PEOPLE v.

POMAR
November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.
FACTS:
Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to
La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the
City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her
pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days
before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still
refused to pay Fajardo.
The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar
appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed
police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
“factory, shop or place of labor of any description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of
the state.

RULING:

The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public
conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the
growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that
power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express
inhibition of the people’s law – the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended
and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the
employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will
hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of
labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for
sixty days during which no services were rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions
of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
From <http://ezlexdigest.blogspot.com/2012/12/people-v-pomar.html>

G.R. No. L-46892 June 28, 1940

ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING COMPANY, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC
FACTS:

 On December 12, 1938, the Union, representing Antamok’s workers and employees who were
members of the labor union, addressed a letter to Antamok requesting 21 claims in favor of their
members.
 DOLE intervened and an amicable settlement was agreed upon by the parties. Hence, the workers
agreed to end the strike. After signing the agreement, the workers went on strike again, due to their not
being allowed to work in the mines upon their return, ostensibly due to air quality inside the mine.
 On January 9, 1939 the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) in accordance with Article 4 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 103.
 On March 31, 1939, with most of the Union’s 21 claims still pending, the Union filed a motion before the
CIR alleging that:
o The foreman A. Haber and 9 other workers had been suspended indefinitely on March 29;
o These workers had previously been transferred to outside work in order to provide Antamok with an
excuse to separate them later from service;
o Another group of about 30 workers were dismissed by [Antamok] without any reason and without
authorization from the court; and
o The suspensions and separations were acts of revenge and discriminatory for the workers.
 Antamok contested the motion by denying the imputed facts and claimed that:
o Haber and his nine companions were suspended for their continued laziness during working hours and
for having consistently refused to work, and
o The 45 workers headed by foreman Victoriano Madayag were dismissed for having refused to point out
those responsible for the ill-treatment of foreman Juan Moldero on the morning of March 30, 1939.
 On May 6 1939, the CIR ruled in favor of the Union. It denied Antamok’s motion for reconsideration.
Thus, this appeal by certiorari was brought before the SC.
 Antamok contended that Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 1031, which created the CIR, as amended by
Acts Nos. 254 and 355, is unconstitutional because it violates the principle of separation of powers, and
allows the deprivation of freedom and property without due process of law. Antamok alleged further that
the procedure with CIR had denied them of due process of law and of equal protection before the law.

ISSUES:

 WoN CA 103 violates the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on delegation of powers
o NO. CA 103 gives the CIR full discretion to resolve and decide agrarian and industrial disputes in the
manner it believes to be fair and equitable, regardless of technicalities or legal forms (Article 20), and
the power thus granted is judicial rather than legislative. So it does not violate the principle of
separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers or equal protection before the
law. "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no
valid objection can be made."
 WoN the legal powers CA 103 grants to the CIR are so arbitrary and unreasonable that they allow
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law or that Article 20, CA 103 at least suffers
from this fundamental defect because it confers on the CIR the power to issue its own rules of
procedure, which contravenes Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution which prescribes that the
Supreme Court shall issue rules concerning written pleadings, uniform practice and procedure for all
courts of the same category.
o NO. Section 20 reads: "The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its rules of procedure and shall
have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice”

1Commonwealth Act No. 103, entitled "An Act to afford protection of labor by creating a Court of Industrial Relations
empowered to fix minimum wages for laborers and maximum rental to be paid tenants, and to enforce compulsory arbitration
between employers or landlords, and employees or tenants, respectively; and by prescribing penalties for the violation of the
orders"
o Article 20 clearly stipulates that the rules of procedure which it adopts, to which the court must conform,
must be based on justice and equity, and prescribes that the criterion which must be formed must be
based on the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms. CA 103
cannot be challenged on the ground that authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law nor does it conflict with the precept of Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution
because the CIR is not of the same category as the municipal courts, courts of justice and courts of first
instance for which the regulations of the Courts by the Supreme Court [apply].
 Citing the concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. CA, to reassure the settled view that CA
103 and its amendments are valid and not unconstitutional:
o “Our Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from
economic and social distress which was threatening the stability of governments the world over.”
o Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general provisions were inserted in the Constitution which
are intended to bring about the needed social and economic equilibrium between component elements
of society through the application of what may be termed as the justitia communis advocated by Grotius
and Leibnits many years ago to be secured through the counterbalancing of economic and social forces
and opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed, as it were, in
custodia societatis. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people' was thus inserted as vital principle in our Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.) And in
order that this declaration of principle may not just be an empty medley of words, the Constitution in
various sections thereof has provided the means towards its realization. For instance, section 6 of
Article XIII declares that the State 'shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and
minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital
in industry and in agriculture. The same section also states that 'the State may provide for compulsory
arbitration. In extraordinary cases mentioned in section 16, Article VI, of the Constitution, the President
of the Philippines may be authorized by law, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as the
National Assembly may prescribe, to 'promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy.’
o "By and large, these [constitutional provisions] all evince and express the need of shifting emphasis to
community interest with a view to affirmative enhancement of human values. In conformity with the
constitutional objective and cognizant of the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes had
given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country, the National Assembly enacted CA
103, entitled 'An Act to afford protection of labor by creating a Court of Industrial Relations empowered
to fix minimum wages for laborers and maximum rental to be paid by tenants, and to enforce
compulsory arbitration between employers or landlords, and employees or tenants, respectively; and by
prescribing penalties for the violation of the orders' and, later, CA 213, entitled, 'An Act to define and
regulate legitimate labor organizations.'
o "In CA 103, and by it, our Government no longer performs the role of a mere mediator or intervenor but
that of the supreme arbiter."

From https://www.scribd.com/document/334681384/Antamok-Goldfields-Mining-Co-v-CIR

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
From <http://digestingcases.blogspot.com/2015/06/oposa-vs-factoran.html>

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

231 SCRA 292 G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

FACTS

 On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to
stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of
the water content of the surrounding area.
 The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as
required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
 The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could
considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.
 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of
Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop
and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
 On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its
Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate,
Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
 The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order
 In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a
balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
 On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from
enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from
dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders
of the court.
 COURT OF APPEALS
 On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and
desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development
Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

ISSUE

 Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of
garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan
which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation
and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open
garbage dumpsite

SUPREME COURT

 Yes.
 As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.
 It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
 Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
 In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass
upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such
plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.

ISSUE

 Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws

SUPREME COURT

 Yes.
 By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever
order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
 To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to
the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly
was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to
draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when
the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
 The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the
1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
 As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-
impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind
that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.
From https://www.scribd.com/doc/155255864/Laguna-Lake-Development-Authority-vs-Court-of-Appeals

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was
granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project
or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens,
fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region
interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It
is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot
be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which
grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code
of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

From <http://digestingcases.blogspot.com/2015/06/laguna-lake-development-authority-vs-ca.html>

PLDT V. NTC AND ETCI [G.R. NO.88404. OCTOBER 18, 1990]

FACTS
Private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) obtained from Congress Republic Act
No. 2090 a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications.
Petitioner PLDT invoked the “prior operator” or “protection of investment” doctrine in its opposition to
ETCI’s subsequent application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN). The National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted provisional authority to ETCI subject to the condition
that it shall enter into “interconnection agreement” with PLDT. PLDT elevated the case to the Supreme
Court pointing out ETCI’s defective legislative franchise to operate telecommunications system, among
others. ETCI contends that PLDT’s special civil action must deal only on issues whether the NTC acted
without jurisdiction of with grave abuse of discretion in granting ETCI the assailed provisional authority
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(1) ETCI is entitled of provisional authority;
(2) R.A. No 2090 partakes ETCI’s valid legislative franchise;
(3) PLDT may refuse NTC Order to enter into “interconnection agreement” with ETCI;
RULING
(1) YES. The provisional authority is granted in a very limited sense: for a period of 18 months which
may be revoked or revised by NTC, and applicable only in Metro Manila. Contrary to PLDT’s contention
that it is nothing short of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN), basic differences
exist. The issuance of CPCN is still subject to the exclusive prerogative of the NTC after full evaluation of
the application.
(2) YES. The NTC construed the technical term in R.A. No. 2090 “radiotelephony” liberally as to include
the operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. The construction given by an administrative
agency deserves great weight and respect. To otherwise question the validity or applicability of R.A. No.
2090 is a collateral attack on the statute which is not allowed. A franchise is a property right and cannot
be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a
franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly
the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto.
(3) NO. The PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to interconnect. The interconnection which has been required
of PLDT is a form of “intervention” with property rights dictated by the encompassing objective for the
common good. The NTC, as the regulatory agency of the State, merely exercised its delegated authority
to regulate the use of telecommunications networks when it decreed interconnection.

From <https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2014/11/23/philippine-long-distance-telephone-co-pldt-v-ntc-and-etci-g-r-no-88404-
october-18-1990/>

PLDT vs NTC
GR 94374 21 February 1995

FACTS:
Private respondent Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. ("Eastern"), filed, on 16 July 1987, with
the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN") and to construct,
maintain and operate an International Gateway Facility ("IGF") which is estimated to cost US$5 Million.
Eastern is a 60% Filipino owned corporation 2 organized under Philippine law and holder of a legislative
franchise under R.A. No. 808, as amended by R.A. No. 5002, in relation to P.D. No. 489 granting it the
right and privilege to:
. . . land, construct, maintain and operate telecommunication systems by cable or any other means now
known to science or which in the future may be developed for the reception and transmission of
messages between any point in the Philippines to points exterior thereto, including airplanes, airships or
vessels even though such airplanes, airships or vessels may be located within territorial limits of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
PLDT contends that an IGF is inherently part of "a telephone system" since it is "useful only for a
telephone system." Thus, PLDT contends that in effect Eastern is asking for a CPCN to establish
a telephone system. But Eastern has no franchise to establish a telephone system. Hence, PLDT
continues, Eastern cannot be granted the CPCN it seeks.
On 27 August 1992, the Court, speaking through Gutierrez, Jr., J., by a split vote,1 rendered a Decision
granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company ("PLDT").
Eastern and the Solicitor General, In behalf of NTC, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
WON the state, through NTC, should and may compel PLDT to share the IGF with Eastern.
HELD:
YES and YES. The SC reconsidered and ruled in favor of appellants Eastern and NTC.
PLDT has no right to treat its subscribers as its proprietary assets to be "exploited" by PLDT alone,
rather than as customers to be served in the manner that a public utility is supposed to serve the public.
Both local subscribers of PLDT or any other domestic telephone system, as well as callers from across
the oceans, should be accorded a choice. The fundamental point is that customers' choice and free
competition among carriers are essential if reasonable prices and efficient and satisfactory service are to
be achieved and maintained and the public's rapidly growing needs adequately served, in the area of
telecommunications, an area so vital to national social and economic development.

The regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems by NTC is in the exercise of the
plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. The 1987 Constitution
recognizes the existence of that power when it provides:
Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common
good. Individuals and private groups including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the
duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands
(Article XII).
The NTC, as the regulatory agency of the State, merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the
use of telecommunications networks when it decreed interconnection.

MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES AND PAGCOR (G.R. NO 111097. JULY 20, 1994)
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
respondents.
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of casino followed
by Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefor. Petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically
harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of
the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the
proper upbringing of the youth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.
HELD:
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed.
RATIO:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts
do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
From <https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2013/06/01/magtajas-vs-pryce-properties-and-pagcor-g-r-no-111097-july-20-1994/>

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of

Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 171947-48

18 December 2008

TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila
Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as
plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government

agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns
about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is
not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of

specific pollution incidents?
2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is
not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding

petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot
escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila
Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as discretionary, for,
as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that
these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection,
and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform
these duties.

The petition is DENIED.