Suntay vs. Suntay

6/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 300
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
*
G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998.
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, **
petitioner, vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
Appeals; Certiorari; Actions; When certiorari as a special civil

action can be availed of.—Certiorari as a special civil action can
be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to
prosper.
Actions; Motions; The motion to dismiss may be filed within
the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint.—Special
proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder
would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides
that the motion to dismiss may be filed “within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint.” Clearly, the motion
should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioner’s
opposition which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil
actions.
Marriages; A void marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all.—The fundamental distinction between void and
voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to
have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect
to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article
144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are
called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016ba817aa0368fecb5a003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void

marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
____________
* SECOND DIVISION.
** Should read Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay.
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VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 761
Same; A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces

all its civil effects.—A voidable marriage, is considered valid and
produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment
of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had
never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to
prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by
the second paragraph of Article 89. x x x Stated otherwise, the
annulment of “the marriage by the court abolishes the legal
character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it
cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union
produced during its continuance.”
Same; Words and Phrases; The terms “annul” and “null and
void” have different legal connotations and implications.—Indeed,
the terms “annul” and “null and void” have different legal
connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing;
annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something that
does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled
presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect
when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a
marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which
already exists from the very beginning.
Judgments; It is an elementary principle of procedure that the
resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the
dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to
settlement of rights of the parties; Excepts.—Parenthetically, it is
an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the
court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights
of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding
statement in the body of the decision or order which may be

somewhat confusing, the same is not without a qualification. The
foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final
decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be
wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction
—which usually is “the case where the order or decision in
question is that of a court not of record which is not
constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which
the judgment is based.”
762

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Aquino and Ursua for petitioner.
Estelito P. Mendoza and Orlando A. Santiago for
private respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the

fallo of a decision is the primary issue in this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C.
Suntay who opposes respondent Isabel’s petition for
appointment as administratrix of her grandmother’s estate
by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of
petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of
this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita
Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage
soured so that1 in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed a
criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo
2
filed before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, charging her, among others,
with infidelity and praying for the custody and
3
care of their
children who were living with their mother. The suit was
docketed as Civil Case Number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
___________
1 Allegedly for parricide.

2 Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City.
3 Decision dated October 3, 1967 of the CFI of Rizal penned by Judge
Lourdes P. San Diego, p. 3; Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.
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VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 763

“WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio

Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is
hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the
parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the record
that the question of the case and custody of the three children
have been the subject of another case between the same parties in
another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the
same cannot be litigated in this case.
“With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of
counsel that the third party defendants are willing to pay
P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept
the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the
defendant is awarded said sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim
and to pay attorney’s
4
fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
“SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
As basis thereof, the CFI said:
“From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined

in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the
trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already
out of the hospital he continued to be under observation and
treatment.
“It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the
plaintiff’s mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had
made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
“There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties
was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiff’s mental illness
had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
“x x x x x x x x x
___________
4 Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
764

“(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
“There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant

knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof
that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges
in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-
psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more5
in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his

mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The
latter is respondent Isabel’s paternal grandmother. 6
The
decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.
Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent
Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco 7
Suntay filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for issuance in her
favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of
her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which
case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is
one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and
prayed8 that she be appointed as administratrix of the
estate.
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition
claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent,
that he has been managing the conjugal properties even
while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to
protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that
petitioner and her family have been alienated from the
decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years
and thus, prayed9
that Letters of Administration be issued
instead to him.
___________
5 Ibid.
6 Annex “I” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 111-119.
7 Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78.
8 Annex “I,” Petition.

9 Annex “J,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 116-118.
765
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 765

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an

opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special
proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel
should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedent’s
estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under
Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no
right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate
relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
respondent Isabel’s father predeceased his mother, the late
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence
of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the
marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents is “null and void,”
the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor
interest in
10
the estate of her paternal grandmother—the
decedent. On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the 11
assailed order denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied 12
by the
trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998, petitioner,
as mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as well
as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a
motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for
the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the
motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive
portion of the decision declaring the marriage of
respondent Isabel’s parents “null and void” must be upheld;
and (d) said decision had long become final and had, in fact,
been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that
petitioner’s motion to dismiss was late having been filed
after the opposition was already filed in court, the
counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and
that petitioner in his
____________
10 Motion to Dismiss, Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-36.
11 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch

78; Annex “D” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
12 Order of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78—Annex “H” of the
Petition; Rollo, p. 110.
766

opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent

Isabel’s allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedent’s son. She further contends
that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous
premise that there is a conflict between the body of the
decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for
annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the
validity of the marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after
hearing declare a marriage “voidable” otherwise, the court
will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages
under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled
is “voidable.”
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only
if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a)
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law 13
for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.
There must be a capricious, arbitrary14
and whimsical
exercise of power for it to prosper.
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the
respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereunder, to wit:
“The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively

assessed and the pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that a
motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the
peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from
an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not
adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to
assert a cause of action against a particular defendant.
Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of
the proceedings, not only be-
____________
13 Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617 (1996).

14 Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, 263 SCRA 1 (1996).
767
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 767

cause of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify, the
State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
“x x x x x x x x x
“The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality
of the petitioner to file and maintain this special proceedings, that
in the case at bench, the body of the decision determines the
nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of
nullity.
“The oppositor’s contention that the fallo of the questioned
decision (Annex “A”—Motion) prevails over the body thereof is not
without any qualification. It holds true only when the dispositive
portion of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and
can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction.
“Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body
of the decision may be referred to for purposes of construing the
judgment” (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and
Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive
portion must find support from the decision’s ratio decidendi.
“Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of
Quezon City, marked as Annex “A” of oppositor’s motion, the
marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85, par. 3 of the Civil
Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable.
Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before
the decree of annulment, she is 15
considered legitimate (Art. 89,
par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.).”
The trial court correctly ruled that “a motion to dismiss at

this juncture is inappropriate.” The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governs the procedure to be observed
16
in actions,
civil or criminal and special proceedings. The Rules do not
only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the
coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to
dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule
16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss

may be filed
____________
15 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.

16 Rules 1 & 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
768

“within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint.” Clearly, the motion should have17 been filed on
or before the filing of petitioner’s opposition which is the
counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioner’s motion to dismiss filed out of
time, it was filed almost two years after respondent Isabel
was already through with the presentation of her witnesses
and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses.
The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but
also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off
course from established jurisprudence on this matter, as
petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law
and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged
conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive
portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty
in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal
basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel’s
parents is clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New
Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the
Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive
portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that
the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents is “null and
void” and that the legal effect of such declaration is that
the marriage from its inception is void and the children
born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such 18
argument
cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New
Civil Code clas-
___________
17 February 7, 1996.
18 Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by male and
female respectively, even with the consent of the parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;
769
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 769

sify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates

19
the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.
_____________
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of
killing of the spouse of either of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified
in Article 82. (n)
Article 81. Marriage between the following are incestuous and void
from their performance, whether the relationship between the parties be
legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood;
(3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth degree. (28a)
Article 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the
beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;

(2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter
and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and the
surviving spouse of the latter;
(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a)
Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during

the lifetime of the first spouses of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or
if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court. (29a)
Article 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after

three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the
meantime she has given birth to a child. (n)
19 Article 85 of the New Civil Code reads:
770

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable

marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with
respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction
have the same status, rights and obligations as 20
acknowledged natural children under Article 89
irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
_____________
“A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing

at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was between the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if
male, or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if
female, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parent, guardian or person having authority over the party,
unless after attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the
case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the
former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and
the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her
husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(5) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or
intimidation, unless the violence or threat having disappeared,
such party, afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her
husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(6) That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically
incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity
continues, and appears to be incurable.
20 Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void

from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
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VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 771

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid

and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the
special contract as if it had never been entered into but the
law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of
children born in voidable marriages is governed by the
second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
“Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of

annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children,
21
and are also called natural
children by legal fiction.” (Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the annulment of “the marriage by the

court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by
the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical
consequences 22which the marital union produced during its
continuance.”
Indeed, the terms “annul” and “null and void” have
different legal connotations and implications. Annul means
to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make23
void or
of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas
null and void is something that does not exist from the
beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it
subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is
terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a

marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition
which already exists from the very beginning.
____________
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural

children by legal fiction.
x x x x x x x x x
21 See Tolentino, New Civil Code, Vol. 1, pp. 244-245.
22 Sy Loc Lieng, et al. v. Sy Quia, et al., 16 Phil. 137 (1910).
23 Nuguid v. Nuguid, 123 Phil. 1305 (1966).
772

There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s argument that it

is the dispositive portion of the decision which must control
as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel’s
parents was void or voidable. Such argument springs from
a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict
between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of
procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue
as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is
the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the
parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding
statement in the body of24
the decision or order which may be
somewhat confusing, the same is not without a
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the
dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear
and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without
need of interpretation or construction—which usually is
“the case where the order or decision in question is that of
a court not of record which is not constitutionally required
to state25 the facts and the law on which the judgment is
based.”
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the
dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must
be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in
order to give effect to the intention, purpose
26
and judgment
of the court. In Republic v. de los Angeles the Court said:
“Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that ‘[i]n case of

doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.’

This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding upon
the courts in relation to its judgments.
____________
24 Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 (1964).

25 Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading Corporation, 29 SCRA 397
(1969).
26 41 SCRA 422 (1971).
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VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 773

“x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be

construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as
far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and
so as to give effect to every word and part if possible, and to
effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with
the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864)”
[Emphasis supplied]
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of

the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is
voidable:
“It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiff’s
mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made
themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed
under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
“There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties
was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiff’s mental illness
had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
x x x x x x x x x
“(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party,
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
x x x x x x x x x
“There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage
defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there
is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The

charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the
neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives
more 27in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).”
____________
27 Decision, Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.
774

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null

and void the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents based
on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal
consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore
governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of
Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to
the rule just abovementioned. Based on said provision the
children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of
the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3,
1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking
appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate
grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke
their successional right of representation in the estate of
their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their
father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their
grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a
determination by the courts of whether the Letters of
Administration may be granted to her. Neither does the
Court adjudge herein the successional rights of the
personalities involved over the decedent’s estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point
what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz
Castro, emphasized to “all magistrates of all levels of the
judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be
exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed
once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the
rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions
made as well as the directions and instructions given by
the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the
decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and
unequivocally leaving absolutely

28
no room for dispute,
debate or interpretation.”
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the
instant petition is DISMISSED.
____________
28 Padua v. Robles, 66 SCRA 485 (1975).
775
VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 775

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Per current jurisprudence, “a marriage though

void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact” before
any party thereto “can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void.” (Apiag vs. Cantero, 268 SCRA
47 [1997])
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 [1997])
——o0o——
776
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6/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 300

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Appeals; Certiorari; Actions; When certiorari as a special civil

Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void

** Should read Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay.

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 761

Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

Same; A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces

statement in the body of the decision or order which may be

762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the

1 Allegedly for parricide.

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 763

“WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

“From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined

4 Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 39-41.

764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his

8 Annex “I,” Petition.

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 765

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an

10 Motion to Dismiss, Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-36.

11 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch

766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent

“The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively

13 Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617 (1996).

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 767

The trial court correctly ruled that “a motion to dismiss at

16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss

15 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.

768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 769

sify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;

(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;

Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

Article 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after

770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable

“A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing

20 Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 771

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid

“Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of

Stated otherwise, the annulment of “the marriage by the

terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a

obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural

772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s argument that it

“Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that ‘[i]n case of

that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.’

24 Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 (1964).

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998 773