A.C. No.

6116 August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later
reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and
Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late
Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was
reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed
commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about ₱
40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter 3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to
pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then
demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent ignored.

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of
his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children,
and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business5without the required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and
claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16,
1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction
against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint. 6

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report
and Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended
that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same in
its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration 10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141
dated October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. 11 Lawyers may, thus, be
disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11,
1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has
violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which
do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit
with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as
his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb
the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath 14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of
customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis. 15 The lending of money to a
single person without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a consistent
basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that
the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of
the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it
appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as
recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the

Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon
9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27, 2 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled “ Bobie
Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada”3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules
15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules
15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled
“Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,” where complainant was one of the respondents,
complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband,
Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified true
copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein
Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels, 6 as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses
during the trial proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from
the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended
her from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint
against him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by
circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute.
She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not
within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client.
She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake;
thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance. 10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. 11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of
law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.

On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that
Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.
RULING

We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders
a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts
which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that
Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her
husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-
examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that
such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were
done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended from the
practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada
cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in
behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein
in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.

Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she
represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to
inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom
she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost,
an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. 15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part
of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand
to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's
actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not
representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from the
practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as
counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of
the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme
Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in
the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of
its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end
desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible. 18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating

Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant
is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we
can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant
Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed
serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of
several post-dated checks.

Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit 1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The
Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the
latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan. 2cralawred

According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted
with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De
Vera.3cralawred

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of
P20,000.00 per month until fully paid. 4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera
persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by
mortgaging her property located in Lucena City. 5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-
dated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more checks to cover the
interest agreed upon.7cralawred

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in the
amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689
post-dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the
amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera. 8cralawred

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks
"bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a
second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was closed. 9cralawred

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations,
prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. 10cralawred

The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable
cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of
arrest was issued by the trial court. 11cralawred

In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for
violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 12cralawred

On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint. 13cralawred

Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.

According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting
Project to Atty. De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe' Telecom sites across
Northern and Southern Luzon.15cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they
agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would
cover the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per
site.16cralawred

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006. 17 At that time, Teresita had to
deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom. 18 However, Teresita did not have the funds
required for the application of building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell
site.19cralawred

Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached
Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason
Teresita gave was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband regarding the
loan.20cralawred

Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister. 21 She only lent Teresita another
check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]" 22cralawred

Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value. The
checks were not meant to be deposited. 23cralawred

Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out
that the proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since
she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint. 24cralawred

Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint
was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or]
abused her position against the interests of the complainant." 25cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused. 26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare allegations
that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and that the checks
issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on the part
of [Atty. De Vera]."27cralawred

On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90)
days from receipt of [the] records[.]" 28cralawred
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory
conferences where the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits. 29 Upon
the termination of the mandatory conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their respective
verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order." 30.

Both parties failed to file their position papers. 31cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law. 32 The Investigating Commissioner
ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the loans she
obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the
ordinary experience.

. . .

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent incurred
monetary obligations from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the latter as security for
the payment of the loans.

Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious
misconduct.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . . worthless
check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. . . . A check issued as an
evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented for payment — has the same effect as an
ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in
violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

. . .

[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for
gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.] 33 (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath
as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 34 The
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following
provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and

36
Recommendation reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is
recommended that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law. 37cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-612 38 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated the
B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration 40 dated September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for
Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.

In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-241 42 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties' respective motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution .subject of the
motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken
into consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant
to his Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B of the Rules and
resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-612 dated May
11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the original)
cralawlawlibrary

The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and
approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.

Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged by
Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also
raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal
proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the
criminal acts complained of."44cralawred

This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing worthless
checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.

In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing
post-dated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against
respondent Collado.. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised
against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment
charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not have
enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the
acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider
that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on
the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment"; 47 it is serious or gross
when it is flagrant.48cralawred

We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that
is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to
prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime
against public order to be abated.

. . .

Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for. the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest
and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.49(Citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public
or private capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from Teresita.
Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by
denying the existence of the loan and claiming that the checks were mere "show checks." 51 However,
she failed to present evidence to prove those allegations.

The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for P540,000.00, 53 and
on which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that there was no separate
transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated checks issued
by Teresita to Mary Jane only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed that she had no personal knowledge of
any transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. 55cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her
checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed
to know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value that were
dishonored upon presentation for payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole." 56 A
lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to
him.'"57cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint 1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012
filed by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes
(Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts

Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint 2 for damages against
his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other
defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-
QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-0008689 3/Issued on March 10, 2008." 4 Maximino claimed that at
the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected
payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his
third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate
case for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the
complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that
he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will
impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records,
never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your]
lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong
polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel 7 in the
complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the
interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner
and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to
dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, 8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his
signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03
of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM)
Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.

In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the
third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of
Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was
declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive
language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and
were uttered in good faith.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty,
Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying
Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IBP Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation 15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance
requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information
would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any
administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando
and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor
intended to be published and known by third persons.

In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him
to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration 17 which was however
denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint
against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency
and morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts,
their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to
uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession. 21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all
times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with
fellow lawyers.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum. 23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court
treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a
letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his
integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is considered
conduct unbecoming of the legal profession. 25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the
tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign
and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's
insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive
conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary
plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for
all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a
departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal
profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should
remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their
conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them. 26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that
the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando
should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another
lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and
insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. 27 While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client. 29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his
failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had
filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be
cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the
records.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues
and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR.,
AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D.
PAJARILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified complaint 1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for
allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a
lawyer from representing conflicting interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a lawyer
to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients.

The salient facts of the case follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two
opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M. Adeva,
Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban
Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.

In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a total monthly
compensation and honorarium of P6,000.

On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized
Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and
Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural
Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant.

On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the
Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as
stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of
Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having financial difficulties.

On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial
capacity to pay the loan.
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.

On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which
nullified the appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members of
the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the
latter of the SEC Order.

On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order
and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein respondent.
The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that
respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.

On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to P400,000.

On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.

On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.

On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the
respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness,
and loyalty.

Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued
that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the
complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors
to file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed that he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict
of interest which applies only to the legal counsel of complainant. Respondent argued that he merely
served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third,
respondent argued that there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that he could not
have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant.

On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and

Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommending
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year. The Investigating
Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed
by his former client, the complainant herein. The Investigating Commissioner cited cash
vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that respondent was paid by complainant for his retained legal
services. According to the Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent's claim
that the complainant merely appointed him as its corporate secretary. The Investigating
Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's representatives to file this administrative
case is immaterial since proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person.
On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-770 4 which
affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed a penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for one year against respondent.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 5 which
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.

The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by
complainant against RBP.

We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former
client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing
conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.7 In Maturan v. Gonzales8 we further explained the rationale for the
prohibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his
client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to
take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if
the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence of conflict of
interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. 10 It also applies when
the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly or
indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former
client.11 This rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse interests. 12 What a lawyer owes his
former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 13 A lawyer may only be
allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. 14chanrobleslaw

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting interests
when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the complainant,
respondent's former client, against RBP.

The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by complainant for
his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to
2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client. And respondent appeared as counsel of
RBP in a case filed by his former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests since respondent failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly
the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting
interests.15chanrobleslaw

We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction between
RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the
financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his former client.

Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and information in
connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public records.
In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal
pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter
appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of
the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian
vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as
to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former client during that relationship, before
refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330;
286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary
that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might have a bearing on
the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof.
(Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even
though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77
Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in
determining the existence of conflict of interest.

Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is imbued with
public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person." Thus, in the present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia
Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for disbarment even without
authority from the Board of Directors of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290
of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year
against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S.
ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of
the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of
fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also
what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from
any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of
protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to
his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before
the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery
of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case
No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the
law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the
ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among
others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the
correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm
delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates
endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the
law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco
admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case
No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred
to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended
Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No.
33 as party-defendant.3Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-
defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed
conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds,
the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization
through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44
among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders.
On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their codefendants are charged,
was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA
lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta,
became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex
"A" of the expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as
such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid
Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the
allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material
interest therein and therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in his name in Annex "A" of the
expanded Amended Complaint are his assets. 6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying
the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated
October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. 8 The Counter-Motion
for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their respective
9
shareholdings.
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in
PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated
May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33;
(b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter
aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21,
1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor
had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they
have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their
acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has
apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in
turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5
of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA
72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the
PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In
the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in
by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is
DENIED for lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers
who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the
law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners
ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification
reasonable under the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in
violation of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the
identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping
of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due
consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the
law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on
essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33
grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of
his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA
law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by
private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their
sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information
obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of
the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding
him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to
dismiss Civil Case No.0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger
fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal
with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The
statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they
have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their
acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and
identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled
"Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG,
through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG
wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it
was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in
corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers
executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons; some in
blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that,
one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the
petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the
shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again,
this is important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr.
Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say
that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits
from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal
Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we
would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course
of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is
merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as
against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services
may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend
on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by
the contract to the person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of
the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his
client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what
may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and
exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and
stable tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford,26 the U. S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of
attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is
the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious,
to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the
party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel,
without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice
given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28Passed on into various provisions of the
Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client
is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be
borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of
his client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the
most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose
between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either
opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too
high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby
rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct
individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered
by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which
encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in
order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option
but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know
his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged
to grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge
the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related
to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified
client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney
revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not
remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her
refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt orders,
the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions
described above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate
the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino
Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law
partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and
Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino
on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and
circumstances of the case, held:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information
would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the
rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege.
"In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of
compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such
disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of
this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases,
protected as confidential communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New York
Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought
action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared
on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name
of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution
of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent
under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court
held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to
defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such cases is clearly the attorney for the
policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be
used in an action or claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or
assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other
matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter
so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the
ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this
case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address
cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the
summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are
sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower
court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the
court's request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected
with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to
the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court
held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented
certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such
evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would
compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of
communications made to him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they
were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever
gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only
his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be
made the basis of a suit against his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable
position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and
sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then
being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered
to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another
amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to
the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients.
The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird
refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and
accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the
enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients he was found
guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to
reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in
settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation
into that client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client's name
is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the
disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money
was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient
amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to
the government for but one purpose — to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so
that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment
indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum
previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is
criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are
the reasons the attorney here involved was employed — to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been
held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit
of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering
their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted
the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure,
framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties
as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in
the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client)
of a . . . crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the
privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the
exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his
name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the
prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a
shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the
client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against
the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to
give advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in the cases
above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege,
in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related,
when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client." 49 "Communications made
to an attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which
may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each
other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications."50 Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege,
would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known to the
prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open up
other privileged information which would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's
identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird
exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the
privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise
been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What these cases
unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing
expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend
on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the
building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such
as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the
transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously
protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a
duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the
privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly
gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal
the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the
transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of
transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other.
In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the
transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer
cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle which
forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,54 the
US Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty
to its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its
client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court
instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of
cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in
favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee
lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum
meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to
pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical
stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle
for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients
in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but
the punctilioof an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that
the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess,
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to
accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life — so
share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that is not
all. What a subject is this in which we are united — this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a
magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I
think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who
are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely passion — only to be
won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain
of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall
within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners
and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy
funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-
owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen
million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as
dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument
in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross
abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of
the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the
PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would
exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the (client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the private respondent
was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a
nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the
interest of truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of the principal." 59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a
statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners
have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's
Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance
of "legitimate lawyering." 60 Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that
there exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private
respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to
sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the
identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show — and absolute nothing
exists in the records of the case at bar — that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his
client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement
between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's
special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan
should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private
respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three
documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and
one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to
reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services
while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted
disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the
respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was
treated as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which
made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from
the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven
application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so
62
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. Those who fall
within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the
liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest. 63
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated
litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's
demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents
related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of
the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing
expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are
called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise
their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that
they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right
against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is
obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as
a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with
respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to
sanction an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and
palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to
continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and
subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's motion
for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its
resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition. 1
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of
Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-
Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan
del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet
was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the
criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free
patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application
was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued
in his favor for that lot which is situated in thepoblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action 2 for the cancellation of respondent Paredes'
patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the
aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment 3 nullifying said patent and title
after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations
in his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case. 4
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for
perjury5 was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. 6 On November 27,
1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the
dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were
terminated.7 In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent
Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary
investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and
induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was
Paredes' counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution 8 recommending the criminal prosecution of
respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for
reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in
that motion:
. . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the
same evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon
recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of
arraignmentand the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready
reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent
herein . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes with
a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed
by the defense was later granted in respondent court's resolution of August 1, 1991 11 and the case
was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges
against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three
respondents herein for falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed that respondent Honrada, in
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents
purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. 13 These falsified
documents were annexed to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan
resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same
would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was
ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury
case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury case in his court did not
reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by
the Department of Justice. 14
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and
repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications, 15respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the
graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it
appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned
therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary
investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of
respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that
he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the
way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor
was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification
charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel
for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the
evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty.
Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which
may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any further
controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against each
of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, 18 each of which named one of the three
private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court. However, the same
were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was
concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet,
there was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of documents by
respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-
client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in
their opposition to the prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this
ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship
existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged
in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential
matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in
his professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the
offense charged in the information is privileged. 19
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, 20 the controversy was elevated to
this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1)
whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred
by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for
discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which
existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts
surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by respondent
Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it
further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes,
Jr. without the latter's consent." 21
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as
the facts thereof and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a
clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting mental
cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court,
and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel
therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents
by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements
being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to "any communication," without distinction or
qualification. 22
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular
mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is
not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as
well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. 23
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations as
counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were
prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal
act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed
by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary
investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and words of the parties during
the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes
would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under
conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal
act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be
committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court
appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that
respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada
that have already been committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true
that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those
crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege,
however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by
the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard
to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he
seeks the lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a
party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily,
the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney
and client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he
and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the
process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference
to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of
afuture offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification
which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in
order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege
from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances
may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice." 27
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by
the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a
crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his
conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the
noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether respondent
Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to
testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the
preceding issue, did not pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which
are now submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of
some ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or not
respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving
that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence have been
submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the
pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on the
merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in three
separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman
recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of public documents against all the
respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further
controversy, one information was filed against each of the three respondents here, resulting in three
informations for the same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case by the
following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's discharge as state witness, he can,
nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases
were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation
in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving
common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as
co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was charged
separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the
effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that they
are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried
together are called joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been a
consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and became a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of action involved
had originally been joined in a single action. 29
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation "(w)hen two or more persons are
charged with the commission of a certain offense" was too broad and indefinite; hence the word
"joint" was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all together
charged therewith substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time. The word "joint"
means "common to two or more," as "involving the united activity of two or more," or "done or
produced by two or more working together," or "shared by or affecting two or more. 30 Had it been
intended that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules
could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances
obtaining in the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After
all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that
since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all
members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he "does not
appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he must be the least guilty 32 as is so often erroneously
framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of
membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the
others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of
the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the
offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others in
three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against
their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-
conspirators was discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime of
estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he
was easily convinced by his two co-accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the
commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty
as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is
untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by
the accused to be discharged compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in
law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicity articulated found expression in People
vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of
a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be
discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing
not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy,
he is equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the
presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except
Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of
cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct
evidence was available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony
could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial
court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence
reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage
a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not
appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-
accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity
of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of
conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation
in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an
accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the
commission of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other
accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion
of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be
the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.
(Emphasis ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense
is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical
action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on
the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant
consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory
that the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the
discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the
need for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience
that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify
truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based
on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated by
the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification
charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the
formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the
charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the
prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose
discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto
and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in
his Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses,
identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco
C. Ariño, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and
Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who
initiated the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to
file the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the
certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ariño.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor
General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may
propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of
the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such
discretion should have been exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and
issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the
retirement of two members of its Second Division 37 and
38
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment dated June 14,
1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new
members thereof 39 declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza
and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the Second
Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments submitted by the
Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the
Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to setting aside the questioned
Resolutions and to grant the prosecution's motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state
witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to
that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impunged
resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed
and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11043, March 08, 2017
LIANG FUJI, Complainant, v. ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted
in the alien's wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to
administrative liability.

Before this Court is an administrative complaint 1 dated November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji)
and his family, against Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz (Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz) for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance
of a Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.

Through a letter2 dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina
B. Layusa directed the complainants to file a verified complaint "with supporting documents duly
authenticated and/or affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged" 3 in the
complaint.

Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with copies of the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O.
No. BOC-2015-357 (B.L.O. No. SBM-15-420) and for Relief of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for
Immediate Consideration, and Administrative Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative
Complaint),5 which Fuji filed with the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and
prayed that the same be treated as their verified complaint. Complainants further informed this Court
that they had difficulty obtaining certified true copies of the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of
Commissioners, which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa, Summary Deportation Order dated June 17,
2015, and Warrant of Deportation from the Bureau of Immigration personnel who just gave them the
"run[-]around."6 They alleged that the Bureau of Immigration personnel were not particularly helpful,
and did not treat Fuji's case with urgency. 7

The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation Order 8 dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a
Chinese national, was ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz was the special prosecutor who brought the formal charge against Fuji and
another person upon her finding that Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013, with extension
expired on December 6, 2013.9 Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one
(1) year and six (6) months in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7). 10 Her
investigation was triggered by a complaint-affidavit dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo
alleging that Fuji and another person had defrauded him. 11
On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration. 12

On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence Division served Fuji's Warrant of
Deportation, and thereafter arrested him at Brgy. Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the assistance
from local police.13 Fuji was brought to and detained at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility,
National Capital Region Police Office, Taguig City. 14

On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's Motion for Reconsideration. 15

On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint. 16 Subsequently,
on March 10, 2016, Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-2015-357, and
Release on Bail through counsel. 17

On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a Resolution dismissing the deportation
charge against Fuji on the ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a working visa valid until 30
April 2016 under Jiang Tuo Mining Philippines, Inc. as Marketing Liason." 18 Fuji was directed to be
released from Bureau of Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23, 2016. 19

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was
not afforded any hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order was
issued against him.20 Fuji further alleged that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in
discharging her duties because a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration records would
have revealed that he was not overstaying because his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until April 30,
2016.21

In her August 25, 2016 Comment, 22 respondent Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she
committed any grave misconduct. 23 She claimed that Fuji was accorded due process during the
summary deportation proceedings. 24 He was directed, through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the
Legal Division, to submit his Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to do. 25 Fuji was also
able to file his motion for reconsideration and verified petition to reopen the case. 26

Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the Bureau of Immigration -
Management Information System (BI-MIS) constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's overstay in the
country, hence, her formal charge had legal basis. 27

Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her duties. 28 She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit any flagrant
disregard of the rules, or unlawfully used her station to procure some benefit for herself or for other
persons.29 Respondent pointed out that the Ombudsman had in fact dismissed the complainant's
charges against her.30 She added that Fuji stated in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that he
had mistakenly signed some documents including the administrative complaint. 31

We find respondent administratively liable for her negligence in her failure to ascertain the
facts before levying the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.
I

Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in
government service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either to the
proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or employee or
the Ombudsman.32

For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court dismissed the disbarment complaint against
former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr.,
and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public
officials being charged for actions involving their official functions during their tenure, which should be
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman. 34 In that case, one (1) of the respondents sought to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order from
the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a counter-affidavit based on the same
administrative complaint filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant. 35

Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,36 the Court dismissed the complaint
against respondents - government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the
acts or omissions alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . . official functions in the [Civil
Service Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the
Office of the Ombudsman."37 It would seem that the complainant directly instituted a disbarment
complaint with this Court instead of filing an administrative complaint before the proper administrative
body.

This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records
here show that the Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint
due to the pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of
Immigration, and considered the case closed. 38

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered his
release. However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.

Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and
the apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint, this
Court considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary authority" 39 over members of the legal
profession.40

Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to
dismiss this administrative complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of this nature
cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." 41 The primary object
of disciplinary proceedings is to determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is
conducted solely for the public welfare, 42 and the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant. What will
be decisive are the facts borne out by the evidence presented by the parties. In Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos:43
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.44
II

Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying on the
basis of the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-MIS. 45 A copy of the Memorandum with
attachments was attached to respondent's Comment. 46

However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji "overstayed" or that "Liang's working
visa expired on 8 May 2013 and his TVV expired on 6 December 2013" 47 as respondent claims.
Relevant portions of the Memorandum read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For : ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ

From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION

REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA EXTENSION PAYMENT, LATEST

Re :
TRAVEL AND DEROGATORY OF THE FOLLOWING:

1. MR./MS. LIANG FUJI

2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE

3. MR./MS. JACKY CHANG HE

Date : 04 June 2015

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------

Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status; Visa Extension Payment and TRAVEL
RECORD/S, please find the result/s as follows:

....

Result/s : 1. LIANG FUJI

- Derogatory Record Not Found

- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached files for your ready reference.
 NOTE: DOB: 18 October 1991)

- Immigration Status Found

- Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please see the attached files for your
ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18 October 1991)48

....
The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration records showing details of filing of
applications, such as official receipts, - and travel record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz who
made the determination that Fuji overstayed on the basis of the'documents transmitted to her by the
BI-MIS.

Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were computer print-outs showing details of official
receipts dated June 14, 2013, August 7, 2013, and November 19, 2013 for temporary visitor visa
extension and official receipt dated July 15, 2013 for an application for change of immigration status.
Also, the travel records of Fuji show the following details:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Date &
: 4 June 2015 3:05 PM
Time

Verifier : DIMARUCOT J

Database : TRAVEL - ARRIVAL

TRAVEL FLIGHT IMMIG

TRAVEL DATE PORT OFFIC3ER ACTION REMARKS
TIME NO STATUS

10-FEBRUARY- NAIA
11:34PM CZ377 9G MIJARES ALLOWED
2014 1

06-JANUARY- NAIA
11:51PM CZ377 9A PARANGUE ALLOWED
2012 1

22-
NAIA
SEPTEMBER- 11:25PM CZ377 9A NUNEZ ALLOWED49
1
2011

Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in the Philippines on February 10, 2014
under a work visa immigration status. 50 Simple prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela Cruz
should have verified whether or not the July 15, 2013 application for change of status had been
approved by the Bureau of Immigration Commissioners, especially since she had complete and easy
access to the immigration records.

Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the Bureau of
Immigration should exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the immigration
records, whenever the legal status and documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a
deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, it is however, a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person. 51

Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents transmitted to
her by the BI-MIS, especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
deportee. She should not have simply relied on the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-MIS
at the bottom portion of the receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A visa extension stating "Valid until:
06-Dec-2013." Had she inquired further, she would have discovered that Fuji's application dated July
15, 2013 for conversion from temporary visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by the Board
of Commissioners on November 21, 2013 — or one (1) year and seven (7) months earlier - with
validity until April 30, 2016. Thus, even if Fuji's temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired on December
6, 2013 his stay in the country was still valid under the 9G work visa.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official. 52 However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court.

Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable." As a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration,
she is the representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her task was to investigate and
verify facts to determine whether a ground for deportation exists, and if further administrative action
— in the form of a formal charge — should be taken against an alien.

Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would have found out about the approval
of Fuji's application, which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji
was deprived of his liberty for almost eight (8) months, until his release on March 23, 2016.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to give attention to a task due to carelessness or
indifference.54 In this case, respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the fundamental right of
every person, including aliens, to due process and to the consequences of her actions.

Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations
consistent with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust. 55 The ethical standards
under the Code of Professional Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government
lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high
standard of ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service. 56 In this case, respondent's
negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and high standards of public service and
the legal profession.

The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court. 57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the
penalty for simple neglect of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
In previous cases,59this Court imposed the penalty of suspension of three (3) months to six (6)
months for erring lawyers, who were negligent in handling cases for their clients. We find appropriate
the penalty of suspension of three (3) months considering the consequence of respondent's
negligence. This suspension includes her desistance from performing her functions as a special
prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall immediately serve her suspension. She shall
formally manifest to this Court that her suspension has started, and copy furnish all courts and quasi-
judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent shall also serve copies of her manifestation on all adverse parties in all the
cases she entered her formal appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to Atty.
Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz's personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution 1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and inappropriate conduct tending
to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and
Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent
beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission will
impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April 2013. 2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G.
Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the
filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and
Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys")
werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale
and use of dangerous drugs.3In a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges
were dropped for lack of probable cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the
evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up" allegedly
prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to
conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that respondenthad
prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales. 5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
(VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had
admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act.
They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for
acts unbecoming a member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal processes. 7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent
showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-
ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor. 8 Atty. Lozano’s
verified ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as
CBD Case No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of
respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings. 10 On 27
February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed
by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as
well as for investigation, report and recommendation. RESPONDENT’S VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his
clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate release of
Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the accused, together with their families,
came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his clients. 12 Sheer faith in the innocence
of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order.
Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it,
then everything may be expedited." 13 In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release order
was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at
all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of
Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the
charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the
release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order
to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence,
Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar
action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against
members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court. 16 By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. 17
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any
way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent
may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating
Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court." We believe
that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-
peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where
respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that
the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This
refusal purportedly impelled him to take more serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the Secretary
himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasihe is very political
also so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that day because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that
Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was
very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I
did was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for
signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to PDEA. So
hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with the parents
of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the
afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman
kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can
I do if I move on this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your
Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko
pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those
particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho
kami ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the
case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;" and
that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father was a
Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows my sister was a
Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete
stranger to him."20 Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that
he was personally acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close. 21
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he
personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the
latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery
despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and
consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that
tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s
faith inthe judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that
end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is
condemnable and unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall not state
or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding
rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the law. 23 A
self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain
a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting
standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as
commensurate penalty for the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-month
suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling whenshe solicited
₱100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her help in the case of her friend
Emerita Muñoz, who had a pendingcase with the Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a
former court attorney of the high court. 24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present
case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof violating
Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he
is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. This also serves as
an emphaticWARNING that repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s bar records. The Court Administrator is
hereby directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City,
Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A.
Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30,
against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("respondents").
Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03, 1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion")
in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). 4 The
Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos
appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was
sitting as pairing judge.
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments
rendered in favor of Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as
REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.
Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered
by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the
1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax
Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is
ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.
SO ORDERED.6
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) 7 dated 30 July
2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent portions of which read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual
and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x
x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the
Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period
of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon.
Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is
highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of
the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is
an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to
a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE
base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that
The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the
Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is
determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is
backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the
Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS
committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the
ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and
ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER,
the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight! 8
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a
fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. 9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain
why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating"
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. 10 In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, 11 Velasco-Jacoba
claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will
show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case." 12 Velasco-
Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the
Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of
justice."13She rationalized as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking
adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-
side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of total and utter
disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-
hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just
articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good
fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must
believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters
involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x 14
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they] may
have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the line and
gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the
record.15
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her
with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on
her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said
"O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be
filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her
husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." 17 This pleading turned out
to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
suspension from the practice of law.18
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting
any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her
imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a
senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over." 19At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should
have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because "[Veneracion] had already filed
against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the
Ombudsman."20
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law
Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly
rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance 21 and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019"). 22 The first charge became the subject of a
preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge,
Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit 24 filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain
why he should not be held in contempt. 25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-
Jacoba’s statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. 26 Judge
Lacurom later rendered a decision 27 finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP
Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice. 28
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended
the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months. 29 IBP Commissioner Navarro
found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which
amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority." 30 Although the remarks were not directed at
Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a smack on the
judiciary system as a whole."31
The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Report and
Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court,
together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus: 33
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge Lacurom
is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable Court of
Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition
with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the
same issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme
Court for being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;
5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint should
likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of
Appeals.34(Emphasis supplied)
The Court’s Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that the present complaint should be
considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary
injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to
nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26
September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and
(2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners
allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court." 36
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither
identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for being
premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacurom’s orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could
not be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition for certiorari assailing
the same orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative
nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same
has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the challenged order or
judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is
administratively liable.37
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding
implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against
Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001
motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it
is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or
indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew
it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the
motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court
document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her
husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing
each other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-
Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years,
[she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other." 38 By
Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act
of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion.39
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001
motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author of
the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition
did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the
motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to
be gigantic and monumental."40
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her
reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was raised
only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had
been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion
that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the
outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him. 41 This petition
for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s
handiwork.42
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object
timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. 43 This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of
Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult
to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that
the words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect." 44
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July
2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. 45 However,
even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001
motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and
decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be
forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the
courts and trust in judicial administration.47
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language
but also to pursue the client’s cause through fair and honest means, thus:
Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client
in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case
No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacurom’s sala. The Court’s attention is drawn to the fact
that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the
cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In
Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six
months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite the
lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and
sheriff’s fees."48 In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties
when he failed to file the appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed
the penalty of one year suspension.49
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay
conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section
415 of the Local Government Code. 50
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a
stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted
themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the
court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law
for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a
repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents’ personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863
captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge
Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863,
Judge Manahan issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from
hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges,
would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action
of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction. 2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation. 3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, 4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez
(Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores
appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and
was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-
Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty.
Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of
respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010
giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure
to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating
among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and fair play.
Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution commands:
Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and
human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary conference
on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of
his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear
and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed
a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in
your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge. 7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected
not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong, as
well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system." 8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine
interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to
voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must
be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must
not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the
confines of reason and common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also,
we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of
law for half a century. 10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it
proper to fine respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6332 April 17, 2012
IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS. 145817 AND
145822
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Factual Background
This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña filed an Urgent Motion
to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003 1 (the subject
Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated petitions involving respondent that were pending before the
Court.2 This motion is directed against the then ponente of the consolidated petitions, Justice Antonio
T. Carpio, and reads in part:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully states:
1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to hurdle in his quest for justice against Urban Bank
and its officials, he has remained steadfast in his belief that ultimately, he will be vindicated and the
wrongdoers will get their just deserts [sic]. What respondent is about to relate however has, with all
due respect, shaken his faith in the highest Court of the land. If an anomaly as atrocious as this can
happen even in the august halls of the Supreme Court, one can only wonder if there is still any hope
for our justice system.
2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he is not making a sweeping accusation against all
the members of this Honorable Court. He cannot however remain tight-lipped in the face of the
overwhelming evidence that has come to his knowledge regarding the actuation of the ponente of this
Honorable Division.
3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private respondent received a call from the counsel for
petitioners, Atty. Manuel R. Singson (through his cell phone number 09189137383) who very
excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending
the redemption period and the consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during
the execution sale. Private respondent was aghast because by them, more than two weeks had
lapsed since the redemption period on the various properties had expired. At that juncture in fact,
Certificates of Final Sale had already been issued to the purchasers of the properties. The only step
that had to be accomplished was the ministerial act of issuance of new titles in favor of the
purchasers.
4. Private respondent composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending incident with this
Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he could not remember any.
In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get
such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained
that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties
involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it might
again cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close down.
5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy of the order that Atty. Singson was
talking about, he asked Atty. Singson to fax him the "advance" copy that they had received. The faxed
"advance" copy that Atty. Singson provided him bore the fax number and name of Atty. Singson’s law
office. A copy thereof is hereto attached as Annex "A".
6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It appeared that a supposed Motion for
Clarification was filed by petitioners through Atty. Singson dated 6 August 2002, but he was never
furnished a copy thereof. He asked a messenger to immediately secure a copy of the motion and
thereafter confirmed that he was not furnished a copy. His supposed copy as indicated in the last
page of the motion was sent to the Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices.
ACCRA, however, was never respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of the
petitioners. Respondent’s copy, in other words, was sent to his opponents.
7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without even giving respondent an opportunity to
comment on the same. In contrast, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
19 November 2001 had been pending for almost a year and yet petitioners’ motions for extension to
file comment thereon [were] being granted left and right.
8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed on 10 December 2002, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion (to Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13 November 2002
Resolution). He filed a Supplement to the said motion on 20 December 2002.
9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he received
sometime last week two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two documents indicate that
this Honorable Court has not actually granted petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They indicate that
the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had
bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda of the First
Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution
was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members
of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the
members of the Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to
Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November
2002 Resolution. This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued
by the First Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution
exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C."
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of
what Atty. Singson was bragging to him about. The clear and undeniable fact is the Honorable
members of this Division agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but
the ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was
GRANTED.
12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is CERTAIN that the ponente has a special interest in
this case. Recently, he also found out that the ponente made a special request to bring this case
along with him when he transferred from the Third Division to the First Division. Respondent has a
copy of the Resolution of this Honorable Court granting such request (hereto attached as Annex "D").
Indeed, this circumstance, considered with all the foregoing circumstance, ineluctably demonstrates
that a major anomaly has occurred here.
13. In view of these, private respondent is compelled to move for the inhibition of the ponente from
this case. This matter should be thoroughly investigated and respondent is now carefully considering
his legal options for redress. It has taken him seven years to seek vindication of his rights against
petitioners, he is not about to relent at this point. In the meantime, he can longer expect a fair and
impartial resolution of this case if the ponente does not inhibit himself.
14. This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized the importance of impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality on the part of judges and justices. The ponente will do well to heed such
pronouncements.
15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon this Honorable Court to clarify its real position on
the 19 November 2001 Resolution. It is most respectfully submitted that in order to obviate any further
confusion on the matter, respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002 (as well as
the Supplement dated 19 November 2002) should be resolved and this Honorable Court should
confirm that the stay order contained in the 19 November 2001 Resolution does not cover properties
already sold on execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Peña attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit two
copies of the official Agenda for 13 November 2002 of the First Division of this Court, which he
claimed to have anonymously received through the mail. 3 He also attached a copy of the Court’s
internal Resolution regarding the transfer of the case from the Third Division to the First Division,
upon the request of Justice Carpio, to establish the latter’s alleged special interest in the case. 4
In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17 February 2003 to require Atty. Peña and Atty. Manuel
R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, to appear before the Court on 03
March 2003 for an Executive Session.5
The reason for the required appearance of the two lawyers in the Executive Session is explained in
the Court’s Resolution dated 03 March 2003. 6 It states:
The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally opened the
executive session and then requested Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug
stated that the executive session was called because the Court is perturbed by some statements
made by respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña involving strictly confidential matters which are purely
internal to the Court and which the latter cites as grounds in his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion."
Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Peña and counsel for petitioner Atty. Manuel R. Singson
attended the session.
The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to obtain copies of the documents he used
as annexes in his motion to inhibit, and whether the annexes are authentic.
The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken as entirely different and apart from the
merits of the main case.
Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three (3) annexes attached to the motion to
inhibit, Annexes "B", "C" and "D," questioned how the latter was able to secure copies of such
documents which are confidential to the Court and for the sole use of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
First Division and the Justices concerned.
Annex "B" is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental agenda of the First Division for November
13, 2002 (pages 61-62), with an entry in handwriting reading "10 AC" on the left side and what appear
to be marginal notes on the right side of both pages. Annex "C" is alleged to be a photocopy of the
same supplemental agenda of the First Division for November 13, 2002, with marginal notes on the
right side of pages 61-62. Annex "D" appears to be a photocopy of the resolution dated September 4,
2002 of the Third Division transferring the instant case to the First Division (an internal resolution).
Atty. Peña was made to understand that all his statements taken during this executive session were
deemed under oath. Atty. Peña acceded thereto.
Atty. Peña was asked whether he knows any personnel of the Court who could possibly be the
source. Atty. Peña replied in the negative and added that he obtained those documents contained in
the annexes through ordinary mail addressed at his residence in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,
sometime in the second or third week of January 2003; but failed to give the exact date of his receipt.
He said Annexes "B" and "C" were contained in one envelope while Annex "D" was mailed in a
separate envelope. He did not bring the envelopes but promised the Court he would do his best to
locate them. On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that the envelopes may no longer
be found. He was unable to respond to the observation of the Chief Justice that the Court would be in
no position to know whether the envelopes he would later produce would be the same envelopes he
allegedly received. Atty. Peña further admitted that his office did not stamp "Received" on the
envelopes and the contents thereof; neither did he have them recorded in a log book.
When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those annexes as grounds for his motion to inhibit
when the same were coursed only through ordinary mail under unusual circumstances and that
respondent did not even bother to take note of the postal marks nor record the same in a log book,
Atty. Peña answered that he was 100% certain that those documents are authentic and he assumed
that they came from Manila because the Supreme Court is in Manila.
At this juncture, Atty. Peña was reminded that since he assured the authenticity of Annexes "B", "C"
and "D", he should be willing to accept all the consequences if it turns out that there are no such
copies in the Supreme Court or if said annexes turn out to be forged. Atty. Peña manifested that he
was willing to accept the consequences.
When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the original that made him conclude that those
photocopies are authentic, he replied in the negative, but he believed that they are official documents
of the Court inasmuch as he also received a copy of another resolution issued by the Court when the
same was faxed to him by Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.
Atty. Peña expressed his disappointment upon receiving the resolution because he was not even
furnished with a copy of petitioner’s motion for clarification, which was resolved. He found out that his
copy was addressed to Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices, which was never
respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of the petitioners.
He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the motion for clarification was acted upon even without
comment from him, and he admitted that under said circumstances, he made imputation of bribery as
a joke.
As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of record that Justice Carpio and Justice Azcuna
denied that Annex "B" is their copy of pp. 61 and 62 of the agenda, Justice Carpio also said that per
verification, Annex "B" is not Justice Santiago’s copy. Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex "B" does
not belong to any of the Justices of the First Division. It was also pointed out that each of the Justices
have their respective copies of the agenda and make their own notations thereon. The official actions
of the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of the Court.
Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both Atty. Peña and Atty. Singson to paragraphs 3 and
4 of respondent’s "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion,
which contain the following allegations: "(Atty. Singson) very excitedly bragged that they had been
able to secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the
consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale. Private
respondent was aghast because by then, more than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption
period on the various properties had expired. In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent (Atty.
Peña) teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort
because they could not afford to lose the properties involved."
For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a copy of the resolution dated November 13, 2002
to Atty. Peña and expressed his belief that there was nothing wrong with it, as the resolution was
officially released and received by his office. He explained that his staff merely copied the parties in
the resolution of February 13, 2002 when the motion for clarification was prepared. Hence, the
respondent was inadvertently not sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to inhibit,
reasoning that all he said was about the suspension of the redemption period which was the subject
of the motion for clarification. Atty. Singson branded as false the allegation of Atty. Peña that he, Atty.
Singson, resorted to bribery in order that the suspension of the redemption period would be granted.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that he was only joking to Atty. Singson when
on the cellular phone he intimated that Justice Carpio could have been bribed because he has a new
Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to answer categorically whether Atty. Singson told him
that Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty. Peña could not make any candid or forthright answer. He was
evasive.
After further deliberation whereby Atty. Peña consistently replied that his only source of the
documents in the annexes is the regular mail, the Court Resolved to require Atty. Magdaleno Peña
within fifteen (15) days from today to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be held in contempt and be
subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if he will not be able to satisfactorily explain to Court why
he made gratuitous allegations and imputations against the Court and some of its members that tend
to cast doubt or aspersion on their integrity.
Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within fifteen (15) days from today his response to
the allegations of Atty. Peña, particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of respondent’s motion to
inhibit.
The Court excused Attys. Peña and Singson from the executive session at 11:35 a.m. and resumed
its regular session on the agenda.
In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the Court Resolves to GRANT the motion by
counsel for petitioner praying that intervenor-movant Unimega Properties’ Holdings Corp. be directed
to furnish aforesaid counsel with a copy of the motion for reconsideration and intervention and that
they be granted an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file comment thereon and require
said intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such service within five (5) days from notice.
The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No. 145882, Benjamin de Leon, et al., on the
motion for reconsideration with intervention by Unimega Property Holdings Corp. is NOTED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Peña duly submitted his Compliance with the Court’s Order, where he stated that: 7
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully submits the following
explanation in compliance with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated 3 March 2003:
1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution required respondent to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a result of the allegations he
made in his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion" dated 30
January 2003. As this Honorable Court stated during the 3 March 2003 hearing, the members of the
Court were "perturbed" by some statements respondent made in the motion.
2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the distress his statements may have caused the
members of this Honorable Court. While such distress may have been the unavoidable consequence
of his motion to inhibit the ponente, it was certainly not his intended result.
3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003 hearing, it appeared that this Honorable
Court was most concerned with how respondent was able to secure Annexes "B" and "C" of his
motion (referring to the two copies of the Supplemental Agenda of the First Division for 13 November
2002) and why respondent used those documents as basis for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.
4. Respondent had explained that he received the two annexes by ordinary mail at his residence in
Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime during the second week of January. The
sender of the document was unknown to respondent because there was no return address. Despite
efforts to locate the envelope in which these documents came, he was unable to do so.
5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at his residence. Since he is often in Manila on
business, it is usually the househelp who gets to receive the mail. While he had given instructions to
be very careful in the handling of documents which arrive by registered mail, the envelopes for
Annexes "A" and "B" may have been misplaced or disposed by the househelp because it did not bear
the stamp "registered mail."
6. When respondent read the documents, he had absolutely no reason to doubt their authenticity. For
why would anyone bother or go to the extent of manufacturing documents for the benefit of someone
who does not even know him? The documents contained a detailed list of the incidents deliberated by
this Honorable Court on 13 November 2002. Definitely, not just anyone could have access to such
information. Moreover, respondent subsequently received another mail from apparently the same
sender, this time containing a pink copy of this Honorable Court’s 4 September 2002 Resolution
(Annex "D", Urgent Motion to Inhibit) transferring this case from the Third Division to the First Division.
The receipt of this last document somehow confirmed to respondent that whoever sent him the copies
of the Supplemental Agenda really had access to the records of this Honorable Court.
7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main basis of his motion to inhibit was the information
relayed to him by Atty. Singson during their telephone conversation on 19 November 2002. As stated
in respondent’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit, while Atty. Singson did not categorically claim that they had
bribed the ponente to secure the 13 November 2002 resolution, however, he made no denial when
respondent, in order to obtain information, half-seriously remarked that this was the reason why the
ponente had a brand new car. Atty. Singson retorted that obviously, they had to take extra-ordinary
measures to prevent the consolidation of ownership of the properties sold as the bank may again
close down. Indeed, one would normally be indignant upon being accused of bribery but Atty. Singson
even chuckled and instead justified their "extra-ordinary" efforts.
8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion was not enough. An implied admission of bribery
on the part of Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may not have been sufficient basis for a motion to inhibit.
However, respondent did not have to look far for evidence. Atty. Singson in not denying the allegation
of bribery is considered an admission by silence, under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Further, Atty. Singson faxed to him the "advance copy" of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. To
respondent, that was solid evidence and in fact to this day, Atty. Singson fails to explain exactly when,
from whom, and how he was able to secure said advance copy. The records of this Honorable Court
disclosed that Atty. Singson’s official copy of the 13 November 2002 Resolution was sent to him by
registered mail only on 20 November 2002 (a copy of the daily mailing report is hereto attached as
Annex "A"). Why then was he able to fax a copy to respondent on 19 November 2002 or a day before
the resolution was released for mailing?
9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to inhibit. He only finally decided to proceed
when he received the copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To emphasize, the Supplemental Agenda
merely confirmed what Atty. Singson had earlier told him. Contrary to the apparent impression of this
Honorable Court, respondent’s motion is not primarily anchored on anonymously received documents
but on the word of petitioner’s counsel himself. The copies of the Supplemental Agenda are merely
corroborative (albeit extremely convincing) evidence.
10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into possession of the information relayed by Atty.
Singson and the copies of the Supplemental Agenda would bring them to the attention of this
Honorable Court. In doing so, respondent was compelled by a sense of duty to inform this Honorable
Court of any apparent irregularity that has come to his knowledge. It was not done out of spite but a
deep sense of respect.
11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by well-meaning friends to publicize the incident and
take legal action against the parties involved. Instead, respondent decided that a motion to inhibit
before this Honorable Court was the most appropriate channel to ventilate his concerns. Respondent
is not out to cast aspersions on anybody, most especially members of this Honorable Court. He had
to file the Urgent Motion to Inhibit because he sincerely believed, and still firmly believes, that he
could not get impartial justice if the ponente did not recuse himself.
12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered confidential by this Honorable Court
leaked out and assures this Honorable Court that he had absolutely no hand in securing them.
Respondent just found himself in a position where he had to come out with those documents because
his opponent was crude enough to brag that their "extra-ordinary" efforts to secure a stay order from a
certain ponente had bore fruit. Respondent has devoted at least seven years of his life to this cause.
He almost lost his life and was nearly driven to penury fighting this battle. Certainly, he cannot be
expected to simply raise his hands in surrender.
13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was confirmed during the 3 March 2003 hearing
that Annex "C" of his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful reproduction/"replica" of the relevant
portions of the Supplemental Agenda (TSN dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on record with the
first Division. With this, respondent rests his case. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance and Affidavit dated 28 July
2003,9 categorically denied having bragged to Atty. Peña and that he did not employ "extra efforts" to
obtain a favorable suspension order from the Court. 10
After considering and evaluating the submissions made by the two lawyers, the Court ordered that a
formal investigation be undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions of Atty.
Peña.11 The Court’s Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in the consolidated petitions, which is the subject
matter of this separate administrative case, reads:
On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Peña filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit the ponente of
the instant case. Respondent Peña attached to his Urgent Motion Annex "B", a copy of pp. 61-62 of
the First Division’s Agenda of 13 November 2002. Respondent Peña claimed that Annex "B" bears
the recommended actions, in handwritten notations, of a member of the Court (First Division) on Item
No. 175 of the Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent Motion for Clarification filed by petitioner
on 7 August 2002. The purported handwritten notation on Annex "B" for Item No. 175 (f) is "N", or to
simply note the motion. However, the Court issued a Resolution on 13 November 2002 granting the
Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his Urgent Motion to Inhibit, respondent Peña claimed that the
Resolution of 13 November 2002 was forged because the recommended and approved action of the
Court was to simply note, and not to approve, the Urgent Motion for Clarification.
Thus, respondent Peña stated in his Urgent motion to Inhibit:
"9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he received
sometime last week two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two documents indicate that
this Honorable Court had not actually granted petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They indicate that
the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had
bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda of the First
Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution
was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members
of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the
members of the Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to
Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November
2002 Resolution. This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued
by the First Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution
exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C".
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of
what Atty. Singson was bragging about. The clear and undeniable fact is the Honorable members of
this Division agreed that petitioner’s Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente
responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED."
On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Peña and Atty. Manuel Singson, counsel for petitioner
Urban Bank, to a hearing to determine, among others, the authenticity of the annexes to respondent
Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit, including Annex "B". In the hearing, respondent Peña affirmed the
authenticity of the annexes and even manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences if
the annexes, including Annex "B", turned out to be forgeries.
In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First Division) informed respondent Peña that the
handwritten notations on Annex "B" did not belong to any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to
whom the case was assigned and the apparent object of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit
as the "ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution," stated that his recommended
action on Item No. 175(f) was "a & f, see RES," meaning on Items 175(a) and (f), see proposed
resolution. In short, the handwritten notations on Annex "B", purportedly belonging to a member of the
Court, were forgeries. For ready reference, attached as Annexes "1" and "2" to this Resolution are a
copy of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpio’s 13 November 2002 Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpio’s
recommended actions for the entire 13 November 2002 Agenda, respectively.
In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Peña to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for submitting the annexes to his Motion to Inhibit. In his
Compliance dated 3 April 2003, respondent Peña did not give any explanation as to why he attached
"B" to his Urgent Motion to Inhibit. In fact, in his Compliance, respondent Peña did not mention at all
Annex "B". Respondent Peña, however, stated that he "just found himself in a position where he had
to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude enough to brag that their ‘extra-
ordinary’ efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente had bore fruit." In petitioner’s
Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson stated that he "categorically denied that he
had bragged to PEÑA about the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated November 13, 2002 and
that extra efforts have been exerted to obtain the same."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS the Office of the Bar Confidant to
conduct a formal investigation of respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña for submitting to the Court a
falsified document, Annex "B", allegedly forming part of the confidential records of a member of the
Court, in support of his Motion to Inhibit that same member of the Court. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to submit its findings, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt of
this Resolution.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Peña 13 and Singson14 duly submitted their respective
Affidavits.
While the administrative case was still pending, some of the other parties in the consolidated petitions
– specifically, Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon Group), the
petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 – manifested before the Court other malicious imputations allegedly
made by Atty. Peña during the course of the proceedings in the said petitions. They moved that these
be considered as sufficient and additional basis to cite him for contempt of court. 15 The Court likewise
referred this matter to the OBC.16
In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De Leon Group, respondent Peña denied
having used abrasive, insulting and intemperate language in his pleadings; and argued that his
statements therein were privileged and could not be used as a basis for liability. 17 He also accused
Urban Bank and its directors and officers of violating the rule against forum shopping by dividing
themselves into separate groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822)
against the same Decision of the Court of Appeals with the same causes of actions and prayers for
relief.18
The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein respondent Peña and Atty. Singson appeared and
testified on matters that were the subject of the administrative cases. 19 Several hearings were also
held with respect to the additional contempt charges raised by the De Leon Group. Thereafter,
respondent Peña filed his Memorandum.20
The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant administrative case and made
recommendations on the matter (the OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this Court does not quote at
length, nor even disclose the dispositive recommendation of the OBC in administrative investigations
of members of the bar. However, Atty. Peña, despite the fact that the OBC Report is confidential and
internal, has obtained, without authority, a copy thereof and has formally claimed that this Court
should apply to him the non-penalty of an admonition against him, as recommended by the OBC. 21
Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that the present ponente of the consolidated
petitions22 from which this separate administrative case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
would exclude or suppress material evidence found in the OBC report from her ponencia in the parent
case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that Justice Carpio had given her by allegedly
recommending her to the Supreme Court. 23 The specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one
Member of the Court to another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support it, is too undignified to
warrant a response in this Decision. To allay his fears that Justice Sereno would participate in any
undue attempt to suppress material evidence, the Court shall summarize and quote from the OBC
Report the four charges of professional misconduct in connection with the instant administrative case.
On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against members of the Court, the OBC found that
respondent Peña gave the impression that some anomaly or irregularity was committed by the
Court’s First Division in issuing the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution. According to
respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the consolidated petitions, purportedly changed the
action of the First Division from simply "NOTING" the motion for clarification filed by Urban Bank to
"GRANTING" it altogether. The OBC opines that although respondent Peña may appear to have been
passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the language he used is not to be considered as malicious
imputations but mere expressions of concern based on what he discovered from the internal
documents of the Court that he had secured. 24 Moreover, the OBC ruled that respondent did not make
a direct accusation of bribery against Justice Carpio, and the former’s remark about the latter having
received a new Mercedes Benz was not made in the presence of the court, but was uttered in a
private mobile phone conversation between him and Atty. Singson. 25 Respondent’s profound
apologies to the Court were also taken cognizance by the OBC, which suggests the imposition of a
simple warning against any such future conduct.26
Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the second charge that respondent supposedly
submitted falsified documents to this Court as annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit, specifically
Annex "B" which appears to be a photocopy of the agenda of the First Division on 13 November 2002
with some handwritten notes.27 It reasoned that the submission of falsified documents partakes of the
nature of a criminal act, where the required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but respondent
Peña is not being charged with a criminal offense in the instant case. The OBC noted the statement
of the Clerk of Court during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session that Annex "B" does not exist in the
records.28
On the third charge for contempt against respondent filed by the De Leon Group and Atty. Rogelio
Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise suggests the dismissal of the same. To recall, respondent
submitted pleadings in the consolidated petitions where he allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan of having
used his influence over Justice Arturo B. Buena to gain a favorable resolution to the benefit of his
clients.29 The OBC suggests that respondent be acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and
disrespectful language against Members of the Court and his fellow lawyers, but nevertheless
recommends that respondent be advised to refrain from using unnecessary words or statements in
the future.30
Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth charge of forum-shopping leveled by
respondent Peña against Urban Bank and the individual bank directors. In his counter-suit,
respondent accused the bank and its directors and officers of having violated the rule against forum-
shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and filing three separate petitions to question the
unfavorable decision of the Court of Appeals. 31 However, since not all the parties to the consolidated
petitions participated in the hearings in the instant case, the OBC recommends that separate
proceedings be conducted with respect to this counter-suit in order to afford Urban Bank and all of the
concerned directors and officers, including their respective counsel, to defend themselves and
present witnesses and/or evidence in support of their cause. 32
Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC submitted the following recommendations for approval
of this Court:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended the following:
A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:
1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the statements in his Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not
constitute malicious imputations as he was merely expressing his concern of what he has discovered
based on the documents he has obtained. However, let this case serve as his FIRST WARNING,
being an officer of the court, to be more cautious, restraint and circumspect with his dealings in the
future with the Court and its Member.
2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such non-sense and unfounded joke against Honorable
Justice Antonio T. Carpio the latter deserves due respect and courtesy from no less than the member
of the bar. Likewise, Atty. Singson should also be ADVISED to be more cautious in his dealing with
his opposing counsel to avoid misconception of facts.
B. On the charge of falsification:
1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified documents on ground of lack of legal basis. A charge
of submitting falsified documents partakes of the nature of criminal act under Art. 172 of the Revised
penal Code, and the quantum of proof required to hold respondent guilty thereof is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. This is to avoid conflicting findings in the criminal case. The administrative
proceedings of the same act must await of the outcome in the criminal case of falsification of
document.
C. On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:
1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the statements cited by Atty. Peña in his pleadings
previously filed in related cases, while it may appear to be offending on the part of the complainant,
but the same do not categorically contain disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language or
intemperate words that may tend to discredit the name of the complainant. Respondent merely
narrated the facts based of his own knowledge and discoveries which, to him, warranted to be
brought to the attention of the court for its information and consideration. He must be ADVISED
however, to refrain from using unnecessary words and statements which may not be material in the
resolution of the issued raised therein.
D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping
1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum shopping, as embodied in the Comment dated 22
August 2003 of Atty. Peña, as a separate administrative case against the petitioners and counsels in
G.R. 145817, G.R. No. 145818 and G.R. No. 145822;
2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a copy of the said comment dated 22 August 2003
for their information.
3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel, SINGSON VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented
by ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA & CRUZ represented by
ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S. D. AQUINO and ATTY. HAZEL ROSE
B. SEE to comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. 33 (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUES
In these administrative matters, the salient issues for the Court’s consideration are limited to the
following:
(a) whether respondent Peña made gratuitous allegations and imputations against members of the
Court;
(b) whether he can be held administratively liable for submitting allegedly "falsified documents"
consisting of internal documents of the court;
(c) whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for the contempt charges leveled against
him in the Manifestation and Motion filed by the De Leon Group; and
(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors and officers are guilty of forum shopping.
OUR RULING
A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing against a Member
of the Court.
We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on this charge.
Respondent Peña is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery and
wrongdoing against a member of the Court, as seen in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his
statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, and his unrelenting obstinacy in hurling
effectively the same imputations in his subsequent pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a Member
of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent Peña, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers.34 They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
court35 and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.36
While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of foul and abusive language. 37 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. 38 A
lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate
and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 39
In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Peña insinuated that the then ponente of the case had
been "bribed" by Atty. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, in light of the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, suspending the period of redemption of the levied
properties pending appeal. The subject Motion to Inhibit reads in part:
4. Private respondent [Peña] composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending incident
with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he could not
remember any. In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the
ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in
fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the
properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City)
as it might cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close down. 40 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First Division of this Court, respondent Peña
explained that his reference to the bribe was merely a "joke" in the course of a telephone
conversation between lawyers:
CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:
Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Peña on [sic] when you made mention earlier of him saying
about Justice Carpio?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, Your Honor, he said "kaya pala may bagong Mercedez [sic] si Carpio, eh."
CHIEF JUSTICE:
He said to you that?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about bribery.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. PEÑA:
First of all I would like to … everything that he said, he told me that he got, they got a stay order, it is
a stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio and then I gave that joke. That was just
a joke really. He got a new Me[r]cedez [sic] Benz, you see, he was the one who told me they got a
stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio, that was what happened …
CHIEF JUSTICE:
You mean you made a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
You Honor?
CHIEF JUSTICE;
You made a joke after he told you supposedly that he got (interrupted)
ATTY. PEÑA:
He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
And you say that is the reason why he got a new Mercedez [sic] Benz, you made it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.
CHIEF JUSTICE;
That is correct, you are making it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, I think, because how they got (interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion that it was Atty. Singson who said that Justice
Carpio was bribed or the ponente was bribed, is that also another joke? 41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Peña insinuated ill motives to the then ponente of the consolidated petitions with respect
to the issuance of the 13 November 2003 Resolution. To respondent’s mind and based on his
interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda which he anonymously received, the First Division
agreed only to simply note Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, the questioned
Resolution, which Atty. Singson sent to him by facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence,
respondent Peña attributed the modification of the action of the First Division to simply "note" the
Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent Peña, to Justice Carpio, who had supposedly
received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered resolution.
However, as pointed out by the Court in the Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each Justice has his
own respective copy of the Agenda, where he can make his own handwritten notations on the action
for each item and case, but "[t]he official actions of the Court are contained in the duly approved
minutes and resolutions of the Court." 42 Hence, contrary to the insinuations made by respondent
Peña, Justice Carpio had not altered the action of the First Division in granting Urban Bank’s Motion
for Clarification in the consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the approved resolution agreed upon
by the Justices then present. The ponente of the case had not recommended that the Motion for
Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had referred to a separate resolution, i.e., "a) & f) – See
RES.," disposing of the said item (F) including item (A), which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate
Justice Artemio Panganiban. In addition to the official minutes of the 13 November 2002
Session,43 Justice Carpio submitted for the record his written recommendation on the agenda item
involving the consolidated petitions, to prove that this was his recommendation, and the minutes
confirm the approval of this recommendation.44
The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First Division, had indeed adopted
the recommended and proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the
Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is completely wrong for respondent Peña to claim that
the action had been issued without any sufficient basis or evidence on record, and hence was done
so with partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify the
imputation of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any
verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a member of
this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave accusations. They cannot be treated
lightly or be "jokingly" alleged by parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or motions. These
suspicions or insinuations strike not only at the stature or reputation of the individual members of the
Court, but at the integrity of its decisions as well.45
Respondent Peña attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation between Urban Bank’s failure
to furnish him a copy of its Motion for Clarification, purportedly denying him an opportunity to refute
the allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt means by which the unfavorable Resolution was
thereby obtained. This is completely untenable and irresponsible. Had he simply confined the issue to
an alleged deprivation of due process, then there would hardly be any controversy regarding his
conduct as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of notice of the Motion for
Clarification filed the bank in the consolidated petitions could have been raised as a valid concern for
judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Peña insinuates ill motives on the part of Members of the
Court imputing the failure of a private party to give him due notice to be, in effect, a failure of the
Court. This merits the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers over him as a member of the Bar. To
allege that bribery has been committed by members of the judiciary, a complainant – especially, a
lawyer – must go beyond mere suspicions, speculations, insinuations or even the plain silence of an
opposing counsel.
Based on the two lawyers’ disclosures during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent
Peña appears to have been caught by surprise by his telephone conversation with Atty. Singson, who
informed him of the suspension of the redemption period by the Court and its issuance of a Stay
Order over the execution pending appeal. The astonishment of respondent would seem natural, since
he was caught unawares of Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification, which was the subject matter of the
13 November 2002 Resolution. His supposed joke, which he himself initiated and made without
provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it suggested that the bank had obtained the Order from
this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury automobile.
Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the
reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis
for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of investigating the veracity of Atty. Singson’s revelations,
respondent read too much into the declarations and the purported silence of opposing counsel
towards his joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to a specific Member of the
Court. Such conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and falls utterly short of giving
respect to the Court and upholding its dignity.
Respondent Peña’s defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion between Justice Carpio, Atty.
Singson and the petitioners was a "joke" fails to convince, as in fact, he was deadly serious about the
charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his alleged insinuation of ill motives was just a "joke"
between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone conversation regarding the case. Although the
courts and judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they are not immune to criticisms nor are they
beyond the subject matter of free speech, especially in the context of a private conversation between
two individuals. In this case, though, respondent himself was responsible for moving the private
matter into the realm of public knowledge by citing that same "joke" in his own Motion for Inhibition
filed before this Court. In general, courts will not act as overly sensitive censors of all private
conversations of lawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience to the duty to afford proper respect
and deference to the former. Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away from exercising its disciplinary
powers whenever persons who impute bribery to judicial officers and bring such imputations
themselves to the court’s attention through their own pleadings or motions.
Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of bribery was only made in jest, respondent has never
backed down since he first made the accusation in January 2003 and continually raises as an issue in
the consolidated petitions how Justice Carpio purportedly changed the agreed action of the First
Division when he issued the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, even after the Court in the 03
March 2003 Executive Session had precisely explained to him that no impropriety had attended the
issuance of the said Resolution. In the Motions to Inhibit dated 21 January 2010 46 and 22 August
2011,47 he repeatedly insists on the "anomalous/unusual circumstances" surrounding the issuance by
Justice Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which was allegedly contrary to the handwritten
notes made in the copies of the Agenda that he received. Respondent Peña most recently capitalized
on the purported alteration or falsification supposedly committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics
complaint against the latter, where he alleged that:
Sometime thereafter, respondent Peña received a copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st Division of this
Honorable Court with a notation in handwriting "10AC" on the left side and marginal notes on the right
side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this Honorable Court took up the matter of the Motion for
Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank, this Honorable Court merely "N" or "Noted" the Motion for
Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank and did not grant the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a copy of the Motion for Clarification, or required to
comment by the Honorable Justice Carpio and opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, being able to secure
an advance copy of the assailed 13 November 2002 Resolution), the matter brought out in the
Executive Session and the admission made by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable Hilario Davide
and the Honorable Justice Vitug with regard to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st Division of this
Honorable Court which was sent to respondent Peña was correct and that the Motion for Clarification
was merely "N" or "NOTED". However, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued a Resolution "Granting"
the Motion for Clarification.
Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the 13 November 2002 Resolution in an
anomalous/falsified manner and in clear contravention of this Honorable Court’s Decision to merely
"Note" the same. A clear judicial administrative violation. 48 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the bribery "joke" which respondent himself initiated has gotten the better of him. Respondent
has convinced himself of the veracity of his own malicious insinuations by his own repetitious
allegations in his subsequent pleadings.
The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual penalties in administrative cases in the presence
of mitigating factors, such as the acknowledgment of the infraction and the feeling of remorse. 49 In this
case, the "profound" apologies50 offered by respondent Peña for his insinuations against Justice
Carpio are insincere and hypocritical, as seen by his later actions. Although he expressed remorse for
having caused the Court distress because of his statements, 51 he refuses to acknowledge any
unethical conduct on his part for his unfounded accusations against the actions of Justice Carpio with
respect to the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution. Worse, he has persisted in attributing ill-
motives against Justice Carpio, even after the latter had recused himself from the case since 2003.
This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating unfounded and vicious attacks against
the integrity and impartiality of Members of this Court. Earlier in the proceedings of the consolidated
petitions, respondent assailed how retired Justice Arturo B. Buena showed bias in favor of the De
Leon Group, when the latter’s petition in G.R. No. 145822 was reinstated on a second motion for
reconsideration:52
It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein respondent that petitioner’s counsel has been
making statement to the effect that they could get a favorable resolution from the Supreme Court, on
their second motion for reconsideration. In short, petitioners’ counsel is practically saying that they are
sure to get the Supreme Court to entertain the second motion for reconsideration even if it violates
the rules.53
1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice Buena because it was he who penned the
challenged Resolution, which granted the second motion for reconsideration in violation of the Rules.
It was he who crafted, drafted and finalized the said Resolution. It was he who tried to justify the
violation of the Rules. It was from Justice Buena’s office that contents of the challenged Resolution
was apparently "leaked" to the petitioners’ counsel long before its promulgation. 54
What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what phenomenon transpired? Why are herein petitioners
"very special" in the eyes of Justice Buena?55
It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has been affected by his relationship with Atty.
Vinluan, as evidenced by the above-described facts and circumstances. 56
Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente, reinstated the petition without any
explanation whatsoever, and in gross violation of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. This was highly irregular by itself. But what made reinstatement more suspicious was the
fact that even before the release of the Resolution reinstating the petition in G. R. No. 145822, the
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, was already boasting that he would be able to reinstate
their petition. Obviously, even before the release of the Resolution in question, Atty. Vinluan already
knew what Justice Buena’s resolution would be. 57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In no less than six motions, 58 he similarly accused former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban of
prejudice based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, wherein some of the directors and officers of
Urban Bank were also members. He even claimed that Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank to
meet with some of the directors and officers, who consulted him on the legal issues arising from
criminal suits in relation to the facts of the main petitions, citing only an unnamed "reliable source":
The friendship and close relationship of the three (Justice Panganiban and Urban Bank’s Arsenio
‘Archit’ Bartolome and Teodoro ‘Ted’ Borlongan) went beyond their being Rotarians. As a matter of
fact, Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of times going to Urban Bank to see Archit and/or Ted,
before the bank’s closure. Respondent has also discovered, through a reliable source, that Justice
Panganiban was known to have been consulted, and his legal advice sought, by Borlongan and
Bartolome, in connection with the above-entitled cases, while the same was still pending with the
Court of Appeals and in connection with the four (4) criminal cases filed the with the MTC [Municipal
Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against Borlongan, et al., for "introducing falsified
documents in a judicial proceeding". In the latter cases, it was even Justice Panganiban who
furnished a copy of the SC Decision in Doris Ho vs. People (his own ponencia) to Bartolome and
Borlongan, for the purpose of giving his friends a legal basis in questioning the issuance of the
warrants of arrest against Borlongan and the rest of his co-accused in Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to
6686, MTC Bago City (now appealed to Supreme Court; see Footnote No. 1 below). 59 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Lastly, respondent Peña raised the issue of "unmitigated partiality" against retired Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that the latter resolved a separate case involving related issues to
the main petitions in favor of the opposing parties:
3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled "Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v. Magdaleno M. Peña,
et al", are also the same petitioners in the above-entitled consolidated cases G. R. Nos. 145817 and
145822; and the respondents in the above-entitled consolidated case G. R. No. 162562. Under the
circumstances, herein private respondent is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the extreme bias and
prejudice of Justice Nachura against him in G. R. No. 143591 would certainly be carried over to the
above-entitled consolidated cases. 60 (Emphasis supplied.)
Not only has respondent Peña failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery
and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in
moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court. 61 Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no
longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances.
Respondent Peña has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in
utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,62 the Court chose to indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan Paguia, when the
latter imputed devious motives and questioned the impartiality of members of the Court, despite its
earlier warnings:
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against
the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let
alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality,
integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to
impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot be
countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the country. To be sure, Atty.
Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the practice of law after showing sincere remorse and
having renewed his belief and respect for the Court, almost eight years from the time the penalty was
imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Peña be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
for his apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly imputing unfounded motives and partiality against
members of the Court.
B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court Documents.
We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with respect to the second charge.
It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April 2003, expressed
administrative concern over Atty. Peña’s behavior on three points: (1) his submission of a falsified
court document, (2) his access to Supreme Court documents that are highly restricted and
confidential, and (3) his use of court documents (genuine or false) in his pleadings.
Respondent Peña submitted a falsified internal court document, Annex "B," had illegal access to
confidential court documents, and made improper use of them in the proceedings before this Court.
The Court directed the initial investigation by the OBC based on the charge that respondent Peña had
submitted a falsified document to this Court. 63 The charge of falsification stems from his submission of
an alleged copy of the Court’s Agenda 64 (Annex "B") purportedly belonging to a member of the
Division handling the case. The pertinent portion of the subject Motion to Inhibit reads:
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the Official Agenda of the
First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned
Resolution was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office of two different
members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that
the members of the Division had allegedly agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification and Urgent
Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13
November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was released to the parties) a falsified document
because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First Division granting petitioners’
Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the
First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two
Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C". 65 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Peña expressed his absolute conviction
that the document attached as Annex "B" was an exact copy of the Agenda of the then ponente of the
case.66 It was later discovered, however, that no such copy existed, either in the latter’s records or in
those of any other member of the Division concerned:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is concerned it was confirmed by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of this Division that the original of that does not appear in the record, is not in the
record and that nobody, none of the members of the division has a copy of, that copy of Annex B of
your pleading does not come from anyone of the members of the division. That is the position of the
Court now as explained earlier. Specifically Mr. Justice Carpio said that Annex B, specifically with that
capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come from his office, was not based on the document in
his office and that is also true to each of the members of this Division. 67 (Emphasis supplied.)
The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Peña
submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a
copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent misled
the Court by presenting a document that was not what he claimed it to be. Contrary to the assurances
made in the same motion68 he made allegations that were false and submitted documents that were
not borne out by the records of this case. Instead of verifying the contents of Annex "B," which came
to him through dubious means, he unquestioningly accepted their genuineness and veracity. Despite
the Court’s own explanation that Annex "B" does not exist, he continues to insist on its existence.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the legal
profession.69Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. 70 As disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the
law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. 71 Courts
are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. 72 In
the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of
this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a
disciple of truth.
Respondent Peña would argue, however, that falsification – as a criminal act under the Revised
Penal Code – was not judicially established during the proceedings of the OBC investigation and,
thus, he cannot be held liable for falsification. The comparison of the present administrative and
disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of falsification is misplaced.
The subject matter of administrative proceedings is confined to whether there is administrative liability
for the submission of a falsified document – namely Annex "B," which respondent Peña claims (albeit
mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda of the ponente. The issue, then, is whether he
transgressed the ethical standards demanded of lawyers, by which they should be truthful in their
dealings with and submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly does not include the
determination of criminal liability, which demands a different modicum of proof with respect to the use
of falsified documents. At this time, the Court makes no definitive pronouncement as to the guilt of
respondent over his violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code regarding the use of
falsified documents.
In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of the
ponente’s Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was
later found to have been inexistent in the court’s records. Regardless of whether or not Annex "B" was
criminally falsified or forged is immaterial to the present disposition. What is now crucial is whether
respondent was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect to the genuineness and
authenticity of his submissions.
The assertion of respondent Peña that the typewritten contents of Annexes "B" and "C" appear to be
genuine and accurate is unconvincing and cannot exonerate him from liability. Although Annex "C"
was determined to be in the Court’s records, 73 the bare similarity of its typewritten contents with those
of Annex "B" will not shield him from disciplinary action. Although the typewritten contents of the two
Agendas appear identical, the handwritten notes located at the right-hand side are different.
Respondent, in fact, claims that the handwritten notes come from two different members of the
Division, one of them the then ponente of the case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of the handwritten remarks – not on the
printed contents – which are allegedly contrary to the substance of the Court’s 13 November 2002
Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. Respondent Peña cannot claim the genuineness of Annex
"B" (which is not in the records), based on the apparent identity of its printed contents with those of
Annex "C" (which is in the records). The handwritten notes are markedly different and, according to
him, made by two different members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent failed to
substantiate his assertion that Annex "B" and the notes made therein belonged to any member of this
Court.
More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Peña has not explained, to the Court’s satisfaction,
how he managed to obtain internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Peña would have the Court believe that he happened to obtain the two copies of the
Agenda (Annexes "B" and "C") and the internal Resolution (Annex "D") in two separate envelopes
anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly received them sometime during the second or
the third week of January 2002 in his home-cum-office in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. 74 He,
however, failed to present the envelopes containing the documents, but explained that these may
have already been thrown away, since he had no system of recording incoming communications in
his home/office in the province. The Court is not persuaded by his account of the receipt of these
restricted court documents.
The Agenda, the Court’s action thereon, as well as the Resolution (Annex "D"), are internal
documents that are accessible only to court officers, 75 who are bound by strict confidentiality. For
respondent Peña to have been able to secure originals or photocopies of the Court’s Agenda is
disturbing because that ability implies a breach of the rules of strict confidentiality in the Court.
Notably, the Agenda purportedly sent to him did not contain all the items for deliberation by the
Court’s First Division for that day; the copies sent were limited to the incidents pertaining to his
pending case. This circumstance can hardly be considered as random, since the exact item (Item No.
175) of concern for him – specifically, the Court’s action on Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification –was
what had been sent directly to his provincial home/office, and what he conveniently acquired thereby.
The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court records just coincidentally and anonymously
appeared in the provincial home/office of respondent Peña through ordinary mail. Also incredible is
his explanation that the envelopes that contained the documents, and that could have led to the
identification of their source were opportunely misplaced or thrown away, despite the grave
importance he had ascribed to them. It is highly improbable that a personnel of the Court would
breach the rules of strict confidentiality 76 to send to litigants or their counsel the Court’s Agenda,
together with handwritten notes and the internal resolutions of the Court, without any prodding or
consideration, and even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and administrative
penalties.77Respondent Peña’s account of having lost the envelopes appears too convenient an
excuse to assuage the Court’s skepticism towards this breach of confidentiality within its own halls.
Worse, respondent Peña flaunted his continued access – as recent as 2010 – to other internal and
confidential records in the proceedings of this case. Despite the administrative proceedings leveled
against him for having "illicitly" obtained the confidential Agenda of the Court’s First Division, he
brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior by surreptiously acquiring no less than the
confidential and still unreleased OBC Report on the very administrative case of which he himself is
the subject.
In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010, 78 respondent Peña prayed that the questioned
13 November 2002 Resolution be recalled on the ground that there was a mistake in its issuance
based on the copies of the Agenda he had mysteriously received. In support of this motion, he
casually cited and attached a photocopy of the confidential OBC Report. 79 This OBC Report has not
been released to any party, and was then in fact still under deliberation by this Court. Curiously, the
attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to the unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as
it actually appears in the rollo of the administrative case. 80 Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in
the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy thereof.
Regardless of the means employed by respondent, his acquisition of the OBC Report from the
Court’s own records already speaks of an appalling pattern of unethical behavior that the Court will no
longer ignore. Even as he was the subject of an administrative case for obtaining confidential court
records, he continued to have access to other internal documents of the Court. His actions have
established that he is incorrigible and not likely to change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding
ethical standards and ignoring the rule of confidentiality of court records deserves nothing less than
the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the profession.
Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent Peña even tried to bolster his claim that the
then ponente of the case had a special interest in the case by attaching an internal resolution of the
Court.81 In the said Internal Resolution dated 04 September 2002, the two consolidated petitions (G.R.
Nos. 145817 and 145822) were transferred from the Third Division to the First Division, where Justice
Carpio was subsequently assigned. 82 How respondent Peña was again able to secure this internal
document is another disturbing mystery in this case, especially since the resolution was sent by the
Third Division Clerk of Court to the First Division Clerk of Court, the Raffle Committee and the Judicial
Records Office only, and not to any of the parties. Similar to the copies of the Agenda of the First
Division, respondent Peña again purportedly received this Internal Resolution by mail. 83 What is more
alarming in this instance is that he received not just any photocopy of the Court’s Resolution, but a
pink copy itself, the very same material used for such internal resolutions in the Court’s records. As
he himself admitted, respondent Peña could not have gotten hold of the said internal Resolution,
which was on its face declared an internal matter, without the assistance of a person who had access
to the records of his case in the Court.
This claimed "major anomaly" of the transfer of the case, which is being decried by respondent in the
subject Motion to Inhibit, stems from his gross misunderstanding of the internal rules of the Court.
Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions due to the retirement of other Justices,
the cases already assigned to a Member-in-Charge are required to be transferred to the Division to
which the Member-in-Charge moves. 84 Hence, in this case, Justice Carpio, similar to other members
of the Court at that time, did not lose his case assignments but brought them with him when he
transferred to the First Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned cases to the new Division are
made by request from the Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is
Member-in-Charge will be retained by a Division in which he is no longer a member. Thus, the
transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division that is being heavily criticized by
respondent Peña was simple compliance with the established internal procedures of the Court, and
not attributable to any undue interest or malicious intention on the part of the then ponente to retain
the case for himself. Respondent had raised "irresponsible suspicions" 85 against the integrity of the
ponente without any understanding of the Supreme Court’s processes in the transfer of cases.
Respondent Peña had, in fact, previously used this deplorable tactic of obtaining internal court
records to call for the inhibition of Justices of the Court. In previously moving for the inhibition of
Justice Buena, he assailed how supposedly the retired Justice violated the rules with respect to a
second motion for reconsideration when the latter reinstated the Petition of the De Leon Group in
G.R. No. 145822. Respondent attributed the special treatment extended by Justice Buena to his
supposed association with the De Leon Group’s counsel, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA Law
Office. To establish this special treatment, he attached a complete copy of the Minutes of the
Division86 composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases dismissed by the Court due to failure to pay
the required fees, which Justice Buena allegedly did not reinstate:
10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show that for the past several months alone,
seventy-seven petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, mainly for failure to pay the required
fees. Out of that number, NONE WERE REINSTATED upon the filing of a SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. If Justice Buena willingly disregarded the Rules by reinstating petitioners’
petition (De Leon Group Petition in G. R. No. 145822) upon the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration, then he should have reinstated also the aforesaid 77 cases in order to be fair. At the
very least, he should now reinstate all of said 77 cases if only to show that he is not biased in favor of
herein petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however, because those cases are not favored
ones. Photocopies of the case titles and numbers, as well as the resolutions dismissing the aforesaid
seventy-seven cases, consisting of 58 pages, are attached hereto collectively as Annex "A". 87
Respondent Peña was able to attach to this motion for inhibition the portions of the Court’s Minutes
on 12 April 2000, 07 February 2001, 12 February 2001, 14 February 2001, 26 February 2001, 28
March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April 2001, 16 May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August 2001,
13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August 2001, 05 September 2001, 24 September 2001, 08
October 2001 and others which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed to specific cases which
were dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees, among others. It was unclear if the cases were
specifically assigned to Justice Buena or if respondent Peña represented any of the parties therein.
Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained confidential Minutes of the Court pertaining to other
cases, which specifically dismissed or denied petitions on the failure of the parties to pay necessary
fees. This could not have just been mere coincidence again since it required some legal
understanding and familiarity with the cases in order to be able to sift through and identify the kinds of
cases, which were dismissed or denied on such grounds. Although the parties to these cases were
notified and given copies of the Court’s resolutions, what respondent Peña obtained were the actual
copies of the Minutes that included other items in the Court’s Agenda and that were not released to
the public. Under the Court’s own Internal Rules, only the Minutes pertinent to the parties are those
that are distributed to the parties concerned. 88 Yet, respondent was able to attach wholesale Minutes
of dozens of cases to his pleading.
Although the above confidential documents that were accessed by respondent – totaling 58 pages in
all – are not the subject of the investigation of the administrative case, his previous receipt or
acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as 2000 confirm in no uncertain terms his access to
internal records of the Court, not just of his case, but of other pending cases and that this access has
continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic that respondent Peña would accuse his fellow
lawyers of allegedly having an "inside track" to members of the Court, when he in turn, on record, had
mysteriously easy access to confidential court documents. That internal documents of the Court
(whether voluminous or in relation to his case or otherwise) would suddenly find themselves in the
hands of respondent Peña through registered mail is too incredible for this Court to attribute any good
faith on his part.
Even if the Court were to give some modicum of credence to the unlikely story of how respondent
Peña came upon these internal documents, it looks with disapproval upon his actions with respect to
those documents, which were supposedly sent to him anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent
official judicial records that are confidential in nature and not easily accessible, the ethical recourse
for them would be to make a candid and immediate disclosure of the matter to the court concerned
for proper investigation, and not as proof to further the merits of their case. In fact, respondent himself
acknowledged that reporting the "leaked out" documents was a duty he owed to the Court 89– more so
in this case, since the documents were sent anonymously and through dubious circumstances.
No issue would have arisen with respect to his continuing fitness to be a member of the legal
profession, if he had simply reported his receipt of the "leaked" court documents, and nothing more.
Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the suspicious circumstances of his having obtained
confidential court records; he even had the tenacity to use the documents sent through suspicious
means to support his request for inhibition. As a lawyer, he should have known better than to hinge
his motions and pleadings on documents of questionable origins, without even verifying the
authenticity of the contents by comparing them with sources of greater reliability and credibility.
If respondent Peña entertained doubts as to the veracity of the Division’s actions with respect to the
pending incidents in his case, as allegedly embodied in the anonymous Agendas sent to him, then he
should have simply checked the records to verify the genuineness of the questioned 13 November
2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. It is through officially released resolutions and
decisions that parties and their counsel are informed of and guided by the Court’s actions on pending
incidents, and not by the confidential and handwritten notes of the individual members of the Court.
Respondent’s wholesale reliance on copies of the Agenda purported to be those of individual
members of the Court and anonymously sent to him is grossly misplaced.
The Court has already explained that there was in fact no discrepancy between the agreed upon
action of the Division and the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, contrary to the assertions of
respondent Peña. He grounded the subject Motion to Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously sent
copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank should simply be
noted,90 but it was instead granted by the Court. The Court, however, made clear during the 03 March
2003 Executive Session, that there was nothing irregular about annotating the first item with "SEE
RES" (See Resolution) and marking the rest of the incidents with "N" (Noted). In fact, these
annotations conform with the recommended actions submitted by the ponente for that particular
item.91The Resolution identified in the first item governs and contains the actual disposition of two of
the incidents in the pending case. 92 To be sure, what governs as the final action of the Court en banc
or in Division is the minutes of the proceedings, 93 which lists the dispositions of the items taken up
during the session, reviewed by the members, and finally approved by the Chief Justice or the
Division chairperson. Contrary to respondent’s suspicions, the action taken by the Division in its 13
November 2002 Session was accurately reflected in the questioned Resolution released by the Court.
Respondent Peña has no one else to blame but himself, since he "allegedly," blindly and mistakenly
relied on "anonymously sent" unverified photocopies of the Court’s Agenda, in order to support his
call for the inhibition of a member of the Court. Neither can he rely on the alleged "bragging" of Atty.
Singson – which the latter denies – to impute ill motive to judicial officers. Whether Atty. Singson
actually exerted "extraordinary efforts" to secure the suspension Order or freely divulged it in their
telephone conversation, respondent should have been more circumspect in making grave
accusations of bribery (jokingly or not) without any extrinsic evidence or proof to back up his claim.
Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and
documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal
court documents has not been properly explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Peña that
this Court’s confidential documents would simply find themselves conveniently falling into
respondent’s lap through registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be
traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules
have been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent Peña now aids
and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have reached him. It is not
unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised
Penal Code94 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Peña benefitting from the
same.95 Respondent’s actions clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment.
This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by the earlier imposition of an indefinite
suspension. If taken together, these two violations already speak of respondent Peña’s inherent
unworthiness to become a member of the Bar. Although an indefinite suspension opens up the
possibility of future reinstatement after a clear showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in the
case of Atty. Paguia), respondent has shown to be incorrigible and no longer deserves the
compassion of the Court. Not only has respondent thumbed his nose on the integrity of the persons
occupying the Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery and wrongdoing, he has also showed
disdain for the sanctity of court procedures and records by his haughty display of illegal access to
internal Supreme Court documents.
C. Third Charge: Respondent Peña’s insinuations of wrongdoing and collusion between members of
the Court and another counsel.
Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente, respondent Pena’s allegations of collusion between
previous members of the Court and the counsel for the De Leon Group are unfounded and
contravene the ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his fellow lawyers. His actions reveal a
pattern of behavior that is disconcerting and administratively punishable.
However, considering the ultimate penalty of disbarment earlier imposed on respondent Peña, the
Court no longer finds the need to squarely rule on the third charge, as any possible administrative
liability on this matter would be a mere superfluity.
D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is not the proper subject of the present allegations
of administrative misconduct.
The counter-charge of forum shopping has been made by respondent Peña against petitioners and
their respective counsel in his defense. 96 However, this is already beyond the scope of the subject
matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled that he assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De
Leon Group, and the other group of bank officers filed three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817,
145818 and 145822, respectively) before the Court. They all questioned therein the rulings of the
appellate court affirming the grant of execution pending appeal.
Considering that this claim is the subject of administrative penalties, and that other interested parties
did not participate in the investigation conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity dictate that
the Court reserve judgment for the meantime until the subject is fully ventilated and all parties are
given an opportunity to argue their cases.
The charges of forum shopping are hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing and/or hearing of
separate administrative complaints 97 against petitioners Urban Bank, Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E.
Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon and Eric L. Lee, and
their respective counsel of record. Considering their deaths, petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan and
Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no longer be included in any future administrative action in relation to these
matters. On the other hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by respondent Peña and
therefore, is not a real and direct party to the case.
EPILOGUE
As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by respondent Peña’s actions in the
administration of justice. In order to foreclose resort to such abhorrent practice or strategy in the
future, the Court finds the need to educate the public and the Bar.
Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional
colleagues.98 They shall not, in their professional dealings, use language that is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.99 Lawyers shall use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial
nature of our legal system. 100 The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of a judicial forum.101
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their
cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even
wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged. 102
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that respondent Peña has manifested a troubling history of
praying for the inhibition of several members of this Court or for the re-raffle of the case to another
Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded accusations of partiality. A sampling of his
predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to
shop for a sympathetic ear, includes the following:
1. Peña’s Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12 January 2001;
2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated 20 August 2001;
3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October 2001;
4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February 2002;
5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;
6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January 2003;
7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing) dated 08 July 2004;
8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17 December 2007;
10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re: Justice Panganiban);
12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January 2008;
13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio T. Carpio)
dated 02 June 2008;
14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;
15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Dante
O. Tinga) dated 04 August 2008;
16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco) dated
14 August 2008;
17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated 28 August 2008;
18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January 2010;
19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno) dated
30 March 2011;
20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); and
21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011 (Re: Justices Carpio, Jose Perez and
Sereno).
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and
sparse relations between the parties and the members of the Court to wild accusations of partiality on
mere conjectures and surmises. For example, respondent accused former Chief Justice Panganiban
of bias based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro Borlongan, then
President of Urban Bank, was likewise an officer. 103 He moved for the inhibition of Justice Sereno on
the ground that she was "a close judicial ally" of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter, according to
respondent, was antagonistic toward him during the Court’s 03 March 2003 Executive Session in this
administrative case.104
Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled from the Court’s Third Division
because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a member thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court
through the endorsement of former Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of the
then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former President Fidel V. Ramos. 105 He similarly sought the
inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close professional and political ties with former President
Ramos.106 He likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law school
classmate and fraternity brother of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then Presidential Legal
Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according to respondent Peña, "President Ramos,
through Justice Corona, will most likely exercise his influence over the Honorable Justice Brion." 107
Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of Urban
Bank because of his decision in a related case 108 and his prior appointment as Undersecretary of
Education during the Ramos presidency, respondent Peña impliedly prayed that his case be
specifically retained in the Court’s Third Division. 109Respondent’s peculiar request, which was not
included in his other motions, gives the impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura inhibit
himself, respondent nonetheless did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third Division. If his
only intention was to raise the possibility of bias against Justice Nachura alone, then it would not
matter whether his case remained with the Third Division, with another member being designated to
replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division altogether. Respondent Peña’s odd prayer in
his motion for inhibition bore signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly to
him, except for one member.
In Chin v. Court of Appeals,110 the Court warned against litigants’ contumacious practice in
successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one who is more friendly and
sympathetic to their cause:
We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy
of public trust and confidence. But under the circumstances here, we also agree that unnecessary
inhibition of judges in a case would open the floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering that
Judge Magpale was not the first judge that TAN had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of
prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners’ apprehension about the practice
of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause than previous
ones.
As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to disqualify themselves need not
always be heeded. It is not always desirable that they should do so. It might amount in certain cases
to their being recreant about their duties. It could also be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit
a judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court’s warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple and successive requests for inhibition
and re-raffle filed by respondent Peña. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in no
uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice, most especially in the highest tribunal of the
land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the reasons why this administrative case has dragged
on for years. Not only does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the Court, but it
likewise delays the administration of justice.
Oddly enough, respondent Peña has been less concerned about the inordinate delay in resolving the
case than about making sure that the "wrong" or "unfriendly" Justices – in his perception – do not sit
and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted interruptions caused by his numerous
motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case languishing in this Court for years and
clogging its dockets. Respondent stands out for this disorderly behavior and must be made an
example so that litigants be reminded that they cannot bend or toy with the rules of procedure to favor
their causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the rules of basic courtesy in imputing
sinister motives against members of the Court.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Peña has violated several canons of
professional and ethical conduct expected from him as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His
conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of action – in this Court, no less – tend to
undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded accusations
against fellow lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to obtain confidential
and internal court records and to use them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his cause.
In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination towards casually moving for the
inhibition of Justices of the Court based on unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse or
contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña has shown and displayed in these proceedings that he has fallen
short of the ethical standards of the noble profession and must be sanctioned accordingly.1âwphi1
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty.
Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and other copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to secure copies
of the following: (a) copies of the Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of the Court’s First Division,
attached as Annexes "B" and "C" of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, attached as Annex "D" of the same motion; (c) the Report and Recommendation
dated 11 December 2007, issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as Annex "5" of
respondent Peña’s Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the Minutes of the Court,
consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex "A" of the Reply (to Petitioners’ Opposition to Motion to
Urgent Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Peña. She is further required to
SUBMIT such an investigation report with recommendations on the administrative and disciplinary
liabilities, if any, of all court personnel possibly involved therein, as well as suggestions for protecting
confidential and internal court documents of pending cases within NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-
Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral
Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie
R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another
marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan,
Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment
on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against
him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion 7 praying that respondent's failure
to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be
submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case
was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus
Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however,
countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing
the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her
husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only
when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3,
Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion
when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him.
Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending
himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which
triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila
and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to
file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative
complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy
Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167. 9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the
complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, 11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the
complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he
would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a
copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent. 12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, 13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken
by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that
the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the
Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a
copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by
Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7,
2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. 14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt
No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his
residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with
mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." 16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable
to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE
Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required
thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with
the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and
(3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN
Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of
compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located.
During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot
be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of
arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported
that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale
Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices.
Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD,
declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The
Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However,
respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. 22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure
of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of
Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the
Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered
into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second
marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative
that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The
certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit
to continue as a member of the Bar. 24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his
comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years,
the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to
have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has
issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this
day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the
complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it
is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that
indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that
there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained
a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have
relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent.
However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently
offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer
feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were deliberate,
maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the
consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the
judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof." 26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty
of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it
in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law
practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against
judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from
hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795,
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault” then pending in Branch 51 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. 1 Atty.
Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the
accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also
moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC “[c]onsidering
the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned,” where “he does
not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by
the undersigned.”2cralawred

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14,
2007,3viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x x

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of
counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in
this province as he would like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his
whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this
Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is
why he should not have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in
this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client
in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in
the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED.

Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated
January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault
is likewise DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint 4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty.
Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the
presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty.
Dealca to submit his comment.5cralawred

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14,
2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due
process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the
motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and that it should be
Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for
gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation, report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in
connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled “Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and
Court Stenographer Merlyn D. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51,
Sorsogon City” (Yap v. Judge Madrid). 8cralawred

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit the administrative
complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H.
Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him
and his clients.9cralawred

In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following
findings and recommendation:10cralawred
x x x x

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed
by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA
IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E; (4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5)
Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that
respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges
and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that respondent had
handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid &
Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the
court, and the case aroused (sic) out of the unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that
was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases
handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge
Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled “Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.,” for: Accion Publiciana
and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez.

OMB-L-C-0478-E was an offshoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled “Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D.
Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III” for: Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L.
Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III,
entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman
case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled
“Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most
Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending
execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-
6842 entitled “Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III” for Support pending
before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the
clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of
Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the
judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated
March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled “EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINAS-
CARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled
“SOFIA JAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA” passed by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: “RESOLVED to
ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the Supreme Court
dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida)
– The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated
February 17, 2004 entitled “Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida” for: Malpractice (Forum
Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For:
Falsification of Medical Records” which provides for the dismissal of the cases against all the
accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings,
although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases
are pertaining to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered
by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent
had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and
Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the administrative case of
Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All these documentary
evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the “PROPENSITY” of the respondent as a
member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided
for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a

penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from finality of the
decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and

11
Recommendation finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal complaints; and
recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because his
motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely
personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41, 12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and
dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.

Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for
reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545. 14cralawred
Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal
Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

I
Atty. Dealca must guard against
his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges
and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound
to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court
personnel.15cralawred

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of
vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court
personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self-
interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for
that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for
the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty.
Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as
IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, 16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel
and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being
adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the
appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to
render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 17cralawred

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by
an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. 18 The oath
exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to “wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit.” These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable. 19cralawred

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate
groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of
justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients
and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, 20 so must he equally guard himself against his own
impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth
behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits
that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. 21cralawred

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration
of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this
one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be
penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good
faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal complaints against judges,
court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he
made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed
frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to
confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring
judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the
case.23

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in
frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause
now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.
The minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the
Court.24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute
resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact
and law, is deemed sustained or upheld, 25 and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual
adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due course
indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a
quo.26cralawred

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the
Court issues in disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals: 27cralawred
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them
as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual
in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord
with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is
filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

x x x x

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc.
v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section
14,29 Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, through Justice Regalado, declared that resolutions
were not decisions within the constitutional contemplation, for the former “merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it;
and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision.” It pointed out that the
constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to
and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was
being refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal.
Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to
deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions raised were factual, or there was no
reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.30cralawred
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have “in good grace inhibited himself” upon his
motion to inhibit in order to preserve “confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.” 31 However, IBP
Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to
inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual
and legal bases.32cralawred

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal
causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved
upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon
them.33cralawred

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently
state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

x x x x

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts
that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.34cralawred

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not
also hear cases handled by the undersigned x x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly
insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in
which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at
all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge
Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated
the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who
does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must
be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and
prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty.
Dealca was participating as a counsel. 36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or
hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role
to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly
contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be
ever brought against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 39 we reprimanded
him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly,
based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03, 40 and
Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice
of law for a period one year.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of this decision, with
a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Dealca’s personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014
[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2908]
AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a complain for disbarment 1 on grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and
dishonesty filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos (Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos (Aida), and
their children, Alistair R. Campos (Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).
Antecedents
Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986.
In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-square meter lot (the property) in Bayugan, Agusan
del Sur from a certain Renato Alimpoos. Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in Alistair’s
name. Alistair was then a student without an income and a capacity to buy the property. In 2006,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28258 covering the property was issued in Alistair’s name.
Meanwhile, Alistair got married and his wife and child likewise resided in Eliseo’s house until 2008. 2
On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur,
Branch 7, a Petition3for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. He claimed that during the
first few days of their marriage, he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual
intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He also averred that Aida experienced
severe pain when she delivered Alistair. Consequently, Aida no longer wanted to bear children. He
likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida.
On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss 4 wherein he represented himself as the
owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost the
owner’s certificate of title which used to be in his files. On September 15, 2008, he caused the
annotation5 of the said affidavit in the copy of OCT No. P-28258 kept in the Register of Deeds of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. In the Affidavit of No Loss 6 executed on October 21, 2008 and likewise
inscribed7 in the certificate of title, Alistair refuted Eliseo’s representations.
On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur a complaint for perjury 8 against Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of OCT
No. P-28258 was in his possession. Eliseo was aware of such fact, but he still deliberately and
maliciously asserted a falsehood.
In Eliseo’s Counter-Affidavit,9 he insisted that he is the sole owner of the property covered by OCT
No. P-28258. Eliseo continued:
That when I applied for titling of said lot, I caused it to be registered in the name of [Alistair], who was
still single, as I have some other properties (land) under my name;
That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still has a sister;
That when the title was released, it was kept in our files;
That when I filed an annulment case against my wife which is now pending before the [RTC] of
Bayugan, I offered to my wife as a settlement to have our properties settled. One of [these properties]
is this lot, which I asked to be sold and its proceeds be divided between us. I have learned that my
wife refused to have that property sold claiming that I could not sell the house and lot as it is in the
name of our son, herein complainant Alistair R. Campos;
xxxx
That my son’s statement in his complaint affidavit that the Owner’s Duplicate of the Title of the Lot
has long been in his actual, physical and personal possession, is utterly false, as the title was
previously in our possession in our files as the property is undersigned's own exclusive property. x x x
That when I learned that together with my wife, he is going to apply for a loan making the title of the
lot as collateral, I decided to file a petition for cancellation of the title under my son's name Alistair R.
Campos, and asked Mrs. Azucena A. Ortiz, to get a certified copy of the title from the Register of
Deeds to be used in the filing of a petition for cancellation of the title in my son’s name;
That I was told by Mrs. Ortiz, that she was told by the Register of Deeds, that I have to execute an
affidavit of loss so that I can be given a certified copy. Since the title is not in my possession after I left
my residence and I cannot find it from my files, I let Mrs. Ortiz prepare an affidavit of loss and I signed
it. I have also instructed her to [cause the annotation of the affidavit on the certificate of title] to protect
my interest as the real owner of the lot, to counter or stop my wife and son from using the titles as
collateral of a loan;
x x x x.10
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Sur dismissed for lack of probable
cause Alistair’s complaint for perjury against Eliseo. 11 The resolution, which dismissed the complaint,
in part, reads:
"[W]hen [Eliseo] found out that the title of the lot he bought was missing and could not be found in his
files, he did the proper actions to protect his rights thereto by executing an Affidavit of Loss.
x x x [W]hen [Eliseo] sensed that his wife is about to obtain a loan using the title as collateral without
his consent and to protect his right as owner of the property, he went to the Register of Deeds to
cancel his son’s ownership over the lot in question with the intent to revert back its ownership in his
name. However, when asked to produce a copy of its duplicate original, [Eliseo] could not present the
same as it was already lost and could not be retrieved from his files. To prove its loss, an Affidavit of
Loss was executed by [Eliseo] attesting to the fact of its unavailability.
x x x It can be deduced that the act of [Eliseo] was done in good faith. x x x The intent of [Eliseo] in
executing the Affidavit is not tainted with a corrupt assertion of falsehood since there was a firm belief
that indeed, the title is not anymore found in his files. It could not be located and the title is kept by
[Alistair] who took sides with [Aida] who has plans to enjoy the benefits from the title using it as a
collateral in obtaining a loan from the lot covered by the said title. [Had Alistair been truthful to Eliseo,
the former could have informed the latter of the] whereabouts of the title and could have sought
permission from his father when he took the copy of the title from [Eliseo’s] files. By not informing
[Eliseo], he could not be faulted for executing such Affidavit and neither can he be found guilty of
perjury as there was no malice on his part to do the same. x x x." 12 (Citation omitted)
On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint 13 for Legal Separation, Support and Separation of
Conjugal Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a
homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect, contradicted the said confession when he admitted to Alistair
and Charmaine that he was then intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise claimed that
Eliseo is temperamental and had stopped giving support to their family.
On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
an administrative complaint14 for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo.
Formal investigation was thereafter conducted.
Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned administrative complaint against Eliseo, he resigned
from his judicial post on July 1, 2009.15
On September 14, 2009, after the conclusion of a hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage before the RTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Judge Eduardo Casals (Judge
Casals) called the parties for a conference in his chamber. A scuffle ensued inside the chamber. The
police blotter filed promptly after the incident indicated that Eliseo choked Charmaine and attempted
to box but failed to hit Alistair.16
On June 4, 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed the instant complaint for disbarment 17 against
Eliseo. They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in
(a) causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name; (b) subsequently misrepresenting
himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258; (c) falsely declaring under oath in
the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 is
missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair; (d) stating in his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he has
an intimate relation with another woman; and (e) choking and boxing his children on September 14,
2009.
After Eliseo’s submission of his comment, 18 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 19
In Eliseo’s Position Paper20 filed with the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), he interposed
the following defenses: (a) the complainants are engaged in forum shopping in view of pending
administrative and civil cases in all of which the issues of immorality and homosexuality have already
been raised;21 (b) the complaint is instituted merely to harass him as a consequence of his refusal to
provide a monthly support of Php60,000.00 to his wife and children; 22 (c) he has no extra-marital
relation but he once told Alistair and Charmaine in jest that due to Aida’s infidelity, he intends to live
separately with another woman who may be more caring and loving than his wife; 23 and (d) to protect
his rights and prevent the complainants from using as a collateral for a loan the house and lot
covered by OCT No. P-28258, he executed the Affidavit of Loss on September 10, 2008 as a pre-
requisite to his filing of an action in court for the registration of the property in his name. 24 Further,
Eliseo refuted Alistair and Charmaine’s claims relative to the scuffle which occurred on September 14,
2009 inside the chamber of the judge hearing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Eliseo
insists that if Alistair and Charmaine’s claims were true, they could have presented independent
witnesses to corroborate their version of the incident, and medical certificates to prove that they
indeed sustained injuries. What follows is Eliseo’s account of what had transpired:
[A]fter adjournment of the hearing of the annulment case, the judge called the parties to his chamber
for a conference. [Aida] however was reluctant to go unless her children would join her. The judge
then called all of them to the chamber. Once there, the Judge inquired about [Eliseo’s] proposal for
settlement. While [Eliseo] was explaining to the judge, [Charmaine] reacted by raising her voice
uttering unprintable words to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] requested her to calm down reminding her that they
were still in court. But she continued her tirade at [Eliseo] with greater intensity even calling him a bad
father, and that she despised him. x x x Charmaine had already been ejected by the judge out of the
court for lack of decorum and respect. The order for her removal arose after she interrupted the court
several times by shouting at [Eliseo]. When she was already outside the court premises, she was
even heard by a certain Samuel Pasagdan saying that [Eliseo] should watch out after the hearing as
she was going to attack him. The prior incident (where she was thrown out of court) made her angrier
in the chamber. So when she continued with her unpleasant and scandalous utterances by again
interrupting [Eliseo] who was asked by the judge to talk about his proposal for settlement, [Eliseo]
walked to her and held her by her shoulder to put some sense to her that she really had to calm down
out of respect [for] the judge. There was no choking of Charmaine. But, this sight of holding
Charmaine by the shoulder was viewed differently by [Alistair] who flung with force and recklessness
a bag containing an unknown hard object to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] was hit and in pain. At this point,
Charmaine suddenly held [Eliseo] from behind so he could not defend himself from the onslaught of
Alistaire (sic) who was poised to attack him. [Eliseo] was forced to elbow Charmaine to break free
from her hold. There was a brief exchange of punches between Alistair and [Eliseo] before the
Presiding Judge broke the fray. This incident could not have happened if not for Charmaine’s own
misdemeanor and initial provocation.25
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine did not attend the hearing held on March 18, 2011, but Atty. Gener
Sansaet came to represent them. Eliseo appeared on his own behalf, with Atty. Alex Bacarro as
collaborating counsel.
During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of (a) immorality and psychological
incapacity in having extra-marital affairs; and (b) serious misconduct in the execution of the Affidavit
of Loss need not be resolved anymore in the instant disbarment complaint since they are already the
subjects of other pending cases. 26 He also expressed his doubt that Alistair is his biological son. 27 He
also alleged that Aida, who had served for three terms as a Provincial Board Member, had a lover,
who was likewise a political figure.28 Aida harbored the impression that Eliseo’s filing of his Petition for
the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage caused the downfall of the former’s political career. 29
The Report and Recommendation of the CBD
On June 11, 2012, CBD Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (Commissioner Din, Jr.) submitted his
Report and Recommendation 30 to the IBP Board of Governors. Commissioner Din, Jr. recommended
the dismissal of the instant disbarment complaint against Eliseo for lack of evidence. Commissioner
Din, Jr. ratiocinated that:
The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not [Eliseo] committed serious misconduct sufficient
to cause his disbarment. The determination of [Eliseo’s] culpability is dependent on the following: 1.
whether or not [Eliseo] was dishonest with regards to the statements he made in his Petition for
Annulment. [Corollarily] whether or not [Eliseo] is guilty of immoral conduct; 2. Whether or not the
statements raised in the Affidavit of Loss concerning the certificate of title of the Campos’ property
were untrue; and 3. Whether or not [Eliseo] choked his daughter, Charmaine, during the amicable
settlement of the annulment case in the (sic) Judge Casal’s (sic) chambers.
The Commission finds in the negative. Gross or serious misconduct has been defined as "any
inexcusable, shameful and flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of
a cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a predetermined, obstinate or intentional purpose
(Yumol, Jr. vs. Ferrer, Sr., 456 SCRA 457).
As a consequence of finding of gross misconduct has been held to be "a ground for the imposition of
the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege." (Cham v. Atty. Paita-
Moya[,] A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008).
In the same vein, the Supreme Court has likewise held that: "A lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character
is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good qualification for all
members of the bar (Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564, August 20, 2008).
In the case at bar, the complainants’ averments of [Eliseo’s] alleged transgressions, i.e. the
incongruence of his homosexuality and the extramarital relation of [Eliseo] as grounds for annulment
compared with the complainants’ allegation that [Eliseo] admitted that he has a mistress; the alleged
choking of [Charmaine]; and the execution of the Affidavit of Loss despite knowledge of the fact that
the certificate of title was with [Alistair] who is the registered owner of the subject property taken on
their own is a valid ground to find [Eliseo] guilty of gross misconduct.
However, [Eliseo] has succinctly rebutted each and every single allegation of the complainants
making the case at fore a battle of opposing narration of facts.
More importantly, the pieces of evidence presented by the complainants are insufficient to prove their
claim beyond the degree of evidence required of them by law to satisfy and overcome.
Basic and fundamental is the rule that "the burden of proof is upon the complainant and the Court will
exercise the disciplinary power only if the former establishes the case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence."
xxxx
In the case at bar, [apart] from the allegations in the complaint, no other evidence was presented by
the complainants to bolster their claims. Aside from the statements made in the complaint, no other
corroborative or collaborating evidence documentary or testimonial from independent, third person
was presented to convince this Commission by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that [Eliseo] is
guilty of the allegations contained therein. 31(Citation omitted)
The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of Commissioner Din, Jr. In the
Extended Resolution issued on March 20, 2013, the Board suspended Eliseo from the practice of law
for two years. Thus:
[T]he Board, upon a thorough perusal of the records, finds sufficient evidence to sustain misconduct
on the part of [Eliseo] as a lawyer, specifically his filing an Affidavit of Loss of Title to Real Property
which Title was in the name of Alistair, his son, and which was in the latter’s possession,
substantiated with annexes and affidavits. The same holds true for the alleged choking incident in the
Judge’s chamber which was caused to be blottered, Annex "G". [Eliseo] also admitted his infidelity
albeit he postulated the defense of homosexuality. All these, taken together, fall short of the ethical
standards set forth for lawyers in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 32
Issues
Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in:
I.
Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name;
II.
Subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258;
III.
Falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner's
copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair;
IV.
Stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to
his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and
V.
Choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.
This Court’s Ruling
Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside the
chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009 shall be resolved. Anent the foregoing, this Court is
compelled to once again impose a fine upon Eliseo for violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a member of the bar.
This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors that Eliseo deserves to be sanctioned
for his unbecoming behavior.
In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a penalty of two years of suspension from the practice
of law, the IBP Board of Governors considered all the three charges of immorality, dishonesty and
misconduct against the former.
However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon
Eliseo a fine of Php20,000.00 for simple misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in
Alistair’s name when the subject property actually belongs to the former. The charges of (a)
immorality in engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss on
September 10, 2008, were, on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after finding either the
evidence of the complainants as insufficient or the issues raised being already the subjects of Eliseo’s
pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are
anchored upon almost the same set of facts, except that in the former, the issue of occurence of the
scuffle on September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court does not intend to punish Eliseo twice for
the same acts especially since they pertain to his private life and were not actually committed in
connection with the performance of his functions as a magistrate before.
In Samson v. Caballero,33 the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers" means, viz:
This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled
"Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers
as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine
Bar," provides:
"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges
of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. x x x.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution."
xxxx
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and
show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as
member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench
but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of
administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers.
This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary
replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also
as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a
disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an
administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax
Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court. 34 (Citations and emphasis omitted)
The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint against a lawyer
when an administrative case had been previously filed against him or her as a magistrate. Ideally
therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should have been consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-
1761. However, it is well to note that Samson v. Caballero 35 was promulgated by the Court on August
5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the instant disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009. Further, while all
the allegations in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the instant disbarment complaint, the last
issue of engagement in the scuffle is an addition to the latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the
said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings.
In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged.1âwphi1 It bears
stressing that not one of the parties had presented even one independent witness to prove what
transpired inside the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took place is a
fact, but the question of who started what cannot be determined with much certainty.
While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as
self-defense on his part.36
While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the incident, and understands that
the successive acts of the parties during the tussle were committed at a time when passions ran high,
he shall not be excused for comporting himself in such an undignified manner.
Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
The case of Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong,38 on the other hand, is instructive anent what constitutes
unbecoming conduct, viz:
Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior
but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method." 39
Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own
children inside the chamber of a judge. This Court shall not countenance crude social behavior.
Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place
where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. 40 Misbehavior
within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. 41 Although Alistair and Charmaine were
not entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose
conduct failed to show due respect for the court and lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of
the legal profession.
Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court views with disfavor Eliseo’s statement during the
hearing conducted by the CBD on March 18, 2011 that he doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal
son.42 As a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware that ascribing illegitimacy to Alistair in a proceeding
not instituted for that specific purpose is nothing short of defamation.
All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
conducted himself in a manner not befitting a member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with his
own children in the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009 and recklessly expressing his
doubt anent the legitimacy of his son Alistair during the hearing before the CBD.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. A FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is hereby
imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.