Fundamental Moral Theology: René T. Lagaya, SDB, MTD

FUNDAMENTAL
MORAL
THEOLOGY
RENÉ T. LAGAYA, SDB, MTD
Don Bosco Press

Makati City
2007
(For Private Circulation only)
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Chapter I: The Nature of Moral Theology …………………...……... 4
Chapter II: The Justification for Moral Theology ……………..……. 6
Chapter III: The Moral Teaching of the New Testament .……….….. 8
Chapter IV: The Historical Background of Moral Theology .……... 26
Chapter V: The Nature and Characteristics of Christian

Behaviour ……………………………………………….. 66
Chapter VI: The Human Conscience and the Moral Norm ……….. 78
Chapter VII: Sin and Conversion …………………………….……… 102
Chapter VIII: Virtue and Christian Wholeness ……………..….......... 118
Outline …………………………………………………………..... 131
Bibliography ………………………………………………………..….. 134
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CHAPTER I:
THE NATURE OF MORAL THEOLOGY
The division of theological subjects into various subjects and disciplines is the
result of the modern thrust towards specialization. In ages past the tendency was
towards synthesis. This was particularly symbolized by the coronation of Charlemagne
by Pope Leo III (795-816) as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire on Christmas Day of
the year 800 C.E.1 Such desire for synthesis was embodied in the production of
theological summas. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) referred to the whole theological
enterprise as sacra doctrina.
The emergence of Moral Theology as a separate discipline was primarily due to

the insistence of the Council of Trent (1545-1563) on the detailed confession of sins in
the celebration of the Sacrament of Penance. This brought about the necessity of having
able confessors. Hence Moral Theology was originally intended for the preparation of
such able confessors.
Moral Theology was traditionally taught under two main headings:
1. General Moral Theology;

2. Special Moral Theology.
The former dealt with the general principles of morality, namely: human act, moral law,
human freedom, conscience, sin and virtue. The latter treated the principles relevant to
the moral evaluation of specific circumstances – hence the name special.
Contemporary Moral Theology however is taught differently for reasons we

shall explain a little later. It is treated under these two main headings:
1. Fundamental Moral Theology;

2. Special Moral Theology.
Fundamental Moral Theology has two main parts: (1) the Foundational Portion,
consisting of its Biblical Foundation and its Historical Foundation; (2) the Systematic
Portion, consisting of the treatment of the general moral principles centering on the
consideration of the Human Person and his or her quest for wholeness.
Contemporary Special Moral Theology focuses on the relationships to which the

Human Person is subjected. Thus it has three main divisions:
1. Religious Ethics, which deals with the human being’s relationship with God;
1
Cf. Philip Hughes, A Short History of the Catholic Church, 8th ed., London, Burns & Oates, 1974, p. 78.
4
2. Personal Ethics, which tackles the dynamics of the human person’s relationship
with himself or herself;
3. Social Ethics, which handles the human person’s relationship with other human
beings and with the whole of creation.
5
CHAPTER II:
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR MORAL THEOLOGY
With Rene Descartes (1596-1650) a great change occurred in the approach to

human knowledge. His critical spirit made him put into doubt anything and everything
in the realm of human knowledge. Only that knowledge which can withstand his
Methodic Doubt is declared to be true. For any piece of knowledge to be true, it must
have the refulgence of that original and indubitable statement: Cogito, ergo sum! (I think,
therefore I am!)
Every science must justify the principles on which it builds up its intellectual
edifice. This holds true also for Moral Theology. Thus the principles governing human
behaviour must have a firm foundation if they are to be considered scientific. “The task
of fundamental moral theology is to justify an ethical theory for the establishment of
values and norms in the present social, intellectual, and cultural situation and, in this
task, to draw special attention to the function of Christian faith.” 2 Fundamental Moral
Theology is tasked with presenting a rigidly coherent ethical system that is solidly
rooted in the very ground that nourishes the Christian faith.
The mode of justifying an ethical system follows either of these two views: (1)
Teleology; (2) Deontology. “A teleological theory says that the basic or ultimate criterion
or standard of what is morally right, wrong, obligatory …, is the nonmoral value that is
brought into being. The final appeal, directly or indirectly, must be to the comparative
amount of good produced, or rather to the comparative balance of good over evil
produced.”3 The term teleology “is derived from (the Greek word) telos, end or aim.”4
The moral quality of any human act for teleologists can be gauged only from its
consequence. No human activity has an exclusively good effect. The human reality
imposes both good and evil consequences. Thus what matters to morality is the greater
balance of good over evil. The end, aim or consequence is a nonmoral value or what
teleologists prefer to call pre-moral values or physical goods. Since the consequence of
moral activity is a physical good or bonum physicum, it can be measured or quantified. A
greater yield of good results would thus make the human act that produced it morally
good. Should there be more bad consequences, the human act then would be deemed
morally evil.5
“Deontological theories deny what teleological theories affirm. They deny that the
right, the obligatory, and the morally good are wholly, whether directly or indirectly, a
2
Franz Böckle, Fundamental Moral Theology, trans. N. D. Smith. New York, Pueblo Publishing Company,
1980, p. 3.
3
William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hal, Inc., 1973, p. 14.
4
Böckle, Fundamental Moral Theology, p. 236.
5
Cf. Böckle, Fundamental Moral Theology, p. 9.
6
function of what is nonmorally good or of what promotes the greatest balance of good
over evil for self, one’s society, or the world as a whole. They assert that there are other
considerations that may make an action or rule right or obligatory besides the goodness
or badness of its consequences – certain features of the act itself other than the (pre-
moral) value it brings into existence ….” 6 “The name (deontology) is derived from (the
Greek) to deon, duty …. Those who support it are convinced that there are actions that
are, independently of all possible circumstances, in themselves contrary to morals,
whatever consequences may result from them.”7 Deontologists insist that a human act
must be gauged morally in itself and not from its results. Or rather the consequences
can be taken into consideration in assessing the moral quality of a human act, but
together with all the other features of the act. We shall deal with these features later in
the chapter on the nature and characteristics of Christian behaviour.
Philosophically speaking, these two moral viewpoints as truly at odds with each
other. “Moralists have judged these two schools of thought as irreconcilable. But it
seems there is a way out of this impasse. In the consideration of consequences the long-
term effect must be the issue. In the last analysis this long-term consequence is nothing
else but the realization of that petition in the Lord’s Prayer: Your Kingdom come! (Mt
6,10; Lk 11,2.) The ultimate consequence of any form of human behaviour is the
fulfillment of the Reign of God. The Reign of God has the course charted for its
attainment. This course consists in all those rules and regulations that determine how
the kingdom is to come. It is precisely in order to deviate from this course of action that
the Lord Jesus has been subjected to the test in the desert. In other words, the Reign of
God is the point of reconciliation of all teleological and deontological theories. The
Reign of God – which as we shall see shortly is the central moral message of Jesus – is
the ultimate criterion of morality.”8
Vatican II insisted on the renewal of the sacred sciences. “Other theological

disciplines should also be renewed by livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and
the history of salvation. Special attention needs to be given to the development of moral
theology. Its scientific exposition should be more thoroughly nourished by scriptural
teaching.”9 Thus Fundamental Moral Theology must ground the basic moral principles
in Sacred Scripture and in Human History. Hence Moral Theology must have a good
Biblical foundation and a solid Historical basis. Only moral principles that are true to
God (Biblical Foundation) and are true to the human person (Historical Foundation) are
deemed scientific. In our case, we shall first deal with the Moral Teaching of the New
Testament. Then we shall tackle the Historical Background of Moral Theology.
6
Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed., p. 15.
7
8
Rene T. Lagaya, SDB, The Key Concept in the Missionary Document Evangelii Nuntiandi, in Religious
Life Asia, VI:4 (October-December 2004), p. 56.
9
Optatam Totius 16d, quoted in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, SJ, New York, The
American Press, 1966, p. 452.
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CHAPTER III:
THE MORAL TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT
The New Testament presents the fullness of divine revelation. It thus provides
the irrefutable source for moral life and Christian behaviour. We shall tackle this rich
source of moral teaching in four points: (A) the Centrality of the Basileia Message of
Jesus; (B) the Importance of the Abba of Jesus; (C) the Decisive Action of Jesus in the
New Commandment of Love; (D) the Overriding Concern of Jesus for Communitas.
A. THE CENTRALITY OF THE BASILEIA MESSAGE OF JESUS
The first words uttered by any important personage acquire special importance
because they contain in a nutshell his or her entire plan of action. Thus the first words
of Jesus as recorded in the oldest gospel account are programmatic. Mark 1, 14-15 are
central to the understanding of the moral message of Jesus.
After John had been arrested, Jesus went into Galilee. There he proclaimed the
gospel from God saying, “The time (Greek: kairos) is fulfilled, and the kingdom
of God (Greek: he basileia tou Theou) is close at hand. Repent (Greek: metanoeite)
and believe (Greek: pisteuete) the gospel.
“The kingdom of God/Heaven is a subject of major importance in the Bible for two
primary reasons: its frequency in the first three canonical (synoptic) gospels of the New
Testament, and the conviction that it stands at the very center of the message of the
historical Jesus.”10 Indeed, “at the heart of Jesus’ message was his proclamation of the
Basileia of God. This very full concept signifies God’s present rule and the aim of history
– his kingdom. God’s Basileia then, is the quintessence of his historical activity with and
through man while at the same time it points to the state at the end of time, which is
exclusively controlled by God, a state in which the world will no longer be dominated
by the powers of evil and god will rule. Jesus’ moral message forms part of this
proclamation of the rule and kingdom of God and its claim is essentially determined by
it.”11 “The concept of God’s kingdom therefore means that God is God and Lord and
that, for this reason, man is human and the world is saved, because God’s state of being
God and Lord sets man and the world free from the powers of evil that are hostile to
creation and reconciles them in their division and absence of salvation.” 12
10
Dennis C. Duling, Kingdom of God, Kingdom of Heaven, in The Anchor Bible, vol. 4, New York,
Doubleday, 1992, p. 49.
11
12
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“… the Gospel of Mark contains 20 references to the word kingdom, 14 of which
are to the Kingdom of God and 6 to the word king (basileus) as ironic references to Jesus.”13
“Statistically a commanding 54 references to kingdom and 38 to Kingdom of Heaven/God
or its equivalent are scattered throughout Matthew. The vast majority of these are to
Kingdom of Heaven (32 references; 4 Kingdom of God references, including the probable
Mt 6,33).”14 The term kingdom occurs 46 times in the gospel (of Luke) and 8 times in the
Acts. The most common expression is the Kingdom of God (Luke: 32 references; Acts: 6
references).”15 The general usage of basileia signifies “the being, nature and state of the
king.”16 Thus it can mean the “dignity or power” 17 of the king. But since “the dignity of
the king is expressed in the territory ruled by him,” 18 the term basileia can well be
translated as kingdom. One should never lose sight however of the fact that it is the
reign that is the primary meaning with realm as a possible secondary connotation.
This central moral message of Jesus has a twofold content: (1) the doctrinal
indicative, which is the proclamation of the basileia of God; (2) the moral imperative,
which consists in the twofold demand of repentance or conversion (Greek: metanoia) and
of believing or faith (Greek: pistis).
1. THE PROCLAMATION OF THE BASILEIA OF GOD
The basileia proclamation of Jesus possesses the following characteristics: (a) It is

eschatological in character. (b) It is a gift of God. (c) It is holistic in character. (d) It is in
view of salvation. (e) It is universal in scope.
a. The Eschatological Character of the Basileia of God
There are four basic ways of understanding eschatology: (1) Consequent

Eschatology; (2) Realized Eschatology; (3) Existential Eschatology; (4) The Already-and-
the-Not-Yet Eschatology.19
Consequent Eschatology refers to the purely future approach to eschatology as

proposed primarily by Albert Schweitzer. According to Consequent Eschatology, “the
Kingdom in Jesus’ preaching is considered as an object of imminent expectation but its
coming still lies in the future.”20 It explains the teachings of Jesus about the Basileia as
consisting of future events that “are so vividly presented, that the distances which
separate them from the present are so shortened that their occurrence seems
13
Duling, Kingdom of God, Kingdom of Heaven, in The Anchor Bible, vol. 4, p. 56.
14
15
16
Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 1, Grand Rapids, Michigan, WM.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964, p. 579.
17
Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 1, p. 579.
18
Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 1, p. 579.
19
Cf. John Füllenbach, SVD, The Kingdom of God: The Heart of Jesus’ Message for us Today, Manila,
Divine Word Publications, 1989, pp. 64-68.
20
Füllenbach, The Kingdom of God, p. 64.
9
immediate.”21 Everything said of the Reign of God is always something that will come
to pass still at some future time.
Realized Eschatology refers instead to the purely present approach to

eschatology. Its main proponent was C. H. Dodd. For Realized Eschatology, “the
Kingdom of God as it is presented in the parables is precisely an event that is
happening in the present experience only in terms of a present reality.” 22 In other
words, the coming of Jesus heralds the coming of the Basileia into people’s lives. When
God begins to take possession of people, when human beings begin to acknowledge the
sovereignty of God in their lives, the Reign of God is realized in the here and now.
Existential Eschatology was proposed by Rudolph Bultmann. For him “the

expectation of the Kingdom for Jesus consists of Jesus’ awareness of the absolute
sovereignty of God. Jesus’ proclamation of its imminent coming is an expression of the
fact that before the sovereignty of God, man stands in a crisis of decision.” 23 In front of
the invitation to allow God to reign in one’s life, the human person has to make a
decision for or against the Basileia of God. This decision must be made at a concrete
point in his or her existence – a decision that will influence the whole of his or her
existence.
The Already-and-the-Not-Yet Eschatology was coined by Oscar Cullmann but

was proposed by a good number of exegetes and theologians. This approach looks at
the Reign of God as existing in two time frames: the present and the future. Indeed the
time is fulfilled (present) and the Kingdom of God is close at hand (future). 24 Such an
approach makes of the Kingdom difficult to grasp, simply because people have no
experience of living in two time frames. Either we recall the past, live in the present, or
look forward to the future.
For Joachim Jeremias the Kingdom parables have two aspects: Hope and Crisis.
“Hope looks in expectation towards what is to come, and the crisis, expressed in terms
of imminent catastrophe, calls the person now to a decision for or against the person of
Jesus in whom the Kingdom is present.” 25 The crisis expresses the present. Hope
presents the future.
Rudolph Schnackenburg sees God as one who “dynamically works salvation in

the present in Jesus although the consummation as judgment and final salvation
remains in the future.”26 The salvation wrought by Jesus is of the present time. But its
consummation is still of the future. This consummation consists either in the judgment
21
22
23
Füllenbach, The Kingdom of God, pp. 65-66.
24
Cf. Mk 1,15.
25
26
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of those who refuse the salvation brought by Jesus or in the final salvation of those who
accept Jesus’ redemptive work.
Oscar Cullmann develops the so-called eschatological tension. This tension is

linked to the human person who is already redeemed in Christ but who is not yet saved
due to the possibility of damnation that is linked to his or her historical existence. As
long as the human person is subject to the changes of the historical categories of time
and place, the possibility of deciding against God remains. “The decisive battle in a war
may have already occurred in a relatively early stage of the war, and yet the war still
continues.”27 Christ has already won the decisive battle in the war of salvation and the
result of the war is already assured. But as the war still rages some disciples may still be
lost in the end.
For Wolfhart Pannenberg the eschatological issue should be understood in terms

of the Basileia of God as a proleptic reality. He recognized the “ontological priority of
the future.”28 It is not the present that determines the future. Rather “it is the future that
has an imperative claim upon the present and the present should be seen as an effect of
the future, in contrast to the conventional assumption that past and present are the
cause of the future.”29 In other words, if we want to understand the present, we must
look towards the future. “In Jesus’ message of the Kingdom, the end of history has
come into history itself. It reveals what history is all about and towards what it is
moving. The content of the Kingdom is the final fulfillment of humankind’s social
destiny and the ultimate revelation of God himself and who he really is for us.” 30
Finally there is Jurgen Moltmann. He “sees the already more in terms of hope,
which is what makes the present dynamic. The reason for a life of hope in the future is
the resurrection and appearances of Jesus. The resurrection should be seen as a seed
with an imminent vitality that has a definite tendency.” 31 The Risen Jesus gives hope to
humankind. This hope makes of the present move towards the full realization of this
hope in the future in “the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come.” 32
Eschatology is viewed in terms of hope. Christ is already risen but humankind is not yet
in the risen state. The Risen Christ already enkindles hope in the present, but this hope is
not yet fully realized; it will be realized for humankind only in the future.
It is this fourth view of eschatology that has gained general acceptance. The
Basileia of God is truly already and not yet.
b. The Basileia of God as a Gift
27
28
29
30
31
32
Cf. The Nicaean Creed.
11
The Gospel of Mark as well as the Gospel of Luke show a preference for the term
he Basileia tou Theou, the Kingdom of God or the Reign of God. The Gospel of Matthew
however seems to prefer the term he Basileia ton ouranon, the Kingdom of heaven. This
“corresponds to Hebrew malkut samayim or Aramaic malkuta dismaya. The conventional
argument is that the plural heavens in this variant does not refer simply to the
transcendent realm, but is a circumlocution, an expression which avoids uttering or
writing the Divine Name (YHWH); if so, the the Kingdom of (the) Heaven(s) is equivalent
to the Kingdom of God.”33 But it also shows the nature of the Reign of God as coming
from above. There were several groups and parties in Israel during Jesus’ times who
were keenly interested to hasten the coming of the Kingdom. We shall discuss four such
groups: (1) the Pharisees; (2) the Sadducees; (3) the Essenes; (4) the Zealots.
 The PHARISEES: “These were an extraordinarily powerful group within first

century Judaism. They have had a bad press in Christian sources being regarded
as legal fanatics – a judgment which will certainly be deemed unfair, if not
simplistic, when we begin to understand what they really stood for. The
Pharisees who stand in the tradition of the Hasidim, 34 were convinced that the
Law revealed God’s purpose and will for all people and that it should always be
followed meticulously. Accordingly, they were dedicated to studying the
Scriptures and they also elaborated an immense commentary which showed how
the minutiae of the law applied to each and every situation. For them, these
traditions were just as binding as the Pentateuch.” 35 The Pharisees were largely a
lay movement who were convinced that the meticulous observance of the Law
and the accompanying traditions would prepare “for the coming of a Davidic-
dynastic-Messiah who would restore the kingdom to Israel.” 36
 The SADDUCEES: “By and large they represented the wealthy Hellenized
aristocrats of Jerusalem, many of whom were rich landowners. The chief priest
together with the elders and other priests were members of this group. In
addition to the offering of sacrifice, they were concerned with the control of the
Temple and its wealth and with the organization of the Jewish state. (The Temple
was the religious and political center of Judaism.) … we realize that those in
charge of the Temple really controlled a vast financial and administrative empire
…. Unlike the Pharisees and the Hasidic groups, the Sadducees were quite
willing to collaborate with the ruling authorities in the land. They had worked
out a compromise which meant that they would accept foreign domination
provided their own position remained undisturbed. Because they held a leading
position within the country, they were committed to maintaining the status quo,
33
Duling, Kingdom of God, Kingdom of Heaven, in THE ANCHOR BIBLE, vol. 4, p. 50.
34
The Hasidim referred to a group of Jews in the Maccabean period who are described in 1Mc 2,42, as
devoted to the law. (Cf. Hasideans, John L. McKenzie, SJ, Dictionary of the Bible, New York, MacMillan
Publishing Co., Inc., 1965.)
35
Eamonn Bredin, Rediscovering Jesus: Challenge of Discipleship, Quezon City, Claretian Publications,
1990, p. 53.
36
Bredin, Rediscovering Jesus, pp. 53-54.
12
so the Romans, with whom they collaborated, did not interfere with them ….
Unlike the Pharisees, they accepted only the Pentateuch which legislated for the
Temple and the priesthood, which they controlled, and they rejected any later
developments such as resurrection of the dead or the traditions of the elders.
They were therefore opposed to new ideas, to changes in Temple religion or
political structures, to anything which would threaten their self interest.” 37 The
Sadducees were concerned too with the coming of the Kingdom, but they were
not too keen at hastening its coming since it might threaten their privileged
position. They would support the coming of the Kingdom if it would enhance
their wealth and authority among the people. Their efforts at making the
Kingdom come centered on the preservation of Temple worship and all that it
entailed.
 The ESSENES: “It would be difficult to imagine a group more opposed to all that
the Sadducees stood for than the Essenes. They are not mentioned in the New
Testament and most of our information about them comes from the writings of
the community living at Qumran on the shores of the Dead Sea. Their name
seems to be a Hellenized version of the Hasidim and they certainly stand four-
square within that tradition …. The Pharisees were intent on recognizing and
responding to the presence of God in the everyday affairs of life, with making
the ordinary holy, while still being devoted to the Temple and its ritual. The
Essenes went much further in their pursuit of perfection. They rejected Temple
worship as impure. The priests in their view were illegitimate and so they
withdrew to the wilderness to live ascetic and celibate lives apart from society ….
The life of the community – its prayer, its study, its renunciation of private
property, its ritual worship and common meals of brotherhood, its rigid
observance of the many precepts of the rule of the community – was understood to
be the true, indeed only authentic way to live and to worship God.” 38 Through
their rigouristic asceticism they hoped to hasten the coming of the Kingdom.
 The ZEALOTS: “They too believed that they were engaged in the holy war of the
end time against Israel’s enemies and that God would intervene and bring his
work to completion. For them, Israel’s only Lord was God, she was his very own
possession and any form of occupation of the land was a crime against Yahweh
himself. The same impulse felt by the Pharisees, the Essenes, and indeed the vast
majority of the people, to see Israel restored to an independent, truly Jewish
kingdom, was carried to the point of violent resistance by the Zealots and the
Sicarii (dagger-carrying assassins).”39 The desire of the Zealots to bring about the
coming of the Kingdom was through the use of arms.
37
38
39
Bredin, Rediscovering Jesus, p. 56.
13
The Basileia message of Jesus was no party to any of the above-mentioned groups
and parties. It is to come from heaven. In other words, the Reign of God is to come as a
pure gift of the Father. Its coming is by divine initiative. Human beings may strive to
dispose themselves so as to act as instruments in God’s hands, but they can never bring
it about through mere human effort.
c. The Holistic Character of the Basileia of God
Jesus came into an Israel that is full of messianic expectation. For a long time
there has been no prophet in Israel. Thus John the Baptizer’s appearance and
particularly Jesus’ coming brought the people’s messianic expectation to its zenith. But
the image of the Messiah and of his coming Kingdom is replete with political
underpinnings. The Zealots promoted this idea with great zeal. Jesus however refused
to be identified with this highly politicized image. “Jesus, as he realized they were
about to come and take him by force and make him king, fled back to the hills alone.” 40
In fact, Jesus constant efforts to dissociate himself from this political picture of the
Messiah were interwoven in the Gospel of Mark in what has come to be known as the
Messianic Secret. In his performance of miracles Jesus enjoined silence in order that he
may not be misinterpreted as a political figure.41 It appears that Jesus wished for himself
the image of the Messiah as the Suffering Servant of Yahweh (Ebed Yahweh) found in
Deutero-Isaiah. Four Songs portray this Servant image: 42,1-9; 49,1-7; 50,4-11; 52,13-
53,12.
Nonetheless the highly spiritualized image of the Messiah as Ebed Yahweh does
not mean that the Reign of God has no concern for the temporal order of things. Jesus
said: “Very well, pay Caesar what belongs to Caesar – and God what belongs to God.” 42
This statement of the Lord shows that his authentic disciple must also show concern for
the things of Caesar, but within set parameters. The Jewish mind was alien to any
dichotomy between the sacred and the profane. After all, the world “was a work of God, a
divine miracle or – in the biblical phrase – a work of his hands. It was God’s world, and
God has given it to man to inhabit. Man was to enjoy this world, work in it, and praise
God for the miracle of its existence.” 43 Human beings show the rightful concern for the
temporal order by their respect for the necessary autonomy of earthly affairs. Vatican II
sanctions this: “If by the autonomy of earthly affairs is meant the gradual discovery,
exploitation and ordering of the laws and values of matter and society, then the
demand for autonomy is perfectly in order: it is at once the claim of modern man and
the desire of the Creator. By the very nature of creation, material being is endowed with
its own stability, truth and excellence, its own order and laws. These man must respect
as he recognizes the methods proper to every science and technique.” 44 The whole of
40
Jn 6,15.
41
Cf. Mk 1,25; 1,34; 1,44; 3,12; 5,43; 7,36; 8,26.
42
Mt 22,21.
43
Edward, Schillebeeckx, Marriage: Human Reality and Saving Mystery, London, Sheed & Ward, 1976, p.
15; cf. Ps 139,14.
44
Gaudium et Spes, 36a.
14
creation is bound to be part of the coming Kingdom. “We are well aware that the whole
creation, until this time, has been groaning in labour pains.”45
d. The Basileia of God as oriented towards Salvation
The preaching of John the Baptizer was indeed characterized by condemnations

and threats of punishment. “Brood of vipers, who warned you to flee from the coming
retribution?”46 “Even now the axe is being laid to the root of the trees, so that any tree
failing to produce good fruit will be cut down and thrown on the fire.” 47 “His
winnowing-fan is in his hand; he will clear his threshing-floor and gather his wheat into
his barn; but the chaff he will burn in a fire that will never go out.” 48 John too
proclaimed the Kingdom, but, in view of the preceding quotes, in definitely harsh and
retributive terms. “Repent, for the kingdom of Heaven is close at hand.” 49 Thus he was
greatly confused and even when disturbed with the attitude taken by the Lord Jesus.
He even entertained doubts about the messianic identity of Jesus: “Are you the one who
is to come, or are we to expect someone else?” 50 The Lord Jesus tried to convince John
that with him are the authentic signs of the coming Kingdom: “Go back and tell John
what you hear and see; the blind see again, and the lame walk, those suffering from
virulent skin-diseases are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised to life and the
good news is proclaimed to the poor ….” 51 It is just that the Kingdom is being
established not for judgment and condemnation, but for salvation. “For this is how God
loved the world: he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not
perish but may have eternal life. For God sent his Son into the world not to judge the
world but so that through him the world might be saved.”52 Jesus’ mild, conciliatory and
welcoming attitude was true to the image of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh: “He does
not cry out or raise his voice, his voice is not heard in the street; he does not break the
crushed reed or snuff the faltering wick.” 53 After all Jesus proclaims: “I will certainly not
reject anyone who comes to me.”54
e. The Universal Character of the Basileia of God
The universal character of the Reign of God is clear from the Matthean
missionary mandate: “All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go,
therefore, make disciples of all nations; baptise them in the name of the Father and of the
Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teach them to observe all the commands I gave you.
45
Rm 8,22.
46
Mt 3,7b.
47
Mt 3,10.
48
Mt 3,12.
49
Mt 3,2.
50
Mt 11,3.
51
Mt 11,4-5; cf. Is 35,5; 61,1.
52
Jn 3,16-17.
53
Is 42,2-3.
54
Jn 6,37b.
15
And look, I am with you always; yes, to the end of time.” 55 Jesus spoke of his dream of
having a truly universal Kingdom: “And I tell you that many will come from east and
west and sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob at the feast in the kingdom of
Heaven.”56 But in the very same gospel we find a mandate of Jesus that seems to limit
the universal character of the Reign of God: “Do not make your way to gentile territory,
and do not enter any Samaritan town; go instead to the lost sheep of the House of
Israel.”57 How are we to understand and resolve these apparently conflicting mandates?
At his coming Jesus found a highly divided house. The spiritually elite in Israel
looked down with contempt on the great majority of the people, whom they deemed to
be grossly wanting in the observance of the Law. “When the Pharisees saw this, they
said to his disciples, ‘Why does your master eat with tax collectors and sinners?’” 58 In
another passage we read: “This rabble knows nothing about the Law – they are
damned.”59 Jesus realized that it would be long and difficult before he could achieve the
goal of making the Kingdom of God truly universal in character. Before uniting east
and west, Jews and gentiles, he first had to bring about the unity of the Israelite nation.
He must bring together those who claimed to be just with those whom they spurned as
unjust. Going to the lost sheep of the House of Israel was a first step at bringing about a
universal Kingdom. It is a process that had to be worked out by stages. Matthew 10,5b-6
represents the initial stage of this universalizing process, whereas Matthew 8,11 and
28,18-20 represent the concluding stage.
2. THE TWOFOLD DEMAND OF THE BASILEIA OF GOD
After proclaiming the Reign of God – the doctrinal indicative – the Lord Jesus
proposes the twofold demand of the Basileia – the moral imperative. “Repent and
believe the gospel.”60
a. The Demand for Conversion
This is the negative dimension of the moral imperative of the Reign of God.
Repentance or conversion is incompatible with an attitude of self-righteousness. No one
who is convinced of his or her goodness would every feel the need to repent and be
converted to the Lord. Conversion can only thrive in an atmosphere of loss. Sin as such
is no obstacle to conversion. In fact it oftentimes brings about that feeling of loss that
spurs a person to come to conversion. The situation of loss makes a sinner feel the need
for something stable to hang on and something clear to give direction to his or her life.
Thus the sinner, burdened by the weight of his or her own sinfulness, seeks God, clings
to God in desperation, and comes to a real experience of conversion.
55
Mt 28,18-20.
56
Mt 8,11.
57
Mt 10,5b-6.
58
Mt 9,11.
59
Jn 7,49.
60
Mk 1,15.
16
The parable of the Pharisee and the Publican 61 beautifully illustrates the problem
that self-righteousness brings to the demand for conversion. “The Pharisee, proudly
extolling his pious acts before God, is blind to his own human weakness and poverty;
he does not need God or his mercy and finds none. 62 Such an attitude is usually
associated with contempt for others, so Jesus had doubtless such people in mind when
he spoke of the elder son who stayed away from the feast given for his brother’s
homecoming63 and the discontented labourers in the vineyard. 64 Minds as firmly closed
as these are no longer capable of thinking generously about God, and in their harsh
judgments of their neighbour have lost every spark of love, and they aroused the wrath
of Jesus …. Genuine repentance, the repentance that opens to itself the Kingdom of
God, is only possible when a man knows he is small and slight as a child before God. 65
In his sight we are always unprofitable servants;66 we are always his debtors.67”68
Metanoia, repentance or conversion is therefore characterized by the following

elements:
 Acknowledgement of fault.
 Sorrow for the wrong done.
 Willingness to change.
 Religious motivation.
 Total reform of self.
 Reorientation of life.
 Better understanding of self.
 Deeper knowledge of God.
 Immediate response to the call of grace.
b. The Demand for Faith
This is the positive dimension of the moral imperative of the Basileia of God.
Faith or pistis (Latin: fides) is of two kinds: (1) fides qua creditur; (2) fides quae creditur. The
former refers to faith as that personal attitude of absolute self-surrender to God. The
latter refers to the content of faith consisting in the whole deposit of revelation
(depositum revelationis) or the deposit of faith (depositum fidei), which is the entire body of
revealed truths accepted, possessed, cherished and fostered by the whole community of
61
Cf. Lk 18,10-14.
62
Cf. Lk 18,14.
63
Cf. Lk 15,25-30.
64
Cf. Mt 20,1-15.
65
Cf. Mt 18,3.
66
Cf. Lk 17,10.
67
Cf. Mt 6,12.
68
Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, London, Burns & Oates, 1975, pp.
29-30.
17
believers.69 The Synoptic Gospels seem to emphasize faith as content (fides quae creditur)
whereas the Johannine writings apparently stress faith as attitude (fides qua creditur).
The Pauline letters however seem to show a more balanced approach.
3. THE CALL TO DISCIPLESHIP IN THE BASILEIA OF GOD
One who responds to the proclamation of the Basileia of God through conversion
and faith actually answers to the call of the Lord to discipleship. The pericope
immediately following the announcement of the Reign of God concerns the call of the
first disciples of Jesus, the two pairs of brothers – Simon Peter and Andrew; James and
John, the sons of Zebedee. 70 Discipleship was not new to Judaism. The Jewish rabbis
had disciples. But discipleship in the Kingdom of God seems to differ greatly from the
rabbinic disciples. We can compare them thus:
Disciples of the Rabbis Disciples of Jesus
1 – The Disciple’s choice 1 – The Master’s Choice

2 – Need for Matriculation 2 – Gratis
3 – Treatment as Servants 3 – Treatment as Friends
4 – Teaching by Citation 4 – Teaching on Personal Authority
5 – Argumentation and Contestation 5 – Questioning for Clarification
6 – Conclusion in Graduation 6 – Absence of Graduation
The rabbinic disciples enrolled with the rabbi of their choice. They paid for their
studies but were treated practically as servants. In order to be convincing the rabbis
cited authoritative sources and were open to argumentation and contestation. At the
end of their course of studies they did graduate to become rabbis themselves.
The disciples of the Lord Jesus were chosen by the Master himself. “You did not
choose me, no, I chose you ….” 71 They never paid to become disciples and were treated
as friends. “I shall no longer call you servants, because a servant does not know the
master’s business; I call you friends, because I have made known to you everything I
learnt from my Father.”72 Indeed as a teacher Jesus “taught them with authority, unlike
their own scribes.”73 They never questioned nor objected to the teachings of Jesus; if
ever they seemed to question the Lord, it was in order to ask for clarification due to the
profundity of the Lord’s teachings. “Explain to us the parable ….” 74 “At this, Peter said
to him, ‘Explain the parable for us.’” 75 They never graduated from the school of the
Lord. “Nor must you allow yourselves to be called teachers, for you have only one
69
Cf. Karl H. Peschke, SVD, Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the light of Vatican II, vol. 2: Special
Moral Theology, rev. ed., Manila, Divine Word Publications, 1994, pp. 18-23.
70
Cf. Mk 1,16-20.
71
Jn 15,16a.
72
Jn 15,15.
73
Mt 7,29.
74
Mt 13,36.
75
Mt 15,15.
18
Teacher, the Christ.”76 They always remained disciples; in the Kingdom of God, once a
disciple always a disciple.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ABBA OF JESUS
It is true indeed that “no one knows the Father except the Son ….” 77 Yet we dare
to call God Father. “The introduction to the Our Father in the Latin Mass contained the
words audemus dicere (we dare to say) which caught something of the daring,
astounding privilege that is ours in being able to pray to God as Father, through Jesus
Christ.”78 The Jews approached God with fear and trembling. “Now at daybreak two
days later, there were peals of thunder and flashes of lightning, dense cloud on the
mountain and a very loud trumpet blast; and in the camp, all the people trembled.” 79
“Seeing the thunder pealing, the lightning flashing, the trumpet blasting and the
mountain smoking, the people were all terrified and kept their distance. ‘Speak to us
yourself,’ they said to Moses, ‘and we will obey; but do not let God speak to us, or we
shall die.’”80 Out of respect for God, but maybe more out of fear of him, the Jews came
to avoid even pronouncing the divine name God revealed to Moses – YHWH: “I am he
who is.”81 Thus calling God Father on the part of the disciples of Jesus was indeed a
daring deed. Yet that was how the Lord Jesus taught them: “So you should pray like
this: Our Father in heaven, may your name be held holy.”82
A lengthy quotation from Eamonn Bredin is helpful at this juncture: “We should
also notice that while Jesus encourages and urges his disciples to pray in the way he
does (and it is disciples who are urged to pray constantly), he is never actually presented
to us as including himself with his disciples in saying ‘Our Father’ (Mt 6:9, is somewhat
peculiar to Matthew and Jesus is here teaching his disciples how they should pray).
Indeed the distinction between ‘my father’ and ‘their father’ or ‘your father’ is
rigorously maintained in the gospels. This would seem to suggest that Jesus was aware
of a distinction between his experience of God and that of his disciples and yet he
teaches them to pray in the same way as he does. The disciples’ ability to pray in this
way is seen as a consequence of the insight they have gained into Jesus’ distinctive
vision of God’s relationship to human beings and is ultimately dependent on their
relationship with Jesus. Two texts outside the gospels corroborate this: ‘When we cry
76
Mt 23,30.
77
Mt 11,27.
78
79
Ex 19,16.
80
Ex 20,18-19.
81
Ex 3,14. “The God of Israel is called by His personal name more frequently than by all other titles
combined; the name not only identified the person, it revealed his character. This name is now pronounced Yahweh
by scholars; the true pronunciation of the name was lost during Judaism when a superstitious fear of the name
prevented its enunciation. In its place was read Adonai, ‘Lord’; the combination in writing of the consonants
YHWH and the vowels of Adonai, a-o-a, created the hybrid Jehovah of the Eng Bibles.” John L. McKenzie, SJ,
Dictionary of the Bible, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1965, God.
82
Mt 6,9.
19
Abba, Father! it is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are children
of God’ (Rom 8:15-16), and because ‘you are sons, God has sent the spirit of his son into
our hearts, crying Abba! Father!’ (Galatians 4:6). They retain the original Abba Father
form remembered vividly in the pre-Pauline tradition as characteristic of Jesus. It is a
sacred prayer formula which can be used by Christians only because they possess the
spirit of Jesus and are children of God.”83
The Lord Jesus identifies himself intimately with his Abba. “… then you will
know for certain that the Father is in me and I am in the father.” 84 To Philip’s query
Jesus answers: “Have I been with you all this time, Philip, and you still do not know
me? Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father.” 85 Yes, indeed, Jesus claims: “The
Father and I are one.”86 Jesus wants his disciples to have eternal life, which can only be
had through knowledge of the Father: “And eternal life is this: to know you, the only
true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” 87 Knowledge of himself is the path
towards knowledge of the Father since “no one knows the Father except the Son and
those to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.”88
Jesus Christ insists on his disciples that his Abba is enough and guarantees
personal fulfillment. The eunuch sayings are particularly instructive in this regard. “…
and there are eunuchs who have made themselves so for the sake of the kingdom of
Heaven.”89 What is the context of these eunuch sayings of Jesus? “The word eunuch is an
extremely harsh expression. It is a difficult enough word today, but in the first century,
when such men were a public part of society – even though a rejected part of that
society – it was extremely offensive and crude. There is not the slightest possibility that
the early Church would have ever invented a saying which used such an expression, to
place it upon the lips of Jesus, as he spoke of himself or his followers. You do not have
your heroes described (or describing themselves) with offensive language. If the saying
is found in the Gospel of Matthew, then it must have been said by Jesus. Despite the
continual repetition of the word eunuch in Matt. 19,12, the evangelist has been able to
take it from the tradition and use it – because Jesus himself had said it.”90
Francis Moloney continues his explanation of the eunuch sayings thus: “There is
ample evidence in the Gospels that Jesus was the object of continual abuse from his
opponents …. Among the many terms used for such abuse it appears more than likely
that they would have called Jesus eunuch! Given the importance of marriage and the
procreation of children, in obedience to Gen. 1,28, there must have been something
unique about the life of Jesus of Nazareth which have his opponents the opportunity to
83
84
Jn 10,38b; cf. Jn 14,10.11.
85
Jn 14,9a.
86
Jn 10,30.
87
Jn 17,3.
88
Mt 11,27b.
89
Mt 19,12.
90
Francis J. Moloney, SDB, A Life of Promise: Poverty, Chastity, Obedience, London, Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1984, p. 103.
20
call him a eunuch, in a derogatory and abusive sense.” 91 The eunuch state was one of
impossibility of entering “into a married situation.” 92 The Lord Jesus did not just choose
not to marry. He found it impossible to marry because “the overwhelming experience
of his life was the presence of the lordship of God, whom he called Abba – Father …. It
was this lordship which led him to his state of celibacy, to his being a eunuch because of
the overwhelming presence of the Kingdom in his life.” 93 The completion in life
provided by marriage was deemed unnecessary by Jesus because his Abba was all-
satisfactory and truly sufficient to fill his life. This understanding of his Abba was what
the Lord wanted to communicate to his disciples so that they too could find the
fulfillment of their lives only in his Abba.
C. THE DECISIVE ACTION OF JESUS IN THE ONE

COMMANDMENT OF LOVE
At the Last Supper, according to the Johannine narrative, Jesus promulgated the
new commandment of love: “I give you a new commandment: love one another; you
must love one another just as I have loved you.” 94 In the Synoptic Gospels however the
new commandment of love took the form of a synthesis made by Jesus of two
commandments on love in the Old Testament.
Rudolf Schnackenburg discusses the context of the synoptic formulation of the

great commandment of love. “All three synoptic gospels record this great act of Jesus in
an important pericope which, however, receives different formulation in the three
evangelists. In Mark 12:28-34, it is a learned discussion with a well-disposed Scribe who
is seeking God, approves Jesus’ words, emphasizes the pre-eminence of love over
external acts of worship, and is praised by Jesus for doing so. According to Matthew
22:34-40, a Pharisee lawyer tries to trap Jesus; the pericope – clearly the event was the
same as that described by St. Mark – is given the form of a controversy. At Luke 10:25ff.
the saying about the twofold commandment merely forms the introduction to the story
of the good Samaritan, and, surprisingly, is uttered by the questioner himself. The
whole passage has a practical aim. The teacher of the law wanted Jesus to tell him what
he ought to do to inherit eternal life, and Jesus brought his parable of a merciful act of
true neighbourly love to a climax with the words ‘Go and do likewise’ (v. 37).” 95
At first glance it seems that there is nothing novel at all in the formulation of the
Lord Jesus of the great commandment of love. After all both commandments are
directly lifted from the Old Testament. “Each of these two commandments … enjoyed
specially high esteem in Judaism. The commandment to love God (Deut. 6:5) belongs to
91
Moloney, A Life of Promise, p. 105.
92
93
94
Jn 13,34.
95
Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, p. 91.
21
the Shema, the old confession of monotheistic faith recited every morning and evening
by the devout Jew and already customary in Jesus’ time.” 96 The commandment to love
the neighbour instead is drawn from the Book of Leviticus 19,18. It is one of the
regulations meant to make the whole Israelite community holy like Yahweh, their
God.97 “What was it, then, that Jesus did?”98
Jesus’ action was threefold:
1. By juxtaposing the erstwhile two separate commandments, he revealed the

indissoluble interior bond between these two commandments. The
commandment on the love of God is the source of authentic love, while the
commandment on the love of neighbour is the expression of this love.
2. Jesus clearly showed that the whole law, consisting of 613 commandments
(248 positive precepts and 365 prohibitions, 99 with 248 representing the parts
of the human body and 365 representing the days of the year), could be
reduced to this and only this chief and double commandment.
3. The Lord reinterpreted neighbourly love as love of the nearest person, not just
“the members of your race”;100 Jesus thus interpreted it in an absolutely
universal sense.101
D. THE OVERRIDING CONCERN OF JESUS FOR COMMUNITAS
Among Jesus’ most notable activities was table fellowship. “Our self-service style
meals have none of the significance that meals had for the Jews at that time. A
companion was one who broke bread with you (com-panion) – for a Jew, sharing a meal
was a very intimate expression of friendship and communication and was much more
than a social occasion. To take part in a meal meant fellowship with God and with those
96
Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, p. 94. Praying the Shema twice a day was in
observance of the Mosaic injunction “Let the words I enjoin on you today stay in your heart. You shall tell them to
your children, and keep on telling them …, when you are lying down (evening) and when you are standing up
(morning).” Dt. 6,6-7. It seems however that it later evolved into praying this prayer three times a day. We read
from the Didache, a work of the Apostolic Patristic era, the following: “Do not let your fasts be with the hypocrites.
They fast on Monday and Thursday; but you shall fast on Wednesday and Friday. Do not pray as the hypocrites do,
but as the Lord commanded in His gospel, you shall pray thus: Our Father who art in heaven …. For thine is the
power and the glory forever. Pray thus three times a day.” (8,1, quoted in William A. Jurgens, The Faith of the Early
Fathers, vol. 1, Collegeville, The Liturgical Press, 1970, p. 3.) It seems that the Christian author was urging the
disciples to act differently from the Jews. They should change their fast days. In their prayer too they should not
use the Shema but the Lord’s Prayer, and they should do this thrice daily.
97
Cf. Lv 19,2.
98
99
Cf. Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, p. 93.
100
Lv 19,18. The universalization of the erstwhile highly exclusive concept of neighbour is particularly
evident in the Lukan version (10,25-37).
101
Cf. Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, p. 95.
22
who sat at table. It meant sharing peace, brotherhood or sisterhood, and forgiveness.” 102
Table fellowship with Jesus meant community-building centered on the Lord. “Barriers
were broken down in the presence of Jesus. He accepts people as they are, reaches out
to them as fellow human beings and so they feel forgiven, reconciled, part of a wider
community – they feel human again.” 103 Table fellowship with Jesus meant coming to
wholeness and coming to communion.
“We begin to realize that eating and drinking in the presence of Jesus is not
simply a matter of giving food to the hungry. Nor is it a question of gathering together
disadvantaged members of society in order to inaugurate social change, nor is it a
question of offering group therapy. It is a question of theology and eschatology rather
than biology, sociology, or psychology. By seeking to draw together in table fellowship
the so-called sinners and self-styled righteous, Jesus is making an unbelievably
powerful statement about God and his ways of bringing about final salvation. Without
asking people how they stand in relation to God he offers them peace, wholeness, and
forgiveness.”104 Forgiveness does not come about primarily through the words “your
sins are forgiven.”105 “But we ought to look instead to the much more pervasive and
more striking theme of acceptance, table fellowship, and festivity and try to understand
their implications for forgiveness.” 106 In other words, the forgiveness that we all seek “is
already given to us before our search begins.”107 By being allowed to sit with the Lord
Jesus and to break bread with him, forgiveness, wholeness and communion are ours for
the taking. Such is the operation of the divine love.
We are drawn by Jesus to himself and to one another. When we are touched by
the Lord’s forgiveness, we become bonded to others who have had such a similar
experience. This process of community-building goes through three stages:
1. “There is a separation from the structures of group or social role or lifestyle

previously taken for granted.
2. “There follows a lengthy period of transition and testing when the initiates are
on the boundary, on the limen or threshold, when they are betwixt and between
what has been and will be. This is called the liminal stage.
3. “Finally, there are the rituals to mark the incorporation into their new lifestyle or
group or social role of those who have fulfilled the rites of initiation.”108
102
103
104
105
Mk 2,5b.
106
107
108
23
The first stage entails a moving away from the sources of personal security in
life. This absence of security is necessary for the experience of liminality. The second
stage consists in the common groping in the dark of all who are going through the
experience of insecurity. Bonding comes about naturally and leads to the third stage
when communitas is brought into existence. Communitas refers to the ideal community –
the goal of the Basileia of God. In the last analysis, communitas is the ultimate moral
standard. Anything that helps to bring about communitas is good; anything that goes
against it is evil.
CHAPTER IV:
24
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF MORAL THEOLOGY
The history of Moral Theology can be conveniently divided into four epochs:
1. Ancient Christianity – until St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.)

2. Medieval Christianity – until St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 C.E.)
3. Modern Christianity – until St. Alphonsus Mary de’ Liguori (1696-1787 C.E.)
4. Contemporary Christianity – until the present.
A. MORAL THEOLOGY IN ANCIENT CHRISTIANITY
This first epoch is also known as the patristic era. In other words, it is the period
of the Fathers of the Church. “Today only those are to be regarded as Fathers of the
Church who combine these four necessary qualifications:
 Orthodoxy of doctrine,
 Holiness of life,
 Ecclesiastical approval, and
 Antiquity.”109
1. THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS
The earliest patristic writers were known as the Apostolic Fathers. They were the
immediate disciples of the Apostles. Their writings were mostly in the form of letters or
epistles occasioned by certain exigencies of the local Christian communities. References
to Sacred Scripture were abundant, since the works of the Apostolic Fathers were
basically ad intra or addressed to the Christians themselves. Typological argumentation
was the favoured style of writing, particularly the presentation of Jesus Christ as the
model of Christian life.
Contemporary scholars have listed seven such Fathers: Barnabas, Clement of

Rome, Ignatius of Antioch, Polycarp of Smyrna, Hermas, Papias of Hierapolis and the
author of the Didache. “… they may be regarded as connecting links between the time of
revelation and the time of tradition, and as very important witnesses to the Christian
faith. The authors belong to very different regions of the Roman Empire, for instance,
Asia Minor, Syria and Rome. They wrote for special occasions. Nevertheless, they
109
Johannes Quasten, Patrology, vol. 1: The Beginnings of Patristic Literature – From the Apostles Creed
to Irenaeus, Westminster, Maryland, Christian Classics, Inc., 1984, p. 10.
25
present a unified world of ideas that give us a picture of the Christian doctrine at the
turn of the century.”110
The surviving documents of this early Christian period “are concerned with the
way converts to the movement ought to behave. These documents are addressed not to
individuals but to communities, and they have among their primary aims the
maintenance and growth of these communities. In these documents we can see, though
not always very clearly, the very formation of the Christian moral order, of a set of
Christian moral practices. (It seems that) we cannot begin to understand that process of
moral formation until we see that it is inextricable from the process by which distinctive
communities were taking shape. Making morals means making communities.” 111
2. THE APOLOGISTS
The second century was characterized by the emergence of the Apologists. They
were Christian writers who took up the defence of the Christians against pagan attacks.
Their writings were basically ad extra or addressed to those outside the Church. Thus
the Apologists cited Sacred Scripture less. Instead they had recourse to Greek
philosophy. They had to use language that was understandable to their attackers. They
had no real affection for Greek philosophy, but they appreciated its usefulness in their
defence of Christianity against its erudite enemies.
The foremost Apologists were St. Justin the Martyr (died ca. 165 C.E.) and St.
Irenaeus of Lyons (ca. 160 – ca. 202 C.E.). Among the more important works of St. Justin
were The First Apology, The Second Apology and The Dialogue with Trypho the Jew. “The
doctrine of the Logos is the most important doctrine of Justin, because it forms a bridge
between pagan philosophy and Christianity. For Justin teaches that although the Divine
Logos appeared in his fullness only in Christ, a seed of the Logos was scattered among the
whole of mankind before Christ. For every human being possesses in his person a seed
(sperma) of the Logos. Thus not only the prophets of the Old Testament but even the
pagan philosophers carried a germinating seed of the Logos in their souls, as for
instance, Heraclitus, Socrates, and the Stoic philosopher Musonius, who lived according
to the directions of the Logos, the Divine Word.”112
The most important works of St. Irenaeus were The Detection and Overthrow of the
Pretended but False Gnosis – more popularly known in its Latin title Adversus Haereses
(Against Heresies) – and The Demonstration of the Apostolic Teaching. His most relevant
contribution to the history of moral theology was his teaching on anthropology.
“Following the Platonic idea that man consists of physis, psyche and nous, Irenaeus
teaches that man is composed of body, soul and spirit.” 113 Moreover “every man has
110
Quasten, Patrology, vol. 1, p. 40.
111
Wayne A. Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1993, p. 5.
112
113
26
need of redemption and is capable of redemption.” 114 The human person is redeemed
through his or her sharing in the glory of God. The human person is the imago Dei115 by
creation and the similitudo Dei116 by divine condescension. “The redemption of the
individual is effected by the Church and her sacraments in the name of Christ …. The
sacrament is the climax of the recapitulation of creation in Christ.” 117
Another Apologist worthy of note was Aristides of Athens who asserted that
Christians had superior moral standards. To be noted too was Athenagoras of Athens
who was “unquestionably the most eloquent of the early Christian Apologists.” 118 He
was all praise for virginity, taught that marriage was indissoluble even after death and
that marriage was “only for the purpose of having children.” 119 He also condemned
abortion in the strongest terms. An important work of an anonymous Apologist is The
Epistle to Diognetus. It “depicts in glowing terms the superiority of Christianity over the
foolish idolatry of the pagans and over the external formalism of the worship of the
Jews.”120
3. THE CATECHETICAL SCHOOL OF ALEXANDRIA IN EGYPT
“The School of Alexandria is the oldest centre of sacred science in the history of
Christianity.”121 It was founded around the year 180 C.E. for the holistic preparation of
catechumens. It taught not only the Christian religion but the arts and the sciences as
well. It was steeped in Greek philosophy for which its directors showed genuine
affection. The Catechetical School of Alexandria found Greek philosophy particularly
helpful in the exposition and understanding of the Christian faith. It showed great
fondness for the allegorical method, 122 especially in the interpretation of Sacred
Scripture.
“The first known rector of the school of Alexandria was Pantaenus (died ca. 200
C.E.). He was a Sicilian and became a convert to the Christian religion after having been
a Stoic philosopher.”123 He was ably succeeded by Titus Flavius Clemens or St. Clement
of Alexandria (ca. 150 – 211/216 C.E.). He “was born of pagan parents, probably at
Athens about the year 150 C.E. After becoming a Christian he journeyed to Italy, Syria,
and Palestine, seeking Christian teachers for his own instruction. Finally he met the
celebrated Pantaenus in Alexandria, and was so attracted to the master that he settled
there and became, in order, Pantaenus’ pupil, associate, assistant, and finally succeeded
114
115
Image of God.
116
Likeness of God.
117
118
119
120
121
Johannes Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2: The Beginnings of Patristic Literature – The Ante-Nicene
Literature after Irenaeus, Westminster, Maryland, Christian Classics, Inc., 1984, p. 2.
122
Cf. Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2, p. 3.
123
27
him as director of the school of catechumens, attaining the latter position about the year
200 C.E. Two or three years later he was forced by the persecution under Septimius
Severus (emperor 193-211 C.E.) to flee from Egypt. He died in Cappadocia between the
years 211 and 216 C.E., without ever having seen Egypt again.”124
St. Clement’s most important writings comprised a trilogy: Protreptikos

(Exhortation to the Greeks);125 Paidagogos (The Tutor/The Instructor of Children); 126 Stromateis
(Carpets/Miscellanies).127 The Protreptikos “is an address aiming at conversion. Its purpose
is to convince the worshippers of the gods of the folly and worthlessness of pagan
beliefs, to point out the shameless features of obscure mysteries and to induce them to
accept the only true religion, the teaching of the Logos of the world, who after being
announced by the prophets, has appeared in Christ.” 128 The Paidagogos presents the
Logos “as tutor in order to instruct these converts how to conduct their lives.” 129 The
Stromateis discusses “most varied questions without strict order or plan and pass from
one problem to another without systematic treatment, the different topics being woven
together like colors in a carpet.” 130 In this trilogy St. Clement emphasizes the role of
Greek philosophy as a preparation “for the acceptance of the faith.” 131 Greek philosophy
contains the “germs of divine truth” 132 – hoi logoi spermatikoi. Nonetheless “philosophy
can never take the place of revelation.”133
Of special relevance to the study of the history of moral theology is Clement’s

teaching on sin and penance. “According to Clement the sin of Adam consisted in his
refusal to be educated by God and has been inherited by all human beings not through
generation but through the bad example given by the first man …. Clement is
convinced that only a personal act can stain the soul.” 134 Regarding penance Clement
states that there “should be only one penance in the life of the Christian, that preceding
baptism, but that God, out of mercy for human weakness, has granted a second which
can be obtained only once.”135
It would also be interesting to deal with Clement’s teaching on marriage and

virginity. “Clement defends marriage against all attempts of the Gnostic sects to
discredit and reject it. He not only recommends marriage for moral reasons, he goes so
far as to regard it a duty for the welfare of the country, for the succession of children
and for the perfection of the world …. The purpose of marriage is the procreation of
124
William A. Jurgens, The Faith of the Early Fathers, vol. 1, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1970, p. 176.
125
Cf. Jurgens, The Faith of the Early Fathers, vol. 1, pp. 176-177.
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
28
children which … is an act of cooperation with the Creator …. (But) Clement puts
marriage higher than a sexual union; it is a spiritual and religious union between
husband and wife …. Even death does not dissolve this union completely and for this
reason Clement is against any second marriage …. (However Clement) is convinced
that he who remains single in order not to be separated from the service of the Lord will
gain a heavenly glory. But when he compares matrimony and virginity he regards the
married man as superior to the single.”136
“The school of Alexandria reached its greatest importance under Clement’s

successor, Origen (ca. 185 – 253 C.E.), the outstanding teacher and scholar of the early
Church, a man of spotless character, encyclopaedic learning, and one of the most
original thinkers the world has ever seen.” 137 “He was born … most probably at
Alexandria,”138 the son of a Christian family. His father was Leonidas, a martyr in the
persecution of Septimius Severus. Bishop Demetrius of Alexandria made Origen
director of the Catechetical School while he was still 18 years of age. 139 About the year
202, Origen “emasculated himself, taking Matthew 19,12 in a too literal sense.” 140 He
acquired great fame; he was even invited by the Empress Mother, Julia Mamaea, to
Antioch so that she may hear him. “When Caracalla (emperor 211-217 C.E.) looted the
city of Alexandria, closed the schools and persecuted the teachers, Origen decided to go
to Palestine, about the year 216. The bishops of Caesarea, Jerusalem and other
Palestinian cities asked him to deliver some sermons and to explain Scripture to their
communities, which he did, although not a priest. His own superior Demetrius at
Alexandria objected and blamed the Palestinian hierarchy for permitting a layman to
preach in the presence of bishops …. Origin obeyed his superior’s strict orders to return
to Alexandria at once. However, in order to avoid such difficulties for the future, Bishop
Alexander of Jerusalem and Theoctistus of Caesarea ordained Origen, when, fifteen
years later, he passed through Caesarea on his way to Greece, where his bishop had
sent him in order to refute heretics. This but made the situation worse, because
Demetrius now took the view that according to canonical legislation, Origen could not
be admitted to the priesthood since he had castrated himself.”141
According to Eusebius of Caesarea, the father of church history, Bishop

Demetrius originally did not mind the castration incident. “He (Demetrius) was amazed
at Origen’s headstrong act, but approving his enthusiasm and the genuineness of his
faith he told him not to worry, and urged him to devote himself more keenly than ever
to the work of instruction. That was the line he took at the time, but when a little later
the same worthy saw him (Origen) prosperous, great, eminent, and universally
esteemed, he yielded to human weakness and wrote to the bishops throughout the
136
Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2, pp. 34-35.
137
138
139
Cf. Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2, p. 37.
140
141
29
world in an attempt to make Origen’s action appear outrageous ….” 142 “Demetrius
called a synod, which excommunicated Origen from the Church of Alexandria. A
second synod in the year 231 deprived him of the priesthood. After Demetrius death
(232) he returned to Alexandria but his successor Heraclas, Origen’s former assistant,
repeated the excommunication.”143 Origen re-established himself at Caesarea. In the
year 250 he was imprisoned during the persecution of Decius (emperor 249-251 C.E.).
But with the sudden death of Decius, the persecution ceased and Origen was released
but broken down physically by the tortures he experienced. “He died at Tyre in C.E. 253
at the age of sixty-nine,”144 not a martyr – his lifelong desire. Because he did not die a
martyr’s death, some of Origen’s novel and controversial ideas were posthumously
condemned. Thus many of his works were simply lost to posterity.
Origen most important work for the history of moral theology was his Peri
Archon (On the First Principles). “The work consists of four books, the content of which
could be summarized under the headings: God, World, Freedom, Revelation.” 145 In the
third book he expounded the role of the free will and of moral responsibility in human
life. He thus provided the first systematic outline of moral theology. Moreover “Origen
testifies to original sin and infant baptism. Every human being is born in sin and for this
reason it is apostolic tradition to baptize the newly born.” 146 In this connection “Origen
stresses on different occasions that strictly speaking there is only one forgiveness of
sins, that of baptism, because the Christian religion gives the power and grace to
overcome sinful passions.”147 But “the Church has never claimed to be an actual sinless
community of saints …. Without any doubt, Origen fully appreciates the power, the
efficacy and the fundamental importance of baptism as the basis of the whole of the
spiritual life …. But he knows much more than any of the theologians before him that,
more often than not, when baptism is mentioned in the sense just outlined, it is a matter
of what it should be, rather than of what it in fact is …. A relapse after baptism is,
therefore, only to be expected, without God’s mercy.”148 “However there are a number
of means to obtain remission … of sins committed after baptism.” 149 Origen lists the
following:
 “Martyrdom,
 “Almsgiving,
 “Forgiving those who trespass against us,
 “Conversion of a sinner,
 “Charity, and finally
142
Eusebius, The History of the Church, 6,8, trans. G. A. Williamson, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd.,
1965, p. 247.
143
144
145
146
147
148
Karl Rahner, SJ, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Church, trans. Lionel Swain,
London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983, pp. 250-251.
149
30
 “Dura et laboriosa per poenitentiam remissio peccatorum”150 – the sacrament of
penance.
4. THE NORTH AFRICAN LATIN FATHERS
The contributions of Tertullian and of St. Cyprian of Carthage to the

development of moral theology focused more on the sacrament of penance. Quintus
Septimius Florens Tertullianus (ca. 155 – ca. 220 C.E.) was born of pagan parents and
became a well-known lawyer in Rome. “After his conversion about 193, he settled in
Carthage, and enlisted at once all his knowledge of law, literature, and philosophy on
the side of the Christian faith …. About 207 he openly went over to the Montanists and
became the head of a special sect within them, the so-called Tertullianists ….” 151
Tertullian’s fanatical passion for truth and his uncompromising attitude led him to
excesses, especially in matters of penance. His thoughts are contained in two main
works: De Paenitentia (On Penance – Catholic period) and De Pudicitia (On Chastity –
Montanist period). The former claims that all serious sins must be subjected to the
sacrament of penance. The latter asserts that some sins must be excluded form the
discipline of penance since they cannot be forgiven by the Church. Tertullian’s legalistic
approach to morality left very little room for the activity of conscience.
St. Cyprian of Carthage (200/210 – 258 C.E.) was a great admirer of Tertullian
but possessed a personality totally different from him. Caecilius Thascius Cyprianus
“was born between 200 and 210 in Africa, most probably at Carthage, in a rich and
highly cultivated pagan family …. Disgusted with the immorality of public and private
life, with the corruption in government and administration, his soul, touched by grace,
sought something higher …. Shortly after his conversion he was raised to the
priesthood and in C.E. 248 or the beginning of C.E. 249 he was elected bishop of
Carthage ….”152 He sought a safe place of refuge during the Decian 153 persecution. But
during the Valerian154 persecution he was beheaded on 14 September 258, the first
bishop-martyr of Africa. His major contribution to the development of moral theology
was his teaching on the sacramental nature of church penance. He elaborated on the
penitential liturgy as consisting of three stages:
 The performance of penance,

 The exhomologesis, and
 The reconciliation by the imposition of hands.155
He did not develop a structure for fundamental moral theology because his teachings were
mainly in response to concrete pastoral problems.
150
Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2, p. 84. The hard and laborious remission of sins through penance.
151
Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2, pp. 246-247.
152
153
Decius was Roman emperor from 249-251 C.E.
154
Valerian was Roman emperor from 253-258 C.E.
155
Cf. Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Church, pp. 152-171.
31
5. THE RELEVANT GREEK FATHERS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY
The fourth century is the golden age of patristic moral theology. Three important
facts characterize this period from the theological point of view:
 First, the progressive Christianization of the Roman Empire;

 Second, the flourishing, after the era of the persecutions, of monasticism as the
model of Christian life;
 Third, the appearance in both the Greek East and the Latin West of strong
personalities that directed the life of the Church.156
St. Anthony (ca. 250-356 C.E.), the great hermit and father of monasticism, who
life was written by St. Athanasius (ca. 295 – 2 May 373), 157 embodied the ideals of
Christian moral life. In fact, all the Fathers of the Church of this period entered
monasticism for sometime in their lives, if not for their entire lives. Outstanding among
these men were the Cappadocians, St. Gregory of Nazianzus (ca. 330 – 389/390) and
especially the brothers St. Basil the Great (ca. 330 – 1 January 379) and St. Gregory of
Nyssa (ca. 335 – ca. 394). Noteworthy too was St. John Chrysostom (344/354 – 14
September 407).
St. Basil the Great truly merited the title great due to “his outstanding
qualifications as an ecclesiastical statesman and organizer, and as a great exponent of
Christian doctrine and as a second Athanasius in the defense of orthodoxy, as the father
of oriental monasticism and reformer of the liturgy.” 158 St. Basil was “above all a man of
action, preoccupied with the practical aspect, with the moral dimension of the Gospel
message, making him different from the other Greek Fathers who were more interested
with the metaphysical dimension. In his two Monastic Rules, Detailed Rules (Regulae
fusius tractatae) and Short Rules (Regulae brevius tractatae), Basil describes the general
Christian duties, exhorts the people to an ascetical way of life, and lays down the basis
of oriental monastic legislation in answer to the practical questions of the monks. In his
Exhortation to Youths as to How They shall Best Profit by the Writings of the Pagan Authors,
he resolves the question of the relationship between classical Greek literature and
Christianity, harmonizing the Hellenistic moral ideal with his teaching on virtue
together with the idea of divine grace as a gift of God. In his Commentaries on Sacred
Scripture, above all on the Psalms, he proposes the laws of Christian life, insisting on
humility and fasting, and doing away with such vices as anger, avarice and
156
Cf. Louis Vereecke, CSsR, Storia della teologia morale, in Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale,
Francesco Compagnoni, Giannino Piana, Salvatore Privitera, eds., Milan, Edizioni Paoline, 1990, p. 1317, unofficial
translation.
157
We shall not deal at length with St. Athanasius, the great Bishop of Alexandria, Father and Doctor of the
Church, the intrepid promoter of the teachings of the Council of Nicaea, the champion of the Divinity of Jesus
Christ. Our reason is that he has indeed done much in the history of dogma, but not really in the history of moral
theology.
158
Johannes Quasten, Patrology, vol. 3: The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature – From the Council
of Nicea to the Council of Chalcedon, Westminster, Maryland, Christian Classics, Inc., 1984, p. 204.
32
drunkenness. St. Basil excels particularly in his social teachings. In a world in which the
rich become richer and the poor always poorer, he reminds the people of the duty of
almsgiving. He says that the rich are not the owners of their riches but only their
administrators for the sake of the poor, he himself would organize works of charity for
the miserable of society.”159
St. Gregory of Nyssa “was neither an outstanding administrator and monastic

legislator like Basil, nor an attractive preacher and poet like Gregory of Nazianzus. But
as a speculative theologian and mystic he is certainly the most gifted of the three
Cappadocians.”160 “The basis of his moral teaching is the concept of the human person
as the image of God. Consequently to live morally means to move always towards the
realization in oneself of this image according to the various conditions of life. He insists
on love for the poor and on almsgiving, while condemning usury as a social
calamity.”161
St. John Chrysostom is the greatest exponent of the Exegetical School of Antioch.
This school, founded by Lucian (+312), “laid great stress on a literal rendering of the
biblical text and a historical and grammatical study of its sense.” 162 Chrysostom, the
great patriarch of Constantinople, laid the foundation of his moral teachings on his
expounding of Stoic and Platonic doctrines within the Christian context. “He is first and
foremost a moralist whose aim is to foster the moral uprightness of his listeners. His
preferred moral themes are the vices and the virtues. He puts the love of God and
neighbour at the forefront, assigning at the same time a special place to friendship. He
condemns such vices as vanity, luxuriousness and pleasure-seeking and warns people
against going to the circus and the theatre since these are veritable occasions of sin. In
fact he calls them assemblies of Satan. Moreover no one has spoken as John Chrysostom
for the promotion of justice and the duty of almsgiving.” 163 He speaks of the priesthood
as a most precious treasure and of marriage as rooted both in mutual love and in the
divine love.164
6. THE RELEVANT LATIN FATHERS – DOCTORS OF THE CHURCH
For the history of moral theology in ancient Christianity, two Latin Fathers – who
are also Doctors of the Church – are truly noteworthy: St. Ambrose of Milan (339-397
C.E.) and his renowned disciple St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.).
159
Cf. Vereecke, Storia della teologia morale, in Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, p. 1318, unofficial
translation.
160
161
trabnslation.
162
163
translation.
164
translation.
33
“Ambrose was born at Trier while his father, also named Ambrose, was
administering the Prefecture of Gaul …. After the premature death of his father,
Ambrose arrived together with his mother and two brothers at Rome, where he was
certainly in residence prior to Christmas of 353 when his sister, Marcellina, was veiled
as a virgin by Pope Liberius in the Basilica of St. Peter. No particular information is
available regarding the adolescence of Ambrose. It is known that he studied rhetoric
and was advanced to the position of a lawyer, in which capacity he was employed in
368 in the Prefecture of Sirmium. Towards 370 he was nominated consularis Liguriae et
Aemiliae with his residence at Milan. The most explicit testimony to the impartial
wisdom of his administration is provided by the events following the death of the Arian
bishop, Auxentius. Vigorous conflicts had arisen between the Catholics and the Arians
regarding the election of a successor, and when Ambrose intervened to exercise his
responsibility as consularis and restore the peace, he was acclaimed as bishop as much
by the Catholics as by the Arians, although he was only a catechumen at the time. He
was baptized and a week later was consecrated bishop … (with) December 7, 374, as the
date of the Episcopal consecration ….”165
“In order to live up to his new responsibilities, Ambrose devoted himself, under
the direction of Simplicianus, to acquiring a profound knowledge of Sacred Scripture, of
the Greek Fathers and of Jewish and pagan writers such as Philo and Plotinus …. This
study, complemented by extended prayer on the Word of God, was to become the
source of Ambrose’s pastoral activity and preaching.” 166 St. Ambrose’s greatest
contribution to moral theology was his De Officiis Ministrorum (On the Duties of
Ministers). “The dating of this work poses notable difficulties and embraces a span of
time extending from 377 … until 391 ….” 167 “Ambrose has followed his Ciceronian
model in the title, the division into three books, and in the formal content of the work: I.
on that which is virtuous, II. on that which is practical, III. on the opposition between
that which is virtuous and that which is practical.” 168
“This composition, which is dedicated especially to the clergy but perhaps also to
all the faithful, diverges substantially from its exemplar by demonstrating the radical
difference between Stoic morality, which has its point of reference in man, and
Christian morality, which has its point of reference in God. This difference is explained
by Ambrose not so much by means of examples drawn from the Bible in place of the
pagan Greek and Roman examples used by Cicero as by means of the eschatological
orientation which dominates the entire work.” 169 This work is considered in the history
of moral theology as the first systematic exposition of Christian morality. 170
165
Maria Grazia Mara, Ambrose of Milan, Ambrosiaster and Nicetas, in Patrology, vol. 4: The Golden Age
of Latin Patristic Literature – From the Council of Nicea to the Council of Chalcedon, ed. Angelo di Berardino,
trans. Rev. Placid Solari, OSB, Westminster, Maryland, Christian Classics, Inc., 1986, pp. 144-145.
166
Mara, Ambrose of Milan, Ambrosiaster and Nicetas, in Patrology, vol. 4, p. 145.
167
168
169
170
Cf. Vereecke, Storia della teologia morale, in Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, p. 1319.
34
“While returning from Pavia in February of 397, on one of his trips necessitated
by his attendance at an episcopal election, Ambrose fell ill. He died at Milan on April 4,
397.”171
The life of St. Augustine of Hippo can be divided into three distinct periods:
1. From birth to conversion (354-386);

2. From conversion to episcopate (386-396);
3. From episcopate to death (396-430).172
“Augustine was born on November 13, 354, the son – perhaps the eldest – of a
municipal counselor and small property holder at Thagaste in Numidia. If, as seems
probable, he was African by race as well as by birth, he was nevertheless Roman by
language, culture and persuasion. He studied at Thagaste, at Madaura and, with the aid
of his fellow-citizen Romanianus, also at Carthage. Augustine taught grammar at
Thagaste (374), and rhetoric at Carthage (375-383), Rome (384) and at Milan (fall 384-
summer 386), in this latter city as an official professor. He had a profound knowledge of
the Latin language and culture, but was not proficient in Greek and did not know
Punic.
“Having received a Christian education from his very pious mother, Monica,
Augustine always remained a Christian at heart, even when, aged 19, he abandoned the
Catholic faith.
“Augustine’s long and tormented interior evolution (373-386) began with his
reading of Cicero’s Hortensius, which stirred his enthusiasm for wisdom, but tinged his
thought with rationalism and naturalism. Shortly thereafter, having read the Scriptures
without profit, he encountered, listened to and followed the Manichaeans. There were
three principal reasons for this development: the declared rationalism which excluded
the faith, the open profession of a pure and spiritual Christianity which excluded the
Old Testament, and the radical solution to the problem of evil offered by the
Manichaeans.”173 But his keen intellect found problems also with the doctrines of Mani,
which not even the Manichaean bishop, Faustus, could resolve. Thus Augustine “fell
into the temptation of skepticism.”174
“The Platonists helped Augustine resolve two major philosophical problems:

materialism and the nature of evil. He learned to overcome the first of these … by
discovering within himself the intelligible light of the truth. He resolved the second by
coming to the notion of evil as a defect or privation of good. There remained, however,
171
172
Cf. Agostino Trape, Saint Augustine, in Patrology, vol. 4: The Golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature –
From the Council of Nicea to the Council of Chalcedon, ed. Angelo di Berardino, trans. Rev. Placid Solari, OSB,
Westminster, Maryland, Christian Classics, Inc., 1986, pp. 345-350.
173
Trape, Saint Augustine, in Patrology, vol. 4, pp. 345-346.
174
Trape, Saint Augustine, in Patrology, vol. 4, p. 346.
35
the theological problem of mediation and grace. In order to resolve this he turned to
Saint Paul, from whom he grasped that Christ is not only Teacher but also Redeemer.
When he had thus overcome the final error, naturalism, his return to Catholic faith was
complete.
“However, at this point there appeared, or better, reappeared, another problem:

namely, the choice of the way to live the Christian ideal of wisdom and the question of
whether it was necessary to renounce for this every earthly hope, including a career and
marriage. The giving up of his career, even though it promised to be a brilliant one (he
was being considered for the presidency of a tribunal or of a province) was not difficult.
The giving up of marriage cost him dearly. At age seventeen in order to place some
check on the passions of adolescence and to remain in vogue with the popular society
…, Augustine had begun to live with a woman by whom he had a son (who died
between 389 and 391) and to whom he had always remained faithful.” 175 The decisive
moment came in the summer of 386.
Augustine himself narrates this significant event in his Confessions. “But when
deep reflection had dredged out of the secret recesses of my soul all my misery and
heaped it up in full view of my heart, there arose a mighty storm, bringing with it a
mighty down pour of tears …. And lo, I heard from a nearby house, a voice like that of
a boy or a girl, I know not which, chanting and repeating over and over, Take up and
read. (Tolle, lege.) Take up and read …. So I hurried back to the spot where Alypius was
sitting, for I had put there the volume of the apostle when I got up and left him. I
snatched it up, opened it, and read in silence the chapter on which my eyes first fell:
‘Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in strife and
envying; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its
concupiscences.’176 No further wished I to read, nor was there need to do so. Instantly,
in truth, at the end of this sentence, as if before a peaceful light streaming into my heart,
all the dark shadows of doubt fled away.” 177 At the Lent of 387 Augustine “enrolled
himself among the catechumens, followed the catechetical instructions of Ambrose and,
together with his friend Alypius and his son Adeodatus, was baptized by him at the
Easter Vigil during the night of April 24-25, 387.”178
St. Augustine’s theology is basically Platonic in orientation. Moreover his

writings were in answer to any of these three heresies:
1. Manichaeism (from Mani) advocated a dualistic approach to reality in answer to

the problem of evil in the world. Everything material was evil whereas
everything spiritual was good.
175
176
Rm 13,13-14.
177
The Confessions of St. Augustine, 8,12,28&29, trans. John K. Ryan, New York, Image Books, 1960,
pp.210-202.
178
Trape, Saint Augustine, in Patrology, vol. 4, pp. 348-349.
36
2. Pelagianism (from Pelagius) put to doubt the doctrine of original sin. There was
no corruption of human nature. The sin of Adam was some kind of bad example,
whereas the redemptive action of Christ was at the level of a good example. Sin
consisted in following the bad example of Adam; virtuous action was a following
of the good example of Christ.
3. Donatism (from Donatus) dealt with sacramental validity and efficacy. Donatus
made the validity and efficacy of the sacraments dependent on the personal
dispositions of the minister. A minister in the state of sin could not administer a
valid sacrament and his sacramental action had no effect on the recipient.
St. Augustine insisted on the goodness not only of the spirit but of matter as well
since both spirit and matter have been created by the one and only God. Evil does not
exist in itself; it is but the deprivation or absence of good. “Evil is not a substance … but
is the defect, the corruption, the deprivation either of moderation, or of beauty or of the
natural order. Evil thus cannot exist except in the good; not in the supreme Good which
is incorruptible, but in the mutable good which is created from nothing.” 179 He
explained that original sin really brought about the corruption of human nature that
necessitated the regeneration wrought by Christ. There is really the need for grace, “a
free gift of divine benevolence,” 180 so as to rectify the effects of original sin. St.
Augustine claims: “The remission of sins is total and full …. All sins are forgiven, none
excluded … and man is restored to innocence …. Interior renewal, on the other hand, is
progressive and is never perfect except in the resurrection when, once baptism has fully
borne fruit, mortality and sickness will cease ….” 181 St. Augustine also taught that the
sacraments are acts of God and are thus independent of the personal dispositions of the
ministers. Sacraments bestow grace because of their divine source. Thus the sinfulness
of the minister cannot invalidate a sacrament nor render it ineffective.
“Augustine defines theology as the science which generates, nourishes, defends

and fortifies faith.”182 But he does not give primacy to faith but to love. “Man has his
beatitude (happiness) from the same source from which he has the strength of being
and the light of knowing, i.e., from God and this beatitude cannot be anything other
than God Himself.”183 Happiness is “the joy of the truth.” 184 A person “is not able to be
happy who either does not have what he loves, whatever it may be; or who has what he
loves but loves what is harmful; or who does not love what he has, even though it be
extremely good. However, he alone is happy who has everything he wants and who
wants nothing evil ….”185 “Augustine reduces the virtues to the ordo amoris (order of
love), a love directed to a life which conforms to the very order of things ….” 186 “He
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
37
formulates the doctrine of frui (to enjoy) and uti (to use) and distinguishes, on the one
hand, those things which render a person happy and which must be loved in
themselves as the end to which one tends and in which one takes delight, and, on the
other hand, those things which are only the means to this end which must be used as
such. It follows that moral disorder consists completely in inverting the order of things
…. It is on this basis that the famous Augustinian aphorism, ‘Love, and do what you
will’ (Dilige, et fac quod vis), must be understood ….”187 Only authentic love leads to
happiness and authentic love respects the right order of things – no inversion of ends
and means; we should enjoy (frui) ends and use (uti) means; we should not use ends
and instead enjoy means as if they were the ends of our lives.
B. MORAL THEOLOGY IN MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY
We can divide our exposition of the medieval history of moral theology into two
parts. The early history of moral theology in medieval Christianity is practically
identical with the evolution of the Sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation. There are
two fundamental traditions in this evolution – the Mediterranean penitential tradition
and the Celtic penitential tradition. Ladislas Orsy, SJ, is a good source of this early
medieval history of moral theology.188 The moral theology in later medieval Christianity
was characterized by the growth of various schools of thought, culminating in the
Schoolmen of the European universities.
1. MORAL THEOLOGY IN EARLY MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY
“In the first five centuries, the particular churches around the Mediterranean
developed structures through which forgiveness was granted by the bishop in the midst
of the community. Such structures were modeled after the ancient procedure, used by
the Jews, of excluding a sinner from the synagogue and admitting him again when he
repented. Although Christian practices differed from one place to another, by the fourth
or fifth century a fairly uniform pattern had developed. It was followed, also, by the
new churches on the continent of Europe.
“An important clue to the understanding of this Mediterranean rite of granting

forgiveness is found in the rule that, to be a penitent, the sinner had to be admitted into
the order of penitents. When this happened, he was marked for life: once a penitent,
always a penitent. He became subject to a special and severe discipline.
“He could be received into this penitential way of life by the bishop, and by him
alone. From the moment he was accepted, he contracted ecclesial and civil disabilities.
He was barred for life from clerical service. In many churches, he was forbidden to
187
188
Ladislas Orsy, SJ, The Evolving Church and the Sacrament of Penance, Denville, NJ, Dimension Books,
1978.
38
marry or, if he was married, he was enjoined not to use his marital rights. In the civil
society, access to public and honorable offices was closed to him.189
“After admission into the order of penitents, the repentant sinner had to
complete the satisfaction imposed on him by the bishop.” 190 This normally lasted for
several years and consisted in “prayer, fasting, almsgiving and other good deeds.” 191
Satisfaction also included “wearing penitential garb, abstaining from baths, renouncing
pleasures, carrying out vigils, sleeping on a hard bed ….” 192 These penitential acts were
not meant to be merely punitive; they had a symbolic and therapeutic value. These acts
manifested their spiritual state and should have helped them to come to healing:
“sackcloth made of goat hair, to symbolize their separation from the sheep of Christ’s
flock; chains, to signify their bondage to sin; rags, to dramatize their poverty of virtue.
Some had to cut their hair short like slaves, to show that they were slaves to Satan;
others had to sprinkle themselves with ashes, to show they were spiritually dead like
Adam, and cast out from the paradise of the church. Penances usually included …
eating and sleeping less, to lessen the penitents’ attachment to the things of this world;
contributing alms to the poor, to purge them of the desire for wealth; refraining from
marital relations, to purify them of the passions of the flesh; renouncing involvement in
business or politics, to remove them from obvious temptations to sin again. And of
course as public sinners they were not allowed to share in the communion of saints, that
is, the eucharist.”193
“In Asia Minor and other places in the east there were four grades in the order of
penitents:
1. “weepers had to remain outside the church and implore the prayers of the
faithful;
2. “hearers could stay at the back of the church, but only for the liturgy of the
word;
3. “kneelers could come further into the church and receive the bishop’s blessing
before being dismissed with the catechumens;
4. “standers could remain for the entire liturgy but could not receive communion
until they were restored to the status of communicant.”194
“Here a question naturally arises: for what kind of sins was someone condemned
to do such drastic penance? There was no uniform answer. In many churches, especially
in the larger ones, lists evolved containing sins for which the bishop could admit
someone into the order of penitents. The lists were of different lengths. All of them
189
Cf. Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Church, p. 207.
190
Orsy, The Evolving Church and the Sacrament of Penance, pp. 31-32.
191
Orsy, The Evolving Church and the Sacrament of Penance, p. 32.
192
Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Church, p. 153.
193
Joseph Martos, Doors to the Sacred: A Historical Introduction to Sacraments in the Catholic Church,
New York, Doubleday, 1982, p. 325.
194
Martos, Doors to the Sacred, pp. 325-326.
39
contained major offenses, such as apostasy from the faith, 195 murder and adultery,196 but
none of them stopped there.”197
A point of interest is the value of the “so-called libelli of the martyr-confessors.”198

These martyr-confessors were holy men and women who had already confessed their
Christian faith and had suffered severely for it, but were still awaiting execution. When
approached by the penitents, they used to give letters stating that the bearers were
already forgiven. Bishops normally accepted such libelli and immediately reconciled the
penitents concerned. The Council of Carthage of 251 decided not to honour anymore
such libelli due to the confusion they were creating in the enforcement of the penitential
discipline.199
A final point to consider in the Mediterranean penitential tradition is the issue of

recidivism. How did the early Church handle the case of those who relapsed into grave
sin after having been reconciled in the Sacrament of Penance? It seems that there was no
consensus on the matter. For some local churches, no reconciliation was given to the
recidivist until the time of his or her imminent death. 200 For other ecclesial communities,
no second reconciliation was possible; “a person who has once received church
reconciliation is not able to do so a second time.”201
The Celtic penitential tradition was very different from the Mediterranean. It
evolved in Ireland and the British Isles where, it seems, the public form of penitential
discipline was never practised.202 St. Patrick (385-461 C.E.) is reputed for the
establishment of the Church in Ireland along the lines of the Mediterranean local
churches, with its center at the primatial episcopal see of Armagh. But by the 6 th century
the Celtic church had become a monastic church. Its center was “no longer Armagh, but
the monastery at Iona; its towering spiritual leader (was) not the bishop, but the abbot
and in some instances the abbess; not a parish church provided for by a diocesan priest
but a monastery (became) the spiritual center for monk, nun, and, above all, lay people.
The reasons for this sudden and dramatic change are not all that clear, but certainly the
195
The Regional Council of Carthage of 251 C.E., headed by St. Cyprian of Carthage (200/210-258 C.E.),
clarified the issue of readmitting apostates to the Church and rendered the following decision:
 The libellatici (those who had only procured statements from Roman authorities that officially showed that
they were no longer Christians, documents which could be gained, at times, simply by paying a price) could
be reconciled, after adequate penance.
 The sacrificati (those who actually offered sacrifice either to the Roman emperor or to the Roman gods) and
the thurificati (those who offered only incense to the emperor or to the gods) could be reconciled only at the
time of death, provided they had done penance during their lifetime.
Cf. Kenan B. Osborne, OFM, Reconciliation & Justification: The Sacrament and its Theology, New York, Paulist
Press, 1990, p. 60.
196
These three grave offenses comprised the so-called triad of mortal sins.
197
198
Osborne, Reconciliation & Justification, p. 59.
199
Cf. Osborne, Reconciliation & Justification, pp. 59-60.
200
201
Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 15, p. 207.
202
40
fact that Ireland was almost totally rural, while episcopal churches were designed for
urban populations, (played) a not insignificant role.”203
“The spirituality of Celtic monasticism, however, has little rootage in Benedictine

monasticism; rather, one finds its rootage in early Egyptian and Syriac monasticism.
Again, the reasons for this connection are, to the historian, almost conjectural. Two
issues, bearing on the sacrament of reconciliation, are of prime importance. In both
Egyptian and Syriac monasticism, and in the Celtic monasticism, the idea that a monk
or nun (eventually a lay person as well) must have a spiritual director was self-
understood. A monk without a spiritual director is like a body without a head is a truism
which runs throughout the literature of this period. Secondly, it seems that early
Egyptian monasticism applied to the spiritual life a dynamism taken from early
Egyptian medicine and the care of the bodily life; namely, contrary cures contrary.
Someone in fever is cooled by the application of cold water; someone flushed with
blood is cured by leaching; etc. So, too, in the spiritual realm: someone given to
overindulgence in food or drink needs to fast and abstain; someone prone to laziness
ought to work more; someone tending to sleep too much should keep vigils; etc. These
two factors form the context for the Celtic church’s application of reconciliation.” 204
We can say therefore that the Celtic penitential tradition has the following
characteristics:
1. Rural in context,
2. Monastic in origin,
3. Egyptian and Syriac in orientation,
4. Private in manner,
5. Tariffed in the acts of satisfaction,
6. Repeatable in practice, and
7. Having no lasting consequences or permanent disabilities.
“There were no cities on the island (of Ireland) and so Christian life centered
around the monasteries. From them, the monks traveled out to the countryside bringing
baptism and the mass and preaching the forgiveness of sins. But the wild clansfolk did
not adjust easily to the moral norms of the new religion, and in their daily affairs they
continued to behave much as they had before being converted. To make matters worse,
the monasteries were few and far between, and the itinerant preachers could not always
be on hand to bring them the church’s assurance of forgiveness on their deathbed. To
remedy the situation the monks prescribed the same means they themselves used to
overcome their sins and make satisfaction for them during their lifetime: private,
repeated confession and continuous works of penitence. On one trip they would hear
the confessions of those who had seriously violated God’s or the church’s
commandments, and assign them their penance. On the next trip, or whenever the
203
204
41
penance was completed, they would pray with the penitents, asking for God’s merciful
pardon. Since there was no official excommunication or reconciliation with the church,
however, and since the monks were not bishops, the sign of forgiveness was a blessing
rather than an imposition of hands. To bring some measure of fairness and uniformity
to this widely scattered practice, the monks carried with them small books containing
lists of sins and the appropriate penances for each of them. For less serious sins they
recommended that the people confess their sins to each other and perform lesser works
of mortification, just as the monks were accustomed to doing.”205
The people felt the guilt of their own sinfulness. They thus had recourse to the
monasteries to obtain forgiveness. Originally the abbot would listen to the secret
confession of their sins, prescribe a fitting penance, and on their return, after the
completion of the prescribed satisfaction, bless them with the assurance of pardon. With
the spreading itinerant preaching of the monks and the growing number of penitents,
ordinary monks and even abbesses lent their assistance to the administration of the
sacrament of penance. After all, what was needed was the ability to impose an
appropriate penance. It is the performance of penance that obtained forgiveness of sins.
For the sake of the less able monks, penitential books were designed that gave rise to
tariff penance; a fitting act of satisfaction was prescribed for a particular sin in
accordance to the conditions of the penitent. It was all private – no order of penitents.
Penitents could go again and again to confess their sins, do the imposed penance, and
obtain forgiveness. There were no permanent disabilities.
“The two systems, the Mediterranean and the Irish, had common foundations:
both were built on the belief that pardon for sins can be obtained in the Christian
community through the ministry of bishops or priests. But, they displayed strong
differences as to whom, by whom, in what way, and how many times pardon could be
given. Sooner or later, the two systems were bound to come into conflict.
“They did when Irish priests crossed over to the European continent, as pilgrims
and missionaries, carrying in their minds their own understanding of the
administration of forgiveness, and in their bags their penitential books. The stage was
set for them: most Christians on the continent were already alienated from the use of
public penance. The Irish offered pardon to them in a new form with no public and
permanent humiliation attached to it. People responded positively …. But there was
some loss, too. The awareness of the social dimension of sin and repentance diminished
significantly. The emphasis was on the personal reconciliation of a Christian with his
Maker.”206
“Difference in understanding leads easily to external conflict. By the end of the

sixth century, there was indeed a difference in understanding of the ways a sinner
could obtain forgiveness in the Church …. It lasted for some five centuries, with
205
Martos, Doors to the Sacred, pp. 329-330.
206
42
varying intensity. The two systems were too different to coexist peacefully side by side.
Two conciliar texts, in clear contrast with each other, can be quoted to illustrate the
opposing minds and practices.
“One text is from the Third Council of Toledo held in 589. It was a particular, but
important, council. Sixty-two bishops participated; the recently converted king of the
Visigoths, Rekkared, was present also. There a number of Arian bishops were
reconciled, and the unity of the Church was restored. The king and the Fathers made
solemn profession of their faith according to the Councils of Nicea, Constantinople I
and Chalcedon. To safeguard the purity of faith, the Council issued twenty-three
doctrinal statements and another twenty-three disciplinary capitula. The eleventh is on
penance: ‘We have learned that, throughout some churches (parishes and/or dioceses)
of Spain, the faithful are doing penance not according to the canonical rule but in
another detestable way. That is, as many times as it pleases them to sin, they ask a
presbyter to grant them pardon. We want to put an end to such an abominable
presumption. (Therefore,) this sacred council orders that penances be given according
to the rite (procedure) prescribed by the ancient canons: that is, that the person who
repents of his evil deeds be excluded temporarily from Eucharistic communion and,
along with other penitents, ask often for the imposition of hands; and that, when he
time of his satisfaction is completed according to the judgment of the bishop, he be
readmitted to communion. Those who relapse into their sins, either while doing
penance or after they have been reconciled, must be condemned according to the
severity of the ancient canons ….’
“The other text is from a council held at Chalon-sur-Saone, in the province of

Lyons. In the middle of the seventh century (between 647 and 653), the bishops of the
western kingdoms of the Franks gathered there in synod. They professed their faith
according to the Nicean Creed and, as a fruit of their deliberations, they promulgated
twenty-seven disciplinary decrees. Canon 8 not only upheld the Irish penitential system
but positively recommended it, although in discreet terms: ‘We judge that penance for
sins is a medicine for the soul; it is good for all. All priests agree that once the penitent
has confessed his sins to the priest, he should be given his penance ….” 207
“Gradually, the tide turned in favor of the Irish system. The faithful abandoned
the practice of public penance; people flocked to those priests who gave them
absolution privately.”208
2. MORAL THEOLOGY IN LATER MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY
There was very little theologizing in early medieval Christianity due to the
confusion brought about by the barbarian invasions of the civilized nations around the
Mediterranean Sea. But with the peace brought about by the Carolingian period and the
207
208
43
domination of the Holy Roman Empire, theology began to flourish once more.
Charlemagne was especially keen on reform at all levels. In this difficult task he sought
the assistance of Alcuin (ca. 735 – 19 May 804), who extolled the monastic ideal,
although he never became a monk himself and as a secular cleric never went beyond
the diaconate.209 Alcuin brought some kind of synthesis (particularly through his De
Virtutibus et Vitiis) to the efforts at moral reform of two English monks, St. Bede the
Venerable (673-735) and St. Boniface/Winfrith (675-754). Other famous monk-
reformers were Bl. Rabanus Maurus (776/784 – 4 February 856), abbot of Fulda and
Archbishop of Mainz, with his De Puritate Cordis, and St. Paschasius Radbertus (ca. 785
– ca. 860), abbot of Corbie, with his De Fide, Spe et Caritate.210 It was obvious therefore
that the monastic spirit would dominate the desired reform movement in the moral
field.
St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033/1034-1109) inherited from his master, Lanfranco

(+1089), founder of the School of Bec in Normandy, a scientific method of doing
theology. Even if Anselm’s methodology was radically grounded in Sacred Scripture,
he nonetheless championed the use of reason. His goal was to make the mysteries of the
faith understandable even to the unbeliever (fides quaerens intellectum). In his De Veritate
he strived to solve the problem of the moral obligation. In his De Libertate Arbitrii he
dealt with the dynamics of the human act. His mastery of the prevalent philosophical
currents, particularly his good grasp of St. Augustine, made him come to the following
conclusion: Man is free to will, not in order to reach what he wants, but in order to will
what he should, and thus to want that which is for him the convenient thing to will or
for the sake of the rectitude of willing. 211 Therefore the human will is free but within the
framework of his or her destiny, that is, to will only that which is just. Opting for what
he or she should not choose, or choosing what is wrong or evil, is actually self-
destructive since it destroys the integrity of the will. Hence the will is the determining
element in morality.212
A truly significant moment during this later Medieval period was the foundation
of the Monastery of Cluny in Burgundy (909/910 C.E.). It was a unique foundation
because it enjoyed absolute freedom in the election of its abbot and it was exempted
from the jurisdiction of the local bishop, subject as it was to the Pope alone. 213 “The
spirit of the monastery was characterized by:
1. “Strict adherence to the Benedictine rule,

209
Cf. L. Wallach, Alcuin, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967, I:279-280.
210
Cf. Adrian Holderegger, Per una fondazione storica dell’etica, Corso di Morale, vol. 1: Vita Nuova in
Cristo – Morale fondamentale e generale, Tullo Goffi & Giannino Piana, eds., Brescia, Queriniana, 1983, p. 190.
N. M. Haring, Paschasus Radbertus, St., in New Catholic Encyclopedia, X:1050. M. F. McCarthy, Rabanus
Maurus, Bl., in New Catholic Encyclopedia, XII:37-39.
211
Cf. De Libertate Arbitrii, 3.
212
Cf. Holderegger, Per una fondazione storica dell’etica, Corso di Morale, vol. 1, p. 190.
213
“The episcopate was now so generally corrupted by the spirit of the world that to be subject to it was
often a direct menace to spiritual and temporal well-being.” Philip Hughes, A Short History of the Catholic Church,
8th ed., London, Burns & Oates, 1974, p. 81.
44
2. “Severe asceticism,
3. “Absolute obedience to the abbot, and
4. “Special attention to liturgical worship.”214
The reforming spirit of Cluny was aided by the fact that its first abbots proved to be
able and holy men, who enjoyed longevity of life. 215 A Cluniac monk worthy of special
mention was Peter the Venerable (1090 – 20 August 1153). He was the ninth abbot of
Cluny, from 22 August 1122 until his death. In a polemical age he was known for his
insistence on peace and reasonableness both in his official and in his personal
contacts.216 He stressed as the core of monastic spirituality and of Christian moral life
the process of lectio, meditatio, oratio seu contemplatio.217
The Cluniac Reform was further intensified by the Monastery of Citeaux,

founded in 1098. The greatest of the Cistercians, as the monks of Citeaux were called,
was St. Bernard (1090 – 20 August 1153 C.E.), founding abbot of the Monastery of
Clairvaux. Known as Doctor Mellifluus (Honey-sweet Doctor) for his persuasive
eloquence, he elaborated on the relationship of the human conscience and love. The
exaltation of conscience is in direct proportion to the gift of the self in love. Love calls
for communion with the beloved which brings about mutual trust. 218 His unique
contribution to moral theology was his emphasis on objective morality. For St. Bernard
observance of the law manifests true love. Any infraction of the divine law, no matter
how unintentional, is to some degree sinful. There cannot be any breaking of the law
without it being sinful.
The lay theologian, Peter Abelard (1079 – 21 April 1142) is reputed to be the first
modern man. Although he was very much part of the Middle Ages, he was truly
concerned with the problems of modern times. Focusing on the human conscience, he
stressed subjective morality. He took a position that was the exact opposite to that of St.
Bernard. Using dialectics to the utmost, he arrived at the discovery of the subject. This
discovery of the subject was a foreshadowing of the central preoccupation of
contemporary human beings. The morality of human activity is not based solely on the
object, which may be either good or bad in itself, but on the intention too or interior
consent of the subject. It is not the breaking of the law that constitutes sin in front of
God, but the intention of the human person to offend the Divine Lawgiver. It is the
214
August Franzen & John P. Dolan, A History of the Church, Freiburg, Herder, 1965, p. 175. Cf. also
Philip Hughes, A Short History of the Catholic Church, p. 82.
215
First Abbots of the Monastery of Cluny:
1. Bl. Berno, abbot from 909 to 13 January 927, 18 years.
2. St. Odo, abbot from 927 to 18 November 942, 15 years.
3. Bl. Aymard, abbot from 942 to 5 October 965, 23 years.
4. St. Majolus, abbot from 965 to 11 May 994, 29 years.
5. St. Odilo, abbot from 994 to 1 January 1049, 54 years.
6. St. Hugh, abbot from 1049 to 29 April 1109, 60 years.
216
Cf. P. Edwards, Peter the Venerable, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, XI:230.
217
Reading, Meditation, Prayer or Contemplation. Cf. Marie-Dominiqe Chenu, Il Risveglio della
Coscienza nella Civilta Medievale, Milan, Jaca Book, 1982, p. 388.
218
Cf. Chenu, Il Risveglio della Coscienza nella Civilta Medievale, p. 56.
45
human assent, and not the object of the act, that constitutes the criterion of morality.
The effect of a good intention can never be evil. The goodness of an act is measured by
the purity of intention on the part of the subject. Therefore moral good or evil depends
on the human intention.219
Known as Doctor Scholasticus,220 Peter Abelard “is renowned for his solution of
the problem of universals.”221 “… arriving in Paris, he studied under William of
Champeaux (1070-1122), head of the cathedral school of Notre Dame. Prior to William’s
arrival, Paris had been considered intellectually inferior to the Benedictine Abbey of Bec
and the cathedral schools of Laon and Chartres.” 222 He also sought theological training
from one of the best teachers of the 12 th century in the person of Anselm of Laon
(+1117). But he soon proved to be a critic of his own teachers. In trying to solve the
problem of the universals, Abelard forced William of Champeaux “to modify his
extreme realist position, according to which there is a separately existent reality
corresponding to each of the universal terms in one’s vocabulary.” 223 As for Anselm of
Laon, Abelard “found fault with (his) teaching methods.” 224 Peter Abelard truly
surpassed his masters in wisdom and influence.
“As a man, (Abelard) is known for his celebrated love affair with Heloise.” 225
After impregnating her, he married her secretly. But since this affair proved to be too
compromising for his lucrative teaching career, he forced her into the convent of Saint-
Argenteuil. Heloise’s uncle Fulbert, canon of Notre Dame, retaliated by hiring some
men who emasculated him. He subsequently entered the monastery of Saint-Denis, but
soon got himself into trouble by radically opposing St. Bernard. Using his immense
influence, St. Bernard had him condemned at the Council of Sens in 1141. “He appealed
to Pope Innocent II, oblivious of the fact that Bernard’s letters had closed all doors to
him. On the way to Rome, he was received at the monastery of Cluny by Peter the
Venerable, who persuaded him to abandon the struggle, attempt reconciliation with
Bernard, and accept a papal authorization to pass his remaining years under the
protection of Cluny.”226
A truly noteworthy man of this period was Peter Lombard (1105-1164). He wrote
what for several centuries was the standard textbook of theology – the Libri
Sententiarum IV (The Four Books of Sentences). It was a collection of sentences or
statements quoted from diverse authoritative sources and grouped according to the
following headings:
1. God;
219
Cf. Chenu, Il Risveglio della Coscienza nella Civilta Medievale, pp. 35-44.
220
Scholastic Doctor.
221
S. R. Smith, Abelard, Peter, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, I:15.
222
Smith, Abelard, Peter, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, I:15-16.
223
Smith, Abelard, Peter, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, I:16.
224
225
226
46
2. Creation;
3. Incarnation/Redemption;
4. Virtues/Sacraments/Eschatology.
His presentation of the theological and cardinal virtues introduced into Scholastic
theology the scheme of the virtues as the standard mode of treatment of moral
theology.227
The Golden Age of Medieval theology came with the flourishing of the European
Universities and the appearance of the Mendicant orders. There were two major schools
of thought: the Franciscan School and the Dominican School. The Franciscan School was
ably represented by Alexander of Hales (ca. 1180 – 21 August 1245 C.E.), called Doctor
Irrefragabilis,228 and by St. Bonaventure (1212 – 15 July 1274 C.E.), known as Doctor
Seraphicus.229 The Dominican School instead had St. Albert the Great (1206 – 15
November 1280 C.E.), called Doctor Universalis,230 and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 7
March 1274 C.E.), referred to in history as Doctor Angelicus or Doctor Communis,231 as the
foremost representatives. They all wrote commentaries on the Books of Sentences of Peter
Lombard and authored theological syntheses known as summas.
Alexander of Hales was already a master of theology at the University of Paris

prior to his entrance into the Franciscan Order in 1236. With William of Melitona and
John de la Rochelle he wrote the Summa fratris Alexandri. He is a follower of St.
Augustine. His major contributions to moral theology are the following:
1. Essential Will is some kind of permanent habit in the human person and not just
the capacity to choose (deliberative will). It is at the root of the medieval idea of
synderesis.
2. Natural Law is an essentially immanent and unchanging disposition present in

creation. The attainment of this intrinsic finality brings about moral perfection.
3. Grace is not just an inspiration. It is a habit, a disposition or an attitude that

informs, or essentially shapes, the soul.232
St. Bonaventure is known as the second founder of the Order of Friars Minor. He
was a pupil of Alexander of Hales and later became a doctor of theology at the
University of Paris.233 He is reputed for emphasizing the concept of imago Dei234 in moral
theology. His thoughts were basically Platonic. Self-fulfillment for the human person is
227
228
Irrefutable Doctor.
229
Seraphic Doctor.
230
Universal Doctor.
231
Angelic Doctor or Common Doctor.
232
Cf. Holderegger, Per una fondazione storica dell’etica, Corso di Morale, vol. 1, pp. 193-195.
233
He received his doctorate in October 1257, on the very same day as St. Thomas Aquinas.
234
Image of God.
47
possible only through the full realization of the idea of the image of God. This idea is
among the rationes aeternae or eternal sensible forms, that, for their part, are copies of the
principium primum (first principle) or causa efficiens (efficient cause) – the Triune God.
The moral task is to transcend the world of shadows and to reach the world of ideas,
that is, to move from the actual human condition towards the full realization of the
human self as image of God. This moral movement is possible only through the
operation of the grace of God in love. Through love the human being becomes true to
his or her nature as image of God.235
St. Albert the Great was primarily responsible for introducing Aristotle to the
European Universities and to Medieval Scholasticism. After studying theology in
Germany, he was appointed lecturer of theology at Hildesheim, Freiburg im Breisgau,
Regensburg and Strassburg. “Around 1241 he was sent to the University (of Paris) to
prepare for the mastership in theology. The intellectual climate of Paris … was vastly
different from his native Germany, for here he encountered the new Aristotle, recently
translated from Greek and Arabic, and the wealth of Arabic learning introduced from
Spain ….”236 Working initially on the commentaries of the Arabic philosophers,
Avicenna (980-1037 C.E.) and Averroes (1126-1198 C.E.),237 and of the Jewish rabbi,
Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 C.E.), Albertus Magnus sought to present the rightful
place of Aristotle in Christian thought. “‘Our intention,’ he said, ‘is to make all the
aforesaid parts of knowledge intelligible to the Latins.’ This vast project took about 20
years to complete and is one of the marvels of medieval scholarship.” 238 For him
Aristotelian thought could best clarify the moral ideas of human will, virtue and sin.
His crowning glory was the introduction of his pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas, to the world
of Aristotle, a move that radically altered the course of world learning.239
St. Thomas Aquinas reorganized, deepened and systematized the philosophical

heritage of Aristotle and the theological patrimony of St. Augustine. His monumental
yet unfinished work240 is his Summa Theologiae. The intention of St. Thomas Aquinas for
writing his summa was, ironically enough, for the instruction of beginners in the sacred
sciences.241 It has practically five parts:
235
236
J. A Weisheipl, Albert the Great, St.,in New Catholic Encyclopedia, I:254.
237
He is known in history as The Commentator.
238
Weisheipl, Albert the Great, St., in New Catholic Encyclopedia, I:255.
239
240
“On the feast of St.Nicholas (6 December 1273) … (St. Thomas Aquinas) was celebrating Mass when he
received a revelation which so affected him that he wrote and dictated no more, leaving his great work, the Summa
theologiae, unfinished. To Brother Reginald’s expostulations he replied, ‘The end of my labours is come. All that I
have written appears to be as so much straw after the things that have been revealed to me.’” Michael Walsh, ed.,
Butler’s Lives of the Saints, concise ed., Kent, Burns & Oates,1985, pp. 29-30.
241
The Prologue states: “Quia catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum
pertinet etiam incipientes erudire, secundum illud Apostoli I ad Corinth. 3, (1-2): ‘tanquam parvulis in Christo, lac
vobis potum dedi, non escam’; propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opera est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem
pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium.” The Catholic teacher should
instruct not just the advanced learners but the beginners as well, giving them milk and not solid food that maybe
hard to digest. St. Thomas’ summa was meant to be intellectual milk for the instruction of beginners.
48
1. Prima Pars (Ia): 119 questions on Sacred Theology, God, Creation, Man, Angels,
and Devils.
2. Secunda Pars (IIa): 189 questions on Moral Theology.
a. Prima Secundae (IaIIae/I-II): General Moral Theology.
b. Secunda Secundae (IIaIIae/II-II): Special Moral Theology.
3. Tertia Pars (IIIa): 90 questions on Jesus Christ, the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the
Sacraments, ending with the Sacrament of Penance.
4. Supplementum Tertiae Partis: 99 questions on the rest of the Sacraments and on
Eschatology.
5. Appendix ad Supplementum Tertiae Partis: 2 questions on Purgatory and on the
Punishment for Original Sin.242
The Supplement and its Appendix were written by Reginald, the Secretary of St.
Thomas Aquinas, after the master’s death on 7 March 1274 based on the notes and
manuscripts he has left behind. St. Thomas Aquinas was taken ill and died at the
Cistercian Abbey of Fossa Nuova near Terracina while he was on the way to the
Council of Lyons at the invitation of Pope Bl. Gregory X (1271-1276). 243 “He died before
he was 50 years old. Few men in history have been able to look back on so productive,
fruitful, and holy a life.”244
The Summa Theologiae follows the egressus-regressus (exitus-reditus) scheme of the

Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus 245(205-270 C.E.). God, the Uncreated One, moves out
(egressus/exitus) of himself by creating the world. The return (regressus/reditus) to God is
accomplished in his Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. Thomistic moral theology is part of the
return movement to God. It is not meant to be a list of duties nor an introduction to the
commandments. Rather Thomistic ethics is an exposition of the dynamics of human
behaviour that is oriented towards the last end of humanity – the beatific vision. The
ethical standard for St. Thomas Aquinas is virtue. The purpose of every human activity
is happiness. Unlike the voluntaristic orientation Franciscan moral theology – centered
on love, Thomistic moral theology is essentially rationalistic. The quest of the intellect
for the truth shows the participation of the human person in the divine essence and
directs the quest of the will for the good. It is right reason that determines good and
evil; what conforms to right reason is good, whereas what deviates from right reason is
bad.246
C. MORAL THEOLOGY IN MODERN CHRISTIANITY
242
Cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, Alba, Editiones Paulinae, 1962.
243
Cf. Walsh, ed., Butler’s Lives of the Saints, p. 30.
244
W. A. Wallace & J. A. Weisheipl, Thomas Aquinas, St., in New Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV:109.
245
Plotinus was a pupil of Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neoplatonism, who also taught Origen.
246
49
The modern age in moral theology was ushered in by the Franciscan Doctor
Subtilis,247 Bl. Ioannes Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-1308 C.E.). He created a system of
considerable complexity that tried to synthesize the teachings of St. Bonaventure and of
St. Thomas Aquinas. Duns Scotus took the basic ideas of Franciscan theology and
perfected them. He made the infinite love of God the point of departure of moral life
and of the whole of theology. This infinite love of God invites the human person to love
him in return and for himself alone. But the response of the human being to the love of
God must be made in absolute freedom. For an act to be good it must possess the
following qualities:
1. It must conform to right reason.

2. It must have all the necessary conditions required by its efficient cause, its object,
its end, its form, and the circumstances of time and place.
3. It should be the expression of a free act of the will in pursuit of the ultimate end.
4. It should be informed by love and be accepted by God.248
Duns Scotus taught the existence of a natural law written in the beings
themselves. Its compelling force does not come from the internal coherence of the law
but from the dictate of the divine will which expresses itself in revelation. The law is,
first and foremost, an act of the will; it is an imperative. Faithful to the Franciscan
tradition, he distinguished the precepts of the first tablet of the Commandments of God
from the precepts of the second tablet. The first tablet contains commandments which
are essentially and necessarily linked to God. These are clear manifestations of the
divine will and have to be observed at all costs. They are intimately connected to the
end. The second tablet proposes means that are useful for the attainment of the end.
God can do away with them if he so chooses in favour of others. Thus Duns Scotus
distinguishes the two dimension of the Divine Will:
1. The Will of God de potentia absoluta (God can will anything that is not contrary in
itself.)
2. The Will of God de potentia ordinata (God chooses from a numerous array of
possible orders one that he imposes on his creation.)
In this sense God is absolutely free and truly all-powerful. He is not subject to the
nature of any being and he transcends the nature of everything that exists. In fact, the
distinction between mortal sin and venial sin lies in the importance of the
commandment transgressed and not in the weight of the obligation imposed. 249
Scotist theology is a highly complex system. It is characterized by the following:
1. Rational concept of God;

2. Moderate Realism;
247
Subtle Doctor.
248
Cf. Vereecke, CSsR, Storia della teologia morale, Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, p. 1324.
249
Cf. Vereecke, CSsR, Storia della teologia morale, Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, pp. 1324-1325.
50
3. Moral Objectivity.
Although Duns Scotus strived to integrate Thomistic theology into his system, he still
showed his bias for the Franciscan school of thought. Thus he espoused the
voluntaristic approach to morality.250
Scotist thought had as its natural consequence the School of Nominalism

founded by the Franciscan William of Ockham (1288-1349 C.E.). If the will were
foremost, then decisions of the will are prior to the activity of the intellect. A name
(nomen) has no objective content; it is but a decision of the will. Thus the assigning of a
name can be an arbitrary activity. The use of a name is the result of convention or of the
common agreement of individuals; no process of intellectual abstraction is needed. The
same holds true for moral precepts. They are decisions of the will of the lawgiver, with
no basis at all on objective reality. The good is never permanent, based as it is on the
arbitrary decision of the will. Therefore what is good and right is determined by law,
which is the expression of the will of the lawgiver. Morality is essentially legalistic.
William of Ockham was excommunicated for his extreme views Pope John XXII (1316-
1334) in 1328 and was later expelled from the Franciscan Order in 1331. With William of
Ockham came a theological shift. The School of Realism advocated by St. Thomas
Aquinas was called the via antiqua or the old way that should already be discarded. The
preferred approach should be the via moderna, the modern way – the School of
Nominalism.251
The Nominalistic School led a couple of centuries later to the Protestant

Reformation. Martin Luther (1483-1546 C.E.) never rejected the Sacrament of Penance.
He actually kept three sacraments: Baptism, the Eucharist and Penance. 252 But he
advocated a different view of the Sacrament of Penance, appalled as he was with what
he deemed as its total absence of matter. The absence of sacramental matter meant “the
lack of a divinely instituted sign.” 253 “Luther’s criticism of the sacrament is theologically
in line of succession from the Franciscan school, and more particularly, from Duns
Scotus.”254 Martin Luther took over too many of the Nominalistic ideas of William of
Ockham.255 Luther claimed: “The forgiveness of sins does not result immediately from
absolution; absolution provokes a certain disposition which, through God’s promise,
calls forth forgiveness.”256
“St. Thomas Aquinas had very clearly laid down the three parts of penance as
essential to the sacrament:
250
251
252
Max Thurian, Confession, rev. ed., London, Mowbray, 1985, p. 25.
253
Thurian, Confession, p. 25.
254
255
Cf. Thurian, Confession, p. 24.
256
51
1. “The matter, as it were, (quasi materia) of the sacrament:
a. “Contrition of the heart – sorrow for having committed sin and determination
not to fall into it again;
b. “Spoken Confession – a complete avowal to one and the same priest of all the
sins one remembers;
c. “Satisfaction – acts of reparation proposed by the priest, mainly fasting,
prayer, and alms-giving.
2. “The form of the sacrament he held to consist in the words of absolution (Ego te
absolvo) pronounced by the priest, the minister of the sacrament.
3. “Its effect was the absolving of the sin.
“The Council of Florence, in 1439, in its decree concerning the Armenians, merely took
up once more the Thomist doctrine, which remains today the official belief of the
Roman Church.”257
Martin Luther viewed the Sacrament of Penance as a proclamation of the gospel

of divine compassion. Anyone able to arouse a terror-stricken conscience and faith in
the divine forgiveness can be a minister of the sacrament. Thus it is not the priestly
absolution but the dispositions of terror and of faith aroused in the sinner that calls for
the forgiveness of sins.258 Forgiveness is therefore a legal declaration of not guilty
anymore. If the sinner can bring about in his or her conscience terror and faith as the
result of listening to the Word of God, he or she becomes worthy of the divine verdict
that his or her “sins are forgiven.” 259 There is no real regeneration or healing; there is
only the assurance that God no longer considers the sinner guilty. No satisfaction is
needed or can ever be made since human beings can do nothing that can ever
compensate God for their sins. “This extreme position of the early Luther must be
viewed in the light of the controversy over the traffic in indulgences and absolution.” 260
The Catholic reaction to the Protestant Reformation was the reforming Council of
Trent (1545-1563 C.E.). In its 14th Session the Council in some way likened the Sacrament
of Penance to Baptism, thus giving it truly transforming effects. In chapter 5 on
Confession it asserted that “all mortal sins of which they have knowledge after a diligent
self-examination, must be enumerated by the penitents in confession, even though they
are most secret and have been committed only against the last two precepts of the
Decalogue ….261 It is evident furthermore, that those circumstances that change the
species of the sin are also to be explained in confession ….” 262 The great need arose of
257
258
Cf. Thurian, Confession, p. 25.
259
Mk 2,5b.
260
Thurian, CONFESSION, p. 27.
261
Mortal sins must be confessed not in general but specifically and one by one.” The Canons and Decrees
of the Council of Trent, trans. Rev. H. J. Schroeder, OP, Rockford, IL, Tan Books & Publishers, Inc., 1978, p. 93.
262
The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, p. 93.
52
having priests able to hear the confession of penitents according to these conciliar
prescriptions. After all, priests must be able to determine which sins are mortal since
these are the obligatory matter of the sacrament. Such mortal sins must then be
confessed according to species, number and circumstances. The need therefore for a
special subject that would train worthy confessors was felt. Thus Moral Theology
emerged.
The emergence of Moral Theology as a separate discipline in the post-Tridentine

period was prepared for by the rediscovery of Thomism. Spain was at the height of its
influence. The University of Salamanca, with its amazing pool of prominent professors,
helped to bring about this rediscovery: Dominic Soto, OP (d. 1560), Melchor Cano, OP
(d. 1560), Bartholomew of Medina, OP (d. 1580), Dominic Banez, OP (d. 1604), Gabriel
Vasquez, SJ (d. 1604), Francis Suarez, SJ (d. 1617), and Henry Henriquez, SJ (d. 1608).
But the most influential of them all was Francis of Victoria, OP (ca. 1480-1546).
Francis of Victoria was born at Victoria in Avila. He received his early education
at Burgos. After entering the Order of Preachers, he was sent to Paris for studies. “In
1522 he returned to Spain and taught theology at the Dominican College of St. Gregory
at Valladolid till 1524, when he was appointed to the principal chair of theology in the
University of Salamanca which he held till 1544. The influence which Francis exerted
directly in the University of Salamanca and indirectly in the Universities of Alcala,
Coimbra, Evora, Seville, Valladolid and others, forms an interesting chapter in the
history of theology. More than any other theologian in his time, he ministered to the
actual intellectual needs of the Church. Scholasticism (Thomism) had lost its former
prestige and was passing through the most critical stage of its history. The times had
changed and it required a master to adapt speculative thought to the new conditions.
The revival of theological activity in the Catholic universities of this period, consequent
upon the doctrines of the reformers, and the development of theological speculation
inspired Francis to inaugurate a movement for the restoration of scholastic philosophy
and to give to theological science a purer diction and an improved literary form.” 263 As
the professor of the first hour, he lectured mainly on the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas
Aquinas:
 1526-1529 (3 years) – SECUNDA SECUNDAE

 1529-1531 (2 years) – Quartum Sententiarum
 1531-1533 (2 years) – PRIMA PARS
 1533-1534 (1 year) – PRIMA SECUNDAE
 1534-1537 (3 years) – SECUNDA SECUNDAE
 1537-1538 (1 year) – TERTIA PARS (qq. 1-57)
 1538-1539 (1 year) – Quartum Sententiarum
 1539-1540 (1 year) – PRIMA PARS (qq. 1-59)
263
Joseph Schroeder, Francis of Vittoria, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, VI:232.
53
Francis of Victoria showed the world the great practical value of Thomism.
There were new historical circumstances and social events to be reckoned with. The
right to colonize had to be justified. Using the Special Moral Theology of St. Thomas,
Francis of Victoria advocated the basic human rights to life and bodily integrity, to
social and political liberty, to education, to self-defense, to property and to equality. He
acknowledged the supreme but not absolute power of the State in civil matters. He
called the Church a perfect society, but did not give to the Pope supreme power over
the whole world. He defended the right of all nations to exist and fostered mutual aid
and respect among nations.
The Society of Jesus, founded by St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), was

instrumental for the emergence of Moral Theology as a distinct discipline for the
training of confessors. The fifth Jesuit General, Claudius Acquaviva (1543-1615 C.E.),
who was Superior General from 1581, issued the Ratio Studiorum for the order. This plan
of studies provided for a separate subject known as Moral Theology. This led to the
writing of moral treatises known as Institutiones Morales. The most famous of these was
the one authored by the Jesuit Juan Azor (1536-1603).
Juan Azor wrote his Institutionum Moralium (Liber) in quibus universae quaestiones
ad conscientiam recte aut prave factorum pertinentes breviter tractantur. 264 Simply known as
Institutiones Morales, it was soon enough referred to Theologia Moralis. It was based on
the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Prima Secundae provided the frame of
reference for the first chapter, beginning with the treatise on conscience. Instead of
dealing with typically Thomistic speculative topics like the last end and grace, Azor
concentrated on various moral cases. He used the Secunda Secundae for the other two
chapters, but always working on moral cases. These moral cases centered on the
commandments of God and of the Church. In other words, Azor adopted the legalistic
approach in his desire to assist confessors in forming right judgments in the
administration of the Sacrament of Penance. Solving concrete cases of conscience based
on the existing laws and commandments became his primary preoccupation. Arriving
at certainty of moral judgment was the overriding concern. 265
The Tridentine prescriptions for the Sacrament of Penance brought about the
desire of seeking moral certainty and intellectual precision. Added to the impact of the
Council of Trent were the earlier influences of the School of Nominalism, the critical
spirit and the teachings of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) on clear and distinct ideas, and
the Rediscovery of Thomism brought about by the University of Salamanca. To all these
should be added the subjectivism of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that stressed the
importance of the individual.
The desire for moral certainty and intellectual precision bred the various post-
Tridentine schools of thought that came to be known in history as the moral systems.
264
The book of moral institutions in which the universal questions of conscience pertaining rightly or
wrongly to the facts are briefly treated.
265
Cf. Vereecke, Storia della teologia morale, Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, p. 1329.
54
The conflict among these systems gave rise to the crisis of the moral systems. It was
practically a re-visiting of the Bernard-Abelard Conflict of the 12 th Century. As St.
Bernard emphasized the position of the law in moral life (moral objectivity) and Peter
Abelard stressed human freedom with its locus in conscience (moral subjectivity), the
various moral systems sided with either the law or human freedom. In the 17 th and 18th
centuries however there were more conflicting forces and more players in the field.
The moral systems in defense of the law or of moral objectivity are the following:
 Absolute Tutiorism (from the Latin word tutior, meaning ‘safer’).

It states that some presumption, no matter how slight, regarding the binding
force of a law makes the law in question morally obligatory. One cannot
disregard the law unless one is absolutely certain that it is not binding. The safer
way is always the right course of action to take: tutior vel certa (the safer or the
sure one). Pope Alexander VIII in a decree of the Holy Office, dated 7 December
1690, condemned this extremist position: Non licet sequi opinionem (probabilem) vel
inter probabiles probabilissimam. (To be condemned is the position that it is not
lawful to follow a probable opinion or the most probable among a host of
probable opinions.)266
 Moderate Tutiorism.
It is a modification of the previous moral system, designed to make tutiorism fit
within the parameters set by the Holy Office. It proposes that conscience should
always follow the probable opinion in defense of the law unless it goes against
the most probable opinion in favour of human freedom: tutior vel probabilissima
(the safer or the most probable one).
 Probabiliorism (from the Latin probabilior, meaning ‘more probable’).

It asserts that it is not always necessary to follow the most probable opinion. It is
good enough to follow a more probable opinion: tutior vel probabilior (the safer or
the more probable one). In the absence of a clearly more probable opinion in
favour of human freedom, the law must always be observed. This is the official
Dominican position.
 Compensationism.
It was seemingly proposed by a certain Potton. It says that the more probable
opinion is the right moral position. But even this more probable position can be
discarded in favour of human freedom, by way of exception, if the transgression
of the law would eventually make up for the violation.
The moral systems in favour of human freedom or of moral subjectivity are the
following:
266
DS 2303.
55
 Laxism.
It is the exact opposite of Absolute Tutiorism. For a law to oblige, there must be
no shade of doubt as to its binding force; the law must be so sure as to render
absolutely improbable the benign opinion. This extreme position was
condemned by Pope Bl. Innocent XI in a decree of the Holy Office, dated 2 March
1679, on the errors of laxism. The condemned position is as follows: Generatim,
dum probabilitate sive intrinseca sive extrinseca quantumvis tenui, modo a probabilitatis
finibus non exeatur, confisi aliquid agimus, semper prudenter agimus. (To be
condemned is the position that, generally speaking, while intrinsic or extrinsic
probability may be minimal, such that one hardly reaches the limits of
probability, if we act with confidence, we always act with prudence.) 267
 Probabilism (from the Latin probabilis, meaning ‘probable’).

It was originally proposed by Bartholomew of Medina, OP, in 1577. In his
commentary on the Secunda Secundae of St. Thomas Aquinas he said: Si est opinio
probabilis, licitum est eam sequi, licit opposita probabilior sit. (It is lawful to follow a
probable opinion, even if the opposite is more probable.) Probabilism rightly
contests the highly objective position of tutiorism. But it also opens the door
towards the acceptance of laxism. The moral act has become the bone of
contention between the objectivity of the law and the subjectivity of human
freedom. Sometimes the issue is coached in these terms: Who is right – the
human person in the exercise of his or her freedom, or God in the enforcement of
his law? The issue becomes highly unacceptable when put in this way. There is
no opposition between God and human freedom. After all, the God who gave
the law is also the one who gave human beings freedom when he created the
human person in his own image and likeness. But the aforementioned issue is
the logical conclusion of the probabilistic position of the Dominican
Bartholomew of Medina. Ironically probabilism has become the official Jesuit
position.
 Equiprobabilism.
It is basically a variant of probabilism. When a person is in doubt as to which of
two probable opinions to take, he or she should opt to observe the law if he or
she is sure of its existence, but doubts whether the law has ceased or has been
abrogated; instead he or she should feel free to disregard the law if he or she
doubts its very existence. Equiprobabilism advocates the position that a doubtful
law does not bind in conscience. It is attributed to St. Alphonsus Mary de’
Liguori (1696-1787). Actually he never referred to his teachings as a system. His
followers were the ones who constituted his thoughts into a moral system and
called it equiprobabilism. It was a Jesuit in the 19 th century, Antonio Ballerini,
who formulated the basic tenets of this moral system:
1. A doubtful law does not bind whatsoever.

267
DS 2103.
56
2. In case of doubt and, in front of two equally or almost equally probable
opinions, the course of action in favour of human freedom may be safely
chosen.
3. A doubtful law should be observed only if it is the more probable
position.268
St. Alphonsus “was the eldest son of Giuseppe de’ Liguori, of a noble and ancient
Neapolitan family and an officer of the royal navy, and Anna Cavalieri. After receiving
his early education at home under the care of tutors, Alphonsus was enrolled in 1708 at
the University of Naples, when at the age of 16 he received his doctorate in utroque iure.
He practiced at the bar for some years, leading the while an exemplary Christian life
under the direction of the Oratorians. When charged in 1723 with the defense of the
interests of the Duke of Gravina against the Grand Duke of Tuscany, he lost confidence
in the justice of his client’s cause, perhaps in consequence of intrigues. Shocked by this
experience he renounced the world and put on clerical dress, 23 October 1723 ….
Ordained (a priest) December 21, 1726, he devoted himself in a special way to the work
of hearing confessions and preaching …. On November 9, 1732, he founded … a
congregation of priests (and brothers) under the title of the Most Holy Redeemer
(known, after 1749, as the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer) …. This
congregation was formed with a special view to the needs of the country people who so
often lacked the opportunities of missions, catechetical instruction, and spiritual
exercises …. He was appointed bishop of Sant’Agata dei Goti and was consecrated in
Rome, 20 June 1762. As a bishop he soon distinguished himself for his work of reform
…. He was stricken in 1768 with a painful illness that made the pastoral ministry
difficult; he offered his resignation from his see, and it was accepted by Pius VI in 1775.
He then retired to Pagani, where he devoted himself to the governing of his
congregation …. Beatified 15 September 1816, by Pius VII, canonized 26 May 1839 by
Gregory XVI, declared Doctor of the Church by Pius IX on 23 March 1871, Alphonsus
was finally made Patron of Confessors and Moralists by Pius XII, 26 April 1950.”269
The prudential doctrine of St. Alphonsus did not intend to overcome the two
opposite systems of Probabiliorism and of Probabilism with another moral system
which measures the degrees of probability. He wanted to resolve the conflict with a
concept of moral life, and consequently an idea of the judgment of conscience and of
prudence, which overcomes subjectivism with subjectivity and objectivism with
objectivity. It is supposed to be a synthesis of subjectivity and of objectivity in moral life
for the sake of the enhancement of the human person.
He was educated by a Dominican of the strict probabiliorist inclination. But his

pastoral work with the people proved that such strict probabiliorist views would be
harmful to the people. He thus experimented with probabilism. But at that time the
268
Cf. Domenico Capone, CSsR, Sistemi morali, Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, Francesco
Compagnoni, Giannino Piana, Salvatore Privitera, eds., Milan, Edizioni Paoline, 1990, p. 1317, unofficial
translation, pp. 1246-1254.
269
Louis Vereecke, Alphonsus Liguori, St., in New Catholic Encyclopedia, I:336-337.
57
Jesuits, who supported this position, were under attack. He saw too its limitations. The
moral act could fall into individualism or into a special kind of existentialism. Every act
would be valuable to the measure of the freedom which characterized it. This freedom
would either be total or hemmed in by the law. The way out of this dilemma is to
personify the moral act. It is the act of a human person who makes a decision in
conscience by exercising the virtue of prudence.
The moral act is a function of the human person. It is his or her mode of
expression and his or her way of deepening the value inherent in himself or herself.
This value which constitutes the human person is the creaturely tension. It is the product
of the rapport between the mortal human being and the Immortal God. Objectivism
would put stress the glory of the Immortal God. Subjectivism would emphasize the
dignity of the mortal human being. St. Alphonsus puts the glory of the Immortal God
(objectivity) in the dignity of the moral human being (subjectivity). He thus has a
personalistic view of morality, which is the synthesis of objectivity and of subjectivity.
St. Alphonsus looks at the moral act from two points of view: knowledge and
conscience. From the point of view of knowledge, truth determines the casuistic rules
under the guidance of the virtue of prudence. This entails the principle of flexibility. Rules
exist in the abstract. When human beings apply rules to their actual situation, they may
oftentimes prove to be highly improbable. Thus they must be neither rigid nor lax in
their application of rules; they should rather be realistic.
From the point of view of conscience, the principle of Christian personality is the one
at stake. The actual exigencies of the human person living in grace in the midst of the
challenges of this world constitute the criterion of judgment. A highly probable opinion
in theory may be highly improbable and less salutary in practice. Thus St. Alphonsus
was severe when it came to formal sin, but very indulgent when it came to merely
material sin. No law should obscure the rapport between God and the human person.
Morality consists in the depth of this rapport. The believer must judge before his or her
God, in the light of the Gospel of Christ and helped by the grace of the Holy Spirit, what
is the good that must be done and the evil that must be avoided in the concrete
historical situation in which he or she finds himself or herself. 270
The major works of St. Alphonsus Mary de’ Liguori are the following:
 Theologia Moralis – his masterpiece which went through 70 editions.

 Homo Apostolicus – a concise moral theology for confessors which underwent 118
editions.
 Praxis Confessarii – a manual for confessors.
 Il Confessore per la Popolazione Agricola – a manual for confessors in rural
settings.271
270
Cf. Capone, Sistemi morali, Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, pp. 1252-1253.
271
58
D. MORAL THEOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIANITY
The contemporary history of moral theology can be divided into that of the 19 th
Century and that of the 20th Century. The 21st Century is just too recent to offer any
worthwhile consideration.
1. MORAL THEOLOGY IN THE 19TH CENTURY
The history of moral theology in the 19 th century centers on the contribution of

the School of Tübingen, which spearheaded the renewal movement known as the
German Catholic Aufklärung (enlightenment). Three authors are worthy of note:
a. John Michael Sailer (1751-1832)
In his Handbuch der Christlichen Moral (Handbook of Christian Morals), 3 volumes,

Munich, 1817, he offers a general exposition of Christian life directed not only to priests
but to lay people as well. He develops his moral theology around the central idea of
charity taken from his highly revered model, St. Francis of Sales (1567-1622), calling it
theologia cordis or the theology of the heart. Moral theology is a morality of conversion;
the action of the human being is a response to the call of God and to the initiative of
grace. Charity should integrate all commandments, duties and obligations, sin, virtue,
and the sacraments.
b. John Baptist Hirscher (1788-1865)
His book entitled Christiche Moral als Lehre von der Verwirklichung des göttlichen
Reiches in der Menschheit (Christian Morals as the Teacher of the Realization of the Reign of
God in the World), 3 volumes, Tuebingen, 1835, has as its central idea the Reign of God.
The Reign of God should grow in the human person through faith and good behaviour
and, in this way, should spread all throughout the world. He treats this central biblical
theme with depth and psychological insight.
c. Magnus Jocham (1808-1893)
In his work Moraltheologie oder die Lehre vom christlichen Leben nach den
Grundsätzen der Katholischen Kirche (Moral Theology or the Teacher on Christian Life
according to the Principles of the Catholic Church), 3 volumes, Salzburg, 1852-1854, he sees
the reality of the Mystical Body of Christ as the effective norm for Christian life. He looks
at the sacraments as the effective means for transforming human beings into the
children of God and of incorporating them into the Mystical Body of Christ.
59
These three authors clearly demonstrate the three essential characteristics of the
German Catholic Aufklärung:
 It is rooted in Sacred Scripture.

 It advocates a moral theology organized around a central theme, which due to its
profundity however fails to give effective guidelines for the solution of concrete
problems.
 It avoids the distinction between Moral Theology and Ascetical Theology.272
2. MORAL THEOLOGY IN THE 20TH CENTURY
The history of moral theology in the 20 th century defies easy classification. Each
theologian tries to be unique and highly original. But three currents are discernible.
a. Shift from Commandments to Virtues
The first current is the shift of the scheme of treating moral theology from that of
the Commandments to that of the Virtues. The Thomistic scheme follows that of the
virtues. But the Nominalistic School, with its legalistic approach to moral theology, put
the stress on the commandments. The Tridentine teachings on the Sacrament of Penance
reinforced the use of the scheme of the commandments. But the encyclical letter Aeterni
Patris of Pope Leo XIII, dated 4 August 1879, which laid down that Thomism should be
the basis of the teaching of philosophy in Catholic institutes, could have been
instrumental in this shift back to the scheme of the virtues. Josepf Mausbach and Otto
Schilling developed their moral theology based on the virtues.
b. Ultimate Basis of Moral Norm
The second current consists in the search for the ultimate basis of the moral
norm. Fritz Tillman presents the idea of the imitation of Christ. Emile Mersch opts
instead for the Mystical Body of Christ. J. Selzenberger speaks of the Reign of God.
Gerard Gilleman makes his basis the new commandment of love. Bernhard Häring has a
triad of themes: the Reign of God, the imitation of Christ, and love.
c. New Possibilities
This third and last current consists in the search for new possibilities for solving
contemporary moral problems. Ten historical circumstances seem to be responsible for
the shape of Moral Theology towards the end of the 20th century.273
272
Cf. Vereecke, Storia della teologia morale, Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, pp. 1333-1334; cf.
also Carlo Caffarra, Teologia morale (storia), Dizionario Enciclopedico di Teologia Morale, Rome, Edizioni
Paoline, 1981, p. 1105.
273
Cf. Richard A. McCormick, SJ, Moral Theology 1940-1989: An Overview, Theological Studies (50:1)
March 1989, pp. 3-24.
60
1. THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF VATICAN II
The ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council presents the proper context for
theologizing in the field of morals. The first three chapters of Lumen Gentium are
entitled the Church as Mystery or Sacrament, the People of God, and the Church as
Hierarchical, respectively. This sequence shows the priority given to the themes of
Mystery, Sacrament and the People of God prior to the Hierarchy. Collegiality,
Ecumenism and Eschatology are also stressed. The Church as Servant is also given a
prominent place.
2. THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF KARL RAHNER
The anthropology of Karl Rahner presents the depth of the human act. Human
activity is never uniform; it comes according to various layers of the exercise of
freedom. At the center, core, or at the deepest level is the exercise of fundamental
freedom. Here the person is enabled to make a fundamental option, whereby he or she
disposes of himself or herself totally. Other layers simply produce peripheral acts. The
application of this Rahnerian idea to moral theology was spearheaded by Joseph Fuchs,
SJ, and Bruno Schüller, SJ.
3. MORAL NORMS AND THE REVISION OF METHOD
In 1965 Peter Knauer, SJ, published his seminal essay entitled, The Hermeneutic
Function of the Principle of Double Effect. It has proven to be the opening salvo in a 25-year
discussion of the proper understanding of moral norms within the community of
Catholic moral theologians. At the risk of oversimplification, Knauer’s basic thesis can
be worded as follows: the causing or permitting of evils in our conduct is morally right or
wrong depending on the presence or absence of a commensurate reason.
4. THE BIRTH CONTROL COMMISSION AND HUMANAE VITAE
These two are put together because only when Humanae Vitae is seen in the light
of the previous consultations does it yield the full dimensions of the problem. The Papal
Commission Pro studio populationis, familiae et natilitatis 274 was constituted by Pope John
XXIII in March 1963 with 6 members. His death the following June prevented any
meeting of the commission to take place. It was reconstituted by Pope Paul VI and
expanded to 55 members, including married laity, and a consultant. This commission
voted heavily for a change in Church teaching on contraception. In its majority
document Documentum syntheticum de moralitate regulationis nativitatum, 275 the papal
commission opted for the possibility of using artificial means of birth control. But a
dissenting minority composed of 4 theologians (John Ford, SJ, Jan Visser, CSsR,
274
For the study of population, family and birth.
275
Synthetic Document on the Morality of the Regulation of Births.
61
Marcelino Zalba, SJ, and Stanislas de Lestapis, SJ) came out with its own document
entitled Status Quaestionis.276
When Humanae Vitae came out on 25 July 1968, it clearly showed that Pope Paul
VI sided with the minority. This fact unleashed a firestorm which made moral
theologians freshly aware of the inadequacy of a heavily juridical notion of the moral
teaching office. Correspondingly they became more sensitive to their responsibilities,
especially their occasional duty to dissent in light of their own experience with the
faithful and their reflection on their pastoral experience. Non-reception of the encyclical
became overnight a live theological issue. Questions were raised about the formation of
conscience, the response due to the ordinary magisterium, the exercise of authority in
the Church, the consultative processes and collegiality, and the meaning of the
guidance of the Holy Spirit on the pastors of the Church. It resulted in the moral issue
of contraception being smothered in the ecclesiological tumult. 277
5. THE EMERGENCE OF FEMINISM
Feminism is referred to by some as surely one of the signs of the times. Women
nowadays are in positions of leadership in theological societies. Due to the scarcity of
priests, many women have even been called to administer parishes in some parts of the
world. Definitely women have a lot to contribute to moral theology, particularly to the
deepening of the theology of marriage and of human sexuality. On 22 May 1994,
however, Pope John Paul II issued the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, on the
question of priestly ordination. He spoke in no unclear terms that priestly ordination is
reserved exclusively to male persons: “Quamvis doctrina de ordinatione sacerdotali viris
tantum reservanda constanti et universali Ecclesiae Traditione servetur …. Declaramus
Ecclesiam facultatem nullatenus habere ordinationem sacerdotalem mulieribus
conferendi, hancque sententiam ab omnibus Ecclesiae fidelibus esse definitive tenendam.” (n.
4.)278 This papal intervention was apparently provoked by the ordination of women to
the priesthood and even to the episcopate in the Anglican Communion. This position
shows that no matter what is said in favour of women, the Catholic Church is still a
male-dominated community.
6. THE MATURATION OF BIOETHICS
The years 1969-1971 represented something of a turning point in moral theology

due to the establishment of several institutes for bioethical studies. It showed the
breadth and complexity of the problems created by modern technology. It became clear
276
State of the Question.
277
Cf. John O’Riordan, CSsR, Evoluzione della Teologia del Matrimonio, Assisi, Cittadella, 1974, pp. 66-
67; Robert Blair Kaiser, The Encyclical That Never Was: The Story of the Pontifical Commission on Population,
Family and Birth, 1964-66, London, Sheed & Ward, 1985.
278
“As much as you please, the teaching on priestly ordination as reserved to male persons should be kept
as belonging to the constant and universal tradition of the Church …. We declare that the Church has no power
whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women, and this teaching should be held definitively by all the faithful
in the Church.” (John Paul II, Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, n. 4)
62
that it is impossible for any one theologian to be a truly reputable expert in all fields of
moral theology nowadays. Thus there is the need for interdisciplinary cooperation.
7. THE INFLUENCE OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY
The growth of Liberation Theology, due to the ongoing research of Third World
theologians like Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff, Juan Luis Segundo, and Jon Sobrino
has profoundly affected the state of contemporary moral theology. It demolished the
separatist mentality, whereby this world was viewed as unconnected with the next
world; emphasis was given not to the present realities, but to the future realities of the
coming world. Liberation Theology insisted on the radical continuity between the
eschatological promises and human liberation from systemic oppression. It also
provoked Christians to participate actively in the construction of a just social order.
Finally, Liberation Theology put the emphasis on social concerns, thereby giving some
kind of balance to the otherwise eschewed approach to morality with its overemphasis
on personal interests and on sexuality.
8. THE PERSON AS THE MORAL CRITERION
Vatican II asserted that “the moral aspect of any procedure … must be

determined by objective standards which are based on the nature of the person and the
person’s acts.”279 Thus no other criterion except for the human person should be used in
making moral judgments. In other words, any human activity that truly enhances the
human is person is good; anything that diminishes the dignity of the human person and
frustrates his or her fulfillment is evil.
9. THE CURRAN AFFAIR
The canonical mission of Charles Curran to teach moral theology at the Catholic
University of America in Washington, D.C., was removed with the letter Questa
Congregazione280 of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on 25 July 1986. After
much dialogue he still refused to change his views on the right to public dissent from
the ordinary Magisterium of the church, the indissolubility of consummated
sacramental marriage, abortion, euthanasia, masturbation, artificial contraception,
premarital sex, and homosexual acts – views that are contrary to Catholic teaching.
Commenting on the affair and the impending condemnation, Bishop Matthew Clark,
Curran’s local ordinary, wrote on 12 March 1986: “If Father Curran’s status as a Roman
Catholic theologian is brought into question, I fear a serious setback to Catholic
education and pastoral life in this country. That could happen in two ways. (1)
Theologians may stop exploring the challenging questions of the day in a creative,
healthy way because they fear actions which may prematurely end their teaching
careers. (2) Moreover, able theologians may abandon Catholic institutions altogether in
279
Gaudium et Spes, n. 51.
280
This Congregation.
63
order to avoid embarrassing confrontation with church authorities. Circumstances of
this sort would seriously undermine the standing of Catholic scholarship in this nation,
isolate our theological community and weaken our Catholic institutions of higher
learning.”281
10. THE RESTORATION
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the then Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith and now Pope Benedict XVI, 282 describes the efforts being undertaken by the
Magisterium of the Church in doctrinal and moral matters as restoration. The
Magisterium has a twofold function: (1) to curb abuses and (2) to stimulate growth. The
contemporary feeling however in the community of moral theologians is that the
exercise of the former task is so overpowering to the detriment of the latter. Restoration
therefore has an ambivalent image. A concrete example of this is the promulgation of
the Catechism of the Catholic Church.283 Some hailed it as a real milestone in the history of
the Catholic Church; others instead condemned it as a step back to pre-Vatican times.
CONCLUSION
At the end of this treatment on the History of Moral Theology we can make our
own the following suggestions of Richard A. McCormick regarding how Moral
Theology should be if it were to make rapid progress. Moral Theology should be: (1)
open, (2) ecumenical, (3) insight-oriented, (4) collegial, (5) honest, (6) scientifically-
informed, (7) adult, (8) realistic, (9) Catholic or universal, and (10) Christ-centered. 284
281
McCormick, Moral Theology 1940-1989: An Overview, pp. 16-17.
282
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger was elected Bishop of Rome on the second day of Conclave, on the 4th
Balloting, on 19 April 2005.
283
The editio typica or the definitive text was promulgated by Pope John Paul II on 15 August 1997 with
the Apostolic Letter Laetamur Magnopere.
284
Cf. McCormick, SJ, Moral Theology 1940-1989: An Overview, pp. 23-24.
64
CHAPTER V:
THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF CHRISTIAN BEHAVIOUR
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
St. Thomas Aquinas begins the Moral Theology section of his Summa Theologiae
(II pars) by describing the human person as always acting for a certain purpose or end.
The very first article of the first question of I-II part of the Summa asks whether it would
be proper to the human person to act in view of an end. 285 It is natural for the human
person to be purposeful. Such purpose-driven activity constitutes responsible human
behaviour.
Msgr. Paul J. Glenn summarizes Aquinas’ thoughts in this fashion: “Alone

among earthly creatures, man is master of his acts. The distinctively human
characteristic is the exercise of free will. Hence free will acts are human acts. A free will
act is any thought, word, deed, desire, or omission which comes from a man acting with
full knowledge of what he is doing, who is free to act or to refrain from action, and who
285
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.1, a.1: Utrum homini conveniat agere propter finem.
(Whether it is proper to the human person to act in view of an end.)
65
gives the full assent of his will to the act. Only such an act is a human act in full
perfection. Other acts performed by a man, but inadvertently, or without full
knowledge, freedom and choice are indeed acts of a man, but they are not human acts.
Since human acts are free will acts, and since free will acts are acts chosen and
performed in view of an end or purpose or goal, it is evident that human acts are acts for
an end, that is, acts done for the purpose of attaining an end. The common phrase for
such acts is, ‘acts to an end,’ the word to meaning towards or in view of.”286
Responsible human behaviour therefore means an act for which the human
person can be held accountable. This is possible only when we have at hand a human act
(actus humanus) and not just an act of the human person (actus hominis). A human act is one
that has been executed with these three characteristics: (1) knowledge, (2) freedom, and
(3) choice. The absence of any one of these elements reduces the act to a mere act of the
human person. In other words, a human act is the fruit of integral deliberation, that is,
the product of the activity of the human intellect and of the human will, operating in
freedom. Thus purposeful human activity means that the agent or doer, in a context of
freedom, chooses a value of which he or she is adequately aware. For such an act the
human person is accountable.
In order to clarify the discussion further, let us now give examples of the so-
called act of the human person (actus hominis).
1. The natural acts of the vegetative and sense faculties.

2. The acts of persons without the use of reason.
3. The acts of people asleep or under the influence of hypnosis, alcohol or drugs.
4. Quick and nearly automatic reactions.
5. Acts performed with accompanying grave impediments.287
St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that there can only be one ultimate end or purpose
for human life because all human beings share in the same nature. This ultimate end
has a twofold perspective: (1) the order of intention and (2) the order of execution.
From the perspective of the order of intention, the ultimate end is the very first thing
that moves a person to act. From the viewpoint however of the order of execution, the
ultimate end is the very last that a person attains, since beyond it he or she cannot want
anything else in life.288 Now this ultimate human end is nothing else but happiness. 289
All human beings want to be happy. There is no problem in that! But people disagree
regarding the nature of this happiness. St. Thomas Aquinas dedicates a whole
question290 to the consideration of elements from which people vainly seek happiness:
286
Msgr. Paul J. Glenn, A Tour of the Summa, Rockford, IL, Tan Books & Publishers, Inc., 1978, p. 99.
287
Cf. Charles Belmonte, Fundamental Moral Theology, Manila, Studium Theologiae Foundation, Inc.,
1997, p. 21.
288
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.1, a.4.
289
290
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.2.
66
 Article 1: Riches.
 Article 2: Honour.
 Article 3: Fame or glory.
 Article 4: Power.
 Article 5: Some bodily good.
 Article 6: Pleasure.
 Article 7: Some spiritual good.
 Article 8: Some created good.
In his Summa Theologiae St. Thomas Aquinas declares that happiness – the ultimate end
of each and every human person – can be found only in God, the Uncreated Good. 291
B. SOURCES OF MORALITY
The morality of human behaviour consists in the determination whether the

human acts are good or evil. This brings us to the consideration of the sources of
morality. According to the philosophy of the Greek master Aristotle, everything that
exists is composed of a duality of principles, principally matter and form. This holds true
also for the human act. Therefore for the determination of the moral quality of an
activity, whether it is good or bad, we must dwell on the matter and the form of the
human act.
The matter of the human act is the ‘object of the act’ (finis operis). This consists in
the very purpose of the activity in question. It answers the question: What is it for?
Instead the form of the human act is the ‘intention of the agent or doer’ (finis operantis).
This consists in the motive behind a person’s action. It answers the question: Why did
he/she do it? This intention depends on a variety of factors:
1. Knowledge – the awareness of the value inherent in the act as perceived by the
human intellect.
2. Freedom – the capacity of the human will to pursue the value perceived by the
intellect. It is the ability to choose. Since this ability is twofold, human freedom is
also twofold:
a. Fundamental – when the choice consists in the acceptance or rejection of the
Absolute Good that is God alone.
b. Peripheral – when the choice consists in the selection from a set of relative or
created goods.
291
67
3. Christian Perspective – the Gospel orientation that necessarily marks the choices
of the believer. The intention of the Christian agent is ideally always in view of
the realization of the Reign of God.
 As the central moral message of Jesus Christ, 292 the Kingdom should be
behind every act of the disciple.
 Adopted by the Father in baptism, the authentic child of God seeks only the
interests of the Kingdom.
 Through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the Christian is transformed at a

twofold level:
+ Entitative level or level of Being through Sanctifying Grace.
+ Operative level or level of Action through the infused virtues and the gifts
of the Spirit.
Since the believer has been transformed at the very core of his or her being
by sanctifying grace, he or she is helped in his or her acts, through the
infused virtues and the gifts, to seek only the Reign of God.
For a human act to be good, both the matter and the form should be good. For a
human act to be evil, it is enough for either the matter or the form to be evil. In other
words, good comes only from an integral cause. Any lack of integrity in the cause
makes the whole activity bad. The degree of good or evil however in the human act
depends on a third factor – the ‘circumstances’ (circumstantiae). Thus there are three
sources of morality: [1] the Object of the Act (finis operis); [2] the Intention of the Agent
or Doer (finis operantis); [3] the Circumstances (circumstantiae). The first two however are
primary sources since they determine the moral quality of the human act, causing it to
be either good or bad. The third is only a secondary source of morality since it cannot
make an essentially good act evil and vice-versa; circumstances only increase or
diminish the good or evil already contained in the act.
The circumstances surrounding a moral act are traditionally classified as seven:
1. Quis? This is the circumstance of: Who did it? It refers to the personal
characteristics of the agent or the aspects of his or her person that have a
bearing on the moral act, like office or state of life.
The circumstance of quis can also refer to: Who was affected by it? To
whom was it done? The recipient of the act can modify the good or evil inherent
in the moral act.
292
Cf. Mark 1, 14-15.
68
Another way of viewing the circumstance of quis is: Who is the
accomplice? The ally who helped in the perpetration of the deed can also
increase or diminish the moral quality of the human act.
2. Quid? This is the circumstance of: What is the extent of the act? It refers to the
quantity or magnitude of the deed performed.
3. Ubi? This is the circumstance of: Where was it done? It refers to the place where
the deed was perpetrated.
4. Quibus auxiliis? This is the circumstance of: With what means was it done? The
instrument used to perform the act has a bearing too on the moral act.
5. Cur? This is the circumstance of: Why was it done? Why did it happen? This refers
to the circumstantial intention and should not be confused with the moral
intention or finis operantis. According to empirical psychology intention is the
sum total of internal factors that make a person choose a particular course of
action from a host of possibilities and bring it to completion with the
appropriate energy. This idea of intention is what circumstantial intention is all
about. It is actually wider in scope than moral intention. The moral intention or
finis operantis is the reason which the human agent had in mind when he did
the act. Circumstantial intention or cur instead covers even unconscious
motivations.
6. Quomodo? This is the circumstance of: How was it done? It refers to the manner
in which the act was performed.
7. Quando? This is the circumstance of: When was it done? It refers to the time
when the moral act was committed. It can also mean the amount of time
consumed for the performance of the deed.
C. IMPEDIMENTS TO MORAL ACTIVITY
The integrity of Christian behaviour can be marred by certain elements that we

can refer to as the impediments to moral activity. These impediments can be either
permanent or transitory in nature.
1. IMPEDIMENTS THAT ARE PERMANENT IN NATURE
The human person is not an absolute being. Hence his or her moral acts are never
absolutely conscious and free. His or her exercise of freedom is conditioned by a
multitude of factors that are relative to his or her status as a creature, with a nature that
69
is fallen in Adam but redeemed in Christ. He or she is subject to the following
influences:
 Instincts.
 Hereditary traits.
 Inborn tendencies.
 Psycho-physical dispositions.
 Character.
 Unconscious conflicts.
 Learned attitudes.
 Acquired habits.
 Mental illness.
 Personal upbringing.
 Environment.
The environment covers the prenatal environment of the womb, the family
atmosphere, the local neighbourhood, the school setting, the geographical
features of the land, the atmospheric conditions of the place, the social structure
of the nation, the cultural milieu of the country, the religious heritage of the race,
as well as the global situation.
 Level of maturity or stage of moral development.
This is somewhat permanent in nature but is in reality merely transitory. It is
somewhat permanent because the moral acts at a given stage are marked by all
the features of this level of maturity which allows no exceptions. Hence at certain
stages of moral development no integral human act is possible due to gross
immaturity.
Nonetheless this condition is not meant to last forever. Hence it is merely
transitory. The person is bound in time and given the proper conditions to pass
on to the next higher stage.
2. IMPEDIMENTS THAT ARE TRANSITORY IN NATURE
St. Thomas Aquinas lists four such impediments and they have come to be
known as the classical impediments to moral activity:
a. FORCE is the external violence which compels a person to do something to

which he or she is internally opposed.
b. FEAR is a condition arising from the threat of an impending future evil.
c. PASSION is an intense feeling or emotion that clouds the exercise of the

intellect and the will. St. Thomas Aquinas lists 11 such passions:
o Love – Hatred
o Joy – Sadness/Grief
70
o Desire – Aversion/Horror
o Hope – Despair
o Courage/Daring – Fear
o Anger
d. IGNORANCE is the lack of knowledge which a person should possess. It can

be classified into:
o Invincible or Inculpable – when it cannot be dispelled despite all of one’s

good will.
o Vincible or Culpable – when it can be dispelled in normal circumstances.

+ Affected Ignorance – when it is directly willed.
Here one purposely avoids to know something regarding the matter at
hand as a means of being excused from sin or of not avoiding some sin to
which one is particularly attached.
+ Crass or Supine Ignorance – when it is indirectly willed.
In this case one fails to acquire the necessary knowledge due to sheer
carelessness.
+ Inadvertence – is the lack of due attention, which from the moral
standpoint is equivalent to ignorance, no matter how momentarily it may
be.
Impediments to moral activity destroy the integrity of the human act. For this
reason acts done with accompanying impediments should be considered in one of these
two ways. First of all, if the impediments are grave, they should be seen not as human
acts but only as acts of the human person. Hence the agent or doer cannot be held
responsible for them. Secondly, if the impediments are light, the acts should be viewed
with diminished responsibility.
D. FUNDAMENTAL OPTION
An important but controversial dimension of the nature of Christian moral

activity is the fundamental option. The Magisterium of the Church officially tackles the
issue in three contemporary documents:
 Declaration on Certain Questions concerning Sexual Ethics PERSONA HUMANA

(Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) 29 December 1975 [PH].
 Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation RECONCILIATIO ET PAENITENTIA (Pope

John Paul II) 2 December 1984 [RP].
71
 Encyclical Letter regarding Certain Fundamental Questions of the Church’s Moral
Teaching VERITATIS SPLENDOR (Pope John Paul II) 6 August 1993 [VS].
In Persona Humana, n. 10, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith discusses
fundamental option in connection with the issue of mortal sin. It states: “There are those
who go so far as to affirm that mortal sin, which causes separation from God, only
exists in the formal refusal directly opposed to God’s call, or in that selfishness which
completely and deliberately closes itself to the love of neighbour. They say that it is only
then that there comes into play the fundamental option, that is to say the decision which
totally commits the person and which is necessary if mortal sin is to exist; by this option
the person, from the depths of the personality, takes up or ratifies a fundamental attitude
towards God or people. On the contrary, so-called peripheral actions (which, it is said,
usually do not involve decisive choice), do not go so far as to change the fundamental
option, the less so since they often come, as is observed, from habit. Thus such actions
can weaken the fundamental option, but not to such a degree as to change it
completely.”293
The third paragraph of PH, n. 10, contains the essential teaching of the document
on fundamental option: “In reality, it is precisely the fundamental option which in the last
resort defines a person’s moral disposition. But it can be completely changed by particular acts,
especially when, as often happens, these have been prepared for by various more
superficial acts. Whatever the case, it is wrong to say that particular acts are not enough
to constitute mortal sin.”294
A further elaboration on the link between the fundamental option and mortal sin
is found in the seventh paragraph of PH, n. 10: “A person therefore sins mortally not
only when his actions come from direct contempt for the love of God and neighbour,
but also when he consciously and freely, for whatever reason, chooses something which is
seriously disordered.”295
The Roman Congregation in PH views the fundamental option not as a concrete

act but as the person’s moral disposition which shows the nature of his or her basic
commitment in life. A positive fundamental option is a total commitment of the self to
God that expresses itself in love of neighbour. A negative fundamental option is an
absolute rejection of God, which consequently is a total commitment of the self to evil,
that manifests itself in hatred for neighbour.
In RP, n. 17, Pope John Paul II discusses the issue of the fundamental option in
his explicit condemnation of the weakening of the sense of sin: “Likewise, care will have
to be taken not to reduce mortal sin to an act of fundamental option – as is commonly said
today – against God, intending thereby a explicit and formal contempt for God and
293
PH, n. 10.
294
PH, n. 10.
295
PH, n. 10.
72
neighbour. For mortal sin exists also when a person knowingly and willingly, for
whatever reason, chooses something gravely disordered. In fact, such a choice already
includes contempt for the divine law, a rejection of God’s love for humanity and the
whole of creation: the person turns away from God and loses charity. Thus the
fundamental orientation can be radically changed by individual acts. 296 Clearly there can
occur situations which are very complex and obscure from a psychological viewpoint,
and which have an influence on the sinner’s subjective culpability. But from a
consideration of the psychological sphere one cannot proceed to the construction of a
theological category, which is what the fundamental option precisely is, understanding
it in such a way that it objectively changes or casts doubt upon the traditional concept of
mortal sin.”297
The Holy Father in this document on the sacrament of penance was careful not to
water down the traditional understanding of mortal sin. This seems to be the fear of the
Magisterium of the Church whenever the topic of fundamental option surfaces. It is
true that the making of a negative fundamental option occurs with extreme rarity. Thus
it can be subsequently construed that the committing of mortal sin also happens very
rarely in a person’s life. Since this conclusion apparently contradicts human experience,
the Church wants to caution people not to ever equate mortal sin with a negative
fundamental option.
The Pope deals with fundamental option in his encyclical letter VS in n. 65. This
topic occurs in the part on Fundamental Choice and Specific Kinds of Behaviour.298 John Paul
II writes: “The heightened concern for freedom in our own day has led many students
of the behavioural sciences to develop a more penetrating analysis of its nature and of
its dynamics. It has been rightly pointed out that freedom is not only the choice for one
or another particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself and a
setting of one’s own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately
for or against God. Emphasis has rightly been placed on the importance of certain
choices which shape a person’s entire moral life, and which serve as bounds within
which other particular everyday choices can be situated and allowed to develop.” 299 The
document recognizes the need for the fundamental option, since contemporary moral
life cannot be grasped without it. Human freedom does not only concern the ability to
choose from a variety of options, but to make a fundamental decision that would orient
one’s whole life. This fundamental option would be the context that would enable
anyone to understand why a person makes such particular choices in his or her daily
life. The problem therefore is not in the acceptance or rejection of the idea of the
fundamental option, but in the understanding of its nature and dynamics.
The Pope endeavours to explain the idea of the fundamental option as it is found
in various contemporary authors. “They speak of a fundamental freedom, deeper than
296
Cf. PH, n. 10.
297
RP, n. 17.
298
VS, chapter II, part III., nn. 65-70. Cf. Acta Apostolicae Sedis 85 (1993).
299
VS, n. 65.
73
and different from freedom of choice, which needs to be considered if human actions
are to be correctly understood and evaluated. According to these authors, the key role in
the moral life is to be attributed to a fundamental option, brought about by that
fundamental freedom whereby the person makes an overall self-determination, not
through a specific and conscious decision on the level of reflection, but in a
transcendental and athematic way. Particular acts which flow from this option would
constitute only partial and never definitive attempts to give it expression; they would
only be its signs or symptoms …. A distinction thus comes to be introduced between the
fundamental option and deliberate choices of a concrete kind of behaviour.”300 There is a
difference, in the writings of these authors, between fundamental freedom and
categorical freedom.301 In the exercise of fundamental freedom, a fundamental option is
made which determines the direction of one’s whole life. But it would be practically
impossible to determine when and where a person has made such a fundamental
option. Particular acts, that express this fundamental option, do not exhaust in their
entirety the full significance of the fundamental option. The making of particular
choices is an exercise of relative freedom, which is done at the actual and concrete level.
The making of the fundamental option is an exercise of fundamental freedom, that is
done at the transcendental and athematic level. Thus one can only surmise with some
degree of certainty what the fundamental option is from the sum total of a person’s
particular acts. In other words, a positive fundamental option can be inferred if the
great majority – and not all – of a person’s particular acts are good, and vice-versa. This
is best described as the transcendental school of thought.
John Paul II continues: “In some authors this division tends to become a
separation, when they expressly limit moral good and evil to the transcendental
dimension proper to the fundamental option, and describe as right or wrong the other
choices of particular innerworldly kinds of behaviour: those, in other words, concerning
man’s relationship with himself, with others and with the material world. There thus
appears to be established within human acting a clear disjunction between two levels of
morality: on the one hand, the order of good 302 and evil, which is dependent on the will,
and on the other hand, specific kinds of behaviour, which are judged to be morally right
or wrong only on the basis of a technical calculation of the proportion between the
premoral or physical goods303 and evils which actually result form the action.”304
According to these authors, good or evil is determined by the fundamental option.
Right or wrong instead is determined by the consequences of particular choices. “Thus,
an act is right if and only if it … produces, will probably produce, or is intended to
produce at least as great a balance of good over evil as any available alternative; an act is
wrong if and only if it does not do so.” 305 Particular choices are made on the basis of the
300
VS, n. 65.
301
Cf. Brian V. Johnstone, CSsR, Fundamental Option, The New Dictionary of Theology, Joseph A.
Komonchak et al., eds., Wilmington, Delaware, Michael Glazier, 1987, p. 407.
302
Bonum morale. Cf. Böckle, Fundamental Moral Theology, pp. 8-9.
303
Bonum physicum.
304
VS, n. 65.
305
Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed., p. 14.
74
greater balance of good over evil. There is no concrete situation in this world that
contains only good and no evil. Thus to choose between good and evil is an impossible
task. What matters is the proper proportion between good and evil. This is the greater
good – lesser evil argumentation. The right course of action is where the premoral goods
outweigh the physical evils. “The conclusion to which this eventually leads is that the
properly moral assessment of the person is reserved to his fundamental option,
prescinding in whole or in part from his choice of particular actions, of concrete kinds of
behaviour.”306 This is best described as the teleological school of thought.
It can be safely concluded that the two schools of thought on the fundamental
option presented by Pope John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor are both replete with
difficulties. But the teleological school, based as it is on the consequence or end (telos),
contains more problems. The transcendental school, with a proper framework, can be
acceptable. This framework can be found in the realm of developmental psychology.
Bernard Häring emphasizes “the contribution made by Erikson for a better
understanding of the fundamental option ….”307 Erik Erikson describes human life as a
movement through eight cycles of life. 308 “The focal point of his description of the life
cycles is the gradual affirmation of identity and, then, integrity as the basis of a fruitful
life.”309 Häring insists on the fact that “the unfolding of identity comes very close to
what theologians call fundamental option or basic intention.”310
Erik Erikson (1902-1994) presents the human person as undergoing eight ages311
of development:
1. Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust

2. Autonomy vs. Shame & Doubt
3. Initiative vs. Guilt
4. Industry vs. Inferiority
5. Identity vs. Role Confusion
6. Intimacy vs. Isolation
7. Generativity vs. Stagnation
8. Ego Integrity vs. Despair
Erikson presents the stages of moral development as tasks to be accomplished. Each

developmental stage presents some kind of a climactic experience that leads to the
making, the verification, the deepening or even the reversal of the person’s fundamental
option. Such making, verification, deepening or reversal takes concrete form in a
306
VS, n. 65.
307
Bernard Häring, CSsR, Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, vol. 1:
General Moral Theology, Middlegreen, Slough, St. Paul Publications, 1978, p. 244.
308
Cf. Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, London, Triad/Paladin, 1977.
309
Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, vol. 1, p. 169.
310
311
Cf. Erikson, Childhood and Society, pp. 222-247; see appendix.
75
particular choice which the individual makes. The fundamental option hinges on this
concrete choice which is deemed pivotal.
By way of summary, the three Magisterial documents referred to above and the
various authors advocating the fundamental option seem to have different
preoccupations. The Magisterium is apparently concerned with not watering down the
concept of mortal sin. The proponents of the fundamental option seek a deeper
understanding of the nature of the human person and the dynamics of moral activity. It
cannot really be denied that human acts are not all at the same level. Some acts are more
profound and of greater importance. Others are of lesser moment. The fundamental
option is necessary in order to grasp the breadth and height and depth of human
activity. It is a definitive, although not totally irreversible, decision for or against God,
expressed in a concrete choice, that is a culminating event in his or her life, implying the
person’s total commitment either to good or to evil.
By way of conclusion, we can make the following brief but important

observations:
1. The fundamental option orients a person’s whole life, which can be gauged from
the general direction of his or her concrete acts.
2. The fundamental option and a particular or categorical choice are not mutually
exclusive.
3. A crucial moment in a person’s life bridges the gap between the two.
4. The fundamental option entails a total commitment of self.
5. Mortal sin, that merits eternal damnation, necessitates a radical rejection of God
and a total commitment to evil.
76
CHAPTER VI:
CONSCIENCE AND THE MORAL NORM
We shall now tackle the Standards of Morality. There are two such standards –
the subjective and the objective. The subjective standard of morality is the Human
Conscience; the objective standard of morality is the Moral Norm. In times past there was
a tendency to put these two standards of morality in opposition to each other. But these
two standards are really intimately linked; they actually coalesce. The subjective
Human Conscience personalizes the objective Moral Norm and makes it binding. The
Moral Norm is not a norm for human conduct unless the Human Conscience recognizes
it as binding. The Moral Norm exists in itself, but only when it is recognized as binding
by the individual Human Conscience does it become normative for individual human
behaviour.
A. THE HUMAN CONSCIENCE
Our reflection on the Human Conscience shall proceed in three stages: (1) Sacred
Scripture; (2) The Fathers of the Church; (3) Theological Reflection.
1. SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE
77
The Old Testament does not have a special word for conscience. The closest
Hebrew word for it is LEB, which literally means:
Greek Latin English Pilipino

KARDIA COR HEART LOOB
The closeness of the Hebrew LEB to the idea of conscience is made particularly evident
in two instances:
(1) In Job 27,6, the Hebrew LEB was translated into the Greek Septuagint, not as
KARDIA, but as:
Hebrew Greek Septuagint312 English

LEB SYNEIDESIS CONSCIENCE
(2) In Ecclesiastes/Qoheleth 7,22, the Hebrew LEB was translated into the Latin
Vulgate, not as COR, but as:
Hebrew Latin Vulgate313 English

LEB CONSCIENTIA CONSCIENCE
The Hebrew LEB literally refers to the physical organ of the human body.
Figuratively speaking, however, it can mean any of the following:
 The seat of the noblest powers of the human person;314

 The inward and spiritual part of the human person;315
 The seat of the spiritual strength, intelligence and even feelings of the
individual.316
 The core of the sentiments and affections of the individual;
 The ambivalent centre of a person’s joys and sorrows;
 The indicator of the individual’s reactions to the intriguing situations of life;
 The expression of the individual’s hopes and aspirations; and
 The person’s fundamental attitude before God.
The New Testament understanding of conscience centers on the Greek word

syneidesis. Its absence in the Synoptic gospels points to the basically Semitic mentality
312
Timothy E. O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, rev. ed., San Francisco, Harper Collins, 1990,
p. 106.
313
O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, rev. ed., p. 106.
314
Cf. René T. Lagaya, SDB, The Implications of the Theory of Moral Development of Lawrence Kohlberg
for the Christian Formation of Conscience (Unpublished Licentiate Thesis in Moral Theology), Rome, Academia
Alfonsiana, 1985, pp. 67-69.
315
Johannes B. Bauer, Heart, Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology, ed. Johannes B. Bauer, London, Sheed &
Ward, 1970, p. 360.
316
Bauer, Heart, Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology, p. 360.
78
prevalent there. Although written in Greek, the Synoptics were written under Hebraic
and Palestinian influences. Thus the Synoptic idea of conscience is akin to the Old
Testament idea of heart.317
The word syneidesis appears in the other books of the New Testament in the
following instances318:
1Corinthians: 4,4 8,7 10,25

8.10 10,27
8,12 10,28
10,29 (2X)
2Corinthians: 1,12 4,2 5,11
Romans: 2,15 9,1 13,5
1Timothy: 1,5 3,9 4,2

1,15
1,19
2Timothy: 1,3
Acts: 23,1 24,16
Hebrews: 9,9 10,2 13,18

9,14 10,22
1Peter: 2,19 3,16

3,21
John: 8,9
In the Johannine writings the word syneidesis occurs only once, in the passage on the
adulterous woman (7,53-8,11), a passage that is found only in the E, G, H, and K
manuscripts.319 The author of this pericope is definitely not John. In fact it is omitted by
the oldest witnesses. Its style is that of the Synoptics and the author is probably Luke. 320
In the so-called Catholic epistles the term is found only three times, and all these in
1Peter. In the Acts of the Apostles it is found twice, and both of them in Pauline
317
W. D. Davies, Conscience, in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, vol. 1, New York, Abington
Press, 1962, p. 674. Cf. Lagaya, The Implications of the Theory of Moral Development, pp. 70-71.
318
Cf. C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, London, SCM Press Ltd., 1955, p. 62.
319
Cf. Lagaya, The Implications of the Theory of Moral Development, p. 71.
320
Cf. footnote u, The New Jerusalem Bible, standard ed., London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985, p.
1761.
79
discourses. All the rest of the occurrences of the word are found in the so-called corpus
paulinum. In this body of letters attributed rightly or wrongly to St. Paul, we find the
key to the New Testament understanding of conscience. 321
Where did St. Paul get his idea of syneidesis? There are three theories that try to
answer this question. The most popular one concerns Stoicism. 322 Ceslaus Spicq alludes
to this possibility: “It is just possible that the apostle’s use of the word conscience is
derived from his compatriot, the Stoic Athenodorus of Canana (near Tarsus), who lived
from 74 B.C.E. to C.E. 7 and instructed the Emperor Augustus.” 323 C. A. Pierce contests
this theory however by insisting that only three quotations from Stoic writers can be
presented that deal with syneidesis. Of these the most vital seems to be that of Epictetus.
But Epictetus was only about four years old at the martyrdom of St. Paul in Rome. Thus
he could not have possibly influenced the Apostle to the Gentiles. 324 Moreover the term
syneidesis “has undertones of emotion, anxiety, or concern, which little comport with the
Stoic ideal of self-sufficiency (apatheia).”325 In other words, the term conscience whose
content is so alien to Stoic philosophy could not have been born from Stoic
philosophers.
Another theory speaks of a possible Epicurean origin. But C. A. Pierce refuses to

accept even the intimations of Epicureanism, although W. D. Davies suggested such a
possibility when he wrote: “The term first occurs in a passage in Democritus (460-270
B.C.E.), whose philosophy was akin to Epicurus (342-270 B.C.E.).” 326 C. A. Pierce’s
refusal hinges on his disdain for the very authenticity and reliability of the alleged
sources.327
If these two aforementioned theories prove to be unacceptable, where could St.

Paul have taken the term syneidesis? C. A. Pierce says: “It is therefore in general at the
level, not of technical philosophy, but of the commonplaces of everyday usage that his
meaning must be sought.”328 At the outset let us exclude the disputed Pauline letters. In
the undisputed epistles we find three references in 2Corinthians and another three in
Romans. These references are well spaced. But the nine references in 1Corinthians are
basically gathered into two lumps. Both of these references are concerned with only one
subject matter – “meat sacrificed to idols.”329 Thus the third theory proposes that St.
Paul obtained the term syneidesis from the controversy raging at that time in Corinth
about the food offered to false gods.
321
322
Davies, Conscience, in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, vol. 1, p. 671.
323
Ceslaus Spicq, Conscience, in Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology, ed. Johannes B. Bauer, London, Sheed
& Ward, 1970, p. 131.
324
Cf. C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, pp. 13-14. Cf. also Davies, Conscience, in The
Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, vol. 1, p. 671.
325
326
327
328
Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, p. 16.
329
80
There seem to be two groups in the Christian community of Corinth. The first is
the group that claims to be of strong conscience; the second is the group that St. Paul
refers to as having a weak conscience. “On the ground of their superior knowledge that
idols, to which the food had been dedicated, were literally nonentities, so that the
dedication of food to them was without significance, strong Christians were tempted to
ignore the scruples of their weaker brethren, and override their objections.” 330 The
Christians of strong conscience were claiming the freedom to do whatever they pleased
in the matter concerning eating food offered to idols since there definitely was no
question of idolatry. How could there be idolatry when the gods symbolized by the
idols did not exist at all? The term syneidesis therefore was taken by the Christians of
strong conscience as their battle-cry to be granted freedom regarding their conduct in
the matter at hand. The problem however was such conduct was proving to be a
scandal to the Christians of weak conscience. They were drawn to follow the example of
their brethren of strong conscience, but in their regard they were doing it on the
conviction that they were truly taking part in an idolatrous exercise. Thus eating meat
sacrificed to idols was truly a sin of idolatry. On this ground St. Paul remonstrated with
the Christians of strong conscience that they were not totally sinless in this whole affair.
They too were offending God. Their sin was one of scandal – a sin against charity. By
leading their weak brethren to commit the sin of idolatry, they themselves have
offended charity. As the Christians of strong conscience were claiming freedom on
grounds of syneidesis, St. Paul was forbidding them on the same grounds of syneidesis.
Charity dictated that the strong brethren should not eat food offered to the gods out of
consideration for the consciences of their weak brethren. The Pauline usage of syneidesis
therefore comes from the battle-cry used at Corinth regarding the controversy
surrounding the eating of meat sacrificed to idols.
But now what is the content of the Pauline understanding of syneidesis? It

definitely was not a favourite term of St. Paul. 331 In fact he did not consider it important
to Christian ethics. His attitude towards conscience was actually negative – “that of
rebuke.”332 St. Paul rebukes the Corinthians because on the issue of meat sacrificed to
idols they have incurred the wrath of God. For St. Paul the universe is the creation and
realm of God whose government is characterized by order. Each of the elements that
make up the universe has its own due place, function and nature. There is a delicate
balance in the universe that must be maintained by fidelity to the fixed and unalterable
boundaries. Boundary violations would initiate a reaction among the elements
comprising the universe, a reaction whose aim is to rectify the wrong and restore the
balance. The effect however on the transgressor is normally painful and may be
regarded as penal.333
330
331
332
333
Cf. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, pp. 68-69.
81
In Pauline doctrine the human person “is thus subject to three pressures,
complementary and overlapping but nevertheless distinguishable.” 334 First of all, there
is the physical order, because the human person is subject to the pressures of the physical
creation. Should the human person transgress the physical order he or she would incur
natural calamity. Secondly, there is the social order, because the human person is subject
to the pressures of society. Violations of the limits imposed by society would lead to
civil penalty, figuratively referred to as the Sword. Thirdly, there is the order related to
the human person’s “own internal constitution and nature.” 335 Violations of the
demands of the internal order would lead to the incurring of the Divine Wrath in the form
of Conscience.336 “When the rebellion takes the form of a moral wrong, that internal
wrath is what St. Paul understands by conscience.”337 Syneidesis in the New Testament
therefore is basically what is popularly known as the remorse felt by an individual after
he or she has sinned.
2. PATRISTIC TEACHING
We shall now deal with three Fathers of the Church whose teachings on the
human conscience are of special relevance to our concerns. The first is Origen of
Alexandria (185-254 C.E.) Following the philosophy of Plato, Origen, in his
Commentariorum in Epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Romanos (PG 14), sees the human person as
composed of three parts:
 Spirit (Greek: pneuma; Latin: spiritus);

 Soul (Greek: psyche; Latin: anima);
 Flesh (Greek: sarx; Latin: caro).
Origen identifies conscience with the spirit, the source of noble and lofty desires. It is
the part of the human person that pulls the individual up. The flesh is the source of base
concupiscence. It is that part which pulls the individual down. The soul is the part that
stands somewhere in between the spirit and the flesh. It contains both lofty and base
desires, both good and evil inclinations. Thus it is susceptible to the influences of both
the spirit and the flesh.338 Should the flesh succeed in pulling the human person down,
then we have a situation of damnation. Should conscience succeed in pulling the
individual up, then we have the situation called salvation.
The second Father of the Church for our consideration is St. Jerome of Stridon (ca
347-419/420 C.E.). In his Commentariorum in Ezechielem Prophetam (PL 25), he discusses
conscience in connection with the vision of Ezekiel on the four living creatures:
334
335
336
Cf. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, pp. 68-69.
337
338
Cf. Aniceto Molinaro, Momenti nella Storia della Teologia, La Coscienza, by Aniceto Molinaro &
Ambrogio Valsecchi, Bologna, EDB, 1971, pp. 30-31.
82
 Eagle – Conscience;
 Man – Reason;
 Lion – Irascible Tendencies;
 Ox – Concupiscible Appetites.
Conscience is superior to all the other parts of the human person and exercises a
supervising role over the activities of the other three.339
Medieval theologians have attributed to St. Jerome two Greek terms for
conscience: synderesis and syneidesis. The latter presents no problems because it is the
Greek word for conscience. The former however brings with it a lot of difficulties since
it does not exist in the Greek language. Medieval theologians have explained its
appearance thus: “In preparing the first Latin text of the Bible, it seems that Jerome was
working from a Greek manuscript which was not altogether legible. He had to deal
with selections where the topic was clearly conscience, but where the word did not
appear to be syneidesis. Rather the word in his text seemed to be synderesis. Jerome
studied the text, and thought he detected differing nuances when one or the other word
was used. Thus he concluded that the latter term must be simply a Greek word with
which he was unfamiliar, a word being used to make a very particular point.” 340 Since
St. Jerome was not familiar with the word synderesis, he simply kept it in its original
form in his Latin translations of scriptural materials. Instead he translated the Greek
syneidesis into the Latin conscientia. Medieval theologians built on this twofold
understanding of conscience by proposing synderesis as the reality of the Habitual
Conscience and syneidesis or conscientia as the reality of the Actual Conscience.
“But, recent scholarship has made clear that Jerome was wrong. There are not
two words in Greek for conscience, but only one. The distinction between the two
concepts may very well be useful, and indeed we shall find it so. But in making that
distinction, we must be clear that it is ours, not the Bible’s.” 341 “The trouble can be
traced to the Glossa Ordinaria.342 It refers to a compilation of glosses on the texts of
certain manuscripts.343 These glosses are marginal or intralinear notes or commentaries
to certain obscure words.344 Thus the Glossa Ordinaria on Ezekiel must have contained
synderesis and the scribe who copied St. Jerome’s commentary must have corrected his
syneidesis with the synderesis345 found in the Glossa Ordinaria.”346
339
Cf. M. B. Crowe, The term Synderesis and the Scholastics, in Irish Theological Quarterly (23: 1956), p.
152.
340
Timothy E. O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, original ed., New York, The Seabury Press,
1978, p. 89.
341
O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, original ed., p. 89.
342
Cf. M. B. Crowe, The term Synderesis and the Scholastics, in Irish Theological Quarterly, p. 155.
343
Cf. J. M. Buckley, Glossa Ordinaria, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, New York, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1967, vol. 6, p. 515.
344
Cf. O’C. Sloane, Gloss, Biblical, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, VI:516.
345
Cf. Crowe, The term Synderesis and the Scholastics, Irish Theological Quarterly, p. 155.
346
Lagaya, The Implications of the Theory of MoraL Development, p. 82.
83
The third Father of the Church whom we shall discuss is St. Augustine of Hippo
(354-430 C.E.). In his Enarratio in Psalmum CXLV, he comments the ability of the human
person to praise the Lord.
 The human person can praise the Lord because he or she does not only
possess a body; the individual also has a soul.
 The soul can praise the Lord because in the soul is found reason.
 Reason can praise the Lord because in reason resides conscience.
St. Augustine refers to conscience as Sedes Dei – the Divine Throne and the Royal
Chamber of God. It is that innermost portion of the human person where no one can
enter except for God and for the human person himself or herself. 347 In it the God –
Human Person Dialogue takes place. The positive response of the human person results
in salvation. The negative response of the human person brings about damnation. This
dialogue is pure and unalloyed because no one can enter this Sedes Dei except for the
partners in this saving dialogue. In other words, no other creature, not even the devil,
can affect conscience. The devil can influence the human senses, both external and
internal, but not conscience. Thus a decision of conscience is a fully responsible act of
the human person. The individual has only himself or herself to blame for his or her
own sinfulness.
3. THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION
The theological reflection on the human conscience can be a complicated matter.

There are three basic approaches to the understanding of the human conscience. There
is the traditional Twofold Understanding of Conscience,348 the Threefold Understanding,349
and the Single Understanding of Conscience.350
a. The Twofold Understanding of Conscience
According to this approach the human conscience can be understood as:
 Synderesis or Habitual Conscience.

 Syneidesis/Conscientia or Actual Conscience.
There are two major schools of thought on this twofold understanding of the
human conscience:
347
Cf. Ambrogio Valsecchi, Coscienza, Dizionario Enciclopedico di Teologia Morale, eds. Leandro Rossi
& Ambrogio Valsecchi, Rome, Edizioni Paoline, 1981, p. 171.
348
Cf. Bernard Häring, CSsR, The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, vol. 1: General
Moral Theology, trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, Paramus, NJ, The Hewman Press, 1966, p. 139.
349
Cf. John Macquarrie, Three Issues in Ethics, New York, Harper & Row, 1970, pp. 111-112.
350
Cf. Walter E. Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence, Birmingham, Alabama,
Religious Education Press, 1981, pp. 1-33.
84
1. The Franciscan School – represented by Alexander of Hales and by St.
Bonaventure.
2. The Dominican School – represented by St. Albert the Great and by St. Thomas
Aquinas.
The Franciscan School understands Habitual Conscience or synderesis as the

habit of the will which inclines it towards the good. This importance given to the human
will is true to the Franciscan voluntaristic bent. Actual Conscience or
syneidesis/conscientia instead is the habit of the practical intellect which is innate to the
human person and which contains the first moral principles that guide moral
behaviour.351
The Dominican School, for its part, understands Habitual Conscience as a habit
and Actual Conscience as an act.352 St. Albert the Great sees the Habitual Conscience as a
special power or inborn faculty of the soul where the universal moral principles reside as
they direct the Practical Intellect in its pursuit of the good. Actual Conscience instead is
a function of the Practical Intellect which applies the universal moral principles to
concrete situations.353
St. Thomas Aquinas gives refinement to the thoughts of his master Albert. He
deals with the Habitual Conscience or synderesis by drawing a parallelism between the
Speculative Intellect and the Practical Intellect. The Speculative Intellect has the habit of
the first self-evident principles in speculative matters called intellectus principiorum. The
Practical Intellect likewise has the habit of the immediately-known first principles in
practical matters known as synderesis. The intellectus principiorum acts as some kind of
immovable mover for all speculative activity. The synderesis, for its part, acts as the
immovable mover for all practical activity. 354 In other words, synderesis is the permanent
disposition or the habit of the first principles of morality or of the natural law residing
in the practical intellect which moves the person to do good and to avoid evil. 355 As the
immovable mover of all moral activity, the Habitual Conscience is necessarily infallible.
The Actual Conscience or syneidesis/conscientia is the act of applying the moral

principles proposed by the Habitual Conscience to the concrete situations of human life.
It is actually the conclusion of a logical syllogism in moral matters. A logical syllogism
is composed of two premises (major and minor) and a conclusion. “A universal
principle is provided by the Habitual Conscience (major premise); it is combined with
another principle more clearly related to action (minor premise); and the conclusion into
which the premises issue is considered the act of conscience (syneidesis/conscientia).356
351
Cf. Lagaya, The Implications of the Theory of Moral Development, pp. 87-88.
352
Lagaya, The Implications of the Theory of Moral Development, pp. 89-93.
353
Cf. St. Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, 1.2, q. 71, a. 1; Aniceto Molinaro, Momenti nella Storia
della Teologia, La Coscienza, by Aniceto Molinaro & Ambrogio Valsecchi, Bologna, EDB, 1971, pp. 36-37.
354
Cf. St. Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, 1.2, q. 71, a. 1; Aniceto Molinaro, Momenti nella Storia
della Teologia, La Coscienza, by Aniceto Molinaro & Ambrogio Valsecchi, p. 90.
355
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 12.
356
Crowe, The term Synderesis and the Scholastics, in Irish Theological Quarterly, p. 234.
85
The decision reached by Actual Conscience is of two kinds. Thus we have the
Antecedent Conscience and the Consequent Conscience. “If it is a question of an action in
the future, conscience decides whether or not it ought to be done (antecedent conscience);
if it is a past action, conscience examines it in order to discover whether it was rightly or
wrongly done (consequent conscience).”357 Actual Conscience can bind the person to do or
to shun something. But it can also either praise the person for compliance or accuse him
or her for non-compliance with its biddings. 358 Compliance with the dictates of
Antecedent Conscience is always the proper course of action to take. Non-compliance
would always result in remorse of conscience. It is possible that the decision reached by
Actual Conscience may be erroneous, due to mistakes in the syllogism made.
Nonetheless non-compliance with the decision reached would always be sinful since in
that actual situation the person has no possibility of knowing that the dictate emanating
from Actual Conscience is flawed. Actual Conscience is the most intimate and the
ultimate guide of human conduct.
The Thomistic approach to the understanding of conscience is the most widely

accepted of all the theories available.
b. The Threefold Understanding of Conscience
According to this approach the human conscience can be understood as:
 Conscience/1: Synderesis – Conscience as a Characteristic;

 Conscience/2: Conscientia – Conscience as a Process;
 Conscience/3: Syneidesis – Conscience as an Event.
“To begin, we speak of conscience/1. Here we are referring to conscience as an

abiding human characteristic, to a general sense of value, an awareness of personal
responsibility, that is utterly emblematic of the human person.” 359 The term synderesis is
a Greek-sounding word coined in the Middle Ages, originally intended to refer to
habitual conscience. Basically it what urges the human person to do good and to avoid evil.
Every human being seeks the good and draws away from evil. Every person searches
for what is of value to himself or to herself. There may be discrepancy as to what people
may consider to be valuable, but there can be no doubt that all would seek what they
appreciate to be good and avoid what they deem to be evil. Thus conscience/1 is
characteristic of every human individual and is the common moral heritage of humanity.
It is infallible! This means to say that synderesis can never err in bringing people to do
good and to avoid evil. It is indeed a sure guide for humanity.
As for conscience as conscientia, we can say that “if conscience/1 is a

characteristic, conscience/2 is the process which that characteristic demands.
357
Crowe, The term Synderesis and the Scholastics, in Irish Theological Quarterly, p. 240.
358
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 13.
359
86
Conscience/2 deals with the effort to achieve a specific perception of values, concrete
individual values. It is the ongoing process of reflection, discernment, discussion, and
analysis in which human beings have always engaged.” 360 Conscience/2 is really con +
science or conscientia (cum + scientia). Conscientia is the Latin word for conscience. It is
the human process of acquiring moral science. Therefore conscience/2 can also be
referred to as Moral Science. The acquisition of knowledge is never faultless. In other
words, error can creep into the process of gaining knowledge as guide for human
behaviour. Thus, unlike conscience/1, conscience/2 is not infallible! But it is also the
dimension of conscience that is educable. This means to say that formation of
conscience takes place at this level. It is the conscience that is open to external
influences. Hence it is the conscience that can be trained. Conscience as synderesis is an
innate and natural endowment of every human person. No formation of conscience is
possible there! Conscience as conscientia however really seeks all the data possible for
the better understanding of the moral arena. Therefore people influence others at this
level. Should a person get wrong information, he or she would come to an erroneous
moral conclusion. But should he or she obtain proper information, then the individual is
led to the making of a right moral conclusion.
“If conscience/1 is a characteristic and conscience/2 is a process, conscience/3 is

an event. And as such, conscience/3 is consummately concrete. It is the concrete
judgment of a specific person pertaining to her or his own immediate action. But for all
that concreteness, the judgment of conscience/3 is also supremely powerful. For it
constitutes the final norm by which a person’s action must be guided. Indeed, by the
personal decision either to accept or to refuse the demand of conscience/3, the moral
agent engages either in an act of sanctity or in actual sin.” 361 Syneidesis, as mentioned
above, is the Greek word for conscience. Conscience as syneidesis decides on the basis of
the moral conclusions reached by conscience/2. It is the event whereby the human
person commits himself or herself to a course of action charted by conscience as
conscientia. Unlike conscience/2, conscience/3 is infallible! But in its infallibility, it is also
dissimilar to conscience/1. Conscience/1 can never err. Conscience/3 instead can err, if
the moral conclusion reached by conscience/2 is erroneous. But if the process that
conscience/2 has gone through is honest and sincere – although insufficient and
defective at times – then the person concerned cannot be blamed.
Perhaps it is the people responsible for his or her training that should be blamed
because they have failed to present the truth in a convincing manner. Vatican II in the
Declaration on Religious Freedom DIGNITATIS HUMANAE says: “On their part, all men
are bound to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God and his Church, and to
embrace the truth they come to know, and to hold fast to it. This sacred Synod likewise
professes its belief that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and
exert their binding force. The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own
truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.” 362 The
360
361
362
DH, n. 1, The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, SJ, New York, Guild Press, 1966, p. 677.
87
Council teaches that conscience has only one master – the truth. Thus conscience bows
down to the truth if it proposed to it “at once quietly and with power.” 363 The truth does
no violence to conscience, but at the same time it is irresistibly persuasive. Formation of
conscience therefore consists in the compelling presentation of the truth. The moral
ascendancy of those responsible for the formation of conscience does not come from
office or position, but from the ability to present the truth convincingly.
Conscience/3 is infallible, not in the sense that it cannot err, but in the sense that
it cannot sin. It is thus the sure guide of the human person in his or her moral
endeavours. In fact to go against the decision of syneidesis is sinful. The decision of
conscience/3 is to the human person, in all honesty, the right course of action to follow.
Therefore failure to abide by it is to commit a sin. A particular case may arise regarding
persons living in religious institutes and others bound by the vow of obedience. A
superior may bound his or her member by vow to do or to refrain from doing
something. But it is all possible that the superior may fail to present the truth of what he
or she requires in a convincing manner. Thus the conscience of the member resists the
order and instructs the person concerned to do otherwise. To disobey the Superior is
sinful and to disobey one’s conscience is sinful too. How can the religious get out of
such a dilemma? Definitely he or she cannot escape his or her conscience. Hence he or
she is left with the only option of moving out of the jurisdiction of his or her superior so
as to avoid committing a sin. Dispensation from the vow of religious obedience may be
the sinless course of action to take. The member is not blameworthy in this situation. In
all probability the superior is to blame for his or her failure to present the truth in a
convincing manner. In such a dramatic case the action of conscience/3 can truly become
a noteworthy and memorable event.
c. The Single Understanding of Conscience
Walter E. Conn views the human conscience basically “as personal moral
consciousness.”364 He defines conscience thus: “Conscience is the dynamic thrust
toward self-transcendence at the core of a person’s very subjectivity revealing itself
on the fourth level of consciousness as a demand for responsible decision in accord
with reasonable judgment.”365 This definition is indeed pregnant with meaning. We
shall strive to grasp its sense in stages, consisting mainly in the reflection on its various
elements: (1) self-transcendence; (2) subjectivity; (3) consciousness; (4) judgment; (5)
decision.
i. Self-Transcendence
Walter E. Conn, quoting from and commenting on “Trilling’s 1970 Charles Eliot
Norton Lectures, Sincerity and Authenticity,”366 discusses self-transcendence in this
fashion. “Moral language has, like all language, a history, and we must be aware of the
363
DH, n. 1.
364
Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence, p. 2.
365
88
various influences which have given the contemporary moral idiom its particular
shape.”367 “… in the West for some four hundred years,” 368 the key moral concept was
sincerity. “Sincerity … refers primarily to a congruence between avowal and actual
feeling.”369 In other words, it is “the avoidance of being false to any man through being
true to one’s own self ….”370 But now “the concept of sincerity has suffered a sharp
diminution of the authority it once exercised.” 371 The main reason for this decline seems
to be the realization that when we really are sincere, “we actually are what we want our
community to know we are. In short, we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely
act the part of the sincere person, with the result that a judgment may be passed upon
our sincerity that it is not authentic.”372
Thus the word authenticity seems to be a better moral concept because it

“suggests a more strenuous moral experience than sincerity does, a more exigent
conception of the self and of what being true to it consists in, a wider reference to the
universe and man’s place in it, and a less acceptant and genial view of the social
circumstances of life. And it is this concept … that has arisen both to suggest the
deficiencies of sincerity and to usurp its place in our esteem.” 373 All this seems to
suggest that a sincere person is not necessarily an authentic individual. Sincerity
actually implies living up to the expectations of the human community or being true to
the demands of our role in society. The problem here is what if the role we are playing
in the community is not proper to us. To speak in religious parlance: what if the place
we have assumed in the community is not what God has planned for us? The word
authenticity takes into consideration the role God intends us to play for the realization
of the Reign of God. In other words, we are authentic when we are true to God’s will for
us.
The problem with authenticity, for its part, is that it cannot be used to gauge the
moral stature of anyone. The reason for this is the fact that “authenticity itself is not a
criterion … but rather an ideal which stands in need of a criterion.” 374 The satisfactory
criterion seems to be responsibility. Now responsibility, for its part, needs a measure.
And this measure is nothing else but self-transcendence. Hence “the criterion of human
authenticity, of the responsible person, is the self-transcendence that is effected through
sensitive and creative understanding, critical judgment, responsible decision, loyal
commitment, and genuine love.”375 To put it differently, self-transcendence “refers
primarily to the threefold achievement of moving beyond one’s own self that is effected in
366
Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence, p. 4. Cf. Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and
Authenticity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972.
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
89
every instance of correct understanding (cognitive), responsible decision (moral), and
genuine love (affective).”376
ii. Subjectivity
Subjectivity is not the much-depreciated word that connotes arbitrariness when

it is compared with objectivity. Subjectivity refers to the essential element of morality
that initiates the whole process of human activity. After all, the moral subject is no other
than the human person. Now, from the standpoint of the single understanding of
conscience, the meaning of person is inseparable from the meaning of conscience.377 To
propose the person as identifiable with conscience is to understand the human person
as “conscious subjectivity.” 378 We can thus say that “man does not have a conscience; he
is conscience.”379 The idea of subjectivity therefore centers on the human person as
conscience, that is, as an entity acting in full awareness of being the center of moral
activity.
iii. Consciousness
We take consciousness from the viewpoint of conscience as the awareness of the

person of his identity as a moral subject. Bernard Lonergan distinguishes “… different
levels of consciousness and intentionality …. In our dream states consciousness and
intentionality commonly are fragmentary and incoherent. When we awake, they take on
a different hue to expand on four successive, related, but qualitatively different levels.
1. “There is the empirical level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak,
move.
2. “There is an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, express

what we have understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our
expression.
3. “There is the rational level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, pass
judgment on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement.
4. “There is the responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own
operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate
them, decide, and carry out our decisions.”380
There are certain key verbs needed to understand the essence of these levels of
consciousness and intentionality. At the empirical level, the key verb is to experience.
376
377
Cf. Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence, p. 8.
378
379
380
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, SJ, Method in Theology, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 2nd ed., 1973, p. 9.
90
Here there is an “appeal to data.” 381 At the intellectual level, it is to understand. Here
effort is exerted in order to arrive at “a better explanation of the data.” 382 At the rational
level, the important verb is to judge. Here there is the coordinated activity of all
“rational … operations,”383 a harmonious interaction of intellect and of free will. At the
responsible level, it is to decide. Here there is the natural flow of “a judgment of value” 384
into “a decision”385 which commits the whole person into “a transformation of the
subject and his world.”386
The nature of operations at each of these levels of consciousness and

intentionality can be described thus:
1. “Experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding,
2. “Understanding the unity and relations of one’s experienced experiencing,

understanding, judging and deciding,
3. “Affirming the reality of one’s experienced and understood experiencing,

understanding, judging and deciding and
4. “Deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous

relatedness of one’s experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding,
judging and deciding.”387
iv. Judgment
At the empirical level of consciousness, the operation of experiencing is more an

activity of the senses. At the intellectual level of consciousness, the operation of
understanding is more an activity of the intellect. The human activities at these first two
levels do not involve the entire person. It is at the third and fourth levels of
consciousness that the whole human person is fully concerned. The operation of
affirming at the rational level of consciousness demands from the moral subject an act
of judgment. “Self-affirmation, then … is a judgment of fact.” 388 Judgment is the result
381
Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 19.
382
383
384
385
386
Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 130. “Self-transcendence is the achievement of conscious
intentionality, and as the latter has many parts and a long development, so too has the former. There is a first step in
attending to the data of sense and consciousness. Next, inquiry and understanding yield an apprehension of a
hypothetical world mediated by meaning. Thirdly, reflection and judgment reach an absolute: through them we
acknowledge what really is so, what is independent of us and our thinking. Fourthly, by deliberation, evaluation,
decision, action, we can know and do, not just what pleases us, but what truly is good, worth while.” Lonergan, SJ,
Method in Theology, p. 35.
387
Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 14-15.
388
91
of both an intellectual and a volitional process. Judgment is a determination of the
human will whether the value perceived by the intellect is worth pursuing.
v. Decision
The operation of deciding at the responsible level of consciousness is the link

between the judgment of conscience and the dynamics of action or human execution.
When a person decides on some value as worth pursuing, he or she commits himself or
herself to the course of action that would bring about the realization of this judgment.
By deciding the moral subject makes himself or herself responsible for the attainment of
the value in question. Such pursuit would definitely encounter obstacles. Thus it can
only be sustained in direct proportion to the love that the person has for the Ultimate
and Absolute Good.389
vi. Kohlbergian Contribution
Bernard Haering makes a remarkable statement: “If we understand the

contribution made by Erikson for a better understanding of the fundamental option,
then we are helped to appreciate also Lawrence Kohlberg’s contribution towards a
deeper understanding of the moral development of conscience. It seems to me most
fortunate that Kohlberg has found such a ready audience among ethicians and
educators.”390 Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987) worked on the findings of the foremost
child psychologist of the 20th century, Jean Piaget (1896-1980), and devised his own
Cognitive Theory of Moral Development that was applicable even to adolescents and
adults. His theory runs thus:
KOHLBERGIAN COGNITIVE STAGES

OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT391
Level A: PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL

(Physical and Material Considerations)
Stage 1: The Stage of Punishment and Obedience

(Right is literal obedience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment,
and not doing physical harm.)
Stage 2: The Stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange
389
Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 240-241.
390
391
Cf. Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Moral Development,
New York, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1981, pp. 409-412. Cf. also René T. Lagaya, SDB, The Training of
Future Priests: An Application of the Kohlbergian Approach to the Formation of Conscience, Rome, Academia
Alfonsiana, 1987. Cf. also Lagaya, SDB, The Implications of the Theory of Moral Development of Lawrence
Kohlberg for the Christian Formation of Conscience.
92
(Right is serving one’s own or other’s needs and making fair deals in
terms of concrete exchange.)
Level B: CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

(Psychological Considerations)
Stage 3: The Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships and

Conformity
(Right is playing a good/nice role, being concerned about other people
and their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being
motivated to follow rules and expectations.)
Stage 4: The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance

(Right is doing one’s duty in society, upholding the social order, and
maintaining the welfare of society or of the group.)
Level B/C: Transitional Level

(Already Postconventional but not yet Principled)
Level C: POSTCONVENTIONAL AND PRINCIPLED LEVEL

(Principled Considerations)
Stage 5: The Stage of Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility

(Right is upholding the basic rights, values and legal contracts of a society,
even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group.)
Stage 6: The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles

(Right is what conforms to the principles that all humanity should follow,
conceived in terms of Rawlsian Justice.392)
Stage 7: The Stage of Agape Morality

(Right is what is in conformity with selfless love.)
Conn and Lonergan look at conscience development as a deepening of

consciousness and intentionality. The Kohlbergian theory sees this deepening as the
movement of motive from what is merely material and physical to what is principled.
Since motive for human behaviour is the key issue, Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory is truly
helpful to the formation of conscience from the standpoint of the single understanding.
As motive becomes spiritual and selfless, the person matures as a moral subject.
We shall fittingly conclude our discussion of the Single Understanding of

Conscience by enumerating the essential characteristics of Stage Development, which is
the backbone of the Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Lawrence Kohberg:
392
Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971.
93
1. “Stage development is invariant.”393
2. “In stage development, subjects cannot comprehend moral reasoning at a stage
more than one stage beyond their own.”394
3. “In stage development, subjects are cognitively attracted to reasoning at one
level395 above their own predominant level.”396
4. “In stage development, movement through the stages is effected when cognitive
disequilibrium is created.”397
Crises in life should not really be viewed pessimistically. They can even push a person
to rethink and evaluate his or her position – effect what is called in Kohlbergian terms a
cognitive disequilibrium. This can indeed move him or her forward in the journey
towards moral maturity.
B. THE MORAL NORM
Vatican II devotes an entire number in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in

the Modern World GAUDIUM ET SPES on the topic of conscience:
“In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law 398 which he does not impose
upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good
and avoid evil,399 the voice of conscience can when necessary speak to his heart more
specifically: do this, shun that.400 For man has in his heart a law written by God. 401 To
obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged. 402
“Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. 403 There he is alone
with God,404 whose voice echoes in his depths. In a wonderful manner conscience
reveals that law405 which is fulfilled by love of God and neighbor. 406 In fidelity to
conscience, Christians are joined with the rest of men in the search for truth, and for the
genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of individuals and
from social relationships. Hence the more that a correct conscience holds sway, the
393
Ronald Duska & Mariellen Whelan, Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg, New York,
Paulist Press, 1975, p. 47.
394
Duska & Whelan, Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg, p. 48.
395
To be read as stage.
396
397
398
Cf. Natural Law.
399
Cf. Habitual Conscience.
400
Cf. Actual Conscience.
401
Cf. Natural Law.
402
403
Cf. St. Augustine.
404
Cf. St. Augustine.
405
Cf. Natural Law.
406
Cf. the Synthesis of all the commandments and the supreme standard of morality.
94
more persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and strive to be guided by
objective norms of morality.407
“Conscience frequently errs408 from invincible ignorance without losing its

dignity. The same cannot be said of a man who cares but little for truth and goodness,
or of a conscience which by degrees grows practically sightless as a result of habitual
sin.”409
Three observations are in place at this juncture of our discussion:
 There is no uniform and harmonious understanding of the human conscience in

the teachings of the Second Vatican Council.
 The human conscience and the moral norm are intimately linked.
 It is the human conscience that bestows normativity or binding force on the
objective standards of morality.
The things that we seek in life are connected with importance. The philosopher
Dietrich von Hildebrand is helpful here. For him, “to be human is … to find some
things important and some things not. What is more, we do not find all things
important for the same reason. Some of the things we cherish are important to us
simply because they are subjectively satisfying. They feel good, and therefore we like
them. Other aspects of life, however, we consider important because of their utility.
They are objectively good for us. Visits to the dentist, the pursuit of an education, or
regular exercise may or may not be fun. But most people consider them somehow
important nonetheless.
These two categories of importance, however, do not, in von Hildebrand’s

judgment, exhaust our experience. On the contrary, he finds that members of the
human community consider some things important simply because they are good in
themselves. They have a kind of life of their own, independent of both our wishes and
our needs, and human persons cherish them for what they are.” 410 Examples of such
realities are truth, ethical goodness, honesty, fairness, compassion, chastity, justice, and
all those realities we have traditionally named virtues.411 “To these realities that fall into
this category of independent importance von Hildebrand gives the name values.
Whether they be intellectual, aesthetic, or moral, values have this common characteristic
of independent importance. Values are there, present in our experience, whether we
like it or not.”412
407
Cf. Natural Law.
408
409
GS, n. 16, The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, SJ, pp. 213-214.
410
411
Cf. O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, rev. ed., p. 132.
412
95
In reality the moral norm is tied up with value. The human conscience recognizes
value as a necessary good, a good worth pursuing so as to attain personal fulfillment.
Thus the moral norm imposes itself by virtue of the inherent good to which it leads. In
other words, if the individual abides by the moral norm, he or she would enjoy the
good intimately linked with it. Hence the moral norm is no harsh imposition, based on
an empty promise. It really helps the person to achieve personal fulfillment. Indeed it
brings the individual to be true to his or her human nature.
1. CLASSIFICATIONS
a. Eternal Law
The first classification of moral norm that we have to deal with is the eternal law.
Eternal Law is God as “the source of moral law and obligation in our world.” 413 Eternal
law therefore is not really a norm as the very God who has created everything
“according to his good pleasure which he determined beforehand in Christ ….” 414 The
eternal law consists in the whole gamut of the saving plan of God – “the mystery of His
purpose”415 for the whole of his creation which “is waiting with eagerness for the
children of God to be revealed.”416 As such no creature can ever know the full extent of
the eternal law. Its height and breadth and depth are unfathomable to humanity since
no mortal creature can ever grasp the fullness of the divine plan.
The eternal law is dynamic because it is a plan that will be realized in the fullness
of time. It is not a legal code with which one must comply. Rather it is a plan for the
salvation of humanity and for the fulfillment of all creation which demands human
collaboration with God for its full realization. In the words of the Synoptic Gospels, 417
the eternal law can be identified with the Reign of God, that reality which Jesus Christ
came to proclaim and to establish. God created everything for a purpose. In this regard,
God designed the whole of creation according to certain modes of conduct that would
lead towards the fulfillment of this purpose. Compliance with these designated modes
of conduct thus becomes compelling and obligatory – otherwise the divine purpose
would be frustrated. Hence eternal law is truly God as the source of obligation in
creation.
b. Natural Law
The next classification in our agenda for discussion is the natural law. “God is
the creator of the world, the source of all its being. And so, as God brings about the
human world and human nature, so the eternal law brings about natural law. Or to put
this another way, as the eternal law is God under the aspect of lawgiver, natural law is
413
414
Ep 1,9.
415
Ep 1,9.
416
Rm 8,19.
417
Cf. Mk 1,14-15.
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human nature under the aspect of its inherent obligations …. In von Hildebrand’s
terms, natural law is the reality of moral values as they impinge on our
consciousness.”418 Natural law cannot be found written anywhere. The only place where
it can be found is in the heart of the human person. 419 Thus natural law is actually the
consciousness of the demands of the human nature. If these demands are authentic,
then they lead to the fulfillment of the saving plan of God. In other words, the natural
law shows human beings the way towards the realization of the Reign of God.
Many of contemporary moral teachings are based on Natural-Law arguments. A

clear example is the Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI on the Regulation of Birth HUMANAE
VITAE, published on 25 July 1968. The Holy Father clearly stated that the content of the
encyclical letter is “a teaching based on the natural law ….” 420 But is the natural law
“really a law at all”?421 Since “the natural law is a source of true obligation,” 422 then it is
really a law. The natural law is a coercive force that truly demands compliance. 423 But
since the natural law does not exist in any official pronouncement, but is a “Law
engraved on their hearts, to which their own conscience bears witness,” 424 then it cannot
fittingly be called a law. The natural law therefore is a unique law, a law sui generis. It is
a law that can be read only by the human conscience.
c. Positive Law
“It is clear … that the natural law is insufficient for the ordering of human life.
Given the obvious fact that we are social beings, beings who must coordinate with and
relate to our fellows, it is obvious that there is also a need for a variety of regulations by
which to organize common life.”425 Thus we have the classification of the moral norm
known as positive law. “This term is ambiguous in contemporary English, but it was
coined for the simple reason that such laws are posited. They are the creations of human
ingenuity, not given self-evidently by the fabric of creation like the natural law. Positive
laws can be expressed in both affirmative and negative propositions (and hence are not
necessarily positive in that sense of the word). But in either case they constitute the tools
of the human enterprise of societal living.”426
“St. Thomas Aquinas defines law as an ordinance of reason, promulgated for the
common good by one who has charge of a society.” 427 This traditional definition of law
perfectly coincides with the concept of positive law. The one who holds authority in
human community makes explicit the demands of the natural law for the good running
418
419
Cf. GS, n. 16.
420
HV, n. 4, Pasay City, St. Paul Publications, 1968, p. 4.
421
422
423
Cf. O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, rev. ed., pp. 134-135.
424
Rm 2,15.
425
426
427
Msgr. Paul J. Glenn, Ethics, St. Louis, Missouri, 1930, p. 72.
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of society. Positive law therefore that contradicts the demands of the natural law loses
its force. Authentic positive law cannot be arbitrary. It must be grounded in the natural
law and it must have the common good of society in view. In other words, positive law
that contravenes natural law cannot demand compliance.
Positive law promulgated by ecclesiastical authorities is known as ecclesiastical

law, or more fittingly canon law. Positive law that is promulgated by the governments
of civil societies is called civil law. Positive law that is proposed as a duty that must be
performed is known as affirmative law. It prescribes an act and binds always but not at
every moment. In other words, it allows room for exceptions. Positive law that is
proposed as a prohibition is known as negative law. It forbids an act and binds always
and at every moment. In short, it allows no exceptions.428
2. DISPENSATIONS
Positive law can cease to bind. We shall just refer to this section of our discussion
as dispensations, although this term has a more technical meaning. Dispensations are not
possible when it comes to either the Eternal Law or the Natural Law. As long as God is
God, the eternal law holds. As long as human nature is what it is, the natural law binds.
Positive law however may cease to bind on the following occasions:
a. When the obligation ceases.

b. When the law itself ceases.
c. When the virtue of epikeia is exercised.
The obligation to obey a law stops when the person concerned ceases to be
subject of the law. This situation happens on these three occasions:
 Transfer of domicile.
 Granting of Dispensation.
 Giving of a Privilege.
Domicile is a place where a person stays with the intention of remaining there
permanently, or where he or she has stayed for five complete years. 429 “Members of
religious institutes and societies of apostolic life acquire a domicile in the place of the
house to which they are attached.”430 A dispensation is the relaxation of a positive law
in a particular case granted by someone who enjoys executive power, but always within
the limits of his or her competence. 431 A privilege is a favour granted to a certain person
by someone who exercises legislative power or also by someone who enjoys executive
428
Cf. Glenn, Ethics, p. 78.
429
Cf. canon 102 (1983 Code of Canon Law).
430
Canon 103.
431
Cf. canon 85.
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authority if he or she has been given this power by the competent legislator. 432 A
privilege is presumed to be perpetual.433
The duty to comply with a positive law stops when the law itself ceases, and this
can happen on these two occasions:
 Revocation or abrogation by competent authority.

 Disappearance of the purpose for the law.
“Epikeia is a term describing the way in which a Christian ought to deal with
what appears to be a conflict between the letter of the law and the spirit of the law.” 434
St. Thomas Aquinas would argue in this way: “Since law is essentially the intelligent
ordering of means to an end, epikeia must be understood as the correct interpretation of
the intention of the law. Every human law is an attempt to concretize in the letter of the
law the intention of the spirit of the law. But inasmuch as everyday life is complex and
constantly shifting, it is to be expected that the letter of the law will not always succeed
in serving the spirit of the law.” 435 This rich Thomistic explanation of the law
necessitates three observations:
1. “Christians must forsake the letter of the law if it does not actually serve the
common good in a particular case. It is not a matter of being permitted to violate
the law. One is morally obligated to do so because the basic moral obligation is to
seek the good. If a human law does not actually serve that good, Christians must
do whatever will serve that good. Thus the notion of epikeia is not (as is often
thought) a matter of replacing duty with un-Christian license. No, it is a matter
of replacing one apparent duty (to the letter of the law) with another, more
fundamental duty (to the spirit of the law, to its true function of serving the
common good.)”436
2. “Epikeia is the virtue (power, skill, habit) by which Christian persons discern the
inner meaning of any human law so as to obey it intelligently in the majority of
cases and to violate it reasonably in the properly exceptional case.” 437 St.
Augustine defines virtue as: “Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua bene vivitur, qua
nemo male utitur.”438 Since epikeia is a virtue, it can be used only for good and
never for evil.
432
Cf. canon 76.
433
Cf. canon 78.
434
O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, original ed., p. 188.
435
O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, rev. ed., p. 231. Cf. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 120, a.
2.
436
437
438
St. Augustine, Retractiones, I,9. PL 32,597. (Virtue is a quality of inner goodness through which one
lives well, through which one avoids acting badly.) Cf. Bernard Häring, CSsR, The Law of Christ, vol. 1: General
Moral Theology, trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, CPpS, Paramus, NJ, The Newman Press, 1966, p. 485.
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3. Epikeia is situated within the context of the virtue of justice. 439 Hence “it is not a
dispensation from the law but … the correct application of an inherently limited
law oriented toward serving the public good.” 440 Thus it can rightly be said that
“exercising the virtue of epikeia is morally superior to the mere observance of the
letter of the law. It is realistic about the inability of law both to cover every
contingency and to define the full measure of moral responsibility. Epikeia
enables each person to respond to the demands of the Spirit by discerning the
inner meaning, or spirit, of the law before making the final decision in a concrete
situation.”441
We come now to the last point for our discussion on the topic of the moral norm.
This is the issue of civil disobedience. As the term implies, this applies only to civil
law. “The grounds for civil disobedience lie in the fundamental moral obligation of
natural law: to seek and to do the good and to avoid evil. If a law does not serve the
good, then we are morally obliged (not just permitted) to violate the law.” 442 For civil
disobedience to be justifiable, it is necessary that it:
1. “Counts the Cost.

2. Affirms the Law.
3. Is a Last Resort.
4. Identifies a Specific Aim.
5. Is Concerned for the Means.
6. Respects the Structures of the Community.
7. Contributes Toward Reordering the Community.”443
439
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 120, a. 2.
440
Richard M. Gula, SS, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality, New York, Paulist
Press, 1989, p. 257.
441
Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality, p. 258.
442
Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality, p. 259.
443
Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality, pp. 259-260. Cf. Daniel Stevick,
Civil Disobedience and the Christian, New York, Seabury Press, 1969, pp. 102-113.
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CHAPTER VII:
SIN AND CONVERSION
A. THE MYSTERY OF SIN
1. SCRIPTURAL TEACHING
“In the opening verses of the Miserere444 we find three words which are used to
designate sin.”445 “These three words are pesha, awon and hattah. Eventually the notion
of sin tends to crystallise around these words, particularly the word hattah, and the
progressive unification of the language of sin is a sign that the idea of sin is coming to
maturity. What then do these three words mean?”446
“Pesha in its secular or everyday usage indicates an act of rebellion or

unfaithfulness … (with) strong overtones of hostility and enmity. In its religious usage,
describing man’s relation with God, the term presupposes that there is a bond, an
alliance, a covenant between God and man. It envisages sin as a breaking of the
covenant, an infidelity to the covenant, a transgression of the covenant. This infidelity
or transgression originates from a hostile decision of the human will. The religious
usage of the word begins in the Pentateuch and recalls in particular the great infidelity
of Israel to God’s covenant love. Thus sin is an act of unfaithfulness to the God of the
covenant.”447 Pesha therefore can be committed by the human person only against
someone to whom he or she is related in some way when taken in the secular sense. In
the religious sense, it can be done against God if he or she is bound by some kind of
covenant. It is usually translated as offence.448
“Awon is a word which is used mainly in a religious sense and is often translated
by iniquity, although in some ways the word guilt comes closer to the Hebrew
meaning.449 It indicates not so much the act of transgression as the state of the sinner
which results from the transgression. Sin results in a disordered, distorted situation
which deserves punishment. Awon or guilt is the state of the sinner who has
transgressed the will of God and now stands in a condition of discord or disharmony
with that will. The primitive meaning of the word probably contains the image of
444
Ps 51.
445
Clement Tierney, The Sacrament of Repentance and Reconciliation, Sydney, E. J. Dwyer, 1983, p. 14.
446
Tierney, The Sacrament of Repentance and Reconciliation, p. 15.
447
Tierney, The Sacrament of Repentance and Reconciliation, pp. 15-16.
448
Cf. Ps 51,1, The New Jerusalem Bible, standard ed., p. 864.
449
Cf. Ps 51,2, The New Jerusalem Bible, p. 864.
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something distorted or twisted out of shape by a massive weight. Thus the sinner
appears as a person twisted out of shape by a massive weight of sin and guilt.” 450
“When Leonardo da Vinci was painting his masterpiece The Last Supper, he
looked for a model for his Christ. At last, he located a chorister in one of the churches of
Rome who was lovely in life and features, a young man named Pietro Bandinelli. Years
passed, and the painting was still unfinished. All the disciples had been portrayed save
one – Judas Iscariot. Now he started to look for a man whose face was hardened and
distorted by sin – and at last he found a beggar on the streets of Rome with a face so
villainous that he shuddered when he looked at him. He hired the man to sit for him as
he painted the face of Judas on his canvas. When he was about to dismiss the man, he
said, ‘I have not yet found your name.’ ‘I am Pietro Bandinelli,’ he replied, ‘I also sat for
you as your model of Christ.’ The sinful life of years so disfigured the once fair face of
the young man that it now looked as though it were the most villainous face in all
Rome!”451
“Hattah is the word most commonly used in the old testament for sin and the
word that is generally translated as sin in our bibles.452 Hattah literally means to miss the
mark or the target, or to lose one’s way with the result that a person is now adrift in a
trackless desert. This concrete image conveys the meaning of sin. In the moral order sin
is a culpable deviation from God which implies a deviousness in the human heart. It is a
deliberate turning away from God, the goal of human life and destiny. More precisely,
the goal or target that is missed is concretely that of the covenant of Sinai. It was Israel’s
law which expressed the people’s obligations to the God of the covenant and gave their
lives a sense of direction. But this covenant obligation was not conceived primarily as
one of justice but of love.
“The word hattah has a further implication. It indicates that the sinful act is a
delusion for man, a self-deception. Man thinks he has achieved something by sinning,
but he has missed God, the unique source of life and happiness.” 453 Pope John Paul II in
his Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation RECONCILIATIO ET PAENITENTIA states that sin
is a separation from God (aversio a Deo) and an attachment to a creature (conversio ad
creaturam).454 Sin is thus a totally mistaken direction in life. “The sinner is in reality a
man who is lost in the wasteland of his guilt, a defective person, a lifeless being, one
whose existence is empty, frustrated and devoid of meaning.”455
“Moreover, sin is not only a delusion for man but also in a certain sense a
delusion for God. God has loved his people, watched over them with care, displayed
450
451
Anthony P. Castle, A15: Sin, in Quotes & Anecdotes: An Anthology for Preachers & Teachers, Essex,
Kevin Mayhew Ltd., 1979, pp. 50-51. (There seem to be some inaccuracies in the story as narrated in the book.
The venue seemed to have been Milan and the medium was not oil on canvass but tempera on the refectory wall of a
Dominican convent.)
452
Cf. Ps 51,2, The New Jerusalem Bible, p. 864.
453
454
Cf. John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, 2 December 1984, Acta Apostolicae Sedis (1984), n. 17.
455
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his loving kindness in the covenant and manifested his saving will in the events of
history. And so he expected something better from his people. God’s expectation of a
responsive love from his people is frustrated by their sinfulness.” 456
2. THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION
Our theological reflection on sin will proceed in three stages. First of all, we shall
reflect on the mystery of the cross. Secondly, we shall focus on the social dimension of
sin. Thirdly, we shall discuss the degrees of sinfulness.
a. The Mystery of the Cross
In the document Reconciliatio et Paenitentia Pope John Paul II speaks of sin has
having both a vertical dimension and a horizontal dimension.457 As the cross has two beams
– the vertical and the horizontal – sin too is a tragic offence against both God and
humanity. The Holy Father invites “all to look to the mysterium Crucis as the loftiest
drama in which Christ perceives and suffers to the greatest possible extent the tragedy
of the division of man from God, so that he cries out in the words of the Psalmist: ‘My
God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’” 458 This is the vertical dimension of sin. But
there is the horizontal dimension as well, which in reality brings about a threefold
division between the sinner and himself or herself, between the sinner and other human
beings, and between the sinner and the whole of creation. As sin results in this fourfold
division, separating the sinner (1) from God, (2) from the self, (3) from others, and (4)
from creation, so the cross of Christ effects a “fourfold reconciliation” 459 as well. The
Paschal Mystery of Christ, through the tree of the cross, brings forth the fruit of
reconciliation “with God, with themselves, with neighbour, with the whole of
creation.”460
The cross of Christ symbolizes the reality of sin as an offence against the Creator
with its vertical beam and against the whole of created reality with its horizontal beam.
“God is love.”461 Love makes one vulnerable to the possibility of getting hurt. “God is
vulnerable to sin because he loves man and his world.” 462 These vertical and horizontal
dimensions of sin can be viewed from this fivefold presence of the divinity.
i. The Presence of God in Creation
“The first bond of love that unites God with men is the act of creation, the first
act in saving history. By creation every man is made in the image of God and every man
456
457
Cf. John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 7.
458
John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 7.
459
460
461
1Jn 4,8.
462
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is the recipient of God’s love. Because God himself is love, the only way that God can
make man in his own image and likeness is to create a conscious subject who is called in
his inner being to become a loving person in his relationships with both God and his
fellowmen. Thus creation universalizes the bond between God and man, and so
universalizes the idea of sin.”463 Any offense against any created reality is an offense
against the Creator. After all, everything is a “work of his hands.” 464 Destruction of
creation is sinning against the Creator. Hurting a human person is particularly sinful to
God because humanity has been created in the divine image and likeness. It is sinful in
a twofold manner. It hurts the person injured and it hurts the person who causes the
injury. “… there is no such thing as a victimless crime. The sinner himself, at the very
least, is always the victim and in the long run the human community also becomes the
victim. In this respect, too, no man is an island and the bell tolls for every man.” 465
ii. The Presence of God in the Covenant People
“If the bond of creation universalizes the idea of sin, the bond of the covenant
deepens the malice of sin. The covenant means that God’s presence in the world is
deepened and focused in a people which is God’s sign for humanity, raised up among
the nations. And so Israel’s thinking about sin is dominated by the idea of the covenant
bond between God and his people. The covenant is like a marriage bond, but it comes
to existence because God chose Israel and loved her first.” 466 The Sinaitic covenant
emerged in the form of a suzerainty treaty 467 – an act of condescension on the part of
God towards this insignificant group of people. “Yahweh set his heart on you and chose
you not because you were the most numerous of all peoples – for indeed you were the
smallest of all – but because he loved you and meant to keep the oath which he swore to
your ancestors.”468 The covenant was a genuine act of God’s faithful love.
There were two dominant societal laws governing the life of the Chosen People
of God, particularly during the semi-nomadic patriarchal period of its history. The first
was the law of hospitality and the second was the law of solidarity.469 The former was the
law directed ad extra (towards the people outside the clan), whereas the latter was the
law directed ad intra (towards the members of the clan). The law of solidarity, based on
the patriarchal social structure,470 has become the social basis of the covenant itself. The
Sinaitic covenant in a particular way galvanized the descendants of Abraham, of Isaac
463
464
Schillebeeckx, Marriage: Human Reality and Saving Mystery, p. 15.
465
466
467
A suzerainty treaty is a pact between two partners who are unequal in power, wealth and influence. This
is opposed to the parity treaty which is a pact concluded by two basically equal partners.
468
Dt 7,7-8a.
469
Cf. Sergio Bastianel & Luigi Di Pinto, Per una fondazione biblica dell’etica, Corso di Morale, vol. 1,
Vita Nuova in Cristo (Morale fondamentale e generale), eds. Tullo Goffi & Giannino Piana, Brsecia, Queriniana, pp.
81-82.
470
The patriarch ensured the unity of the clan. He possessed all the powers needed for the preservation of
this unity: religious, administrative, legislative and judicial. There was also the system of the firstborn son, which
assured the peaceful transition of powers in the clan and forestalled any danger towards fragmentation and disunity.
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and of Jacob as the Chosen People of Israel. The solidarity of the Chosen People was
based on the intervention of “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of
Jacob”471 in their history. This was especially seen in the Exodus event. The Sinaitic
Covenant thus stood as some form of moral imperative drawn from the Exodus Event
which acted as some form of doctrinal indicative. Both of these were meant to ensure the
preservation of the spirit of solidarity within God’s Chosen People. The people that had
such a marvelous experience at the Red Sea willingly agreed to the Covenant ratified at
Mount Sinai and to be known as the one People of God. The People of Israel became
Yahweh’s “personal possession.”472 Therefore any offense committed by a member of
this Covenant People was an act against the solidarity of the whole nation. And any
threat against the People of Israel from any foreign power was an affront to God
himself.
iii. The Presence of God in Christ
Jesus Christ is the most unique presence of God. “In Jesus, God is present among
men in a unique way and is vulnerable to sin in a unique way.” 473 “Christ is God as he
appears outwardly.”474 The foundation of this outward manifestation of God, of this
epiphany, is the mystery of the Incarnation. The Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (451
C.E.) solemnly defines this mystery thus:
“Following therefore the holy Fathers, we unanimously teach to confess one and
the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in divinity and perfect in
humanity, the same truly God and truly man composed of rational soul and body, the
same one in being (homoousios) with the Father as to the divinity and one in being with
us as to the humanity, like unto us in all things but sin. 475 The same was begotten from
the Father before the ages as to the divinity and in the latter days for us and our
salvation was born as to His humanity from Mary the Virgin Mother of God.” 476
“We confess that one and the same Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son,
must be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion (asygchytos/inconfuse) or
change (atreptos/immutabiliter), without division (adiairetos/indivise) or separation
(achoristos/inseparabiliter). The distinction between the natures was never abolished by
their union but rather the character proper to each of the two natures was preserved as
they came together in one person (prosopon/persona) and one hypostasis (subsistens). He
is not split or divided into two persons, but He is one and the same only-begotten, God
the Word (Logos/Verbum), the Lord Jesus Christ, as formerly the prophets and later Jesus
471
Ex 3,6.
472
Ex 19,5.
473
474
475
Cf. Hb 4,15.
476
J. Neuner, SJ, & J. Dupuis, SJ, eds., The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic
Church, rev. ed., New York, Alba House, 1981, n. 614, p. 154. Cf. DS 301.
105
Christ Himself have taught us about Him and as has been handed down to us by the
Symbol of the Fathers.”477
This most solemn conciliar definition tries to explain a mystery that will always
remain a mystery to the human mind. It would always baffle the human intellect how
the divine and the human natures in Jesus Christ would remain forever distinct and
simultaneously so united as to constitute only one Person – the only-begotten Son, the
Eternal Logos, the Divine Word. Karl Rahner asserts: “When God wants to be what is
not God, man comes to be.” 478 This suggests that the human person, as the image and
likeness of God, exists in the form of a mirror. A mirror portrays the image but in
reverse. Thus the understanding of both God and the human person would bring the
fullness of reality. Therefore the essential key to the understanding of both God and
humanity is Jesus Christ, “who, being in the form of God, did not count equality with
God something to be grasped. But he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave,
becoming as human beings are; and being in every way like a human being.” 479
“Because in the Incarnation the Logos creates the human reality by assuming it, and
assumes it by emptying himself, for this reason there also applies here, and indeed in the
most radical and specific and unique way, the axiom for understanding every
relationship between God and creatures, namely, that closeness and distance, or being
at God’s disposal and being autonomous, do not vary for creatures in inverse, but
rather in direct proportion. Christ is therefore man in the most radical way, and his
humanity is the most autonomous and the most free not in spite of, but because it has
been assumed, because it has been created as God’s self-expression.” 480 This idea of
direct proportionality is a most profound and most interesting Rahnerian insight. The
more that the human person empties himself or herself in profound humility, the more
he or she approaches the divine greatness. The more that the individual submits himself
or herself to the divine will, the more he or she attains personal autonomy.
But God does not make himself present in Jesus Christ only though the mystery
of the Incarnation; he also does so through the mystery of redemption. Redemption is a
matter of loving. In his farewell discourse at the Upper Room Jesus says: “No one can
have greater love than to lay down his life for his friends.” 481 Since no creature can
surpass God in love, God died on the cross in the person of the Incarnate Word. This
may appear to be a disturbing statement. How can God die? The idea of the death of
God seemingly contradicts the Thomistic teaching on the impassibility of God. “Peccator
enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective potest.”482 No matter what the sinner does, he or
she can never injure God. From this point of view, suffering is impossible for God.
Hence suffering is considered as an imperfection, something totally alien to the divinity.
477
Neuner & Dupuis, eds., The Christian Faith, n. 615, pp. 154-155. Cf. DS 302.
478
Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans. William
V. Dych, New York, The Seabury Press, 1978, p. 225.
479
Ph 2,7.
480
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, p. 226.
481
Jn 15,13.
482
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 47, a. 1, ad 1.
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But the mystery of redemption is the fullest expression of the divine love since only
suffering and death can convince humanity effectively of the depths of the divine love.
Suffering as an expression of love is a perfection. God’s immense love for humanity
makes him vulnerable to suffering “in an extreme way.”483 “A God who cannot suffer is
inferior, not superior, to man. A God who cannot suffer is a God who cannot love.” 484
Although the divine and the human natures in Jesus Christ exist “without confusion or
change,”485 they also exist “without division or separation.” 486 Jesus Christ died on the
cross as a Divine Person. Thus out of infinite love for humanity, God died on the cross.
iv. The Presence of Christ in our Neighbour
As the mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine Word is the key to the proper
understanding of the presence of God in Jesus Christ, so it is also the way towards
finding Christ in our neighbour. “… the bond of the incarnation links Christ to every
man, my neighbour and myself. By sinning against our neighbour we sin against Christ
himself.”487 “This is apparent in the scene of the Last Judgment (Mt 25), as it is
traditionally interpreted. ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty, a stranger or
naked, sick or in prison and did not come to your help?’ Then he will answer, ‘I tell you
solemnly, insofar as you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you neglected
to do it to me.’”488 In the Corinthian controversy on conscience and the eating of food
offered to idols, St. Paul has this to say: “So, sinning against your brothers and
wounding their vulnerable consciences, you would be sinning against Christ.” 489 The
Old Testament interpreted neighbour in terms of “the members of your race.” 490 Hence
the commandment you “will love your neighbour as yourself” 491 was interpreted in the
Old Testament as the key towards ensuring solidarity within the Jewish nation. But in
the New Testament, when “the Word became flesh,”492 all human beings are to be
considered neighbour. Thus to the question addressed by the lawyer to Jesus – “And
who is my neighbour?”493 – the Lord presents the parable of the good Samaritan. 494
“Jesus’ demand that no limit be set on love of one’s neighbour and that one stand by the
sufferer with immediate practical help even when he is a national enemy” 495 truly
universalizes the concept of neighbour. It is an allusion to, nay, a consequence of, the
presence of Christ in our neighbour.
v. The Presence of Christ in the Church

483
484
485
486
487
488
Tierney, The Sacrament of Repentance and Reconciliation, p. 34. Cf. Mt 25,44-45.
489
1Co 8,12.
490
Lv 19,18.
491
Lv 19,18.
492
Jn 1,14.
493
Lk 10,29.
494
Cf. Lk 10,25-37.
495
107
“We can now say that sin has an ecclesial dimension. It injures the Church as the
community which Christ has brought to existence through his paschal mystery and as
the community in which Christ is present through the Holy Spirit. The Church is a
community so intimately united as the body of Christ that the sin of one member has
repercussions for the whole people.”496
“From the ecclesial view point sin damages the Church in two ways, both
internally and externally:
 “internally, because the sinful members of the Church are no longer models of
holiness for others but a scandal to others;
 “externally, because the sinful members obscure the nature of the Church as a
sign raised up among the nations, the sacrament of salvation for the world, the
community which visibly manifests the holiness of God and Christ, the
community which has a mission to the world.
“Through the sinfulness of its members the Church becomes in a real sense a sign of
contradiction. It is always holy through Christ in the Holy Spirit and yet it becomes the
Church of sinners.”497
Origen of Alexandria (185-254 C.E.), among the Fathers of the Church, perhaps
presents best the idea of a Church that is both holy and sinful, “simul iustus et
peccator.”498 “The Church has never claimed to be an actual sinless community of saints.
The letters of Paul make it abundantly clear that a Christian was capable of sinning after
baptism and that this frequently happened.” 499 A very clear example is the case of
excommunication in Corinth for the sin of incest. 500 “The images of the dead branch on
the tree of the Church, of the mixture of wheat and chaff on the threshing-floor of the
Church, of Noah’s ark with its clean and unclean animals – all these are quite frequently
applied to the community of the Church in the second and at the beginning of the third
century.”501 There is an idealization of baptism in the early Church. “Without any
doubt, Origen fully appreciates the power, the efficacy and the fundamental importance
of baptism as the basis of the whole of the spiritual life. And he certainly has not
overlooked the once-and-for-all, immediately effective meaning of baptism, which is the
foundation of all further progress, in favour of a merely interior, slow and gradual
moral-mystical ascent of man towards God. But he knows much more clearly than any
of the theologians before him that, more often than not, when baptism is mentioned in
the sense just outlined, it is a matter of what it should be, rather than of what it in fact is
…. Even if baptism is not actually received unworthily, according to Origen it is still
496
497
498
Rahner, TheologicaL Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, p. 252.
499
Rahner, TheologicaL Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, p. 250.
500
Cf. 1Co 5,1-5.
501
Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, p. 250.
108
only a beginning, albeit a fundamental and indispensable one.” 502 The personal
experience of Origen at Alexandria with his own bishop bears witness to the presence
of sin within the ecclesial community. The great historian Eusebius comments on the
attitude of Bishop Demetrius towards Origen: “… but when a little later the same
worthy (Demetrius) saw him (Origen) prosperous, great, eminent, and universally
esteemed, he yielded to human weakness and wrote to the bishops throughout the
world in an attempt to make Origen’s action 503 appear outrageous, just when the most
respected and outstanding bishops of Palestine, those of Caesarea and Jerusalem,
judged him worthy of position in the Church and of the highest honour, and ordained
him presbyter.”504 If sin can be found in the highest ranks of the hierarchy, then the
Church is truly simul iustus et peccator.
Therefore penance is enjoined on the sinful members of the Church. Penance is

proper to the baptized. The Shepherd of Hermas of the mid-second century of the
Christian era urges penance in view of the imminence of the end of the world. “The
Christian must have finished his penance by the last day and cannot begin it only then
… whereas for the pagan there is still the possibility of baptism right up to this day.” 505
b. The Social Dimension of Sin
Pope John Paul II dealt at length with the issue of the social dimension of sin in
the Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia. “Sin, in the proper sense, is always
a personal act, since it is an act of freedom on the part of the individual person, and not
properly of a group or community. This individual may be conditioned, incited and
influenced by numerous and powerful external factors. He may also be subjected to
tendencies, defects and habits linked with his personal condition. In not a few cases
such external and internal factors may attenuate, to a greater or lesser degree, the
person’s freedom and therefore his responsibility and guilt. But it is a truth of faith, also
confirmed by our experience and reason, that the human person is free. This truth
cannot be disregarded, in order to place the blame for individuals’ sins on external
factors such as structures, systems or other people.” 506 But then what is behind the term
social sin? “The expression and the underlying concept in fact have various
meanings.”507
1. “To speak of social sin means in the first place to recognize that, by virtue of a
human solidarity which is mysterious and intangible as it is real and concrete,
each individual’s sin in some way affects others …. In other words, there is no
502
Rahner, TheologicaL Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, pp. 250-251.
503
The act referred to here was Origen’s headstrong act of emasculating himself in an absurdly literal
adherence to the Gospel saying: “There are eunuchs who made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven’s
sake.” Cf. Eusebius, The History of the Church, bk 6, ch 8, trans. G. A. Williamson, Middlesex, Penguin Books,
1965, p. 247.
504
Eusebius, The History of the Church, bk 6, ch 8, p. 247.
505
Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, p. 70.
506
507
109
sin, not even the most intimate and secret one, the most strictly individual one,
that exclusively concerns the person committing it.”508
2. “Some sins however by their very matter constitute a direct attack on one’s
neighbour and, more exactly, in the language of the Gospel, against one’s brother
or sister. They are an offence against God because they are offences against one’s
neighbour. These sins are usually called social sins, and this is the second
meaning of the term.”509
3. “The third meaning of social sin refers to the relationships between the various
human communities. These relationships are not always in accordance with the
plan of God, who intends that there be justice in the world, and freedom and
peace between individuals, groups and peoples. Thus the class struggle, whoever
the person who leads it or on occasion seeks to give it a theoretical justification, is
a social evil. Likewise, obstinate confrontation between blocs of nations, between
one nation and another, between different groups within the same nation – all
this too is a social evil.”510
4. The fourth meaning being given to social sin that of situations of sin. This refers to
“certain situations or the collective behaviour of certain social groups, big or
small, or even of whole nations and blocs of nations” 511 that support or even
exploit evil. This is an improper use of the term social sin, a usage “that is not
legitimate and acceptable, even though it is very common in certain quarters
today.”512 The reason for this impropriety is the fact that no matter how you look
at it, “such cases of social sin are the result of the accumulation and concentration
of many personal sins…. The real responsibility, then, lies with individuals…. At
the heart of every situation of sin are always to be found sinful people.”513
c. The Degrees of Sinfulness
The Holy Father, John Paul II, goes on to another topic in his discussion of sin in
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia. “But here we come to a further dimension in the mystery of
sin, one on which the human mind has never ceased to ponder: the question of its
gravity.”514 The Old Testament often speaks of two kinds of sin:
 “Sins committed deliberately”515 and

 “Sins committed through ignorance.”516
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 17, (peccata SCIENTER quidem commissa).
516
John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 17, (peccata PER IGNORANTIAM commissa).
110
The First Letter of John in the New Testament also speaks of a twofold classification of
sin:
 “Sin which leads to death”517 and

 “Sin which does not lead to death.”518
The Fathers of the Church speak too of two categories of sin. St. Cyprian of
Carthage (200/210-258 C.E.) contrasts mortal sin from venial sin. He calls the former
crime (crimen) and the latter sins of daily life or minor sins (peccata minora). Since the
concern of St. Cyprian was more on the administration of the discipline of penance, he
insists that mortal sins would require public penance whereas venial sins can be
remitted through private penance.519
Origen also speaks of the distinction between mortal sin and venial sin. He refers
to the former as deadly (insanabilis plaga), that is, a wound that cannot be healed and
one that would definitely lead to death. The latter he refers to as sin that is not deadly
(levis culpa), that is, light sin, or also a wound that would heal easily (vulnus facile).520
The distinction therefore between mortal sin and venial sin was one that concerns life
and death.
St. Augustine (354-430 C.E.) “speaks of letalia or mortifera crimina, contrasting

them with venialia, levia or quotidiana. The meaning that he gives to these adjectives was
to influence the successive Magisterium of the Church.” 521 In the Middle Ages St.
Thomas Aquinas built on the Augustinian teachings and built his own theology of sin.
However he did not focus on the patristic idea of spiritual life and spiritual death.
Instead he built a moral theology based on right reason (recta ratio). Right reason moves
the human person to act purposefully.522 The ultimate goal of all human activity is the
vision of the very essence of God. 523 “According to Saint Thomas, in order to live
spiritually man must remain in communion with the supreme principle of life, which is
God, since God is the ultimate end of man’s being and acting. Now sin is a disorder
perpetrated by man against this life-principle. And when through sin, the soul commits
a disorder that reaches the point of turning away from its ultimate end 524 – God – to
which it is bound by charity, then the sin is mortal; on the other hand, whenever the
disorder does not reach the point of turning away from God, the sin is venial. 525 For this
reason venial sin does not deprive the sinner of sanctifying grace, friendship with God,
517
John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 17, (hamartia pros thanaton).
518
John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 17, (hamartia me pros thanaton).
519
Cf. Rahner, SJ, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, pp. 171-176.
520
Cf. Rahner, SJ, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, pp. 252-259.
521
522
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 1, aa. 1-2.
523
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 3, a. 8.
524
Aversio a Deo.
525
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.
111
charity, and therefore eternal happiness, whereas just such a deprivation is precisely the
consequence of mortal sin.”526
“… mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed
with full knowledge and deliberate consent.”527 The grave matter refers to something
whose object or finis operis is “intrinsically grave and mortal”528 independent of the
circumstances and even of the intention of the doer or the finis operantis. Nonetheless
grave matter alone does not constitute mortal sin. It is but the matter of the human act.
The form must likewise be considered with equal importance. In fact, absence of full
knowledge and deliberate consent would reduce the supposedly mortal sin into merely
venial. Mortal sin is essentially an inversion of values. Something that is only finite and
created is adored and given supreme worth 529 – an act that is automatically coupled
with the absolute rejection of God and constitutes a total commitment of the person to
evil. This is the mortal sin that merits “eternal punishment.” 530 Since the person has
rejected God in an absolute manner, he has actually chosen to be separated from God
for all eternity. In other words, the penalty merited by one who commits mortal sin is
actually a self-imposed punishment.
As for venial sin, Pope John Paul II has this to say: “Man knows well by
experience that, along the road of faith and justice which leads to the knowledge and
love of God in this life and towards perfect union with him in eternity, he can cease to
go forward or can go astray, without abandoning the way of God; and in this case there
occurs venial sin. This however must never be underestimated, as though it were
automatically something that can be ignored, or regarded as a sin of little importance.
“For man also knows, through painful experience, that by a conscious and free
act of his will he can change course and go in a different direction opposed to God’s
will, separating himself from God (aversio a Deo), rejecting loving communion with him,
detaching himself from the life-principle which God is, and consequently choosing
death.”531
“During the Synod Assembly some Fathers proposed a threefold distinction of

sins, classifying them as venial, grave and mortal.”532 Much before this Sixth General
Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, Tertullian (ca. 155 - ca. 220 C.E.) already suggested a
threefold distinction of sins: (1) Mortal Sins (delicta mortalia, delicta irremissibilia, delicta
ad mortem);533 (2) Mediocre Sins (delicta mediocria, delicta leviora);534 (3) Daily Sins (delicta
526
527
528
529
Conversio ad creaturam.
530
531
532
533
Mortal sins, unforgivable sins, sins unto death.
534
Mediocre sins, light sins.
112
cotidianae incursionis).535 This threefold distinction of Tertullian is a feature of his
Montanist period, found as it is in his Montanist work De Pudicitia.536 This synodal
proposal actually highlights the fact that there are various degrees of gravity within the
same category of venial sin. Nonetheless “there is no middle way between life and
death.”537 Mortal sin means spiritual death. There are no degrees of death. One cannot
be deader than another. That is absolutely absurd. Life however allows the possibility of
varying degrees of health and sickness. Thus there can be varying degrees of venial sin.
But there can be only two basic categories of sin according to the degree of gravity:
mortal sin and venial sin.
3. CLASSIFICATIONS
Sin may be either external or internal. An external sin concerns the use of the
physical powers of the human person. An internal sin is consummated in the human
mind. Internal sins are of four kinds:
1. Mental Complacency – the sinful imagination without the desire to act on it.
2. Sinful Joy – the delight experienced in having accomplished an evil deed.
3. Sinful Regret – the sadness felt in having failed to perform an evil deed.
4. Sinful Desire – the determination to perform a sinful action.
Sin may also be of commission or of omission. A sin of commission consists in the

performance of a forbidden act. A sin of omission is the failure to do an obligatory
activity. Oftentimes we consider sins of commission as graver than sins of omission. But
sins of omission can effectively exclude people from the Kingdom, as we find in the
parable of the Last Judgment.538 “Then he will answer, ‘In truth I tell you, in so far as
you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you neglected to do it to me.’ And
they will go away to eternal punishment ….”539
One can also incur guilt by being responsible for the sins of others. Such
responsibility can arise in these three cases:
1. Seduction – the deliberate effort to lead someone to sin.
2. Scandal – an unbecoming conduct that becomes an occasion of sin to others.
3. Cooperation – the moral or merely physical participation in the evil deed

perpetrated by someone else.
535
Sins committed daily.
536
On Chastity. Cf. Rahner, SJ, Theological Investigations, vol. 15: Penance in the Early Church, pp. 126-
130. Tertullian went over to the heretical sect of Montanism around the year 207 A.D. This sect was known for its
highly rigouristic morality, thus proposing even a category of sins that no intervention of the Church can ever remit.
Cf. Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2: The Ante-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus, pp. 246-248.
537
538
Mt 25, 31-46.
539
Mt 25, 45-46a.
113
a. Formal Cooperation – the moral concurrence with the principal agent in a sinful
deed; the consent given by the cooperator to the wrong act done by the
principal agent. Since the cooperator approves of the sin, he or she shares in
the guilt of the principal agent.
b. Material Cooperation – the merely physical participation in the wrong deed

performed by the principal agent while withholding one’s consent. Since the
cooperator disapproves of the sin, he or she incurs no guilt. This normally
happens when the cooperator lends his or her help to the principal agent due
to force or out of fear. The cooperator normally dislikes the deed and even
registers his or her disapproval, but is totally helpless due to the grave
consequences of his or her lack of cooperation.
B. THE DYNAMICS OF CONVERSION
“… conversion is basic to Christian living ….” 540 In fact, it is a conditio sine

qua non for discipleship in the Reign of God. We would find great enlightenment
regarding the dynamics of conversion from Bernard Lonergan. He states: “By
conversion is understood a transformation of the subject and his world. Normally it is a
prolonged process though its explicit acknowledgment may be concentrated in a few
momentous judgments and decision. Still it is not just a development or even a series of
developments. Rather it is a resultant change of course and direction. It is as if one’s
eyes were opened and one’s former world faded and fell away. There emerges
something new that fructifies in inter-locking, cumulative sequences of developments
on all levels and in all departments of human living.”541
Conversion is essentially a deepening of consciousness and intentionality. And

“… different levels of consciousness and intentionality have to be distinguished.” 542
Now movement from one level of consciousness to the next is effected through
conversion. As there are different levels of consciousness (empirical – intellectual –
rational – responsible), there are also different stages of conversion. “Conversion may
be intellectual or moral or religious. While each of the three is connected with the other
two, still each is a different type of event and has to be considered in itself before being
related to the others.
 “Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination

of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and
human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is
seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is
540
541
542
114
what is out there to be looked at. Now this myth overlooks the distinction between
the world of immediacy, say, the world of the infant and, on the other hand, the
world mediated by meaning. The world of immediacy is the sum of what is seen,
heard, touched, tasted, smelt, felt. It conforms well enough to the myth’s view of
reality, objectivity, knowledge. But it is but a tiny fragment of the world mediated
by meaning. For the world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense
experience of an individual but by the external and internal experience of a cultural
community, and by the continuously checked and rechecked judgments of the
community. Knowing, accordingly, is not just seeing; it is experiencing,
understanding, judging, and believing. The criteria of objectivity are not just the
criteria of ocular vision; they are the compounded criteria of experiencing, of
understanding, of judging, and of believing. The reality known is not just looked at;
it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by
judgment and belief.”543 Intellectual conversion enables the person to move from the
empirical level to the intellectual level of consciousness.
 “Moral conversion changes the criterion of one’s decisions and choices from
satisfactions to values. As children or minors we are persuaded, cajoled, ordered,
compelled to do what is right. As our knowledge of human reality increases, as our
responses to human values are strengthened and refined, our mentors more and
more leave us to ourselves so that our freedom may exercise its ever advancing
thrust toward authenticity. So we move to the existential moment when we discover
for ourselves that our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected
objects, and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of
himself. Then is the time for the exercise of vertical freedom and then moral
conversion consists in opting for the truly good, even for value against satisfaction
when value and satisfaction conflict. Such conversion, of course, falls far short of
moral perfection. Deciding is one thing, doing is another. One has yet to uncover
and root out one’s individual, group, and general bias. One has to keep developing
one’s knowledge of human reality and potentiality as they are in the existing
situation. One has to keep distinct its elements of progress and its elements of
decline. One has to keep scrutinizing one’s intentional responses to values and their
implicit scales of preference. One has to listen to criticism and to protest. One has to
remain ready to learn from others. For moral knowledge is the proper possession
only of morally good men and, until one has merited that title, one has still to
advance and to learn.”544 With moral conversion the human person moves from the
intellectual level to the rational level of consciousness.
 “Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly

falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions,
qualifications, reservations. But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic
state that is prior to and principle of acts. It is revealed in retrospect as an under-tow
543
544
115
of existential consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness, as
perhaps an increasing simplicity and passivity in prayer. It is interpreted differently
in the context of different religious traditions. For Christians it is God’s love flooding
our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us. It is the gift of grace, and since the
days of Augustine, a distinction has been drawn between operative and cooperative
grace. Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a
replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of
flesh becoming effective in good works through human freedom. Operative grace is
religious conversion. Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, the
gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of the whole of one’s
living and feeling, one’s thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions.” 545 Religious
conversion makes the individual move from the rational level to the responsible level
of consciousness. At this responsible level the human person is converted to God. A
real conversio ad Deum is effected. But this does not mean a turning away from
creatures, an aversio a creaturis. No, there is in fact a movement towards the whole of
created reality, but all from the divine standpoint. In other words, the authentic
convert treats creation as God would have him or her do so.
CHAPTER VIII:
VIRTUE AND CHRISTIAN WHOLENESS
545
Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 240-241.
116
“In the past century the prevalence of bourgeois ethos created a spirit of cynical
disdain for virtue. For some, virtue was a shrewish old spinster, toothless and wrinkled;
for others it was mere braggadocio or futile bravado; for many it was but ineffectual
mediocrity.”546 “Even in his time, Hegel was struck by the fact ‘that people nowadays
do not talk of virtue as much as they used to.’ Nowadays the word virtue seems to be
actually derided and obsolete, survives almost only in an ironic sense. There are various
reasons for this loss of force – the philosophy of morality constructed by Kant, which
placed all the stress on duty, obligation, conscience, intention and subjectivity; and then
the eighteenth and nineteenth century middle-class, economic view of virtue directed
towards well-regulated domesticity, clear-cut attitudes such as orderliness, cleanliness,
punctuality and industry, as though these things constituted the decisive moral and
even Christian excellences. Virtue inevitably came to look like a coercive system which
strangles man and keeps him from his intensest and most vital possibilities. Hence
Nietzche’s vividly presented objections which caricatured virtue as a renunciation of
power and an insidious compensation for human inferiorities.” 547 Virtue has therefore
become the quality of the mediocre person. But virtue has its own hallowed niche in the
history of moral theology.
“Possibly no term in the history of moral thought has stimulated more interest,
reflection and speculation that that of virtue. Its importance for moral living has been
uncontested, but the precise definition of virtue, its relation to other elements of moral
experience, and the number and unity of the virtues have varied widely over the
centuries according to the different conceptions of the moral life.” 548 We shall discuss
this topic following the historical evolution of the concept. We gather that the evolution
of the idea of virtue came about in four important periods: (A) Classical Period; (B)
Patristic Period; (C) Scholastic Period; (D) Contemporary Period.
A. CLASSICAL PERIOD
“It was the Greeks who articulated philosophically the nature and definition of
virtue. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Neo-Platonists have all made their
mark on the theory of virtue and the necessity of virtue for proper moral living. Because
these philosophers almost always conceived the acquisition of moral virtues as directed
toward public life within the community, their writings have had an enormous impact
upon the moral thought and development of Western political sciences.” 549 Indeed we
can say for certain that “in classical Hellenism virtue was the shining splendor of the
magnanimous spirit aspiring to the loftiest summit of moral excellence. It was the
perfection of harmony and the true wealth of the noble mind utterly devoted to the
546
Häring, The Law of Christ, vol. 1: General Moral Theology, p. 485.
547
Bernhard Stoecke, Virtue, in Concise Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. Bernhard Stoeckle, London,
Burns & Oates, 1979, pp. 270-271.
548
James J. Walter, Virtue, The New Dictionary of Theology, eds. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins &
Dermot A. Lane, Pasay City, Saint Paul Publications, 1991, p. 1081.
549
Walter, Virtue, in The New Dictionary of Theology, p. 1081.
117
good.”550 The English word virtue actually comes from the Latin word virtus, which
refers to the quality of the vir, a highly honourable male person in society. Virtue
therefore is not for the mediocre. Rather it is the quality of a person in whom moral
excellence is highly evident in view of the common good.
“Yet there was a fatal defect in this ancient concept of virtue; it was
anthropocentric. It centered in man. For the ancients, virtue did not consist in
worshiping God.”551 The classical concept of virtue “stressed human achievement and
merit.”552 Maybe it is for this reason that “there is no Hebrew term in the OT that
conveys the general meaning of virtue.”553 “Virtue is the translation of the Greek arête,
which simply means any kind of excellence. Thus a knife’s arête would be its sharpness,
that of a horse its speed, and that of an athlete his or her skill.” 554 With the translation of
the Hebrew Scriptures into the Greek Septuagint, the word arête was used, but it was
used infrequently. The situation did not improve with the New Testament. The few
instances of its use (Ph 4,8; 1Pt 2,9; 2Pt 1,3; 1,5) proved its unpopularity – due most
probably to its anthropocentricity.555
“For Aristotle, virtue is intimately related to human happiness or eudaemonia as

the final end of humanity. Within his teleological view of human nature, Aristotle
argued that the moral virtues do not arise in us naturally but are acquired and then
perfected by consistently exercising them through a habit (ethos).”556 Bernard Häring,
commenting on the nature of virtue as an acquired habit states thus: “Perfect virtue is
the fundamental right attitude so deep-seated as to have become a kind of second
nature.”557 Virtue thus springs from a choice for good that brings about the constant
repetition of a good deed. The initial difficulty encountered in the execution of the good
deed gradually vanishes until the whole course of action becomes not just easy but truly
pleasurable. The ease and pleasure that characterize the performance of a virtuous deed
is what makes of the acquired habit a kind of second nature that disposes the individual
not only to do the right thing rightly but also to gain pleasure from it. 558 Moreover as a
“kind of second nature”559 virtue becomes difficult to shake off. “It is a permanent capacity
of the soul’s powers assuring that constancy in good action which makes a man true to
himself in the multiple hazards of decision and in the most diverse situations in life.” 560
550
Häring, The Law of Christ, vol. 1, p. 485.
551
552
Walter, Virtue, The New Dictionary of Theology, p. 1081.
553
Walter, Virtue, The New Dictionary of Theology, p. 1081.
554
Stanley Hauerwas, Virtue, in A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, eds. John Macquarrie & James
Childress, London, SCM Press Ltd., 1986, p. 648.
555
Cf. Walter, Virtue, in The New Dictionary of Theology, p. 1081.
556
557
558
Cf. Hauerwas, Virtue, in A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, p. 648.
559
Hauerwas, Virtue, in A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, p. 648.
560
118
“Aristotle defined virtue (arête) as a state of character (hexis) concerned with
choice, lying in a mean intermediate between two extremes (vices).” 561 Virtue
permanently inclines the human person to choose the good and this good does not
consist in an option for any extreme position but rather for the mean. In other words,
virtue is the assurance of a well-balanced personality. This balanced position is what
serves best the common good. After all, according to the classical view, virtue is the
moral excellence of a person, not just for his or her own sake, but more for the sake of
the human community.
“Virtue is much more than bravery of a sort. It is the perfect accord with the
good, the most basic harmony with what is good. To be virtuous means more than to
decide for the good in a general way, for the virtuous man is completely taken up with
the good in the profoundest depths of his personality and to the final and ultimate
external activity in the use of his freedom …. From this point of view, virtue is one, not
diverse. To be chaste and no more, to be moderate and no more, or merely just, is not as
such the same as to be virtuous simply and without qualification. To be virtuous one
must be taken up with the good in its whole depth and breadth.” 562 Virtue implies
personal integration with the consequent harmonization of the individual with the
community.
Karl Rahner asserts: “Virtue is the power (ability, skill, facility) to realize moral
good, and especially to do it joyfully and perseveringly even against inner and outer
obstacles and at the cost of sacrifices. The contrary of this habitual ability and readiness
(over and above the mere capacity) is vice.” 563 Virtue is thus the perfection of a human
capacity for the good of the human community. Since there are four major operative
capacities, there are also four types of perfection that are referred to as cardinal virtues:
1. Prudence for the Practical Intellect;

2. Justice for the Free Will;
3. Temperance for the Concupiscible Appetites;
4. Fortitude for the Irascible Tendencies.
“The Greeks looked upon prudence as the sum and summit of virtue. To be
prudent in the sense understood in Hellenistic intellectualism was to manifest the most
comprehensive virtue.”564 “Prudence points the way of the good; it places practical
reason in right order. Justice gives the right orientation to the will; it looses the grip of
selfishness in matters of objective justice and right. Temperance maintains a balance in
the appetites (concupiscible) of desire, holding to the right mean between dullness and
lust. Fortitude (courage) keeps the aggressive (irascible) appetite under control,
maintaining a balance between timidity and insolence. Prudence and justice order and
561
562
Häring, The Law of Christ, vol. 1, pp. 485-486.
563
Karl Rahner, Virtue, in Encyclopedia of Theology, ed. Karl Rahner, London, Burns & Oates, 1975, p.
1794.
564
119
regulate the two spiritual powers of the soul, while temperance and fortitude control
sensual desire and rebellion, thus keeping the principal psychosomatic capacities in
order. Viewed as a special virtue, prudence is the art of right counsel and guidance;
justice is the fulfillment of the obligation to pay what is strictly due to others to the
point of equality; fortitude is the spirited engagement for the good even at the risk of
life and limb; temperance is the disciplining of sensual desire, particularly through
chastity.”565
By way of summary, virtue in the classical period can be described thus:
1. Virtue is personal moral excellence which enables the individual to serve the
interests of the human community.
2. Virtue is acquired through the constant repetition of good deeds as a
consequence of a conscious and deliberate choice.
3. Virtue is a permanent disposition or habit which facilitates the execution of a
good deed and which makes its performance delightful despite all the odds.
4. Virtue is human moral excellence whose measure is the mean between two
extremes – both extremes are thus deemed to be vices; virtue ensures a well-
balanced personality.
5. Virtue is the perfection of the natural operative powers of the human person:
the practical intellect (prudence), the free will (justice), the concupiscible
appetites (temperance), and the irascible tendencies (fortitude).
B. PATRISTIC PERIOD
In the patristic age, Lucius Caelius Firmianus Lactantius (c. 250 – c. 317 C.E.) was
a follower of the Stoic philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (born on 3 January 106 B.C.E.
and murdered on 7 December 43 B.C.E.). Lactantius was the first Father to formulate a
general concept of Christian virtue. In The Divine Institutions (c. 304-310 C.E.), his most
important work, he says: “… it is clear that the knowledge of good and evil is one thing,
but virtue is another; for knowledge can exist without virtue …. Virtue is not the
knowing of good and evil. Rather, virtue is the doing of good and not-doing of evil.
Knowledge, therefore, is in fact joined to virtue in such wise that knowledge precedes
virtue and virtue follows knowledge. Cognition is of no value unless it is followed by
action.”566 Virtue thus entails knowledge of the good. But this knowledge must be
willed and acted upon. Only then can such knowledge become virtue.
St. Augustine of Hippo was the one among the Fathers of the Church who
offered the best definition of virtue: “Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua bene vivitur, qua
565
566
Lactantius, The Divine Institutions (6,5,10), quoted in The Faith of the Early Fathers, ed. William A.
Jurgens, Collegeville, Minnesota, The Liturgical Press, 1970, vol. 1, p. 268.
120
nemo male utitur.”567 Basically the Augustinian concept runs thus: “Virtue is
steadfastness and facility in doing good springing from the heart of man. One who is
endowed with great gifts can use the wealth of his endowments for good as well as for
evil. But virtue is that inner equipment of the forces of the soul which is turned
exclusively to the good life and which cannot be misused. It transcends noble
endowment and capacity. It is a permanent capacity of the soul’s powers assuring that
constancy in good action which makes a man true to himself in the multiple hazards of
decision and in the most diverse situations in life.” 568 St. Augustine considers virtue as
something added to the natural endowments of the human person – either through
personal acquisition or through divine infusion – which can be used exclusively for
doing good. In other words, virtue can never be used to do wrong.
A very important Augustinian insight is “the unity and interconnection of the

virtues in Christian life. He accepted the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks, viz.,
prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, but he gave pride of place to the Christian
virtues of faith, hope and especially charity. For him it was charity which animates and
unifies all the virtues, and it was God who gives true virtue by which we are enabled to
serve God and one another in love.” 569 St. Augustine goes against the anthropocentrism
of the classical concept of virtue by insisting on the centrality of charity in human life –
something that can only be given by God. He moves away from prudence towards
charity in the search for that which unifies all the virtues in human life. By insisting on
the animating role of charity, St. Augustine implies that without charity all the other
virtues lose their force in leading the human person to salvation.
Another Augustinian insight is his insistence on the role of intention in virtuous

living. “Thus, the key element in virtue for Augustine was not right action (officium) but
the end (finis) for which an action is done.” 570 Doing good and avoiding evil do not
necessarily spell virtue. It is the reason for doing good or avoiding evil that determines
the presence or absence of virtue in human life. This reason can only be love if virtue is
to exist. In the last analysis, the only valid intention for a Christian so that he or she can
be considered virtuous is love. In other words, a virtuous disciple of Christ behaves
only out of love.
By way of summary, virtue in the patristic period can be described thus:
1. Virtue consists in choosing and acting on the known good.

2. Virtue is a permanent good quality of the soul that is added to the natural
endowment of the human person.
3. Virtue can be used only for good and never for evil.
567
PL 32, 597. (Virtue is a quality of inner goodness through which one lives well, through which one
avoids acting badly. Cf. Häring, The Law of Christ, vol. 1, p. 485.)
568
569
570
121
4. Virtue can be either cardinal (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) or
Christian (faith, hope, charity).
5. Charity unifies and animates all the virtues and constitutes the only valid
motive for virtuous living.
C. SCHOLASTIC PERIOD
“The scholastic period saw the flourishing of systematic treatises on the virtues.
The two main influences on the thought of the scholastic authors were Augustine and
Aristotle …. By applying the Aristotelian notion of habit to the virtues, the scholastics
were now able to distinguish clearly the natural virtues from the supernatural virtues of
faith, hope and charity.” 571 The Thomistic treatment on virtue in Secunda Pars of the
Summa Theologiae – based on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle – has remained
unsurpassed until the present.572 Based on “his neo-platonic understanding that all
things come from God (exitus) and are oriented back to God (reditus),573 St. Thomas
Aquinas saw virtue – “a good operative habit (habitus) productive of the good”574 – as
one the means available to the human person to go back to God. Virtue perfects the
human powers “so that they can be disposed regularly and easily to truth and
goodness. Thus, the subject of the virtues is the perfection of some power or faculty of
the soul, and their object is the production of some goodness.” 575 St. Thomas Aquinas
sees the human person as having the powers needed to be able to return to God, but
these natural endowments need to be perfected by virtue.
St. Thomas defines virtue thus: “Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur,
qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.” 576 This Thomistic definition
is actually just an elaboration of the Augustinian definition, but it highlights the nature
of divine infusion. Aquinas views virtue as existing at two levels, based on his teaching
on the relation between nature and grace. At the natural level, the cardinal virtues,
which are acquired through pure human effort, perfect the practical intellect, the free
will, the irascible tendencies and the concupiscible appetites so that they may be
“productive of the good.”577 But whatever good is produced still falls short of salvation,
which is the fruit of grace. Hence, in order that the human powers may be productive
not just of the good but of salvation, there is need for infused virtues. “It is the clear
teaching of the Church that with sanctifying grace the supernatural virtues of faith,
hope, and love are also infused into the soul.” 578 The Council of Trent declares: “For
571
572
Cf. Walter, Virtue, in The New Dictionary of Theology, p. 1082.
573
574
575
576
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 55, a. 1: Virtue is a quality of inner goodness through
which one lives well, through which one avoids acting badly, and which God effects in us without our willing it.
577
578
122
though no one can be just except he to whom the merits of the passion of our Lord Jesus
Christ are communicated, yet this takes place in that justification of the sinner, when by
the merit of the most holy passion, the charity of God is poured by the Holy Ghost in
the hearts of those who are justified and inheres in them; whence man through Jesus
Christ, in whom he is ingrafted, receives in that justification, together with the
remission of sins, all these infused at the same time, namely, faith, hope and charity.” 579
Bernard Häring adds: “Theologians commonly hold that, in addition to the theological
virtues, also the supernatural moral virtues are infused into the soul, as powers or
dispositions.”580 Quoting from the Tridentine Catechism, Bernard Häring says:
“Together with the baptismal grace the noble retinue of all the virtues enters the
soul.”581
Through grace therefore God infuses supernatural virtues – the theological

virtues of faith, hope and charity, as well as the moral virtues of prudence, justice,
fortitude and temperance, together with all other virtues that God may deem to give –
into the human person thus enabling each and every virtuous act of his or hers to bring
about his or her salvation. “… without grace, the powers of the human soul and good
moral actions are directed to a natural finality or goodness” 582 only and not to the
supernatural goal of salvation. Natural virtues are acquired through human effort
consisting in the constant repetition of good deeds. Supernatural virtues instead are
given through divine infusion. Divine infusion does not facilitate the acquisition of the
natural virtues. “It does not follow simply from the infusion of the moral virtues that
man is spared effort in the acquisition of moral perfection. According to very many
theologians, the infused virtues do not in themselves impart any facility at all in the
exercise of virtue. They do no more than elevate the basic powers supernaturally,
informing and equipping them for the supernatural exercise of virtue.” 583 With the
supernatural virtues every act of natural virtue becomes salvific. “Thus, the natural or
acquired virtues and the supernatural virtues do not differ in the respect of being
habits, for both are considered as habits by Aquinas, but they differ in the finality or
kind of goodness to which they regularly dispose us, in the kind of merit that is gained,
and in the degree of perfection that is reached by the powers of the soul.” 584
By way of summary, virtue in the scholastic period can be described thus:
1. Virtue is an effective means for the human person in order to reach God.
2. Virtue has a twofold function:
579
Council of Trent, 6th Session: Decree concerning Justification, 13 January 1547, chapter 7, quoted in
The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, trans. H. J. Schroeder, OP, Rockford, IL, Tan Books & Publishers,
Inc., 1978, pp. 33-34; cf. DS 1530.
580
Häring, The Law of Christ, vol. 1, p. 491; cf. Letter of Pope Innocent III to Humbert, Archbishop of
Arles, 1201 AD, DS 780; Council of Vienne (1311-1312 AD), Decrees: “Sanctifying grace and the virtues are
conferred in baptism on both infants and adults,” DS. 904.
581
582
583
584
123
a. It perfects a particular human power;
b. It ensures that the perfected human power produces only what is good.
3. Virtue may be either acquired through human effort or infused through divine
initiative with the bestowal of sanctifying grace.
4. Infused virtue does not facilitate the exercise of natural virtue but it gives the
acts of acquired virtue saving character.
D. CONTEMPORARY PERIOD
As stated above, it was difficult to surpass the Thomistic synthesis on virtue.

Thus Catholic theologians in the contemporary period busied themselves with the lists
and classifications of virtues. They stressed in a particular way “the eschatological
virtues of gratitude, humility, vigilance, serenity and joy that are given to the believer
by the Holy Spirit. These lists of virtues suggest at least two things:
1. “that different virtues are needed to perfect the various powers and appetites of
the moral subject; and
2. “that there is a diversity of goods or values to be sought after in moral life, and
each set of values requires a distinct aptness or ready disposition to achieve
them.
“For example, prudence and faith dispose reason to seek values of an intellectual
nature; and the virtues of justice, hope and charity facilitate the will to achieve moral
values on a regular basis.”585
This Catholic stress on lists and classifications of virtues seems to fragment the
human person. It may even give the impression that there is an abyss between the
natural and the supernatural orders. “If the moral subject and the virtuous life are
viewed less abstractly, and therefore more historically, it is possible to argue that there
has always been one historical order in which the divine-human interaction has taken
place. Thus, in every authentic human act the virtue of charity is involved in fact,
disposing the moral subject and all truly good acts to the only destiny possible – love of
God through the neighbour.”586
The need for a multiplicity of virtues in order to perfect a specific human power
may give the impression that any unity of the virtues is impossible. Nonetheless various
philosophers and theologians through the ages have sought to find some rallying point
for the virtues. The Greeks have not come to a consensus as to the possibility of having
such a unifying virtue. But they have given primacy of importance to prudence. St.
Augustine explained that “charity unified the virtues ….” 587 St. Thomas Aquinas tried to
585
586
587
124
synthesize Aristotle and Augustine by stressing both prudence and charity. “Recently,
however, some theologians have come to question this ancient claim by pointing to the
possibilities that tragedy, as an inevitable part of the human condition, can force a
conflict between two virtues or that virtue can lead, not to happiness, but to the greatest
suffering. Most contemporary theologians, though, continue to argue for the unity of
the virtues, but the methods for doing so differ. In the Catholic tradition, some scholars
unify the virtues by continuing to coordinate and interrelate the different finalities of
nature (natural virtues) and supernature (infused virtues), while others unify the
virtuous life by arguing that every true moral act intends, at least implicitly but really,
God as its object. In the latter view, transcendental method is used to demonstrate that
charity is the font of all the virtues by how it can inform, unify and direct all aspects of
the moral subject and moral action towards life with God.”588
The idea that charity informs and unifies all the virtues translates into the
understanding that without charity all virtues are dead or unable to bring about the
salvation of the moral subject. After all, James says: “In the same way faith, if good
deeds do not go with it, is quite dead.”589 “As a body without a spirit is dead, so is faith
without deeds.”590 Good deeds seem to refer to acts of charity. St. Paul himself asserts:
“We are led by the Spirit to wait in the confident hope of saving justice through faith,
since in Christ Jesus it is not being circumcised or being uncircumcised that can effect
anything – only faith working through love.”591 For this reason, loss of charity would
render all the virtues ineffective.
The Protestant theologians have offered truly interesting insights on the

contemporary understanding of virtue. “Jonathan Edwards, the Calvinist theologian of
the Great Awakening in the 18th century, perhaps has been the most influential
commentator on the nature of virtue among Protestant authors in North America and
maybe elsewhere.”592 “Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) is widely acknowledged to be
America's most important and original philosophical theologian. His work as a whole is
an expression of two themes – the absolute sovereignty of God and the beauty of God's
holiness. The first is articulated in Edwards' defense of theological determinism, in a
doctrine of occasionalism, and in his insistence that physical objects are only collections
of sensible ideas while finite minds are mere assemblages of thoughts or perceptions. As
the only real cause or substance underlying physical and mental phenomena, God is
being in general, the sum of all being. Edwards' second theme is articulated in accounts of
God's end in creation, and of the nature of true virtue and true beauty. God creates in
order to manifest a holiness which consists in a benevolence which alone is truly
beautiful. Genuine human virtue is an imitation of divine benevolence and all finite
588
589
Jm 2,17.
590
Jm 2,26.
591
Ga 5,5-6.
592
Walter, Virtue, in THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY, p. 1083.
125
beauty is an image of divine loveliness. True virtue is needed to discern this beauty,
however, and to reason rightly about divine things.”593
“Edwards’ own Calvinist heritage, together with influences from the moral sense
school of philosophy and neo-platonism, led him to reflect in a distinctive way on the
nature of authentic virtue for Christian moral living. For him, natural humanity,
motivated by self-love, is capable only of achieving inferior virtue, not true virtue. The
origin of true virtue, or moral beauty, is a gift from God in grace, and Edwards assigned
three interrelated aspects to its nature:
1. “it is primarily concerned with the affections or will;

2. “it involves a cognitive aspect which corrects the possibility of disordered or
misdirected affections;
3. “it possesses symmetry and proportion.
“By weaving together the aesthetic and the moral into a singular fabric, Edwards gave a
unique texture to how virtue was to be understood and practiced.” 594
Another influential ethicist on virtue is Alasdair MacIntyre. “Alasdair C.

MacIntyre (1929- ) … teaches at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana …. In his
highly influential book After Virtue (1981), MacIntyre argues that moral theory and
practice are currently in a state of grave disorder, brought on in part by the liberal
individualism of the Enlightenment. He holds that people can best remedy this disorder
by reviving the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics.” 595 He thus insists on the
importance of virtues in the moral renewal of humanity.
The third contemporary Protestant theologian who has contributed much to the
discussion on ethics is Stanley Hauerwas (1940- ). He speaks of three essential
considerations in the understanding of virtue: (1) vision; (2) character; (3) narrative. 596
“Hauerwas contends that discussions on Christian morality have focused too much on
personal choice, on rationality and on objectivity. Greater focus needs to be
concentrated on the agent and … on the agent’s vision.” 597 Vision refers to “a way of
seeing the world.”598 Hauerwas insists that a Christian has a certain way of seeing the
world, a vision that is unique to the disciple of Christ. A Christian comes to this unique
vision through discipline that springs from the Gospel.599
593
Wainwright, William, "Jonathan Edwards", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/edwards/>. (Accessed
14 August 2005.)
594
Walter, Virtue, in THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY, p. 1083.
595
The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia Copyright © 2003, Columbia University Press.
<http://reference.allrefer.com/encyclopedia/M/MacIntyre,html.> (Accessed 14 August 2005.)
596
Cf. John W. Crossin, WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT VIRTUE?, New York, Paulist Press, 1985, p.
40.
597
Crossin, WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT VIRTUE?, p. 40.
598
599
Cf. Crossin, WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT VIRTUE?, p. 40.
126
Character for Hauerwas means “the qualification of man’s self-agency through
his beliefs, intentions, and actions, by which a man acquires a moral history befitting his
nature as a self-determining being.”600 In character Hauerwas lays stress on “personal
self-determination.”601 People are not merely the result of psychological or
environmental factors. “Man is at the mercy of external forces only if he allows himself
to be, for man is not just acted upon but agent. To be a man is to be an autonomous
center of activity and the source of one’s own determinations; all he knows, all he wills,
all he does issues from that very act by which he is.”602
We come now to the consideration of narrative or story. “A story … is a narrative

account that binds events and agents together in an intelligible pattern. We do not tell
stories simply because they provide us a more colorful way to say what can be said in a
different way, but because there is no other way we can articulate the richness of
intentional activity ….”603 In his essay Story and Theology, Hauerwas says: “We love a
good story …. A story commands our attention much more than a lecture about stories.
We often remember the stories we heard in a lecture or a sermon even though we
cannot remember why they were told in the first place.” 604 He insists on the central role
of story in Christianity. “For it is obvious that whatever else it is the message that
appears central to the Christian faith is in the form of a story.” 605 Thus story is deemed
“essential for the theological task.”606
Quoting from Sallie TeSelle’s article The Experience of Coming to Belief, Hauerwas
says: “Why does everyone love a good story and how is story related to theological
reflection? The answers to these two questions are, I believe, related. We all love a good
story because of the basic narrative quality of human experience; in a sense, any story is
about ourselves, and a good story is good precisely because somehow it rings true to
human life. Human life is not marked by instantaneous rapture and easy solutions. Life
is tough. That is hardly a novel thought, but it is nonetheless the backbone in a literal
sense – the structure – of a good story. We recognize our own pilgrimages from here to
there in a good story; we feel its movement in our bones and know it is right.”607 We
should be careful however not to conceive of story in fictitious terms. The story that
concerns theology is definitely factual. Using a classical philosophical term, a theological
story is cum fundamento in re.608
600
601
Crossin, WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT VIRTUE?, p. 42..
602
Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection, Notre Dame,
Fides/Claretian, 1974, p. 55.
603
Stanley Hauerwas with Richard Bondi and David B. Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further
Investigations into Christian Ethics, Notre Dame, University of Norte Dame Press, 1977, p. 76.
604
Hauerwas with Bondi and Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 71.
605
606
607
Hauerwas with Bondi and Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 71-72.
608
With basis in reality; grounded in reality; rooted in what is real; founded in what is real.
127
Citing Lou O. Mink’s article History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,
Hauerwas suggests: “Surprises and contingencies are the stuff of stories, as of games,
yet by virtue of the promised yet open outcomes we are enabled to follow a series of
events across their contingent relations and to understand them as leading to an as yet
unrevealed conclusion without however necessitating that conclusion.” 609 Such
surprises and contingencies however are not unrelated. Stanley Hauerwas explains:
“Stories are thus a necessary form of our knowledge inasmuch as it is only through
narrative that we can catch the connections between actions and responses of men that
are inherently particular and contingent.” 610 In relation to virtue therefore narrative or
story implies that a virtuous person is not one who is free of faults. In fact, a faultless
life is devoid of story. A good plot or storyline runs on the interaction of good and evil.
Virtue in a person entails a beautiful blending of the comic and the tragic, of the heroic
and the sinful, arising from his or her determination to pursue a vision and leading to a
coherent, logical and satisfying ending or conclusion. Viewed in this way, virtue leads
to the salvation of the individual and to the realization of the Reign of God. After all,
does the Church not proclaim amid the mystifying candlelight of the Easter Vigil
celebration: “O happy fault, O necessary sin of Adam, which gained for us so great a
Redeemer!”611 The tragic sin of Adam was necessary for the world to have such a
Redeemer. Tragic happenings in human life that are integrated into the fabric of the
story of human life are even necessary for the attainment of human integration. This is
indeed the virtuous living that breeds salvation!
By way of summary, virtue in the contemporary period can be described thus:
1. The perfection of a particular human power depends on the convergence of a

Multiplicity of Virtues due to the variety of objects to which it is directed.
2. Despite the multiplicity of virtues, the Virtue of Charity unifies, harmonizes
and enlivens all the virtues.
3. Virtue is an operative habit, but it has a cognitive dimension which ensures it
from deviation.
4. Virtue necessitates a sense of symmetry and proportion; one cannot possess
too much of one virtue and too little or the total absence of another.
5. Virtue entails three elements:
a. Vision;
b. Character;
c. Narrative or Story.
609
610
611
The Easter Proclamation (Exsultet).
128
OUTLINE
I. The Nature of Moral Theology
II. The Justification for Moral Theology
129
III. The Moral Teaching of the New Testament
A. The Centrality of the Basileia Message of Jesus
1. The Proclamation of the Basileia of God

a. The Eschatological Character of the Basileia of God
b. The Basileia of God as a Gift
c. The Holistic Character of the Basileia of God
d. The Basileia of God as oriented towards Salvation
e. The Universal Character of the Basileia of God
2. The Twofold Demand of the Basileia of God
a. The Demand for Conversion
b. The Demand for Faith
3. The Call to Discipleship in the Basileia of God
B. The Importance of the Abba of Jesus
C. The Decisive Action of Jesus in the One Commandment of Love
D. The Overriding Concern of Jesus for Communitas
IV. The Historical Background of Moral Theology
A. Moral Theology in Ancient Christianity
1. The Apostolic Fathers

2. The Apologists
3. The Catechetical School of Alexandria in Egypt
4. The North African Latin Fathers
5. The Relevant Greek Fathers of the Fourth Century
6. The Relevant Latin Fathers-Doctors of the Church
B. Moral Theology in Medieval Christianity
1. Moral Theology in Early Medieval Christianity

a. The Mediterranean Penitential Discipline
b. The Celtic Penitential Discipline
2. Moral Theology in Later Medieval Christianity
a. Pre-Scholastic Period
b. Scholastic Period
C. Moral Theology in Modern Christianity
1. The Nominalistic School
130
2. The Protestant Reformation
3. The Tridentine Counter-Reformation
4. The Moral Systems
D. Moral Theology in Contemporary Christianity
1. Moral Theology in the 19th Century

a. John Michael Sailer
b. John Baptist Hirscher
c. Magnus Jocham
2. Moral Theology in the 20th Century
a. Shift from Commandments to Virtues
b. Ultimate Basis of Moral Norm
c. New Possibilities
V. The Nature and Characteristics of Christian Behaviour
A. Characteristics of Human Behaviour
B. Sources of Morality
C. Impediments to Moral Activity
1. Impediments that are Permanent in nature

2. Impediments that are Transitory in nature
D. Fundamental Option
VI. Conscience and the Moral Norm
A. The Human Conscience
1. Scriptural Doctrine
2. Patristic Teaching
3. Theological Reflection
a. The Twofold Understanding of Conscience
b. The Threefold Understanding of Conscience
c. The Single Understanding of Conscience
B. The Moral Norm
1. Classifications
a. Eternal Law
b. Natural Law
131
c. Positive Law
2. Dispensations
VII. Sin and Conversion
A. The Mystery of Sin
1. Scriptural Teaching
2. Theological Reflection
a. The Mystery of the Cross
b. The Social Dimension of Sin
c. The Degrees of Sinfulness
3. Classifications
B. The Dynamics of Conversion
1. Intellectual Conversion
2. Moral Conversion
3. Religious Conversion
VIII. Virtue and Christian Wholeness
A. Classical Period
B. Patristic Period
C. Scholastic Period
D. Contemporary Period
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FUNDAMENTAL

RENÉ T. LAGAYA, SDB, MTD

Don Bosco Press

Chapter I: The Nature of Moral Theology …………………...……... 4

Chapter II: The Justification for Moral Theology ……………..……. 6

Chapter III: The Moral Teaching of the New Testament .……….….. 8

Chapter IV: The Historical Background of Moral Theology .……... 26

Chapter V: The Nature and Characteristics of Christian

Chapter VII: Sin and Conversion …………………………….……… 102

Chapter VIII: Virtue and Christian Wholeness ……………..….......... 118

Outline …………………………………………………………..... 131

Bibliography ………………………………………………………..….. 134

The emergence of Moral Theology as a separate discipline was primarily due to

Moral Theology was traditionally taught under two main headings:

1. General Moral Theology;

Contemporary Moral Theology however is taught differently for reasons we

1. Fundamental Moral Theology;

Contemporary Special Moral Theology focuses on the relationships to which the

With Rene Descartes (1596-1650) a great change occurred in the approach to

Vatican II insisted on the renewal of the sacred sciences. “Other theological

A. THE CENTRALITY OF THE BASILEIA MESSAGE OF JESUS

1. THE PROCLAMATION OF THE BASILEIA OF GOD

The basileia proclamation of Jesus possesses the following characteristics: (a) It is

a. The Eschatological Character of the Basileia of God

There are four basic ways of understanding eschatology: (1) Consequent

Consequent Eschatology refers to the purely future approach to eschatology as

Realized Eschatology refers instead to the purely present approach to

Existential Eschatology was proposed by Rudolph Bultmann. For him “the

The Already-and-the-Not-Yet Eschatology was coined by Oscar Cullmann but

Rudolph Schnackenburg sees God as one who “dynamically works salvation in

Oscar Cullmann develops the so-called eschatological tension. This tension is

For Wolfhart Pannenberg the eschatological issue should be understood in terms

b. The Basileia of God as a Gift

 The PHARISEES: “These were an extraordinarily powerful group within first

c. The Holistic Character of the Basileia of God

d. The Basileia of God as oriented towards Salvation

The preaching of John the Baptizer was indeed characterized by condemnations

e. The Universal Character of the Basileia of God

2. THE TWOFOLD DEMAND OF THE BASILEIA OF GOD

a. The Demand for Conversion

Metanoia, repentance or conversion is therefore characterized by the following

b. The Demand for Faith

3. THE CALL TO DISCIPLESHIP IN THE BASILEIA OF GOD

Disciples of the Rabbis Disciples of Jesus

1 – The Disciple’s choice 1 – The Master’s Choice

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ABBA OF JESUS

C. THE DECISIVE ACTION OF JESUS IN THE ONE

Rudolf Schnackenburg discusses the context of the synoptic formulation of the

Jesus’ action was threefold:

1. By juxtaposing the erstwhile two separate commandments, he revealed the

D. THE OVERRIDING CONCERN OF JESUS FOR COMMUNITAS

1. “There is a separation from the structures of group or social role or lifestyle

1. Ancient Christianity – until St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.)

A. MORAL THEOLOGY IN ANCIENT CHRISTIANITY

1. THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

Contemporary scholars have listed seven such Fathers: Barnabas, Clement of

3. THE CATECHETICAL SCHOOL OF ALEXANDRIA IN EGYPT

St. Clement’s most important writings comprised a trilogy: Protreptikos

Of special relevance to the study of the history of moral theology is Clement’s