Gacad v. Clapis, JR PDF

5/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 676
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012.*
CRISELDA C. GACAD, complainant, vs. JUDGE

HILARION P. CLAPIS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch
3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, respondent.
Administrative Law; Appeals; The rule which concedes due

respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of
witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases.―It is a settled rule that the findings
of investigating
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* EN BANC.
535
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 535
Gacad vs. Clapis, Jr.
magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by

reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due respect,
and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by
trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases.
Same; Misconduct; Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing
or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in
connection with one’s performance of official functions and
duties.―Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with
one’s performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt
or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent
disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment.
Same; Judges; It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not
only be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial at all times.―
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016aa63cebc5230fbc6a003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial;

he must also appear to be impartial at all times. Being in constant
scrutiny by the public, his language, both written and spoken, must
be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued. Needless to state, any gross misconduct seriously
undermines the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary.
Same; Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Supreme Court found
Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting
bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused
and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that
the guilt of the accused is strong.―We also find Judge Clapis liable
for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings without
a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without affording
the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused
is strong. Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that “at the hearing of an
application for bail filed by the person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. x x x.” This rule presupposes that: (1) an
application for bail was filed, and (2) the judge notified the prosecu-
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
tor and conducted a bail hearing for the prosecution to adduce

evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.
Same; Gross Misconduct; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Under
Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law or procedure are both classified as serious
charges.―Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure are both
classified as serious charges, for which the imposable penalties are
any of the following: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all
or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporation:
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of
Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violations of

Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and
Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
Criselda C. Gacad (Gacad) filed a Verified Complaint1
dated 9 June 2010 against Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr.
(Judge Clapis), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, for
Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of
Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations of
Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3
(Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to
Criminal Case No. 6898 entitled “People of the Philippines v.
Rodolfo Comania.”
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1 Rollo, pp. 1-10.
537
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 537

According to Gacad, on 3 November 2009, she went,

together with her father Jovenciano Cardenas and sister-in-
law Agriculita Vda. De Cardenas, to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Nabunturan, Compostela Valley,
to file criminal charges against the suspect who gunned
down her brother Gregorio Cardenas. They met provincial
prosecutor Graciano Arafol, Jr. (Arafol), who advised them
not to hire a private counsel.
The following day, Arafol informed Gacad that he filed a
complaint for murder against the suspect but the Provincial
Governor kept on pressuring him about her brother’s case.
Arafol suggested that they see Judge Clapis so he would
deny the Motion for Reinvestigation to be filed by the
accused Rodolfo Comania (accused). Arafol, further, told
Gacad to prepare an amount of P50,000 for Judge Clapis.
On 23 November 2009, Arafol told Gacad that they would
meet Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum
City. Thus, Gacad, together with her husband Rene Gacad
and their family driver Jojo Baylosis (Baylosis), proceeded
to the Golden Palace Hotel. Inside the hotel, Gacad joined
Arafol and his wife at their table. After a while, Judge
Clapis joined them. Arafol told Judge Clapis, “Judge sya
yong sinasabi kong kapitbahay ko may problema.” Judge
Clapis replied, “So, what do you want me to do?” Afarol

answered, “Kailangang madeny ang reinvestigation ni Atty.
Gonzaga and we proceed to trial kasi palaging tumatawag si
Governor.” Arafol paused, and continued, “Wag kang mag-
alala judge, mayron syang inihanda para sa iyo.” Gacad felt
terrified because she had not yet agreed to Arafol’s
demands. Hence, when Arafol asked her, “Day, kanus a nimo
mahatag ang kwarta?” (When can you give the money?),
Gacad could only mumble, “Paningkamutan na ko makakita
ko ug kwarta... basin makakita ko sir.” (I will try to look for
money, maybe I can find, sir.) Judge Clapis excitedly
nodded and said, “Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni
sila.” (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.)
538

The following day, Arafol instructed his nephew

Baldomero Arafol (Baldomero) to go to Gacad’s house to
accompany Baylosis. In Gacad’s house, Gacad gave P50,000
to Baylosis in the presence of Baldomero. Baylosis then
drove with Baldomero to Jollibee in Tagum City. Upon their
arrival, Baldomero alighted and Arafol got into the
passenger seat. Arafol directed Baylosis to drive to Mikos
Coffee Bar. Along the way, Arafol took the money from
Baylosis. At Mikos Coffee Bar, Arafol alighted, telling
Baylosis to wait for him. Then, Arafol went inside Mikos
Coffee Bar to join Judge Clapis.
In his Sworn Affidavit dated 8 April 2010, Baylosis stated
that he went out of the vehicle and saw, through the full
window glass of the Mikos Coffee Bar, Arafol sitting at a
table together with Judge Clapis. After Arafol left Mikos
Coffee Bar, he told Baylosis to bring him back to Jollibee in
Tagum City.
On the second week of January 2010, Arafol showed to
Gacad a copy of Judge Clapis’ Order dated 4 January 2010
denying the Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the accused.
Subsequently, Arafol told Gacad that Judge Clapis was
borrowing P50,000 from her for his mother’s hospitalization.
Arafol handed to Gacad a postdated BPI check allegedly
issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment. However,
Gacad failed to produce the P50,000. Gacad alleged that,
from then on, Arafol and Judge Clapis began to “play
different hideous schemes” to prejudice their case.2 Judge
Clapis set hearings on 4 February 2010, 8 February 2010,
and 1 March 2010. However, the Notices for Hearings were
mailed only on 1 March 2010 and were received by Gacad

only on 3 March 2010.
Thereafter, Judge Clapis set a hearing for a petition for
bail on 29 March 2010, which Gacad came to know only
inadvertently since she received no notice for the hearing.
During the 29 March 2010 hearing, Public Prosecutor
Alona Labtic
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2 Id., at p. 4.
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VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 539

moved that the petition for bail be put in writing. However,

the counsel for the accused manifested that he was not
prepared for a written petition because it was only right
before the hearing that the accused informed him of Arafol’s
agreement to bail. Thus, Judge Clapis calendared the case
for speedy trial. He set a continuous hearing for the petition
for bail on 12 April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010.
On 8 April 2010, the accused filed a Petition For Bail
while Gacad filed a Motion For Inhibition of Judge Clapis.
On 18 May 2010, Judge Clapis granted the accused’s
Petition For Bail. On 24 May 2010, Judge Clapis issued a
Notice of Preliminary Conference set on 2 December 2010.
On 1 June 2010, Judge Clapis inhibited himself.
To bolster her case of corruption against Judge Clapis,
Gacad recounted her previous encounter with Judge Clapis
and Arafol in Criminal Case No. 6251 against her brother.
According to Gacad, Arafol suggested that they give Judge
Clapis the P80,000 cash bond posted in the case so that her
brother’s case could be dismissed. After conceding to Arafol’s
proposal, Judge Clapis indeed dismissed the case despite the
strong evidence against her brother.
In an Indorsement letter dated 21 June 2010, the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) required Judge Clapis to
comment. In his Comment3 dated 26 July 2010, Judge
Clapis narrated the events regarding Criminal Case No.
6898, beginning with the arraignment set on 17 December
2009 up to his inhibition on 1 June 2010. Judge Clapis did
not attach any documents to support his narration. Judge
Clapis claimed that notices were made verbally because of
time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides
were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all
proceedings, Gacad was in court and the orders were done in

open court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently
scheduled the pre-
_______________
3 Id., at p. 52.
540

liminary conference of the case to 2 December 2010. Finally,

he denied owning an account in BPI.
In its Resolution4 dated 15 December 2010, this Court’s
Second Division noted the recommendation of the OCA
dated 3 November 2010 and resolved to: (1) re-docket the
instant administrative complaint OCA-IPI No. 10-3440-RTJ
as regular administrative matter A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257;
and (2) refer the matter to the Executive Justice of the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, for raffle among its
Justices, and direct the Justice to whom the case is assigned
to conduct an investigation on the matter and to submit a
report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of
the records of the case.
Pursuant to the Resolution of 15 December 2010, the
records of the case were forwarded to Justice Romulo V.
Borja, the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Mindanao Station, and then to the Raffle Committee. On 10
May 2011, the case was raffled to Justice Zenaida T.
Galapate-Laguilles (Investigating Justice) for investigation.
Thereafter, the Investigating Justice ordered the parties to
submit their respective evidence, and set the case for
hearing on 14 June 2011, 21 June 2011, and 28 June 2011.
The 28 June 2011 hearing was subsequently reset to 28
July 2011.
In its Resolution dated 6 July 2011, this Court’s Second
Division granted the Investigating Justice an extension of
60 days or until 9 September 2011 to terminate her
investigation and submit her recommendation.
In her undated Report and Recommendation, the
Investigating Justice ruled that Judge Clapis committed
grave misconduct for acting contrary to the prescribed
standard of conduct for judges. Although the Investigating
Justice was not convinced that Judge Clapis received
P50,000, and then tried to borrow another P50,000, from
Gacad, she found Gacad’s
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4 Id., at p. 130.
541
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 541

narration of her meeting with Judge Clapis in Golden

Palace Hotel as credible. The Investigating Justice stated:
“x x x In a provincial setting such as the place where the parties

come from, it is not difficult to imagine the considerable power that
persons of the respondent’s calibre could wield in the mind of a
litigant such as the complainant herein. The substance and tenor of
the complainant’s testimony and element of possible motivation on
the part of the respondent given his unrefuted closeness with
Prosecutor Arafol convince this Justice that the complainant is
telling the truth.
xxxx
x x x Respondent judge merely offered a flat denial when he
could have presented Prosecutor Arafol to buttress his disavowal of
any imputed misconduct on his part. x x x Respondent’s reaction,
however, is regrettably lackadaisical, if not abnormal, for one whose
integrity was shred to pieces by no less than the Trial Prosecutor
who is his partner, in an almost daily basis, in the task of
dispensing justice. There is simply no showing indeed that
respondent herein took umbrage at Prosecutor Arafol’s alleged
brazenness and daring to sully his name.”5
Furthermore, the Investigating Justice found Judge

Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Clapis
was partial in granting bail to the accused and in failing to
set the case for hearing within a reasonable time.
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice recommended the
penalties of: (1) suspension for one year without salary and
other benefits for gross misconduct; (2) a fine of P20,000.00
for gross ignorance of the law; and (3) reprimand for neglect
of duty.
In a Memorandum dated 11 January 2012, the OCA
agreed with the findings of the Investigating Justice but
disagreed with the recommended penalties. The OCA found
that Judge Clapis violated Canon 1 (Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02) and Canon 2 (Rule 2.01) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. The OCA also found Judge Clapis liable for gross
ignorance of the law for
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 412-413.
542

failing to observe the rules in hearing the petition for bail

and to accord the prosecution due process. Accordingly, the
OCA recommended the penalties of: (1) suspension for six
months for gross misconduct; and (2) a fine of P40,000 for
gross ignorance of the law.
We have ruled that in administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden to prove his accusations
against respondent with substantial evidence or such
amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.6 This Court has
consistently ruled that charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.7
In the present case, there is indeed no substantial
evidence that Judge Clapis received the P50,000 given by
Gacad to Arafol, and that Judge Clapis tried to borrow
another P50,000 from Gacad secured by a check allegedly
signed by Judge Clapis himself. The testimony of Gacad,
stating that Judge Clapis received P50,000 and tried to
borrow another P50,000 from her, both through Arafol,
cannot be given due weight for being hearsay evidence. On
the other hand, although Baylosis testified based on his
personal knowledge, he did not categorically state that he
saw Arafol give the money to Judge Clapis. In addition, the
check allegedly issued by Judge Clapis was in the account
name of Arafol as attested by the BPI Business Manager’s
Certification. Hence, Gacad fell short of the required degree
of proof needed in an administrative charge of corruption.
_______________
6 Monticalbo v. Maraya, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, 13 April 2011,
648 SCRA 573 citing De Jesus v. Guerrero III, G.R. No. 171491, 4
September 2009, 598 SCRA 341; Manalabe v. Cabie, A.M. No. P-05-1984,
6 July 2007, 526 SCRA 582; Adajar v. Develos, 512 Phil. 9; 475 SCRA 361
(2005); Ong v. Rosete, 484 Phil. 102; 441 SCRA 150 (2004); Datuin, Jr. v.
Soriano, 439 Phil. 592; 391 SCRA 1 (2002).
7 Id. citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, A.M. No. P-10-
2788, 18 January 2011, 639 SCRA 633.
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VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 53

We, however, find Judge Clapis liable for gross

misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio,8 the Court held that while the
respondent judge, in that case, may not be held liable for
extortion and corruption as it was not substantially proven,
he should be made accountable for gross misconduct.
In the present case, the Investigating Justice found
Gacad’s narration, that she met and talked with Judge
Clapis in the Golden Palace Hotel, as credible. Gacad
categorically and unwaveringly narrated her conversation
with Judge Clapis and Arafol. On the other hand, Judge
Clapis merely denied Gacad’s allegation during the hearing
conducted by the Investigating Justice, but not in his
Comment, and without presenting any evidence to support
his denial. It is a settled rule that the findings of
investigating magistrates are generally given great weight
by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.9 The
rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil
and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative
cases.10
Thus, the acts of Judge Clapis in meeting Gacad, a
litigant in a case pending before his sala, and telling her,
“Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila” (Okay, leave
it all to me, we shall crush them.), both favoring Gacad,
constitute gross misconduct.
In Sevilla v. Lindo,11 where the respondent judge
tolerated the unreasonable postponements made in a case,
the Court held that such conduct proceeded from bias
towards the ac-
_______________
8 469 Phil. 896; 426 SCRA 63 (2004).
9 Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, 23 April 2010, 619
SCRA 60, citing Vidallon Magtolis v. Salud, 506 Phil. 423; 469 SCRA 439
(2005).
10 Ferreras v. Eclipse, A.M. No. P-05-2085, 20 January 2010, 610
SCRA 359.
11 A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714, 9 February 2011, 642 SCRA 277.
544

cused, rendering such acts and omissions as gross

misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in
connection with one’s performance of official functions and
duties.12 For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial
act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the
intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-
known rules.13 The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment.14
Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial
reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on record.
First, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to Gacad only
after the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started conducting
the bail hearings without an application for bail and
granted bail without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong.
Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary conference seven
months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his
declaration of speedy trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot
escape liability by shifting the blame to his court personnel.
He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for
order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates
are not the guardians of the judge’s responsibility.15
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken
together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and
propriety. His
_______________
12 Salazar v. Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, 19 April 2007, 521 SCRA
449, citing Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, 483 Phil. 601; 440
SCRA 578 (2004); Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486; 301
SCRA 560 (1999).
13 Id.
14 Almojuela v. Ringor, Jr., 479 Phil. 131; 435 SCRA 261 (2004), citing
Mercado v. Dysangco, 434 Phil. 547; 385 SCRA 327 (2002).
15 Kara-an v. Lindo, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1674, 19 April 2007, 521 SCRA
423, citing Hilario v. Concepcion, 383 Phil. 843; 327 SCRA 96 (2000).
545
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 545

acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of

the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly:
CANON 2. INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO THE

PROPER DISCHARGE OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE BUT ALSO
TO THE PERSONAL DEMEANOR OF JUDGES.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xxx
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROPER
DISCHARGE OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE. IT APPLIES NOT
ONLY TO THE DECISION ITSELF BUT ALSO TO THE PROCESS
BY WHICH THE DECISION IS TO BE MADE.
xxx
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in
and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the
public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and the judiciary.
xxx
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is
before, or could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or
impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make
any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of
any person or issue.
xxx
CANON 4. PROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
PROPRIETY ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL
THE ACTIVITIES OF A JUDGE.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities.
546

xxx
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be

impartial; he must also appear to be impartial at all times.16
Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both
written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the
best of intentions be misconstrued.17 Needless to state, any
gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary.
We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of
the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition for
bail being filed by the accused and without affording the

prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong.
Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that “at the hearing of an
application for bail filed by the person who is in custody for
the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. x x x.”
This rule presupposes that: (1) an application for bail was
filed, and (2) the judge notified the prosecutor and
conducted a bail hearing for the prosecution to adduce
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.
In the present case, the records show that Judge Clapis
set the first bail hearing on 29 March 2010 yet the Petition
For Bail was filed only on 8 April 2010. Furthermore, the
12, 13 and 14 April 2010 bail hearings reveal that the
prosecution was not given the opportunity to be heard in
court. During the 12 April 2010 hearing, Gacad appeared by
herself because the private prosecutor, who was to appear in
her behalf, filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. Gacad
requested for more time to secure a new private counsel.
Gacad also manifested that she already filed a motion for
Arafol to inhibit from the
_______________
16 De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, 407 Phil. 351; 355 SCRA 69 (2001).
17 Id.
547
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 547

case. Judge Clapis allowed her to secure a new private

counsel but the hearing proceeded with the accused alone
being given the opportunity to present his evidence. It was
only during the 14 April 2010 hearing, the last day of
hearing, that Gacad was represented by another public
prosecutor since she could not secure a new private counsel.
But immediately after the defense completed presenting its
evidence in support of its bail application, the petition for
bail was submitted for resolution. The prosecution was not
given an opportunity to present evidence to prove that the
guilt of the accused is strong. Judge Clapis’ Order granting
bail indicates that he merely used as basis the affidavit of
one prosecution witness that was submitted earlier. Clearly,
Judge Clapis failed to observe the proper procedure in

granting bail.
As stated in the report of the Investigating Justice:
“It is true that proceedings were conducted on April 12, 13 and

14, 2010 but nowhere in these settings was the Prosecution given
an ample opportunity to oppose the Petition or to prove that the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. There was even no inquiry
from the respondent as to the character or reputation of the accused
and the probability of his flight during the trial. These are
important and basic questions to be considered by a conscientious
judge whenever a Petition for Bail in a capital offense is laid before
him. Jurisprudence clearly instructs that “in cases where (the) grant
of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the Prosecution
must be given the opportunity to present within a reasonable period
all the evidence it may desire to produce before the court should
resolve the Motion for Bail.”
Sadly for respondent, he seemed unaware that he was duty-
bound to require the presentation of proof of guilt of the accused
because without it, he would have no basis for the exercise of his
discretion on whether or not bail should be granted. It was
precipitate of him to simply consider the affidavit of one prosecution
witness and conclude that “there was no ambush but there was
merely a shootout, as to who fired first it cannot be determined
because the affidavit of the prosecution witness did not state so x x x
and mainly on this basis, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution failed to
548

establish that evidence of guilt is strong for the Court to deny the
Petition of accused Rodolfo Comania to be admitted to Bail.”18
Gacal v. Infante19 is instructive on this issue. The

respondent judge in that case was held guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and the rules when he granted bail to
the accused charged with murder without conducting a
hearing and despite the absence of a petition for bail from
the accused. The Court emphasized that bail cannot be
allowed to a person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the
prosecution; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in
prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of
well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such
error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge

liable for gross ignorance of the law.20 If judges are allowed
to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law,
there will not only be confusion in the administration of
justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.21
Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure are
both classified as serious charges, for which the imposable
penalties are any of the following:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public of-
_______________
18 Rollo, pp. 420-421.
19 A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, 5 October 2011, 658 SCRA 535.
20 Dipatuan v. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 48, citing
Reyes v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1973, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 244.
21 Id.
549
V OL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 549

fice, including government-owned or controlled corporation: Provided,

however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.22
Judge Clapis had already been administratively

sanctioned in Humol v. Clapis, Jr.,23 where he was fined
P30,000 for gross ignorance of the law. In this previous case,
the Court sanctioned Judge Clapis for his failure to hear
and consider the evidence of the prosecution in granting
bail to the accused. His order relied solely on the arguments
of counsel for the accused. In Humol,24 the Court reminded
Judge Clapis of the duties of a trial judge when an
application for bail is filed, but in the present case, he
ignored the same. Therefore, we now impose upon him the
extreme administrative penalty of dismissal from the
service. In Mangandingan v. Adiong,25 the Court dismissed
Judge Santos Adiong from service upon a finding of guilt for
gross ignorance of the law as well as gross misconduct
constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Again, judges are reminded that having accepted the

exalted position of a judge, they owe it to the public to
uphold the exacting standard of conduct demanded from
them. As the Court repeatedly stressed:
“The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are

designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the
judicial
_______________
22 Rules of Court, Rule 140, Section 11.
23 A.M. No. RTJ-11-2285, 27 July 2011, 654 SCRA 406.
24 Id.
25 A.M. No. RTJ-04-1826, 6 February 2008, 544 SCRA 43.
550

system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge

and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the
highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his
office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior
both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from
any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.”26
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Judge Hilarion P. Clapis,

Jr. of the Regional Trial Court , Branch 3, Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley from the service for Gross Misconduct
and Gross Ignorance of the Law, with forfeiture of all
benefits due him, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from appointment to any public office
including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
His position in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley is declared VACANT. This
Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of
the Department of Justice for the investigation of Provincial
Prosecutor Graciano Arafol, Jr. for possible serious
misconduct in handling Criminal Case No. 6898 entitled
“People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Comania.”
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno,
Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part due to relationship to a party.
Brion, J., On Leave.
_______________
26 Tan v. Rosete, 481 Phil. 189; 437 SCRA 581 (2004).
551
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 551

Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. dismissed for gross

misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, with
disqualification from reappointment to any public office
including government-owned and -controlled corporations.
His position declared vacant.
Notes.―Gross misconduct has been defined as any

inexcusable, shameful or flagrantly unlawful conduct on the
part of the person involved in the administration of justice,
conduct that is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to
the right determination of the cause. (Buehs vs. Bacatan,
591 SCRA 217 [2009])
Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor
of petitioner Albert Chang Tan, since a TPO cannot be
issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No.
9292, known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004. (Ocampo vs. Arcaya-Chua, 619
SCRA 59 [2010])
――o0o――
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5/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 676

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012.*

CRISELDA C. GACAD, complainant, vs. JUDGE

Administrative Law; Appeals; The rule which concedes due

VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 535

Gacad vs. Clapis, Jr.

magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by

It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial;

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gacad vs. Clapis, Jr.

tor and conducted a bail hearing for the prosecution to adduce

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violations of

VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 537

According to Gacad, on 3 November 2009, she went,

Clapis replied, “So, what do you want me to do?” Afarol

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The following day, Arafol instructed his nephew

mailed only on 1 March 2010 and were received by Gacad

VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 539

moved that the petition for bail be put in writing. However,

proceedings, Gacad was in court and the orders were done in

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

liminary conference of the case to 2 December 2010. Finally,

VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 541

narration of her meeting with Judge Clapis in Golden

“x x x In a provincial setting such as the place where the parties

Furthermore, the Investigating Justice found Judge

5 Id., at pp. 412-413.

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

failing to observe the rules in hearing the petition for bail

VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 53

We, however, find Judge Clapis liable for gross

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cused, rendering such acts and omissions as gross

VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 545

acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of

CANON 2. INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO THE

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be

bail being filed by the accused and without affording the

VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 547

case. Judge Clapis allowed her to secure a new private

Judge Clapis failed to observe the proper procedure in

“It is true that proceedings were conducted on April 12, 13 and

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gacal v. Infante19 is instructive on this issue. The

error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge

18 Rollo, pp. 420-421.

19 A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, 5 October 2011, 658 SCRA 535.

V OL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 549

fice, including government-owned or controlled corporation: Provided,

Judge Clapis had already been administratively

Again, judges are reminded that having accepted the

“The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Judge Hilarion P. Clapis,

Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del