EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23645 October 29, 1968

BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster General,
HON. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
DOMINGO GOPEZ, in his capacity as Acting Postmaster of San Fernando, Pampanga,respondent-appellants.

Lorenzo P. Navarro and Narvaro Belar S. Navarro for petitioner-appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

This appeal puts in issue the constitutionality of Republic Act 1635,1 as amended by Republic Act 2631,2 which provides
as follows:

To help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the Director of Posts shall order for the period from August
nineteen to September thirty every year the printing and issue of semi-postal stamps of different denominations with face
value showing the regular postage charge plus the additional amount of five centavos for the said purpose, and during the
said period, no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamps: Provided, That no such
additional charge of five centavos shall be imposed on newspapers. The additional proceeds realized from the sale of the
semi-postal stamps shall constitute a special fund and be deposited with the National Treasury to be expended by the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society in carrying out its noble work to prevent and eradicate tuberculosis.

The respondent Postmaster General, in implementation of the law, thereafter issued four (4) administrative orders
numbered 3 (June 20, 1958), 7 (August 9, 1958), 9 (August 28, 1958), and 10 (July 15, 1960). All these administrative
orders were issued with the approval of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

The pertinent portions of Adm. Order 3 read as follows:

Such semi-postal stamps could not be made available during the period from August 19 to September 30, 1957, for lack of
time. However, two denominations of such stamps, one at "5 + 5" centavos and another at "10 + 5" centavos, will soon be
released for use by the public on their mails to be posted during the same period starting with the year 1958.

xxx xxx xxx

During the period from August 19 to September 30 each year starting in 1958, no mail matter of whatever class, and
whether domestic or foreign, posted at any Philippine Post Office and addressed for delivery in this country or abroad,
shall be accepted for mailing unless it bears at least one such semi-postal stamp showing the additional value of five
centavos intended for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society.

In the case of second-class mails and mails prepaid by means of mail permits or impressions of postage meters, each piece
of such mail shall bear at least one such semi-postal stamp if posted during the period above stated starting with the year
1958, in addition to being charged the usual postage prescribed by existing regulations. In the case of business reply
envelopes and cards mailed during said period, such stamp should be collected from the addressees at the time of delivery.
Mails entitled to franking privilege like those from the office of the President, members of Congress, and other offices to
which such privilege has been granted, shall each also bear one such semi-postal stamp if posted during the said period.

Mails posted during the said period starting in 1958, which are found in street or post-office mail boxes without the
required semi-postal stamp, shall be returned to the sender, if known, with a notation calling for the affixing of such
stamp. If the sender is unknown, the mail matter shall be treated as nonmailable and forwarded to the Dead Letter Office
for proper disposition.

Adm. Order 7, amending the fifth paragraph of Adm. Order 3, reads as follows:
In the case of the following categories of mail matter and mails entitled to franking privilege which are not exempted from
the payment of the five centavos intended for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, such extra charge may be collected in
cash, for which official receipt (General Form No. 13, A) shall be issued, instead of affixing the semi-postal stamp in the
manner hereinafter indicated:

1. Second-class mail. - Aside from the postage at the second-class rate, the extra charge of five centavos for the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society shall be collected on each separately-addressed piece of second-class mail matter, and the total sum
thus collected shall be entered in the same official receipt to be issued for the postage at the second-class rate. In making
such entry, the total number of pieces of second-class mail posted shall be stated, thus: "Total charge for TB Fund on 100
pieces . .. P5.00." The extra charge shall be entered separate from the postage in both of the official receipt and the Record
of Collections.

2. First-class and third-class mail permits. - Mails to be posted without postage affixed under permits issued by this
Bureau shall each be charged the usual postage, in addition to the five-centavo extra charge intended for said society. The
total extra charge thus received shall be entered in the same official receipt to be issued for the postage collected, as in
subparagraph 1.

3. Metered mail. - For each piece of mail matter impressed by postage meter under metered mail permit issued by this
Bureau, the extra charge of five centavos for said society shall be collected in cash and an official receipt issued for the
total sum thus received, in the manner indicated in subparagraph 1.

4. Business reply cards and envelopes. - Upon delivery of business reply cards and envelopes to holders of business reply
permits, the five-centavo charge intended for said society shall be collected in cash on each reply card or envelope
delivered, in addition to the required postage which may also be paid in cash. An official receipt shall be issued for the
total postage and total extra charge received, in the manner shown in subparagraph 1.

5. Mails entitled to franking privilege. - Government agencies, officials, and other persons entitled to the franking
privilege under existing laws may pay in cash such extra charge intended for said society, instead of affixing the semi-
postal stamps to their mails, provided that such mails are presented at the post-office window, where the five-centavo
extra charge for said society shall be collected on each piece of such mail matter. In such case, an official receipt shall be
issued for the total sum thus collected, in the manner stated in subparagraph 1.

Mail under permits, metered mails and franked mails not presented at the post-office window shall be affixed with the
necessary semi-postal stamps. If found in mail boxes without such stamps, they shall be treated in the same way as herein
provided for other mails.

Adm. Order 9, amending Adm. Order 3, as amended, exempts "Government and its Agencies and Instrumentalities
Performing Governmental Functions." Adm. Order 10, amending Adm. Order 3, as amended, exempts "copies of
periodical publications received for mailing under any class of mail matter, including newspapers and magazines admitted
as second-class mail."

The FACTS. On September l5, 1963 the petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Because this letter, addressed to a certain Agustin Aquino of 1014 Dagohoy Street, Singalong, Manila did not
bear the special anti-TB stamp required by the statute, it was returned to the petitioner.

In view of this development, the petitioner brough suit for declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, to
test the constitutionality of the statute, as well as the implementing administrative orders issued, contending that it violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation. The lower court
declared the statute and the orders unconstitutional; hence this appeal by the respondent postal authorities.

For the reasons set out in this opinion, the judgment appealed from must be reversed.

I. Before reaching the merits, we deem it necessary to dispose of the respondents' contention that declaratory
relief is unavailing because this suit was filed after the petitioner had committed a breach of the statute. While
conceding that the mailing by the petitioner of a letter without the additional anti-TB stamp was a violation of
Republic Act 1635, as amended, the trial court nevertheless refused to dismiss the action on the ground that
under section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, "If before the final termination of the case a breach or
 violation of ... a statute ... should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary
action."chanrobles virtual law library

The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be brought "before breach or violation" of the
statute has been committed. Rule 64, section 1 so provides. Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to treat an
action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies only if the breach or violation occurs after the filing of the
action but before the termination thereof.

Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been a breach of the statute before the firing of this action, then
indeed the remedy of declaratory relief cannot be availed of, much less can the suit be converted into an ordinary action.

Nor is there merit in the petitioner's argument that the mailing of the letter in question did not constitute a breach of the
statute because the statute appears to be addressed only to postal authorities. The statute, it is true, in terms provides that
"no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamps." It does not follow, however, that
only postal authorities can be guilty of violating it by accepting mails without the payment of the anti-TB stamp. It is
obvious that they can be guilty of violating the statute only if there are people who use the mails without paying for the
additional anti-TB stamp. Just as in bribery the mere offer constitutes a breach of the law, so in the matter of the anti-TB
stamp the mere attempt to use the mails without the stamp constitutes a violation of the statute. It is not required that the
mail be accepted by postal authorities. That requirement is relevant only for the purpose of fixing the liability of postal
officials.

Nevertheless, we are of the view that the petitioner's choice of remedy is correct because this suit was filed not only with
respect to the letter which he mailed on September 15, 1963, but also with regard to any other mail that he might send in
the future. Thus, in his complaint, the petitioner prayed that due course be given to "other mails without the semi-postal
stamps which he may deliver for mailing ... if any, during the period covered by Republic Act 1635, as amended, as well
as other mails hereafter to be sent by or to other mailers which bear the required postage, without collection of additional
charge of five centavos prescribed by the same Republic Act." As one whose mail was returned, the petitioner is certainly
interested in a ruling on the validity of the statute requiring the use of additional stamps.

II. We now consider the constitutional objections raised against the statute and the implementing orders.

1. It is said that the statute is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically the claim is
made that it constitutes mail users into a class for the purpose of the tax while leaving untaxed the rest of the population
and that even among postal patrons the statute discriminatorily grants exemption to newspapers while Administrative
Order 9 of the respondent Postmaster General grants a similar exemption to offices performing governmental functions.

The five centavo charge levied by Republic Act 1635, as amended, is in the nature of an excise tax, laid upon the exercise
of a privilege, namely, the privilege of using the mails. As such the objections levelled against it must be viewed in the
light of applicable principles of taxation.

To begin with, it is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions.4 This power has aptly been described as "of wide range and flexibility."5 Indeed, it is said that in the field of
taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the greatest freedom in classification. 6 The reason for this is
that traditionally, classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to achieve an
equitable distribution of the tax burden.

That legislative classifications must be reasonable is of course undenied. But what the petitioner asserts is that statutory
classification of mail users must bear some reasonable relationship to the end sought to be attained, and that absent such
relationship the selection of mail users is constitutionally impermissible. This is altogether a different proposition. As
explained in Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co.:8

While the principle that there must be a reasonable relationship between classification made by the legislation and its
purpose is undoubtedly true in some contexts, it has no application to a measure whose sole purpose is to raise revenue ...
So long as the classification imposed is based upon some standard capable of reasonable comprehension, be that standard
based upon ability to produce revenue or some other legitimate distinction, equal protection of the law has been afforded.
See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, supra, 358 U.S. at 527, 79 S. Ct. at 441; Brown Forman Co. v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, 2d U.S. 56, 573, 80 S. Ct. 578, 580 (1910).
We are not wont to invalidate legislation on equal protection grounds except by the clearest demonstration that it
sanctions invidious discrimination, which is all that the Constitution forbids. The remedy for unwise legislation must be
sought in the legislature. Now, the classification of mail users is not without any reason. It is based on ability to pay, let
alone the enjoyment of a privilege, and on administrative convinience. In the allocation of the tax burden, Congress must
have concluded that the contribution to the anti-TB fund can be assured by those whose who can afford the use of the
mails.

The classification is likewise based on considerations of administrative convenience. For it is now a settled principle of
law that "consideration of practical administrative convenience and cost in the administration of tax laws afford adequate
ground for imposing a tax on a well recognized and defined class." 9 In the case of the anti-TB stamps, undoubtedly, the
single most important and influential consideration that led the legislature to select mail users as subjects of the tax is the
relative ease and convenienceof collecting the tax through the post offices. The small amount of five centavos does not
justify the great expense and inconvenience of collecting through the regular means of collection. On the other hand, by
placing the duty of collection on postal authorities the tax was made almost self-enforcing, with as little cost and as little
inconvenience as possible.

And then of course it is not accurate to say that the statute constituted mail users into a class. Mail users were already a
class by themselves even before the enactment of the statue and all that the legislature did was merely to select their class.
Legislation is essentially empiric and Republic Act 1635, as amended, no more than reflects a distinction that exists in
fact. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "to recognize differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard [them] and
concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic."

Granted the power to select the subject of taxation, the State's power to grant exemption must likewise be conceded as a
necessary corollary. Tax exemptions are too common in the law; they have never been thought of as raising issues under
the equal protection clause.

It is thus erroneous for the trial court to hold that because certain mail users are exempted from the levy the law and
administrative officials have sanctioned an invidious discrimination offensive to the Constitution. The application of the
lower courts theory would require all mail users to be taxed, a conclusion that is hardly tenable in the light of differences
in status of mail users. The Constitution does not require this kind of equality.

As the United States Supreme Court has said, the legislature may withhold the burden of the tax in order to foster what it
conceives to be a beneficent enterprise.11This is the case of newspapers which, under the amendment introduced by
Republic Act 2631, are exempt from the payment of the additional stamp.

As for the Government and its instrumentalities, their exemption rests on the State's sovereign immunity from taxation.
The State cannot be taxed without its consent and such consent, being in derogation of its sovereignty, is to be strictly
construed.12 Administrative Order 9 of the respondent Postmaster General, which lists the various offices and
instrumentalities of the Government exempt from the payment of the anti-TB stamp, is but a restatement of this well-
known principle of constitutional law.

The trial court likewise held the law invalid on the ground that it singles out tuberculosis to the exclusion of other diseases
which, it is said, are equally a menace to public health. But it is never a requirement of equal protection that all evils of the
same genus be eradicated or none at all.13 As this Court has had occasion to say, "if the law presumably hits the evil where
it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied."

2. The petitioner further argues that the tax in question is invalid, first, because it is not levied for a public purpose as no
special benefits accrue to mail users as taxpayers, and second, because it violates the rule of uniformity in taxation.

The eradication of a dreaded disease is a public purpose, but if by public purpose the petitioner means benefit to a
taxpayer as a return for what he pays, then it is sufficient answer to say that the only benefit to which the taxpayer is
constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society, established
and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude the levying of taxes except
as they are used to compensate for the burden on those who pay them and would involve the abandonment of the most
fundamental principle of government - that it exists primarily to provide for the common good.
Nor is the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation infringed by the imposition of a flat rate rather than a graduated tax.
A tax need not be measured by the weight of the mail or the extent of the service rendered. We have said that
considerations of administrative convenience and cost afford an adequate ground for classification. The same
considerations may induce the legislature to impose a flat tax which in effect is a charge for the transaction, operating
equally on all persons within the class regardless of the amount involved.16 As Mr. Justice Holmes said in sustaining the
validity of a stamp act which imposed a flat rate of two cents on every $100 face value of stock transferred:

One of the stocks was worth $30.75 a share of the face value of $100, the other $172. The inequality of the tax, so far as
actual values are concerned, is manifest. But, here again equality in this sense has to yield to practical considerations and
usage. There must be a fixed and indisputable mode of ascertaining a stamp tax. In another sense, moreover, there is
equality. When the taxes on two sales are equal, the same number of shares is sold in each case; that is to say, the same
privilege is used to the same extent. Valuation is not the only thing to be considered. As was pointed out by the court of
appeals, the familiar stamp tax of 2 cents on checks, irrespective of income or earning capacity, and many others, illustrate
the necessity and practice of sometimes substituting count for weight ...17

According to the trial court, the money raised from the sales of the anti-TB stamps is spent for the benefit of the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, a private organization, without appropriation by law. But as the Solicitor General points
out, the Society is not really the beneficiary but only the agency through which the State acts in carrying out what is
essentially a public function. The money is treated as a special fund and as such need not be appropriated by law.

3. Finally, the claim is made that the statute is so broadly drawn that to execute it the respondents had to issue
administrative orders far beyond their powers. Indeed, this is one of the grounds on which the lower court invalidated
Republic Act 1631, as amended, namely, that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Administrative Order 3, as amended by Administrative Orders 7 and 10, provides that for certain classes of mail matters
(such as mail permits, metered mails, business reply cards, etc.), the five-centavo charge may be paid in cash instead of
the purchase of the anti-TB stamp. It further states that mails deposited during the period August 19 to September 30 of
each year in mail boxes without the stamp should be returned to the sender, if known, otherwise they should be treated as
nonmailable.

It is true that the law does not expressly authorize the collection of five centavos except through the sale of anti-TB
stamps, but such authority may be implied in so far as it may be necessary to prevent a failure of the undertaking. The
authority given to the Postmaster General to raise funds through the mails must be liberally construed, consistent with the
principle that where the end is required the appropriate means are given.

The anti-TB stamp is a distinctive stamp which shows on its face not only the amount of the additional charge but also
that of the regular postage. In the case of business reply cards, for instance, it is obvious that to require mailers to affix the
anti-TB stamp on their cards would be to make them pay much more because the cards likewise bear the amount of the
regular postage.

It is likewise true that the statute does not provide for the disposition of mails which do not bear the anti-TB stamp, but a
declaration therein that "no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamp" is a
declaration that such mail matter is nonmailable within the meaning of section 1952 of the Administrative Code.
Administrative Order 7 of the Postmaster General is but a restatement of the law for the guidance of postal officials and
employees. As for Administrative Order 9, we have already said that in listing the offices and entities of the Government
exempt from the payment of the stamp, the respondent Postmaster General merely observed an established principle,
namely, that the Government is exempt from taxation.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Angeles and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.