Power Transition and Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy: Why China and The US March Towards Strategic Competition?

The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019, 1–34
doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy019
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Power Transition and Paradigm Shift
in Diplomacy: Why China and the US
March towards Strategic Competition?
Zhou Jianren*
Zhou Jianren is an Associate Professor at the School of International Relations, Beijing
Language and Culture University, China.
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
Abstract
The rise of China is one of the most notable events in the early 21st century. The
strategic impacts of its rise and interactions between the hegemonic power and the
rising power have become focal points for scholars in the field of international rela-
tions. This article uses prospect theory, power transition theory, and nuclear deter-
rence theory as the basis for constructing a theory of strategic competition to
explain the relationship between the hegemonic power and the rising power, and
the strategic interactions between them during the power transition process. This
new theory of strategic competition maintains that states take diplomatic actions
not just to seek gains, but also to avoid losses. Building upon a critical review and re-
vision of power transition theory, the theory of strategic competition proposes that
before the rising power overtakes it, the hegemonic power will take action to avoid
incurring losses, and that in response the rising power will passively take action to
avoid its own losses. After the rising power has overtaken the hegemonic power,
however, it will take action to expand its interests, and the hegemonic power will
then passively take action to avoid its own losses. Under the inhibitive influence of
nuclear deterrence, strategic competition between the hegemonic power and the ris-
ing power is limited to peaceful measures including diplomatic means. This article
tests the theory of strategic competition through examining the paradigm shifts in
diplomacy of the US and China that have occurred since 2010.
Introduction
The rise of China is often considered the most notable phenomenon of the begin-
ning of the 21st century. The strategic impacts of China’s rise, moreover, have be-
come a focal point for international relations studies. The influence of China’s
rise on the strategic interactions between China, as the rising power, and the US,
C The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of International Relations,
V
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2 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019, Vol. 12, No. 1
as the established power, is of particular interest to scholars.1 A closer look at the

strategic interactions between China and the US makes quite obvious that they
are moving towards competition. Key members of the Obama administration
used phrases unequivocally pertaining to the term ‘Sino-US competition’,2 and
the Trump administration has clearly defined China as the primary competitor,3

which implies a shift in the US government’s perception of China. Before World
War II (WWII), the ruling power and the rising power often competed violently
and vehemently.4 Sino-US competition, however, firstly and primarily manifested
itself in diplomatic areas and peaceful ways.5 Both countries have undergone at
their respective cores a certain degree of paradigm shift in diplomacy that has led
them to compete with each other. By carefully examining the strategic interaction
between China and the US, we also find many intriguing phenomena. First, it is
unclear why China and the US did not undergo any obvious paradigm shifts in
diplomacy before 2010, yet since that year have made dramatic changes, one after
another. Secondly, the US, as the established power, seems more dissatisfied than
China, the rising power, having been the first to shift its diplomatic paradigm.
After 2010, the US brought into full effect the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, so attempt-
ing to change the existing international framework and reconstruct an
1 See Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Future of U.S.–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’,

International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005), pp. 7–45; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for
Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton,
2011); Richard K. Betts, ‘Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after
the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993/94), pp. 34–77; John J.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); Avery
Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or
Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia’, International
Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006), pp. 81–126; and Enrico Fels, Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific?:
The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance (Switzerland:
Springer, 2017).
2 Vice president Biden clearly stated that the US seeks constructive or responsible competi-
tion with China when he attended the opening session of the Sino-U.S. Strategic and
Economic Dialogue on 9 May, 2011 and 23 June, 2015, https://www.obamawhitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/05/09/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-opening-session-us-china-stra
tegic-econ; http://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/244120.htm.
3 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 18 December, 2017, https://www.white
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
4 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); Graham Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap: Are the
U.S. and China Headed for War?’, The Atlantic, 24 September, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.
5 Although the US NSS, released by the Trump Administration in December 2017, makes clear
that China is also seen as a strategic and military competitor, the US under the Trump presi-
dency is still primarily competing with China economically rather than militarily to date.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019, Vol. 12, No. 1 3
Asia-Pacific order by extending its influence in three key areas: security, politics,
and the economy. By contrast, China, the rising power, seems satisfied with the
status quo, its paradigm shift in diplomacy having been less proactive than that of
the US. The character of these respective changes contradict power transition the-
ory, which claims that the dominant power, as a status quo power, will seek to

actively maintain the status quo, and the rising power, as a revisionist power, will
challenge the existing system. This contradiction leads to the core questions
addressed in this article: Why has Sino-US strategic competition intensified since
2010? Why has the strategic competition between China and the US remained in
the peaceful diplomatic domain? And why did the US undergo the first paradigm
shift in diplomacy, after which China’s ensued, rather than vice versa?
This article first reviews and then scrutinizes prior studies on the paradigm
shifts in diplomacy of China and the US. Secondly, it uses prospect theory, power
transition theory, and nuclear deterrence theory as the basis for constructing the
theory of strategic competition between the rising power and the hegemonic
power. In addition, I develop testable hypotheses to identify the initiator (the
hegemonic power or the rising power) of the paradigm shift in diplomacy, and to
determine whether the paradigm shift occurred to avoid losses or to seek gains.
Thirdly, I test the proposed strategic competition theory on the relationship be-
tween the rising power and the hegemonic power through examining China and
the US’s paradigm shifts in diplomacy since 2010. In that section, I examine the
power transition between China and the US, and define the paradigm shift in dip-
lomacy. I next determine whether China and the US have undergone the para-
digm shifts in diplomacy, and which was the first to actively pursue such changes.
I then identify the goal of each state’s paradigm shift. The final section presents
the conclusion and its implications.
Critical Review of Existing Theories

International relations scholars have paid close attention to strategic interactions
between China and the US, and analysed changes that have taken place in each
state’s foreign policies. Here, I present theories that attempt to explain the para-
digm shifts in diplomacy of China and of the US.
Leadership Characteristics and China’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

He Kai and Feng Huiyun claim that to understand the foreign policies of a state,
one cannot pay attention solely to national characteristics, as realists do, or con-
fuse national characteristics with national actions; nor can one treat leaders’
beliefs as one-dimensional, as constructivists do. Instead, one must examine the
five dimensions of leaders’ belief systems. These scholars propose that leaders’
personal belief systems have a substantial influence on states’ foreign policies.
Thus, to explain or predict policy changes, one must take the leader into account.
He Kai and Feng Huiyun use operational codes to compare the philosophical and
instrumental beliefs of both President Hu Jintao and President Xi Jinping. Their
results suggest that the two presidents share similar philosophical beliefs, but that
Xi has more assertive instrumental beliefs. Therefore, these scholars conclude

that although Xi will not fundamentally change policy goals, he will take more
assertive measures to achieve them.6 Taken as a whole, according to He Kai and
Feng Huiyun, China’s policy changes stem from its leaders’ different
characteristics.

However, the samples that He Kai and Feng Huiyun’s research use are invalid.
The speech samples of both Hu and Xi were mostly made during Hu’s presidency;
therefore, similarities between the two presidents’ speeches may be expected, be-
cause at that time even Xi had to align with the tone of the central government.
Studying the speech samples of both presidents made during Hu’s presidency,
therefore, cannot effectively prove similarities or differences between their belief
systems. In addition, He Kai and Feng Huiyun’s assessment—that the two share
fundamentally similar beliefs—cannot explain China’s paradigm shift in diplo-
macy. Because these changes actually started at the end of Hu’s presidency, a cer-
tain degree of paradigm shift in diplomacy took place during both Hu and Xi’s
presidencies. Therefore, the leaders’ respective characteristics cannot explain
China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy. Thirdly, the theory these scholars propose
does not rule out other important alternative explanations for these policy
changes, such as American policy shifts, or the change in China’s relative strength
(compared to that of the US).
Explanations for US’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

Importance of the Asia-Pacific Region This argument implies that the US’s
‘pivot to Asia’ strategy is not targeted at China, but rather signifies the vital im-
portance of the Asia-Pacific region to the US. The US claims that the area deserves
priority by virtue of considerations of the distribution of strategic resources.7
Although this argument might explain why the US brought the ‘pivot to Asia’
strategy into effect, it fails to do so, for putting this strategy in practice entailed
attempts to strengthen alliances and reinforce forward military deployments—
measures clearly targeted at China, and to promote the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) which, under the Obama administration, excluded China.
Rise of China Two arguments agree that the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy tar-
gets China. They are: the rise of China argument; and the China assertiveness ar-
gument. The rise of China argument claims that China’s growing strength is the
target of the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. The China assertiveness argument,
meanwhile, proposes that the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy signifies America’s reaction
to China’s malicious intent.
6 He Kai and Feng Huiyun, ‘Xi Jinping’s Operational Code Beliefs and China’s Foreign Policy’,
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2013), pp. 209–31.
7 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, No. 189 (2011), pp. 56–63; Phillip C.
Saunders, ‘China’s Rising Power, the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-China
Relations’, Issues & Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2014), pp. 19–55.
The rise of China argument holds that since China embarked on ‘reform and
opening-up’ in 1978, its strength, especially its military strength, has considerably
expanded, which worries both the US and many of China’s neighbouring coun-
tries. The ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy was hence formulated in response to China’s
growing strength, as a way of allaying the concerns of other regional countries

and uniting them against China. Moreover, the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy sends a
status signal reflecting the US’s ability to assuage the worries of these regional
countries, deter China, and strengthen and reconstruct America’s leadership in
the region, and possibly the entire world.8
China Assertiveness This argument claims that, rather than a response to
China’s increased strength, the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy has been triggered by the
country’s ever more assertive foreign policies. The argument holds that the assert-
iveness of China’s foreign policies in 2009 and 2010 dramatically heightened anx-
iety among its neighbours, to the extent where they demanded greater US
presence and vigilance. Thus, these assertive policies are believed to be the funda-
mental reason for the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy.9
In conclusion, current studies mostly focus on either China’s unilateral para-
digm shift or the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, and take no account of interactions
between the hegemonic power and the rising power. Moreover, these studies do
not consider the sequences or goals of the paradigm shifts in diplomacy of China
and the US.
A Theory of Strategic Competition

In the next section, I use prospect theory, power transition theory, and nuclear de-
terrence theory as the basis for constructing a theoretical framework for the stra-
tegic competition between the rising power and the hegemonic power. First, I
combine realist theory and prospect theory to discuss the goals of foreign policies,
which include seeking gains and avoiding losses. I illustrate that not all foreign
policies aim to seek gains but rather to avoid losses. Secondly, based on a critical
8 Tomohiko Satake and Yusuke Ishihara, ‘America’s Rebalance to Asia and its Implications
for Japan-US-Australia Security Cooperation’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2012),
pp. 6–25; Pu Xiaoyu, ‘Baquan de yinxiang guanli——diwei xinhao, diwei kunjing yu meiguo
yatai zai pingheng zhanlüe’ (‘Impression Management of Hegemony: Status Signal, Status
Dilemma and the US Asia Pacific Rebalance Strategy’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World
Economy and Politics), No. 9 (2014), pp. 34–49; Zhang Bohui, ‘Guoji guanxi xianshi zhuyi lilun
yu meiguo yatai zai pingheng zhanlüe’ (‘Realist Theories of International Relations and the
U. S. Asia Pacific Rebalance Strategy’), Guoji guanxi yanjiu (International Relations Studies),
No. 2 (2014), pp. 11–26.
9 Saunders, ‘China’s Rising Power, the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-China
Relations’, pp. 19–55; David Shambaugh, ‘Assessing the US “Pivot” to Asia’, Strategic
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2013), pp. 10–19; James M. Keagle, Richard D. Fisher, Jr. and
Brian Johnson, ‘Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia: Elevating Allies’, Joint Force
Quarterly, No. 70 (2013), pp. 59–65.
review and revision of power transition theory, I elaborate the logic of power
competition between the hegemonic power and the rising power during the power
transition process. I discuss the two core questions: (i) Who initiates the challenge
during the power transition process? and (ii) Why would a state initiate such a
challenge, and what are its goals? I then consider the effect of nuclear deterrence,

which limits the intensity of strategic competition between the two
powers. Under the inhibitive influence of nuclear weapons, strategic competition
between the two powers may be limited to peaceful measures including
diplomatic means.
National Strategic Goals: Seeking gains or Avoiding Losses

Realist Theories on National Goals
Realists have had ample discussions on national interest goals. Hans Morgenthau
argues that states aiming to gain power adopt imperialist, status quo, or prestige
policies. The aim of an imperialist policy is to expand power or change the distri-
bution of power in its favour; the aim of a status quo policy is to maintain current
power; and a prestige policy aims to demonstrate power with a view to either
maintaining or expanding it. In conclusion, therefore, the aim of national policies
is not necessarily to seek gains, but may also be to maintain current interests, that
is, to avoid losses, according to Morgenthau.10
Arnold Wolfers proposes that a state’s foreign policy goals may include self-
extension, self-preservation, and self-abnegation. Self-extension refers to chang-
ing the status quo, that is to say, seeking gains. However, self-preservation refers
to maintaining the status quo, that is, avoiding losses; and self-abnegation refers
to seeking international interests that go beyond national interests.11 Therefore,
Wolfers seems to think that national policy may transcend the consideration of
one’s own interests, but that these self-interests include both avoiding losses and
seeking gains.
However, neither Morgenthau nor Wolfers compares seeking gains with
avoiding losses, or decides which one of the two is more important than the other.
Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, clearly proposes that preserving current inter-
ests is more important than seeking gains. Waltz maintains that survival is a
state’s priority, and that only when survival is guaranteed will a state pursue other
goals, such as peace, welfare, and power. In conclusion, Waltz claims that a state
has two different policy goals: seeking gains and avoiding losses, of which avoid-
ing losses takes priority.12
Professor Yan Xuetong draws upon Maslow’s theory on the hierarchy of needs
and maintains that there is also a hierarchy of national interests which, on a
10 Hans Morganthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th edition (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1985).
11 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 91–93.
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1979).
descending scale of importance, include national survival, political recognition,

economic interests, dominance, and world contribution.13 The first two refer to
maintaining existing national interests, and the latter three to expanding national
interests. National survival and political recognition, therefore, are the founda-
tions of economic interests, dominance, and world contribution. Thus, similar to

Waltz, Yan Xuetong also believes that avoiding losses is more important than
seeking gains.14
John Mearsheimer, who holds that security is the primary goal of states, claims
that because the international system is anarchic, a state can only obtain security
through self-help. At the same time, great powers can never be certain about the
intentions of other great powers. Moreover, all the great powers possess offensive
military capabilities. Thus, the great powers fear each other, and international an-
archy intensifies this fear. Therefore, rational states only adopt worst-case scen-
ario thinking and maximize their power to protect their security. In conclusion,
according to Mearsheimer, states pursue security through increasing their power,
which means they avoid losses through seeking gains. Therefore, the two motives
are indistinguishable.15
To summarize, realist scholars generally believe that national goals include
both seeking gains and avoiding losses. Therefore, not all foreign policies aim to
seek gains; they can also aim to avoid losses.
Prospect Theory: The Micro-foundation

Prospect theory, which claims that whether people face gains or suffer losses
influences their level of risk acceptance, provides realist scholars with a psycho-
logical basis for considering national strategic goals.16 According to prospect
13 Abraham Harold Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2nd edition (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1970).
14 Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi (An Analysis of China’s National Interests)(Tianjin:
Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1997), p. 67.
15 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chapter 2.
16 Although prospect theory may be meant to describe risk behaviour of individuals at the be-
ginning and there may not have been systematic empirical studies which confirm that pro-
spect theory correctly describes the risk propensities of foreign policy decision-makers, it
doesn’t mean that we cannot use this descriptive model to analyse the behaviours of states.
The rational choice model is also meant to describe decision-making behaviours of individ-
uals at the beginning, and there are no systematic empirical studies which confirm that for-
eign policy decision-makers adopt a procedure to make decisions as the rational choice
model indicates. However, there is almost a consensus in the IR academic community that
we can use the rational choice model to analyse the behaviours of states. Secondly, there
exists growing experimental literature on escalating commitment and investment behaviour
which shows that prospect theory provides a descriptive model for organizational and
group decision making. Furthermore, there also exist ample literatures applying prospect
theory to explain phenomena in IR; see Barbara Farnham, ‘Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis:
Insights from Prospect Theory’, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 205–35;
theory, people define gains and losses based on reference points that are subject-
ively decided, and tend to give more weight to outcomes that are considered cer-
tain. This is called the certainty effect. It implies that, whether facing gains or
losses, people tend to exaggerate whichever prospect they consider to be certain.
Owing to the certainty effect, therefore, people tend to be risk-averse when faced

with prospective gains. Consequently, when presented with a choice between a
certain small gain and an uncertain large gain, people tend to choose the former,
even though its expected value is lower. Moreover, owing to the certainty effect,
when faced with prospective losses people tend to be risk-seeking. This means
that when presented with a choice between a certain small loss and an uncertain
large loss, the tendency will be to choose the latter, even though the expected loss
is greater. In conclusion, according to prospect theory, people have loss aversion
tendencies that make them risk-seeking when faced with losses and risk-averse
when faced with gains.17
Although prospect theory is mainly aimed at explaining human decision-
making behaviour with regard to risk, and people’s different risk propensities
when faced with losses or gains, we can infer from it two possible policy goals of
political decisions: one is to seek gains; the other is to avoid losses. Owing to loss
aversion tendencies, a certain level of loss can cause far greater pain than the de-
gree of joy which a similar level of gain would bring. This concept supports the
beliefs of the abovementioned realist researchers whereby security is of the utmost
importance, which equate with giving priority to avoiding losses. Since a state’s
primary goal is to avoid losses, according to prospect theory, a state that faces
losses will be particularly proactive with regard to policy changes, even though
such changes may risk antagonistic escalation. A state that faces gains, on the
other hand, will not necessarily be proactive in changing its policies and courting
Audrey McInerney, ‘Prospect Theory and Soviet Policy Towards Syria, 1966–1967’, Political
Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 265–82; Barbara Farnham, Avoiding Losses/Taking
Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Michigan: University of Michigan Press,
1994); Jack Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 87–112; Rose McDermott, Risk-
Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Michigan:
University of Michigan Press, 1998); Mark L. Haas, ‘Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile
Crisis’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2001), pp. 241–70; Jeffrey W.
Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Power Politics and the Balance of Risk:
Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery’, Political Psychology, Vol. 25,
No. 2 (2004), pp. 177–211; Christopher K. Butler, ‘Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007), pp. 227–50; He Kai and Feng Huiyun,
‘“Why Is There No NATO in Asia?” Revisited: Prospect Theory, Balance of Threat, and US
Alliance Strategies’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2010),
pp. 227–50.
17 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk’, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1979), pp. 263–92.
risk escalation. These inferences from prospect theory give us the theoretical basis
for our study, which seeks to determine whether the rising power or the hegemon-
ic power will be the first to initiate a challenge in their strategic interactions.
Power Transition Theory and Its Revision

Power transition theory, which A.F.K Organski first proposed in 1958,18 is most
prominent in studies on the strategic interactions between hegemonic powers and
rising powers.19 Balance of power theorists believe there are few hegemonic
powers, or none at all, in the world system. By contrast, power transition theo-
rists believe that there is always a dominant power in the world system. To some
extent, the world system is hierarchical rather than anarchic, wherein the domin-
ant power shapes international order and maintains the system’s stability in order
to gain a disproportional level of interests. However, the law of the uneven devel-
opment of power engenders both the existing hegemon and the future challenger
when a state realizes substantial internal transformation. Once the capabilities of
such a state increase it will, as a rising power, be dissatisfied with the existing
world order which the hegemonic power constructed for its own interests.
Therefore, the rising power will forcefully challenge the established hegemon to
change the system and accelerate the process of power transition. Thus, war is
most likely to break out between a rising power and a hegemonic power during a
period of power transition.20 Robert Gilpin’s hegemonic theory also claims that
as the rising power’s relative capabilities increase it will attempt to change the
dominant rules of the international system and seek a redistribution of the spheres
of influence, or even of the control of territories, so causing the system to become
unstable. According to Gilpin, the rising power is likely to initiate a challenge
during a power transition.21 Although power transition theorists do not dispute
that the rising power will initiate war, they do dispute the timing of such a chal-
lenge. Organski initially claimed that the rising power will initiate a war before it
overtakes the hegemonic power. Later, however, his empirical study with Jacek
18 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).

19 For detailed discussion on power transition theory, see A. F. K. Organski, World Politics
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); A. F. K. Organski and Jack Kugler, The War Ledger
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For further discussion on applying power
transition theory to China’s rise, see Douglas Lemke and Ronald Tammen, ‘Power Transition
Theory and the Rise of China’, International Interactions, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2003), pp. 269–71;
Ronald Tammen and Jack Kugler, ‘Power Transition and China-US Conflicts’, Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, No.1 (2006), pp. 31–55; and Jack Levy, ‘Power
Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 11–33. There’s some scholar criticizing using
power transition theory to explain the impact of China’s rise, see Steve Chan, China, the
U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).
20 Organski, World Politics, chapter 12; Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition, chapter 14.
21 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 33, 187.
Kugler found that the rising power will initiate war after it has overtaken the
hegemonic power.22
However, if a state’s rise is based on its internal transformation, and the exist-
ing international order does not hamper those internal changes and its rise, then
why would the rising power desire a change in the existing international order? If

internal transformation leads to the rise of a state, then changing the international
system will not necessarily speed up, as Organski and Kugler suggested, the
power transition. Moreover, since the existing system does not hamper the rise of
a state, but challenging the hegemonic power comes with great risks and costs,
why would the rising power use force to challenge the hegemon militarily? As
previously discussed, until the rising power finishes its power transition it will re-
main weaker than the hegemon; therefore, how can a challenge at this stage guar-
antee victory? In fact, even Organski realized that, logically, it seems unwise for
the rising power to initiate a confrontation while it is still the weaker of the
two.23 If, however, the rising power overtakes the hegemonic power, it has thus
achieved its goal peacefully, and initiating a risky and costly military challenge
seems illogical. On the whole, therefore, the presumption that the rising power is
a dissatisfied state is entirely debatable.
Moreover, the presumption that the hegemonic power is a satisfied country is
equally unfounded. Since power transition theory takes it for granted that the
hegemonic power is satisfied with the status quo, power transition theorists only
consider the possibility of war initiated by the rising power; they do not consider
that the hegemonic power may also provoke war. In reality, even if the hegemonic
power is satisfied with the status quo, it may be dissatisfied with the trend of the
power shift, in which case the hegemonic power may be likely to initiate a pre-
ventive war.24 Although Gilpin claimed that, due to its increase in relative
strength, the rising power’s potential gains grow as its costs diminish, thus mak-
ing it even more likely to go to war, he also suggests that, for a hegemonic power
facing the prospect of a decline, launching a preventive war while it still has the
22 Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, pp. 49–61; Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, ‘The
Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation’, in Manus I. Midlarsky ed.,
Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1989), pp. 171–94.
23 Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition, p. 371.
24 For systematic theoretical explanations on preventive wars, please see Dale C. Copeland,
The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Richard Ned Lebow, Why
Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010); Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1999), chapter 4; Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and
the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: Kings Crown, 1956), pp. 263–350; Jack S. Levy,
‘Declining Power and the Preventive Motivations for War’, World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1
(1987), pp. 82–107. Although some may argue that the degree of compatibility between inter-
national and domestic orders would influence a state’s attitude towards the current inter-
national order, that compatibility is constant across the time on which this article focuses,
therefore, cannot explain the paradigm shift in diplomacy of either state.
power advantage and so eradicating once and for all the risk of losing hegemony
is the most attractive option.25 Stephen Van Evera explicitly proposed that it is
the declining hegemonic power that will have the desire to initiate a preventive
war before the rising power overtakes it, and that the rising power will want to
avoid war.26 That is, during the power transition period, the first threat of war is

not that emanating from the rising power to challenge the established hegemon,
but rather that of the preventive war the declining hegemonic power launches.
Thucydides attributed the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to the fear that the
rise of Athenian power in Sparta triggered. At that time in ancient Greece, Sparta
was the hegemonic power and Athens was the rising power. Indeed, it was
Sparta, the hegemon, who sent the ultimatum and initiated war.27 Even Organski
himself contends that, theoretically, wars that are initiated before the rising
power overtakes the hegemonic power are preventive ones that the hegemonic
power provokes.28 Moreover, if the hegemonic power anticipates that the rising
power will resort to war after overtaking it as Organski and Kugler suggested,
then the hegemonic power will be even more likely to provoke a preventive
war.29
Therefore, we can reasonably infer that before the rising power overtakes the
hegemonic power, that hegemonic power will be the most likely to initiate a war
to reverse the power transition process and so avoid entering a conflict that the
rising power launches after the transition is complete. In that case, the rising
power can either fight back or compromise. However, after the rising power has
overtaken the hegemonic power it may initiate a war to weaken the former hege-
monic power further to ensure that it can no longer compete, thus enhancing its
newly acquired power advantage. The former hegemonic power, meanwhile,
must either fight back or compromise. Many existing studies have shown that
stronger countries are most likely to initiate a war or conflict.30
Next, I elaborate on the above points by analysing the game equilibrium be-
tween the hegemonic power and the rising power under non-nuclear situations.31
25 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 191.

26 Evera, Causes of War, chapter 4.
27 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, (London: Penguin Books,
1972).
28 Organski, World Politics, p. 371. However, at that time, Organski thought that all military
challenges were initiated by the rising power even when it had not yet overtaken the hege-
monic power. As I have explained, his later research with Kugler refuted this proposal.
29 Evera, Causes of War, chapter 4.
30 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1982), pp. 194–5, 199; Charles S. Gochman and Zeev
Maoz, ‘Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28,
No. 4 (1984), pp. 585–616; Daniel S. Geller, ‘Power Transition and Conflict Initiation’, Conflict
Management and Peace Science, Vol. 12 (1992), pp. 1–16.
31 It’s worth noting that the conclusions of all deductive reasoning, including game theory, lie
in what assumptions are set for the deductive logics; nevertheless, we can use game
The gain value for the status quo is set at 0.32 The status quo includes current ter-
ritory, population, economy, strength ranking, development, sovereignty, polit-
ical independence, etc. My analysis is mainly based on the absolute gains of both
parties in the game, and assumes that if both sides choose war, the stronger coun-
try will be more likely to win.33 This assumption is supported by many existing

studies.34 To simplify the analysis, when both sides choose a strategy of war, the
stronger country has a high probability of military victory with ps ¼ 0.75, and the
weaker country has a low probability of winning with pw ¼ 0.25. When one side
chooses peace and the other side chooses war, the side that chooses war will cer-
tainly win, as its probability of success is p ¼ 1. The war gains for the winning
side are set at 4; the war losses for the losing side are set at –4; and if both sides
choose peace, then each has a war gain of 0. If the stronger country chooses war,
the other side will incur a cost of 2, and if a smaller country chooses war, the
other side will incur a cost of 1; if a strategy of peace is chosen, which means that
a strategy of non-resistance is chosen, then the cost incurred will be 0.
Before the rising power overtakes it, the hegemonic power is the stronger of
the two, but the rising power has a relatively faster growth rate. If both sides
choose peace, then the status quo will be maintained, meaning that both sides
have a gain of 0. Logically, this also results in the continuation of the power tran-
sition, albeit at a slower rate than expected. In a non-nuclear situation, if both
sides choose war, since the hegemonic power is stronger than the rising power,
the expected gain from war for the hegemonic power is E(Bh) ¼ 40.75þ
(–4)0.25 ¼ 2 and that for the rising power is E(Br) ¼ –40.75 þ 40.25 ¼ –2,
which shows the zero-sum nature of war. The final payoff for the hegemonic
power will be Ph ¼ E(Bh)–Ch ¼ 2–1 ¼ 1 and that for the rising power will be Pr ¼
E(Br)–Cr ¼ –2–2 ¼ –4. If the hegemonic power chooses war but the rising power
chooses peace, then the final payoff for the hegemonic power will be Ph ¼ Bh–Ch
¼ 4–0 ¼ 4 and that for the rising power will be Pr ¼ Br–Cr ¼ –4–2 ¼ –6. If the
hegemonic power chooses peace and the rising power chooses war, then the final
payoff for the hegemonic power is Ph ¼ Bh–Ch ¼ –4–1 ¼ –5 and that for the rising
power is Pr ¼ Br–Cr ¼ 4–0 ¼ 4. See Table 1 for details.
theory to articulate the reasoning process more sufficiently, clearly, rigorously, and convin-
cingly. Furthermore, because the conclusions lie in the assumptions, what we should do is
not to question whether the game theory adds new information, but to check whether the
assumptions make sense.
32 McDermott also sets the status quo as the reference point. Levy and Thompson, too, point
out that ‘the most common reference point for most people in most situations, however, is
the status quo’. See McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, chapter 2 and Jack S.
Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 151.
33 For the simplification of theoretical analysis, I assume a neutral offence–defence balance
in this article.
34 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ‘Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of
War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1978), p. 252; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,
The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 21–2, 29–30; Small and Singer,
Resort to Arms, pp. 194–5, 199.
Table 1. Equilibrium of the Game before the Rising Power Overtakes the Hegemonic Power
Hegemonic Power
War Peace
Rising Power War (–4, 1) (4, –5)

Peace (–6, 4) (0, 0)
The solution to the above game is war for both sides. The game equilibrium re-
sult of (–4, 1) indicates that when both sides choose war, the rising power will
suffer losses, and the hegemonic power will end up with an absolute gain.
However, with regard to relative gains, that of the hegemonic power would be Ph’
¼ Ph–kPr. To simplify our analysis, let us set k ¼ 1, so the hegemonic power will
have a relative gain of Ph’ ¼ Ph–Pr ¼ 1–(–4) ¼ 5; that is, the hegemonic power can
successfully reverse the process of the power transition. From this result, we can
conclude that before the rising power overtakes the hegemonic power, the hege-
monic power is more likely to initiate a preventive war.
After overtaking the hegemonic power, the rising power is not only the stron-
ger of the two but also has a higher growth rate. If both sides choose peace, then
the status quo will be maintained, meaning that both sides will have a gain of 0.
Similar to the argument above, under such a circumstance, the power transition
continues, but the transition speed may be slower than expected. In a situation
without nuclear weapons, if both sides choose war, then because the rising
power is stronger than the hegemonic power, the rising power’s expected
gain is E(Br) ¼ 40.75þ(–4) 0.25 ¼ 2 and that of the hegemonic power is E(Bh)
¼ –40.75 þ 40.25 ¼ –2. The final payoff for the rising power will be Pr ¼
E(Br) –Cr ¼ 2–1 ¼ 1 and that for the hegemonic power will be Ph ¼ E(Bh)–Ch ¼
–2–2 ¼ –4. If the rising power chooses war but the hegemonic power chooses
peace, then the rising power will have a final payoff of Pr ¼ Br–Cr ¼ 4–0 ¼ 4,
and that for the hegemonic power will be Ph ¼ Bh–Ch ¼ –4–2 ¼ –6. If the rising
power chooses peace and the hegemonic power chooses war, then the rising
power will have a final payoff of Pr ¼ Br–Cr ¼ –4–1 ¼ –5, and that for the hege-
monic power will be Ph ¼ Bh–Ch ¼ 4–0 ¼ 4. Please see Table 2 for details.
The outcome of the game is still war for both participants. The game result of
(1, –4) indicates that when both sides choose war, the rising power will have an
absolute gain while the hegemonic power will suffer losses. With regard to rela-
tive gains, when both sides choose war, the rising power will have a relative gain
of 5, and when both sides choose peace, the rising power will have a relative gain
of 0. That is, the rising power can speed up the power transition process by wag-
ing a war after it overtakes the hegemonic power, which leads to our conclusion
that the rising power is more likely to initiate a war after overtaking the hegemon-
ic power.
Above is my revision of the power transition theory, which considers that only
the rising power will initiate war. The revised version also considers that the hege-
monic power will likely initiate a preventive war before the rising power
Table 2. Equilibrium of the Game after the Rising Power Overtakes the Hegemonic Power
Hegemonic Power
War Peace
Rising Power War (1, –4) (4, –6)

Peace (–5, 4) (0, 0)
overtakes it. Moreover, the rising power will be more likely to provoke a war
after it overtakes the hegemonic power. Next, I revise the presumption of the
power transition theory that states go to war to seek gains rather than to avoid
losses. Power transition theorists believe that the rising power initiates war to ac-
celerate the power transition or, in other words, to accelerate its power expan-
sion. That these theorists presume that the rising power seeks gains is obvious.
However, as previously discussed, having done ample research on states’ foreign
policy goals, realist scholars believe that these goals include security, which refers
to avoiding losses, as well as economic welfare, political status, and other types of
gains. Gilpin also believes that the motivation for a state to try to change the sta-
tus quo, or even challenge hegemony through war during the hegemonic transi-
tion could be either to avoid losses or to seek gains. Especially for the hegemonic
power, the goal of initiating war is more likely to be avoiding losses than seeking
gains.35 In conclusion, states may initiate war either to seek gains or avoid losses.
Initiating a war is costly and risky. According to my previous discussion on the
risk propensity of a state when faced with gains and losses based on prospect the-
ory, a state is more likely to initiate a war to avoid losses. If in the process of
power transition the hegemonic power does not change its strategy, the rising
power generally faces gains, while the hegemonic power generally faces losses.
Therefore, logically speaking, the hegemonic power is more willing to take the
risk of conflict escalation and increased uncertainty, and to initiate a challenge.
As discussed above, it is highly likely that the rising power will fail if it initiates
a challenge before it overtakes the hegemonic power. Thus, according to expected
utility theory,36 the probability that the rising power will initiate a challenge is
low. In addition, according to prospect theory, before the rising power overtakes
the hegemonic power it faces a choice between a certain but small gain, and an
uncertain but larger gain, so the rising power will choose the former rather than
choosing to initiate a challenge, as Organski proposes, for an uncertain but larger
35 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 14, 52, 55, 140–1, 201–2, 239.
36 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953); For using expected utility theory to explain
war, see de Mesquita, ‘Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War’, pp.
241–67; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981);
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ‘The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model’,
American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 1 (1985), pp. 157–76; Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
gain. In contrast, until the rising power overtakes the hegemonic power the hege-
monic power still maintains a power advantage, and if it initiates a challenge it is
highly likely to succeed. So, according to expected utility theory, the hegemonic
power is more likely to use force. By the same token, however, according to pro-
spect theory, the hegemonic power faces a choice between an impending small

but certain loss and a larger but uncertain loss. Therefore, the hegemonic power
will likely choose to ‘gamble’ to avoid losses; that is, it is entirely possible that the
hegemonic power will wage a preventive war to avoid future losses. If the hege-
monic power initiates a war or a challenge, as shown in Table 1, the rising power
will be faced with impending losses. Therefore, to avoid greater immediate losses,
logically, the rising power can only choose war in response.
However, after the rising power has overtaken the hegemonic power there is a
higher probability that the rising power will succeed in militarily challenging the
established hegemonic power. According to expected utility theory, the rising
power is likely to initiate a war to obtain gains. Nevertheless, according to pro-
spect theory, having overtaken the hegemonic power, the rising power still faces
the choice between a certain but small gain and an uncertain but larger gain. That
is, it seems that even after gaining the power advantage the rising power will still
choose not to initiate a challenge. Of course, logically speaking, since the rising
power has already surpassed the hegemonic power, there is a lower degree of un-
certainty as to the outcome; therefore, there is an increased probability that the
rising power will provoke a military challenge. As the expected utility theory and
prospect theory have different predictions on whether the rising power will initi-
ate a war or a challenge after the transition is completed, we have to draw on em-
pirical cases to assess which theory has more support in reality. Based on the
empirical study done by Organski and Kugler, historically, all rising powers have
launched military challenges after completion of the power transition.37
However, once the hegemonic power has lost its power advantage after the
power transition has been completed there is a high possibility that it will fail to
initiate a military challenge. Therefore, according to expected utility theory, there
is a low probability that the hegemonic power will initiate a military challenge.
But according to prospect theory, the hegemonic power also faces a choice be-
tween an impending small but certain loss and a large but uncertain loss.
Therefore, the hegemonic power is more likely to choose the latter and initiate a
preventive war to avoid losses. Again, expected utility theory and prospect theory
offer different predictions, so we have to look at the empirical evidence. Previous
studies provide no accounts of historical cases of a hegemonic power initiating a
challenge after being overtaken by the rising power in hopes of reversing the ad-
verse situation. In conclusion, therefore, the rising power is likely to provoke a
war after it has overtaken the hegemonic power, as Table 2 shows. The hegemon-
ic power will then be placed in a situation of impending losses. Therefore, to
avoid greater immediate losses, logically, the hegemonic power can only choose
war in response.
37 Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, p. 59.

Table 3. Initiation of War by the Hegemonic Power and the Rising Power and their Goals
Sequence of Action
Initiator Responder
Timing of Action Before overtaking Hegemonic power (to Rising power (to avoid immedi-

avoid future losses) ate losses)
After overtaking Rising power (to expand Hegemonic power (to avoid im-
immediate gains) mediate losses)
Based on the above discussion and revision of power transition theory, I pro-
pose the following hypotheses: Before being overtaken by the rising power the
hegemonic power is likely to initiate a challenge to avoid future losses, so impos-
ing immediate losses on the rising power, which then drives the rising power to
fight back in order to avoid losses. After overtaking the hegemonic power, the ris-
ing power is likely to initiate a challenge to expand its immediate gains, so impos-
ing immediate losses on the hegemonic power, which then forces the hegemonic
power to fight back in order to avoid losses. Taken as a whole, the country that
initiates the challenge and the purpose of the challenge are different before and
after the transition is completed. Moreover, of the four situations mentioned
here, three aim to avoid losses. Please see Table 3 for details.
Effects of Nuclear Deterrence on Strategic Competition

The third problem with power transition theory is that it largely ignores the
effects of nuclear deterrence. The reason why power transition theorists claim
that there has been no major war since WWII is that a power transition from the
US is far beyond the reach of any country including USSR. According to their cal-
culations, the strength of the USSR never reached even the threshold for a power
transition, because as the USSR’s gross national product (GNP) did not exceed
80% of the US’s, it was far from surpassing it.38 However, unless in the future
there is empirical evidence to show that even the strongly inhibitive effect of nu-
clear deterrence cannot prevent the outbreak of a major war during the power
transition process, scholars of international relations will always doubt the power
transition theory explanation of why there has been no major war since WWII,
due to its inability to refute the theory that nuclear deterrence leads to peace,
which is a powerful alternative explanation. Furthermore, if we use the
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) from the Correlates of War
(COW) database to measure the strength of the USSR and the US, we find that
the USSR surpassed the US around 1970; and if we use the number of nuclear
warheads as the indicator, we find that the USSR also surpassed the US in 1976.
We all know that no hot wars occurred between the two countries, all of which
contradicts the prediction of power transition theory, and illustrates even more ef-
fectively the inhibitive effect of nuclear deterrence on war.
38 Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition, chapters 13–14.

Indeed, the invention of nuclear weaponry has dramatically altered the pattern
of war, and its potentially dreadful and devastating effects have led to the general
belief that the logic of nuclear deterrence supersedes that of the balance of
power.39 Proponents of nuclear deterrence theory believe that the sheer horror
that nuclear weapons and their catastrophically destructive capabilities evokes is

sufficient to bring about a balance of terror, founded on the assumption that nei-
ther side has the capability to wipe out the other’s nuclear arsenal. Consequently,
nuclear powers will not dare to provoke wars against each other, and thus main-
tain peace. Proponents of this theory believe that nuclear deterrence can prevent
nuclear wars and generate much more caution about initiating a crisis or conven-
tional war.40 Glenn H. Snyder has proposed a stability-instability paradox, which
claims that the more stable the military balance is at the nuclear level, the less sta-
ble it is at lower levels of violence, and hence the greater likelihood of low-level
armed conflicts breaking out or escalating.41 Daniel S. Geller’s empirical study
demonstrates that the possession of nuclear weapons could possibly precipitate
conflict escalation,42 which partially supports the stability-instability paradox.
Other studies on the relationship between nuclear weapons and the credibility
and effectiveness of deterrence, and on the relationship between nuclear weapons
and crisis escalation go so far as to suggest that nuclear weapons neither make de-
terrence more effective nor prevent the escalation of crises.43
39 Arthur Lee Burns, ‘From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis’, World Politics, Vol.
9, No. 4 (1957), pp. 494–529.
40 See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Praeger, 1977), pp. 98–99; Robert Jervis, The
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Scott Douglas
Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3rd
edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012); Evera, Causes of War, chapter 8.
41 Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury ed.,
Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 184–201; Robert
Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),
p. 31.
42 Daniel S. Geller, ‘Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1990), pp. 291–310.
43 Frank Harvey and Patrick James, ‘Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate
Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda’, Conflict Management and Peace Science,
Vol. 12, No. 1 (1992), pp. 17–45; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in
American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press,
1974), pp. 537–44; Paul K. Huth and Bruce M. Russett, ‘What Makes Deterrence Work?
Cases from 1900-1980’, World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1984), pp. 496–526; Paul K, Huth,
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1988); Paul K, Huth, ‘Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War’, American Political
Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (1988), pp. 423–43; Paul K, Huth, ‘The Extended Deterrent
Value of Nuclear Weapons’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1990), pp. 271,
276–77; Erik Gartzke, ‘The Capitalist Peace’, American Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 51, No. 1 (2007), pp. 166–91.
However, there are also many other studies showing that nuclear deterrence,
including extended nuclear deterrence, is effective, and that the presence of
nuclear weapons reduces the level of violence during crises.44 Even if the stability-
instability paradox holds true, one cannot deny the comprehensively peaceful
effect of nuclear weapons. New empirical studies on the relationship between nu-

clear weapons and outbreaks of war have shown that nuclear powers do not go
to war with each other.45 Indeed, my focus is on the inhibitive effects of nuclear
weapons on wars between nuclear powers. Even if, as other studies have shown,
nuclear weapons cannot completely protect nuclear powers from severe crises or
proxy wars, the Cold War between the US and the USSR alone is enough to prove
that nuclear weapons inhibit the level of intensity of power competition.46
Indeed, the peaceful competition between the US and the USSR led Waltz to con-
clude that the probability of an outbreak of war between nuclear powers is close
to zero.47 In conclusion, we have reason to believe that it is due to the existence
of nuclear weapons that the power competition between the hegemonic power
and the rising power will not proceed in the form of war which, as power transi-
tion theory suggests, is the most violent, costly, and risky method, but rather in
the form of diplomatic competition—a way of competing for strategic influence
without engaging in war.48
Although power transition theory is mainly used to explain when and which of
either the rising power or the hegemonic power would initiate a war rather than
engage in paradigm shift in diplomacy, we must bear in mind that switching from
44 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, ‘An Assessment of the Merits of Selective
Nuclear Proliferation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1982), pp. 283–306; Erich
Weede, ‘Preventing War by Nuclear Deterrence or by Detente’, Conflict Management and
Peace Science, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1981), pp. 1–18; Erich Weede, ‘Extended Deterrence by
Superpower Alliance’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1983), pp. 231–54;
Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D. C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1987); Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, ‘Proliferation and International
Crisis Behavior’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2007), p. 139.
45 Robert Rauchhaus, ‘Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), pp. 258–77.
46 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International
System’, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1986), pp. 99–142; John Lewis Gaddis, The
Long Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Nuclear Myths and
Political Realities’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (1990), pp. 731–45;
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security,
Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993), pp. 44–79; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’,
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2000), pp. 5–41.
47 Waltz, ‘Nuclear Myths and Political Realities’, p. 740.
48 Yang Yuan, ‘Daguo wu zhanzheng shidai baquanguo yu jueqiguo quanli jingzheng de zhuyao
jizhi’ (‘The Key Mechanisms of Competition between Hegemonic States and Rising Powers
in the Era of Great Power Peace’), Dangdai yatai (Journal of Contemporary Aisa-Pacific
Studies), No. 6 (2011), pp. 6–32.
a strategy of peace to one of war is the most extreme form of paradigm shift in
diplomacy. Therefore, the above revised power transition theory can still provide
insight into both the diplomatic competition between the rising power and hege-
monic power and their paradigm shifts in diplomacy.49 According to traditional
power transition theory, the rising power will make the first move to transform

its foreign policies and adopt a harsher, more aggressive foreign policy strategy,
in efforts to expand its interests before overtaking the hegemonic power.
However, as discussed earlier, this viewpoint is debatable. By adopting a more ag-
gressive foreign policy strategy, or initiating a diplomatic confrontation with the
hegemonic power prior to overtaking it, the rising power clearly puts itself in
harm’s way in light of its disadvantages with regard to capabilities. However,
according to the revised power transition theory, we can logically infer that the
hegemonic power may become dissatisfied with the trend before the rising power
has overtaken it. To avoid future losses, therefore, the hegemonic power will
make the first move by transforming its foreign policy strategy and seeking
changes in the international system, thus to strengthen its efforts to balance
against and impede the rising power, and to stop—or even reverse—the power
transition trend. The hegemonic power’s diplomatic paradigm shift will cause the
rising power to face immediate losses, and to avoid this the rising power must
transform its own foreign policies. However, having overtaken the hegemonic
power, the rising power may then adopt more active and assertive foreign policies
to strengthen its new hegemonic position and expand its power, so imposing im-
mediate losses on the former hegemonic power, which to avoid it must transform
its own foreign policy. Please see Table 4 for details.
Power Transition and the Paradigm Shifts in Diplomacy

According to Organski’s definition, when the rising power’s strength reaches
80% of that of the hegemonic power, the power transition process begins; and
when the rising power’s strength exceeds 120% of the hegemonic power’s
strength, the power transition process has been completed.50 Using GDP calcu-
lated according to the exchange rate, China is closing its gap with the US. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that China’s GDP would be 61.7%
49 However, it’s worth noting that whether or not to initiate a paradigm shift in diplomacy
involves a different calculus of likely gains and losses from that of whether or not to initiate
a war, for the latter is much more costly. Another caveat is that the article is meant to ex-
plain why the hegemonic and rising powers initiate a war or paradigm shift in diplomacy, ra-
ther than the outcome of these moves. This then raises the question: if a state may fail to
forestall the power transition by initiating a paradigm shift in diplomacy, why bother to
change its diplomatic paradigm? The answer is simply that the state is more likely to pre-
empt power transition by shifting its diplomatic paradigm than by retaining it unchanged.
50 Organski, World Politics, chapter 12; Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, pp. 44, 49; Levy
and Thompson, Causes of War, p. 44.
Table 4. Paradigm Shifts in Diplomacy of the Hegemonic Power and the Rising Power and their
Goals
Sequence of Action
Initiator Responder

Timing of Before overtaking Hegemonic power (to avoid Rising power (to avoid immedi-
Action future losses) ate losses)
After overtaking Rising power (to increase im- Hegemonic power (to avoid im-
mediate gains) mediate losses)
of the US’s in 2017. According to these data and Organski’s definition, therefore,
China and the US have not even entered the power transition process (Figure 1).51
On the other hand, if we look at the calculation of GDP based on Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP), China’s GDP increased from 22.6% in 1992 to 82.9% in
2010, which would suggest that the US and China have begun the power transi-
tion process. In 2014, China’s GDP reached 104.6%, surpassing that of the US,
making China the world no. 1 economy. According to the IMF’s estimation,
China’s GDP would reach 119.4% of the US’s in 2017, further increasing its
power advantage (Figure 2).52 Although both of these indicators are objective,
the US government uses GDP in terms of PPP,53 whereas the Chinese government
uses GDP based on official exchange rates.
I define paradigm shift in diplomacy, which may involve a dramatic change in
relations with the great power(s) in the world, as changes in a state’s guiding prin-
ciples, policy goals, and policy priority, of its foreign policy focus. According to
this definition, we ascertain that the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy may be con-
strued as a paradigm shift in diplomacy. Before the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, fight-
ing terrorism around the world was the guiding principle of America’s foreign
policy. After the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy came into effect, the US’s guiding diplo-
matic principle reverted to that of traditional great power competition. The US’s
policy goal thus changed from the eradication of terrorism to preventing or
51 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/

weodata/index.aspx. Although there are other measurements of power and states may re-
spond to disaggregate power developments rather than aggregate power developments, I
choose to use GDP as an indicator of states’ power in order to make my article commensur-
able with previous researches on power transition. For detailed and thorough discussions
on power, see Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, Power in World Politics
(London: Routledge, 2007); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public
Affairs, 2011); and Fels, Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific?, chapter 3. For states’ responses to
granular power growth, see Steven E. Lobell, ‘A Granular Theory of Balancing’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2018), pp. 593–605.
52 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook Database’, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/
weodata/index.aspx.
53 CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-fact
book/geos/ch.html.
China
France
110
Germany
100
India
90
Italy

80
Japan
70
Russia
60
United
50 Kingdom
United
40
States
30
20
10
0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Fig. 1. The Evolution of the Relative Capabilities (GDP Calculated Based on Official Exchange Rates) of
the Major Powers.
Fig. 2. The Evolution of the Relative Capabilities (GDP Calculated Based on PPP) of the Major Powers.
balancing against the rise of another great power and securing its own hegemony,
and the US’s policy priority shifted from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. However, the Obama administration’s enhanced, if reluctant, intervention
in the Middle East after the rapid and dramatic rise of the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant in 2014 did not represent a paradigm shift in diplomacy.54
54 Carmen-Cristina Ci^rlig, ‘The international coalition to counter ISIL/Da’esh (the “Islamic

State”)’, European Parliamentary Research Service, 17 March, 2015, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551330/EPRS_BRI%282015%29551330_EN.pdf.
Also apposite to this definition is the ‘striving for achievement’ strategy, which
represents China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy. China has changed the guiding
principle of its foreign policy from ‘keeping a low profile’ to ‘striving for achieve-
ment’. China’s policy goal thus changed from striving for economic development
to striving for the Chinese dream of rejuvenating the Chinese civilization. China’s

policy priority also shifted from the US to the neighbouring countries surrounding
China.
The US’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

Since 2010, the US has pressed on with the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy in three dimen-
sions: military, political, and economic. In the military dimension, the US has
strengthened and expanded its alliance system in the Asian-Pacific region.55 To
accomplish this, the US first re-emphasized duties and obligations to its allies thus
heightening the credibility of alliance commitments to them. The second step was
to strengthen its leadership status with regard to alliances. Thirdly, the US pro-
vided its allies with essential support with respect to military technology, thereby
increasing their dependence on the armaments it supplied, and elevating the cred-
ibility of—and hence strengthening—these alliances.56 Finally, the US has
enhanced security cooperation with its regional allies, and also expanded both the
geographical scope of alliance operations and the field of alliance cooperation.57
With regard to expanding alliances, the US has mainly adopted two measures:
one is seeking potential new allies; the other is promoting multilateralization of
bilateral military alliances. The US has been trying to attract new allies by
strengthening joint exercises, conducting intelligence cooperation, establishing
dialogue mechanisms, and providing military technical support. Promoting multi-
lateralization of military exercises was the first method the US used to promote
multilateralization of bilateral alliances and military cooperation. The second
55 Zhou Jianren, ‘Tongmeng lilun yu meiguo chongfan yatai tongmeng zhanlüe yingdui’
(‘Coping with America’s Alliance Strategy within the Context of the Rebalancing to Asia and
the Pacific’), Dangdai yatai (Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), No. 4 (2015), pp.
26–54.
56 Cheryl Pellerin, ‘U.S. Foreign Military Sales Promote Security Cooperation’, DoD News, 18
September, 2013, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id¼120815; Qi Haixia,
‘Cong junshou kan meiguo zhanlüe zhongxin dongyi de buju tezheng’ (‘Understanding the
Characters of the U. S. Strategic Pattern after Pivot to East through Arms Sales’), Guoji
guanxi xueyuan xuebao (Journal of University of International Relations), No. 4 (2012), pp.
57–65.
57 ‘Signing of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement’, 28 April, 2014, https://ph.usem
bassy.gov/signing-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/; ‘Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines on Enhanced Defense Cooperation’, US Department of State, https://2009-2017.
state.gov/documents/organization/244799.pdf; ‘The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense
Cooperation’, 27 April, 2015, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/shishin_20150427e.html.
was pushing for multilateral cooperation, and the third was promoting multilater-
alization of the cooperation mechanisms.58
The US moreover put the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy into practice militarily
through strengthening forward military deployments. With regard to comprehen-
sive military distribution, on 2 June, 2012, the then US Secretary of Defence Leon

E. Panetta announced in his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue
in Singapore that by 2020 the US would deploy 60% of its naval forces to the
Pacific, thus breaking from the traditional 50-50 split between the Pacific and the
Atlantic.59 The US has deployed advanced ships, military aircraft, strategic offen-
sive weapons, and strategic defence systems to Singapore, Australia, Japan, South
Korea, and Guam.60
Last but not least, the US has also adopted the new air-sea battle operational
concept to push the ‘pivot to Asia’ forward militarily.61 Since China developed
anti-access area denial (A2/AD) and other high-tech military equipment, and
expanded its own military strength,62 the risk of military intervention in the sea
areas surrounding China, and the potential casualties and losses this would entail,
has become far greater. China’s military progress has caused doubt among
58 Zhou, ‘Coping with America’s Alliance Strategy within the Context of the Rebalancing to
Asia and the Pacific’, pp. 37–42.
59 ‘Panetta’s Speech at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue, June 2012’, US Department of
Defence, June 2012, http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID¼1681.
60 ‘Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Singapore’, 3 June, 2011, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID¼4831; Jackie Calmes, ‘A U.S. Marine Base for Australia
Irritates China’, New York Times, 16 November, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/
world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html; David Cenciotti, ‘Three
B-2s and ‘Several’ B-1s Have Deployed to Guam to Deter China and North Korea’, The
Aviationist, 10 August, 2016, https://theaviationist.com/2016/08/10/three-b-2s-and-several-b-
1s-have-deployed-to-guam-to-deter-china/; Yoichi Kato, ‘The U.S. Military Presence in
Japan in the Context of the ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific’, Reexamining Japan in Global
Context, http://www.suntory.com/sfnd/jgc/forum/006/pdf/006_kato_en.pdf; ‘US and South
Korea Agree THAAD Missile Defence Deployment’, 8 July, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-36742751.
61 Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-access and
Area Denial Challenges (Washington DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013); Matteo Dian, ‘The
Pivot to Asia, Air-Sea Battle and Contested Commons in the Asia Pacific region’, The
Pacific Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2015), pp. 237–57; Richard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska,
The Air-Sea Battle Debate and the Future of Conflict in East Asia (Singapore: RSIS Policy
Brief, 2013).
62 Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering
the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United
States (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich,
and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington,
DC: CSBA, 2010); Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2010).
American allies in the region as to whether the US may be relied upon to fulfil its
security commitments should they come under attack from China. These allies
hence doubted both the resolve and the capability of the US to honour its commit-
ments.63 As discussed above, ensuring the reliability of American alliances in the
Asia-Pacific region has been an important approach to bringing the ‘pivot to

Asia’ strategy into effect and maintaining US leadership in the region. To main-
tain its alliance reliability the US needed to eradicate any challenges posed by the
A2/AD technology. Introducing the new air-sea battle concept, therefore, has be-
come integral to putting the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy into practice, both to demon-
strate the US’s military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region and its resolve to
fulfil security commitments to its allies.64
Politically, advancement of the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy was mainly manifested
in American active participation in regional political frameworks. The first indi-
cation was the president and the secretary of state’s more frequent visits to Asia-
Pacific countries during the Obama administration.65 The second was the Obama
administration’s higher-profile political involvement, in contrast to that of the
Bush administration, in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific region, to show its resolve
towards political participation in the region.66 To this end, President Obama and
important members of his administration made public announcements and
released public documents claiming that the US was a ‘resident power’ rather
than a ‘visiting power’ of the Asia-Pacific region.67 Lastly, the Obama
63 Douglas Stuart, ‘San Francisco 2.0: Military Aspects of the U.S. Pivot toward Asia’, Asian
Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2012), pp. 202–18.
64 Dian, ‘The Pivot to Asia, Air-Sea Battle and Contested Commons in the Asia Pacific Region’,
p. 245.
65 The Asia-Pacific countries refer to East Asian countries and Oceanian countries. The data
were collected from https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president; https://his
tory.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/secretary.
66 ‘U.S. “is Back” in Asia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Declares’, The Associated Press,
21 July, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/u-s-back-asia-secretary-state-hil
lary-clinton-declares-article-1.429381; Wang Si, ‘Meiguo jiaru <Dongnanya youhao hezuo
tiaoyue> yi zai zhiheng zhongguo’ (‘The United States Joins the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia to Balance China’), 22 July, 2009, http://world.huanqiu.com/
roll/2009-07/523307.html; Zhao Xueliang, ‘Aobama zai Ri yanjiang cheng “meiguo shi taiping
yang guojia”’ (‘Obama Declares “US is a Pacific Power” in a Speech in Japan’ ), 14
November, 2009, http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-11/632260.html; ‘Barack Obama’s
Speech in Tokyo’, Financial Times, 15 November, 2009, https://www.ft.com/content/
9e985a46-d0c2-11de-af9c-00144feabdc0; Hellen Cooper and Martin Fackler, ‘Obama Says
U.S. Seeks to Build Stronger Ties to China’, New York Times, 13 November, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/world/asia/14prexy.html.
67 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities’, 12
January, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135090.htm;
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Remarks By President Obama to the
Australian Parliament’, 17 November, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
administration devoted greater efforts to participating in East Asian regional co-

operation mechanisms, having launched the US–ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) Summit and attempted to elevate the East Asian
Summit to the primary platform for addressing security matters in the Asia-
Pacific region.68

Economically, the TPP was crucial to bringing the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy into
effect. Although the US insisted that the TPP is an open platform, during negotia-
tions it nevertheless persistently rejected China’s involvement. The US wanted to
make the TPP a so-called high standard trade agreement and a benchmark for fu-
ture trade deals. It moreover sought to make the TPP the foundation for a free
trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region. Since economic strength is the cur-
rency of power in the 21st century, and although the TPP was a trade agreement,
the US considered it as serving strategic purposes in addition to those of trade/
economic goals.69
China’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy was first apparent in its guiding principles
and policy goals. In the wake of the collapse of the USSR, dramatic changes in
Eastern Europe, and the end of bipolarity along with the Cold War, China faced
unprecedented isolation. At that critical moment, Deng Xiaoping proposed that
China needed to observe calmly, secure its position, cope with affairs composed-
ly, keep a low profile, and never claim leadership.70 From then onwards, the
‘keeping a low profile’ principle was the core guiding thought behind Chinese for-
eign policies, whose focus was moreover on creating a favourable external
press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament; Clinton, ‘America’s

Pacific Century’, pp. 56–63; Tom Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013: A
Rebalance toward Asia’, Vital Speeches International, Vol. 5, No. 5 (2013), pp. 128–33.
68 See Clinton, ‘Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities’; Office of
the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Remarks By President Obama to the Australian
Parliament’; Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, pp. 56–63; Donilon, ‘The United States and
the Asia-Pacific in 2013’, pp. 128–33; Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks at Press Availability’, 23 July,
2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm; ‘Overview
of ASEAN-U. S. Dialogue Relations’, ASEAN Secretariat’s Information Paper, 4 January, 2016,
http://www.asean.org/storage/2016/01/4Jan/Overview-of-ASEAN-US-Dialogue-Relations-(4-Jan-
2016).pdf; Yang Baoyun, ‘Tilting Balance of Power’, China Daily, 3 August, 2010, p. 8.
69 See Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’, pp. 128–33; Clinton, ‘America’s
Pacific Century’, pp. 56–63.
70 Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, Di san juan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III)
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 319–20, 363; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yan-
jiushi (CCCPC Party Literature Research Office), ed., Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975–1997,
Shang juan (Deng Xiaoping Chronicle, 1975–1997, Vol. I)(Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chu-
banshe, 2004), p. 1346.
environment for China’s modernization goals.71 However, at the Conference on

the Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries held on 24–25 October,
2013, President Xi Jinping stated: ‘Doing well in the diplomatic work with neigh-
bouring countries stems from the need to realize the two “centenary goals” and
achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China needs to work hard to

advance diplomacy with neighbouring countries, strive to win a sound surround-
ing environment for China’s development, and enable neighbouring countries to
benefit more from China’s development for the purpose of common develop-
ment.’72 This comment was regarded as signifying a tremendous change in
China’s guiding principles and foreign affairs policy goals, manifested in the shift
from ‘keeping a low profile’ to ‘striving for achievement’,73 and from creating a
good external environment favourable to modernization to creating a good exter-
nal environment favourable to realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, or
in other words, the rise of China.
The second manifestation of China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy was appar-
ent in the priority given to its policies. Since the 1990s, Chinese foreign policy
had always given top priority to the Sino-US relations, considering it a ‘priority
among priorities’, in the belief it could influence Chinese diplomacy as a whole,
and that it was immediately relevant to China’s political, economic, and national
security interests. China has attempted to improve Sino-US relations as a means
71 As early as 1954, Chairman Mao had proposed that China needs a peaceful external envir-
onment for domestic economic development, see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), Zhonggong zhongyang wen-
xian yanjiushi (CCCPC Party Literature Research Office), eds., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan
(Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chu-
banshe, Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), pp. 160, 168, 186–7; After Reform and Opening-up,
especially after the 1982 constitution established an independent foreign policy of peace,
creating a favourable external environment for China’s socialist modernisation became a
fundamental goal for China’s foreign policies. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa (The
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China), 4th edition (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,
1999), p. 8; Zhao Ziyang, ‘Report on the Work of the Government 1983’, 16 February, 2006,
http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_200823.htm. Since then, every report on the
work of government and every report at Party Congress have reiterated this goal of china’s
foreign policy.
72 ‘Xi Jinping zai zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua’ (‘Xi
Jinping Makes Important Remarks at a Conference on the Diplomatic Work with
Neighbouring Countries’), 25 October, 2013, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1025/c1024-
23332318.html.
73 Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014), pp. 153–84; Of course, there are some scholars
who doubt whether ‘striving for achievement’ truly deviated from ‘Keeping a Low Profile’,
see Qin Yaqing, ‘Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s
International Strategy’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2014), pp.
285–314.
to advancing Sino-Japanese relations, Sino-European relations, and relations be-

tween China and other US allies. The emphasis on Sino-US relations fundamental-
ly continued during Hu Jintao’s presidency.74 However, after the change to the
‘striving for achievement’ policy, China’s foreign policy priority began to shift to
its neighbours. This change first became evident at the October 2013 high-level

Conference on the Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries. China has
never before held such a high-level conference on relations with any great power
or with any other region. This action hence implied that China had made diplo-
macy with its neighbours a top priority in its foreign affairs. The second medium
through which this change came into focus was a 2014 Government Report in
which diplomatic work with neighbouring countries was the first matter
74 See Jiang Zemin, ‘Waijiao gongzuo yao jiandingbuyi de weihu guojia he minzu de zuigao liyi’
(‘Diplomatic Work Should Unswervingly Uphold the Supreme Interests of the Country and
the Nation’), Jiang Zemin wenxuan, Di yi juan (Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. I)
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006), pp. 311–7; Jiang Zemin, ‘Dangqian de guoji xingshi he
women de waijiao gongzuo’ (‘The Current International Situation and Our Diplomatic Work’),
Jiang Zemin wenxuan, Di er juan (Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II) (Beijing: Renmin
chubanshe, 2006), pp. 195–206. Since these were internal speeches, they could reflect more
accurately the true mindset of the highest Chinese leadership. In these two internal
speeches, Jiang Zemin not only lay stress on Sino-American relations, but also made it the
top priority among great power relations, while neighbouring countries followed and devel-
oping countries came last. This order differs from the order he used in public speeches in
the same period. In the reports to the 14th and 15th Party Congress, the order was neigh-
bouring countries, developing countries, and finally, developed countries. See Selected
Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. I, pp. 241–5; and Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II, pp. 39–
42. The reports at the 16th, 17th and 18th Party Congress featured the same order as the in-
ternal speeches: first, developed countries, then neighbouring countries and finally, devel-
oping countries. See Jiang Zemin, ‘Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui, kaichuang zhongguo
tese shehui zhuyi xin jumian’ (‘Build a Well-off Society in an All-round Way and Create a
New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’), Jiang Zemin wenxuan,
Di san juan (Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. III) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006), pp.
566–8; Hu Jintao, ‘Gaoju zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei duoqu quanmian
jianshe xiaokang shehui xin shengli er fendou’ (‘Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately
Prosperous Society in All Respects’), Hu Jintao wenxuan, Di er juan (Selected Works of Hu
Jintao, Vol. II) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2016), pp. 649–52; Hu Jintao, ‘Jiandingbuyi
yanzhe zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi daolu qianjin wei quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui
er fendou’ (‘Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive
to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects’), Hu Jintao
wenxuan, Di san juan (Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Vol. III) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,
2016), pp. 650–3. For more on the changes in the priorities of China’s foreign policy, see Da
Wei and Sun Chenghao, ‘China’s Changing Foreign Policy Priorities’, International Security
Affairs, No. 29 (2015), pp. 86–7.
addressed, followed by relations with developing countries, and ending with rela-
tions with the other great powers.75
As regards concrete diplomatic actions, China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy
was mainly manifested in a more resolute attitude toward issues of sovereignty,
and the proposal of the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative and its accompanying

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
The first incident that showed China’s resolute attitude with regard to sover-
eignty was that of its confrontation with the Philippines over Huangyan Island
(Scarborough Shoal). China did not hesitate to confront the Philippines in April
2012 and to maintain the sovereignty that it claims over Huangyan Island.76
Since then, to protect its sovereignty, China has also reclaimed land under its con-
trol on the South China Sea reefs for large-scale construction.77
China’s resolute stance on sovereignty was also apparent in its countermeas-
ures against Japan’s purchase of the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. First, when the
Japanese government announced on 10 September, 2012 its ‘purchase’ of three of
the five disputed Diaoyu Islands, so bringing into effect their ‘nationalisation’, the
Chinese government issued that same day a statement declaring that Diaoyu and
its affiliated islands were the baseline of its territorial sea. Second, to exercise its
jurisdiction China sent law-enforcement vessels to cruise the waters around the
Diaoyu Islands.78
75 Li Keqiang, Report on the Work of the Government 2014, 5 March, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/
zhuanti/2014gzbg_yw.htm.
76 Yu Jinghao, ‘Fei yao ba huangyandao zhengduan tijiao guoji fayuan’ (‘Philippines Wants to
Submit Huangyan Island Dispute to the International Court of Justice’), Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), 18 April, 2012, p. 21; ‘Wo jiu huangyandao shijian zaici yuejian Feilübin zhu-
hua shiguan linshi daiban’ (‘China Once Again Summoned the Charge d’Affaires ad Interim
of the Philippine Embassy in China on the Huangyan Island Incident’), Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), 9 May, 2012, p. 3; Qiang Wei, ‘Zhong Fei bingfei tongshi cong huangyandao
chechu gongwuchuan’ (‘China and the Philippines Not Concurrently Pull Out Official Ship
from Huangyan Island’), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 7 June, 2012, p. 21.
77 For more on China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea, see Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, https://amti.csis.org/category/land-reclamation/.
78 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu guanyu diaoyudao ji qi fushu daoyu linghai jixian de
shengming’ (‘Statement of the People’s Government of China on the Baseline of the
Territorial Sea of the Diaoyu Island and Its Affiliated Islands’), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily),
11 September, 2012, p. 1; Guo Jiping, ‘Zhongguo diaoyu dao qi rong taren siyi “maimai”’
(‘How can China’s Diaoyu Island be Recklessly “Traded” by Others’), Renmin ribao (People’s
Daily), 11 September, 2012, p. 3; Yu Jianbin, ‘Zhongguo haijian chuanbo biandui dida daioyu
dao haiyu kaizhan weiquan xunhang zhifa’ (‘China’s Maritime Surveillance Fleet Entered
Waters Around the Diaoyu Islands on a Rights Safeguarding, Patrol and Law Enforcement
Mission’), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 15 September, 2012, p. 1; ‘Zhongfang chixu baochi
dui riben fanzhi yali’ (‘China Continues to Hold Pressure Against Japan’), 13 September,
2012, http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2012-09-13/260078.html.
On 7 September, 2013, while on a visit to Kazakhstan, Xi Jinping proposed

jointly building a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’; and on 3 October, while on a visit
to Indonesia, he proposed the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’.79 Since then,
the ‘Belt and Road initiative’ has become an important platform for cooperation
between China and countries along the proposed routes, and more than forty

countries and international organizations have signed agreements of cooperation
with China.80 On 28 March, 2015, the Chinese National Development and
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of
Commerce, with the authorization of the State Council, jointly issued the Vision
and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road, which is often referred to as the blueprint for the
‘Belt and Road Initiative’.81 On 14–15 May, 2017, China hosted the Belt and
Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in Beijing, which promoted co-
operation under the ‘Belt and Road Initiative.’ Twenty-nine heads of states and
governments attended, and 1, 500 delegates and representatives from around 130
countries and more than 70 international organizations participated in the
forum.82
79 Xi Jinping, ‘Hongyang renmin youyi gongchuang meihao weilai’ (‘Developing People-to-

people Friendship, and Creating a Beautiful Future Collaboratively’), Renmin ribao (People’s
Daily), 8 September, 2013, p. 3; Xi Jinping, ‘Xieshou gongjian zhongguo-dongmeng mingyun
gongtongti’ (‘Hand in hand in Building a China-ASEAN Community of Destiny’), Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), 4 October, 2013, p. 2.
80 For more details, see the One Belt One Road website operated by the Chinese government,
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn; Xi Jinping, ‘Gongdan shidai zeren gongcu quanqiu fazhan’
(‘Sharing the Responsibility of the times, and Promoting Global Development’), Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), 18 January, 2017, p. 3.
81 Guojia fazhan gaige wei (National Development and Reform Commission), Waijiao bu
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Shangwu bu (Ministry of Commerce), ‘Tuidong gongjian sichou
zhi lu jingjidai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhi lu de yuanjing yu xingdong’ (‘Vision and
Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road’), 7 February, 2017, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201702/
201702070519013.pdf; http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.
82 Xi, ‘Sharing the Responsibility of the times, and Promoting Global Development’, p. 3; ‘Wang
Yi zai shier jie quanguo renda wu ci huiyi juxing de jizhehui shang jiu zhongguo waijiao
zhengce he duiwai guanxi da zhongwai jizhe wen’ (‘Wang Yi Answers questions from
Chinese and Foreign Journalists on China’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations at a Press
Conference Held at the Fifth Session of the 12th National People’s Congress’), Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), 9 March, 2017, p. 6; Du Yifei, Hu Zexi, Huan Xiang, ‘Xi Jinping zhuxi jiang
chuxi bing zhuchi “yidai yilu” guoji hezuo gaofeng luntan xiangguan huodong’ (‘President Xi
Jinping Will Attend and Host the Activities of the Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation Forum’), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 19 April, 2017, p. 1; Zheng Qingting,
‘Waijiao bu juxing zhongwai meiti chuifenghui: 28 guo yuanshou, zhengfu shounao yi queren
canjia “yidai yilu” gaofeng luntan’ (‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs Holds Briefing for Chinese
and Foreign Media: 28 Heads of State and Government Have Confirmed their Participation
To assist the progress of the ‘One Belt One Road’, China also established the
AIIB.83 It was on 2 October, 2013, on a visit to Indonesia for talks with President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, that Xi Jinping first proposed establishing the AIIB,
and expressed willingness to provide financial support for infrastructure construc-
tion in developing countries in the region, including the ASEAN countries.84 On

24 October, 2014, the first 21 countries, also known as the Prospective Founding
Members, signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Preparing to Establish
the AIIB in Beijing.85 On 29 June, 2015, representatives of fifty-seven countries
from five continents and the Prospective Founding Members of the AIIB signed
the Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Beijing,
and decided that the AIIB’s authorized capital stock would be US$100 billion.86
On 16 January, 2016, upon conclusion of its opening ceremony, the AIIB official-
ly opened for business.87 On 23 March, 2017, the AIIB approved the applications
of thirteen new members, reaching a total of 70 member states. During its first
year of operation, the AIIB approved nine projects with a total loan amount of
approximately US$1.7 billion.88
in the Belt and Road Forum’), 19 April, 2017, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2017-04-19/doc-

ifyeifqx6356404.shtml; ‘Beijing Enters Belt and Road Time’, 13 May, 2017, http://news.xinhua
net.com/english/2017-05/13/c_136280110.htm.
83 Guojia fazhan gaige wei (National Development and Reform Commission), Waijiao bu
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Shangwu bu (Ministry of Commerce), ‘Vision and Actions on
Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’.
84 Du Shangze, Liu Hui, ‘Xi Jinping tong yindunixiya zongtong Susilo juxing huitan zhongguo
yinni guanxi tisheng wei quanmian zhanlüe huoban guanxi’ (‘Xi Jinping Holds Talks with
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhokonen, China Indonesia Relations Raise to
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 3 October, 2013, p. 1.
85 Li Weihong, ‘Xi Jinping huijian chuxi choujian yatouhang beiwanglu qianshu yishi geguo
daibiao’ (‘Xi Jinping Meets with Representatives from Various Countries Attending the
Signing Ceremony of the MOU on Preparing to Establish the AIIB’), Renmin ribao (People’s
Daily), 25 October, 2014, p. 1.
86 Li Lihui, ‘Xieding qianshu yatouhang choujian maichu zui guanjian yibu’ (‘Signing
Agreements: Most Crucial Step in the Preparation for Establishing the AIIB’), Renmin ribao
(People’s Daily), 30 June, 2015, p. 4. Among the 57 founding member countries of the AIIB,
37 are Asian countries, and 20 are countries from other regions. See Li Lihui, ‘Yatouhang
choujian “shijianbiao” mingque’ (‘Timetable for Establishment of the AIIB determined’),
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 16 April, 2015, p. 2.
87 Yu Yichun, ‘Goujian renlei mingyun gongtongti de xin pingtai’ (‘A New Platform for Building
Community of Human Destiny’), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 17 January, 2016, p. 2.
88 Huang Fahong, et al., ‘Guoji yulun reyi yatouhang kuoda pengyouquan’ (‘International
Media’s Hot Discussions on AIIB Expanding Circle of Friends’), Renmin ribao (People’s
Daily), 25 March, 2017, p. 2; Sun Yi, ‘Yatouhang: gongxian fazhan jiyu wanshan quanqiu zhili’
(‘AIIB: Contributing Development Opportunities and Improving Global Governance’), Renmin
ribao, haiwaiban (People’s Daily, Overseas edition), 24 March, 2017, p. 1.
The Timing and Goals of the Paradigm Shifts in Diplomacy

Although some scholars consider the US to have begun its paradigm shift in diplo-
macy before 2010,89 I believe that two events determine the timing of these
changes. One occurred on 23 July, 2010, when the then Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton announced at the ASEAN regional forum in Hanoi that the United State

had a national interest in the freedom of navigation, in open access to Asia’s mari-
time commons, and in respect for international law in the South China Sea. She
moreover announced that the US prefers territorial disputes to be resolved not
through coercion but through a collaborative diplomatic process, thus shifting
from the previous American position of not intervening in disputes involving the
South China Sea.90 The second event occurred in November 2011, during
Obama’s visit to Australia, when he announced in a speech delivered to the
Australian Parliament that 2, 500 marines would be deployed in Australia, and
explicated America’s policy regarding the Asia-Pacific region.91 These two events
clearly show that the US’s paradigm shift in diplomacy occurred after July 2010
and before November 2011.
The core purpose of the US’s paradigm shift in diplomacy has been to maintain
its world leadership. This goal was overtly articulated by many members of the
Obama administration, from President Obama himself to high-level figures such
as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon, when expounding on America’s Asian policies. Hillary Clinton clearly
stated that maintaining America’s tradition of economic and strategic leadership
is in America’s strong interest,92 and that a strategic turn to Asia logically aligned
with America’s global efforts to maintain its global leadership.93 Donilon stated
that one of the Obama administration’s goals was to restore the foundation of
America’s global leadership.94 President Obama, meanwhile, made it clear that
he did not accept second place for the US;95 he also considered the economic
strength of the US to be the foundation of its leadership in the world and the
Asia-Pacific region,96 declaring that he would not allow China to write the trade
89 Keagle, Fisher, Jr. and Johnson, ‘Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia’, pp. 59–65.
90 Clinton, ‘Remarks at Press Availability’.
91 Calmes, ‘A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China’; Office of the Press Secretary,
The White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’.
92 Clinton, ‘Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia’.
93 Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, pp. 56–63; Saunders, ‘China’s Rising Power, the U.S.
Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-China Relations’, pp. 19–55.
94 Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’, pp. 128–33.
95 ‘State of the Union: President Obama’s Speech’, 27 January, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/State_of_the_Union/state-of-the-union-2010-president-obama-speech-transcript/
story?id¼9678572.
96 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the
Australian Parliament’.
rules for the Asia-Pacific region— the world’s fastest-growing region. President
Obama clearly stated that the trade rules must be established by the US.97
Two events also determine the timing of China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy.
The first was the standoff between China and the Philippines near Huangyan
Island in April 2012, which marked the significant adjustment of China’s diplo-

matic posture from seeking peace through compromises to seeking peace through
might. The second event was at the Conference on the Diplomatic Work with
Neighbouring Countries in October 2013, China’s first high-level diplomatic
symposium focusing on a particular region, when Xi Jinping proposed new for-
eign policy principles. Therefore, it is clear that China’s paradigm shift in diplo-
macy occurred after April 2012 and before October 2013.
The policy goals of China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy can be judged accord-
ing to the goals set forth in the white paper China’s Peaceful Development, pub-
lished in September 2011, wherein the Chinese government for the first time
clearly defined its core interests, which include: state sovereignty, national secur-
ity, territorial integrity, and national reunification, China’s political system as
established by the constitution, and overall social stability, and developing basic
safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development. In add-
ition, the paper declared that China would be firm in upholding these interests.98
Summary
I have examined the China-US power transition process and paradigm shifts in
diplomacy to test the theory of strategic competition between the rising power
and the hegemonic power. According to the above examination, the US’s para-
digm shift in diplomacy occurred between July 2010 and November 2011. At the
same time, China’s GDP, calculated based on PPP, reached 82.9% of the US’s in
2010, and 89.3% of the US’s in 2011. Thus, these two countries have entered the
power transition process, but have yet to complete it. China’s paradigm shift in
diplomacy occurred between April 2012 and October 2013. I use the sequence of
these paradigm shifts as the criteria to determine which country was the initiator
of the paradigm shifts in diplomacy and which was the passive responder. The ini-
tiator transforms its foreign policy first, and the responder adjusts its policy in re-
sponse. Thus, the US’s paradigm shift in diplomacy was active, and China’s
adjustment was passive, as a reaction to America’s paradigm shift.
The purpose of America’s paradigm shift was to maintain its hegemony. As the
established hegemon, the goal of the US is solely to avoid losing its hegemony,
that is, to avoid losses rather than seek gains. China’s paradigm shift in
97 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Remarks by the President in State of the
Union Address’, 20 January, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015.
98 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi (The State Council
Information Office of the People’s Republic of China), Baipishu: Zhongguo de heping fazhan
(White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development), 6 September, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/
2011-09/06/content_1941204.htm.
diplomacy, moreover, was aimed at protecting its core interests and avoiding
losses. Additional deterrent diplomatic actions and punitive foreign policies were
mainly aimed at avoiding losses with respect to territorial sovereignty, national
security, and development interests. In particular, punitive diplomacy can be eas-
ily misinterpreted as proactive diplomatic paradigm shift. However, these actions

are still passive responses to prior moves of the target countries. For example,
conducting routine patrols of territorial waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands
was a reaction to the Japanese island purchase; and land reclamation in the South
China Sea was a reaction to the Philippines’ decision to submit the maritime dis-
pute in the South China Sea to an international tribunal at the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in the Hague. Moreover, punitive diplomacy is a necessary step to-
ward ensuring the credibility of deterrent diplomacy.
Taken as a whole, the paradigm shifts in diplomacy of both the US and China
occurred before the rising power overtook hegemonic power. The US, as the
hegemon, initiated its paradigm shift, and China, as the rising power, transformed
its foreign policies in response. Both sides aimed at avoiding losses rather than
seeking gains. This phenomenon is completely consistent with the prediction of
strategic competition theory with regard to a rising power and a hegemonic
power that this article developed.
Conclusion
The rise of China is one of the most notable events that occurred in the early 21st
century. The strategic impact of its rise and interactions between the hegemonic
power and the rising power have become a focal point for scholars in the field of
international relations. This article uses prospect theory, power transition theory,
and nuclear deterrence theory as the bases for constructing a theory of strategic
competition between a hegemonic power and a rising power to explain the stra-
tegic interactions between the two powers during the power transition process.
Strategic competition theory maintains that states take diplomatic actions not just
to seek gains but also to avoid losses. Building upon a critical review and revision
of the power transition theory, strategic competition theory proposes that before
the rising power overtakes the hegemonic power, the hegemonic power will be
the first to take action to avoid losses, and in response the rising power will pas-
sively take action to avoid its own losses. After the rising power has overtaken the
hegemonic power, however, the rising power will be the first to take action to ex-
pand its interests, and in response the hegemonic power will passively take action
to avoid its own losses. Under the inhibitive influence of nuclear deterrence, how-
ever, strategic competition between the hegemonic power and the rising power is
limited to peaceful measures, particularly through diplomatic means.
I then examine the paradigm shifts in diplomacy of China and the US since
2010 to test the proposed theory of strategic competition. The US transformed its
foreign policy before China did. At the time of the US’s diplomatic paradigm shift
the power transition process between China and the US has just begun, but it has
not yet been completed, and China’s power has not yet surpassed that of the US.
The purpose of the US’s paradigm shift in diplomacy was to maintain its hegem-
ony, that is, to avoid losses. China’s paradigm shift in diplomacy ensued. Its pur-
pose was to protect national sovereignty, national security, and development
interests, which could also be categorized as avoiding losses. In conclusion, before
the rising power overtook the hegemonic power, the US, as the hegemonic power,

initiated paradigm shift in diplomacy to avoid losses, which caused China to face
losses, so propelling the paradigm shift of its own policies to avoid such losses.
This process is perfectly consistent with the prediction of strategic competition
theory developed in this article.
Finally, although the Trump administration has adopted foreign policies that
differ from those of the Obama administration, the US under Trump is neverthe-
less dissatisfied with the status quo and the trend, just as it was under the Obama
administration. Therefore, Trump will continue to push for the paradigm shift in
diplomacy that may be even more intense than Obama’s, which constituted an
adjustment to the post WWII international order as shaped by the US. Trump’s
paradigm shift in diplomacy, however, will be aimed at tearing down the post-
WWII international order to reverse the relative decline of the US and maintain
its hegemony.
Acknowledgement
The early versions of this article were presented to the seminar on ‘Rising Power
Foreign Policy Transformation: Theoretical Studies and Historical Dimensions’
organized by the Institute for International Relations, Tsinghua University on 9
March, 2014 and to the seminar on ‘China’s Rise and New Type of Great Power
Relations’ organized by the University of International Relations on 28 October,
2014. My gratitude goes to Yan Xuetong, Chen Qi, Zhou Fangyin, Qi Hao, Xu
Qiyu, Yang Yuan, the editors, and two anonymous reviewers for their critical
comments and helpful suggestions. And my thanks also go to Chris Wu for his
help in English writing. This study was funded by Science Foundation of Beijing
Language and Culture University (supported by ‘the Fundamental Research
Funds for the Central Universities’), with the approval number 14YBB20.

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The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019, 1–34

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*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

as the established power, is of particular interest to scholars.1 A closer look at the

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1 See Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Future of U.S.–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’,

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Critical Review of Existing Theories

Leadership Characteristics and China’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

Xi has more assertive instrumental beliefs. Therefore, these scholars conclude

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Explanations for US’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

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A Theory of Strategic Competition

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National Strategic Goals: Seeking gains or Avoiding Losses

descending scale of importance, include national survival, political recognition,

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Prospect Theory: The Micro-foundation

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Power Transition Theory and Its Revision

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18 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).

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25 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 191.

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Rising Power War (–4, 1) (4, –5)

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Rising Power War (1, –4) (4, –6)

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37 Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, p. 59.

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Effects of Nuclear Deterrence on Strategic Competition

38 Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition, chapters 13–14.

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Power Transition and the Paradigm Shifts in Diplomacy

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51 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/

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54 Carmen-Cristina Ci^rlig, ‘The international coalition to counter ISIL/Da’esh (the “Islamic

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The US’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

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administration devoted greater efforts to participating in East Asian regional co-

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China’s Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy

press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament; Clinton, ‘America’s

environment for China’s modernization goals.71 However, at the Conference on

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to advancing Sino-Japanese relations, Sino-European relations, and relations be-

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On 7 September, 2013, while on a visit to Kazakhstan, Xi Jinping proposed