Tri-Pride Lawsuit
Tri-Pride Lawsuit
Tri-Pride Lawsuit
Defendants.
SELF, as individuals (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), by and through their counsel, and as their cause
INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiffs bring this action seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
“City”); LIEUTENANT PETERS, in his individual capacity and acting as a police officer for the
capacity and acting as a police officer for the CITY OF JOHNSON CITY, TENNESSEE
arrest Plaintiffs pursuant to the City’s “Special Event Policy, Procedure and Application” (the
“Policy”), and the practices and customs approved by the City for interpreting, enforcing, and
applying the City’s Policy. Plaintiffs challenge the manner in which the Policy was interpreted,
enforced, and applied against them pursuant to the training, policies, and practices used by
CITY, TENNESSEE trains its officers, agents, and employees to interpret, enforce, and apply the
practice, or custom for training its officers, agents, and employees to interpret, enforce, and
apply the Policy and alleges that the training is either erroneous or lacking in proper instruction
Policy and the practice and/or custom for training (or lack of training for) its officers, agents, and
of the City’s Policy against Plaintiffs on September 15, 2018, and seeks injunctive relief to
PARTIES
personal capacity.
6. Plaintiff, ARTHUR FISHER, is an adult and brings this action in his personal
capacity.
capacity.
corporate located within the State of Tennessee and has the ability to sue and be sued. The City
has the right, power, privilege, and authority to adopt and enforce the Policy. The City has the
right, power, privilege, and authority to train (or fail to properly train) its officers, agents, and
employees to interpret, enforce, and apply the Policy and other regulations and to do and perform
all of the acts pertaining to its local affairs. At all material times, the City acted toward Plaintiffs
under color of the statutes, ordinances, customs, and usage of the City. At all material times, the
City was the employer of the City’s police officers, including but not limited to LIEUTENANT
PETERS, SERGEANT HODGES, and other unknown officers acting to interpret, enforce, and
apply the Policy against Plaintiffs, and is responsible for the training (or lack thereof), policies,
practices, and customs of the City’s Police Department. The City knew of the unlawful
enforcement of the City’s Policy alleged herein, and had the power and authority to remedy the
unlawful interpretation, enforcement, and application, but failed to do so. The City, by both its
acts and failure to act, has ratified the unlawful interpretation, enforcement, and application of
the Policy.
police officer for the CITY OF JOHNSON CITY, TENNESSEE, was at all relevant times
employed in the City’s Police Department. LIEUTENANT PETERS enforced the Policy under
police officer for the CITY OF JOHNSON CITY, TENNESSEE, was at all relevant times
are employed as police and/or enforcement officers for the CITY OF JOHNSON CITY,
TENNESSEE, and/or were acting as agents and/or employees for the CITY OF JOHNSON
CITY, TENNESSEE. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names of Defendants DOES 1 through 5
and therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend
this Complaint to allege their true names and thereon allege that each of the fictitiously named
Defendants are responsible for the occurrences herein alleged, and that Plaintiffs’ damages, as
herein alleged, were caused by their conduct. DOES 1-5 enforced the City’s Policy under color
of state law and/or were acting as agents and/or employees for the City.
12. Plaintiffs bring this action seeking injunctive relief and nominal and/or
acting under color of state law, of certain rights secured to Plaintiffs and others as alleged herein
which provide for original jurisdiction in this Court of all suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
14. Jurisdiction is also conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the cause
of action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) in that the state law claims form part of the same case or
16. This Court is authorized to grant Declaratory Judgment under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, implemented through Rule 57 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and under Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4,
Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, and to issue the Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive
relief requested by Plaintiffs under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
17. This Court is authorized to grant Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief and to award
Plaintiffs’ costs in this action for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and civil rights, including
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, Rule
18. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants
reside and/or do business in the Eastern District of Tennessee and may be found and served in
19. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee as all of the events giving
FACTS
20. Plaintiffs are individuals acting to spread awareness of their views regarding
freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion, and to further their religious, political, and
social beliefs.
22. Plaintiffs bring this action to vindicate and protect their rights to Freedom of
Speech, Assembly, and the Free Exercise of Religion, and their rights under Tennessee’s
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, in
the City by ensuring that Defendants are restrained from acting prospectively in violation of
those rights.
23. The public parks, public streets, public sidewalks, and public rights-of-way within
the jurisdiction of the City (“Public Spaces”) are traditional public fora.
24. Plaintiffs, citizens, and members of the public utilize the Public Spaces for
25. Plaintiffs have shared their religious, political, and social speech with people in
the City.
26. Plaintiffs’ message is one of hope and salvation that Christianity offers.
27. Plaintiffs have not harassed, encouraged violence, or expressed themselves in any
28. Plaintiffs desire to continue their peaceful activities without being incarcerated or
cited.
34. On upcoming days – including but not limited to days in May 2019 through
activities by peacefully expressing religious, political, and social speech within the City’s Public
Spaces.
35. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ prior enforcement of the Policy,
Plaintiffs are unsure of their ability to exercise their constitutionally-protected activities, and fear
36. The City adopted the Policy titled “Special Event Policy, Procedure and
Application.”
37. The Policy states in part: “A Special Event Permit is approved and issued for
street closure requests and road block requests in relation to an organized special event.”
38. The Policy defines a “Special Event” as: “Any organized street festival,
commercial block party, road race, parade, or fundraiser road block that is open to the public,
whether a ticketed event or a non-ticketed event, held wholly or partially on City owned or
maintained property.”
39. The Policy states in part: “It is the goal of the Special Event Review Committee to
assist event organizers in planning safe and successful events that create a minimal impact on the
communities surrounding the events. . . . The Committee will review all upcoming events held in
41. On September 7, 2014, Plaintiff WALDROP and others were peacefully sharing
43. Sergeant Van Mominee stated that the activity was illegal because it was creating
a disturbance.
44. While Sgt. Mominee was speaking with Plaintiff WALDROP, an associate began
to speak.
45. Sergeant Mominee stated that no person was allowed to speak in the direction of
the Pride event within Rotary Park because it would automatically be considered a disturbance.
After being asked to clarify the legal definition of “disturbance,” Sgt. Mominee replied that if
any person speaking caused anyone at the Pride event to turn and look in the direction of the
46. Sergeant Mominee further warned that Plaintiff WALDROP and his associates
The director of the event had decided that Plaintiff WALDROP and his associates would be
allowed to speak in their direction if they used only their casual voices.
48. After about 10 minutes, Plaintiff WALDROP and his associates left.
49. In an attempt to amicably resolve this issue, on October 15, 2014, Plaintiff
WALDROP sent an email to Chief of Police Sirois, notifying him of the situation and asking if
50. Chief Sirois replied that he would look into the issue, but never replied with any
51. On August 27, 2015, counsel for Plaintiff WALDROP sent a letter to the City,
notifying the City of Plaintiff WALDROP’s intention to peacefully share his religious message
at the upcoming Pride event at Rotary Park, and requesting a conference call to discuss the issues
52. On September 3, 2015, outside counsel for the City responded, rejecting the
request for a conference call, and directing counsel for Plaintiff WALDROP to inform Plaintiff
WALDROP of cases relating to time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, and
53. On September 15, 2018, the Tri-Pride Festival (“Festival”) was held in the City.
54. On September 15, 2018, the Festival was free to the public.
55. On September 15, 2018, the Festival was open to the public.
58. On September 15, 2018, the Festival was located on public streets and sidewalks
59. On September 15, 2018, Plaintiffs were exercising their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion by peacefully sharing their Christian message.
60. On September 15, 2018, Plaintiffs were exercising their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion by peacefully sharing their Christian message
61. On September 15, 2018, the public sidewalk and public park where Plaintiffs
62. On September 15, 2018, Plaintiffs went through the security checkpoint in order
63. On September 15, 2018, the City’s supervising officer on the scene was
LIEUTENANT PETERS.
had supervisory decision-making authority on the scene for the City for interpreting and
preached in the park the festival organizers “would tell us that they don’t want you there, you
would be asked to leave; once you left you’re fine; if you went back in then you could be cited.”
67. On September 15, 2018, LIEUTENANT PETERS told Plaintiffs “y’all have
already been told you’re not welcomed over there . . . so, you can’t go over there.”
68. On September 15, 2018, LIEUTENANT PETERS told Plaintiffs “you will be
70. On September 15, 2018, LIEUTENANT PETERS stated Plaintiffs were required
71. On September 15, 2018, the City’s DOE 1 officer, agent, and employee told
72. On September 15, 2018, the City’s DOE 2 officer, agent, and employee told
Plaintiffs “on this side of the sidewalk has [sic] been rented by a private company.”
73. On September 15, 2018, the City’s DOE 2 officer, agent, and employee told
74. On September 15, 2018, the City’s DOE 2 officer, agent, and employee told
Plaintiffs that the festival organizers’ permit allowed them to decide who they did not want in the
festival.
75. On September 15, 2018, the City’s DOE 3 officer, agent, and employee told
Plaintiffs “you guys have already been warned not to be back on the property.”
77. On September 15, 2018, the City’s DOE 3 officer, agent, and employee called the
78. On September 15, 2018, SERGEANT HODGES told Plaintiffs that they could not
stand on the sidewalk outside the barricaded festival area because the festival area was
79. On September 15, 2018, SERGEANT HODGES told Plaintiffs they could not
the City’s DOE 1-5 officers, agents, and employees threatened to arrest Plaintiffs pursuant to the
policies, practices, and customs adopted and approved by the City to train its officers, agents,
and employees for interpreting, enforcing, and applying the Policy, and conducted themselves
the City’s DOE 1-5 officers, agents, and employees were aware that Plaintiffs could no longer
engage in Plaintiffs’ freedom of speech and free exercise of religion at that time and location
the City’s DOE 1-5 officers, agents, and employees were aware that the known and obvious
consequence of their actions on September 15, 2018, of enforcing the Policy would silence
of the Policy, Plaintiffs forfeited their constitutionally-protected activities due to fear of arrest
and incarceration.
84. On October 8, 2018, counsel for Plaintiffs sent a letter to the City to avoid
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
86. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ prior enforcement of the Policy,
September 15, 2018, Plaintiffs were unconstitutionally denied the right to exercise their freedom
of speech.
September 15, 2018, Plaintiffs were unconstitutionally denied the right to the free exercise of
their religion.
employees’ actions under color of state law on September 15, 2018, have deprived, and continue
September 15, 2018, and the City’s officers’, agents’, and employees’ actions under color of
state law, Plaintiffs fear future arrest and incarceration when exercising their constitutional
rights.
September 15, 2018, and the City’s officers’, agents’, and employees’ actions under color of
state law, Plaintiffs are uncertain and unsure of their ability to exercise their constitutional rights.
95. Plaintiffs have been damaged by the deprivation of their rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4,
97. Plaintiffs are uncertain whether they will be arrested and incarcerated in the future
98. The threat of future arrests and incarceration is both great and immediate.
99. The future impingement of Plaintiffs’ rights is an absolute certainty unless and
100. Defendants have discouraged Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to the point that
Plaintiffs fear arrest and incarceration while exercising their constitutional and civil rights.
and concrete intentions to continue engaging in the exercise of their constitutional rights,
including activities prohibited by the Policy, as interpreted and enforced by Defendants, but they
are fearful of being arrested and incarcerated for exercising their constitutional and civil rights.
102. The violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights alleged herein have caused, and
will continue to cause, Plaintiffs to suffer extreme hardship, both actual and impending;
103. Plaintiffs currently suffer from the denial of rights guaranteed by the United
104. There is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits in this
case because Defendants’ enforcement of the Policy and Defendants’ actions under color of state
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101.
106. The public interest is benefited when constitutional and civil rights are protected
by the Courts.
107. Defendants’ enforcement of the Policy, and the City’s customs, policies,
practices, and actions under color of state law deprived Plaintiffs of their right to freedom of
speech and the free exercise of religion protected under the United States Constitution and
Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-
21-1101.
108. Defendants acted without reasonable cause and without due care in causing the
deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion protected
109. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions and omissions under color
of state law, Plaintiffs suffered the loss of Plaintiffs’ freedom of speech and free exercise of
religion protected under the United States Constitution and Tennessee’s Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101.
110. Defendants’ actions and omissions were performed with malice, or oppression, or
speech and the free exercise of religion protected under the United States Constitution and
Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-
21-1101.
111. Defendants’ enforcement of the Policy, and the City’s customs and practices,
enforced under color of state law, are the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights
to freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion protected under the United States
Constitution and Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21,
112. Defendants’ enforcement of the Policy, and the City’s customs and practices,
enforced under color of state law, operate to unconstitutionally limit, ban, and censor Plaintiffs’
rights to freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion protected under the United States
Constitution and Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21,
113. Defendant City had a duty at all times mentioned herein to implement and enforce
policies and procedures to adequately supervise and adequately train its officials, agents, and
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, as
alleged herein.
114. Defendant City failed to implement and enforce policies and procedures to
adequately supervise and adequately train its officials, agents, and employees so as to prevent the
constitutional violations and the violation of Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, as alleged herein.
115. Defendant City’s actions and omissions regarding the failure to adequately train
its officials, agents, and employees so as to prevent the constitutional violations alleged herein
exhibit deliberate indifference toward Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech and the free
exercise of religion protected under the United States Constitution and Tennessee’s Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101.
116. Plaintiffs have satisfied all conditions precedent to bringing this action.
117. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs from
Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and 28 U.S.C. §
1920.
118. The averments of paragraphs 1-117 are repeated and alleged in full force and
speech.
were performed under color of state law in that they claimed to be performing an official duty,
but their acts were outside the limits of lawful authority and abusive in manner, and they further
acted in a way that misused their power, and were able to do so only because of their positions as
City officials.
122. Defendants’ actions were taken with malice or reckless indifference to Plaintiffs’
123. As applied, the Policy unconstitutionally attempts to convert the City’s streets,
sidewalks, and parks from traditional public fora into a nonpublic forum during Special Events
forcing Plaintiffs to move out of a traditional public forum during Special Events.
126. The Policy as applied impedes Plaintiffs’ right to freedom of speech because it
denies Plaintiffs’ right to freedom of speech and satisfies no rational, substantial, or compelling
128. Plaintiffs were deprived of their right under the First Amendment to engage in
129. Plaintiffs have been, and continue to be, deprived of their right under the First
deprivation of their rights, including but not limited to mental and emotional distress, impairment
of reputation, personal humiliation, and other tangible and intangible harms that would not exist
but for Defendants’ actions and/or omissions, and these harms are reasonably certain to be
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the relief requested
hereinafter in the Prayer for Relief, and any further relief this Court deems just under the
circumstances.
131. The averments of paragraphs 1-117 are repeated and alleged in full force and
132. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unconstitutionally abridging the free exercise of
religion.
133. Plaintiffs have a personal belief in the Biblical mandate to spread the Gospel of
Jesus Christ, and Plaintiffs engage in activities, for the purpose of spreading the Gospel of Jesus
Christ, that are prohibited by the Policy, as interpreted and enforced by Defendants.
134. The Bible instructs believers to share the Gospel of Jesus Christ with others, and
136. LIEUTENANT PETERS’, SERGEANT HODGES’, and DOES 1-5’s actions were
performed under color of state law in that they claimed to be performing an official duty, but
their acts were outside the limits of lawful authority and abusive in manner, and they further
acted in a way that misused their power, and were able to do so only because of their positions as
City officials.
138. Defendants’ enforcement requires Plaintiffs to censor their religious speech and
139. By forcing Plaintiffs to choose between abandoning their religious beliefs in order
to gain access to speech in the City’s Public Spaces, and, alternatively, abiding by their religious
beliefs only to be arrested, cited, and fined, Defendants have imposed a substantial burden on
140. As applied, the Policy unconstitutionally attempts to convert the City’s streets,
sidewalks, and parks from traditional public fora into a nonpublic forum during Special Events
141. As applied, the Policy unconstitutionally limits Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion
by forcing Plaintiffs to move out of a traditional public forum during Special Events.
c. bars the free exercise of religion of Plaintiffs and possibly other third-party
143. The Policy as applied impedes Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion
because it denies Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion and satisfies no rational,
Policy.
145. Plaintiffs were deprived of their right under the First Amendment to engage in
146. Plaintiffs have been, and continue to be, deprived of their right under the First
deprivation of their rights, including but not limited to mental and emotional distress, impairment
of reputation, personal humiliation, and other tangible and intangible harms that would not exist
but for Defendants’ actions and/or omissions, and these harms are reasonably certain to be
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the relief requested
hereinafter in the Prayer for Relief, and any further relief this Court deems just under the
circumstances.
148. The averments of paragraphs 1-117 are repeated and alleged in full force and
unconstitutionally abridging the Freedom of Speech and/or the Free Exercise of Religion.
and adequately train Defendants’ officials, agents, and employees, and the resultant enforcement
as alleged herein, lack sufficient objective standards to curtail the discretion of Defendants’
officials and police officers. This provides Defendants and their officials, agents, and employees
the opportunity to enforce speech restrictions in an ad hoc, arbitrary, and discriminatory manner.
c. bar the free speech and free exercise of religion of Plaintiffs and possibly other
152. Plaintiffs were deprived of their constitutional rights prohibited by the City’s
153. Defendants’ actions, policies, and practices unconstitutionally restrict and prohibit
Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment to engage in Freedom of Speech and Free Exercise
of Religion activities.
154. Defendants’ actions, policies, and practices are unconstitutionally overbroad and
are not narrowly tailored to address the City’s interests, thereby allowing Defendants’ agents and
employees to unconstitutionally restrict and prohibit Plaintiffs’ right, and those of the general
public, to engage in Freedom of Speech and Free Exercise of Religion activities otherwise
Defendants.
156. Plaintiffs have been, and continue to be, deprived of their right to engage in
deprivation of their rights, including but not limited to mental and emotional distress, impairment
of reputation, personal humiliation, and other tangible and intangible harms that would not exist
but for Defendants’ actions and/or omissions, and these harms are reasonably certain to be
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the relief requested
hereinafter in the Prayer for Relief, and any further relief this Court deems just under the
circumstances.
158. The averments of paragraphs 1-117 are repeated and alleged in full force and
159. Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part
11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, prohibits Defendants from substantially burdening Plaintiffs’ religious
exercise absent Defendants bringing forth evidence that the burden upon Plaintiffs satisfies a
and Plaintiffs, as individuals and as associates, engage in activities, for the purpose of spreading
the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that are prohibited by the Policy as interpreted and enforced by
Defendants.
161. The Bible instructs believers to share the Gospel of Jesus Christ with others, and
163. Plaintiffs sought, and continue to seek, to discuss issues from a religious
perspective, to distribute religious literature, to display signs, and to engage in religious speech
164. Defendants’ enforcement requires Plaintiffs to censor their religious speech and
165. By forcing Plaintiffs to choose between abandoning their religious beliefs in order
to gain access to speech in the City’s Public Spaces, and, alternatively, abiding by their religious
beliefs only to be arrested, cited, and/or fined, Defendants have imposed a substantial burden on
Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs and the exercise of their religion.
166. As applied, the Policy attempts to convert the City’s streets, sidewalks, and parks
from traditional public fora into a nonpublic forum during Special Events conducted in the City.
167. As applied, the Policy limits Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion by forcing
168. As applied, the Policy imposes a burden on Plaintiffs’ and other individuals’
c. bars the free exercise of religion of Plaintiffs and possibly other third-party
169. The Policy as applied impedes Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion
because it denies Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion and satisfies no rational,
Policy.
171. Plaintiffs were deprived of their right under Tennessee’s Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, to engage in free
172. Plaintiffs have been, and continue to be, deprived of their right under Tennessee’s
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101, to
deprivation of their rights, including but not limited to mental and emotional distress, impairment
of reputation, personal humiliation, and other tangible and intangible harms that would not exist
but for Defendants’ actions and/or omissions, and these harms are reasonably certain to be
hereinafter in the Prayer for Relief, and any further relief this Court deems just under the
circumstances.
AS TO COUNT I:
2. That this Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining and
Defendants, from enforcing the City’s Special Event Policy, Procedure and
2018; and,
3. That this Court issue the requested injunctive relief without a condition of bond or
4. That this Court issue Declaratory Judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act
5. That this Court enter a judgment and decree declaring that Defendants’
with the subject matter here in controversy, in order that such declaration shall
8. That this Court grant Plaintiffs an award of nominal and/or compensatory and/or
9. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing any
Orders; and,
10. That this Court award Plaintiffs’ costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, or
11. That this Court grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as may be just and
proper.
AS TO COUNT II:
2. That this Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining and
Defendants, from enforcing the City’s Special Event Policy, Procedure and
2018; and,
4. That this Court issue Declaratory Judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act
5. That this Court enter a judgment and decree declaring that Defendants’
September 15, 2018, violated Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion; and,
6. That this Court adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations
with the subject matter here in controversy, in order that such declaration shall
8. That this Court grant Plaintiffs an award of nominal and/or compensatory and/or
9. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing any
Orders; and,
10. That this Court award Plaintiffs’ costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, or
proper.
AS TO COUNT III:
2. That this Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining and
enjoining Defendants, and all persons acting in concert or participating with them,
from enforcing the City’s Special Event Policy, Procedure and Application in the
3. That this Court issue the requested injunctive relief without a condition of bond or
4. That this Court issue Declaratory Judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act
5. That this Court enter a judgment and decree declaring that Defendants’
6. That this Court adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations
with the subject matter here in controversy, in order that such declaration shall
fact; and,
9. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing any
Orders; and,
10. That this Court award Plaintiffs’ costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, or
11. That this Court grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as may be just and
proper.
AS TO COUNT IV:
2. That this Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining and
Defendants, from enforcing the City’s Special Event Policy, Procedure and
2018; and,
3. That this Court issue the requested injunctive relief without a condition of bond or
4. That this Court issue Declaratory Judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act
Freedom Restoration Act of 2009, Title 4, Chapter 21, Part 11, C.A. § 4-21-1101;
and,
6. That this Court adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations
with the subject matter here in controversy, in order that such declaration shall
8. That this Court grant Plaintiffs an award of nominal and/or compensatory and/or
9. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing any
Orders; and,
10. That this Court award Plaintiffs’ costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to
and,
11. That this Court grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as may be just and
proper.
Pursuant to 28 U.S. Code§ 1746, I verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
Respectfully submitted,
��
35
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)
The Law Office of Kristin Fecteau, PLLC, 5543 Edmonson Pike, Suite
229, Nashville, TN, 37211, Telephone: (615) 496-5747
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
u 1 U.S. Government u 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State u 1 u 1 Incorporated or Principal Place u 4 u 4
of Business In This State
u 2 U.S. Government u 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State u 2 u 2 Incorporated and Principal Place u 5 u 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,
whose name and address are: The Law Office of Kristin Fecteau, PLLC, 5543 Edmonson Pike, Suite 229, Nashville,
TN, 37211, Telephone: (615) 496-5747
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
u I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
u Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .
Date:
Server’s signature
Server’s address
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,
whose name and address are: The Law Office of Kristin Fecteau, PLLC, 5543 Edmonson Pike, Suite 229, Nashville,
TN, 37211, Telephone: (615) 496-5747
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
u I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
u Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .
Date:
Server’s signature
Server’s address
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,
whose name and address are: The Law Office of Kristin Fecteau, PLLC, 5543 Edmonson Pike, Suite 229, Nashville,
TN, 37211, Telephone: (615) 496-5747
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
u I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
u Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .
Date:
Server’s signature
Server’s address