LOURDES L.

DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE
DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:

Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter
died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special
proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes

Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and
testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors
Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be
liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government.1

Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took
care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon
denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period
granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of
judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued
by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed
several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's,
private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
names. Petitioner opposed the motion.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory
Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1,
1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two
assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.

Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents
before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be
said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise
assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which
declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.

Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to
maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties. 3 Private respondents opposed
the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the
late Alejandro.

The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has
attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is
well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do
so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a
final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4

It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial
court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and
the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same
proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the
testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the will
conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. 6

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to
be probated,7 particularly on three aspects:

n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's

last will and testament;

n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the

execution of wills;

8
n the testamentary capacity of the testator;

n and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under
duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of
the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the
will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court
which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final
and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals
must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law
constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved
by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of which
the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein.

Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are
not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res
judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise
those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be
remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely
by some other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse
should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.

Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by
the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the
shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from
one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in
the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three
legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted that
in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to
the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and
not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy
is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No
intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic
and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic
validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether
the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled
that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the
rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.

Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late
spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or
properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns
the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.

Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not
married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado,
CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and
HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division
(Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.

Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.

Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the First Civil Cases Division of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament 3 with codicil4 of
the late Brigido Alvarado.

On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin"
wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz,
Laguna.

As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were
present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of
the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading
with their own respective copies previously furnished them.

Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the
29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na
Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed
changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido
was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in
the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was
private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental
witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their
own copies.

A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January
1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of
Siniloan, Laguna.5Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to
be probated was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise
mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will
was executed under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's
estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.

When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate
Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust
of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling
Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the
Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have
been denied.

On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that
Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his
blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents
were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public
following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded
that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of
making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.

The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the
time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said
article complied with?

Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind
at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting
fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years
and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist on
14 December 1977.

The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator
under Art. 808 which reads:

Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged.

Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed,
he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand,
petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director
of the Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute), 6 the contents of which were
interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private
respondent.7 Dr. Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he
could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first
consultation.8

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could
still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor
eyesight."9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art.
808 need not be complied with.

We agree with petitioner in this respect.

Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time
his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido
did not do so because of his "poor," 10 "defective," 11 or "blurred"12 vision making it necessary for private
respondent to do the actual reading for him.

The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope of the term
"blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:
 The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes . . .

Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one
reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of
reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his
"poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido
Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were
read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did
so confortably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate,
it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.

Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by
one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document
before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental
witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil
who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.

Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading
suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or
compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness
read the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been
disallowed.

We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.

This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be
so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the
testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then
did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege,
that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first
time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted
testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in
accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the
testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft. 15

Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise
read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr.
Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the
testator whether the contents of the document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the
affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed
were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents. This is especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were
persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C.
Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.

The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance
with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
account, may only defeat the testator's will. 17

As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance
by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail
the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be
disregarded(emphasis supplied).

Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin"
and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal
requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been
rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated
testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial
compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated
11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this
decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.