Article 2, PH Revised Penal Code

Application of its provisions - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of

preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone,
but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being the public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions;
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

US vs. H.N. Bull GR No. 5270 January 15, 1910

FACTS
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of
Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon
appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the
evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No.
55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and
void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the
conviction. HN Bull was travelling with cattles and did not observe proper care for the animals.

ISSUE
Act 55 as passed by the Philippine Congress was deemed unconstitutional.

RULING
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms
subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain
subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that
specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however,
should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and
ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other
matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.) Therefore, Act 55 is not
unconstitutional.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence
and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

People vs Wong Cheng GR No. L-18924

FACTS
Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel
while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the
city.
ISSUE
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein
involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.

RULING
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International
Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction
they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory;
and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States,
according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of these two rules, it is the last one
that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in
the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the
United States.
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was
held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium
Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the
use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not
being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such
a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
People vs Look Chaw GR No 5887

FACTS
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
stated that he “carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes
of opium,” and that “he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared
opium.”
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal,
at the conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon
the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction to try the case.

RULING
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been
committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The appeal having been heard, together
with the allegations made therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession
of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on
account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an
open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law
in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place
itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000,
respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.

US vs Ah Sing GR No. 13005 October 10, 1917

FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the
defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing
him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a
fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at
the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant
bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in
the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of
opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The
defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in
Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that
it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence
direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium
into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

ISSUE
Whether Philippines has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING
Resolving whatever doubt existed as to the authority of the views just quoted, we return
to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act
No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into
the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the
United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima
facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the
importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them
into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman
[U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium
Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into
the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel
which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the
Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it
would be absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between
Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive
that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation
being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into
the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from a
foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it
be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as
charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that
the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

ARTICLE 3, PH REVISED PENAL CODE

Definitions - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
> act: any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world,
it being unnecessary that the same be actually produced, as the possibility of its
production is sufficient; (under RPC, must be external and constituting a felony)
> omission: inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to
do. There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an act.
1. Anyone who fails to render assistance to any person whom he finds in an
uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying (liable for abandonment of
persons in danger)
2. An officer entrusted with collection of taxes who voluntarily fails to issue a
receipt as provided by law (guilty of illegal exaction)
3. Every person owing allegiance to the Philippines, without being a foreigner,
and having knowledge of any conspiracy against the government, who does
not disclose and make known the same to the proper authority (liable for
misprision of treason)
> omission must be punishable because there is no law that punishes a person who
does not report to the authorities the commission of a crime which he witnessed,
the omission to do so is not a felony.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).
> felony: acts or omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code
> elements of felonies:
1. That there must be an act or omission.
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal Code
3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo
(intentional felony: act/omission is malicious, with deliberate intent) or
culpa (culpable felony: act/omission is not malicious, unintentional)

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.
> intent presupposes the exercises of freedom (person without freedom necessarily
has no intent to cause injury) and the use of intelligence (person acting without
 intelligence has no intent): a person who caused an injury by mere accident had
freedom and intelligence but since he had no fault or intention of causing it, he is
not criminally liable)
> the existence of intent is shown by the overt acts of a person: intent is a mental
act but it can be deduced from the external acts performed by a person
> intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act
> acts executed negligently are voluntary (not compelled to refrain or prevent from
taking the precaution necessary to avoid injury to persons)
> in felonies committed by means of dolo, as well as in those committed by means
of culpa, the act performed or the omission incurred by the offender is voluntary,
but the intent or malice in intentional felonies is replaced by imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill in culpable felonies

A. Felonies
> must be punishable by law (under RPC not under special laws), there is no crime
where there is no law punishing it (nullumcrimen, nulla poena sine lege)
> distinguished from “crime” and “offense” which are applied to infractions of the
law punished by special statutes

People of the Philippines v Gonzales

Facts:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38),
in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida,"
found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large
and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00,
plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd
Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo. Custodio Gonzales
was the only appellant in this case.
Issue:
Whether Custudio Gonzales, Sr. has criminal liability. When can a person incur criminal liability?
Ruling:
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient
to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the
commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative
to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on
where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more
definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the
killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood
stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance
would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On
the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the
linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing
in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the
same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the
direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by
the Court of Appeals on him?

People of the Philippines v Silvestre

FACTS
● Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage
● Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol,
Paombong, Bulacan
● On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a
sworn complaint for adultery
● After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal
president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the
complaint
● The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live
again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
● On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and
the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
 ● The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong
● About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la
Cruz, in Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him
for some nipa leaves)
● Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the
home of Nicolas
● On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants
were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of
the house because he was going to set fire to it
● He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of
Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and
Romana
● Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
● Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
● The fire destroyed about 48 houses
● Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
● The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
● Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and
1 day of cadena temporal)
● Romana was convicted as an accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
● The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI
decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
● The lower court erred in convicting Romana as accomplice
● The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or
at least, of reasonable doubt
ISSUE Whether or not Romana can be convicted as an accomplice

RULING
● No
● Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one
who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce
another to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by
previous or simultaneous actions.
● In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of
an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they
are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they
 encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure
to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an
accomplice.
● Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to
Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.

B. Dolo or Malice
Dolo – intent to do an injury to another.
Requisites of dolo or malice:
1. Freedom while doing an act or omitting to do an act;
2. Intelligence while doing the act or omitting to do the act;
3. Intent while doing the act or omitting to do the act.

C. Mistake of Fact
- A misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused an injury to another.
He is not, however, criminally liable, because he did not act with criminal intent.
- Requisites:
1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused
believed them to be;
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful; and
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused.

People of the Philippines v Ah Chong

FACTS
August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open
by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an
unlawful aggression) which had been placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it turned
out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief
was playing a trick on him
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which
took place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effect of the wound of the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the
trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and
one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

ISSUE
Whether or not defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to
the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.

RULING
NO, the decision of the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
● GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code
● Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code states that “crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts
and omissions punished by law.”
● A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
● Voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
● "malice" signifies the intent
● Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so”
● “ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” - an act done by me against my will is not
my act
GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of
the doer
EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard
to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
● ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
The defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in
the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believed threatened his
person and his property and the property under his charge.

People of the Philippines v Oanis

FACTS
Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or
alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant, Corporal Alberto Galanta, and
asked that he be given four men.
The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by
the Provincial Inspector. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to
the house where Irene was supposedly living.
When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who
was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the
place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida
trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene
and her paramour.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired
at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her
paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that
the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Defendants were found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six
months to two years and two months of prision correcional and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appeal separately.

ISSUE
Whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson

RULING
YES, appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
● ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without
fault or carelessness
● appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed.
● "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
● a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary
force or violence in making an arrest
● The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should
be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
● 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-
present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
● According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees
than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
● Appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above
mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ve (5) years of
prision correcional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal , with the accessories of
 the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an
indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

D. Mistake of Fact vs Mistake of Law

Mistake of Fact:

Mistake of Law:

Eduardo Diego v Judge Silverio Castillo

FACTS
On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both
Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto,
with a civil status of single;
In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a “Decree of Divorce” and
purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County,
Texas (247th Judicial District), it was “ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of
matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby
Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.”
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with
herein complainant’s brother, Manuel P . Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T.
Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused
used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.
The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto
RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and gave
credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent for believing
in good faith that her marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment.
An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code:
Knowingly rendering unjust judgement - any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust
judgement in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor
and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is
manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions the evidentiary weight
and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition,
complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judge’s finding of good
faith on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions upon
respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.
In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal
culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge does
not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the
first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our country and because the
accused’s first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was
controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed, albeit
mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could marry again. According to
respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that
knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person,
and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.

ISSUE
Whether or not Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

RULING
NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely
● The law requires that
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust;
(d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
● Even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be
administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose
● As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
● Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
● Error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes
ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action

a. Culpa or Fault
b. Offenses Punished by Special Laws
c. Motive
d. Mala in se - wrong from their very nature;
Mala prohibita - wrong because it is specifically prohibited
 E. Motive and Intent

ARTICLE 4, PH REVISED PENAL CODE

Criminal liability - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

People of the Philippines v Bindoy

FACTS
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the
penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime
charged against the accused is homicide, according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of
Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam,
inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in
violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.

The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this
instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in
convicting him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba
wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and
his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas'
wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she
did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This
occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his
family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy
and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left
behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's
chest, who was then behind Bindoy.

ISSUE
Whether Bindoy is criminally liable when there is no intent to kill Emigdio Omamdam.

RULING
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed
Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to
free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the
chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with
the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted
to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to
answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal
liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the
Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect
that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the
latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very
moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without
Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness adds that he
went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I
think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See
that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me,
nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any
rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed,
would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this
court said in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed
to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives
which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of
the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the
motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold that the appellant is
entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed
from is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So
ordered.

A. Mistake in the identity (error in personae)

B. Mistake in the blow (aberratio ictus)
C. Injurious result is greater than that intended (praeter intentionem)

People of the Philippines v Cagoco

FACTS: About 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped
to talk on the sidewalk. Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back
to the street. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or
twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father, approached Yu Lon from behind
and suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon
fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the
sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued but then lost sight of him. Two
other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung, who were walking by, saw the incident and joined him
in the pursuit of Yu Lon’s assailant. The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General
Hospital, were he died about midnight. A post-mortem examination was made the next day by
Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and
fracture of the skull in the occipital region, and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that
he had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a tumor in the left kidney.

HELD: In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should
be punished for slight physical injuries only instead of murder. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that
which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to
wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be
the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender.

In the Brobst case, supra, it was held that death may result from a blow over or near the heart or
in the abdominal region, notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of
violence; that where death result as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the
mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death,
does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under
the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal
acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences; but that in such cases,
the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is taken into consideration
as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil. 96.) The reasoning of the decisions
cited is applicable to the case at bar. There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the
death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was
clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious act, and the fact that the defendant did
not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful
act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22).

People of the Philippines v Illustre

Facts:

That on or about June 24, 1929, in the municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas,
Philippine Islands, the above-named defendant willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously dealt Juan
Magsino a blow with his closed fist in the right hypochondriac region, bruising his liver and
producing an internal hemorrhage resulting in the death of said Juan Magsino.

Issue:

The victim already suffered tuberculosis and the question is whether this affects the defendant’s
criminal liability.

Ruling:

Doctors Ilagan, Agoncillo, and Roxas agree, with this exception, that while the first two who
performed the autopsy on the body, with their own eyes saw the result thereof, the latter, that is,
Doctor Roxas, simply considered the data hypothetically. We are therefore convinced there is
no fundamental disagreement among the medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim’s
death; and that is was caused by the defendant’s blow on the deceased right hypochondrium,
which bruised the liver and produced an internal hemorrhage.

The appellant denies having hit Magsino, protesting that he had no motive for doing so; but the
evidence shows that he punched Magsino in the abdomen a little to the right, felling him to the
ground.

The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and suffered from incipient pulmonary
tuberculosis does not affect the defendant’s criminal liability, for eve if it rendered the blow
more fatal, the efficient cause of the death remains the same. (U. S. vs. Fenix, 11 Phil. 95) And
the circumstance that the defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability, since he deliberately committed an act prohibited
by law, but simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with article 9, No. 3, of the Penal Code. (U.
S. vs. Samea, 15 Phil. 227.)

The instant case comes under the provision of article 404 of the Penal Code providing the
penalty of reclusion temporal, which must be imposed in its minimum degree in view of the
mitigating circumstance just mentioned, or twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

People of the Philippines v Rodriguez

People of the Philippines v Reyes

FACTS:
On the eve of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his 15-year old son Romeo
Catorse, arrived at the two-storey house of appellant Adronico Gregorio, at Sitio Bug-as, Brgy.
Sta. Cruz in Murcia, Negros Occidental, to attend the wake of the latter’s grandson. When Carlos
and his son arrived, there were already people attending the wake. Downstairs, Adronico
Gregorio, et. al. were conversing, while upstairs, “Tunggak” (son of Adronico), Ricardo Gregorio
(brother of Adronico), et. al. were playing “pusoy” (Russian poker). Persons attending the wake
were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit with him any weapon in their possession for
safekeeping to avoid any trouble. Complying therewith, Carlos handed over his “samurai” while
John Villarosa and Remolito Calalas, surrendered their knives, to Adronico. However, around
1:00 a.m. of May 8, 1986, while playing the Russian poker, appellant Ricardo Gregorio in a very
loud voice, reprimanded “Tunggak” from peeping at the cards of other players, but the son of
Adronico, shouted also in a very loud voice and wanted the game be stopped. When his father
overheard it, he summoned his son and boxed him several times.
In order to pacify the father and son from further aggravation, Carlos Catorse intervened
and begged Adronico to stop hurting his son and not to put him into shame before the crowd.
When suddenly, co-appellant Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind using the latter’s own
samurai and thereafter hacked and stabbed him several times more in different parts of his body.
Right after the deceased fell to the ground, Adronico for his part, repeatedly hacked the victim
with bolo.
Romeo Catorse, son of the deceased, terrified of what he saw and ran out of the house.
Later, when Romeo returned to the house of Adronico Gregorio, he was joined by his sister and
younger brothers, together they found their father lying prostrate and dead. When the police
authorities arrived to the scene of the crime, to investigate, the appellants already fled to another
Sitio, but authorities pursued and succeeded in apprehending them.
 Upon arraignment, both accused entered separate pleas of not guilty for murdering Carlos
Catorse. Hence, another criminal case was instituted against Adronico Gregorio for the murder
of Marcelo Lo.

ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not appellants can invoke self-defense in their criminal liabilities?

HELD:
Appellant Adronico Gregorio interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal
liability, however, the trial court skeptic of the said plea, rejected the same. The futility of
invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in the testimonies of accused Ricardo Gregorio and co-
appellant brother. Ricardo’s testimony affirmed that it was Carlos Catorse who aggravated them
initially, supported by Adronico’s claim, that the deceased first attacked his son and brother. The
court held that not only are the foregoing declarations incredible and incredulous but are innately
false and fatuous.
It is axiomatic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was luck of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.
The trial court agree that such aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia) may be
appreciated against the appellants. Treachery exist when an offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially ensure its execution, without risks to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.
Hence, before the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) could file its Appellee’s Brief,
appellant Ricardo Gregorio died on December 12, 1993. Consequently, his criminal liability as
well as his civil liability based solely thereon is extinguished. However, Adronico Gregorio is to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo
Lo the sum of P50,000 each, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all respects. As
aforestated, the death of Ricardo Gregorio extinguished both his criminal and civil liability arising
from said crime.

US v Marasigan

FACTS
A fight ensued between the accused-appellant, Filomeno Marasigan and one Francisco
Mendoza. As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in
the left hand, the latter being the most serious. The middle finger of the left hand was rendered
useless. The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should be
given another opportunity to present evidence he would be able to show by a physician,
Gregorio Limjoco, that the finger which the court found to have been rendered useless by the
cut already described was not necessarily a useless member, inasmuch as, if the accused would
permit a surgical operation, the finger could be restored to its normal condition. He also asserts
that he could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not the middle finger that was
disabled but the third finger instead.

RULING
We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for
the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefulness of which was destroyed, was the
middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered
useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the
finger could be restored by a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and
ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must
abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

People of the Philippines v Moldes

FACTS
There was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master of ceremonies at
that dance. The appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the deceased.
Appellant then went to the porch of the house and with his bolo began cutting down the
decorations. He descended into the yard of the house and challenged everyone to a fight. Not
attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the bamboo trees and repeated his
challenged for a fight. The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in a
friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the ground, appellant struck at him with his
bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm. As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a
slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of action. The wound was seen and
treated the next morning by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the
care of a local “curandero.” This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the deceased died.

RULING
The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not intend to commit as serious a wound as
was inflicted but struck only in the dark and in self-defense. It is clear that there is no element
of self-defense in the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the use of a
lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have been used in this case, it must
be presumed that he realizes the natural consequences of his act. It is also contended by the
attorney for the appellant that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the wound
would not have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which this assault took place, proper
modern surgical service is not available.
The general rule is “… that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the
wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the
immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment … .”

D. Doctrine of Proximate Cause

Vvda. de Bataclan v Medina

FACTS
There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. While the bus
was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while four passengers could not get out of the overturned bus. After half
an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick
on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned
bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under
and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for
help set it on fire.

RULING
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The
only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of
the death of Bataclan and the other trapped passengers was not the overturning of the bus, but
rather, the fire that burned the bus. We disagree. Proximate Cause has been defined as 'that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' It may be that
ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him
physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set
on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was
the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning
of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by
the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because
it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming
as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid
and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can
also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the
overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the
area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a
large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus.

Urbano v People of the Philippines

FACTS
The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen
Water District (LIWAD) having just arrived from a picnic in the nearby town where, they drunk
beer in a restaurant with some other co-workers While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. The
exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued
throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by
eyewitness Salazar, on Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on
the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented
the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious.
The deceased told his wife of the mauling incident. Thereafter, the deceased was still able to go
to work however, his complaints to his wife of severe pain in the head, prompted him to be
admitted at the community hospital. Finally, Tomelden died on October 10, 1993 due, per Dr.
Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
 With the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals convicting the accused of
homicide, the petitioner now contends that the trial Court and the CA erred in not appreciating
the mitigating circumstances the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the
petitioner.

RULING
The mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed
from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when
attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.
Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He
tried to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky
punch that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious
co-worker to the office of the LIWAD's general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot
reasonably be expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a
wrong as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by
Tomelden was commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just
unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly
been averted had he had the financial means to get the proper medical attention.
Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him
guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at Tomelden's face while their co-
workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that he never intended so grave a
wrong as to kill the victim.

PENALTY
With no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances appreciable in favor
of petitioner, we apply par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, which pertinently provides: When there are two
or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal or
from 12 years and one day to 20 years. With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances
of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of sufficient provocation
from the victim, and the application of par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable penalty would,
thus, be the next lower penalty prescribed for homicide and this should be prision mayor or
from six years and one day to 12 years.
Seguritan v People of the Philippines

FACTS
● November 25,1995: Roño Seguritan y Jara alias Ranio was having a drinking session
with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan (51 year old farmer), Melchor Panis and Baltazar
Panis, in the house of Manuel dela Cruz. Ranio was seated beside Lucrecio as he claimed
that Lucrecio’s carabao entered his farm and destroyed his crops which bun the heated
argument. As Lucrecio was about to stand up, he punched him twice hitting him in the
right and left temple causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block
which was being used as an improvised stove causing him to fall face-up to the ground
and hit a hollow block which was being used as an improvised stove. Lucrecio rode a
tricycle home. His wife noticed blood on his forehead so he explained that he was
stoned.
● November 25,1995 9pm: Lucrecio’s wife and daughter noticed that his complexion has
darkened and foamy substance was coming out of his mouth as he slept. They tried to
revive Lucrecio but failed.
● December 4, 1995: Lucrecio’s wife learned of the incident and requested the assistance of
the NBI. NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Vertido concluded that Lucrecio’s cause of
death was traumatic head injury
● October 1, 1996: He was charged with Homicide
● Ranio presented Joel Cabebe, the Assistant Registration Officer of Gonzaga, Cagayan,
and Dr. Corazon Flor, the Municipal Health Officer of Sta. Teresita, Cagayan, to prove
that Lucrecio died of a heart attack
● RTC: homicide
● CA: Affirmed
● Ranio argued that he should be liable only for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
due to the absence of intent to kill Lucrecio

ISSUE
Whether or not Ranio is guilty of homicide even if there is no intent

RULING
YES. petition is DENIED. AFFIRMED penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum with MODIFICATION
that petitioner is further ordered to pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
● When death resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just
physical injuries, since with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
 particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.
● Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
● Unlawful act - punching Lucrecio
● He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused

People of the Philippines v Marco

FACTS
• November 5, 1964 2:30 pm: It was raining and there was a fiesta being celebrated within
the vicinity of the marketplace of Barrio Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. Constancio
Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if he was the one who boxed the
latter's brother the previous year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had cigarettes
and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he
pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran away and Simeon chased
him. As Constancio was passing by Rafael Marco, father of Simeon, he struck Constancio with
a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and left shoulder.
• Vicente, the father of Constancio, who was in the crowd heard a shout of "Fight! Fight!".
He saw Simeon about to stab Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was holding
the knife. Then, Rafael Marco approached him armed with a cane and a hunting knife. Sensing
danger, Vicente shouted to Constancio and his other son Bienvenido, who appeared on the
scene, to run away. Vicente and Constancio was able to run away but Bienvenido was chased
and stabbed by Rafael which wounded his left hand. Bienvenido tried to run Vicente, but his
foot got caught in a vine on the ground and he fell. Out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who
was accused arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near his anus while he had his two hands touching
the floor and both feet in a forward position. Beltran was followed by Simeon who stabbed
Bienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left arm. Then, Rafael, Simeon and
Beltran ran away. Bienvenido got up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda
where he fell to the ground. Vicente asked him what happened and he said he was ganged up
then died.
• Criminal Case No. 2758: Rafael Marco was convicted of slight physical injuries and his
son, Simeon, was acquitted
• Criminal Case No, 2757: Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran, and Simeon Marco, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Sentenced Rafael Marco to reclusion perpetua. While, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco
who surrendered voluntarily sentenced EACH to an indeterminate penalty consisting of 10
YEARS and 1 DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS, and 1 DAY of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

ISSUE
Whether or not Rafael Marco should be guilty of murder

RULING
NO. modified Rafael Marco guilty of slight physical injuries
 While it is true that Rafael started by stabbing Bienvenido on the left hand, there is no clear
evidence connecting his act with those of Beltran and Simeon. If Rafael had any intention
to really kill Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and Beltran to do it.
 The stabbing by the 3 was not simultaneous. Rather, it was successive. The manner in
which the incident occurred indicates that there was no preconceived plan among the 3.
There is absolutely no showing that Rafael knew of the criminal intentions of Dulcisimo
Beltran or Simeon Marco as to the decedent. Neither is there any showing that after the
decedent was able to run away that Rafael shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco
for assistance. Or that he gave them any inciting or encouraging words, or that he even
joined them
 The accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design
entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal
design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is furthermore
necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should cooperate
with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime.
 The ensuing death was not the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wound
inflicted by Rafael. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other than the
sudden and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and Beltran.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby modified, and
in its stead appellant is found guilty only of slight physical injuries and hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor, and to pay the costs.

People of the Philippines v Villacorta

FACTS
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located at
C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja’s
store. At around two o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store,
Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s
body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body.
Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch
Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken
bamboo stick from Cruz’s body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When
Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center,
where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on
February 14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that
he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical chart
and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

RULING
There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have
indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound
he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the
stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.”
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January
23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus
infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present
evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center,
subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical
treatment of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.
There are doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta
for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date
when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection.
If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have
appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection
has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to
three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only
deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with
tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the
time of his death.
 However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.

E. Impossible Crimes

People of the Philippines v Domasian

FACTS
 March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso Ferreras, his classmate,
along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by Pablito
Domasian who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical
certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan,
where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico
became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man
told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at
Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from
where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed
him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a
tricycle headed for San Vicente. As Enrico was crying and being firmly held, Alexander
Grate, the tricycle driver became suspicious and asked Domasian about his relationship
with the boy who told him they were brothers. Their physical differences and the wide
gap between their ages made Grate doubt so he immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods
went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being
pursued, Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way
home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital
ambulance and already looking for him.
 At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of
Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting
in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the
note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination
 March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note
demanding P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed. . Agra thought the handwriting in
the note was familiar so he referred it to the NBI for examination and it turned out to be
Dr. Samson Tan’s signature.
  Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
o Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a
friend's house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of
his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila
 Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
 RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties.
 Appealed

ISSUE
Whether or not Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with serious illegal
detention

RULING
YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
 Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only in placing a person
in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
 Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was
an impossible crime which he says is not punishable.
 Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly applies to
him, thus:
o Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
o By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
 Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of
inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect
only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this
too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
 On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they
act through physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. These acts
were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the common
ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.
  The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached
him 6 days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra
said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra
could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.

We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each other, committed the
crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
so deserve the penalty imposed upon them by the trial court.

Intod v People of the Philippines

FACTS
 February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who
told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be
killed.
 February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired
at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
 RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE
Whether or not Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

RULING
YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. Court sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by
the law, and to pay the costs
• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
*Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
*Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be
held liable for any crime

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the

decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is
hereby MODIFIED. WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in
mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

People of the Philippines v Enoja

SYNOPSIS:
The five appellants here, all farmers and residents of Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo,
are related to each other. The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the
"New People's Army" (NPA). The provincial fiscal filed an nformation for murder against herein
appellants and their three companions who remained at-large. They were arraigned and entered
pleas of not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellants herein guilty as charged.
The trial court did not give credence to the claim of self-defense and found conspiracy in
committing the crime. The appellants filed this appeal before the Supreme Court.
In this case, circumstances indubitably showed that appellants acted concertedly to kill
Siegfred. Here, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding that conspiracy
was present in this case. Both the victim and the assailant knew each other and the victim gave
no provocation in the attack. Clearly the qualifying circumstance was present in this case. The
defense of alibi did not prosper when the appellants failed to prove the physical impossibility of
their presence at the crime scene at the time of its commission. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court was affirmed with modification that the award of actual damages was deleted.
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that even assuming they
participated in the killing of Siegfred, they should only be held liable for the commission of an
impossible crime under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59
thereof. Appellants theorize that the shots fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the
victim, and hence, their subsequent shooting of the victim merely constitutes the impossible crime
of killing an already dead person. The proposition not only completely contradicts their defense
of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is
irreconcilable with alibi.

ARTICLE 5, PH REVISED PENAL CODE

Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties - Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall
render the proper decision and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should
be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree
of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

A. Judges may not impose penalties in the alternative

Abellana v People of the Philippines

ARTICLE 6, PH REVISED PENAL CODE

Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies - Consummated felonies, as well as
those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
 There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

A. Attempted Stage

People of the Philippines v Lamahang

FACTS
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his
beat on Delgado and CR Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last
named street. At the time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another
from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under
custody.

RULING
There is no doubt in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu’s
store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he has started to make in the
wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the arrival of policeman Tomambing did not
develop beyond the first steps of execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing
penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is
necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the
cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the
offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of
execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically
and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in the case of robbery, in order that the
simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person’s dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly
intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the
accused may reasonably be inferred. The fact under consideration does not constitute attempted
robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling.
People of the Philippines v Lizada

FACTS
Accused-appellant was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape under four separate
Information for raping his stepdaughter.

ISSUE
Will Lizada be charged with attempted rape or act of lasciviousness
PRINCIPLES APPLIED
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of
accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private
complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable for consummated rape.
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of
consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or
attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph
of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on record, we believe that
accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.—Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness
upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding
article, shall be punished by prision correccional.”

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

“There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
RULING
In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of attempted
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to Article 6 of the said
Code and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from six years of prision correccional in
its maximum period, as minimum to ten years of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. Accused-appellant

Rivera v People of the Philippines

FACTS
The accused, all surnamed Rivera, attacked and assaulted one Ruben Rudil, hitting him
with a piece of hollow block while the latter went to a nearby store to buy food together with
his daughter. People who saw the incident called for them to stop. Policemen arrived in the
scene prompting the three accused to fled to their house. Ruben was rushed to the hospital
where the attending physician declared that the wounds sustained by Ruben were slight and
superficial and would heal in about 7 days. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of
attempted murder. Accused, now petitioners, aver that the prosecution had failed to prove that
they had intention to kill Ruben. They aver that based on the testimony of the attending
physician, the victim did not sustained a fatal wound.

RULING
As stated by the attending physician, appellants could have killed the victim had the
hollow block hit his head and had the police not promptly intervened. When a wound is not
sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was
shown by the fact that the three brothers helped each other maul the defenceless victim, and
even if he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them proceeded to hit the victim with a
hollow block had not the police arrived. The accused commenced of the felony directly by overt
acts, but failed to perform all acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder by
reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, Ruben Rodil was
able to run away and the timely response of the policemen. Furthermore, petitioners also draw
attention to the fact that the injury sustained by victim was superficial and thus not life
threatening. However, the nature of the injury does not negate the intent to kill. An essential
element of murder and homicide, whether, consummated, frustrated or attempted, is intent of
the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injury. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a
felony by dolo.

Araneta v Court of Appeals

FACTS
In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, 6th Judicial District
on May 14, 1973, Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute, herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y
Mendoza, also a petitioner, Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago were charged
with murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr. due to multiple gun shot wounds on
March 23, 1972.

ISSUE
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have inflicted only a slight
wound be held accountable for the death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-
accused?

PRINCIPLES APPLIED
The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight wound which did not
cause the death of the victim nor materially contributed to it in order that he may be held liable
for homicide. 18His liability should therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However,
the fact that petitioner Araneta Jr. inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to
kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other conclusion than that there is
intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for
slight physical injury.

RULING
Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any other
attendant circumstances, petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the penalty of imprisonment for ten
(10) months of prision correccional. Although, he is still guilty of attempted homicide.

Baleros v People of the Philippines

SYNOPSIS: About 1:50 in the morning of December 13, 1991 in Manila, the accused Renato
Baleros Jr., forcefully covered the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth
soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, and commenced the commission of rape by lying on
top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with he but was unable to perform all
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prehudice.
The petitioner argues, however, that the above mentioned information, does not allege the
complained act of covering the face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical
caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and disturbance.
HELD: Malice, compulsion, or restraint need not be alleged in an information for unjust
vexation. The paramount question (in a prosecution for unjust vexation) is whether the
offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the
person to whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident, cried while relating to her
classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for
attempted rape proved beyond reasonable doubt that she was disturbed, if not, distressed, by the
acts of the petitioner.

B. Frustrated Stage
People of the Philippines v Sy Pio

U.S. v Eduave

FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl, suddenly struck her from behind, in part at least,
with a sharp bolo. A deadly weapon was used. The motive of the crime was that the accused
was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before
the local officials with having raped her and causing her pregnancy.

HELD: The crime was frustrated, not attempted murder. A felony is frustrated when the
offender performs all acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence, but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. There is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause between the beginning of
the commission of the act and the moment when all the acts have been performed which would
result in the consummate crime. In other words, the subjective phase had been passed. In the
case at bar, the blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his
purpose to kill, thought he had killed and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself
up, he declared that he had killed the complainant. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of
the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence it was due to something beyond his control. In this case, he thought he already
killed the victim.

People of the Philippines v Dagman

FACTS: On the 2nd of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, was attacked by a crowed of persons and was
nearly killed. The motive of the crime was that the persons who harbored enmity against
Magbual had previously been dispossessed of portions of the land by judicial order. Magbual
managed to escape death from his tormentors by the use of feigning death.
HELD: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed all acts of
execution which should precede the felony as consequence but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the
playing possum by Magbual. There was an intent upon the part of the assailants to take the life
of the person attacked, which intent may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the
attack; in this instance, the nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused and their fingering of
the nose of Magbual to see if respiration continued. Deadly weapons were used, blows were
directed at the vital parts of the body, the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and thought they
had killed. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking, the
crime was complete. The particular parts of the body of the person struck during the assault, the
deadly character of the weapons used, the violence of the attack, and the accomplishment of the
crime with alevosia, classifies the crime as frustrated murder. And finally, the victim did not
die, was owing to a chance
C. Consummated Stage
D. Frustrated Theft

Valenzuela v People of the Philippines

FACTS: Petitioner was seen outside the Super Sale Club within the SM Complex by security
guard, Lorenzo Lago. Petitioner was seen unloading cased of Tide detergent with an
accomplice. Valenzuela then haled a taxi, loaded the detergent inside and boarded the same.
Lago proceeded to stop the taxi and asked for the receipt of the merchandise. Petitioner and
accomplice was about to flee when Largo fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security
guards. Valenzuela and accomplice was then apprehended at the scene. The trial convicted the
two with consummated theft. Only Valenzuela appealed to the CA asserting that he should only
be convicted of frustrated theft. CA affirmed decision of the trial court hence the present
petition.

HELD: Valenzuela invoked the Diño and Flores cases. In both cases, the accused were
convicted of frustrated theft, of which it was held “the fact determinative of consummation is
the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less
momentary. Under Article 308 of the RPC, “Theft is committed by any person who, with intent
to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons not force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter’s consent. Reading the Diño and Flores cases, the
ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the
crime of theft defined under Article 308 of the RPC. In the present case, for the purpose of
ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is,
when is the crime of theft produced? Theft is produced when there is the deprivation of personal
property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all acts of
execution for theft, is able to unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. Unlawful
taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing even if
he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Hence, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, it can
only be consummated or attempted.

E. Frustrated or Attempted Homicide

Colinares v People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years
and four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor,
as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained
the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to
the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case
the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable, which was
strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law, no application
for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of
conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide
and not of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court
RULING:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his
case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in
this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable
for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can
apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC
with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.

Roque v People of the Philippines