Case # 4 and # 5 Doctrines

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Mindanao State University

MSU College of Law


Iligan Extension

CASE DOCTRINES
for
CASES #4 and #5

In Compliance for the Course Subject on Labor Law Review

Submitted by:
GROUP 3

Balisco, Herald
Baud, Sittie Rainnie M.
Hamed, Mohamad kalid M.
Minaga-Jamil, Wahida
Manaros, Amer Hussien
Tabao, Moh’d Asrin A.

Fifth Year
Submitted to:
Labor Arbiter Abdul Azis U. Metmug
September 14, 2019
JAIME MONTEALEGRE CHAMON'TE, INC., -versus-
SPOUSES ABRAHAM and REMEDIOS DE VERA,
Case Doctrines:

A writ of execution must strictly conform to every particular of the judgment


to be executed. It should not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor
may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed, otherwise, if it is
in excess of or beyond the original judgment or award, the execution is void. 1

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three basic areas,
namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a
vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or when the
corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3)
alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or
business conduit o f a person, or where the corporation is so organized and
controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality,
agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. In the absence of malice, bad
faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such
corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities. 2

The corporate officers are not held solidarily liable with the corporation for
separation pay because the corporation is invested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from those persons composing it as well as from that of any
other legal entity to which it may be related. To hold a director or officer personally
liable for corporate obligation is the exception and it only occurs when the following
requisites are present: (1) the complaint must allege that the director or officer
assented to the patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the director or
officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that
the director or officer acted in bad faith.3

1 Pascual v. Daquioag, G.R. No. 162063, March 31, 2014, 720 SCRA 230, 240-24.

2 Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO) v. NLRC. GR No. 170689, March 17, 2019.
3 Lozada v. Mendoza. G.R. No. 196134, October 12, 2016, 805 SCRA 673.
F.F CRUZ & CO., INC. VS. JOSE B. GALANDEZ,
DOMINGO I. SAJUELA, and MARLON D. NAMOC,

GR NO. 236496, July 8, 2019


1. Petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it
Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered 'grave,' discretion
must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. i
2. Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter
alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial
evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that '(i]n cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
3. Jurisprudence holds that the parties are not precluded from entering into a
compromise even if a final judgment had already been rendered
As pointed out in Magbanua v. Uy,3 entered into after final judgment. The validity of
the agreement is rendered, justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely
because it was
determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by when
it was entered into.
4. For a deed of release, waiver, and quitclaim to be valid, it must be shown
that:
a) there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any parties;
b) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and
c) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The burden rests on the employer to prove that the quitclaim constitutes a
credible and reasonable settlement of what an employee is entitled to recover,
and that the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full
understanding of its import.

5. “For as long as the employer continuously fails to actually implement the


reinstatement aspect of the decision x x x, the employer’s obligation to the
employee for his accrued back wages and other benefits continues to
accumulate”

6. In Solgus Corporation v C.A. 70


Quitclaims and waivers should be carefully examined and strictly scrutinized with
regard not only to the words and terms used, but also to the factual circumstances
under which they have been executed.
7. “The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity,"

iQuillopa v. Quality Guards Services and Investigation Agency, 774 Phil. 198, 206 (2015), citing Omni
Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, 742 Phil. 335, 342 (2014)

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