Alias Alias Petitioner Vs Vs Alias Alias Respondent Pastor Salazar Vamenta & Vamenta Norberto Romualdez
Alias Alias Petitioner Vs Vs Alias Alias Respondent Pastor Salazar Vamenta & Vamenta Norberto Romualdez
Alias Alias Petitioner Vs Vs Alias Alias Respondent Pastor Salazar Vamenta & Vamenta Norberto Romualdez
SYLLABUS
DECISION
VILLA-REAL , J : p
This is an appeal by way of certiorari taken by Tan Tiah ( alias T. Suya), wherein he
prays, on the grounds alleged therein, for the review of the decision rendered ill the case
by the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, for the
reversal thereof, and for the affirmance of the decision of said Court of First Instance.
As grounds for the allowance of the appeal, petitioner assigns the following
alleged errors of law committed by said Court of Appeals in its decision, to wit:
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in nding in its decision, subject of the
present petition for certiorari, that the 5th paragraph of the contract of lease
Exhibit A establishes rights for the petitioner and for the respondent, which are
antagonistic and, therefore, unenforceable by action.
"2. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in nding in its decision that
the promise, if any, made by respondent to sell to petitioner the land in question is
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not enforceable by action for lack of a price.
"3. The Court of Appeals also erred in nding in its decision that the
5th paragraph of the contract of lease entered into by petitioner and respondent
does not state two promises to buy and to sell which are mutually demandable.
"4. Lastly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the herein
petitioner has no cause of action against defendant-respondent."
On May 14, 1923 petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of lease in
the fifth clause of which, pertinent to the question at issue, provides:
"5th. That upon termination of the period of this contract, namely, ten
years, the lessor shall have the option to buy the building or improvement which
the lessee may have built upon the lots, reimbursing the latter ninety per cent
(90%) of the original net cost of the construction; but should the lessor be unable
or unwilling to buy said building or improvement, the income or rent derived
therefrom shall be equally divided between said lessor and lessee, and the latter
shall no longer have the obligation to pay the rent agreed upon for the lots in the
second paragraph of this contract; provided, however, that the present contract,
with the modification just mentioned, with respect to the income from the building
and the rent from the lot, shall continue in force until the lessor buys the building
or improvement or the lessee buys the land."
The judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Leyte and reversed by
the Court of Appeals, which absolved the defendant is as follows:
"Wherefore, judgment is rendered sentencing defendant to buy the house
of plaintiff or to sell to plaintiff the land on which the latter's house is built. Each
of the parties must submit the name of a person to be appointed commissioner
for the assessment and appraisal of the land on which plaintiff's house is built.
"Defendant is sentenced to pay the costs of the suit."
The main question to be decided in this appeal is whether plaintiff, as lessee, has
a right, by virtue of the aforecited fth clause of the contract of lease, to compel
defendant, as lessor, to sell to him the land on which he built his house in accordance
with said contract.
It will be seen that the lessor i8 given the preference of buying the building
erected on the leased land at a price equivalent to 90 per cent of the original net cost of
the construction upon the termination of the ten years xed in the contract as the
duration of the lease. As ten years have elapsed and the lessor has not exercised his
right to buy the building, and has no intention to do so, may the lessee compel the
lessor to sell to him the leased land? The lessee is not given the option to buy the land.
The grant of said right may not be inferred from the conditional classe of paragraph 5
and from paragraph 4 of the contract since neither in the conditional clause aforecited
nor in the fourth paragraph of the contract is the lessor bound to sell the questioned
land to the lessee. Furthermore, in the said conditional clause the price which the lessee
would have to pay should he decide to buy the land is not xed. Article 1445 of the Civil
Code provides that "By the contract of purchase and sale one of the contracting parties
binds himself to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay a certain price therefor
in money or in something representing the same." According to article 1451, "a promise
to sell or buy, when there is an agreement as to the thing and the price, entitles the
contracting parties reciprocally to demand the ful llment of the contract." And article
1447 of the same Code provides that in order that the price may be considered certain,
it shall be su cient that it be so in relation to some certain thing, or that its
determination be left to the judgment of some particular person, and should the latter
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be unable or unwilling to x the price, the contract shall be inoperative. And according
to article 1449 of the same Code, the designation of the price can never be left to the
determination of one of the contracting parties.
As we have said, a price certain which the lessee should pay the lessor for the
land in case he should desire to buy it has not been xed; neither has anything which
may have a de nite value or which may serve as a basis for the xing of the price been
designated. Also, no determinate person has been named to fix the price.
The price of the leased land not having been xed and the lessor not having
bound himself to sell it, the essential elements which give life to the contract are
lacking. It follows that the lessee cannot compel the lessor to sell the leased land to
him.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we do not nd su cient grounds for reversing
the decision appealed from, which is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.