Lyceum Vs CA 219 SCRA 610
Lyceum Vs CA 219 SCRA 610
Lyceum Vs CA 219 SCRA 610
CA
219 SCRA 610
FACTS:
1. Petitioner had sometime commenced before in the SEC a complaint against Lyceum of
Baguio, to require it to change its corporate name and to adopt another name not
similar or identical with that of petitioner. SEC decided in favor of petitioner. Lyceum of
Baguio filed petition for certiorari but was denied for
lack of merit.
2. Armed with the resolution of the Court, petitioner instituted before the SEC to compel
private respondents, which are also educational institutions, to delete word “Lyceum”
from their corporate names and permanently to enjoin them from using such as part of
their respective names.
3. Hearing officer sustained the claim of petitioner and held that the word “Lyceum” was
capable of appropriation and that petitioner had acquired an enforceable right to the
use of that word.
4. In an appeal, the decision was reversed by the SEC En Banc. They held that the word
“Lyceum” to have become identified with petitioner as to render use thereof of other
institutions as productive of consfusion about the identity of the schools concerned in
the mind of the general public.
5. Petitioner went to appeal with the CA but the latter just affirmed the decision of the
SEC En Banc.
HELD:
Under the corporation code, no corporate name may be allowed by the SEC if the
proposed name is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing
corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive,
confusing or contrary to existing laws. The policy behind this provision is to avoid fraud
upon the public, which would have the occasion to deal with the entity concerned, the
evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of difficulties of
administration and supervision over corporations.
Petitioner claims that the word has acquired a secondary meaning in relation to
petitioner with the result that the word, although originally generic, has become
appropriable by petitioner to the exclusion of other institutions.
The doctrine of secondary meaning is a principle used in trademark law but has been
extended to corporate names since the right to use a corporate name to the exclusion of
others is based upon the same principle, which underlies the right to use a particular
trademark or tradename. Under this doctrine, a word or phrase originally incapable of
exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market, because geographical
or otherwise descriptive might nevertheless have been used for so long and so
exclusively by one producer with reference to this article that, in that trade and to that
group of purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was
his produce. The doctrine cannot be made to apply where the evidence didn't prove that
the business has continued for so long a time that it has become of consequence and
acquired good will of considerable value such that its articles and produce have
acquired a well known reputation, and confusion will result by the use of the disputed
name.
Petitioner didn't present evidence, which provided that the word “Lyceum” acquired
secondary meaning. The petitioner failed to adduce evidence that it had exclusive use of
the word. Even if petitioner used the word for a long period of time, it hadn’t acquired
any secondary meaning in its favor because the appellant failed to prove that it had
been using the same word all by itself to the exclusion of others.
Lyceum of the Philippines v. CA
(G.R. No. 101897)
Facts:
Petitioner Lyceum of the Philippines had commenced before the SEC a proceeding
against the Lyceum of Baguio to change its corporate name alleging that the 2
names are substantially identical because of the word ‘Lyceum’. SEC found for
petitioner and the SC denied the consequent appeal of Lyceum of Baguio in a
resolution. Petitioner then basing its ground on the resolution, wrote to all
educational institutions which made use of the word ‘Lyceum’ as part of their
corporate name to discontinue their use. When this recourse failed, petitioner
moved before the SEC to enforce its exclusive use of the word ‘Lyceum.’ Petitioner
further claimed that the word ‘Lyceum’ has acquired a secondary meaning in its
favor. The SEC Hearing Officer found for petitioner. Both SEC En Banc and CA ruled
otherwise.
Issues:
(2) Whether or not the word ‘Lyceum’ has acquired a secondary meaning in favor
of petitioner.
Ruling:
(1) YES. “Lyceum” is in fact as generic in character as the word “university.” In the
name of the petitioner, “Lyceum” appears to be a substitute for “university;” in
other places, however, “Lyceum,” or “Liceo” or “Lycee” frequently denotes a
secondary school or a college. It may be that the use of the word “Lyceum” may not
yet be as widespread as the use of “university,” but it is clear that a not
inconsiderable number of educational institutions have adopted “Lyceum” or
“Liceo” as part of their corporate names. Since “Lyceum” or “Liceo” denotes a
school or institution of learning, it is not unnatural to use this word to designate
an entity which is organized and operating as an educational institution.
(2) NO. Under the doctrine of secondary meaning, a word or phrase originally
incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market,
because geographical or otherwise descriptive might nevertheless have been used
so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to this article that, in
that trade and to that group of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come
to mean that the article was his produce. With the foregoing as a yardstick, [we]
believe the appellant failed to satisfy the aforementioned requisites. While the
appellant may have proved that it had been using the word ‘Lyceum’ for a long
period of time, this fact alone did not amount to mean that the said word had
acquired secondary meaning in its favor because the appellant failed to prove that
it had been using the same word all by itself to the exclusion of others. More so,
there was no evidence presented to prove that confusion will surely arise if the
same word were to be used by other educational institutions.
(3) NO. We do not consider that the corporate names of private respondent
institutions are “identical with, or deceptively or confusingly similar” to that of the
petitioner institution. True enough, the corporate names of private respondent
entities all carry the word “Lyceum” but confusion and deception are effectively
precluded by the appending of geographic names to the word “Lyceum.” Thus, we
do not believe that the “Lyceum of Aparri” can be mistaken by the general public
for the Lyceum of the Philippines, or that the “Lyceum of Camalaniugan” would be
confused with the Lyceum of the Philippines. We conclude and so hold that
petitioner institution is not entitled to a legally enforceable exclusive right to use
the word “Lyceum” in its corporate name and that other institutions may use
“Lyceum” as part of their corporate names.