviewed decision affirmed with modification.
Note.—Those who in the performance of their obligations are

guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (Go vs. Court of
Appeals, 272 SCRA 752 [1997])
——o0o——
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8/29/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 319

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ADALIA FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

Remedial Law; Evidence; Well-entrenched is the rule that ﬁndings of

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 355

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 357

(IBAA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 from which checks would

3 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-24628.

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

forged Ong’s signature on the checks, claiming that Ong himself

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 359

As a means of repayment, Ong allegedly issued a Certiﬁcation

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor

Based upon the ﬁndings of handwriting experts from the National

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cisco concealed the fact of issuance of the checks from private

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 361

1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

7 RTC Decision, 7-8; CA Decision, 10.

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 363

13 Act No. 2031, sec. 44.

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the

itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially

17 234 SCRA 78 (1994).

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 365

ﬁnality until its satisfaction, this interim period being

We also sustain the award of exemplary damages in the amount of

attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, and the award of

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ.,

Reviewed decision afﬁrmed with modiﬁcation.

Note.—Those who in the performance of their obligations are

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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