BP 22 Research
BP 22 Research
BP 22 Research
https://tiongcosiaobellolaw.com/2017/05/01/bp-22-defanged/
Numerous BP 22 cases have been dismissed and/ or have resulted in the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish that the accused had actually
received a notice of dishonor. In order to appreciate the impact of this development, we
must realize how difficult it really is to prove actual receipt of the notice of dishonor.
First, the prosecution in a BP 22 case must establish that (a) notice of dishonor was sent to
the issuer of the dishonored check and (b) that the same was actually received (Yu Oh v.
Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 125297, 6 June 2003). A notice of dishonor may be sent to
the maker or drawer of the dishonored check by (1) by personal service upon the issuer or
(2) by registered mail. If the notice of dishonor is sent by registered mail, the fact of sending
the notice of dishonor is established by the registry receipt, the registry return card, and an
affidavit executed by the person who mailed the notice of dishonor detailing the
circumstances of the mailing (Victor Ting “Teng See”, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 140665, 13 November 2000).
As to establishing actual receipt, the prosecution must also prove that the signature
appearing on the registry return card or notice of dishonor, in case of personal service,
belongs to that of the issuer of the dishonored check or, at the very least, to his duly
authorized agent. In the latter case, the prosecution must establish the capacity and
authority of such person as agent. An illegible signature, such as when a recipient merely
signs his/ her initials on the registry return card or notice of dishonor, as the case may be,
does not prove that the issuer actually received the notice of dishonor (Victor Ting “Teng
See”, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 140665, 13 November 2000). It is also
crucial that the registry return card or the notice of dishonor indicate the date it was received
in order to fix the start of the five (5) day period within which the maker or drawer of the
check must pay or make arrangements for the payment of the amount of the check (Section
1, BP 22)(Danao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122353, 6 June 2001).
The notice of dishonor may be sent to the office of the maker or drawer of the dishonored
check but he must receive the notice personally or through his authorized agent. A
corporation or an officer of a corporation that receives a notice of dishonor addressed to
one of its employees has no obligation to forward the notice to the employee concerned.
Thus, such receipt is not the receipt contemplated by BP 22 (Lao v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119178, 20 June 1997). A notice of dishonor may also be sent to the residence of the
maker or drawer of the dishonored check and received by him/her, the housemaids or
houseboys who are deemed to have a special power-of-attorney to receive mail in behalf of
the addressee, or any member of the family of sufficient age or discretion (Petilla v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 150792, 3 March 2004). Notably, the notice of dishonor may be sent to,
and received by, the maker or drawer of the dishonored check wherever he may be found
as long as the fact and date of receipt are established.
On Jurisdiction
Our ruling in Morillo v. People29 is instructive as to where violations of B.P. Blg. 22 should be filed
and tried:
It is well-settled that violations of B.P. [Blg.] 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein
any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus,
a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the
place of deposit and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place
where the check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as
the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Big. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such
conclusion.
In said case, the accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and in payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter,
Rural Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason
that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the
repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of
B.P. Big. 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in San Juan are triable. The
accused, however, contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had
been offered to show that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and
held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch,
evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San
Juan, viz.:
Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case
since no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge
of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
x x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of
San Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February
16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch,
Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can
be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x
https://www.coursehero.com/file/pg7m9sd/B-DEFENSES-IN-BP-22-WHAT-ARE-THE-POSSIBLE-
DEFENSES-IN-BP-22-1-The-presentation/
JURISDICTION
http://brillanteslaw.blogspot.com/2013/06/lack-of-criminal-jurisdiction-in-bp-22.html
Said municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred fixes not only the venue of the criminal case but also its
jurisdiction. This if for the reason that in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional as the court
has no jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside its territorial jurisdiction (People
vs. Mercado, 65 PHIL 665).
1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment (Ting vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 551).
It is evident that the elements of said offense do not take place simultaneously but
one after the other. It may occur then that the making, drawing and issuance of a check
takes place in one municipality or territory while the dishonor thereof in another. Hence,
it may be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where it was made,
drawn and issued or where it was dishonored. Otherwise said, it is only courts of either
municipality or territory (place of issuance or place of dishonor), and no other which can
validly exercise jurisdiction and thus hear and decide cases involving said cases.
While it is clear based on the checks themselves that they were dishonored in
Tuguegarao, the drawee bank being China Banking Corporation, Tuguegarao Branch,
there is no allegation or proof whatsoever based on Private Complainant’s Complaint-
Affidavit and its supporting documents, where it was made drawn, and issued to herein
Accused.
The truth of the matter as Accused has declared and clearly shown in his Counter-
Affidavit is that she issued and delivered the subject checks to Private Complainant in his
place of residence which is Iguig, Cagayan.
Most evidently, contrary to the very spirit and purpose of the rule on venue,
Private Complainant, for her own convenience and advantage and to the great
inconvenience and disadvantage of Accused, filed her criminal complaint against the
latter in Cabanatuan City, for no other reason than that being her place of residence.
Having not alleged or shown that the alleged offenses or any ingredient thereof, were
committed in Cabanatuan City, the Honorable Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan City, has absolutely no basis whatsoever to file the instant Information in
Cabanatuan City. It has no legal authority whatsoever to falsely and arbitrarily allege in
said information that the said offenses were committed within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court.
Clearly, Private Complainant, who has the burden of showing that herein cases
are within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, has miserably failed to do so. The
Honorable Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City should have summarily
dismissed her said criminal complaints.
On the contrary, herein Accused has attested and shown through his Counter-Affidavit and supporting
documents, that in fact, she issued the subject checks in Iguig, Cagayan. Clearly then, all the acts which are essential
to the offense of which Accused has been charged of, took place in the province of Cagayan. Hence, the Honorable
Court has not jurisdiction whatsoever to try and hear the instant cases. They should therefore be quashed.
Thus, even without this motion to quash, the Honorable Court on its own, may
order the dismissal of the instant cases, if upon consideration of the complaint or
information together with the affidavits submitted by both parties, it finds no cause or
ground to hold the Accused for trial. There is absolutely nothing in the affidavits submitted
by both parties, which will establish any cause or ground for the Honorable Court to
acquire jurisdiction over the instant cases. Most certainly then, there is likewise no cause
or ground for the Honorable Court to hold the Accused for trial.