ARUNDHATI ROY

CASE (2002) 3 SC 343

Submitted To-
Miss.Smriti Suri Mam

SUBMITTED By:- Reg.no -

11605106
R.no-55
Section-L1601
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PARTICULARS

S.NO TOPICS PAGE NO.

01 INTRODUCTION 03

02 ISSUES 03

03 LAW INVOLED 05

04 ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF 06
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
05 APPLICABILITY OF LAW 7-10

06 CONCLUSION 11

07 BIBLIOGRAPHY 12
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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We would like to show our gratitude Miss.Smriti Suri Mam for giving us a
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frame.
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CASE ANALYSIS

ARUNDHATI ROY CASE (2002) 3 SC 343

Bench: G Pattanaik, R Sethi

Respondent: Arundhati Roy

Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of India

Case referred: Pennekamp v. Florida [(1946) 90 Led 1295 at p.1313]

Harijai Singh and Anr AIR 1999
Andre Paul v. Attorney General (1936), AC 322
Equivalent citations: AIR 2002 SC 1375, 2002 (1) BLJR 811,

Case Note: Section 15, Section 14(2) of Contempt of the Court Act 1926.
Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.
Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court

Introduction-In the case of In re Arundhati Roy the court discussed the question of
fundamental rights vis-à-vis criminal contempt of the Court and said that reasonable
restrictions could be imposed in view of Article 19(2). It observed that since Arundhati Roy
was connected with the Narmada Bachao Andolan, she was an interested party and hence her
actions could not be accepted as having been undertaken for a public cause. Though she was
punished for using disobedient language in her show cause reply, yet her action of protesting
against the Supreme Court verdict in the Narmada case was also seen as rebellious-which the
court rebelliously chose to let go unpunished. The court also seemed to suggest that fair
criticism could flow only from a person qualified to make that criticism and hence Arundhati
Roy, who had no training or research in law, could not make a fair criticism.

Jurisdiction-Narmada Bachao Andolan filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution

of India being Writ Petition No. 319 of 1994 in this Court. The respondent Arundhati Roy,
who is not a party to the writ proceedings, published an article entitled "The Greater
Common Good" which was published in Outlook Magazine and in some portion of a book
written by her. Two judges of this Court, forming the three-judge Bench felt that the
comments made by her were, prima facie, a misrepresentation of the proceedings of the court.
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FACTS OF THE CASE

1. This case concerns a suo- moto contempt petition (that is, a petition initiated by the
Court on its own motion) against the Respondent, Arundhati Roy, a Booker-prize
winning author.

2. During the course of a writ petition by grassroots-movement Narmada Bachao

Andolan, the Court addressed issues of environmental damage and displacement of
marginalized communities due to the development of a reservoir dam on the river
Narmada

3. Following a Supreme Court order that allowed for the height of the dam to be
increased.

4. The Respondent wrote an article criticizing this decision. Subsequently, protests were
staged in front of the gates of the Supreme Court by Narmada Bachao Andolan and
the Respondent. This led to contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with
the police.

5. During the proceedings, all Respondents denied the allegations concerning specific
slogans and banners and the proceedings were dropped. However, along with her
denial, Roy’s response to the show cause notice criticized the Court for issuing
proceedings in the first place.

6. She stated that: “On the grounds that judges of the Supreme Court were too busy, the
Chief Justice of India refused to allow a sitting judge to head the judicial enquiry into
the Tehelka scandal, even though it involves matters of national security
and corruption in the highest places. Yet when it comes to an absurd,
despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition in which all the three respondents
happen to be people who have publicly questioned the policies of the government
and severely criticized a recent judgment of the Supreme Court, the Court displays a
disturbing willingness to issue notice. It indicates a disquieting inclination on the part
of the court to silence criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those
who disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on an FIR that even a local
police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court is doing its
own reputation and credibility considerable harm.”

7. On the basis of the above averments, suo moto contempt proceedings were initiated
against the Respondent for imputing motives to the Court.

8. In her reply affidavit to the contempt notice, the author reiterated her stance and
stressed her continuous dissent against the decision of the Supreme Court. She further
noted that she believed this to be a matter of her right to express her opinions as a
citizen as well as a writer.
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ISSUES RAISED

 Whether it would be permissible to initiate contempt proceedings for scandalising the

court where the contents of an affidavit cause no contempt to any Judge personally
but the action tried to cast an injury to the public by creating a wrong impression in
the mind of the people regarding integrity, ability and fairness of the judiciary?
 Extent to which and circumstances in which fair criticism of Judge, court or its
functioning would be permissible under Article 19(1) (a) and (2)?
 Whether freedom of press is guaranteed separately from and is the same as freedom of
expression under Article 19(1)?
 How should the court deal with a case when a contemnor does not show any
repentance or remorse but persistently and consistently tried to justify the prima facie
contemptuous action and to frustrate the contempt proceedings?

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

1. The respondent stated that she had accused courts of harassing her as if the judiciary
were carrying out a personal clash against her.
2. The respondent stated that she had brought in matters which were not only not
pertinent to the issues to be decided but has drawn uninformed comparisons to make
statements about this Court which do not appear to be protected by law relating to fair
criticism.
3. She also stated that she has written and published several essays and articles on
Narmada issue and the Supreme Court judgment. None of them was intended to show
contempt to the court.
4. She justified her right to disagree with the court's view on the subject and to express
her disagreement in any publication.
5. The respondent stated that I wish to reaffirm that as a writer I have right to state my
opinions and beliefs. As a free citizen of India I have the right to be part of any
peaceful dharna, demonstration or protest March. I have the right to criticize any
judgment of any court that I believe to be unjust.
6. The preliminary objection raised by Shri Shanti Bhushan, Senior Advocate who has
appeared for the respondent-contemnor. Without filing a formal application it has
been urged on behalf of the respondent that the Hon'ble Judges who issued notice in
Criminal Petition No. 2 of 2001 should not be a party to the present proceeding and
the case be transferred to some other Bench, allegedly on the ground that the
respondent-contemnor had reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the said
Judges to whom she claims to have allegedly attributed motives.
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ARGUMENTS ON THE BEHALF OF APPELLANT

 It was stated that the contemnors shouted abusive slogans against the court including
slogans ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to the institution undoubtedly made
the action of the contemnor gross contemptuous and as such the court had initiated the
contempt proceedings by issuing notice.
 The third learned Judge also recorded his disapproval of the statement made by the
respondent herein and others and felt that as the court's shoulders are broad enough to
shrug off their comments.
 The respondents are stated to have attacked, abused and assaulted the petitioners. A
complaint was stated to have been lodged with the Tilak Marg Police Station on the
next day.
 The respondent would amount to depriving all the Judges of the court to hear the
matter and thus frustrate the contempt proceedings, which cannot be the mandate of
law. The apprehension caused by the respondent is imaginary, without basis and not
bonafide. The oral prayer made for one of us not to be a member of the Bench,
hearing the matter, is rejected.

APPLICABILITY OF LAW

 Whether it would be permissible to initiate contempt proceedings for scandalising the

court where the contents of an affidavit cause no contempt to any Judge personally
but the action tried to cast an injury to the public by creating a wrong impression in
the mind of the people regarding integrity, ability and fairness of the judiciary?
In the instant case cognizance of the criminal contempt against the respondent has been
taken by the COURT, suo motu under Section 15 of the Act. Whereas Sub-section (2) of
Section 14 permits a person charged with the contempt to have charge against him tried
by some Judge other than the judge or judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is
alleged to have been committed and the court is of opinion that it is practicable to do so.
No such provision is made under Section 15 of the Act. Obviously for the reason that
when action is at the instance of the COURT, there is no question of any motive of and
prejudice from any Judge. Accepting the plea raised by the respondent would amount to
depriving all the Judges of the court to hear the matter and thus frustrate the contempt
proceedings, which cannot be the mandate of law. The apprehension caused by the
respondent is imaginary, without basis and not bonafide.

Section15 of the contempt of court act

Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court.—

(1) When it is alleged, or appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon its own view,
that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may
cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court,
on the same day, or as early as possible thereafter, shall— —(1) When it is alleged, or
appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been
guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to
be detained in custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day, or as
early as possible thereafter, shall—"
(a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged;
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(b) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge;

(c) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and
after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment, to determine the matter of
the charge; and
(d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as may be just.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person charged with
contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally or in writing, to have the charge
against him tried by some Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing
the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the Court is of opinion that it is
practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application
should be allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together with a statement of the facts
of the case, before the Chief Justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects
the trial thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in any trial of a person charged
with contempt under sub-section (1) which is held, in pursuance of a direction given under
sub-section (2), by a Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the
offence is alleged to have been committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in
whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed to appear as a
witness and the statement placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) shall be
treated as evidence in the case.
(4) Pending the determination of the charge, the Court may direct that a person charged with
contempt under this section shall be detained in such custody as it may specify: Provided that
he shall be released on bail, if a bond for such sum of money as the Court thinks sufficient is
executed with or without sureties conditioned that the person charged shall attend at the time
and place mentioned in the bond and shall continue to so attend until otherwise directed by
the Court: Provided further that the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of taking bail from such
person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his attendance as
aforesaid.

 Extent to which and circumstances in which fair criticism of Judge, court or its
functioning would be permissible under Article 19(1) (a) and (2)?
No person can flout the mandate of law of respecting the courts for establishment of rule
of law under the cloak of freedoms of speech and expression guaranteed by the
Constitution. Such a freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by any law.
Where a provision, in the law, relating to contempt imposes reasonable restrictions, no
citizen can take the liberty of scandalizing the authority of the institution of judiciary.
Freedom of speech and expression, so far as they do not contravene the statutory limits as
contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, are to prevail without any hindrance. However,
it must be remembered that the maintenance of dignity of courts is one of the cardinal
principles of rule of law in a democratic set up and any criticism of the judicial
institution couched in language that apparently appears to be mere criticism but
ultimately results in undermining the dignity of the courts cannot be permitted when
found crossed the limits and has to be punished.

This Court in In Re: Harijai Singh and Anr. has pointed out that a free and healthy
Press is indispensable to the function of a true democracy but, at the same time,
cautioned that the freedom of Press is not absolute, unlimited and unfettered at all times
and in all circumstances.
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Lord Dening in his Book "Road to Justice" observed that Press is the watchdog to see that
every trial is conducted fairly, openly and above broad but the watchdog may sometimes
break loose and has to be punished for misbehavior.

Frankfurther, J. in Pennekamp v. Florida [(1946) 90 Led 1295 at p.

1313] observed:” If men, including Judges and journalists were angels, there would be no
problems of contempt of Court. Angelic Judges would be undisturbed by extraneous
influences and angelic journalists would not seek to influence them. The power to punish for
contempt, as a means of safeguarding Judges in deciding on behalf of the community as
impartially as is given to the lot of men to decide, is not a privilege accorded to Judges. The
power to punish for contempt of court is a safeguard not for Judges as persons but for the
function which they exercise."
The law of contempt has been enacted to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial
Process. If such confidence is shaken or broken, the confidence of the common man in the
institution of judiciary and democratic set up is likely to be eroded which, if not checked, is
sure to be disastrous for the society itself.

 Whether freedom of press is guaranteed separately from and is the same as freedom of
expression under Article 19(1)?
Any expression of opinion would, therefore, be not immune from the liability for exceeding
the limits, either under the law of defamation or contempt of Court or the other constitutional
limitations under Article 19(2).
If a citizen, therefore, in the grab of exercising right of free expression under Article 19(1),
tries to scandalise the court or undermines the dignity of the court, then the court would be
entitled to exercise power under Article 129 or Article 215, as the case maybe.

In relation to a pending proceeding before the Court, while showing cause to the notice
issued, when it is stated the court displays a disturbing willingness to issue notice on an
absurd despicable,entirely unsubstantiated petition, it amounts to a destructive attack on the
reputation and the credibility of the institution and it undermines the public confidence in the
judiciary as a whole and by no stretch of imagination, can be held to be a fair criticism of the
Court's proceeding. When a scurrilous attack is made in relation to a pending proceeding and
the noticed states that the issuance of notice to show cause was intended to silence criticism
and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those who disagree with it, is a direct attack on
the institution itself, rather than the conduct of an individual Judge. The meaning of the
expressions used cannot come within the extended concept of fair criticism or expression of
opinion particularly to the case of the contemner in the present case, who on her own right is
an acclaimed writer in English. At one point of time, we had seriously considered the speech
of Lord Atkin, where the learned Judge has stated:
"The path of criticism is public way: the wrongheaded are permitted to err therein... Justice is
not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though
outspoken, comments of ordinary men."

[Andre Paul v. Attorney General (1936), AC 322]

And to find out whether there can be a balancing between the two public interests, the
freedom of expression and the dignity of the court. We also took note of observations of
Bharucha, J. in the earlier contempt case against the present contemner, who after recording
his disapproval of the statement, observed that the Court's shoulders are broad enough to
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shrug off the comments. But in view of the utterances made by the contemnor in her show
causes filed and not a word of remorse, till the conclusion of the hearing, it is difficult for us
either to shrug off or to hold the accusations made as comments of outspoken ordinary man.

On the basis of the record, the position of law our findings on various pleas raised and the
conduct of the respondent, we have no doubt in our mind that the respondent has committed
the criminal contempt of this Court by scandalizing its authority with malafide intentions.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

 Proceedings under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act are distinguishable from
Section 15 of the said Act. When action is at the instance of the Court there is no
question of any motion of and prejudice from any Judge. Accepting the plea raised by
the respondent would amount to depriving all the Judges of the Court to hear the
matter and thus frustrate the contempt proceedings which cannot be the mandate of
law.
 The judiciary is not immune from criticism but when that criticism is based on
obvious distortion or gross misstatement and made in a manner which is designed to
lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public.
 Under the Constitution, there is no separate guarantee of the freedom of the press and
it is the same freedom of expression, which is conferred on all citizens under Article
19(1). Any expression of opinion would therefore, be not immune from the liability
for exceeding the limits either under the law of defamation or contempt of court or the
other constitutional limitations under Article 19(2).

DECISION OF THE COURT

Sethi, J. delivered the Court’s judgment.

The Court firstly stated that freedoms of speech and expression guaranteed by
the Constitution are subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law, one of these being the
Contempt of Courts Act which, amongst other objectives, is directed at maintaining
the dignity and the integrity of the courts and the judiciary.

It dismissed as irrelevant the Respondent’s argument that the issue of whether truth could be
pleaded as a defense to contempt proceedings had to be determined. “Contempt proceedings
have been initiated against the respondent on the basis of the offending and
contemptuous part of the reply affidavit making wild allegations against the court and thereby
scandalised its authority. There is no point or fact in those proceedings which requires to be
defended by pleading the truth”, it said.

The Court went on to say that the affidavit as a whole was not being considered for contempt
but that part which made allegations questioning the integrity of the Court. It stated that the
purpose of contempt proceedings was not to preserve an individual judge’s reputation but to
maintain public confidence in the judicial system. Judicial criticism must not be based on a
gross misstatement and must not be directed at lowering the reputation of the judiciary.
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In order to be considered fair criticism, the Court said that the statement “must be made in
good faith and in the public interest, which is to be gauged by the surrounding circumstances
including the person responsible for the comments, his knowledge in the field regarding
which the comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved.”

The Court considered that the Respondent’s statement was not based on any understanding of
the law or the judicial system. It said that her statements alleging the judiciary’s willingness
to issue notice on “an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition” whilst exhibiting
a lack of willingness to entertain a case concerning “national security and corruption in the
highest places” and its intention to silence criticism along with her lack of remorse, made it
difficult “to shrug off or to hold the unsubstantiated accusations made as comments of an
outspoken ordinary man”.

Accordingly, the Court found the Respondent guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her
to “symbolic” imprisonment of one day and imposed a fine of Rs. 2000 with the proviso that
if she failed to pay the fine she would be imprisoned for three months.
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CONCLUSION

The contempt power in a democracy is only to enable the court to function effectively, and
not to protect the self-esteem of an individual judge. The foundation of judiciary is based on
the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice.
When the foundation itself is shaken by acts which tend to create disaffection and disrespect
for the authority of the court by disrupting its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets
eroded. Judiciary by punishing the guilty infuses faith in the supremacy of law and
omnipotence of justice. Every offender is to be punished for contumacious acts under the
relevant contempt laws, but it is extremely important to make it sure by the judiciary that
these provisions are not to be misused.

It can be adequately inferred that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is of paramount
importance in the context of sustaining the concept of justice. It aides to make the process of
administering justice expeditious as well as upholds the dignity and faith the people have
bestowed in the judicial system of the country. In itself, it abstains from any form of
arbitrariness. It gives every organization or individual charged under the act reasonable
grounds to defend it or himself, as the case may be. The restrictions, it imposes, is just and
fair in them. Moreover, it recognizes the equal footing of all people in the country by
bringing the judiciary and its officials within its ambit.

During the course of discussion it has been found several loopholes/contradictions in the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. So it is submitted that for the desired results
these loopholes should be pleased by making necessary amendments in the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.

RECOMEMDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

 Even in an open and shut case, The CJI has never given permission to file FIR against
judges. Such cases are also not discussed publicly because of fear of contempt. It
becomes difficult for media and public to debate misconduct by judges.

 Government have been reluctant to act against judges while judiciary has remained
unaccountable as investigating agencies need the permission of the chief justice of
India to initiate action. The judiciary feels if action is taken action judges it will ruin
its image,”
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