Case 1

This case is filed by the spouses Roman A. Pascual and Mercedita Pascual
(Spouses Pascual), Francisco A. Pascual, Margarita Corazon D. Mariano,
Edwin D. Mariano, and Danny R. Mariano

Antonio Ballesteros and Lorenza Melchor-Ballesteros (Ballesteros Spouses)

The instant case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land (subject
property) situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, Laoag Cityand covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-30375[3] of the Laoag City registry

The subject property is owned by the following persons, with the extent of
their respective shares over the same: (1) the spouses Albino and Margarita
Corazon Mariano, 330 square meters; (2) Angela Melchor (Angela), 466.5
square meters; and (3) the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor (Spouses
Melchor), 796.5 square meters.

The property was inherited by their daughter - Lorenza Melchor Ballesteros.

By virtue of an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale.

To whom did Margarita, together with her children, sell the property when she
become widow?

Spouses Pascual and Francisco

Petitioners - They claim that there's no co-ownership over the subject property
considering the shares of the registered owners. Hence the respondents have
no right to redeem the portion of the subject property that was sold to them.

RTC dismissed the petition.

Issue: (1) whether the respondents herein and the predecessors-in-interest of

the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property who have the right of
redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code; and (2) if so, whether that
right was seasonably exercised by the respondents within the 30-day
redemption period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

1. The RTC held that the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of

the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property considering that
 the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the
respective shares of each of the registered owners thereof were indeed
particularized, specified and subdivided.

2. The RTC ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their
right of redemption within the 30-day period pursuant to Article 1623 of
the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lack of a written notice of the sale of
a portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual and Francisco, the
RTC asserted that the respondents had actual notice of the said sale.
Failing to exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual
notice of the said sale, the RTC opined that the respondents can no
longer seek for the redemption of the property as against the petitioners

The appeal of the respondents was GRANTED and the appealed January 31,
2007 Decision is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
another is entered approving [respondents] legal redemption of the portion in
litigation. The rest of their monetary claims were, however, DENIED for lack of
factual and/or legal bases.

Whether or not, RTC seriously committed grave abuse of discretion.

The petition was denied. The assailed ruling of RTC was Affirmed.
Case 2

FACTS:

In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric

tons of sugar due to the effects of El Niño and La Niña phenomena. To
fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87,
Series of 1999 (EO 87), facilitating sugar importation by the private
sector.

On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction issued

the Bidding Rules providing guidelines for sugar importation. Under
the Bidding Rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within
three working days from receipt of notice of the bid award and the
75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.

The Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the
importation or if the imported sugar fails to arrive on or before the
set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the
Sugar Regulatory Administration.

The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the publication

of the invitation to bid. Several sugar importers submitted sealed bid
tenders. Petitioners Southeast Asia Sugar Mill Corporation (Sugar
Mill) and South Pacific Sugar Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged as
winning bidders for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tranches.

Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion
fee amounting to P14,340,000.00, while Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the
conversion fee amounting to P28,599,000.00.

As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations)

delivered only 10% of their sugar import allocation, or a total of only
3,000 metric tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the
remaining 27,000 metric tons of sugar import allocation blaming
sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar corporations sought
immediate reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the
conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.

The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and

damages in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 77) of Quezon City.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Raul Labay
of the SRA’s legal department to assist the OSG in this case. The RTC
held that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in
the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation.
It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar
corporations which merely cancelled the sugar importation. the
deputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul Labay, received his own copy of the
Decision and filed a notice of appeal. The sugar corporations moved
to expunge the notice of appeal, which was thereafter granted, on the
ground that only the OSG, as the principal counsel, can decide
whether an appeal should be made.

The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had
authority to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Whether or not the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of

P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: SRA

First issue: The deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987 authorizes the OSG to represent the SRA, a government agency
established pursuant to Executive Order No. 18, Series of 1986, in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services
of lawyers.

Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such

defect was cured when the OSG subsequently filed its opposition to
the motion to expunge the notice of appeal.

Second issue: The sugar corporations are not entitled to

reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee amounting to
P38,637,000.00.

Paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules provides that if the importer fails
to make the importation, 25% of the conversion fee shall be forfeited
in favor of the SRA.
Case 3
Brief Facts:

Accused in this case are directors/officers of RMSI, possessing substantial capital and a
congressional telecom franchise. Accused thereafter, created the Smart Philippines (“Smartnet”)
division of RMSI. In the meantime same accused also formed a subsidiary corporation named,
Smartnet Philippines Inc. (SPI), with very minimal capital.

Smartnet applied for a Letter of Credit with Asia United Bank (AUB), which was
subsequently granted since AUB was satisfied of its credit worthiness. In the meantime, SPI also
applied for a letter of credit, making it appear to AUB that smartnet and SPI are one and the same
entity, which the latter granted.

SPI thereafter refused to make good with its obligation to pay. AUB then went after
Smartnet to collect however the latter refused contending that SPI and Smartnet are different
entities.

The elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article
315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, “samahang nayon(s),” or
farmers’ associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. In
other words, only those who formed and manage associations that receive contributions from the
general public who misappropriated the contributions can commit syndicated estafa. Gilbert Guy, et
al, however, are not in any way related either by employment or ownership to Asia United Bank
(AUB). They are outsiders who, by their cunning moves were able to defraud an association, which
is the AUB. They had not been managers or owners of AUB who used the bank to defraud the public
depositors. The present petition involves an estafa case filed by a commercialbank as the offended
party against the accused who, as clients, defrauded the bank. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled
that the accused should only be charged for simple estafa.

Case 4

Aldovino VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September
2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-
day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office.

Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His
disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had
been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE:

WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of

COMELEC?

RULING:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term
for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in
the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X,
sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon
B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s
disqualification.

“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective

interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation
that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier
to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge
that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.
Case 5

CASE DIGEST ON ABELLANA V. MARAVE [57 S 106 (1974)] - Where accused appealed his
conviction by the City Court of Physical injuries thru reckless imprudence to the CFI, and while
the case was on appeal, the heirs of the victim filed an independent civil action against him and
his employer in another branch, the civil action will prosper despite the lack of reservation. The
restrictive interpretation of the Rules of Court provision on civil actions requiring reservation as
to include the independent civil action under Art. 33 does not only result in the emasculation of
the civil code provision but also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 is quite
clear. "The right to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution under Article 33 of the Civil
Code is a SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it
nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for
damages in a civil suit. The grant of power to this Court, both in the present constitution and
under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of
substantive right.

Case 6