HIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Appellants Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas are before us seeking a review of the Decision1 dated April 27,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Cebu City, issued in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00857.

On October 19, 1998, appellants were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Bogo,
Cebu City with the crime of Rape under the following Information,2 the accusatory portion of which
states:chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibrary

That on the 16th day of July 1998, between the hours of 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at the house of
the victim at Taytayan, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, confederating and conspiring with one another, with deliberate intent, by
means of force and violence by boxing her on the stomach thereby rendering her unconscious, with
intimidation and lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge
with AAA,3 while she was in a state of unconsciousness.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

On their arraignment on February 23, 1999, appellants pleaded NOT GUILTY5 to the crime charged.

Trial thereafter ensued.

AAA, nineteen (19) years old, is a household help of the spouses Constantino and Elvira Cueva. At around 8
o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1998, she asked permission from her employers to go to her parents'
house.6 AAA's house is located in Barangay Taytayan, Bogo, Cebu,7 the same barangay where her
employers' house is situated. On her way to her parents' house, she met appellants Vergel and Allain who
wanted to go with her but she refused.8 They suddenly held her hands but she was able to get free from
their hold. She then decided to return to her employers' house9 but when she thought about her parents'
need for the money,10 she just stayed and waited at the side of the road hoping that the appellants would go
away.11

Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her parents' house but appellants
reappeared and held her hands again.12 She shouted for help and struggled to be freed from their hold but
appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief13 and appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach
which caused her to lose consciousness.14

At about 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, AAA regained her consciousness and she noticed that she
was only wearing her t-shirt as her bra, panty and maong pants were on her side.15 She felt'pain all over her
body.16 Her vagina hurt17 and it was covered with blood. Her panty and maong pants were also stained with
blood.18 She went back to her employers' house and told them that she was raped by appellants.19

At around 9 o'clock in the morning of the same day, AAA was accompanied by the Spouses Cuevas to the
police station in Bogo, Cebu to report the rape incident.20 The rape incident was contained in a police blotter
and AAA was later instructed to undergo a physical examination which she did.21

Dr. Mary Ann Jabat (Dr. Jabat) of the Severo Verallo Memorial District Hospital, Bogo, Cebu, conducted an
examination on AAA and issued a Medical Certificate22 dated July 17, 1998. The medical findings and
testimony of Dr. Jabat revealed that AAA had lacerations in the perineum and hymen (at 3 o'clock and 10
o'clock positions); her labia majora had erythema and slight edema; and the vaginal swab indicated the
presence of spermatozoa. She said that the lacerations in the perineum and the hymen were due to the
insertion of a foreign object or the male organ23 and that the presence of spermatozoa signifies recent
sexual intercourse.24
On the other hand, appellants strongly denied the accusation and interposed the defense of alibi. They both
claimed that they were not at the crime scene where AAA's alleged rape happened as they were somewhere
else. Appellant Allain claimed that at around 7:00 p.m., he went to fetch her sister Lucille Reichards who
was talking with friends at Kit Prisilla's house; and that he and his sister went home at around 9:00 p.m.
and never went out again.25 While appellant Vergel claimed that at around 8:00 p.m., he bought barbeque
and passed by Kit's house where he saw co-appellant Allain and their sister Lucille talking;26 that when he
went back home a little later, he already saw appellant Allain in their house. Appellant Vergel left their house
again at 9:00 p.m. as he was called by Kit to tally the,collection of the masiao tips; and that he went home
at around 10:00 p.m.27 They both testified that Kit's house is 100 meters from their house28 and that AAA's
house is also 100 meters from their house.29 Appellants' sister Lucille and their mother Amparo Ancajas
corroborated their alibis.

The defense also presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, a medico legal expert, who gave a different explanation on Dr.
Jabat's medical findings,30 and Doroteo Booc, appellants' brother-in-law, to show that he saw AAA walking
with a male companion on that fateful night.31 Appellant Allain's birth certificate was presented to show that
he was still seventeen (17) years old at the time the alleged rape of AAA was committed.32Also presented
was the police blotter.which contained four (4) names as suspects on AAA's rape but the.same police blotter
also contained in the progress report that AAA only suspected accused-appellants as her rapists arid refused
to acknowledge the other two.

On March 28, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,33 the dispositive portion of which states: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas are hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua.

Further, each accused is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92, as amended by Circular No. 63-97 of the Court Administrator, the Jail Warden
of the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC), Cebu City, is hereby directed to
immediately transfer the two (2) accused to the custody of the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Jail Warden, CPDRC for his information, guidance and
compliance.

SO ORDERED.34 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

The RTC ratiocinated that the elements of the crime of rape were duly proven by the prosecution and the
fact of rape had been corroborated in its material details by the medical findings of Dr. Jabat. It found that
AAA had positively identified appellants whom she was familiar with being her neighbors and childhood
friends.

Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its Resolution35 dated July 25, 2007.
The RTC ruled on the issue of appellant Aliain's minority by saying that the penalty imposed upon the two
accused is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, the said penalty should be applied and imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of minority. The RTC further said that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply to
appellant Allain because he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, citing Section 32,
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal which the CA gave due course. The parties were required to submit
their respective briefs and upon their compliance, the case was submitted for decision.

On April 27, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision.

Dissatisfied, appellants filed this appeal for a final review of their conviction. In our Resolution36 dated
January 18, 2012, we notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire within thirty (30) days from notice. Both parties manifested37 that they are adopting the briefs they
filed before the CA.

Appellants claim that based on AAA's testimony, the element of carnal knowledge was not established since
she claimed to be unconscious, hence, she would not know the act allegedly done to her; that she only
believed that they had carnal knowledge of her because she felt pain on her vagina. They claim that there
were inconsistencies in her testimony and that her conduct after the alleged rape negate the commission
thereof.

The issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants'
guilt for the crime of rape.

Article 266-A38 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements of the crime of rape as follows: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

Art. 266-A- Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; c ralawlawl ibra ry

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; cra lawlawlib rary

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, (2) that
the same was accomplished under any of the above-enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of
rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testily
with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.39 Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility
of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victim's
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this
testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime.40

Appellants' claim that rape was not was established as AAA had been unconscious during its alleged
commission is not persuasive.

While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA
as the latter was unconscious, however, proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct
evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt.41 Indeed, the Court had affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence.42

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) and the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.43 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.44

Here, AAA was on her way to her parents' house when appellants, her neighbors since childhood, appeared
and held her hands. She struggled and shouted but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief
to prevent her from shouting, while appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose
consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain all over her body and her vagina. She found
her bra, bloodied parity and maong pants beside her. She went back to her employers' house and told them
that appellants raped her. AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Jabat's declaration that the lacerations
in AAA's perineum and hymen were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male organ and the
presence of spermatozoa signified recent sexual intercourse. It is well settled that when the victim's
testimony is corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude
the existence of the essential requisites of carnal knowledge.45The lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are
the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.46

We find no error committed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in giving credence to AAA's testimony. In
fact, it was put down in record that AAA was crying while she was testifying before the trial court.47 It has
been held in several cases that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the
rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain the victim feels when she recounts the detail
of her traumatic experience.48

We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide
to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the
crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof
of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.49

The prosecution had established that appellants held AAA's hands, and when she tried to shout, appellant
Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the abdomen which
caused her to lose consciousness. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective which were present in this case.50

We find that the RTC correctly rejected appellants' defense of denial and alibi. AAA positively identified
appellants as the persons who raped her. She knew them as they were neighbors since childhood. Denial
fails in the light of AAA's positive declaration.

Appellants' alibi is also unavailing. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at
another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was physical
impossibility for him to have been at the scene of the crime.51 Physical impossibility refers to the distance
between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.52 Appellant Allain testified that at
around 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of July 16, 1998, he was at Kit's house, which was located around 100
meters away from their own house. On the other hand, appellant Vergel testified that he passed by Kit's
house at past 8:00 p.m. and saw Allain thereat. Notably, appellant Allain testified that AAA's house is also
100 meters away from their house. Thus, it would show that Kit's house is also in the same vicinity where
the crime was committed. Hence, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the incident.

Appellants' argument that AAA's conduct after the alleged sexual assault, i.e., washing her bloodied panty
and maong pants, and washing her private part, are not the normal behavior of a woman who had just been
raped deserves scant consideration.

It is not accurate to say that there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims.53 On the
contrary, people react differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of
a rape victim following her defilement.54 What is notable in the records was the fact that after she had
regained consciousness at 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, she immediately went back to her
employers' house and narrated to them what appellants had done to her, later reported the rape incident to
the police and underwent a physical examination of her private parts. Her actions indeed showed her desire
to obtain justice for what appellants did to her.

Appellants' contention that if AAA was positive as to their identification as the perpetrators of the crime
charged, why were there two other names included in the police blotter, is also unmeritorious.

The same police blotter stated a notation that: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Progress Report on Rape Alarm (Entry Nr. 98-257). As per sworn statement of offended party AAA that the
alleged suspects were Allain Ancajas and Vergel Ancajas and she refused (sic) the other suspects.55 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

The inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn statement of AAA and her categorical
declaration56 in open, court that appellants were the perpetrators of the crime charged and no other. It is
well entrenched that entries in a police blotter, although regularly done in the course of the performance of
official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, for these are often incomplete and
inaccurate. These, therefore, should not be given undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated
therein.57

Appellants' claim that a DNA test on the spermatozoa found on AAA's vagina should have been submitted for
DNA testing to know whether the sperm indeed came from both appellants or from AAA's boyfriend.

It has already been established that appellants were the ones who raped AAA. The DNA test is not essential,
while there exists other evidence pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.58 Moreover, if the prosecution
had not conducted such DNA test, appellants should have moved for such test during the trial to prove their
innocence.

All told, we find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt.

Under Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death. The RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both appellants
notwithstanding that appellant Allain was only 17 years old, a minor, at the time of the commission of the
crime on July 16, 1998. His birth certificate59 showed that he was born on December 19, 1980. The RTC did
not consider such minority saying that the penalty imposed upon the two accused is reclusion
perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the said
penalty should be applied and imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
minority.

We beg to differ.

To begin with; on May 20, 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, took effect, RA No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application, as held in People v.
Sarcia,60 which stated:chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this
case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Hence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable penalty on appellant Allain even if
the crime was committed seven years earlier. Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

In Madali, et al. v. People, we held that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate
61

the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.

In this case, it was established that appellant Allain acted with discernment as shown by his act of covering
AAA's mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting and conspired with appellant Vergel in raping
AAA.

As the crime of rape was committed by two persons, the penalty imposable under Article 266 (B) of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 6362 of the Revised Penal Code, if the
penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Since no
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposable. Appellant Allain was only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is, therefore, entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.

Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion perpetua, which
is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.63 To
determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one
degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should
be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full
range of prision mayor.64

Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of age who committed a crime and
was found guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if
such child has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment. Thus: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law. ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not
apply to appellant Allain because he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetuamaking
reference to Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,65 Rule, on Juveniles in Conflict with the law.

We do not agree.

In People v. Sarcia,66 we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No. 8344 even if the minor therein was
convicted of reclusion perpetua and we ratiocinated as follows: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the
offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The
said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a
child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided
by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital
offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and
should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found
guilty of a heinous crime.

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child
in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below: ch anRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of
Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial
proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or
primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. x x x67 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

In fact, the Court En Bane promulgated on November 24, 2009, the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with
the Law, which echoed such legislative intent.68

Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of
age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until
the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No. 9344, to wit: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant
is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the
application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the
said law.

In People v. Jacinto,69 we ruled: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply
to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule are clear on the
matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child
in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years,
so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the
right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given
the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in
conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec.
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A child in
conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect
appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility.70 ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility pursuant to Section
51 of RA No. 9344.

The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 ordered by the RTC to be paid by each
appellant are hereby affirmed. We, however, find that exemplary damages should also be awarded to set a
public example and to protect hapless individuals, from sexual molestation.71 We, therefore, award the
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.72

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.73

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals Cebu City,
issued in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00857 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Vergel Ancajas is
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance appreciated in
favor of appellant Allain Ancajas, and the absence of other modifying circumstances attendant to the crime,
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty often (10) years and one day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporalmedium, as maximum. Both appellants
are each ORDERED to pay P30,000.00 exemplary damages. The award of civil indemnity and moral
damages, both in the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid by each appellant, are maintained. The award of
damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

The case against appellant Allain Ancajas shall be REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate disposition
in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry